[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
SECURING AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: THE TARGET OF TERRORISTS,
AND TSA'S NEW DIRECTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-81
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Pete Olson, Texas
Laura Richardson, California Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Tom Graves, Georgia
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Steve Austria, Ohio
James A. Himes, Connecticut Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Dina Titus, Nevada Officio)
Vacancy
Vacancy
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Thomas McDaniels, Staff Director (Interim)
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Joseph Vealencis, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
For The Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection:
Statement of the National Treasury Employees Union............. 3
Appendix
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for John S.
Pistole........................................................ 29
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus of Nevada for John S. Pistole 40
SECURING AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: THE TARGET OF TERRORISTS,
AND TSA'S NEW DIRECTION
----------
Thursday, September 23, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Titus,
Thompson, Dent, and Olson.
Also present: Representative Al Green of Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come
to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Securing America's Transportation System: The Target of
Terrorists, and TSA's New Direction.''
Our witness today will testify about his plans and
objectives for positioning TSA to meet the challenge of
securing the Nation's transportation systems against terrorist
attacks. This hearing will also provide Members of the
subcommittee with an opportunity to communicate their
priorities and concerns about the TSA programs and policies to
administrator.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
We are here today to discuss critical programs and policies
designed to protect our Nation's transportation systems from
terrorist attacks, and to welcome to the subcommittee the new
transportation security administrator, John Pistole.
Mr. Pistole, we welcome you for many reasons, because this
is an important assignment. Secondarily, we want to applaud you
for committing your life to the service of the American people,
for the years that you have served in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the years of commitment to the security of
this Nation.
With responsibility for ensuring the security of the
Nation's airports, railways, roadways, transit systems, and
pipelines, TSA's mission is critical and immense. Administrator
Pistole comes to TSA in the wake of several events that have
demonstrated to the American public and to Congress that the
terrorist threat to transportation systems is persistent and
evolving, and particularly so because terrorism has franchised.
Unfortunately, terrorists seem to be lacking in creativity and
seek to utilize the same targets to create the greatest havoc.
Marching through this decade since the 9/11 attacks in
2001, we have seen attacks on rail systems in Madrid, London,
Mumbai, Moscow; the plot to destroy several commercial aircraft
simultaneously over the Atlantic; the plot to attack the New
York City subway system; and the attempted attack to destroy
Northwest Airlines Flight 253 in the skies over Detroit on
Christmas day of last year; the scare of last year that
occurred at the Newark airport, where the airport was shut down
because of a belief that someone had entered incorrectly; and,
certainly, the unfortunate circumstances that occurred at
Newark airport again in the last couple of days.
Then, of course, with respect to the transit systems, Mr.
Administrator, you are aware of H.R. 2200, which, with the
leadership of Chairman Thompson and this subcommittee, we have
passed an immensely constructive legislative initiative that
now sits in the United States Senate. We recognize the crisis
of which we are involved in.
You need not be a security expert to understand that our
transportation systems are indeed the targets of attack. How do
we remain vigilant? How do we continue to meet the very real
and significant challenges of protecting our transportation
systems, which are critical to our economy and essential to our
way of life?
Today, the administrator will share with us his views and
vision for accomplishing the mission.
Let me start the discussion by laying this framework: We
are a Nation of people who thrive on independence and deeply
value personal liberty and personal privacy, justice, and
equality. We are also a Nation that has been attacked and
plotted against by terrorists wishing to end the American way
of life.
Mr. Pistole, while we were waiting for the confirmation of
a TSA administrator during most of this Congress, this
subcommittee has not been idle in its oversight of
transportation security issues. The subcommittee has conducted
rigorous oversight hearings on security programs for air cargo,
aviation repair stations, general aviation, passenger
checkpoints, surface transportation inspectors, and the
Registered Traveler program.
The full committee held an important hearing on the Flight
253 Christmas day attempted bombing. Of course, the committee
reported and the House passed H.R. 2200, the TSA Authorization
Act.
We have looked closely at the air marshals and determined
that additional scrutiny and support is very much needed. In
H.R. 2200, Congress gave direction to TSA on important security
matters, including general aviation, security grants,
codification of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee,
improvements to the Federal Air Marshals Service, and the
Federal Flight Deck Officers Program, and a realignment of
surface transportation programs which have been underfunded and
have lacked priority positioning within the TSA.
While the Senate did not act on this important legislation,
we will certainly seek your input in crafting a new
authorization bill in the next Congress.
Let me just add that we have seen over the years since 9/11
the enhancement of the sensitivity of the traveling public,
particularly as it relates to aviation. One maybe less
publicized incident occurred that was told to me by a bystander
on the street, how they wrestled to the ground an individual on
an airplane headed to Las Vegas who was banging on the pilot's
door and seeking to escape. That may have not been a terrorist
intention, but, certainly, it would have been a frightening and
devastating act if that individual had been able to open the
air door, as they were attempting to do, which speaks to the
importance of aviation issues as well as the importance of air
marshals.
In addition to security programs, the new administrator
also has to address workforce issues. Questions have been
raised about TSA's training programs for transportation
security officers, and morale among the TSA workforce is among
the lowest in the Federal Government. With new deployed
technology and screening procedures, training, and workforce
morale issues are more important than ever and form the crux of
implementing an effective security program for our
transportation systems.
On the international front, the administrator and the
Secretary of Homeland Security are our negotiators in
developing stronger security measures at airports throughout
the world. Aviation, in particular, is a global, interconnected
system. Securing the weakest link, wherever it may be, will
help to make the whole system more secure. I understand the
administrator and Secretary will be in Montreal next week
working on these international aviation security efforts, and
we strongly support the effort.
Mr. Administrator, your charge is significant, but this
subcommittee stands ready to work with you to improve security
throughout every mode of transportation.
In closing, I do want you to know that we thank you again
for your long career of Federal service. As a Judiciary
Committee member, I know for sure the work that you have done
at the FBI, and we have now been reacquainted again in your new
capacity. I welcome you to the subcommittee and look forward to
your testimony and our discussion.
At this time, without objection, I would like to enter into
the record a statement from the National Treasury Employees
Union.
Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the National Treasury Employees Union
September 23, 2010
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for allowing me to offer a statement at
today's important hearing about the Transportation Security
Administration. As National President of the National Treasury
Employees Union, I represent several thousand Transportation Security
Administration Officers at TSA. The problems that were anticipated when
TSA was created in a hurry after 9/11 have now become more apparent and
more troubling. The employees have little or no voice in how things
happen at TSA, and too often intimidation is used as a management
technique. We hope that the administration will change this situation
by granting collective bargaining rights by directive in the very near
future. In addition, we look forward to passage of H.R. 1881, co-
sponsored by you and Rep. Lowey and Chairman Thompson, for a permanent
change to full Title 5 protections for our TSA Officers.
There are six areas that we believe need immediate attention:
Collective Bargaining.--A workforce that is engaged and feels
valued is in everyone's best interest. NTEU's No. 1 priority is in
achieving collective bargaining rights for TSA Officers. There have
been so many misconceptions of what collective bargaining would mean at
TSA, that I feel I should address the topic. Chapter 71 of Title 5 of
the U.S. Code sets out a detailed system for Federal employee labor-
management relations. The system is designed so that the business of
the Federal Government can carry on with as little disruption as
possible when there is a dispute. Strikes are expressly forbidden by
statute. A union that has anything to do with even suggesting a strike
is not allowed to represent Government workers. Management retains the
right to hire, assign, lay off, retain, promote, suspend, and/or remove
employees. These are excluded from collective bargaining. Management
has the right to unilaterally determine what qualifications are
required for any assignment.
Federal labor relations are set up so that the mission of every
agency is of paramount importance. Employees can bargain about the
procedures an agency uses, but it cannot bargain about the mission.
Chapter 71 specifically states that management has the right to take
whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission
during emergencies.
Customs and Border Protection Officers have had collective
bargaining rights for 30 years, and work in the same airports as TSA
employees, doing similar work, without ever weakening National
security. In addition, private sector employees that currently provide
screening functions at several U.S. airports have retained broader
private sector collective bargaining rights since before the creation
of TSA.
NTEU recently conducted a survey of TSA Officers which found that
85 percent of TSA employees believe that collective bargaining rights
would improve the effectiveness of TSA. Collective bargaining would
give TSA Officers a voice in their workplace and allow them to work
jointly with TSA leadership to devise uniform, fair, and transparent
personnel procedures that will improve overall job satisfaction and
morale of the workforce. Collective bargaining would provide TSA with a
tested and well-defined process for ensuring fair treatment, addressing
issues with appraisals, evaluations, testing and pay, provide for a
fair and transparent scheduling process, and give employees a hand in
improving workplace safety.
Pay.--The pay system at TSA, the Performance Accountability and
Standards System (PASS) must be eliminated. Every year, when the PASS
payouts have been distributed, my office is flooded with calls from TSA
Officers who are surprised and confused about how their ratings were
determined and demoralized by the arbitrary nature of the payments. In
addition, since most of the workforce has very low base salaries, the
``merit'' increases are insignificant. The yearly certification test,
upon which part of PASS is based, fails to measure an officer's true
on-the-job performance and skills and needs to be completely rethought.
We believe that TSOs should be under the same General Schedule system
as most other Federal employees.
A significant part of the PASS rating is based on the Practical
Skills Evaluations (PSE) testing. The problems with the PSE testing are
myriad and on-going. Officers are generally told whether they passed or
failed, but they typically are not told why. First time failure rates
are high--70 to 80 percent at many locations--yet almost everyone
passes the second time. This leads to the conclusion that PSEs are not
designed to test skills at all (at least not the first time), but to
reduce PASS payouts because the first-time failures negatively impact
the overall year-end PASS score, which determines bonuses. Many
officers report that they have failed PSEs, when they have followed the
pat-down, or baggage search protocol that they been taught and used for
years. Most importantly, officers believe that the PSE tests do not
accurately reflect the real-life conditions and therefore are not an
accurate assessment of their skills and knowledge.
Training.--TSA must standardize and improve training and
remediation efforts. Given the importance of their jobs, it is hard to
believe that the training system at TSA is as haphazard as it is. Most
of the training is on-line, without benefit of the experience of a more
senior officer. Often, the training center is far from the actual
workplace, and training often happens on the employee's own time.
Training and testing on image recognition do not reflect real-life
conditions, rendering it ineffective and sometimes useless.
When tests are done in baggage screening, the results are not
shared with the testees. They may be told they have flunked, but they
are not told why, or what they missed, or how to do a better job the
next time. Before the annual recertification tests, (the PSEs), there
is always a rush to train. Again, the training is often inadequate.
Standard Operating Procedure at one airport is not the same as at
another. During the last round of PSEs, there were many arguments about
whether a person had passed the test or not. TSA should be providing
clear guidance and assistance to help its employees improve
performance.
Leave.--At TSA, if an employee takes sick leave or leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), even if the reason is
unquestionably legitimate and approved by his or her supervisor, it is
deemed an ``occurrence''. Occurrences count against your PASS score,
and too many occurrences result in leave restriction.
Although FMLA is a National law, at TSA, interpretation of the law
depends on who is in charge. Some Federal Security Directors make sure
the law is followed. Some do not appear to understand the law at all.
NTEU had to teach local managers about FMLA, but new problems continue
to crop up. In some airports now, TSA Officers are routinely put on
leave restriction if they are taking FMLA. We are working to overturn
these decisions. Another new wrinkle is that TSA Officers who have been
on FMLA are being forced to undergo new background checks in order to
return to duty. We believe this is against the law and are trying to
find out if this is a TSA directive or one of the many byzantine rules
implemented by local airport TSA personnel.
Worker's Comp.--At TSA, managers and supervisors have found that
the best way to reduce injuries is to stop the employees from reporting
them. The situation is so bad that NTEU has issued a paper on Workers
Compensation for TSA Officers that starts out, ``Do not let anyone in
supervision talk you out of filing (the initial form). It is not
discretionary on their part''. Statements of injury are often
questioned, and in many airports, the person who reports an injury is
treated as a pariah. In some cases, TSA Officers continue to ``work
hurt'' because a TSO who is injured on the job is often told to just
find another job. There are even reports that contacting OSHA with a
safety concern can result in a suspension or demotion.
Labor-Management Relations.--The recent dismal showing of TSA in
the ``Best Places to Work'' survey serves as a confirmation of what I
have heard from my members about conditions at TSA. Out of 224
agencies, TSA ranks 220--almost at the bottom. Very low scores for
effective leadership and a family-friendly culture emphasize that major
changes need to take place at TSA. Employees' perceptions are that
senior leaders (FSDs, AFSDs, and Security Managers) misuse their
authority, exercise it inconsistently, and show little regard for
employees' ideas about how to do the work better. There is also a sense
that work rules are too rigid, not taking into account personal
emergencies or other circumstances beyond an employee's control.
The good part of the ``Best Places'' survey is that it shows that
TSA Officers believe in their mission and love what they do. Many TSA
Officers came to the agency after 9/11, instilled with a passion to
keep our Nation safe. They go to work every day wanting to contribute
to our security. We welcome Mr. Pistole to TSA and hope that we can
work together to make the agency better. No organization would be
happier than NTEU to find that, in next year's survey, TSA is in the
top 10 in The Best Places to Work.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Without objection, upon his arrival--and
he has arrived--the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, a Member
of the full committee, is authorized to sit for the purpose of
questioning witnesses during the hearing today.
Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
Let me acknowledge the presence of Mr. Green; our Chairman
of the full committee, Mr. Thompson; and a Member of the
minority, Mr. Olson from Texas, who are present here today.
The Chairwoman will now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Dent. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman and Members of
the subcommittee, and to our distinguished guest today,
Assistant Secretary John Pistole.
Before I begin, I would like to thank Chairwoman Jackson
Lee for scheduling this hearing today. This is an important
one. Our subcommittee undertook a vigorous schedule in the
111th Congress, and, much like the TSA, we have a great deal of
accomplishments but also a great deal of work that has yet to
be addressed. I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to have
Assistant Secretary Pistole testifying before our subcommittee
today.
This is Assistant Secretary Pistole's first visit before
this subcommittee during open testimony. However, this is not
his first visit before the committee, we should note for the
record. In his previous role as deputy director of the FBI, he
would occasionally brief the committee regarding on-going
terrorist threats to the homeland.
Hopefully, your testimony today will be slightly more
uplifting.
The TSA is an agency with vital importance to the security
of our Nation, and it languished without leadership for far too
long as the administration struggled to find a nominee who the
Senate would confirm. Despite that delay, the nomination of
Assistant Secretary Pistole thankfully brought a candidate with
the valuable law enforcement, counterterrorism, and leadership
experience necessary to lead the TSA.
Mr. Pistole spent 27 years with the FBI, rising from the
position of special agent to become the FBI's deputy director.
Furthermore, he gained first-hand experience in the operation
and management of a large agency with thousands of employees
responsible for a complex set of missions that continually
required outreach to State and local officials as well as the
private sector.
As the Ranking Member of this subcommittee, you know, I
welcome your testimony here today. We have a plethora of issues
to address, but I believe that we can only be successful if TSA
and this committee continue to work in a close partnership that
relies upon regular and strong communication. As the senior
Republican on this subcommittee, I can assure you that we will
work with TSA in a constructive and positive manner. We will
provide strong oversight of your activities, but I commit to
you that we will always be fair, open, and honest.
In the field of aviation security, TSA has accomplished a
great deal of progress but much work remains. We still endeavor
to find the mix of technology, intelligence, and manpower that
will provide optimal security, while respecting privacy and
civil liberties.
I have been and continue to be a strong supporter of the
Advanced Imaging Technology, AIT, systems. These systems, as
you know, give screeners the opportunity to identify non-
metallic threats concealed on a person. The terrorists are
finding new and interesting ways to get around our security
infrastructure, and we need to adapt our technology and our
process accordingly.
However, regardless of what technology we use or what
processes we mandate, much of our security solutions still
require a dedicated workforce and a strong public-private
partnership. All of these individuals must be just as committed
as our TSA checkpoint personnel in protecting our traveling
public.
With surface transportation, it seems that the work is
really just beginning. Securing surface transportation systems
will provide a daunting task, given the enormity of freely
accessible infrastructure inherent to those systems.
Additionally, there are a significant number of overdue
regulations that TSA was supposed to issue since the Congress
passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007. These include regulations requiring railroad
carrier vulnerability assessments, security plans, training
programs, as well as public transportation and over-the-road
bus security training programs. Some of these regulations are
more than 3 years overdue, so we would like to work with you to
see what TSA needs to finish them in a timely manner.
There is also a great deal of work to be accomplished
between TSA and this committee on the Transportation Security
Grant Program. The TSA contemplates fundamental alterations in
the manner of the TSGP and evaluate risk. So let's make sure
that you are aware of the concerns that we hear regularly from
our constituents, many of who operate the most vital
infrastructure in the United States. So, as we approach the
next grant cycle, it is my hope that we can strengthen
cooperation between the committee and TSA and avoid many of the
pitfalls to which we have fallen prey in past years.
So, Madam Chairwoman, we have a lot to cover today, and we
will continue to have a full agenda going forward in the 112th
Congress, so cooperation is the key. The more we act in
partnership with TSA and are made aware of the programmatic
issues, the more we can do to make TSA successful.
Again, Madam Chairwoman, thanks for holding this important
hearing, and I will yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Ranking Member for his
thoughtful statement.
I want to acknowledge the presence of Mr. DeFazio of
Oregon.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. I would like to first
thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, for holding this important
hearing.
I also want to congratulate and thank Mr. Pistole for his
willingness to lead one of the most important agencies in our
Government.
Although TSA has only been in existence for less than 10
years, its impact on the worldwide traveling public,
particularly here in the United States, cannot be understated.
TSA's mission makes it one of the most critically challenging
agencies to lead.
I am confident that you can lead the agency effectively,
and I look forward to working to improve it in any way.
One of the things I want to talk about is, since the start
of this Congress, as you know, this subcommittee has held
several hearings addressing transportation security issues. We
have encouraged TSA to devote more attention and resources to
surface transportation security, the implementation of cargo
screening programs, and the efficient development and
deployment of checkpoint technologies. As a result, we have
learned valuable information from TSA and stakeholders
regarding successful programs and the need to improve others.
We have also had many conversations about TSA's need to
work collaboratively with other agencies and stakeholders. I
hope you will continue to strengthen the agency's relationships
with stakeholders.
One of my chief concerns with TSA has been the need to
update security checkpoints with adequate technology and
enhanced processes that afford greater security and efficient
passenger throughput. The deployment of technology must be done
with thorough consultation.
Last March, this committee requested that TSA submit an AIT
deployment plan for this year, and I understand that we just
received it this morning. But better late than never. But from
March until almost October is too long.
Because of this, it appears that TSA has deployed AIT to
airports on an ad-hoc basis, without considering threat or
risk-based approach. Because if you don't have a plan, the
experience that we have seen as a committee, if there is an
airport with available space, they get a machine. Now, that
might not be threat- or risk-based, but they have the space. We
don't think it should be like that.
I will say, we will look at the plan, Mr. Assistant
Secretary, and the plan might not have that. But in the absence
of a plan to roll out AIT, that is probably what we have been
getting.
With regard to TSOs, TSA must empower its workforce and
find ways to improve morale across the agency. The TSA
workforce has endured unfavorable working conditions for too
long. This has led to low morale, a lack of trust between them
and supervisors and agency officials.
One of the things I would ask that you look at, Mr.
Secretary, is how you pay your TSOs. They absolutely hate that
system of pay. Their comment to me most of the time is, ``Why
can't we get paid on the GS system like every other Federal
employee?'' Then they say, ``You are the Congressman. We are
looking to you to answer.'' Well, I say, you are the assistant
secretary; you run the agency. We want you to help us with that
answer.
Those employees deserve a better system of pay. Not pay,
but they need to know what to expect, as men and women who are
doing a good job. I am eager to work with you to find a
solution that will empower our TSA workforce and provide them
with the best available training and workforce development.
But I would be remiss if I only mentioned the problems at
TSA and not the successes. First Observer--a good program. The
motor carriers and others who are involved in it think the
world of it. So you are to be congratulated, as an agency, for
putting that together.
This office has played a critical role also, the Office of
Global Strategies, particularly after the attack of December
25. We are only as good as our foreign neighbors are. You know
that. They are doing a good job.
So, all in all, we want to welcome you to TSA, and we look
forward to working with you in the future.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman for his constructive
remarks.
It is now time to welcome the witness for what,
Administrator Pistole, will probably be frequent visits,
because it is key that we interact and perform our obligations
and responsibility of oversight.
Before I introduce you, other Members of the subcommittee
are reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements
may be submitted for the record.
As TSA administrator, John S. Pistole oversees management
of a 60,000-person workforce, the security operations of more
than 450 Federalized airports throughout the United States, the
Federal Air Marshals Service, and the security for highways,
railroads, ports, mass transit systems, and pipelines.
Administrator Pistole came to TSA as a 26-year veteran of
the FBI, with extensive National security and counterterrorism
experience. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, he
was put in charge of the FBI's greatly expanded
counterterrorism program, eventually becoming the FBI's
executive assistant director for counterterrorism and
counterintelligence. In 2004, Mr. Pistole was named deputy
director for the FBI.
As noted by the Ranking Member, Mr. Pistole has been before
this committee on a number of occasions, explaining,
unfortunately, incidents that have occurred since 2001 that
evidence that our vigilance in securing the homeland should be
without comparison.
Without objection, the witness's full statement will be
inserted in the record.
We welcome you, Administrator Pistole. Please summarize
your statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Pistole. Well, good afternoon, and thank you, Madam
Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Dent, and distinguished Members of the committee. It is an
honor to be here for the first time for this hearing as the
administrator of TSA, and I appreciate your kind words. I look
forward to deepening the relationship between the committee and
TSA and pledge my cooperation in doing that.
I would like to share some of my thoughts about how I see
the need to sharpen TSA's counterterrorism focus and supporting
the 60,000-member workforce. These goals support my efforts to
lead TSA to the next level of its development by using
intelligence-driven security solutions.
As we know, we just earlier this month commemorated the
ninth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It really is a
constant reminder for the men and women of TSA as to what their
mission is all about.
A key lesson I took from that day and from my career at the
FBI is that one of the best tools to combat terrorism is
accurate and timely intelligence. So my day and that of the
senior leadership team at TSA begins with an intelligence
briefing. We are continually honing our counterterrorism focus
by working with our law enforcement and intelligence community
partners to better operationalize that intelligence. We do that
through a number of different ways, including the watchlisting
and the Secure Flight program, which I will be glad to take
questions about.
The best intelligence, though, is that which is shared with
the rank and file--the TSOs, the Federal air marshals, the
explosive specialists, and behavior detection officers--to help
terrorists from harming the traveling public. So a greater
number of these front-line employees will now have a Secret
security clearance. In fact, it was just approved where we will
be going to 10,000 TSA employees that will have a Secret
security clearance, to push that intelligence to as many people
as possible.
We are also encouraging our citizens across the country to
be vigilant. The Secretary and I recently announced expansion
of the ``If You See Something, Say Something'' campaign
designed to raise public awareness of all types of illegal
activity but particularly focused on terrorism.
We continue to reach out to our foreign partners, as was
mentioned, to strengthen the global aviation system. It was
noted, we will both be in Montreal next week for the
International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly in Montreal,
where 190 member-states will be participating, in an effort to
shore up our civil aviation defenses and efforts.
As we continue to use our intelligence, we need to be
informed by the latest technology. I want to make sure that we
are not using yesterday's technology or even today's technology
to address yesterday's threats. We need to be mindful of those
threats, but we also need to try to anticipate, with the best
intelligence, what the next terrorist attack may look like and
how we can use our intelligence in forming the technology and
our tactics in training and techniques to do the best possible
job.
We have now deployed 224 AIT machines to 56 airports around
the country. Our goal is to have nearly 1,000 AIT machines
deployed by the end of next year. We are working to enhance the
efficiency of using AIT, particularly the training aspects, and
working to address all the concerns that have been raised,
whether that is privacy or safety.
So, any intelligence-driven agency must use that best
technology to accomplish its mission. There are a number of
initiatives that I will be glad to talk about in more detail.
As I engage the workforce, I have done a number of town-halls
around the country to hear from the workforce. I have asked
them two questions: What is working well to make TSA a good
place to work? What are the barriers to keep TSA from being a
great place to work?
So, with that, I have done one other thing that I will
announce, and that is the creation or the establishing of an
Office of Professional Responsibility. One of the things I have
heard from the TSOs and FAMs is the apparent subjectivity of
the disciplinary process within TSA. So I am establishing this
Office of Professional Responsibility, which will adjudicate
significant disciplinary actions taken with respect to all
employees.
So, again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
the subcommittee today to speak with you about TSA's on-going
efforts to ensure the safety and security of the transportation
domain. I look forward to taking your questions.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
[The statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
September 23, 2010
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to appear
before you and this subcommittee for the first time since my
confirmation as the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
Madame Chairwoman, I appreciate the time I spent with you in Houston
and I look forward to deepening the partnership between TSA and this
committee as we work together to improve transportation security.
Today I want to share some thoughts with you about improving TSA's
counterterrorism focus through intelligence and cutting-edge
technology, and supporting TSA's 60,000-member workforce. These goals
support my efforts to lead TSA through the next stage of its
development as it matures into a truly high-performance, world-class
organization that facilitates travel by using smart, intelligence-
driven security solutions that do not compromise the safety, privacy,
or civil liberties of the American people.
intelligence-based counterterrorism
Earlier this month, we commemorated the ninth anniversary of the 9/
11 terrorist attacks and the devastation they wrought in New York City,
at the Pentagon, and due to the brave intervention of passengers, a
field in Pennsylvania. The memory of that day is seared into our
psyches, and is a constant, somber reminder that we must be ever
vigilant against those who would attack our freedoms, our economy, and
our way of life, and who would disrupt our Nation's transportation
system.
A key lesson I took from that day and from my 27 years at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is that one of the best tools we
possess in our effort to combat terrorism is accurate and timely
intelligence. It is with this in mind that I begin my day at TSA with
an intelligence briefing with my senior staff--we are constantly honing
our counterterrorism focus by working with DHS and our Federal partners
to better operationalize this intelligence.
