[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL CHAIN OF COMMAND: AN EXAMINATION OF
INFORMATION SHARING PRACTICES DURING A SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 12, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-74
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
64-700 WASHINGTON : 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the
GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Pete Olson, Texas
Laura Richardson, California Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Tom Graves, Georgia
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Al Green, Texas Daniel E. Lungren, California
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Tamla T. Scott, Director & Counsel
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Michael Russell, Senior Counsel
Kerry Kinirons, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 1
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 2
WITNESSES
Panel I
Col. Michael D. Edmondson, Deputy Secretary, Superintendent of
State Police, Louisiana Department of Public Safety &
Corrections:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Frank V. Hibbard, Mayor, Clearwater, Florida:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Panel II
Adm. Peter Neffenger, Deputy National Incident Commander, United
States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 38
Ms. Juliette Kayyem, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental
Affairs, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 38
Panel III
Mr. Ray Dempsey, Vice President of Strategy, BP America:
Oral Statement................................................. 61
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 63
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL CHAIN OF COMMAND: AN EXAMINATION OF
INFORMATION SHARING PRACTICES DURING A SPILL OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
----------
Monday, July 12, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight,
New Orleans, LA.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in
the Louisiana Supreme Court, 400 Royal Street, New Orleans,
Louisiana, Hon. Christopher P. Carney [Chairman of the
subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Carney, Green, Jackson Lee,
Richardson, Bilirakis, and Cao.
Mr. Carney. The Subcommittee on Management, Investigations,
and Oversight will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Chain of Command: An
Examination of Information Sharing Practices During A Spill of
National Significance.'' I would like to thank all of you for
joining us today.
We are here today to examine the command structure,
including roles and responsibilities for the response to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. We will examine whether the chain
of command is being properly followed by the more than 38,000
personnel responding to the spill and ascertain how information
flows from the Unified Area Command in New Orleans through the
Incident Command Centers in Houma, Louisiana, Mobile, Alabama
and St. Petersburg, Florida to State and local entities.
The most recent Government estimate projects approximately
60,000 to 100,000 barrels of oil are leaking from the damaged
well each day. Based on estimates of the Flow Rate Technical
Group, the spill has become the largest in U.S. waters,
eclipsing the 1989 Exxon Valdez several times over.
Prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill, the largest release
of oil from a platform accident was the Alpha Well 21 Platform
A disaster in 1969, also known as the Santa Barbara oil spill
which released about 100,000 barrels of oil. The Deepwater
Horizon passed that mark in the first couple of days.
Although there have been seven spills of National
significance exercises, or SONS, the magnitude of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill is so much greater spill that the
preconceived command structure may need to be revised. It is
hard to believe that anyone could have imagined the devastation
on the level that we are seeing today.
Secretary Napolitano's Spill of National Significance
declaration triggered the incident command system set forth in
the National response framework and dictated from that point
forward a unified command structure established by the Federal
Government would be in place to coordinate the response to the
spill. There are more than a dozen Federal agencies involved in
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill chain of command. Confusion
surrounding the chain of command for the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill is exacerbated by the number of Government entities,
including Federal, State, local, and Tribal that compromise the
unified response. Moreover, the magnitude of the present spill
has caused many of the Federal Government's best-laid plans to
become inoperable under the present circumstances. Past
exercises yielded a blueprint for the Deepwater Horizon
response. Unfortunately, the fact that the source has yet to be
contained and oil is continuing to flow into the Gulf has
prevented those in the chain of command from shifting solely to
a clean-up operation and caused a much more complicated
situation than had been previously imagined.
Today, more than anything else, I want to hear how smoothly
information is running up and down the chain of command. I
would like to hear constructive ways that that information flow
can improve. We need to know where the bottlenecks are so that
they can be eliminated. I want to know if local and State
entities are getting all the resources and the information they
are requesting as well as the Federal Government and the
decision-makers getting all the information they request.
As much as I hope nothing like this ever happens again,
none of us in this room are that naive. Sooner or later our
country will face another environmental disaster. We would be
remiss as a Nation if we did not thoroughly reflect on our
response to this incident so that we could be better prepared
for the next one.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for their
participation and I look forward to your testimony.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know on May 1, I, along with a couple of other
Members of this subcommittee requested hearings to consider the
Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard's
information-sharing and dissemination efforts, Coast Guard
staffing and resources, and the oil spill's impact on the Gulf
region. I am very pleased that the subcommittee--thank you, Mr.
Chairman--is meeting to consider these issues today.
It has been more than 80 days since this unprecedented
disaster began, and unfortunately there is no end in sight. Oil
has now reached the shores in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, and in my home State of Florida, damaging the
environment and wildlife and adversely impacting the fishing
and tourism industries, the lifeblood of many Gulf cities and
towns.
Like many Members of Congress, I am very concerned about
the Unified Command's efforts to share information with State,
local, and private sector officials. I have heard from numerous
constituents representing both the public and private sectors,
who are experiencing difficulty in receiving vital information
about the impact of the oil spill and recovery efforts. It is
for this reason I am interested in learning from our Federal
witnesses about how they provide information to their State,
local, and private sector partners and also how they respond to
the concerns of these partners.
I hope that this hearing will serve to further inform BP
and Federal responders of the needs and concerns of the
residents of the Gulf region that have been so terribly
impacted. I am also interested in hearing about BP and Federal
efforts to rapidly deploy resources and consider new
alternative technologies to combat this spill. We need to
consider all available options, including offers of
international assistance. The Unified Command must rapidly
consider and respond to local requests for resource deployment.
We cannot let bureaucracy get in the way of response efforts.
It was reported last week in the Washington Post that BP
has received approximately 120,000 proposals for technology
that could address the spill. I am concerned about reports of
delays in approving and deploying promising technology that
could help stop the further spread of oil. How are the
Government and BP processing these proposals to ensure that
credible solutions are deployed in a timely manner?
As we progress further into what NOAA has projected to be
an active--extremely active, excuse me--Atlantic hurricane
season, I would like to learn more about the potential impact
of a hurricane on oil spill response and clean-up efforts,
along with hurricane preparedness efforts.
With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses here
today. You all have a very important job ahead of you and the
Members of this subcommittee stand ready to assist you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
We have unanimous consent that Representatives Jackson Lee
and Richardson be able to sit and question the witnesses.
Without objection, the gentlewoman from Texas,
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, who chairs the committee's
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection; and the gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman
Laura Richardson, who chairs the committee's Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response are
authorized to sit on the dais for the purpose of questioning
the witnesses during the hearing today.
Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
Today's hearing will be divided into three panels. The
first panel is comprised of State and local witnesses. The
second panel will be comprised of Federal Government
representatives and the third panel we will hear from will be
from industry. I welcome each of the witnesses.
Our first witness is Colonel Michael D. Edmondson. Colonel
Edmondson was appointed as the 25th superintendent of the
Louisiana State Police in January 2008 by Governor Bobby
Jindal, who of course is an alumni of this committee. He also
serves as the Deputy Secretary of Public Safety Services and is
responsible for an agency of more than 2,800 employees and a
budget of nearly $0.5 billion. In his role as Deputy Secretary,
Colonel Edmondson oversees the Louisiana Highway Safety
Commission, the Office of Management and Finance, the Office of
Motor Vehicles, the Office of State Fire Marshal, the Louisiana
Oil Spill Coordinator's Office and the Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Commission.
Colonel Edmondson is a career State police officer, having
joined the organization in 1981. He earned his bachelor's of
criminal justice in 1980 from Louisiana State University. He
also attended graduate school there and is a graduate of the
prestigious FBI National Academy in Quantico and the FBI
National Executive Institute.
Our second witness is the Honorable Frank V. Hibbard, Mayor
of Clearwater, Florida. Mayor Hibbard was elected in March
2002. He is a graduate of Florida State University with
bachelor of science degrees in business and economics as well
as an MBA.
He served as the volunteer executive to the United Way of
Pinellas County and the Board of Corporate Partners at H. Lee
Moffitt Cancer Center as well as a Board Member of the Jim
Moran Institute for Entrepreneurial Study at Florida State
College of Business. Mayor Hibbard is a graduate of the Class
of 2000 Leadership Pinellas and the Class of 2007 Leadership
Florida.
He currently serves as Vice Chairman of the Tampa Bay Area
Regional Transportation Authority, or TBARTA, and on the Board
of the Pinellas County Metropolitan Planning Organization, the
Ruth Eckerd Hall, Salvation Army, and Clothes for Kids. Mayor
Hibbard is a member of the Florida League of Mayors and the
Mayors Council of Pinellas County.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Colonel Edmondson.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. EDMONDSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
SUPERINTENDENT OF STATE POLICE, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY & CORRECTIONS
Col. Edmondson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
committee; thank you for inviting me to discuss the information
sharing atmosphere that exists between the Command Group in the
State of Louisiana during this oil spill of National
significance.
Although I am here to discuss issues related to the oil
spill caused by the explosion and subsequent sinking of the
Deepwater Horizon, I would like to first take a moment to
remember the 11 individuals who lost their lives on the night
of April 20, 2010. The loss of life is tragic and should remain
at the heart of everything we do. I ask the committee to
remember these individuals and their families in your thoughts
and prayers. We do every day in Louisiana.
The Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO) was
moved to the Department of Public Safety in July 2009 by an act
of the Louisiana legislature. As you know and stated
previously, located within the Public Safety Services is the
Office of State Police, State Fire Marshal, Emergency Response,
and Hazardous Materials. These offices contain specialized
units such as crisis response and hazardous materials
management that were thought by the legislature to be
compatible with the core mission of LOSCO. From its inception
in 1991 until July 2009, LOSCO was organizationally under the
Office of the Governor. The move to place it under the umbrella
of a large State agency provided a backbone of support and
resources to assist LOSCO in carrying out its mission. The
Department of Public Safety is able to provide administrative,
technical, and logistical support to LOSCO at levels not seen
previously. The original numbers were seven; with the advent of
bringing them into the umbrella of State Police and Public
Safety, they have the ability to have 50-plus individuals at
their command when needed.
In 1995, LOSCO and its partners in State government created
a plan that describes how Louisiana agencies will respond
during oil spills. Called the State Contingency Plan, this
document helps clarify and streamline response procedures.
LOSCO and its partners are continually working to further
refine the State Contingency Plan. The results of this effort
provide a more detailed chain of command for oil spill
cleanups, including a description of each agency's
responsibilities in accordance with the Incident Command
System.
The State Contingency Plan is augmented by the Area
Contingency Plan. There are three of those in Louisiana; one
for each United States Coast Guard Marine Safety Office
jurisdiction: MSO New Orleans, Morgan City, and Port Arthur.
The plans describe response strategies for targeted areas,
thereby providing an essential layer of preparation for oil
spills. A committee guides each plan's development and
revisions. The committees are composed of representatives from
industry, environmental groups, and planners from Federal,
State, and local government. The committees meet regularly to
update oil spill response plans, identify sensitive resources
and develop site-specific response strategies. The meetings are
co-chaired by LOSCO and the United States Coast Guard.
Louisiana responds to any emergency through the Unified
Command process. Through this process, Governor Bobby Jindal
receives input from the involved State agencies and directs
their responses. The Unified Command Group is established by
statute and is defined as the strategic decision-making body
for emergencies in this State with the Governor serving as the
unified commander. The complex array of traditional and
emerging threats and hazards demands the application of a
unified and coordinated approach to emergency incident
management not only during emergencies, but during day-to-day
operation of State government. Governor Jindal established the
UCG membership by Executive Order. It is composed of 16 members
and I am a member of the Unified Command Group as well as the
Oil Spill Coordinator. We have met every day and this being day
84 since the oil spill, we have met every day with the Governor
to go over what is going on in the State of Louisiana. We have
been flown to places around the State that have been impacted
by the oil spill. The current Executive Director of the Oil
Spill Coordinator's Office is with me today, Mr. Roland Guidry.
He will be here for any questions you might have. He and his
Deputy Director, Dr. Karolien Debussche, are here with me also
and will communicate with me as they do on a daily basis as to
the status of the response and issues that may be communicated
to them through local, State, and our Federal partners. LOSCO
staff prepares and disseminates reports to me and my command
staff as to the status of the responses and the numbers and
assignments of staff assigned to the Deepwater Horizon event
responses.
Unified Command Group meetings are held daily in response
to this disaster. Also in Louisiana, our trustee meetings that
are comprised of the Department of Environmental Quality, the
Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife, and Fisheries,
LOSCO, and Coastal Protection and Restoration, they meet every
day as they look at the National disaster plan and damage
assessment to the State of Louisiana. The Governor and cabinet
members often present action items or requests for information
to these representatives, who take such items back to the
Incident Unified Command for review, response, and action.
A Spill of National Significance was declared by the
Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security
on April 29. Governor Jindal then issued a State-wide
declaration of emergency also on that same date. As the
immediate emergency rescue missions ended, LOSCO engaged the
Coast Guard and BP to begin normal oil spill response actions
in accordance with the Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and
the Louisiana Oil Spill Prevention Act of 1991. It is crucial
to note that under the Federal law, that being OPA 90, BP, as
the responsibility party, is legally responsible for response
and removal activities.
As the magnitude of the oil spill grew--and as you know, on
Day 1, there was a first report that came in there was no oil.
Of course, there was maybe 1,000 barrels and then maybe 4,000
barrels, then maybe 9,000, 15,000 and then 19,000 and now
anywhere from 30- to 60,000 barrels a day--it became apparent
that more defensive measures to protect the coastline were
necessary and that there was time to implement those measures
as the oil approached from 48 miles offshore. Local
governments, concerned with the lack of protective measures in
their parishes, developed more robust plans to counteract the
approaching oil, but were frustrated with their inability to
interact and participate in the response efforts. OPA 90
imposes responsibility upon the responsible party to conduct
response and removal activities with oversight from the United
States Coast Guard for offshore spills. BP and the Coast Guard
were rigidly, with little or no impact, executing an Area
Contingency Plan and the State and local governments found it
hard to influence those actions and to incorporate more recent
analysis of what critical areas needed protection.