For example, through better watchlisting capabilities and the
implementation of our Secure Flight program, we continue to improve our
efforts to prevent terrorists from boarding flights. Under Secure
Flight, TSA uses name, date of birth, and gender to vet airline
passengers against terrorist watch lists before those passengers are
permitted to board planes. Passengers who are potential watch list
matches are immediately identified for appropriate notifications and
coordination. Secure Flight vets 100 percent of passengers flying on
U.S. airlines domestically and internationally, as well as passengers
on many foreign airlines, and we are working hard toward the goal of
fully implementing the program for remaining covered foreign air
carriers by the end of 2010. Counting both U.S. and foreign carriers,
Secure Flight currently vets over 97 percent of all airline passenger
travel to, from, and within the United States.
Even the best intelligence, however, does not always identify in
advance every individual who would seek to do us harm. So we also rely
on the security expertise of our frontline personnel--Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs), Federal Air Marshals, explosive specialists,
and Behavior Detection Officers, among others--to help prevent
terrorists from harming Americans.
That reliance means that valuable intelligence must be distributed
widely and rapidly to our employees in the field. One way we are
improving this process is through the extension of secret-level
security clearances to a greater number of TSA employees. This change
significantly enhances TSA's ability to leverage the best intelligence
and elevate our security practices across the board.
But our Nation's security also is a shared responsibility. So we
are encouraging our citizens, our communities, and our security and law
enforcement partners across the country to remain vigilant and continue
to build a National culture of preparedness and resiliency. As you
know, Secretary Napolitano recently announced the expansion of the ``If
You See Something, Say Something'' campaign. This simple and effective
program was started by the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (MTA) to raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism,
crime, and other threats and to emphasize the importance of reporting
suspicious activity to the proper transportation and law enforcement
authorities. In transportation sectors, I have joined Secretary
Napolitano to launch ``If You See Something, Say Something'' with
Amtrak and the general aviation community this year.
In addition to engaging those in our own country, we also continue
to reach out to our foreign partners. Secretary Napolitano and I will
be attending the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Assembly in Montreal next week with our partners from the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration, and we look
forward to working with the international community in our joint
efforts to strengthen the global aviation system.
cutting-edge technology
As we improve our use of intelligence, we also know that effective
technology is an essential component of our arsenal to detect and deter
threats against our Nation's transportation systems. TSA is deploying a
range of next generation equipment--bottled liquid scanners, Advanced
Technology X-Ray systems, and Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) units--to
enhance our efforts.
The most effective technology for detecting small threat items
concealed on passengers is Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). AIT
safely and effectively screens passengers for both metallic and non-
metallic threats, including weapons and explosives, without physical
contact. As of September 17, 2010, TSA has deployed 224 AIT machines to
56 airports Nation-wide, and our goal is to have nearly 1,000 AIT
machines deployed by the end of calendar year 2011.
TSA is seeking to enhance the efficiency of using AIT, while also
reducing privacy concerns related to this technology, by working with
manufacturers, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, the security
industry, and foreign government partners to develop automated threat
detection software, also known as Automated Target Recognition (ATR).
This is software used with AIT to display a computer-generated generic
human image, going even further than the privacy-protected actual image
of the passenger as the current technology does. On-going ATR testing
is designed to ensure effective detection with minimal false alarms.
strengthening the workforce
An intelligence-driven agency using sophisticated technological
tools to root out terrorists will not succeed without a professional,
highly trained, fully engaged, and respected workforce. As I stated
above, the men and women of TSA are on the front line in detecting and
defeating the terrorist threat. Since becoming the administrator for
TSA, I have logged thousands of miles to meet with them. I have been
impressed by their professionalism, work ethic, and enthusiasm. I have
listened carefully to their suggestions on improving operations and
opportunities, and have learned from their insights. I also have
challenged them to hold themselves to the highest standards of hard
work, professionalism, and integrity that already are intrinsic parts
of TSA's fabric.
I also am working to hone the workforce development strategy and to
develop an environment of continuous learning for TSA employees that
will help them meet both individual and organizational goals. As we
continue to implement new technology to meet emerging threats, TSA
routinely evaluates, updates, and upgrades its technical training
curriculum. Over the next 3 months, technical training priorities
include an update to procedures at the passenger screening checkpoint
and support for the deployment of new technologies such as Advanced
Imaging Technology.
We are also working on improving the training for the
Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) workforce. Along with revision
of the TSI Basic Course on multi-modal training, we are developing and
delivering additional courses targeted to specific transportation
modes. TSA also recently expanded the Surface Transportation Training
Center located in Pueblo, Colorado, which I visited in July. This is an
impressive facility that is significantly improving the training we are
able to provide.
Through these efforts, we are finding opportunities to integrate
elements that not only enhance technical skills, but also contribute to
professional development.
We are also engaged in efforts to address and resolve workplace
issues. The Ombudsman at TSA is one of many avenues through which TSA
employees may raise workplace issues and concerns to see them resolved.
As I travel around the country meeting with employees, I have invited
employees to raise issues and concerns to me directly, and I have
learned that many employees also place great value in established
communications channels, such as the National Advisory Council, the
Idea Factory, and local Employee Advisory Councils. Nevertheless, I
also know from my experience at the FBI that an effective Ombudsman
program is a valuable resource for unfiltered, candid feedback on the
state of the workplace environment, and I am committed to its advisory
role to me and the rest of the TSA leadership team.
conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee
today to speak with you about TSA's on-going efforts to ensure the
safety and security of the transportation domain. I look forward to
your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Pistole. I look
forward to us engaging over a period of time.
At this time, I will remind each Member that he or she will
have 5 minutes to question the witness. I will now recognize
myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Administrator, before I begin my line of questioning,
could I get a response for the record that you will work with
the committee in the next Congress on a TSA authorization bill
that will help give you the tools to move the agency forward on
a number of issues?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you for both succinctness and great
enthusiasm, as well.
Let me start by asking you about the state of the
transportation security report. I think you should be noted and
complimented for the on-the-road trip that you have taken to
many, many airports. You might want to share with us how much
progress you have made. I appreciate your visit to Bush
Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas, one of the top 10
airports in the Nation, and for seeing the TSO officers there.
As you have been touring the assets in this short time,
noting that you will be in Montreal in the next week, give us
the 30,000-foot view of what you have and what your priorities
are for TSA. My time is short, so if you could be--30,000 view
and get whatever you think is most instructive.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
My three top priorities are to ensure that all the men and
women of TSA look at their mission as a counterterrorism-
focused National security mission enabled by the latest
technology intelligence. The second is supporting the
workforce, and third is to engage external stakeholders,
especially the traveling public.
There are three things that I am telling every TSA employee
that I expect of them: That is hard work, professionalism, and
integrity.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
You heard me give a rendition of an incident that occurred,
a bystander, an acquaintance, in fact, a lawyer that came up to
me and indicated how two passengers wrestled down this
individual on a flight into Las Vegas. So it was not one of our
air marshals because it was not a plane that had one.
Air marshals provide a critical layer of security. The
Federal Air Marshals Service has come under fire for personnel
misconduct issues, the most disturbing of which is the incident
in the Orlando office that involved a mock Jeopardy board with
racial and otherwise insensitive remarks. I understand this
incident is currently under investigation by the inspector
general.
But what can you tell us today about what your plans are
for reducing personnel problems at FAM, including establishing
the Office of Professional Development you mentioned in your
testimony?
Let me also add, while there are some high-profile
incidents with FAMs, I believe they provide a critical layer of
security, and, frankly, we should increase their presence on
the flight. I want to thank them for their service publicly. I
believe that the majority of the men and women of FAMs are
outstanding public servants.
I have introduced legislation that would double the
presence of FAMs on inbound international flights, which, as we
have seen, is a vector that terrorists have tried to exploit,
most recently on Christmas day. Please provide your comments on
this legislation, which would also provide criminal
investigative training to FAMs and codify the FAMs ombudsman.
So those two-pronged questions, please. I apologize for my
raspy voice.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I, too, applaud the work of the FAMs. I have met with a
number of them, and it is a very difficult assignment to be a
flying Federal air marshal, not on the road but in the air the
time that they are.
I am very concerned about any serious allegation of
misconduct, whether by a FAM or any TSA employee. That is the
reason that I am creating this Office of Professional
Responsibility, to ensure that adjudication of the
investigation of allegations provides a firm, fair process for
that adjudication.
That being said, there are a number of opportunities for
engaging the workforce. Tomorrow I am holding my first senior
leadership team retreat to focus on a number of things,
including what our leadership team's vision is for TSA 10 years
from now. I refer to that as the ``2020 vision'' for TSA: What
do we want to look like as an agency? How should we act? How
should we operate? How do we engage the stakeholders? So I have
asked a number of employees for their vision for the next 10
years.
Critical in that and an integral part is a fair
disciplinary process. So, any time there is an allegation, I
want to make sure that there is a high level of confidence, not
only among TSA employees but you and the subcommittee, the full
committee, and the American public, that if somebody does
engage in improper activity, they are held accountable.
I would just add onto your--the training issue, I believe
that it is a good thing for the Federal air marshals to have
the criminal investigative training. That is something that I
am pursuing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are monitoring the investigation of
the Jeopardy board and the racist comments?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. I--without going into personnel issues,
but I believe you are aware that the Federal air marshal
special agent in charge is no longer there, has been removed,
and other personnel actions are pending.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I didn't hear you specifically. The
language in the legislation talks about doubling the presence
of FAMs on inbound international flights. I know we have worked
with TSA and believe we have drawn some of the best input from
them. So my question is, your reflection on the importance of
that aspect, to be able to work with FAMs.
Mr. Pistole. Right. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
The presence of FAMs on many international flights is a
critical component in our layered security. Given the current
threat stream, the intelligence that we know is out there about
terrorists, al-Qaeda particularly, and affiliates, interest in
still striking aviation as on 12/25, the FAMs may be the last
line of defense when it comes to that. So we appreciate your
support for those additional FAMs on international flights.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you.
With that, let me recognize the Ranking Member for his 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Secretary Pistole, the Aviation Transportation Security Act
authorized TSA to establish trusted passenger programs and use
available technologies to expedite the security screening of
passengers who participate in these programs.
The concept was to allow for the focus on individuals who,
at no cost to the Government, voluntarily provide biographic
and biometric information for the purpose of background checks,
which would free up resources at checkpoints to focus on those
passengers for whom little is known. To meet this statutory
provision, TSA created the Registered Traveler program.
Unfortunately, the last RT vendor ceased operations last year,
partly because of TSA's rejection of the RT program concept.
Former TSA Administrator Kip Hawley, for whom I had a great
deal of respect--I really liked working with him, but he was
never fond of the RT program. Mr. Hawley was concerned about
what he called ``clean-skinned terrorists.'' Can you describe
to us what a clean-skinned terrorist is?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Ranking Member Dent.
A clean-skinned terrorist is somebody with no pedigree, any
derogatory information about him or her that would indicate
that that person is a threat to aviation or anything else.
Mr. Dent. Okay. As you know, too, the clean-skinned
terrorist theory never really resonated with many Members of
the committee, because you have always believed in a risk-based
approach to homeland security matters. You can never assure,
you know, zero percent risk. TSA's aviation security layers are
rooted in the principle of a risk-based approach to security.
Has TSA deviated from the risk-based principle when it
comes to the Registered Traveler program?
Mr. Pistole. Well, first, let me say, Ranking Member Dent,
that I am open to the Registered Traveler program. I think it
is a question of the business model and the viability of that
business model. So I am open to businesses trying to develop
that. If that helps reduce risk, I am all in favor of that.
I do have the concern that a person such as the Times
Square bomber, who would have had very limited, if any,
derogatory information but for one or two very innocuous items,
in many respects, could have become one of those trusted
travelers. So there is always that possibility. But it does
come down, as you say, to managing risk, and how can we
allocate our resources against that risk in the best possible
fashion.
Mr. Dent. Another question I have, too, that--you know, TSA
has often taken the position that every individual entering a
sterile area of an airport must go through a thorough screening
and that a background investigation, much like that conducted
for security clearances, isn't necessary. However, Federal
security directors and TSA personnel, as well as airport
personnel and maintenance workers, receive background checks
and are able to bypass security screening.
I understand you are examining the merits of the RT
program. When do you expect to complete your review? Will you
commit to keeping an open mind as you review the program?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, I do have an open mind to it.
I don't have a specific time frame. What I have looked at,
I am open to the business propositions and the opportunities
that are there. I know there are several airports that have the
equivalent of a Registered Traveler program. A number of other
airports, I believe it is 51, have something for their elite
travelers, which is similar to a trusted traveler, Registered
Traveler program.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Then, also, some airports have been waiting
to get reimbursed by TSA for their investments made to improve
in-line baggage handling and explosive-detection equipment.
Congressman Bilirakis I don't think is going to be here today,
but he requested I ask this question on his behalf.
What plan does TSA have in place to reimburse airports for
their costs of installing explosive-detection systems?
Mr. Pistole. I have conducted a review of that and found
that there are a number of airports around the country that did
work shortly after the 9/11 attacks, as you described. There is
approximately $400 million of that work that was done. So, the
issue that I am dealing with is, is the traveling public in a
better situation if I apply that money to airports that do not
have the improved security equipment in theirs, or do I take
that money and apply it to those which already do? So, again,
it gets back to the risk-management issue.
Mr. Dent. My final comments and questions are, as you are
aware, there was an expose conducted by the New York TV station
earlier this week showing what appears to be sloppy security at
Newark Liberty International Airport. I would note that
Chairwoman Jackson Lee and I were there earlier this year when
there was a security checkpoint breach that resulted in the
dump of the entire terminal, which we remember very well.