Representatives from the State continued to engage the locals
in preparing alternative response plans. These alternative
response plans were then presented to BP/Coast Guard Incident
Command, and vetted through the Planning and Operations
subgroups. These plans were not adopted in full, but served as
a framework for use by the Unified Command in protecting the
coast from impact.
A State whose territory is impacted by an oil spill does
not have the authority to direct response activities. This
stands in marked contrast to the emergency response framework
for non-oil spill emergencies and disasters such as hurricanes,
tornadoes, ice storms, and earthquakes, where State and local
officials have the authority and are expected to take direct
actions to protect life and property. Under OPA 90, it is the
responsible party--in this case, BP--that has the authority to
conduct response and cleanup activities while the Federal
Government maintains ultimate authority. As the event continued
into the first weeks, the Coast Guard incorporated the local
governments into the response efforts, both to take advantage
of their in-depth knowledge of the local area, and to adopt the
detailed local response plans into the overall response effort.
LOSCO representatives have maintained their interaction
with local officials since the early days of this event. A
designated State On-Scene Coordinator has been present in the
Houma command center since its inception. Representatives of
State agencies have been integrated into various levels of the
Federal response to include the Houma Incident Command Post and
the Unified Area Command which was in Robert, Louisiana and is
now located here in New Orleans. Additionally, State employees
have worked tirelessly with local officials to better
coordinate resource requests and serve as an ombudsman for
local government. Additionally, LOSCO engaged a full-time
representative to enhance coordination with the parishes.
The United States Coast Guard has stationed a liaison
officer at the State Emergency Operations Center. The Army
Corps of Engineers, United States Department of Interior, NOAA,
and the Department of Interior and others have been actively
engaged in the response to protect Louisiana's coastline.
In conclusion, at this time, over 1,100 State personnel,
including our National Guard, are involved in the response,
both in the field and the Houma Command Center. The oil is the
enemy and our response will remain firm and lines of
communication will remain open.
As of today, we need more skimmers to remove oil from the
water, more boom to protect our shores, improved surveillance
of oil so it can be removed from the water before it destroys
more of our interior wetland. Most importantly, we need the
Federal Government to pay attention to strategies for
combatting this oil spill from those of us on the front line
and to take action on them with the urgency this fight demands.
If the Federal Government agrees this is a war, we need to see
that they are in it to win it, as our Governor stated. He
further states that our prayers continue to be with those on
the coast and every Louisianan who is impacted by this spill.
We are constantly amazed by the perseverance of our people in
responding to this disaster. They are on the front lines every
day turning fishing boats into defense ships, dragging boom to
the oil to stop the oil and always coming up with more ideas to
protect our land and waters.
It is the same spirit of perseverance that strengthened us
through hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustaf, and Ike. This same
perseverance leaves no doubt in our mind that we will win this
war against the oil spill and come back better than ever
before.
To the people of coastal Louisiana, we will stand with you
and work along side you until every drop of oil is off our
coast and out of our waters and all of our fisheries, our
industry are 100 percent restored.
I stand available for any questions at the conclusion.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Colonel Edmondson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Edmonson
July 12, 2010
Good morning. I am Colonel Mike Edmonson, deputy secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety, Public Safety Services. Although
I am here to discuss issues related to the oil spill caused by the
explosion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, I would like
us to first take a moment to remember the 11 individuals who lost their
lives on the night of April 20, 2010. The loss of life is tragic. I ask
the committee to remember these individuals and their families in your
thoughts and prayers.
Chairman Thompson and Members of this committee: Thank you for
inviting me to discuss the information-sharing atmosphere that exists
between the Command Group and the State of Louisiana during this Spill
of National Significance.
The Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO) was moved to
the Department of Public Safety in July of 2009 by an act of the
Louisiana legislature. Also located within the Public Safety Services
are the Office of State Police and the State Fire Marshal. These
offices contain specialized units such as Crisis Response and Hazardous
Materials Management that were thought by the legislature to be
compatible with the core mission of LOSCO. From its inception in 1991
until July 2009, LOSCO was organizationally under the Office of the
Governor. The move to place it under the umbrella of a large State-wide
agency provided a backbone of support and resources to assist LOSCO in
carrying out its mission. The Department of Public Safety is able to
provide administrative, technical, and logistical support to LOSCO at
levels not seen previously.
In 1995, LOSCO and its partners in State government created a plan
that describes how Louisiana agencies will respond during oil spills.
Called the State Contingency Plan, this document helps clarify and
streamline response procedures. LOSCO and its partners are continually
working to further refine the State Contingency Plan. The results of
this effort will provide a more detailed chain of command for oil spill
cleanups, including a description of each agency's responsibilities in
accordance with the Incident Command System. The State Contingency Plan
is augmented by the Area Contingency Plan (ACP).
There are three ACP's in Louisiana's coastal zone, one for each of
the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Safety Office (MSO)
jurisdictions.
MSO New Orleans ACP
MSO Morgan City ACP
MSO Port Arthur ACP
The plans describe response strategies for targeted areas, thereby
providing an essential layer of preparation for oil spills. A committee
guides each plan's development and revisions. The committees are
composed of representatives from industry, environmental groups, and
planners from Federal, State, and local government. The committees meet
regularly to update oil spill response plans, identify sensitive
resources, and develop site-specific response strategies. The meetings
are co-chaired by LOSCO and the USCG.
Louisiana responds to any emergency through the Unified Command
process. Through this process, Governor Bobby Jindal receives input
from the involved State agencies and directs their responses. The
Unified Command Group (UCG) is established by statute and is defined as
the strategic decision making body for emergencies in the State with
the Governor serving as the unified commander. The complex array of
traditional and emerging threats and hazards demands the application of
a unified and coordinated approach to emergency incident management not
only during emergencies but during day-to-day operations of State
government. Governor Jindal established the UCG membership by an
Executive Order. The UCG is composed of sixteen members. I am a member
of the UCG as well as the Oil Spill Coordinator. The current Executive
Director of the Oil Spill Coordinator's Office is Mr. Roland Guidry. He
and his Deputy Director, Dr. Karolien Debusschere, are here with me
today and communicate with me daily as to status of the response and
issues that may be communicated to them through local, State, and
Federal partners. LOSCO staff prepares and disseminates reports to me,
and my command staff, as to the status of the response, and the numbers
and assignments of staff assigned to the Deepwater Horizon event
response.
UCG meetings are held daily in response to this disaster. Present
at these daily meetings are representatives from BP and the Coast Guard
who brief the Group with what they represent to be the most up to date
data available from the Command Groups in Houma and New Orleans. The
Governor and cabinet members often present action items or requests for
information to these representatives, who take such items back to the
Incident Unified Command for review, response, and action.
A Spill of National Significance was declared by Secretary of U.S.
Department of Homeland Security on April 29, 2010. Governor Jindal
issued a State-wide declaration of emergency also on that same date. As
the immediate emergency rescue missions ended, LOSCO engaged the U.S.
Coast Guard and BP to begin normal oil spill response actions in
accordance with the Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (``OPA 90'') and
the Louisiana Oil Spill Prevention Act of 1991. It is crucial to note
that, under the Federal law--OPA 90--BP, as the responsible party, is
legally responsible for response and removal activities.
As the magnitude of the spill grew over the first several days, it
became apparent that more defensive measures to protect the coastline
were necessary and that there was time to implement those measures as
the oil approached from 48 miles offshore. Local governments, concerned
with the lack of protective measures in their parishes, developed more
robust plans to counteract the approaching oil but were frustrated with
their inability to interact and participate in the response efforts.
OPA 90 imposes responsibility upon the ``responsible party'' to conduct
response and removal activities, with oversight from the U.S. Coast
Guard for offshore spills. BP and the Coast Guard were rigidly
executing the Area Contingency Plan and the State and local governments
found it hard to influence those actions and to incorporate more recent
analysis of what critical areas needed protection. Representatives from
the State continue to engage the locals in preparing alternative
response plans. These alternative response plans were then presented to
the BP/Coast Guard Incident Command, and vetted through the Planning
and Operations subgroups. These plans were not adopted in full, but
served as a framework for use by the Unified Command in protecting the
coast from impact.
A State, whose territory is impacted by an oil spill, does not have
the authority to direct response activities. This stands in marked
contrast to the emergency response framework for non-oil spill
emergencies and disasters (such as hurricanes, tornadoes, ice storms,
and earthquakes) where State and local officials have the authority,
and are expected, to take direct actions to protect life and property.
Under OPA 90, it is the responsible party--in this case, BP--that has
the authority to conduct response and clean-up activities while the
Federal Government maintains ultimate authority. As the event continued
into the first weeks, the Coast Guard incorporated the local
governments into the response efforts both to take advantage of their
in-depth knowledge of the local area, and to adopt the detailed local
response plans into the overall response effort.
LOSCO representatives have maintained their interaction with local
officials since the early days of this event. A designated State On-
Scene Coordinator (SOSC) has been present in the Houma command center
since its inception. Representatives of State agencies have been
integrated into various levels of the Federal response to include the
Houma-Incident Command Post and Unified Area Command which was in
Robert, LA, and is now located in New Orleans. Additionally State
employees have worked tirelessly with local officials to better
coordinate resource requests and serve as an ombudsman for local
government. Additionally, LOSCO engaged a full-time representative to
enhance coordination with the parishes.
The United States Coast Guard has stationed a liaison officer at
the State Emergency Operations Center. The United States Army Corps of
Engineers, United States Department of the Interior, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of the
Interior, and others have been actively engaged in the response to
protect Louisiana's coastline.
In conclusion, at this time, over thousand State personnel are
involved in the response; both in the field, and in the Houma Command
Center. The oil is the enemy and our response will remain firm and
lines of communication open.
Thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Colonel.
We will hear from Mayor Hibbard. But Mayor Hibbard, please,
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF FRANK V. HIBBARD, MAYOR, CLEARWATER, FLORIDA
Mr. Hibbard. Thank you. I am very familiar with time
limits; thank you, Mr. Chair, committee. I am glad to have the
opportunity to talk to you and give you a local government's
perspective.
I would like to talk about communication between the
Federal, State, county, and local governments along with some
of the effects from an economic standpoint that this spill is
having in our area.
I understand that we are functioning under unified command
and have gone through all the required NIMS training. At the
same time, there has been a disconnect between the data that we
are getting at the local level. It is incumbent upon county
emergency managers to be at the top of the heap as far as local
response. Initially the conference calls that those emergency
managers were having on a daily basis with BP, the Federal
Government, and State DEP, we were not privy to those. So a lot
of that data is not filtering down to the local cities that are
dealing with this on a daily basis and trying to prepare and
understand the resources.
I did have the opportunity to visit New Orleans just a
couple of weeks ago and go out to the marshlands right here in
Louisiana and see the response and see the fact that you have
limited resources. We want to make certain that those resources
are going where they are most needed. We do not want to steal
those away from the areas that are currently being affected.
That being said, we also want to know that when the time
comes, we will have resources should oil start to threaten our
shores. That is one of the great challenges for us.
I would also say that many of the conference calls which I
have sat in on personally are very good from a technical
standpoint, to keep someone like myself or our emergency
managers up on the latest events. But as all of you know, all
of the issues that we face have many facets, they are very
complicated.
I would request that somehow, we get somebody who
specializes in public relations that can synthesize a lot of
that data down so that we can convey it to our citizens and our
businesses. One of the greatest challenges we have right now is
educating people on what truly is going on, what they can
expect, what form the oil may manifest itself on my beaches. We
are also a victim of geography and the very poor geography that
most Americans understand. They do not understand what a large
State Florida is and the fact that there may be oil in
Pensacola but we are 8 hours away and have not yet been
affected directly by the oil. But certainly have been affected
by the stigma that it brings. That is most affecting us right
now with our European tourists that are normally coming from
Germany and Great Britain. Those people are guaranteed that
they will have a positive experience by their tour operators.
If they do not, they are refunded their money. Now our hotels
are giving money-back guarantees that there will not be oil on
our beaches and if there are, that the customers will not have
to pay for that. But the airlines are not giving the same type
of treatment. Therefore, none of the tour agencies in Europe--
they have taken Florida basically off the map.
We continue to try to communicate where the oil is and
where it is not. A perfect example of poor communication was
Visit Florida using a NOAA map and talking about how tourists
should deal with oil should it be on the beach, for the entire
State of Florida. That was disseminated to Europe, it was
devastating. That is the bad type of information that we are
seeing out there and I think that is something that certainly
needs to be worked on.
Our area is just coming off of obviously the recession, we
were just starting to turn the corner, a very difficult cold
spring and also the demonization of business travel. We have
lost tremendous numbers of conventioners and we were just
coming off that and now we are dealing with it again. We do not
have the benefit of all the workers that Louisiana has. Our
hotels just simply are losing business because people do not
know that oil will not be there in a month or 2, even though we
know that the loop current probably will keep it away from us.
Let me give you just a couple of anecdotal stories. Our
fishing fleets are backing off, they are not getting tours any
more, they are concerned that some of our waters will be
reduced. Our hotels, and the hotels have a tremendous
multiplier effect. There are people in advertising, marketing,
logistics that work with them and when they lose business, that
trickle down effect is affecting all of these folks. We are
even having real estate deals that folks are backing away from.
That means we do not have documentary stamps, that means we do
not have other transactions and that money is then not in our
economy.
So, Mr. Chairman, I will end there. If there are any
questions I might answer, you also have my written statement,
which is far more detailed.
[The statement of Mr. Hibbard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank V. Hibbard
July 12, 2010
I would like to thank the Committee on Homeland Security for the
opportunity to address the tragic events in the Gulf that we have been
dealing with since April. I will be focusing my comments on
communication between different levels of government, BP, and the
public. I would also like to provide anecdotal examples of how this
catastrophe is affecting our local and State economy.
I did have the opportunity to travel to New Orleans in June with
the U.S. Conference of Mayors and tour some of the Louisiana coast
line. I have seen the resources being utilized and the devastation to
the environment and economy. I am sensitive to efficient use of
resources and making sure that resources are available to those most in
need. I do know that the issues in Louisiana are different from those
in Florida and believe the Federal Government has a responsibility
along with BP in recognizing this as a factor in allocation of
resources.
It is understood that we are functioning under unified command
throughout this event but at times it is unclear whether BP or the
Coast Guard has ultimate authority. The difficulty for local government
is that we are in daily contact with our citizens and businesses and
they look to us to be a filter and advocate for them. Currently the
Coast Guard and White House have daily conference calls, originally
local governments were not privy to these calls, that has since
changed.
We look to our County emergency managers on a local basis for
mitigation strategies and to determine whether we have all the
resources to combat oil should it arrive on our beaches and estuaries,
and the different forms it may manifest itself. We are concerned about
usurping the resources that are currently needed elsewhere but also
want to insure that we are prepared and will have access to the
resources should they become necessary. The time frames in which we
would be notified by Coast Guard have been a moving target between 4
and 6 days. As a Mayor I have to be able to assure our coastal
residents and businesses that we will be prepared to minimize damage
and coordinate a rapid clean-up!
I have personally listened to several of the conference calls and
they are helpful in staying abreast of recent developments especially
on a technical side. I would hope that an additional format can be
developed that is more appropriate for a layman. We need information
that is technically accurate but can be used to educate the media,
citizens, and the tourist industry. Our greatest challenge in
Clearwater and along the entire Florida coast is getting accurate
information about where oil is and areas that most probably will not be
directly affected.
While there has been a shift of economic activity in Louisiana from
fishing to oil clean-up, Florida is not reaping an offset of activity
we are simply seeing a decline in tourism activity. While those in
Louisiana fight a legitimate physical battle with oil we are in a fight
with perception and the stigma of potential oil. We do not have a flood
of workers staying in our hotels on the contrary we are losing
reservations on a daily basis.
Currently we are in our high season for tourists from Great Britain
and Germany this is very challenging because these countries require
tour operators to guarantee the quality of their customer's experience.
This guarantee has resulted in many tour operators taking Florida off
their menu of destinations. They have done this because even with the
knowledge that oil is not on Clearwater's beach today there is no
assurance that in a month when their client arrives that we will still
be unaffected. Many of our larger hotels have introduced programs that
offer a money-back guarantee should oil be on our beaches, this is
beneficial but does not eliminate the second issue which is airlines.
The second roadblock is that airlines are not allowing people to get
out of their reservations and so they are choosing other destinations.
What has all this done to our economy? It has hampered what was
starting to be a slow recovery from the recession and a very cold
spring. The multiplier effect of this is tremendous impacting;
restaurants, fishing charters, logistical companies, retail, marketing
firms, advertising, real estate, sales tax, car rentals, etc. We
recently had a group meeting from the Labor Department that canceled
because of the threat of oil and is now going to Boulder.
A few examples of the multiplier effect; we recently had a
convention coming that had contracted with a limousine and bus company
for all transportation it was a contract worth $35,000 and with the
conference moving to outside Florida that operator has lost that
revenue which creates jobs for drivers and a means to cash flow
vehicles. A prominent realtor I spoke with recently lost two beach
front condo closings due to the threat of oil on our sugar white sand
beaches. This resulted in a loss of commission that the realtor will
not be spending locally. The State has lost documentary stamp revenue.
There is no need for movers or the buying of appliances or any of the
other activities associated with a real estate transaction. Eventually
those units will sell but possibly at a lower price which then
diminishes property tax revenues that leads to fewer dollars for
Police, Fire, and Libraries. These are claims that are virtually
impossible to quantify and will most likely never find their way to BP.
We in Florida also face the challenge of geography, Clearwater is
over 8 hours from Pensacola but the media reports that oil is on
Florida's beaches without distinguishing that the majority of the State
is completely unaffected. I am not hopeful at getting our Nation to
become better at geography nor those from other countries, that is why
the quality of the information and the format in which it is presented
is so crucial. This falls to BP and the Coast Guard as the originator
of data. I would appreciate BP spending more money on public relations
for the areas that have been affected tangibly and simply through
perception.
I hope that this synopsis is helpful and I look forward to
answering questions not addressed as we work together to repair this
devastating tragedy.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Hibbard. I want to thank both of
you for your testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel and I will recognize myself for 5
minutes. If need be, we will go to a couple rounds of
questions.
This is for both of you. Have you ever received conflicting
information from the Federal Government and/or BP?
Col. Edmondson. I think you can go back to Day 1. I think
as part of our Hazardous Material Hotline Louisiana, the first
calls made into that line by BP was the fact that there was an
explosion on that oil rig, but there was no oil at that time
leaking, there was no impact to the State of Louisiana. That
continued for several days when they really did not know how
much was coming out of it. It could be as little as 1,000
barrels and it could be as much as an unlimited amount. That
changed every single day.
I think what was most disturbing for a member of the
Governor's cabinet is the fact that getting resources into the
State of Louisiana, we needed more boom, we needed more
skimmers. You know, you go back to Katrina, I was here during
Katrina, I saw the lives of families, I saw the looks on faces
and the response somewhat from the Federal Government--and this
is just honest--was maybe it is just not that bad. It is just
not that bad, this is New Orleans, there is a little water down
there, they are used to it, they are below sea level anyway.
Well, maybe this incident in the Gulf, maybe it is just not
that bad, is what they are saying.
With that much oil even from Day 1 escaping from that line
and the ability of how close it was to Louisiana of coming
here. Keep in mind, it still has not stopped. I mean we are
cleaning it up. It is easier to clean off the beach but it
still has an impact. Getting inside those marshes, remember,
that is what protects the city of New Orleans and cities along
interstate 10 as storms come into the State of Louisiana. When
that oil gets into the marsh, it just simply dies.
Mr. Carney. Colonel, was the fact that the first couple of
days or 2 or 3 days, that they said there is no or little oil
coming up as a result of the explosion, that delayed, in your
mind, the response from the Federal Government and State
governments in terms of getting skimmers and boom in place and
that sort of thing?
Col. Edmondson. I think it certainly did and I think when
you look at BP, did they have plans in place. Most definitely
they had plans in place. Were they plans that looked at
significance occurrence, was it worst-case scenarios? Because
this was a worst-case scenario in the beginning. It just did
not seem like they were prepared at that point to actually
fight that. To think that, again, maybe it is just not going to
be that bad and we will be able to clear this up, because most
oil spills in a regulated area, it is usually by space and even
by time and this was one in the middle of the ocean and 5,000
feet. Certainly when plumes of oil come up, they do not go
straight up, they move within the water. That is what we saw
within Louisiana and then every day, depending on the weather,
depending on the wind, it just kept coming right back into it.
The other thing with NOAA, they rely on mechanisms within
models to be able to look at where the possibility of the oil
might go but if it is not a live eye looking at it that day
because of weather or something like that, they really can only
guesstimate based on models out of another State, to see what
is happening in the Gulf of Mexico. So I think that was some of
the earlier unknowns and inability. Keep in mind, you are
dealing with the State of Louisiana, a very diverse group of
individuals that are going to go out there and do the best they
can to protect their areas and they started doing that from Day
1.
Mr. Carney. Are the lines of authority clear?
Col. Edmondson. I think they are in some parts. I think you
have to go to--you can certainly do whatever you want, but it
is that reimbursement. The ability of whether you do those
things even though you are trying to fight the oil doing those
things, there may not be a reimbursement in that portion of it
from either the Federal Government or from the Oil Spill Act or
whatever form or mechanism or funding that is available to get
those in.
Mr. Carney. I certainly hope that is not the initial
decision point before somebody acts.
Col. Edmondson. We certainly hope that also.
Mr. Carney. I am sorry--Mayor.
Mr. Hibbard. I would say there were several things. I think
the lines are becoming clearer, fortunately.
One of the things that has vacillated is how the oil would
manifest itself on our beaches. Would it be pure oil, would it
be sheen, would it be tar balls. We were told that Pensacola
would not get what I would call pure oil, that it would come in
the form of tar balls. That obviously has not been the case.
That is something that has been on-going.
We have been told anywhere----
Mr. Carney. Excuse me. Who told you this? Was it----
Mr. Hibbard. We had information from the Coast Guard.
Mr. Carney. From the Coast Guard.
Mr. Hibbard. Yes.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Is the Coast Guard your primary source of
information?
Mr. Hibbard. It is one of our primaries, having Air Station
Clearwater, who did the most Katrina sorties, they are one of
our primaries. Also St. Petersburg has been one of the incident
command points.
Mr. Carney. Right.
Mr. Hibbard. So they have been a point of contact.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Mr. Hibbard. The other issue has been how much notice we
would get. Obviously we are dealing with weather, so that is
variable.
Mr. Carney. Right.
Mr. Hibbard. But it has gone between 3 and 6 days that we
would have a firm number, that if they thought it was coming to
our beaches in the central west coast. At first, we were told 6
days, it has gone as low as 3 and now the party line is 4 days.
The question is: Do we have the resources to deal with it? We
have gone to each of our fire departments to find boom rather
than going to the Coast Guard or BP.
Also the success of boom. I guess you have all taken the
tour today. Certainly when I was here a couple of weeks ago,
you could see that the boom is a very imperfect defense against
the oil. We too have estuaries very similar to the marshes.
Then just the effects of a hurricane. What kind of wild
card is a hurricane, and I do not think that anyone knows that.
But getting a similar answer from different agencies is
difficult.
Mr. Carney. Okay. My time is up. Mr. Bilirakis for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mayor, are you hearing from constituents that the claims
process currently established by BP is sufficient? Are you
worried that claims that are difficult to quantify, such as the
impact on the real estate market or tax revenue will not
ultimately be paid by BP, and what input has BP solicited from
your office to ensure that they have complete information on
the impact of this spill on the Clearwater economy as they work
to resolve the claim issues?
Mr. Hibbard. Well, I would credit Mr. Dempsey, who you are
going to hear from shortly, to having very open lines of
communication. He has done an excellent job.
We recently had a claims office open in the city of
Clearwater, which is a good and bad thing. Once people hear
that you have a claims office, they assume again that you have
oil on your beach rather than you are just being impacted by
the threat.
I think the information on how people will go through the
claims process still needs work. That is one of the things that
I continue to hope to work on. Most of the people should be
putting their claims in on-line initially and then if they are
having difficulties with that, then they can go to an actual
field office to talk to them.
I think the second part of your question, Congressman, is
what I am most concerned about and that is quantifying the
effect of this spill and the stigma attached to it. When you
start getting further and further from the source of revenue, I
think that is very difficult. I do not know that we will be
able to quantify lost sales of real estate and what that means
to our tax base and how that affects police and fire and
libraries which we pay for through those tax revenues. All of
the other multipliers within that. I think the further you get
from the source, if you are not a fishing charter boat, if you
are not a hotelier that has not had a canceled reservation, how
can you quantify the business that simply is not even making
inquiries in coming to your area?
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. As in many Gulf cities, the
tourism industry in Clearwater has suffered greatly from the
cancellation of events as a result of this spill. You mentioned
in your testimony a group from the Department of Labor
canceling their meetings and relocating them to Boulder,
Colorado because of the threat of the oil. This seems to
illustrate the point that the Government is not doing a
sufficient job internally to share information, let alone
spread the message that the oil has only reached certain parts
of Florida. What efforts would you like to see taken in terms
of public relations and media messaging to alter the current
perception that oil has reached all of Florida? You mentioned
Europe and other parts of the country as well.
Mr. Hibbard. BP has given money to the State of Florida. A
portion of that recently did come down to our Tourist
Development Council within our county, which was our initial
request to the Governor, because we believe that we understand
our market and the markets that we serve better than Visit
Florida does. We have been trying to get the information out.
I think it is very difficult to get that information. The
media has not been as helpful as we would like in reporting on
the stories of where oil is versus where it is not.
My other concern I think is that we need to have another
form of information that is less technical, that is accurate.
Accuracy is critical but the information that we get from the
Coast Guard and FDEP is not the kind of information that we can
pass on to tour operators and hotels and our citizens. So there
needs to be a more user-friendly medium.
Mr. Bilirakis. Question for the entire panel and my last
question, Mr. Chairman.
What impact has the oil spill had on your hurricane
preparedness efforts? Maybe Colonel, you could start on that.
Col. Edmondson. Of course, we started some time ago with
our hurricane preparedness. One of the main things we needed
from BP, which took awhile to get from them was exactly their
evacuation plan. That is going to be important to us as we look
at removing those people that are closest to the coastline of
Louisiana. So we need a plan from BP of actually how they are
going to remove those people from the oil rigs, from the
working ships in that area, to move them into Louisiana so we
can get them out of harm's way.
What is critical to Louisiana is the H-hour and that is the
hour when tropical force winds reach the coast of Louisiana.
Once that starts 40 hours out, we have to start looking at
contraflow, which is our last means of removing people from
south Louisiana. Once we do that, of course, we close
interstates and move them in one direction so we can move
people. It is kind of like an hourglass. Prior to contraflow,
you can go anywhere you want. To move people out, we encourage
it, we assist people in doing that, but once those tropical
force winds get close to the coast, we have got to quickly move
those people out. So what has been critical, and we have gotten
those plans from BP but it was a lot later than we would have
liked to have gotten them. But we have been working, that is a
constant effort that is on-going within Louisiana as far as
hurricanes. We are certainly not, along with our brothers in
Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and of course in Texas, we do
know how to deal with those things. Our concern is the life and
property in the waters, to actually move those prior to
hurricanes coming in.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Mayor.
Mr. Hibbard. Congressman, it has not changed any of our
plans. Obviously those are in place. I think what it is, more
than anything, is a distraction. As soon as we hit June 1,
obviously we need to keep our eye on the ball in preparation
for hurricanes. I think the spill has certainly distracted us
from that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Green for 5
minutes, please.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
you for your visionary leadership. This is clearly a hearing
that is timely. I also would like to thank the members of the
Court and the Court Administrators. It is not that often that
we have an opportunity to have a hearing in such a stately and
courtly environment. Most appreciative that we have been
afforded this opportunity.
Colonel, in my opinion, some things bear repeating. What
you said about the lives lost, it bears repeating. Eleven
people lost their lives, families are still suffering. Many
were injured, still recovering. We should not forget that while
we have other concerns that have to be addressed, those lives
that were lost must be considered such that we never allow this
to happen again. I do not want us to lose focus and I am most
appreciative that you called it to our attention.