Have you seen the video footage? Can you tell me if you
have any concerns of what you saw? Also, while I understand TSA
may conduct its own review of the Newark incident, can you
commit the TSA's continued cooperation in our Congressional
review?
Mr. Pistole. ``Yes'' to the last question.
``Yes'' to the video that was on Fox News. It is quite
disturbing to see what could be significant vulnerabilities in
perimeter security and access points.
Mr. Dent. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Administrator, we are now in the midst of six votes. We
ask for your indulgence. We will now recess this committee and
return after votes.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. This hearing is called to order.
I now recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I
especially thank you and the Members of the committee for the
unanimous consent for my participation with this august body.
I would also, Madam Chairwoman, if I may, like to thank the
staff. I have had an opportunity to peruse the memo, and I want
the staff to be well aware that I consider it a very fine piece
of intelligence.
To this end, I would like to confine my comments to the
last 16 words in the last paragraph on the last page. The
sentence reads, ``Due to numerous delays, the TWIC reader pilot
program's conclusion has been postponed until spring 2011.''
Let me welcome you to the committee. I am honored that you
have chosen to help your country in this time of need. I thank
you, Mr. Administrator, for your service that you have
rendered. I am especially grateful that you will be working
with us.
The TWIC card, as it is called, has been a concern that has
been raised by a number of my constituents. The concern that
has been raised by persons on the committee has been that of
deployment of the reader. The card was deployed before the
reader was deployed. As I understand it, we have a pilot
program that is currently under way.
The question, I suppose, is: Will we make this deadline? I
have to ask in this fashion--and this is not to demean you in
any way, but we have given deadlines previously that have not
been met. My hope is that we can get a final deadline, if I may
say so.
So I would like your response, and then I have a couple of
other questions. So if you can be as terse as possible, it
would be greatly appreciated.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman.
I do not have a specific deadline that I would give you
because I do want to manage expectations as I review the TWIC
program and the card readers, as you have indicated. As I
understand, there have been a number of both technological
issues and funding issues as it relates to the deployment of
both the readers in a number of areas.
So I am reviewing that whole process, and I pledge to work
with you and the committee to come back with a better date
rather than the spring of 2011.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. Thank you.
Another concern is one that relates to replacement cards.
As you know, these are difficult times, and many of the workers
that find themselves having to get a new card for various and
sundry reasons have to pay for the new card out of pocket.
Is there a means by which you plan to have a process that
will allow a worker to contest the requirement that it be
replaced at the worker's expense so that workers can have a
belief that, if the card malfunctions, then the worker
shouldn't have to pay for the replacement? But I am not sure
that the process exists now.
If it does exist, then I would like to know what it is. If
it doesn't, can we develop a process that will give us some
reasonable assurance that there will be some sort of
ascertainment as to whom it is should bear the cost of
replacement?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Congressman. It seems to me that
fundamental fairness dictates that, if a card is not working
through no fault of the person themselves, that there should be
some mechanism for that person having a replacement card
without additional costs.
That being said, I don't have the facts here with me today
to be any more definitive about that. But I will look into that
also and get back with you.
Mr. Al Green of Texas. Thank you.
If you would, I would welcome a written word on this as a
response. That way, I can share it with my constituents and let
them know that, indeed, you and I are trying to resolve this
issue. I am sure there many other things that are pressing, but
if you happened to be one of the persons who has had to bear
the cost of replacing a card, for you, it is an issue of
paramount importance.
I thank you for the friendly way that you have approached
it. My hope is that we will be able to resolve this.
Finally, in my last 2 seconds, the establishment of an
Office of Professional Responsibility, I would like to commend
you for doing so. I think that can be meaningfully done. My
hope is that it will work to the advantage of the people who
find themselves having challenges.
Thank you very much. I yield back, Madam.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for his thoughtful
questions, and we will follow up with the gentleman, as well,
as the subcommittee.
I would ask the administrator to send the letter to the
committee for its records. We will work with the gentleman on,
I think, a crucial issue for his constituents and other
constituents.
Thank you.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Dent. No questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Administrator, if I can pose some
additional questions.
We recently had what I feel was a profound hearing in July
on the Surface Transportation Inspection Program. In addition,
you have heard some recounting of H.R. 2200, which is an
overall comprehensive bill on transportation security, among
other issues. You have been making your rounds and have seen
surface systems across the country, including exposure to some
facilities in Houston.
Please tell me your vision for TSA's surface security
program, including, if you will, addressing the committee's
concern and the inspector general's concern with the current
organizational structure of the Surface Transportation
Inspection Program.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I believe the surface security program for TSA is an
integral part of the layered security that we apply across the
non-aviation sector. To that end, the IG's reports have been
noteworthy in terms of the areas of improvement for TSA as it
relates to surface transportation.
So I have reviewed the reports. Looking at the best
construct within TSA for how that--the surface transportation--
the inspector should report, I know there are different
opinions on that, and I have not reached a final conclusion on
that at this point. But I appreciate the subcommittee's
interest in the issue.
As you indicated, my visit to Houston, where both the bus
demonstration, in terms of security measures implemented there,
and then on the light rail, was illuminating for me in terms of
opportunities that we have in TSA to assist State and local
providers of surface transportation, to assist them in their
efforts to provide the best possible security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So let me just determine where you are.
You are in a study mode?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. In response to your question about the
reporting, there are at least two different constructs which I
have seen: The one being the assistant Federal security
director, whether it is for law enforcement or for inspection;
and then the other is out of the actual inspection office.
So, what I am reviewing is what makes the best business
sense, both internally to TSA but equally to the providers of
the service at the local level. So I don't have a resolution of
that yet.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, in essence, there is no firm
organizational structure now; you are reviewing.
Mr. Pistole. There is the existing structure, but, given
the IG's report, that is what I am reviewing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes. Let me be clear: There is no new firm
organizational structure.
Have you put a time line for your review and implementation
of a new structure in response to--or enhanced structure in
response to the inspector general?
Mr. Pistole. I do not have a specific time line on that,
but I will be glad to get back with you and the subcommittee in
the near future as to that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you?
Would you also--what is the status of the TSA executive
level? Do you have in place all of the positions that fall
under your particular leadership?
Mr. Pistole. There is at least one assistant administrator
position that is open that we are trying to fill right now.
That is the--if that is what you are referring to.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And others. That is a Presidential
appointment?
Mr. Pistole. No, that is not. That is simply a----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Civil service?
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. Civil service hire, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So how many of those civil service at that
level do you have remaining vacant?
Mr. Pistole. I would be estimating. Approximately six
involving headquarters and field staffing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What about FSDs around the country?
Mr. Pistole. Right, so I am including those as part of
that. So we have one assistant administrator, and that is for
intelligence. Then there are--I am trying to think of the
number of either FAM SACs, the special agents in charge, or
FSDs. That is why I am giving a ballpark.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Why don't you get us that information in
writing? It is very important.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In fact, why don't I broaden the question?
Just give us the structure of the TSA with all of the
leadership positions and a number of FSDs and a number of
vacancies----
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. That you are working on. It
would be helpful if you would give it some considerable thought
and you have a time line as to how you are progressing with
that.
One of the issues, of course, in security is man- or woman-
power. I think that is an enormous challenge, as well, in what
we are doing.
Let me continue. We have been told that the TSA ombudsman
lacks the independence and authority to get personnel issues
resolved. As a result, employees often avoid the ombudsman and
withhold their complaints, for fear of retaliation.
To give this office the independence and weight it needs to
resolve personnel problems, do you agree that the ombudsman
should either be moved out of TSA to DHS headquarters under the
Deputy Secretary, like the citizenship and immigration services
ombudsman, or should it have its own in TSA that reports
directly to the administrator?
Where is the firewall and the comfort level for employees
to be able to provide the necessary information to this
particular ombudsman?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I believe the ombudsman needs to be an office and person
who is empowered with the authority to look into complaints,
issues that are raised by all members of TSA. I believe it
should be within TSA, rather than DHS writ large, because of
simply the size of TSA, with 60,000 employees. I would not that
ombudsperson's office to be diluted by being at a Department
level rather than agency level.
So my plan is to take the ombudsperson position out of its
current construct in the Office of Special Counsel, which is an
assistant administrator level, and raise that up so it is a
direct report to the deputy administrator and myself.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Does that mean you will physically have
that office in a location that is secure and comfortable for
individuals who need to utilize the services of the ombudsman?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, these questions that you are saying
``yes'' to, if you can provide us with a time line in writing
as to when you expect that to be up and running, I think that
is an important part of professional development.
Competition is critical to ensuring our security system is
as cost-effective and efficient as possible. When will TSA
provide airports and airlines the opportunity to select from
qualified vendors in submitting biometric and biographic
information for criminal history records checks and security
threat assessments, as directed in the TSA Reauthorization Act?
The committee is concerned because TSA has just extended a
no-bid, sole-source contract for two other aviation channeling
programs, even though there are qualified service providers.
Mr. Pistole. Without knowing the specifics of the issue
that you are referring to, Madam Chairwoman, my commitment to
you and the subcommittee and to the full committee is to ensure
that in each and every opportunity that there are opportunities
for all small businesses, minority-owned businesses, anybody
who is qualified to equally compete for contracts with TSA.
So I would be glad separately to get the details that you
are referring to and look into those and get back with you and
the subcommittee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We should probe it just a little bit more,
Mr. Pistole. It appears here that the TSA extended the contract
in a no-bid, sole-source contract for the channeling. You still
may not have all the facts, but I think you should dwell on
sole-source and you should dwell on the challenges that we
have--that was brought to our attention, of the ability of
small, minority, women-owned businesses to even get an
opportunity to respond.
Frankly, I think this is going to be something that is
required in writing. I simply want to know why. Why does this
have to be that approach, when--all of us who serve on this
committee probably have more small businesses offering various
new technology and capabilities. As we have these hearings and
as they are able to reach our offices, there seems to be an
abundance of these individuals and small businesses. I think
you know that it is the President's commitment that we give
opportunities to small businesses in the fair and legally sound
manner of which the procurement process has to operate under.
Can you just provide me with your thinking? What kind of
leadership will you have, No. 1, to answer the question I have
just given--and you may have to do that in writing--that will
give us a better approach and give us a better attitude that
TSA is serious--because TSA's business is around America--about
the opportunities for the same kind of technology or the same
kind of services to be rendered by small, medium, minority, and
women-owned businesses?
Mr. Pistole. Right. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
My philosophical approach, as you say, is, I am a strong
proponent of equal opportunities for small businesses,
minority-owned, women-owned businesses that can compete. I want
to make sure that there is an even playing field for that,
recognizing the challenges that on major acquisitions, such as
AIT and others, small businesses simply would not be able to
compete because of their capacity development issues. Some
contracts obviously require a classified background in order to
get into that, and so that can pose a challenge to a small
business oftentimes. But for all those vendors that we can do
business with, I support that notion wholeheartedly. I know the
Secretary does.
I just saw figures, I believe, last week on the percentage
of contracts that the Department and TSA let to small business,
minority-owned business, women-owned businesses, and it is
above the Government average. So I am a strong supporter of
that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let's probe this just a little bit
more. I do understand that. That is why I would like you to
give some thinking to this. That is, when you have that kind of
sophisticated technology in AIT, there are possibilities of
utilizing the larger, more stable or experienced company, or
company with the technology, and then require percentages of
MWBs to subcontract for a variety of needs that the
installation may call for or other aspects.
I would ask you to--or let me just ask you to muse on that,
to give your thoughts about that. Because I think we should ask
very long and hard questions on how we can best serve the
American public, how we can be secure, and how we can answer
this question of participation.
Mr. Pistole. I agree wholeheartedly, Madam Chairwoman. So
it is something that, frankly, to this point, I have not been
into the details on any acquisition, and I don't necessarily
plan to be involved in any particular ones, but I can set the
tone from the top, as to what I expect. If there are
subcontract opportunities in those large acquisitions, then I
fully support that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate it. Again, why don't we take
all these questions in note for writing and submission back to
the committee?
Let me also add that TSA is one of the more prolific users
of technology. One of the hearings that this committee has held
is the transition of approval from S&T, Science and Technology,
out to the users of the technology.
What kind of efforts will you utilize to have a connection,
have a collaboration with Science and Technology to ensure that
products that might be helpful in securing the Nation move
quickly?
I know you have meetings with the Secretary. You all have
your own internal meetings. But that is something that we need
the users of the technology to be very vocal about, on how that
process works.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. I agree in terms of--
and I have met, as you have mentioned, with Dr. Tara O'Toole
several times from S&T. My issue is wanting to make that what
S&T does is all requirements-driven from TSA, from my
perspective, and that we are working collaboratively to come up
with the best solutions to the gaps that we currently have. So
that is the perspective I bring to the job.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Another issue I find very important--let
me go back to airports and security of airports and focus on
several issues.
I have a lot of friends and colleagues, and so let me say
to them, all my friends in New Jersey, my colleagues in New
Jersey, this is not a pointed effort to highlight the assets
that are there. But I think my Ranking Member indicated that we
were personally in Newark airport when the first incident
occurred where there was a questioning of who went through the
wrong direction. At that time, the airport was literally shut
down.