Mayor, I want to thank you for your testimony. You have a
perch from which you have viewed this that is exceedingly
important to us. So I will have a first question for you,
Mayor.
Heard a lot about the moratorium and we hear quite a bit
about the jobs that are impacted. You are from another side of
the Gulf. I am interested in knowing what your people are
saying about this in terms of getting it right so that it never
happens again.
Mr. Hibbard. There has been great discussion on that,
Congressman. Our Governor has called a special session to talk
about offshore drilling on Florida, which was on the docket for
the next legislative session. I think the majority of
Floridians right now see the threat that offshore drilling
presents. At the same time, visiting here several weeks ago, I
had the opportunity to be meet several families, half of which
were fishermen and half of which worked for the oil industry.
Those seemed to be inseparable. They believe that they can
continue to live in harmony. I think the key is making certain
that there are steps to increase safety on the rigs. We
understand that we want to move towards energy independence.
I would make one comment. Certainly we should remember the
11 men that died on that rig, but there are lives being ruined
right now because of the economic impact--people who will lose
their livelihoods, lose boats, lose family businesses, that
they may never get back.
Mr. Green. Thank you. I concur with you. There is a balance
that we have to achieve. We have to make safety of primary
importance and I understand this and I have a special
relationship, by the way, with your State and with this State.
I was born right here in this city and was reared in Florida.
You and I went to institutions that border each other, I was at
Florida A&M. So I do understand both States and I concur with
you with reference to what we must do to do what we can to
minimize the impact on the economy throughout the area along
the Gulf coast. That balance has to include all that we can do
to stem the flow of the oil, to move on with getting people
back to work and keeping those jobs available, as well as
making sure that we do not have the tragedy occur again. I just
do not want us to lose sight of that as we talk about the
economy. The economy is exceedingly important but so are lives,
and it is that balance that we have to achieve.
I would like to ask you, if I may, Colonel, as you have
been working with the various departments trying to maintain as
much intelligence as possible, what has been the chief obstacle
that you have encountered in terms of having information flow
to you such that you would have the empirical evidence that you
need to make the decisions that you have made along the way?
Col. Edmondson. I think several issues that you have got to
look at in that. One, the ability to know where the oil is
moving to. Evidence outside of models from other States that
guess possibly where the oil is moving to and then for us to
see an impact to an area that the models did not really show
that. Nothing beats a live eye, the ability for weather to be
clear to allow a plane to fly over to actually see from it. I
think that was what was so important for every single day as we
finished our Unified Command Group meeting, we got on a
Blackhawk helicopter with Governor Jindal and we went to where
we thought the oil was, so we could see first-hand, so we could
talk to the individuals that were there and ask them: How is it
affecting you, how can we do this better? There was an
inability of that.
I think the flow of communication early on was significant,
because as we needed more boom, you really were not sure where
the boom was. It was being deployed to other States, we
certainly got our fair share in Louisiana, but some got moved
to other States where there was no oil at the time. Then they
would try to move it back to Louisiana. We also know that there
was not a large supply of boom in the world at that time and we
were trying to get as much as we could into Louisiana. But
listen to that every single day, knowing that we needed those
skimmers, knowing how much oil was coming out of that area,
that it was just going to continue to flow, you needed that
information, needed to get it quickly. So I think that flow of
information early on to know the significance of this event.
Certainly, BP had to know the significance of what the worst-
case scenario would be from that oil and it just was not given
to us in the timely manner that we felt we could have been a
little bit more prepared.
Plans were there, but also the ability to be flexible
sometimes with those plans, to know your plan is this, this is
what we are geared up for. Well, but you know what, we know
that area a little bit better, we know that we should be
flexible, let us do some other things here. Just the inability
to do that in a timely manner. We will get back with you
tomorrow, we will get back with you next week. Then next week,
well, you know, give us another week. Every day that oil is
flowing, every day lives are impacted, every day the economy is
impacted. The Gulf is 35 percent of our seafood industry in the
country, a third of our oil. So we know every day what that
impact was. I think it was an inability for that to be focused
so that we could get the right resources in place. I think that
was probably the biggest obstacle as we looked at that, getting
that flow of information.
We have a working relationship with our Coast Guard,
members of the Coast Guard was in our command staff briefings
every day. So we had the ability to get that, but even from
that point, sometimes his answer was, you know, I can only pass
that forward. I will get back to you tomorrow. Tomorrow is 24
hours later and sometimes that is what the difficulty is. Both
agencies were frustrated in ability to move forward on that. I
think we saw that.
I was in the very first meeting when President Obama came
to Louisiana, I was able to be in that room that day. To hear
from the EPA of the impact in New Orleans, to hear on our
coastline, to hear from the Coast Guard, to hear from the
officials first-hand what was going on and even the inability
of well, we really are not sure exactly what to do, exactly
what needs to be done. I think that inability that we saw in
those first few days and first few weeks, I think we have paid
the price for that as we move forward. Because it is hard to
recoup that when the oil has not stopped. It is still flowing
every single day.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Col. Edmondson. I just want to add this, if I could. What
is most important, and I know y'all know this. This is not a
100-yard dash. When that oil--we hope that when they place it
on there, we can stop that oil. We pray for that every day. But
that is not the end. We cannot declare victory after that. We
still have to clean it up, we still have to fix our fisheries,
our coastline, our shoreline. That is what we have to remember.
This is a marathon. We need to be in it for the long haul and
that is why it is so important for y'all to have these
hearings, that is why I am so pleased you could be here to be
able to talk about these things, because you need to hear from
us. We are in it for the long haul and we need to hear that
from y'all.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Green. Mr. Cao for 5 minutes or
so, please.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this important hearing in my district, which is at the
front line of this oil spill.
I have seen first-hand the confusion and the frustration
caused by what I see as a lack of a coherent command structure.
So most of my questions will be focused--will be asked toward
Colonel Edmondson.
My first question to you, sir, is you stated in your
testimony that Federal officials should listen more to State
and local governments with respect to this oil spill. In what
ways has the Unified Command lacked in that regard and how has
this deficiency affected the State's ability to prevent oil
from entering our most sensitive areas?
Col. Edmondson. Well, I think we have certainly seen
improvement. As we have all grown in this matter, we have
certainly seen improvement in that area. But I think
understanding the fact that people live in an area, work in an
area, work within that industry, they know first-hand the best
ways to approach the problems of significance in that area. I
think we saw that and tried to get that information out, to be
able to be flexible in those plans and to get the communication
out. Maybe the original plan showed that boom needed to be in a
specific area, but to be flexible to know that, you know what,
it did say that, but it also needs to be here. As the currents
flow within the Gulf, as weather has affected it, as winds
affect it, the ability to be flexible and move those things in.
I think that was the frustration, as I saw it, from the
beginning. Again, I am here from the emergency response effort,
to be able to talk about that, and the inability for us to do
that.
But certainly it was in place to address those matters, but
just the flexibility to change as those matters came in place.
Mr. Cao. Now did you see I guess mixed messages from the
different agencies who were deciding on a number of projects or
on a number of procedures? Did you encounter, for example, one
agency saying one thing and another Federal agency saying
another thing? What kind of confusion has that caused, for
example, State agencies to better mobilize?
Col. Edmondson. Well, I think just in line when you say I
will get back to you, the oil is still flowing. To say I will
get back to you when you meet again, it might be 24 hours
later. I think it takes sub-sea dispersements. We were against
that, we wanted more information on that. Certainly when you
disperse oil, it has got to go somewhere. When it breaks up
into much smaller pieces, there is some understanding from
Wildlife and Fisheries and the Department of Environmental
Quality in Louisiana who were listening to our own scientists
who work daily within that region and knows the marshes, knows
the sub-sea life and the fisheries there. I think the lack of
trying to get that information available, because we do not
know what the long-term impact is going to be on that, we still
do not know to this day.
So I think some of those things as you compile them
together certainly were frustrating as we moved forward in that
because there were so many unknowns and even we might have had
impact in that and it did not necessarily go the way we would
suggest it. It had impact directly to the State of Louisiana.
Mr. Cao. Now if you were in the shoes of Admiral Thad
Allen, what would you want to implement?
Col. Edmondson. I am not in his shoes thankfully.
Mr. Cao. But if you were in his shoes, what would you want
to implement?
Col. Edmondson. Well, I certainly hate putting words in
people's mouths, but I think the ability to just get everyone
together and really listen more than speaking, let us listen to
exactly what is going on out there, let us talk to the people.
Let me tell you something, these Coast Guards that live and
work in Louisiana, they are Louisianans, they live and breathe
and work here, they have families here. There was even some
frustration internally what to do from the beginning because
this was such a large magnitude. You know, it is just like the
worst-case scenario was not there. We saw him do that, bring
people in and try to get all the information available and find
out where are the resources. Take the game of football, it
takes a game plan, a game plan to get things done, to move that
football down the field, to score a run in baseball, to score
the winning goal in soccer--it takes a game plan. You have got
to be able to stick to that game plan but be flexible in it
also.
Mr. Cao. What can we do to improve information sharing
between Federal, State, and parish officials?
Col. Edmondson. I think we are doing it right here,
Congressman. I think by bringing people together, having
oversight from a committee such as this and make people talk
about this so it is reported in the news, people see that. I
think that is important.
But keep in mind, once this is cleaned up and we move
forward, we are still involved with the Coast Guard, we are
still involved with industry in Louisiana. We have got to be
able to move forward and I think that is why the open line of
communication, listening, learning from mistakes, learning from
incidents that happen and moving forward. I think that is going
to be the key to this.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Cao. Ms. Jackson Lee for 5
minutes, please.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and Ranking
Member for what is a very important hearing as it lays claim to
jurisdictional concerns by the Department of Homeland Security
and this committee.
Colonel, you are right, we are communicating and I am
listening. It is not just communication, because this is, as my
colleague has indicated, a major tragedy. There are families,
as we sit here today--and some might think that we are speaking
calmly--who are still mourning the loss of their loved ones.
There are families who are still nurturing the wounds, both
mental and physical, of their loved ones.
Mayor, if there is a resiliency, it is in local government
because you have got to be the captain and the champion, you
have got to inspire your businesses and your local population
to say hold on.
But I want to show a little bit of emotion and suggest that
this is gut-wrenching, this is fist-pounding, this is hair-
pulling. We should not be ashamed of it. Because the people of
the Gulf are resilient. Hurricane Rita, Hurricane Katrina and
others, what more can they expect? Why have they been rendered
this? Natural disasters we know may have no explanation, but a
man-made disaster, for people who are educated and versed with
the technology of their industry, you wonder why. So frankly, I
am fist-banging today and outraged.
My sympathy to the families and as well to the hard-working
workers, innocent families in the industry, energy industry,
and shrimpers and oyster persons and fishermen and others who
depend upon the Gulf.
I want, Colonel, to say to you that I note the
conflictiveness of this process. BP is in charge, the Federal
Government is ultimately accountable. That is unique. I would
like to raise a question that if we can correct the structure
of the utilization of what we call National disaster--a
National disaster means that you pull upon Federal resources.
The tension between not calling this a National disaster is to
throw the burden on the Government as it relates to money.
Would it not be helpful if we looked at that proclamation
of a National disaster and had a modification of it that would
allow the private entity to pay, but draw in all the resources
of a National disaster? That is distinctive from a disaster of
significance. Colonel.
Col. Edmondson. I think you are right on with that, Ms.
Jackson Lee. I think that is exactly something you have to look
at and I certainly applaud you for making that statement
because that is what we have to head into.
I have got to add, if I might, our thoughts to Texas. Y'all
were so good to us in Gustaf. I was on the tarmac with Governor
Jindal as we watched ambulances there with people whose oxygen
was being depleted and once that was out, it was over. To see
those planes come from Texas, that was incredible, to bring the
resources that you have. I am going to be meeting with my
counterpart in Texas in Houston on July 20 and we are going to
talk about preparedness, we are going to talk about this
incident, and try to work with the police chiefs in Houston,
Beaumont, and Orange to try to look at helping Houston, helping
Texas the same way that y'all have been so good to us.
I apologize for adding that, I know that is not what we are
here to talk about, but I think it needs to be said.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We appreciate it.
Col. Edmondson. Y'all have been incredible neighbors and we
are going to certainly be just as good to y'all.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We appreciate it.
Col. Edmondson. Thank you for those comments. I think that
is something we have to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me pose another question if I might.
The Federal Government, with its structure, if there was
the provision that if a company had a series of violations of
safety, that the Federal Government could shut that company
down in offshore drilling. Would that have made a better
situation, now that we know how many safety violations BP had?
Col. Edmondson. I think certainly as we move forward we see
the significance, as the Federal Government, State government
gets involved in the investigation. I think you are going to
see how significant that would have been.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mayor Hibbard, let me ask you with respect
to the tourists and the effort that BP has had. Would you want
funds to come directly to local government and what greater
efforts can BP implement? Maybe they can use some of the
advertising dollars that they have utilized now. I certainly
appreciated that they tried to give the public more
information. But I would think that they have given them enough
information about how many good people are there trying to pay
claims. Could they use some of that or could you use some of
that--you do not have the ethical violations that might come
up--to pay to advertise the goodness of the Florida coastline?
Would that be helpful to you?
Mr. Hibbard. That has been something, Congresswoman, we
have been asking for and have not gotten directly. But we do
believe that we have the knowledge to really utilize those
dollars and in a way to ultimately save BP money because we
would not have the losses.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Less people for claims.
Finally, Colonel, let me just say that in Katrina, as you
well know, there was a degree of frustration, devastation,
emotional distress. Legislation that I am writing called The
Remedies Act includes some of the questions that I asked you.
One that it adds is resources for post traumatic stress, which
I imagine is happening to shrimpers and others, restaurant
owners. Would that be a component in a disaster funding or
structure that should be put in place?
Col. Edmondson. Absolutely, and we are seeing evidence of
that even today. So that is absolutely something we need. We
certainly saw it in Katrina. I was there. Now we are seeing it
after this incident. I think you are well within the right
direction on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. Ms. Richardson for 5 minutes. But
before you do that, I think we will have enough interest in
another round for this panel. So go ahead.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe it is Colonel, right?
Col. Edmondson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. I think you asked the question: Are we in
this for the long haul? The answer is yes, and that is why we
are here. Many of us could be in our district and doing other
things but we are here because we are concerned about what has
happened. We view that there is accountability that can go
across the board and that is why we are here.
Let me talk a little bit about communications and outreach.
You talked about layman's terms. I have got to tell you--and
let me say I am so glad--first of all, I want to thank our
Chairman, Mr. Thompson; I want to thank Secretary Napolitano
for affording Members an opportunity to not only be here for
the hearing but to actually come and to see some of the real
world of what is happening out there that you are facing.
I have got to tell you this--and you know, many of us have
our frustrations and we are going to have an opportunity to
talk to a BP representative shortly, but one of my biggest
frustrations, and I am going to be very frank with you, is the
media and how this has been portrayed.
When I listened to you, Mr. Hibbard, it is almost criminal
what is being done on the television. I expected--and I am
going to be very frank with you--I expected to go out there and
see waves and waves of oil. I had no idea to be able to put
into perspective--I am from California--I had no idea, and I
have been to New Orleans many times, but I had no idea how to
put in perspective the miles of distance between New Orleans
and where we are seeing the unfortunate impacts. So to me,
shame on the media, which I think equally has a role to play in
this of hyping some of this up to the point that people are
afraid to come out of their homes, they think birds will never
fly again. I mean it is wrong what has happened.
So what I intend upon doing and what I intend to challenge
some of the Government agencies is shame on us for allowing the
media to paint the story of what is happening out there. If we
have to do our own television shows on C-SPAN or YouTube or
whatever it is, then let us do it. But we should not be
allowing the one or two scenes--you know, I have some
information I am going to show you of, yes, oil that I saw,
and, yes, it is there. But it is not what I have seen on the
television and it is wrong. So part of what is hurting the
economy is the failure to properly communicate what in fact is
happening.
So I wanted to say that publicly first and then I will get
into my two questions. One for each of you.
Colonel, in your testimony on page No. 5, you talked about
participating in the response and you said, ``Local
governments, concerned with the lack of protective measures in
their parishes, developed more robust plans to counteract the
approaching oil, but were frustrated with their inability to
interact and participate in the response efforts due to the
response framework dictated by the OPA 90.''
What specifically do you have as an example of what you
mean by that?
Col. Edmondson. I think most important is flexibility. I
know when you have an incident of this magnitude, you have got
to be able to be flexible to know that just because in your
plan it may have called for boom in one specific area, you
ought to be able to move it on an as-needed basis, that was
hard to do. Also, when you need more of it, you need to know
when it is coming. Not just say, well, you know, it is coming,
it will be here tomorrow and the next day well, it is going to
be here the next day. I think every day I think that hampered
us and I think that was some of the things we saw involved in
that, in getting that information to them and understanding
they know it better than anyone does, especially in those
areas.
So I think more than anything else the flexibility of
getting that information and also giving them impact to know
what is needed in that area and try to get the resources there.
I know that Chairman Carney actually said we hope that
certainly did not impact that, it certainly did and they moved
forward and did some of those things and whether we are able to
fund that or not, certainly that was the right thing to do. But
there ought to be some flexibility in there to actually allow
them to do that.
Ms. Richardson. Have you seen that improve?
Col. Edmondson. We have seen improvement in that. I think
you have seen that, and certainly as we move forward. But I
think the damage done in that critical early aftermath of it, I
think that is going to be the problems we see from this point
out.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, and then my last question of this
series is to Mr. Hibbard and I apologize if I am butchering
your name here. You said it was difficult to know who was in
charge, whether BP or the Coast Guard ultimate had authority.
That was on page 1 of your testimony.
Do you not know that today, honestly?
Mr. Hibbard. I feel much more comfortable now understanding
the chain of command. Those lines have been brightened.
Ms. Richardson. Who, in your opinion, is in charge?
Mr. Hibbard. I feel the Coast Guard is in charge now.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Hibbard. But at first, I really felt as though BP was
calling the shots and even had written the President a letter
to that effect, being very concerned. The Colonel had mentioned
that it is like a game plan for a football team. We really do
need a single coach calling the shots. I appreciate home rule,
but you even have competing States for resources.
Ms. Richardson. Absolutely.
Mr. Hibbard. So we do need unified command. I think that
has improved, but it is something to be looked at for future
events.
Ms. Richardson. So as I close my first round, I just want
to say not to in any way portray that what I saw is not
damaging and it is not going to take tremendous work to repair,
but what I also saw is that it is not everywhere. All of the
implications that I thought were not certainly the case.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Ms. Richardson. I think we will do
another round with this panel and I appreciate your
forbearance. We do not do this always.
I'm sorry?
Col. Edmondson. If you need any part of the technical
information also, it is available.
Mr. Carney. We will get to him if we need it. But the fact
we are doing this is testament to the compelling nature of your
testimony. So thank you very much.
Colonel, does your office provide input on the spill
response efforts? If so, how was that received and how was that
information treated?
Col. Edmondson. We have input at the meetings and as
information goes forward, we have an actual on-scene
coordinator through Mr. Guidry's office. He actually was there
from Day 1 probably for the first 40-some-odd days, was
actually there every day in the command post there in Robert,
Louisiana and then we moved him to Houma because that is where
the main emphasis was taking place. So we have people in
meetings, we have people that are listening.
I think what is critical here, if I may just go in this
direction, is the real-time information. I think that is what
is so critical. You get that in hurricanes, because everything
is in the emergency operations center. With us having that
emergency operations center say in Baton Rouge, say in the
capitals around Tallahassee or Austin, wherever, Birmingham,
Jackson; we had an office in Houma, we had an office in Robert
and now in New Orleans. So getting that real-time information
and getting it to the Unified Command Group, I think that is
where some problems flow in there that you had this, that you
have those offices going on. So just getting that real-time
information has been difficult.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Guidry, how were you received? When you
gave your input to the group, did they embrace it and say thank
you or----
Mr. Guidry. I was accepted by the unified command.
Mr. Carney. Okay, very good.
Colonel, did your office participate in the SONS 2002
exercise they had in New Orleans when they had--please step up
to the chair and join us.
Mr. Guidry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I played the State on-scene coordinator for that along with
Admiral Thad Allen. We worked the SONS. The first day after the
spill, he told me this is worse than what we had practiced.
Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Carney. Right.
For the record, could you identify yourself and your
position and spell your name.
Mr. Guidry. My name is Roland Guidry, R-o-l-a-n-d G-u-i-d-
r-y and for the last 18\1/2\ years, I have been the oil spill
coordinator.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Now, the spill that we are seeing now is
worse than you practiced in 2002. What could we have done to
close that gap between the reality that we saw and what you
practiced? What do you see that we need to do differently?
Mr. Guidry. You know, I was the oil spill coordinator for
Katrina, Rita where we had over 700 spills. We had 10\1/2\
million gallons of oil at one time that got into the
environment. We put our hands around it, but not by ourselves.
We had the Gulf Strike Team and the Coast Guard Strike Team
from the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts that came and helped
us. We got into the branches and we really spread this thing
out pretty good. I think that is one thing that we did not do
fast enough, is get the strike teams activated and have the
branches where it goes into the weed, where the locals get into
the branches and make things easier to work all the way up.
Mr. Carney. That did not happen in this incident?
Mr. Guidry. That did not happen until probably 40 days into
the spill, 35-40 days.
Mr. Carney. From your opinion and your observation, can you
say why that was the case, why it did not happen?
Mr. Guidry. No, I have no earthly idea. I asked for those
guys early on because I knew how they operated.
Mr. Carney. Right. So from Rita and Katrina, you had 10\1/
2\ million gallons of oil spilled and you were able, using the
strike teams, to get a handle on that and clean that up.
Mr. Guidry. Pretty fast. When they came into the
organization, things started really moving. They are experts in
what they do; so, yeah.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Well, we will talk about that further I
think in the next panel.
Now, I have heard the word boom mentioned a lot and the
shortage of it and not knowing exactly how much you had. Is
there an inventory done of this and if so, how often? Do you
know exactly how many feet of boom you have available? Do you
know the type of boom, the in-shore boom, the further-out kind
of--do you know that going in or how often is this inventoried?
Col. Edmondson. We actually, Mr. Chairman, every single
day, we know exactly how much boom is coming into Louisiana,
what we have pre-staged, deployed in different areas that we
can move forward.
Mr. Carney. Prior to the spill?
Col. Edmondson. Prior to that. Keep in mind, this does not
last forever, so some of the stockpile in those areas, once not
used, the expiration dates on there, you cannot use it forward.
So it was the unknown of that, of exactly how much was
available, and that was some frustration early on to try to get
that because there just was not clearly enough to move forward
on that.
Mr. Carney. Understood. I see my time is up. Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mayor, what kind of effect or impact has the oil spill had
on the seafood industry in Florida? Of course, knowing that
most of Florida has not seen oil. Then Colonel, if you could
answer that question as well with regard to Louisiana.
Mr. Hibbard. It is a very similar effect, Congressman to
what the oil is having on the tourism industry. It is stigma.
So whether you go to a restaurant that focuses primarily on
seafood or a seafood market or the grocery stores, people first
of all want to know where that seafood is coming from; and
second, they are just avoiding it altogether. So it is
affecting the seafood industry in that respect. It is also
affecting a lot of the sportsmen that we have that come from
all over the country to fish in our waters for grouper and
other fish that we are really known for. So it is having an
impact.
Mr. Bilirakis. Colonel.
Col. Edmondson. Clearly devastation in Louisiana because it
is the source of what people believe, whether it is accurate or
not. So perception, as we know, based on reality, you are
exactly right, Mayor. My friends call me from around the
country, I just saw something from Louisiana, I am not going to
eat it. Well, it would not be there if it was not safe.
I think what the public needs to know around the country is
that every single day we have scientists out there, we have
Wildlife and Fisheries agents and DEQ specialists that are out
there testing the waters, testing the fish, testing the life
within our fisheries and the Gulf coast region and making sure
that what comes in is edible and we can move it forward. Every
day we open and close areas based on where we see the oil,
based on tests that we have done and that. If there is any
chance for that to be tainted, we are not going to allow
fishing in that area, we are not going to allow it to be
removed and we are going to continue to test it as we move
forward on it. But again, it is perception.
Mr. Bilirakis. We have got to get the word out, is what we
need to do.
Colonel, how many--I understand you are authorized to
deploy 15,000 National Guardsmen in the State of Louisiana. How
many are deployed at this time?
Col. Edmondson. The average contingency is 1,100 that they
have working throughout Louisiana actively involved in the
berms and actually placing the rocks as we protect our
coastline. You know, you have got to say hats off to the
Louisiana National Guard. What they did in Katrina where they
actually patrolled the streets of New Orleans, and what they
are doing in this area with this oil spill is certainly outside
the scope of what they have done throughout the Nation. They
have been a tremendous asset to the State of Louisiana, but
again, 1,100 of those are deployed. We have another couple
hundred that are every day actively involved in the effort and
response to this oil spill in Louisiana.
Mr. Bilirakis. Do you plan do deploy more?
Col. Edmondson. Well, that certainly would not be my
decision. They are certainly available if more are needed, they
could certainly do that; yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. As noted in your opening statement, I am
concerned about the delays in the approval of response
requests. I mentioned it, you did as well.
What response capabilities have you requested, aside from
the approval to dig berms, that have been delayed or denied and
what impact has the denials had on the State of Louisiana?
Col. Edmondson. Well, certainly when you look at what you
exactly talked about has been the frustration portion of it,
needing more boom, needing more skimmers. Knowing that as this
oil moves in and out of our shoreline, we have got over 6,000
miles of shoreline in Louisiana. Most people do not realize
that. But when you look at the topography of Louisiana, the
inlets and outlets, it is so many miles there and knowing as it
washes in and washes out, that that effect continues. I think
that is why it is so critical that we know how much boom is
available, what types of boom are available and getting those
deployed in those areas. I think that has been the primary
frustration in that aspect along with what you talked about.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. Mr. Green, please, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel, you spoke quite well about the flow of information
as it relates to top-down and of course you put emphasis on the
necessity to have not only information, but accurate
information, and have timely information as it comes from the
top down.
I would like for you to put a bit of emphasis, if you
will--and you as well, Mayor--on bottom-up. Were you able to
have your ideas given immediate consideration? Did you get a
response with reference to things that you thought were
important that had some merit, that should be evaluated? Were
you ideas vetted and did you get the feedback that you needed
so that you could make some determination as to how efficacious
you were in terms of helping with this endeavor? If you would,
please.
Col. Edmondson. Certainly you had the initial input, but it
did not mean it was going to happen. I think you only had to
turn on the news to daily see Parish President Mr. Nungesser
and Craig Taffaro of Placquemines and St. Bernard Parish, every
day talking about I am asking for this, I am asking for this,
where is it? Certainly understand the fact that this oil just
kept coming and it is still flowing in today.
Mr. Green. Let me interrupt you, please. What was the
process, as you understood it, for you to get your ideas to the
top?
Col. Edmondson. Mr. Guidry can certainly comment on that
also because he was in those meetings every single day, but
understanding every day listening to our parishes along the
coast report information up and getting that to the unified
group in Robert or in Houma, Louisiana and then getting that
information to the Unified Command Group, of which the Governor
is there and the cabinet secretaries. I think that real time,
but also understanding that if they need something, they need
it. To know that it may be the next day or the next week before
it gets there, I think that was some of the frustration that we
saw early on.
Mr. Guidry. If I may. Stuff was slow coming. You know,
boom, we made a request daily for boom and it got to be almost
like a joke. I would say ``need more boom'' and everybody would
quote, you know, say ``need more boom,'' everybody there would
say the same thing, need more skimmers. Those were slow in
coming.
As the Colonel said, we had probably 16 or 18 reports a day
that come in from all the State entities. We have a call in the
morning and in the afternoon, all the local branches call in
and in the afternoon all the parish EOCs are all together at
one time and they comment on what they need, what they are
doing, what is not happening. So the lines of communication are
open to us and we pass that on. Sometimes it is a little slow
getting back, but that is what we do.