We have had now another incident in Newark airport
regarding inspections over the last 48 hours. We have had,
certainly, a history of concerns that may not have been
directly terrorist-related but they are inspection-related in
Miami airport with drug-running, if you will.
So airports are still in the eye of the storm. Do you view
it necessary within your area to have a focused task force,
maybe small in size, that raises the red flags as to what
directions we can give to airports so that we are not looking
at a tragedy because we overlooked mishaps or failures in
security? I am concerned about that.
Airports are cities. People are there almost 24 hours a
day, to their dismay. They have their own mayor and personnel
that come and go to work, and then they have the guest that
comes, of whom they have to determine their legitimacy for
being there, our passengers, the traveling public.
But it seems that we are always looking beyond the airlines
and the incidents that take place in-flight, which we now have
done and made major changes, but the airports are appearing to
be so vulnerable. I don't see the sense of urgency in dealing
with the security in the airports.
Mr. Pistole. You have touched on a significant issue, Madam
Chairwoman.
In terms of the layered security that we in the U.S.
Government apply to aviation security, recognizing that we
cannot be all places at all times in all instances and for all
people, and so many of the services that you describe are
contracted out, as in the case of Newark with the access points
and perimeter security, which the airport authority contracts
out.
That being said, we provide security directives and
instructions to each of the 450-plus airports in terms of what
their security perimeter and access points should look like,
and so we are reviewing that Newark situation.
My question coming out of that review is, is this a
systemic issue going beyond Newark airport? Are there other
airports similarly situated that perhaps have lax security that
could expose some vulnerabilities and gaps in this layered
security that this news report apparently uncovered?
So when I get those facts, I will look at the propriety of
establishing this small task force, as you suggest. If it
appears there are systemic issues, then we have to roll up our
sleeves and have quite a bit more work to do in working with
those airports that may have those vulnerabilities.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is a very difficult divide that you
have to work with because there are airport authorities, there
are State authorities, there are city governments. The question
becomes whether or not some of these contracts that are
directly related to the security of the traveling public and/or
personnel on the grounds of the airport have to be scrutinized
even more.
Newark is a very large area, and it is located in a very
unique area, as some airports are. We certainly appreciate--I
have just spoken about small businesses, but I think we have to
ask the question whether that is where they should be.
We made the decision on TSO. Certainly, that is a financial
burden on this Government. But I think, by and large, Members
have agreed and the traveling public has agreed, as we have
developed the professionalism of TSO officers and their pride
in the position, that we should look to be looking at some
other options as well.
I want to continue that line of reasoning, and I just have
one or two other questions. But I want to pursue the incident
more thoroughly with the Jeopardy board that was noted, and you
have that under investigation. But that deals with racial
issues. I think it is important for you to add to your report
what efforts you are utilizing, in a very diverse workforce, to
go ahead on into discriminatory practices.
I would like to get, again, a report to this committee on
the demographics of TSO officers and the percentages of
supervisors and managers, which is one of the concerns we hear,
as part of the traveling public, that there is not enough
promotion opportunity and growth opportunity for women and
minorities and others, if you will. That is extremely
important.
Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. It is
extremely important to me also, both in my prior job and now in
this job as the administrator for TSA.
I have been pleased to see the diversity at TSA, not only
in the traditional diversity sense, where there are about 40
percent of all employees are women. I believe it is 45 percent
are minorities, including women, blacks, Hispanics, and others.
So it is a high percentage.
I also am focused on the leadership team. I have a chart
that I got when I first started, just the top 19 executives at
headquarters, basically for name familiarization, to figure out
who is who and where their areas are. I got that on my first
day. I glanced at that again today in anticipation of this
hearing, and, out of those 19, eight are minorities. So that is
obviously a much higher percentage than most areas of the
Federal Government and in many businesses, of course. So I am
looking at that and, again, pleasantly surprised by those
numbers and perspectives.
The other part of the diversity, though, is, because TSA is
a new agency, in the last 9 years, I have been very impressed
with the diversity of experiences in backgrounds that people,
both TSOs and in leadership positions, bring to TSA. So there
is a richness and wealth of experience from many different
agencies and outside the U.S. Government, from aviation, from
surface, all these different areas. So it is, again, a rich
tapestry of individuals who compose the TSA workforce.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have under your jurisdiction that
are out in the field office personnel that come under TSO, or
are they all screeners?
Mr. Pistole. So the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. The TSO personnel that is out in the
field, are they predominantly screeners?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You don't have any office types that are
in the----
Mr. Pistole. Oh, I see. No, all the transportation security
officers are security officers who perform the screening
function, right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Have you made accommodations for those
individuals who have to wear certain headdress and have some
religious practices that they need to advance?
Mr. Pistole. I am not aware of that, and I will have to get
back with you on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will be more specific: Religious
headdress that they have to wear. Religious prayer practices, I
need to know whether you are addressing that question, as well.
So let me just be very, very clear. I do want to have a
good, strong review as it relates to discriminatory practices
and some record of strong messages that will go out from you,
as the leader of the agency, that this is unacceptable,
intolerable behavior. Because sometimes individuals can be
reprimanded and they take it lightly. But I think it is
important, because we are dealing with security issues, that
there is a certain camaraderie that is going beyond anyone's
difference.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Several key rules for surface modes
required by the 9/11 Act are now more than 2 years overdue. TSA
has decided to write a consolidated rule for rail, transit, and
intercity bus employees, as well as a consolidated rule to
govern security assessments and plans for the same three modes.
What is the status of those rules? When will TSA issue the
NPRM for each rule?
Mr. Pistole. I will have to defer on the specifics in terms
of each rule.
It is a concern to me, as it relates to the 9/11
recommendations, that many have been completed but many have
not, for various reasons. I have appointed an accountable
executive within my leadership team to focus on those
recommendations that have not been completed and the reasons
why on a weekly basis.
So I will have to look at the specifics. I mean, I have a
chart of what has been done. I know the rulemaking process can
be cumbersome at times, given comments and things. So I owe you
a get-back on that, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think the simple question is: What is
the status of the rules? In particular that I am asking about,
surface transportation.
Mr. Pistole. Okay.
Ms. Jackson Lee. They may not have even begun, and you need
to let us know if that is the case. They are over 2 years due.
So they may not have even begun. So I just want to make sure
that we get that.
I want to pursue the comments that were made in the
Chairman's opening statement. As I do that, be thinking of this
question, as well, which is sort of connected to the smooth
operations between the FSD and the airport personnel. Many
airports we go to, it is a smooth relationship.
But I would like to question whether there are directives
coming from headquarters as to how that relationship should be
formed, how often should they be meeting, and the issues that
they should be discussing.
To give you an example in point--I have mentioned it at
this committee. I think--and I will just be very clear--
equipment at Houston Intercontinental, as of last week, 10 days
ago, apparently was not in place. It was not in place because
of local permitting issues.
This is in no reflection of the excellent team there. But I
am speaking because there might be a team in Nashville, there
might be a team in Denver, there might be a team in
Philadelphia who are having the same local issues that are even
beyond the boundaries of the airport, because permitting is
done way downtown, away from most airports.
Let me pause and ask, are you developing some way of
ensuring that the team is working together, that if they have
these kinds of concerns, what is the--not concerns, issues--
what reach do they have? Who do they have to call?
You are not going to find the FSD trying to reach to the
local permitting office, the local building permits office. So
they are at a disadvantage. How are you working through those
issues?
Mr. Pistole. So the process, Madam Chairwoman, is, as the
Office of Science and Technology works with the FSD to identify
airports that are ready for the deployment, in terms of a
physical layout, the footprint, and all those things, then they
work from the Office of Science and Technology to acquire the
permit to do the process, so it is not incumbent upon the FSD
to do that. They have other responsibilities, and this is
really a technology deployment issue. So there is an
infrastructure, a team in place to do that.
I learned of the situation in Houston after our visit there
and was disappointed to hear that that had not been
anticipated, and, not pressure, but just reason brought to bear
to get that permitting process done on time, so, as the
equipment is available, then that can be deployed immediately.
My concern with the whole process, which I know you share,
is that that is a potential vulnerability or a gap that we
have. Every day that that equipment is in our possession and
could be deployed but is not is a potential vulnerability and a
gap we have. So I have asked that the review be done on what
happened there and are there lessons learned that we can apply
to other situations. I am not aware of other airports where
that is currently on-going.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is what I hoped that you will do, and
I would appreciate it greatly.
The President has indicated his support for affording
collective bargaining rights to TSA employees. Secretary
Napolitano said last December before the Senate Commerce
Committee that she thought it should be done without
sacrificing--or thought it could be done without sacrificing
security. During your confirmation, you said you would conduct
your own review of the issue.
TSA employees have been very patient in waiting for this
decision to be made. What is the status of your review on this
issue? We in this committee and the subcommittee have submitted
this language previously in a number of bills. Do you support
collective bargaining rights for TSO officers, transportation
security officers? When will we see some movement on this
issue?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I have been conducting a review, as requested by the
Secretary, and that has taken a two-fold approach. One is
through my town hall meetings, my personal engagement with all
employees, both at headquarters and the field. Then the other
is an outside group that has come in and done a number of
interviews of leaders in other agencies, primarily in the
Government but also those in the private sector, to assess
whether collective bargaining would or could have a negative
impact on the security operations.
That report is nearly complete. I will review that report
and then make a decision. I will, obviously, discuss it with
the Secretary. But the bottom line is whether collective
bargaining has an adverse impact on security. If that is not
the case, then the decision tree becomes, one, is it in the
best interest of the TSOs? As you know, a number of them are
already union members without collective bargaining rights.
What I have heard in my town halls is a frustration on
several levels, as identified by the Chairman, in terms of pay
and supervision and performance evaluations and things that may
or may not be addressed by collective bargaining. So that is
part of what I am looking at.
I should have my--I want to get this review. Then my review
will be in the near future. I don't have a specific date for
completion.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can you give us some rounded time frame,
weeks or 2 weeks or next week?
Mr. Pistole. Definitely not next week, because I will be in
Montreal for the ICAO. I would say weeks rather than months, if
that is what you are talking about, yes.
Part of that is, obviously, discussing it with the
Secretary. Then, whether she makes the decision or I make the
decision, I am not sure on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me indicate to you that we can't
argue with thoughtful, constructive review. What I will say to
you, for those of us who came before you, we have actually been
discussing this issue since 9/11, since the creation of TSO and
the Transportation Security Administration and TSO officers. We
have been discussing this issue since that time.
So I would say that we have been somewhat delayed. We now
have an administration, as we understand it, that both the
President and the Secretary have gone on official record for
their support. I cannot imagine that there will be much delay.
I am not going to get into the discussion of which union.
You have some direct conversation with TSO officers. We are not
privy to that. But I think the overall issue is the right for
an opportunity to engage and to be able to raise issues of your
work conditions.
You have already made the point, as the Chairman made, and
that is that there is an unhappiness with the pay scale. It is
not equal to, as I understand it, the civil service. Equally,
the part-time structure is a very challenging structure, and
frustrating. Certainly, we are glad people are working, but if
it doesn't create a pathway of growth, professionalism, then I
really think you need to look at it, and I think you need to
seriously look at this question of not engaging.
I didn't hear you say that you--did you say that you had
opposition, while you were out on your tour, to this idea?
Mr. Pistole. Well, I have asked for the pros and cons from,
again, the TSOs, from the managers, the supervisors, the
executives. So I have received both pros and cons from
different people that I have talked to.
If I could say, Madam Chairwoman, I greatly appreciate your
personal interest in and the subcommittee's interest in the
well-being and benefits of the TSOs, because I know you
appreciate the work that they do every day, often without any
acclaim or recognition, often with complaints. So that is
important to me, to know that you and the subcommittee and the
full committee are as interested in and support the men and
women of TSA as you do. So, appreciate that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we look forward to working with you.
I know that the reporters will probably pause on this
analysis. I thought that you had mentioned--and you just said
that you got the pros and cons. I was going to use this
example, and I think I will go ahead and do so, knowing that I
am probably way beyond jurisdiction of this committee.
But we have been debating Don't Ask, Don't Tell. There has
been a lot of representation as to what the troops would want
and not want. I only raise the question--you don't know until
the process is implemented. You won't know about the
opportunities for engagement on work issues until it is
implemented.
We have seen it implemented in the police and fire,
particularly, where we have something called a ``meet and
confer.'' I am not suggesting that, but what I am saying is--
and jurisdictions have survived when public employees have had
the ability to have a discussion.
I would imagine that, as you review this, you will look at
it and be engaging in the unions and find the best commonality
that you can to protect America and also to provide for these
very, very important workers who are on the front lines.
My simple message is: We won't know until we try it. I just
think it is important. I urge you to have a review that is as
expeditious and thorough so that we can try it and have an
opportunity for workers to be able to feel both appreciated
and, as well, able to communicate their concerns to their
management.
So let me thank you very much. I think we have given you a
litany of questions and reports, all of which will not be due
next week. We recognize the work that has to be done. But I
will say to you that I can't think of a more serious
responsibility within the DHS, which most people now recognize
has really become the armor against terrorists who may come
from anywhere. You are very keenly engaged in the
transportation area, where so many view it as a target that is
attractive to terrorists. That was the title of this hearing.
So, we thank you for contributing to it.
There being no further questions for our witness, I thank
Administrator Pistole for appearing before the subcommittee
today and for your patience. The Members of the subcommittee
may have additional questions for you, and we ask that you
respond to them expeditiously in writing.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for John S.
Pistole
Question 1. When airports send personnel information to TSA and the
FBI for a determination on whether they can issue an employee an
airport security credential they use the clearinghouse operated by the
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE). As this is a sole
source contract, some airports have complained that there are other
channeling service providers that could do the same function for less
than what AAAE charges. What is the status of TSA opening up this
channeling service to other vendors?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports
allowing choice in channeling for airport and aircraft operators, and,
as a part of its Aviation Channeling Services Project, is working
diligently to create a path for additional entities to provide aviation
channeling services. On October 28, 2010, TSA released a draft copy of
the Project's technical requirements on the website for Federal
business opportunities, ``FedBizOpps.Gov'' to provide an opportunity
for review and comment. Specifically, the modified pre-solicitation
states:
``The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is seeking
qualified vendors for its Aviation Channeling Service Project (ACSP) to
support the vetting of airport workers and aircraft operators. The
estimated population is approximately 2,100,000. The anticipated
geographic scope is the United States, and its possessions and
territories. TSA is contemplating the establishment of Designated
Aviation Channelers (DACs) based on the overall performance of each
Offeror's technical solution for meeting TSA requirements. DACs will
provide choice to airport and aircraft operators for channeling
services for aviation populations. The Government plans to certify not
more than three vendors on the basis of the most advantageous
proposals. Responses shall be evaluated against the ACSP Solicitation,
ACSP Technical Specification, and other identified information. The
selection of DACs will be based on factors set forth by the Government.
The selected DACs will be required to meet Federal system Certification
and Accreditation requirements before providing services to regulated
aviation stakeholders. Once selected, the DACs must support and
maintain their technology solution during the qualification testing at
no cost to the Government, including but not limited to the design,
development, maintenance, support, operations, etc. If the Offeror's
system passes qualification testing and is deemed acceptable by the
Government, the Offeror would be placed on the TSA ACSP DAC List.''
Soon after the review and comment period, TSA will issue the final
technical specification and solicit proposals for providing the
aviation channeling services that the American Association for Airport
Executives (AAAE) now exclusively performs under their current
Agreement with TSA.
Question 2. What efforts is TSA taking to ensure that emerging
technologies, especially from small businesses, are being approved and
used? When will TSA next review potential air cargo screening
technologies?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) have several means in place for small businesses to
propose emerging technologies. TSA maintains a Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA) encouraging submission of new technologies, while
also maintaining an on-going BAA specifically for air cargo technology
qualification. S&T has its respective BAA soliciting new technologies
and also employs the System Efficacy through Commercialization,
Utilization, Relevance, and Evaluation (SECURE) and FutureTech outreach
programs, as well as the Small Business Innovative Research program. In
accordance with the existing TSA air cargo BAA, TSA intends to offer at
least one qualification opportunity for products in each of the major
technological groups during fiscal year 2011. Through this process,
businesses of all sizes have equal opportunities for qualification;
including several small technology vendors whose products have been
approved.
Question 3. What is TSA doing to include airport authorities early
in the planning and deployment process for AIT machines? Would you
support giving airport authorities a formal role in the process? Will
TSA reimburse airports for terminal modifications associated with AIT
installation?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) conducts
design discussions with key stakeholders. Relevant stakeholders agree
upon Advanced Imaging Technology designs prior to deployment. Airport
authorities already have a significant role in the deployment process,
as TSA works through each airport's permitting process before
proceeding with any work. Derived from the ``American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act'' in which $1 billion was allocated to TSA for
aviation security projects ($734 million of which was allocated for
checkpoint explosives detection technology), TSA funds construction
costs associated with deploying new technologies into a space provided
by the airports. TSA does not plan extensive terminal modifications in
conjunction with AIT installations.
Question 4. Since TSA is now planning to deploy about 10 new
technologies to passenger checkpoints, how will it ensure that these
different technologies are successfully integrated? Has TSA updated its
passenger checkpoint program strategy to reflect the increased use of
AIT?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
integrated the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) into its passenger
checkpoint screening protocols and has updated its standard operating
procedures to include the AIT. TSA has worked closely with the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate to
develop comprehensive technology roadmaps that guide the agency's
security technology acquisition activities and timelines. The
integration of AIT systems into the checkpoint strategy is a key
component of those technology roadmaps.
Question 5. Over the past few years, TSA has increased the number
of Behavioral Detection Officers at airports Nation-wide. Does TSA have
any way to measure the effectiveness of its Behavioral Detection
Officers to justify this expansion? Does TSA perform covert testing on
Behavioral Detection Officers like it does with passenger and baggage
screeners? Since GAO's report on SPOT was released in May, has TSA
considered any of the recommendations provided in the report?
Answer. The effectiveness of the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program can be measured in both scientific and
practical terms.
TSA is currently working with the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to complete a study to
scientifically validate the effectiveness of the SPOT program.
Preliminary analysis indicates strong support for SPOT as an effective
aviation security measure. A final report is expected in December 2010
and may contain Sensitive Security Information (SSI). TSA would be
pleased to share the results of this study in a closed meeting with the
committee.
From a practical standpoint, the SPOT program has significantly
increased TSA's ability to detect potential suspicious behavior and
activities at our Nation's transportation venues. TSA maintains records
of and performs analysis on the outcomes of each instance where an
individual is referred for additional screening or scrutiny by Behavior
Detection Officers. From January 2006 through July 2010, TSA has
documented over 25,000 cases of individuals referred by Behavior
Detection Officers who were found to be in possession of prohibited
and/or illegal items. During that same time frame, more than 1,600
individuals referred by Behavior Detection Officers were subsequently
arrested by law enforcement agents.
TSA has concurred with each recommendation provided in the GAO's
report on SPOT. Specific projects are currently underway that include
the implementation of eight of the eleven recommendations. TSA
continues to explore solutions that address the remaining
recommendations.
Question 6. Following the August 3, 2010 deadline for screening
100% of cargo on passenger aircraft, has the cargo industry experienced
any supply dislocations due to the 100% screening mandate?
Answer. Based on information provided by airlines and freight
forwarders, industry has not experienced supply chain dislocations. The
Air Forwarders Association and Express Logistics Association have
conducted surveys of their membership and have reported no issues as a
result of the August 3, 2010 deadline.
Question 7. How is TSA verifying that C-C-S-P participants are
properly screening the cargo within their jurisdiction?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of
Security Operations (OSO) has developed a Compliance Work Plan, which
requires that all Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)
participants, specifically Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF),
receive two separate and comprehensive regulatory compliance
inspections per year. Included in these inspections are reviews of
cargo screening requirements. Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI)
also use outreach visits with new CCSFs to discuss all regulatory
requirements.
Additionally, TSA's Cargo Compliance Program requires risk-based
inspections. Any entity with past findings of non-compliance or
investigations into alleged or actual non-compliance is required to be
inspected more frequently.
TSA's Cargo Compliance Program has provided training specific to
screening procedures and technology familiarization for current TSIs.
In-depth procedural and hands-on technology training is taught at the
basic multimodal inspector course. TSA plans to provide further
training to existing TSIs, which will also support planned cargo
screening testing for this fiscal year.
Question 8. In TSA's evaluation of products and technology for use
by C-C-S-P private sector cargo screeners, the agency encouraged
companies to submit technology for approval. Yet, the standards by
which the companies' products were being evaluated were classified.
Please tell me the exact steps that TSA took to ensure that small
businesses were given the necessary clearances to participate in the
evaluation process.
Answer. The standards used to evaluate the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP) proposals were not classified as defined by
various Executive Orders (including Executive Order 13526) and as such
security clearances were not necessary to participate in the program.
Instead, the CSSP standards were determined to be Sensitive Security
Information (SSI) as described in 49 CFR Part 1520. TSA has a
documented process to perform security threat assessments on interested
parties that require access to SSI during competitive acquisitions as a
prerequisite to receiving access to this information. This process
ensures that small businesses, as well as large businesses, are able to
receive this type of information while also allowing TSA to safeguard
sensitive information.
Question 9. The charter of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
expired in April 2010. One of the primary functions of the advisory
committee was to facilitate stakeholder input across TSA security
policies. What is TSA doing to ensure consultation with stakeholders on
security policies, and will the ASAC be meeting again and on a regular
basis?
Answer. Charter renewal and membership activity on all Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) advisory committees is under review by DHS
to assure the advisory committees are effectively used and an efficient
expenditure of resources by the participants. Pending completion of
this review the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to engage stakeholders in a number of ways:
Networked Approach.--TSA offices function as the primary
points of contact for the transportation sector, practicing
regular communication (including intel sharing), conducting
security assessments, sharing best security practices, and
including stakeholders in security planning activities.
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
(CIPAC).--TSA collaborates with stakeholders through the
Transportation Systems Sector Government Coordinating Council
and Sector Coordinating council, as part of CIPAC.
Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan.--TSA
provides comprehensive sector analysis and has the ability to
reach out extensively both within the sector and with other
sectors, to share critical information.
Regular Outreach and Coordination.--This occurs through
blogs, briefings, regularly scheduled conference calls, auto
notification/alert systems, and web boards and other internet
portals.
Question 10. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the aviation
repair station security program lacked specificity on staffing
requirements to effectively oversee the repair station security
inspection program. Will TSA conduct a staffing study to determine
requirements for effectively overseeing a repair station security
program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
conducted a review of staffing requirements for the repair station
security inspection program. The study found that additional staffing
will be required to fully implement the security program and inspection
plan. TSA is developing the strategy needed to carry out and enforce
the new regulations that will be promulgated as a result of the rule
making.
Question 11. Some stakeholders informed the committee that they
have not been consulted on the repair station rulemaking in several
years. How will TSA reach out to stakeholders for input on how to
implement an effective repair station security program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and published it in the Federal Register
on November 18, 2009 for public comment. The comment period was
extended to make sure that all interested parties had an opportunity to
provide comments on the proposed regulations. Throughout the rulemaking
process, TSA has engaged the Repair Station operators and associations
for both foreign and domestic Repair Station operators, through
meetings and site visits. These visits provided valuable insight into
the facilities and existing security procedures already in practice.
TSA hosted a listening session on October 26, 2010 at which 22
representatives from major repair station associations and security
representatives from repair stations had an opportunity to review and
provide feedback on a draft of the Aircraft Repair Station Security
Program (ARSSP). A second such meeting will be held as an additional
event at a repair station convention in Singapore in November 2010.
Finally, TSA plans to conduct significant outreach to all affected
repair station operators to ensure understanding of and compliance with
any new regulations that may be published as a Final Rule in the
future.
Question 12. How will TSA control the dissemination of Sensitive
Security Information in its oversight of repair stations, particularly
those in foreign countries?
Answer. The only Sensitive Security Information (SSI) that the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will initially generate in
support of this rule is the Aircraft Repair Station Security Program
(ARSSP) document. This document will only be provided to foreign and
domestic Repair Stations that will be required to adopt and implement a
security program. TSA will follow all appropriate markings,
protections, and release protocols required by 49 C.F.R. Part 1520 for
each release of the document. Repair stations, both foreign and
domestic, will then be required to comply with the SSI regulations
regarding protection of the security program. As part of TSA's repair
station inspection program, TSA will address whether SSI is treated
appropriately.
Question 13. What is the status of the final rulemaking for general
aviation security programs?
Answer. On October 30, 2008, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) published the Large Aircraft Security Program
(LASP) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). This NPRM proposed
security rules for aircraft operators, including General Aviation
operators. TSA received over 7,000 comments from the public on this
NPRM. TSA is now in the process of developing a Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) and anticipates that it will publish the
SNPRM for comment during the summer of 2011.
Question 14. What steps, if any, has TSA taken to identify and
prioritize the need for security enhancements at general aviation
airports?
Answer. The Section 1617 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007'' Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, 488-
489 (2007) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 44901(k)) required the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to develop and implement on a risk-
managed basis, a standardized threat and vulnerability assessment
program for general aviation (GA) airports. In addition, TSA was
required to evaluate the feasibility of a program to provide grants to
GA airport operators for projects to upgrade security at such airports.
While TSA has determined that a grant program is feasible, the agency
has not yet received appropriated funding to implement or develop this
program. Furthermore, TSA conducted a survey of approximately 3,000 GA
airports to determine a baseline of vulnerabilities as well as to
identify possible mitigation measures that are available to GA
airports. TSA is currently in the process of validating the results of
the survey by visiting a percentage of those participating GA airports.
A final report will be provided to Congress upon completion.
Question 15. When will foreign carriers operating inbound and
outbound international flights, as well as those operating overflights
flights in U.S. airspace, be required to participate in the Secure
Flight program?
Answer. As of October 20, 2010, Secure Flight has been implemented
for 100 percent of all 68 covered U.S. air carriers and 100 out of the
125 covered foreign air carriers. This constitutes 98 percent of all
domestic and international enplanements. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) anticipates that the remaining foreign air
carriers will implement Secure Flight by December 31, 2010. As of
October 31, 2010, all covered foreign air carriers are required to
request and collect Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) which includes
full name, gender, date of birth, and Redress Number (if available) for
flights into and out of the United States. Beginning November 1, 2010,
air carriers that do not provide TSA with SFPD for passengers will be
inhibited by the Secure Flight program from issuing passengers their
boarding passes until the SFPD is provided.