Mr. Green. Mayor, let me follow up with you if I may. Your
access to persons who were able to filter your information, did
you conclude that you had a fair vetting process in terms of
getting information to the top?
Mr. Hibbard. We ran most of our information through our
internal emergency manager who would run it up the flag pole
through the county and then on to the Coast Guard and FDEP. It
is a somewhat arduous process. I can tell you that on a daily
basis, Congressman, I was having constituents give me new ideas
on how to either stop the well or to absorb oil. It is very
hard to run all those down and I certainly would not want to
distract the powers that be from the task at hand.
I think one of the other issues we ran into was a lot of
volunteers that wanted to be a part of any cleanup effort that
might occur and after having a list of literally thousands of
volunteers that e-mailed into the city and to the county, we
were told that it would be the responsibility of BP and the
people that they hired to do any cleanups.
Mr. Green. Yes, Colonel. I want you to address another
question, so I want your response, but some of this waste
cleanup, I am understanding that there is some desire not to
have it located in certain places and persons have given their
protest but the waste is still being placed in areas pursuant
to contracts that were negotiated between BP and certain State
agencies.
I would like for you to comment on this if you would,
please.
Col. Edmondson. Certainly that is true. Once it reaches the
coastline, we have a responsibility. Hazardous material is
under me as far as response. We have got to make sure it is
properly collected and manifested and properly transported to
an area. That is a concern when that area transports to may not
be an area it needs to be in. So we are working very, very
closely with EPA and of course the Department of Environmental
Quality, to make sure we work through that. But once it is
moved in that area and then it becomes infected in that area,
it causes problems. So I think you are right in your comments,
Mr. Green, in that area, that we need to make sure that those
places are done.
You did ask for examples and I think that we certainly need
to be able to give you those. I think when you look at booms,
once you are asking for the booms, and that will come in time,
then that all moves forward, then it is too late, it is in the
marshlands.
One thing that we saw early on and we certainly had many
conversations with the Coast Guard, who has tried to respond to
these types of things, but one thing they said early on was
that we didn't have skimmers small enough to get inside the
marshes, which is why we have started doing the vacuum barges.
We have actually got trucks on barges that are inside those
marsh areas vacuuming that oil from around the marsh area,
because there is so much of it and it gets thick in those
areas.
I think those are instances right there that just shows the
real-time that you talked about, the ability to real-time get
resources there, because once you lose that real-time, it has
moved on and then you have to start fighting it from a
different angle.
Mr. Green. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Green. Ms. Jackson Lee, please,
5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Guidry, thank you for your work. I am
going to ask a series of rapid questions to sort of build the
record.
Mr. Guidry, in your experience, have you ever seen an oil
spill like this?
Mr. Guidry. No, ma'am. The difference with this one and all
the other ones, the other ones, eventually the source stops.
This one here is like a thief in the night, it is not there
today, tomorrow morning it is here, next day it is here or it
hits you back again in the same spot. You know, things do not
move very fast, boats move very slow, so you have got to fly
over the site and find out where the oil is in the morning and
then send the boats out to clean it up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You have worked 18 years--I am going to do
some rapid fire questions. You have worked for 18 years and you
have had oil spills and you have cleaned up oil spills, is that
correct?
Mr. Guidry. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The Gulf has gone on about its business.
Mr. Guidry. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The oyster men and the shrimpers and the
fishermen have gone on about their business.
Mr. Guidry. Yes, ma'am. I am a former fisherman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is important to note, and the
reason is because the magnitude of this disaster I think is
something that we clearly want to frame. But in terms of trying
to fix the problems, let me again go back to a question I think
I asked and would like to ask it more specifically.
My understanding is that BP had a series of violations that
may have been relevant to this well and that they were just in
place, on record in one of our Federal agencies. In a
legislative fix that might work, should we not have a certain
number--for example, this was a high-risk drilling rig--certain
number of violations could bring about an automatic shutdown
for a period of time of that well. Mr. Guidry?
Mr. Guidry. I really could not comment too much on the size
of this, but I would tell you----
Ms. Jackson Lee. If there were a number of safety
violations that had been shown.
Mr. Guidry. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would it be appropriate for the Federal
Government to shut down that well to ask for there to be remedy
by the particular parties involved?
Mr. Guidry. It could be, but I would have put some MMS
people on those wells 24/7 to make sure that these problems did
not happen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If they saw that it did happen, you would
give them the authority to shut the well down?
Mr. Guidry. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Colonel.
Col. Edmondson. Absolutely. I mean we do not need to be a
country of reacting. It ought to be about proactive and the
ability to do what you are talking about certainly would allow
that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think--and you have mentioned the
fact that the Coast Guard strike teams have been very
effective. Do you think enhanced resources and making those
strike teams--I use a different terminology, like a SWAT team,
but giving them the additional enhanced resources and training
would be helpful as we move into these difficult drilling
procedures. Colonel.
Col. Edmondson. Absolutely, you are going to have to have
that in place so they have the ability to move forward and move
rapidly to move those resources in; yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The chain of command for me is enormously
important. Do you think--and Mr. Guidry said something and I
have heard this before of MMS individuals being on the rig and
that would be certainly something to look at. Would you also
think it is important to have a red phone on the rig that has
the ability to go to the right people when you can perceive
something is going to go wrong? I asked some of the officials
of BP did they get a phone call that night and the answer was
no. Do you think there should be a red phone call that reaches
the appropriate persons even though this was in the midst of an
emergency, so that reaction could start right then and there?
Colonel.
Col. Edmondson. You are certainly going to have to have
that. You are going to have to have some form of communication
and listen to everybody on that rig. The ability for anybody,
even at the lowest level, when they see problems are occurring,
they have got to be able to bring that to someone's attention.
Most importantly, when that phone rings, someone has to pick it
up and listen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If we were to--and this is a question
where I do not want you to think that I am trying to get you to
write legislation, but the Department of Homeland Security has
been labeled as--and I think they have been very effective with
the merger of so many different areas, the disaster homeland
front line. We see man-made disasters and we see natural
disasters, hurricanes. Expanding the jurisdiction of the
Department of Homeland Security such that all the resources or
the crisis bearing could fall under one department as relates
to this kind of disaster, would that help your question of
where is the boom, where are the skimmers, who is in charge; so
that once something like this occurred, one call, one group of
people tells whoever it is get this done.
Col. Edmondson. We certainly should have learned that in
Katrina, certainly from a Federal level to understand that that
inventory is in place. But also the ability to understand from
a Federal level, you have got to listen to the local people,
you have got to, because what worked in one State is not going
to work in other States. I think that flexibility--
communication, flexibility, and having plans in place of where
your inventory is. I think that is vitally important.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Or having one Federal Government entity
and then working with the local officials, that might be
helpful to you.
Col. Edmondson. I think so. I do not want them to get so
big that they become ineffective. I think when you get too big
and you put too much on your plate, you become ineffective. We
do that as individuals sometimes. I know I do, and I think you
have got to be careful not to put too much on that plate, but
give them ability. But I think you are moving in the right
direction; yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Richardson, do
you have questions?
Ms. Richardson. Just a couple of very quick ones and then I
am looking forward to us continuing.
Colonel, it is my understanding that the State of Louisiana
has received $50 million. How much have you guys spent and what
have you spent it on?
Col. Edmondson. Well, we spent it on emergency response
efforts going on with the oil, the direct response to the oil
that is approaching Louisiana, both on the State level and on a
local level. I think that is what has been most important.
Ms. Richardson. Specifically doing what though? When you
say emergency response, what does that mean?
Col. Edmondson. Personnel, resources, equipment. Again, all
aimed at combatting the on-going effect of the oil as it
approaches Louisiana. I can get the committee information on
exactly what we spent it on. I think that would be better than
just trying to remember the different things. But I know from
my perspective, what I have used it on has been the people
directly involved because I think that is where it should be
exactly involved every day in combatting both very proactively
and reactively the oil as it approaches Louisiana and making
sure that it gets into those local areas.
Ms. Richardson. So you will provide that to the committee
how much has been spent and on what?
Col. Edmondson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Has it all been spent?
Col. Edmondson. I am not sure exact numbers, I know that
the first $25 million has been. Again, that second $25 million
has not come into Louisiana. I know there was some monies that
was placed forward for some work within the coastline itself,
but I am familiar with the first $25 million that we have
looked at. In fact, that funding actually comes through the
Department of Public Safety as far as the area to oversee and
disburse that. Again, we do not disburse until we get actual
evidence from a State agency that they spent it on that. It is
all through the PIRFA process that the Federal Government uses
to make sure we document expenditures of those monies.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, thank you, Colonel.
Mr. Guidry, you mentioned that strike teams in the past
have physically gone into the marsh themselves and have cleaned
the oil out. Did they cut, did they flush it out with water,
what was the process used?
Mr. Guidry. They direct the clean-up, but in the past, like
in the roseau canes, we will cut a path and flush it out with
pumps.
Ms. Richardson. So you would cut a path to flush it?
Mr. Guidry. Yes, we cut a path in the roseau canes and from
there wash the oil out. We put boom on the outside so that when
the oil comes out the skimmers can pick it up inside the boom.
Ms. Richardson. You work for the State, sir?
Mr. Guidry. Ma'am?
Ms. Richardson. You work for the State of Louisiana?
Mr. Guidry. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. That is a very important point that
you just made because we saw that just today and there was an
issue with that.
Then finally for the record, I just want to say I equally
was very frustrated. I did not understand why we could not just
put a whole rim of boom around the site of the Horizon to be
able to catch the oil before it even got further out. But I
have got to tell you, once I physically saw it, with the waves,
it only can provide limited protection. I think one thing we
have learned out of this incident is that BP and any other
provider that does oil drilling must also use some of that
money to look at technology and research and make sure that
what we really have can do some work. Because even the booms
themselves cannot solve the problems.
Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentlelady yield for a moment?
Could I just ask a quick question?
Mr. Carney. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yield for a moment?
Ms. Richardson. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Following up on her question,
the headline here says ``BP Works on More Secure Well Cap.''
You made a very important statement, Colonel, it keeps flowing
and we cannot clean up. Can you expand on that and the
gentlelady's point about having the technology, the redundancy
on clean-up if something happens? Clean-up but stopping what
happened.
Col. Edmondson. Just looking at the diverse shorelines that
we have throughout the Gulf, I mean looking at our beautiful
beaches, looking at our marshland, our estuaries and all that,
all that area requires a different type of response. I think
what is most important is that we had so much flow at the
beginning that we were not even responding to because we did
not know it was there. Then all of a sudden, it was there and
we did not have the resources available, the real-time efforts
to do those things. As we speak, it is still flowing. Even once
we get that cap on it and they capture what they tell us is
most of it, and hopefully it is, and hopefully those relief
wells that are being drilled are going to be effective and they
are going to work and do the things they need to. Then at that
point, this marathon, maybe we can get towards the end of it.
But I think that natural resource damage assessment has to be
on-going, we have to look at the efforts and we have to make
sure that this fight--we are in it for the long haul. I
appreciate the fact and certainly you evidence here today in
the comments you are making, I believe that y'all are also here
to make sure those things happen, and I do appreciate that; and
thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Quickly for all three of you. Where have the bottlenecks of
the information flow been that you can identify? Bottlenecks of
information. Mr. Guidry, do you have a sense of that?
Mr. Guidry. Not really.
Mr. Carney. Okay, Colonel.
Col. Edmondson. I think what I talked about earlier, I
think having three different places of information that has to
flow, whether it is the State command post and whatever stage
you are in, and you have your National post which is now New
Orleans, your Gulf post which is in Houma, Louisiana. I think
getting that real time information is difficult when you deal
with bureaucracy in each one as you move that information
around. I think that is a bottleneck. I think that is when it
is hard to understand that you can make a decision here, but it
has still got to be approved over here and maybe over here. I
think telling you I will get that answer tomorrow. Well, if you
do not have it tomorrow, then we are now 36 hours, 48 hours
into getting that stuff and then it is past the coastline, it
is into the marshes, on the beaches, it affects the economy, it
affects the seafood industry and that. I think the effect just
moves on and multiplies when you do not have that real-time
information and getting that where it needs to be.
Mr. Carney. Mayor.
Mr. Hibbard. I think certainly we saw bottlenecks at the
State level getting down to the county level and the county
level to the municipal level. The municipalities were not even
included in the process until just recently.
Last, I would say there was a bottleneck between
professionals and laymen and we need to get that out.
Mr. Carney. For the record, I had a shrimp po' boy for
lunch. Okay? It was delicious, so thank you very much.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony. We could
probably do this another couple of hours anyway, but we have to
be respectful of the other panels. Our hearts are out to you
and certainly all those who lost family in the explosion. But
we are in this for the long haul. My kids are long-distance
runners and I know what it means to be in it for the long haul,
and as long as I am in this Chair, we will stay here and work
with you to make sure this kind of thing does not happen again.
We will probably have further questions and we may come to
you in writing. Please respond as soon as you possibly can to
our questions if we have them. Please free to contact our
subcommittee and our committee any time you think there is
information we ought to have.
We will adjourn this panel. We will reconvene in 5 minutes,
so people can refresh themselves.
[Recess.]
Mr. Carney. We will call the second panel now. I want to
welcome our second panel of witnesses and thank them for their
patience. I think the first panel was very interesting and we
needed to hear from them.
Our first witness will be Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger.
Rear Admiral Neffenger serves as the Deputy National Incident
Commander for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill response.
Previous to this assignment, he served as Commander of the
Ninth Coast Guard District from May 2008 to April 2010. In this
capacity, he was responsible for Coast Guard operations
throughout the five Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway and
parts of the surrounding States, including 6,700 miles of
shoreline and 1,500 miles of international border with Canada.
A native of Elyria, Ohio, Rear Admiral Neffenger was
commissioned in 1982 at Coast Guard Officer Candidate School in
Yorktown, Virginia. He has a diverse career of operational and
staff assignments across the spectrum of Coast Guard missions.
Notable among these, he was Captain of the Port, Federal
Maritime Security Coordinator and Commander of Coast Guard
Sector at Los Angeles/Long Beach, California where he was the
senior Coast Guard operational commander for an area of
responsibility encompassing over 300 miles of southern
California coast, including the Los Angeles/Long Beach port
complex, the Nation's largest.