Question 16. Some airports have not been reimbursed for terminal
modifications made to install checked baggage explosives detection
systems because they made expenditures before a reimbursement program
was established by TSA, and now these airports are at the bottom of the
list for receiving reimbursement. What process will TSA establish to
reimburse these airports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes a
risk-based approach to investing in security programs at airports
without optimized baggage screening systems to provide more effective
security solutions. After thorough review, TSA does not have
information to warrant reimbursement for all or a portion of the in-
line baggage screening systems absent prior formal TSA agreements for
funding. Within the confines of the budget, any reimbursement of
previous efforts outside a formal agreement comes at the cost of
advancing current or future security measures.
Question 17. Please provide a deployment plan, including timeline,
location, and risk assessment analysis, for AIT and all other screening
technologies for U.S. airports.
Answer. TSA is available to brief the committee on this subject in
a closed setting.
Question 18. TSOs continue to complain about the poor training
structure in place by TSA, and the committee has been informed that
TSOs who fail certification tests are denied remedial training due to
the lack of availability of Training Instructors. What steps has TSA
taken to address the changes and structure that the TSO training
workforce needs to ensure that they are a highly trained and
knowledgeable workforce in the field, particularly in light of the
deployment of new technology like the Advanced Imaging Technology
machines?
Answer. Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are evaluated
annually under the Performance Accountability and Standards System
(PASS) that includes meeting standards on all applicable Technical
Proficiency assessments. This annual certification is consistent with
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. L. 107-71)
requirement that security screeners (now called security officers) must
successfully complete an annual proficiency review in order to maintain
employment as a TSO. The Technical Proficiency assessment processes
include remediation and reassessment opportunities for an employee to
improve his/her performance if he/she does not qualify on an initial
assessment.
Employees who do not qualify (receive zero points) on an initial
Technical Proficiency assessment are required to receive remediation
and must qualify on the applicable reassessment before returning to
screening duties. These employees may not perform the screening
function in which they initially failed to certify until successful
completion of remediation and reassessment.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has established
over 600 Security Training Instructors (STIs) to provide the needed
training and remediation in the Nation's airports. In addition to the
established STI cadre each airport has the tools it needs to establish
collateral duty Assistant Training Instructors (ATIs) to support the
STIs. TSA continues to evaluate the number of STIs needed, and when
necessary and appropriate, adjustments to STI allocations can be made
to ensure each airport has a sufficient number of trainers to meet
their training delivery needs.
TSA continues to refine and redesign the technical training
portfolio for its security officer workforce--from new hire training to
in-service training--to ensure that it is designed to effectively teach
the basics, continually enhance core skills, and expand overall
capabilities. TSA is committed to always enhancing its training
portfolio, to include enhancements that will contribute to the
effective use of new technologies. TSA works closely with equipment
manufacturers as a technology is approved for TSA use, to design and
develop a comprehensive training module. A training pilot is held for
each new technology in support of the initial limited field deployments
to ensure that TSOs can operate the equipment efficiently and
effectively. Changes may be made to the curriculum based on the pilots
before it is finalized. With technologies that involve image
interpretation, such as the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), TSA
continually develops new images representing clear and suspect/threat
items to enhance TSO image interpretation skills. In addition, TSA is
refining its strategic plan, curriculum roadmap for technical training
design and development, and standardization and performance improvement
efforts to identify skills, capabilities, and competencies that will
contribute to TSO development and thus, build a corresponding
comprehensive training portfolio.
Question 19. What is the estimated completion date for the TWIC
reader pilot program?
Who will pay to replace a faulty TWIC card, the worker or TSA?
Answer. The estimated date to complete data collection for the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) reader pilot
program is early 2011. After the data collection is complete the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security will write and deliver
a report on the results of the pilot to Congress as required by the
SAFE Port Act of 2006.
TSA's card replacement policy provides that transportation workers
must pay for TWIC cards that stop functioning while in their
possession.
Question 20. What is the timeline for implementing a professional
workforce development system for TSA employees?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has a
number of professional workforce development programs currently in
place and continually strives to enhance the development of its
workforce.
Question 21. How will TSA promote the use of small businesses in
the procurement process?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has a very
robust Small Business Program and continually strives to improve
maximizing small business participation in every contract action either
at the prime or sub-contract level. The Congressionally mandated small
business goal for the agency is 23% of contractual dollars per the
Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997. In fiscal year 2003, TSA
started tracking its small business goal numbers in the Federal
Procurement Data System (FPDS). As a start-up agency, the small
business percentages were only at 5.33% with small business prime
contract obligations at $116 million. In fiscal year 2010, TSA met its
goal by awarding 24.48% of its contracting dollars to small business at
the prime level with obligations exceeding $463 million. In addition,
TSA met its Small Disadvantaged Business goal of 10.3%. Lastly, for the
first time, TSA exceeded its Service-Disabled Veteran-owned small
business goal of 3%, which is a significant accomplishment for a young
Federal agency.
These significant small business accomplishments were achieved due
to the strict policy and procedures put in place by TSA. Every
contractual action over $150,000 must be coordinated with the Small
Business Office before a solicitation is released to ensure small
business participation is maximized to the fullest extent, either at
the prime or sub-contract level. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR), mandates that all contracts between $3,000 and $150,000 be
automatically set-aside for small businesses. For large business
contracts, TSA reviews every sub-contract plan to ensure compliance
with TSA's sub-contracting goal of 40%.
In addition, the Director of TSA's Small Business Office
participates in many contractor outreach events across the country,
educating small business owners on how to conduct business with the
agency and briefing them on future contracting opportunities.
Question 22. What are the demographics by gender, ethnicity, and
age of the TSO workforce? What percent of managers and supervisors are
women or minorities?
Answer. The first two charts show the demographics for the
Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce by gender, ethnicity,
and age. The third chart shows the breakdown of managers and
supervisors. All data is as of September 25, 2010.
TSO WORKFORCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALs by Percent
Race and National Origin (RNO) M F RNO by RNO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Indian or Alaska Native........ 308 253 561 1.2
Asian................................... 1,5 649 2,198 4.5
49
Black or African American............... 5,3 5,5 10,922 22.4
68 54
Hispanic/Latino......................... 4,6 2,9 7,673 15.8
90 83
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 122 128 250 0.5
Islander...............................
Other/More Than One Race................ 90 62 152 0.3
White................................... 17, 9,8 26,896 55.3
060 36
-------------------------------
TOTALs by Gender.................. 29, 19, 48,652
187 465
Percent by Gender*................ 60. 40.
0% 0%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* TOTAL TSA Workforce.
TSO Age Distribution
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age Count Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 20...................................... 72 0.1%
20-24............................................. 4,474 9.2%
25-29............................................. 7,680 15.8%
30-34............................................. 5,902 12.2%
35-39............................................. 4,646 9.6%
40-44............................................. 4,878 10.0%
45-49............................................. 5,867 12.1%
50-54............................................. 5,746 11.8%
55-59............................................. 4,898 10.1%
60-64............................................. 3,322 6.8%
65+............................................... 1,167 2.4%
---------------------
TOTAL....................................... 48,652
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSO Supervisor Age Distribution
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Age Count Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 20...................................... 0 0.0%
20-24............................................. 25 0.6%
25-29............................................. 248 5.5%
30-34............................................. 501 11.0%
35-39............................................. 545 12.0%
40-44............................................. 628 13.8%
45-49............................................. 857 18.9%
50-54............................................. 740 16.3%
55-59............................................. 526 11.6%
60-64............................................. 350 7.7%
65+............................................... 121 2.7%
---------------------
TOTAL....................................... 4,541
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSO SUPERVISORS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALs by Percent
Race and National Origin (RNO) M F RNO by RNO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Indian or Alaska Native........ 30 21 51 1.1%
Asian................................... 150 60 210 4.6%
Black or African American............... 490 301 791 17.4%
Hispanic/Latino......................... 364 192 556 12.2%
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 14 17 31 0.7%
Islander...............................
Other/More than one Race................ ... 1 1 0.0%
White................................... 2,0 870 2,901 63.9%
31
-------------------------------
TOTALs by Gender.................. 3,0 1,4 4,541
79 62
Percent by Gender*................ 67. 32.
8% 2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* TOTAL TSO Supervisors.
Question 23. What are the checkpoint screening protocols for
passengers who wear religious headdresses? Are all TSOs trained in
these protocols?
Answer. All headwear, to include religious headwear, must be
screened for prohibited items. Typically, headwear is screened via X-
ray or physical inspection. Working with various religious community
stakeholders, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has also
developed screening options for passengers who prefer not to remove
their religious headwear for X-ray or physical inspection. Detailed
procedures for screening headwear are Sensitive Security Information.
However, TSA is available to provide a briefing to the committee to
discuss specific headwear screening protocols. All Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) working at passenger checkpoints are trained
on the screening options available for individuals wearing headwear,
including religious headwear, as part of their initial and recurrent
training requirements.
Question 24. Several key rules for surface modes required by the 9/
11 Act are more than 2 years overdue. TSA has decided to write a
consolidated rule for sections 1408, 1517, and 1534 to establish
training programs for rail, transit, and inter-city bus employees.
Similarly, the subcommittee understands that TSA is writing a
consolidated rule for sections 1405, 1512, and 1531 to govern security
assessments and plans for the same three modes. What is the status of
these rules, and when will TSA issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) for each rule?
Answer. The consolidated proposed rule establishing security
training requirements for surface mode employees (sections 1408, 1517,
and 1534 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007'' (Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, 488-489 (2007) (9/11
Act)), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 1652-AA55-Security
Training Programs for Surface Mode Employees (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM), is in progress with a planned publication in the
second quarter of fiscal year 2011.
After further review, TSA determined that due to substantive
differences in the requirements for modal security assessments and
plans (sections 1405, 1512, and 1531 of the 9/11 Act), separate rules
for each mode in this area would be most effective. TSA's anticipated
time line for issuance includes: Mass Transit (expected publication of
NPRM first quarter fiscal year 2012), Freight Rail (expected
publication of NPRM fourth quarter fiscal year 2011), and Highway Motor
Carrier (expected publication of NPRM first quarter fiscal year 2012).
Question 25. TSA has proposed changes to the Transit Security Grant
Program (TSGP) grant guidance for fiscal year 2011, and the committee
is concerned that these changes will have a negative impact on the
security of transit systems and the regional partnerships that have
developed since the program's inception. Instead of agencies being able
to collaborate with TSA, FEMA, and regional partners to make decisions
based on the expert knowledge of their systems and the risks they face,
it appears that TSA will dictate what assets are eligible for grant
funding, while still holding grantee agencies ultimately responsible
for securing them. Even more troubling is the suggestion that transit
agencies compete for the 10% of funding to be made available for
operational costs, which is a clear departure from the risk-based award
process required by statute.
What is the status of the proposed changes for fiscal year 2011?
Does TSA intend to implement any or all of these changes?
If TSA has made a determination to implement any such changes, how
was that determination made? What grounds did TSA find that outweighed
the concerns expressed above, as well as significant stakeholder
feedback in opposition to the proposed changes?
Answer. Final decisions regarding the fiscal year 2011 Transit
Security Grant Program (TSGP) Grant Guidance and Application Kit are
pending the passage of a fiscal year 2011 Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) appropriation law.
As a risk-based grant program, DHS continually reviews the TSGP in
order to evaluate its effectiveness in responding to evolving threats
and reducing critical vulnerabilities in the mass transit environment.
The proposal for the fiscal 2011 TSGP would focus on proven operational
deterrence activities, such as canine teams, training, and public
awareness, and initiatives to remediate risk to large critical
infrastructure through a dedicated funding stream. Specifically, the
proposal on infrastructure would direct security funds to the highest
risk areas on the most vulnerable critical infrastructure, increasing
the safety and security of the Nation's traveling public.
Question 26a. The subcommittee believes that it is critical for TSA
and other relevant DHS components to partner with public and private
sector stakeholders in order to facilitate development and testing of
security technology specifically for surface modes. Moreover, the
subcommittee views the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in
Pueblo, Colorado, as an important element in both TSA's endeavor to
guide research and development of security technology for surface modes
and strengthening TSA's credibility with surface stakeholders.
Please describe all activities involving TSA that have been
conducted pursuant to sections 1409, 1518, and 1535 of the 9/11 Act, as
well as TSA's plans for carrying out these provisions in fiscal years
2011 and fiscal years 2012.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) have developed and implemented on-going programs for
Research & Development (R&D) and field evaluation/piloting of security
technologies across modes, including establishment of on-going test
beds. Many of these technologies are effective and suitable for several
modes (e.g., standoff detection of Person-Borne Improvised Explosive
Devices and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, under vehicle
screening, infrastructure protection, improvements in cyber security,
programs to assess effects of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive threats, and programs to collaborate with
industry to develop improved rail tank cars). There are also on-going
programs which track Toxic Inhalation Hazards (TIH) moving by freight
rail, clarify results of rail TIH tank car breaches, and have the means
of assessing and mitigating results of any TIH-related incidents. Both
TSA and DHS S&T have planned resources for security technology, R&D and
field evaluations/pilots in fiscal year 2011, which will continue on-
going programs and explore new technological opportunities.
Question 26b. Please describe all current TSA activities and
resources involving TTC, as well as TSA's plans to further leverage
TTC's experts, training facilities, and testing capabilities in fiscal
year 2011 and fiscal year 2012.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), in
collaboration with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the
American Association of Railroads established and maintains a test bed
at the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) to test and evaluate rail
conveyance vehicle-related security concerns. A multi-year modeling/
simulation and physical testing validation program was established
several years ago and is nearing conclusion. This program assesses
explosive destructive effects on mass transit rail cars. Follow-on
projects are being planned, with intent that the TTC test bed will
continue to be one of TSA's intermodal security test facilities.
TSA began to utilize the TTC in 2006 in order to train its
Transportation Security Inspector--Surface workforce on railroad-
specific safety and security issues. TSA entered into Memorandum of
Agreement with the FRA to build out a portion of the facility to allow
for more advanced training capabilities. In fiscal year 2010, TSA
continued the build out and expansion of surface-related training at
the TTC. The TSA facilitated classroom space modifications and
dedicated personnel to the site (6 Full-Time Equivalents) to develop
the surface transportation security-related course curriculum, manage
facility expansion projects, and to deliver training material.
Current training at the TTC for TSA employees includes coursework
focused on orienting field staff to the railroad operating environment
and providing related safety awareness. Future courses under
development at the facility will provide applicable TSA staff with
advanced railroad operating training, Visible Intermodal Protection
Response training, and highway motor carrier/over-the-road bus
operations. All of these courses include both classroom instruction and
on-site practical application and exercises. TSA expects to begin
providing these courses to certain field staff in fiscal year 2011.
Additionally, throughout fiscal year 2011, TSA will be coordinating
with the TTC in the development of an enhanced intermodal yard and
passenger transit station, which in the future will be used for
practical training.
Question 26c. Has TSA considered the potential for housing training
materials or courses at TTC in relation to forthcoming regulations for
bus, rail, and transit employees?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
considered the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) as potential
source for future stakeholder training that can be used to meet
requirements of forthcoming training regulations for surface modes of
transportation. However, there are many considerations and details that
must first be evaluated before a final decision on this can be made.
Question 27. The First Observer program is currently funded through
a 3-year grant under TSA's Trucking Security Program (TSP), although it
serves multiple transportation sectors, including inter-city buses,
school buses, truck drivers, highway workers, law enforcement, and
related critical infrastructure employees. However, since the initial
grant for First Observer was awarded in 2008, TSP has been zeroed out
of all successive DHS budget requests and appropriations legislation.
The subcommittee understands that the performance period for this
funding ends in July 2011 and considers it an imperative that this
cooperative, model program be sustained past that date.
Does TSA have plans to revive TSP in the fiscal year 2012 budget
request?
If not, does TSA have plans to extend operations of and resources
for the First Observer program beyond July 2011 in some other manner?
Answer. A review of the current 2008 funded Trucking Security
Program grant confirms that the First ObserverTM program, if
necessary, can be continued through calendar year 2011 using current
funding. For the out years, the Department of Homeland Security/
Transportation Security Administration will work with the
administration to determine the course of action for the program and
any appropriate funding measures.
Question 28. How does TSA plan to address the resource gap between
aviation and surface modes?
Answer. The surface transportation sector is significantly
different from the aviation sector, requiring strong stakeholder
partnerships and leveraging of State and local resources in
coordination with Federal requirements and support. There is
significant risk to surface transportation with a high level of
vulnerability due to the open nature of these modes. Various statutes
and executive directives require that transportation risk activities be
determined and implemented collaboratively in accordance with strategic
plans developed with security partners. To obtain a more complete
picture of system-wide risk and inform a National strategy, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has conducted a series of
risk assessments on U.S. passenger rail systems and assets, including
subway rail, commuter rail, and inter-city passenger rail. Building on
these risk assessments, TSA also completed the Transportation Security
Sector Risk Assessment (TSSRA) to serve as a comprehensive, cross-modal
view and comparative analysis of terrorist risk involving
transportation. These combined efforts play an essential role in the
Department of Homeland Security's mission to prevent terrorist acts
within the United States, to reduce vulnerability to terrorism, to
minimize damage from potential attack and disasters, and to improve
system resilience after an incident.
In fiscal year 2010, the TSA worked with the administration and
Congress to support additional efforts in surface transportation
security. TSA received resources to stand up 15 new Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, dedicated to the surface
transportation security environment. TSA is now able to conduct
thousands of VIPR operations annually in surface transportation modes.
TSA also served as the executive agent for decisions on $300 million in
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) public transportation and
railroad security grants.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget will support TSA's
continued efforts to protect the surface transportation system and
ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce, through:
Partnering with Federal, State, local, and private
stakeholders to optimize resources in a risk-based approach to
security;
Conducting inspections of freight railroads, mass transit,
and passenger rail facilities;
Deploying Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams;
Providing canines through the local law enforcement program;
Performing maritime credentialing activities to provide
assistance and oversight of local efforts; and
Providing technical support for the administration of
hundreds of millions of dollars in FEMA Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) Preparedness Program grants (including
Port Security Grants and Rail and Transit Program Grants).
Question 29. Now that Administrator Pistole has had several months
to review the program, does TSA have any plans to make changes in
STSIP's organization or administration?
Does TSA plan to continue the current practice of requiring surface
inspectors to go through aviation and air cargo training? Please
explain fully and include a detailed explanation of how the aviation
and air cargo training requirements are consistent with the program's
authorizing statute, which expressly defines permissible STSIP
activities as specifically surface-related.
Does TSA plan to continue implementation of TSI Evolution, whether
in general or to the extent that it affects STSIP? Please explain fully
the grounds on which TSA has determined to proceed or halt
implementation, and include a detailed explanation of how this course
of action is consistent with the limits and requirements in section
1304 of the 9/11 Act.
As of September 30, 2010, does the Regional Security Inspector
(RSI) have any authority over Federal Security Directors (FSDs),
Assistant Federal Security Directors (AFSDs), or Area Directors in the
field? Please indicate whether an RSI can--unilaterally or on behalf of
the TSA administrator--intervene with or directly overrule an FSD,
AFSD, or Area Director with respect to surface inspector activities and
hiring in the field.
Please provide a breakdown of all relevant diversity and
demographic data for the total number of surface inspectors employed by
TSA as of September 30, 2010.
Answer. The administrator is currently reviewing the Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP) to ensure it is
effectively and efficiently organized to accomplish its surface
transportation security mission. Any potential changes are pending the
completion of this review.
Question 30a. TSA has deployed Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
personnel--as well as other non-surface personnel--to lead Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) team deployments in public
transit and passenger rail systems.
Since the Federal Air Marshal Service's (FAMS) primary mission,
training, and experience are in supporting aviation security, how did
TSA determine that FAMS personnel should be deployed in surface VIPR
teams?
Answer. The Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
program was originally conceived to deliver two fundamental types of
operations, law enforcement and screening. Section 1303 of the
``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007'' (9/
11 Act) (Pub. L. 110-53) authorized the Secretary, ``acting through the
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration'' to
develop VIPR teams. and subsection 1303(a)(1) specifically authorizes
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) to be designated as assets for those teams.
The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) is TSA's designated law
enforcement arm and therefore, FAMS resources were designated for VIPR
involvement. As a foundation of their training, FAMs receive
instruction and develop law enforcement skills necessary to perform law
enforcement functions in all modes of transportation. FAMs
participation in VIPR operations enables TSA to effectively collaborate
with State and local law enforcement. It should also be noted that the
Congress approved dedicated funding within the FAMS in fiscal year 2008
specifically to establish a permanent VIPR program capability within
the Service to support multi-modal deployments.
Question 30b. Does TSA have plans for improving or changing this
program with respect to its activities in surface transportation
systems?
Answer. The Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
program is continually reviewed and refined with the objective of
effectively addressing risk in all transportation modes, including
surface. The short-term focus is on implementing an annual planning
process in which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) field
leaders work, in conjunction with their stakeholders, to determine key
locations and deployment frequencies. In addition, strategic
stakeholder and venue information from other TSA offices is being
combined with the field input to support more effective identification
and prioritization of deployment targets. Data from the Transportation
Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA) framework is also being
introduced to the planning and deployment processes. An information
management system is being implemented to integrate the risk, planning,
and operational information to further improve the program. Full
implementation of the integrated system is anticipated during fiscal
year 2012.
Question 30c. Does TSA plan to go proceed with creating fifteen new
VIPR teams? Please provide the grounds on which this determination was
made and address whether TSA has conducted or utilized any risk-based
assessment that reflects substantive, qualitative, and surface-specific
grounds indicating that fifteen new VIPR teams are the best option for
allocating $25 million to surface transportation security.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
created the fifteen new Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) teams that were funded within the fiscal year 2010 Surface
appropriation. The team locations were identified by considering the
surface transportation risks across the country and the mitigation
effects of the initial ten VIPR teams formed in fiscal year 2008, which
have been focused in high-risk surface transportation areas. To achieve
a National footprint and address remaining risk, the fifteen new teams
were assigned locations that had not previously been assigned VIPR
teams, all of which have identified significant surface transportation
risk locations. This assignment strategy enables broader coverage of
surface transportation risk and also provides the capability for all
resources to adapt to changes in threat levels and respond in a
flexible manner to all areas of the Nation.
Question 30d. Has TSA developed qualitative performance measures to
evaluate the effectiveness and cost vs. benefit of the VIPR program?
Please describe these measures or provide an explanation of why they
have not been developed or implemented.
Answer. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, in order to gauge
program effectiveness, the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) program implemented output metrics that provide insight about
data on deployment tempo, risk-based deployment focus, and stakeholder
satisfaction. By focusing on all three areas, the program is able to
infer program effectiveness. TSA continues to refine these metrics to
evaluate and adapt to improve VIPR reporting. In addition, the program
has established processes to implement outcome-focused metrics.
In addition, outcome-based metrics currently under development will
rely on stakeholder and location information as well as risk
measurement information captured from the Transportation Sector
Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA) methodology. Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) anticipates that the initial implementation of a
new information management system during fiscal year 2011 will
facilitate the collection of data necessary to establish baselines for
the outcome-focused metrics. The information system collecting this
data is scheduled for implementation by February 1, 2011, and
sufficient initial data should be available by July 1, 2011, to start
calculating metric results. Three fiscal quarters of initial data will
be used to establish the baseline metrics by January 1, 2012. The
metrics will be refined during fiscal year 2012, integrating
information anticipated to be available from linkage to the TSSRA
methodology, by July 1, 2012. By linking program inputs to program
outcomes, full implementation of the outcome-based metrics will provide
an additional tool to evaluated the effectiveness of the VIPR program.
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus of Nevada for John S. Pistole
Question 1a. I want to get you on the record on a pilot program
that was recently completed Boston's Logan Airport and at Las Vegas
McCarran, which is located in my Congressional District. As you know,
this pilot involves an enhanced pat-down technique, which I see as
being more invasive than the current techniques. I am concerned that
word of this pat-down technique will spread amongst travelers. Las
Vegas cannot afford to lose any visitors, and I would hate for someone
to cancel their trip due to privacy concerns regarding this new pat-
down technique. I want to ask you a few questions to garner more
details about the pilot and to ensure that TSA did not unnecessarily
inconvenience travelers.
How were the two sites (Las Vegas and Boston) selected for the
pilot?
Answer. BOS and LAS were chosen for this operational evaluation
primarily because of the exceptional working relationship between local
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel and their
respective Airport Authority and the willingness of airport management
to contribute to the evaluation of security screening improvements.
Additionally, since some aspects of the new pat-down procedures are
prompted by anomalies discovered during Advanced Imaging Technology
(AIT) screening, it was important to choose airports that: (1) Had AITs
that screened a population that was likely to generate a significant
sample size of situations requiring the new pat-downs; and (2) could
provide Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) that were highly
experienced in screening protocols for both models of the AIT. BOS and
LAS satisfied those requirements.
Question 1b. Do you anticipate using these sites for future
programs of this nature?
Answer. For each type of pilot we utilize a variety of factors for
selection of airports, therefore it is difficult to speculate on future
venues.
Question 1c. I am concerned that this pilot will not necessarily
yield tangible results. What metrics are you using to monitor the
efficacy of the pilot?
Answer. During the evaluation, a team of data collectors monitored
pat-down occurrence rates, reviewed cycle times (the amount of time
required to conduct each element of the screening protocols), screening
equipment availability and its relationship to pat-down requirements,
and passenger reaction to the pat-downs as recounted by the officer
performing the search.
Question 1d. What opportunities were afforded to passengers to
voice their opinions of the pilot? How are you incorporating this
feedback?
Answer. Since the evaluation was targeted to measure operational
impacts of the new procedure, passenger feedback was not actively
solicited during this evaluation. However, as indicated above, where a
passenger did react to the application of a new pat-down during the
evaluation, TSA collected the information and evaluated it. All
feedback provided by passengers--whether through Transportation
Security Officers, the data collectors, TSA's Got Feedback or Talk to
TSA Program, or to the TSA Contact Center--was reviewed and evaluated.
Question 2. On separate issue, in previous hearings you indicated
that the Department believed that canines play an important role in the
cargo inspection program. You further indicated that the Department was
developing standards for expanding the use of explosive detection
canines to include private sector canines and that a pilot test will be
conducted. Has the pilot test been scheduled? What is the timetable for
the pilot?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
has more than 600 canine teams in the Aviation sector available to
screen cargo bound for passenger aircraft.
The pilot program to evaluate private sector canine teams in the
cargo environment is anticipated to start in the second half of January
2011 and run approximately 120 days.
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