He has served in five Marine safety field assignments as an
engineer on the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Gallatin; as Coast
Guard liaison officer in the Territory of American Samoa; as
Coast Guard fellow on the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee
and as a Chief of the Office of Budget and Programs at Coast
Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC where he was the principal
budget advisor to the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
Rear Admiral Neffenger has earned three master's degrees in
National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island; and Public Administration
from Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government; and in
Business Management from Central Michigan University--by the
way, my wife's alma mater. He holds a bachelor's degree from
Baldwin Wallace College in Berea, Ohio.
Our second witness is Department of Homeland Security
Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs Juliette
Kayyem.
As Assistant Secretary, Ms. Kayyem has strengthened
coordination of intergovernmental interaction across the
Department, improving efficiency and consistency of
communication with State, local, Tribal, and territorial
partners, and ensuring the integration of their homeland
security priorities into the policy development process.
Under her leadership, Intergovernmental Affairs, or IGA,
has assumed the primary communication and coordination role in
a broad array of homeland security initiatives including grant
processes and funding, drivers' license security, energy
efficiency, and intelligence and information sharing with the
State, local, and Tribal partners. In addition, IGA serves as
the primary Tribal liaison for the Department coordinating over
500 Tribes throughout the Nation on homeland security issues.
From 2007 until her appointment by Secretary Napolitano,
she served as the Massachusetts first Under Secretary for
Homeland Security and the Governor's Federally designated
homeland security advisor. In that capacity, she was
responsible for developing State-wide policies on homeland
security, with a focus on all-hazards strategic planning,
prevention, and response, information sharing,
interoperability, and energy security. Ms. Kayyem also had
oversight of the Massachusetts National Guard.
She is a 1995 graduate of Harvard Law School and a 1991
graduate of Harvard College.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record.
I now ask each to summarize his or her statement for 5
minutes--for 5 minutes--beginning with Rear Admiral Neffenger.
STATEMENT OF PETER NEFFENGER, DEPUTY NATIONAL INCIDENT
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Adm. Neffenger. I will do my best, sir.
Good afternoon, Chairman Carney and distinguished Members
of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today about the on-going response into the explosion and oil
spill from the Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit.
What began as a massive rescue and subsequent search for 11
who unfortunately were lost, has become the most complex spill
our Nation has ever encountered and certainly the most complex
event of my career.
This spill is further complicated by the lack of human
access to the source, the challenge of measuring the total
volume of oil discharge, the fact that the oil is spreading out
in all directions, and that we have a major new oil spill every
day. This is not a single monolithic spill, but rather has
become thousands of small spills that in total threaten all
five of the Gulf States and the livelihoods of the citizens of
the Gulf coast.
As you have already heard in previous testimony, there are
thousands of people and hundreds of organizations across the
Gulf coast that are responding to this spill. So I can
understand why it sometimes is not clear how we are organized
and command and control functions. Let me try to explain some
of how that works.
One of the lessons that we learned coming out of Exxon
Valdez and what led to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was that
during major incidents, you need National level leadership to
set strategic direction, coordinate National policy, facilitate
collaboration among Federal, State, and local governments and
coordinate strategic communications across Government and the
affected communities.
In this case, you have a National Incident Commander named,
and that is Admiral Thad Allen, and as noted, I am his Deputy
and was named as such on the second of May of this year.
At the next level, we have the Federal on-scene coordinator
with the statutory authority for oversight of oil spill cleanup
on the water in the case of the Coast Guard. That individual
directs the operation, overseeing the incident commands and we
have one in Houma, Louisiana, one in Mobile, Alabama. Those are
the two most active incident commands. We have also established
incident commands in Galveston, Texas as well as Miami,
Florida, for potential impacts in those areas.
The Federal on-scene coordinator sits at the Unified Area
Command, and so the purpose of the area command is to
coordinate resources amongst those various incident commands,
but the actual decision-making on a daily basis takes place in
the incident commands. So those individuals in Houma, in
Mobile, in Miami, in Galveston, Texas make determinations for
the geographic area for which they are responsible.
So in an incident of this complexity, you have to have
different levels of organization to manage what are the
countless numbers of activities across the thousands of miles
of water and coastline. They do not do it alone, the area
command, as you have heard, has had State representation from
the very outset of the event, and in fact it is critical that
the State be involved with us from the outset because they know
best how to protect their coastlines and we can speak more to
that during the question session.
Given the scope and magnitude of this event, we brought
together all levels of government, industry, nongovernmental
organizations, and volunteers to respond in unprecedented
numbers.
As I said, my primary purpose is to ensure a tight linkage
among all those levels, to look for problems and try to correct
those problems so that we have effective command and control,
the guiding principle of which is to push authority to the
lowest possible level so that on-scene leaders can act and can
act immediately with flexibility and autonomy to employ
effective response strategies. We continue to work to make that
tenet a reality across the Gulf region. We learned a lot of
lessons along the way and it is improving and getting better
with each day of this response.
I have personally briefed every day the five States'
Governors. I do this 7 days a week each day, and we typically
have at least three of the five Governors on those calls. I
have received valuable and very frank feedback that has alerted
me to areas where we needed to adjust operations, expand
efforts, and incorporate greater State and local participation.
Harnessing local knowledge and leadership is a continuing
priority and I would agree with Colonel Edmondson's assessment
of the need to involve State and local--I mean local
individuals. There are a number of examples of how we have done
that, pushing liaisons out to each of the parish presidents'
offices in the State of Louisiana, to the county supervisors'
offices in the other States. We have liaisons assigned to each
Governor and we have liaisons at the local branch levels, which
are down in the local communities. So we have attempted to
continue to engage at greater and increasing numbers.
We have established vessel of opportunity programs where we
are giving local control of those vessels to local communities
under the over-arching guidelines established by the incident
commanders.
I have spent a significant amount of my time in the Gulf
region over the last 2\1/2\ months. I have visited spill sites
numerous times and have worked a lot with the incident commands
to determine what it is they need and how we can do it. We have
identified every--with respect to resources there are a number
of critical resources and we have heard of some of those. We
have identified every foot of fire boom in the world, we have
established a supply chain for everything from dispersants to
skimmers to boom. We have procured boom from all domestic
manufacturers and we mobilized all east and Gulf coast offshore
skimming vessels. To that end, we are now procuring nearly all
Nationally produced snare, containment fire boom, and we have
engaged every domestic boom supplier. Of note, the daily or the
weekly production was a few thousand feet prior to this spill
event. We are now producing domestically a quarter million feet
of boom per week as a result of the demand placed by this.
So in closing, I think the success of this response hinges
on a unified coordinated effort at all levels in reaching down
as deep into the local organizations as you--or local
communities as possible. We will be here as long as it takes to
get this region cleaned up and made whole again. The Coast
Guard will not be going away. As was noted, we live here too.
This is a community. I spent 8 years of my life in New Orleans
in the Coast Guard and so I have a lot of affection and concern
for this area.
So I thank you for this opportunity and I welcome any
questions you may have.
[The statement of Admiral Neffenger and Ms. Kayyem
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Neffenger and Juliette Kayyem
July 12, 2010
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
committee. We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the Federal Government's response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill specifically the chain of command for responders.
On the evening of April 20, 2010, the Transocean-owned, BP-
chartered, Marshall Islands-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
(MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON, located approximately 72 miles Southeast of
Venice, Louisiana, reported an explosion and fire on-board. This began
as a Search and Rescue (SAR) mission--within the first few hours, 115
of the 126 crewmembers were safely recovered; SAR activities continued
through April 23rd, though the other 11 crewmembers remain missing.
Concurrent with the SAR effort, the response to extinguishing the
fire and mitigating the impacts of the approximate 700,000 gallons of
diesel fuel onboard began almost immediately. In accordance with the
operator's Minerals Management Service (MMS)-approved Response Plan,
oil spill response resources, including Oil Spill Response Vessels
(OSRVs), were dispatched to the scene. After 2 days of fighting the
fire, the MODU sank into approximately 5,000 feet of water on April
22nd. On April 23rd, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) located the MODU
on the seafloor, and, on April 24th, BP found the first two leaks in
the riser pipe and alerted the Federal Government. ROVs continue to
monitor the flow of oil.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As the event unfolded, a robust Incident Command System (ICS)
response organization was stood up in accordance with the National
Response Framework (NRF) and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). ICS is utilized to provide a common
method for developing and implementing tactical plans to efficiently
and effectively manage the response to oil spills. The ICS organization
for this response includes Incident Command Posts and Unified Commands
at the local level, and a Unified Area Command at the regional level.
It is comprised of representatives from the Coast Guard (Federal On-
Scene Coordinator (FOSC)), other Federal, State, and local agencies, as
well as BP as a Responsible Party.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Federal Government has addressed the Gulf Oil Spill with an
all-hands-on deck approach from the moment the explosion occurred.
During the night of April 20th--the date of the explosion--a command
center was set up on the Gulf Coast to address the potential
environmental impact of the event and to coordinate with State and
local governments. After the MODU sank on the 22nd, the National
Response Team (NRT), led by the Secretary of Homeland Security and
comprised of 16 Federal agencies including the Coast Guard, other DHS
offices, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Interior (DOI), as
well as Regional Response Teams (RRT), was activated.
On April 29, Secretary Napolitano declared the event a Spill of
National Significance (SONS), which enhanced operational and policy
coordination at the National level and concurrently allowed Admiral
Allen's appointment as the National Incident Commander (NIC) for the
administration's continued, coordinated response. The NIC's role is to
coordinate strategic communications, National policy, and resource
support, and to facilitate collaboration with key parts of the Federal,
State, and local governments.
The NIC staff is comprised of subject matter experts from across
the Federal Government, allowing for immediate interagency
collaboration, approval, and coordination. While the FOSC maintains
authorities for response operations as directed in the National
Contingency Plan, the NIC's primary focus is providing National-level
support to the operational response. This means providing the Unified
Command with everything that it needs--from resources to policy
decisions--to secure the source and mitigate the impact. This will be a
sustained effort that will continue until the discharges are
permanently stopped and the effects of the spill are mitigated to the
greatest extent possible. Beyond securing the source of the spill, the
Unified Command is committed to minimizing the economic and social
impacts to the affected communities and the Nation.
VOLUNTEERISM AND COMMUNICATION WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES
A critical aspect of response operations is active engagement and
communication with the local communities. Several initiatives are
underway to ensure that happens.
1. Active participation and engagement in town hall meetings across
the region with industry and Government involvement.
2. Coordination of public involvement through a volunteer
registration hotline (1-866-448-5816), alternative technology,
products, and services e-mail (horizonsupport@aol.com), and
response and safety training scheduled and conducted in
numerous locations.
3. More than 35,889 inquiries received on-line via the response
website (www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com) with more than
34,478 inquiries completed, with 4-hour average time of
response.
4. Over 12 million page hits on response website.
5. Over 754 documents created/posted to response website for public
consumption.
6. News, photo/video releases, advisories to more than 5,000 media/
Governmental/private contacts.
7. Full utilization of social media including Facebook, YouTube,
Twitter, and Flickr.
8. Establishment of Local Government hotlines in Houma, LA (985-
493-7835), Mobile, AL (251-445-8968), New Orleans, LA (985-902-
5253).
CONCLUSION
From the very beginning of this crisis, the Federal Government has
been in charge of the largest environmental clean-up effort in our
Nation's history. Thousands of ships and other vessels have been
deployed to the Gulf. There are now nearly 46,000 personnel working
across four States to contain and clean up the oil. These personnel are
assisting in efforts to prevent more oil from coming ashore, clean
beaches, train response workers, and help process claims.
On July 7, Admiral Allen announced the launch of a new Federal web
portal--RestoreTheGulf.gov--dedicated to providing the American people
with clear and accessible information and resources related to the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill response and recovery. The site is designed
to serve as a one-stop repository for news, data, and operational
updates related to administration-wide efforts to stop the BP oil leak
and mitigate its impact on the environment, the economy and public
health--unifying web resources across the administration and increasing
public access to the latest information.
The Unified Command continues to attack the spill. As of July 6,
2010, over 28 million gallons of oily water have been successfully
recovered using mechanical surface cleaning methods. Further, over a
million gallons of surface dispersants have been applied to break up
the slick, and controlled burns have been used as weather conditions
have allowed. In addition to the on-going offshore oil recovery
operations, significant containment and exclusion booms have been
deployed and staged strategically throughout the Gulf region. These
booms are used to protect environmental and cultural resources, as well
as critical infrastructure, as identified in the applicable Area
Contingency Plans (ACPs). To date, nearly 3 million feet of boom have
been positioned to protect environmentally sensitive areas. Fourteen
staging areas and three regional command centers have been established
across the Gulf Coast States. The Secretary of Defense approved the
requests of the Governors of Alabama (up to 3,000), Florida (up to
2,500), Louisiana (up to 6,000), and Mississippi (up to 6,000) to use
their National Guard forces in Title 32, U.S. Code, status to help in
the response to the oil spill.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We are ready to
answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Admiral. Secretary Kayyem.
STATEMENT OF JULIETTE KAYYEM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Kayyem. Thank you, Chairman Carney and Members of the
committee. I thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the efforts that
the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and our
Federal family have undertaken to respond to this incident in
coordination with our State and local partners. So my testimony
will focus on that fact.
My history, as you said, Chairman, I was a State homeland
security advisor, I worked for a Governor, I now work for a
former Governor. So I understand quite well the priority of
focusing State and local--of understanding what State and local
officials know, understanding their unique needs of their
community and environments, unlike any other entity.
As the Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at
DHS, one of my roles, ironically actually, was to serve as the
intergovernmental lead in the SONS, the Spill of National
Significance, exercise just a few months before this spill.
During that exercise, we were able to identify information gaps
with our State and local partners and update our plans to
address these. Obviously, as Admiral Neffenger said, the
exercises in no way were reflective of what we are experiencing
today, we admit that wholeheartedly.
From the outset, we knew that working collaboratively with
the State and local officials and responders closest to the
incident would be essential in order to effectively coordinate
this response and their input would be an invaluable resource
for ideas and suggestions for improvement. This has been an
unparalleled event with many challenges along the way, and we
sought to learn lessons from the past and use this local
knowledge and experience to inform our decision-making in every
step of the response. We have learned as we have gone along,
there is no question about it. I will describe some of the
changes we made. We continue to try to improve every day,
especially as the mayor noted in the previous testimony, very
helpful for him to tell us and to tell you sometimes we are
speaking in Coast Guardese or we are speaking in a language
that is not understandable for his constituents. We have that
as a take-away and we will continue to improve every day as we
shift from the immediate response to the long-term recovery and
some of the priorities the Secretary made as she takes on that
essential and important agenda.
So as I said, since Day 1, the administration has engaged
in all-hands-on-deck response to this spill. As we transition
from the search and rescue operation into a larger incident
response, we begin then to more thoroughly engage with our
State and local counterparts in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Florida, with Texas sort of not being--being more
engaged as of late because some of the tar balls have appeared
there and we continue to engage indeed along the eastern
seaboard. We have had a number of outreach efforts with the
Governors in those States.
These efforts were built upon the extensive coordination
that took place prior to this event, including of course the
Area Contingency Plans and the work that people like Roland
from Louisiana, we have known him for a long time, the kind of
work that we have been doing from the get-go on oil spills.
We heard about the pipe leaking on a Saturday, I was down
here by Monday and we had our first Governors' call on that
Monday. We were in close contact with the Governors and their
staffs and on that day the Governors' staffs were invited into
the Unified Area Command. We made it a priority to set up
different structures to allow State and local officials to have
input into the response efforts and these structures took
several forms. As I said, we had the calls with the Governors,
they became daily by the beginning of May and we have held
these daily morning conference calls with senior administration
officials and the Governors of the affected States and followed
up in the afternoon with daily calls with local officials in
the afternoon. I think those were the calls that the Mayor was
speaking about. These calls offer an opportunity for Governors
and local officials to obtain the most current operational
information and engage in a dialogue with the senior
administration officials who are overseeing the response, like
the Admiral, and to make suggestions or convey concerns. These
include the briefings on leak stabilization, resource
deployments, obviously a very large issue, and answers to
questions officials have received from local constituents,
primarily on claims, of course.
For example, I will just give you examples, so that this
does not sound so theoretical. On one of the daily calls,
Governor Barber of Mississippi raised concerns about the
communication capabilities of boats participating in the
vessels of opportunity program. You will remember, a lot of
boats, a lot of boat owners came forward, a couple thousand. It
was a massive undertaking and the Coast Guard actually working
with the State of Mississippi and all the States subsequently
worked to put in place a task force system led by the Coast
Guard boats to improve communication between the vessels and to
get the resources available to those vessels, so maybe not
every vessel had all the high-tech needs that the lead vessel
would have but we had a way to be able to say there is oil
here, we need to move here.
As a result of these daily calls, it also became clear--so
this is our lessons learned as we went along--that the response
would benefit through increased and direct communication
between the Governors and the officials running the multi-State
incident command posts. In response, the Coast Guard and the
Department set up deputy incident commanders. So instead of
having it too top-heavy, this was the beginning of the flat-
lining of the response in each State. So these deputy incident
commanders are in each State to give Governors direct access to
the individuals running Coast Guard operations in their States.
This meant that not all the Governors had to come to Houma or
Robert--excuse me, Robert, Louisiana, that facility is now in
New Orleans. It meant that we were able to get deputy incident
commanders in each State. This also ensured that any questions,
concerns, or requests from these Governors could be met
promptly.
I also want to make it clear that we are DHS-focused, Coast
Guard-focused. This is being repeated in almost every level
with the Federal family. So there are weekly calls between the
Labor Department and the State workforce commissions, between
OSHA and the State employment workforce commissions. I could go
down--SBA, I mean, we are polling and working with the entire
Federal family to make sure that their natural access points
within the States and localities; for example, Health and Human
Services working with the State health officials, are all
getting the right information at the right time.
In addition to the daily calls, I am just going to
highlight one last thing, which the admiral focused on, which
is the liaison officers and the changes we made. As the mayor
said, sometimes the States have a governance structure that is
not getting to the local level. We understand that now. We are
used to working with Governors' offices because of the State
EOC structure, that is how it works. So beginning in May, we
began to deploy what we are calling the Coast Guard Liaison
Program, it was originally called the Parish President Liaison
Program but we realized we had other States that did not have
parishes--and have deployed up to 80 Coast Guard officials in
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to provide direct
access to response for local officials. We have people sitting
in these local government entities, whether they are mayors,
county officials, whatever, trying to get to yes as quickly as
possible. We hear in the media about a lot of the no's, but
when you actually think of the number of decisions that are
being made on the local level about boom deployment, boat
deployment, whatever else, that is all being done because of
the close and localized cooperation between the Coast Guard,
the Federal family, and the State and localities.
I have gone over my time, but I would be happy to answer
any questions about the governance structure and our
responsiveness. Thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Ms. Kayyem. We will begin the round
of questions, each Member getting 5 minutes, of course, and we
will go until we are done. I will start and recognize myself
for 5 minutes.
Admiral, when was the Coast Guard first made aware of the
explosion?
Adm. Neffenger. On the day that it happened. I think--I do
not know the exact time, I do not have a time line, but I think
it was within about an hour and a half or 2 hours after the
initial explosion that we were notified of it and notified that
we had the potential for both a massive search and rescue
operation as well as a potential for a major oil spill. There
were 700,000 gallons of fuel oil on board that vessel, so from
the very outset, we were concerned about a major oil spill as a
result of the explosion.
Mr. Carney. I saw pictures in the news and that was one
hell of an explosion.
Adm. Neffenger. It really was; yes, sir.
Mr. Carney. Why did it take 2 hours to notify you?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, again, let me double-check on that to
be sure. We got initial notification, I think it probably took
us awhile to get out there because it is quite a ways offshore
and so by the time you out on sea and it is going to be at
least a couple of hours by the time you get the helicopters
launched.
Mr. Carney. Okay, so the on-scene is different than the
time you were notified.
Adm. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Then what role did you play once you were
there?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, initially, it was a rescue operation.
There were over 100 people on board the vessel and 11 of whom
were very early on identified as missing. So the first was a
rescue operation and then a coordination of those vessels that
were on scene to fight the fire on board the vessel. The Coast
Guard does not do firefighting but we coordinate the efforts of
those who do come out and do firefighting. So the fire-fighting
efforts were going on, we were coordinating those efforts as
well as conducting the search. That search went on for, as you
know, a period of about 36 hours or so.
Mr. Carney. Right, right. Now within your experience, did
the initial, the first responders and the initial response, did
that all work as pre-arranged within the various chains of
command that had been pre-established?
Adm. Neffenger. Yes, sir, in my experience, it went
according to our normal protocols and there were no delays in
terms of that response. This is something that we do every day.
Mr. Carney. Sure. You know, it is interesting because the
initial reports were that there is no oil flowing out of this
explosion. So we go from zero barrels a day to somewhere
between 60 and 100,000. In fact, we have heard the range from
zero to 100,000 and we are still hearing that. That, I imagine,
has to cause some confusion obviously in terms of response, et
cetera. When did you actually notice the oil starting to flow?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, as I said, we thought from the outset
that we had the potential for a major oil spill, so we actually
activated our strike teams on the very next day, on the 21st of
April. The first of the strike team members actually began to
deploy the 21st, so the very next day, because again, there
were 700,000 gallons of fuel oil on board. So at a minimum, we
were concerned about that.
We did not know what might happen with respect to the
wellhead. We, like everyone else, assumed that the blowout
preventer would have operated, although we do not typically
monitor blowout preventers. But when the vessel sank on the
22nd----
Mr. Carney. Let me stop you there. Are you now monitoring
the blowout preventers? Or are you relying on BP to do that or
the industry to do that?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, again, the Coast Guard does not have
any statutory authority to do so. This is what was the Minerals
Management Service responsibility to do that. I think that that
is a question that needs to be asked with respect to Government
oversight. Our responsibility is for the vessel itself, so the
mobile offshore drilling unit. But all the drilling equipment
and the connection to the drill floor was the responsibility of
the Minerals Management Service.
Mr. Carney. Okay. I apologize, you were talking about the
time line.
Adm. Neffenger. Yes, sir. So anyway, when the rig sank on
the 22nd and took down with it that 5,000 feet of riser pipe,
when it hit the bottom, it stirred up a tremendous amount of
mud and silt. So the initial attempts to see what happened were
clouded by that mud and silt. We did not know whether or not it
was leaking, but again, we were already responding as if we
were going to have a massive spill because it took 700,000
gallons of fuel oil down with it. So at a minimum, we were
concerned about that from the Coast Guard. So we had actually
begun to mobilize and we pulled out the Area Contingency Plan,
talked to the State and said we need to start mobilizing. In
fact, we had State representatives in that. The incident
command post in Houma was established on the 21st, the very
next day. The State provided a State on-scene coordinator on
that very day, and in fact, the very first incident action plan
that was signed, talked about mobilizing resources for a major
oil spill. So our approach was potential major oil spill from
the outset and our typical response is to then start rolling
the resources in, which we did with the strike team.
As it became clear that there were significant leaks coming
off the top of that--and it took about 24 to 36 hours for the
turbidity to settle and really to get a good look at that
riser. Then we realized that we had a potentially much, much
larger problem on our hand. But as I said, we were already
rolling a lot of resources in or had already begun the process,
I should say to roll resources in.
Mr. Carney. So it is beyond major at this point, by the
time the resources are rolling and the turbidity has cleared,
it is clear it is beyond a major spill. I am not sure what the
next step is beyond a major spill, but we are in the midst of
it right now.
Adm. Neffenger. Well, it is a worst-case discharge at that
point.
Mr. Carney. Obviously. The question I had is would you have
done anything differently had you known sort of what the
magnitude of the spill was at that time? I mean what else could
you have done had you known?
Adm. Neffenger. Had we had perfect information, in other
words.
Mr. Carney. Yeah.
Adm. Neffenger. I do not think that initially we would have
done anything different. Remember, we were involved in a very
massive search and rescue operation first. That always takes
precedence, safety and preservation of life. So that consumed
the better part of the first 12 to 18 hours, the initial 12 to
18 hours and actually stretched out over a longer period as we
looked at it. The rig, as I said, the rig did not sink until
the 22nd but when it went down, we were still looking for--we
still had some hope that the individuals might have survived on
the rig, but just were not able to get free, that they might
have been able to free themselves as the rig sank. But I do not
know that there would have been any different response
initially because of the need to mobilize rescue resources
while at the same time beginning to move resources for a spill
response.
Mr. Carney. Okay, thank you. Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, admiral,
for being here and testifying.
Can you give us an update on the latest containment
methods?
Adm. Neffenger. Yes, sir. Well, today, this is actually a
critical week with respect to containment and I do not know how
familiar you are with the various options that have been in
play, but essentially you have--if I can just describe for a
moment what was occurring up until yesterday and then what the
plan is moving forward.
Up until yesterday, we had a vessel called the Discover
Enterprise, which was the so-called top hat that you have heard
about. This is the one where you can see the oil leaking around
the skirt of it. That has been collecting somewhere in the
neighborhood of 15,000 barrels daily off the top of that
blowout preventer and lower marine riser package. Attached to
one of the lines coming off of the side, it is called a choke
line, is a vessel called the Q-4000. It has been collecting
about 8,200 barrels on average a day. It has been burning all
those off because it has no storage capacity, so it has just
been flaring that off. So the combined total has been somewhere
in the neighborhood of 24- to 25,000 barrels daily coming off
the top of that leak.
The plan moving forward, and this is actually taking place
today, was to remove that top hat and to place instead a
sealing cap on board. Basically another small blowout preventer
that will sit on top of the current blowout preventer, seal
tightly and allow for a 100 percent capture of the oil coming
off the top of that wellhead, assuming you do not have any
hurricanes or storms that would interrupt the vessel. So there
are some additional vessels that have come on scene in order to
collect that oil. However, it also gives the opportunity to
attempt to shut the well in, which is the first thing that they
will do.
So there are Government scientists from the National
Laboratories who have been in Houston for the past 80 days or
so, and they have been reviewing, along with the BP engineers
and others, the various steps associated with this. It really
comes down to whether or not the well bore has integrity. So
when they close it, there are three valves or three rams on
this device that they are putting on this weekend. They will
attempt to make the initial closure of those rams sometime in
the next 48 to 72 hours, depending upon the testing and what it
shows. They will see whether the well bore holds pressure, and
they are expecting it to hold a certain amount of pressure. If
it does, then it should be an indication that you have a well
bore that is intact, and they may actually be able to shut the
well in with no further outflow at all, with the final closure
of the well being the completion of the relief well.
I hope that is responsive to your question.
Mr. Bilirakis. When will we know whether this method, this
latest method, is successful? Why did we not try it say weeks
ago?
Adm. Neffenger. As I understand it, and again, I am not an
engineer, a sub-sea engineer. But as it has been explained to
me and I have spent a fair amount of time talking with our
scientists and the scientists, engineers, that are working on
this; part of the problem initially was that this arrangement
of blowout preventer and this device called the lower marine
riser package--these are actually two separate devices--when
you have an emergency on board a mobile offshore drilling unit,
the first line of defense of course is the closure of the
blowout preventer. That is supposed to have sealed it off. The
second is what is called an emergency breakaway, which should
have allowed that second piece of equipment called the lower
marine riser package to break free and pull off the top. Both
of those failed, and that of course, is--the ultimate question
is how did that, how did you have a fail of all the fail-safe
systems?
Well, because that package did not pull off as designed,
there was no way to--had that top package pulled off, you would
have had an ability to immediately attach another blowout
preventer because all the fittings would have been exactly
right. So the intervening time it has taken them to both--and
you had the blowout preventer that got kinked over at about a
5-degree angle. So over the intervening weeks, they have slowly
been straightening the blowout preventer, straightening the
fittings, fabricating new fittings to go on top of something
that was never designed to take a blowout preventer, and
actually fabricating a new blowout preventer. It just took--as
I understand it, it just took those intervening days to do
that. But they started working on this procedure immediately
when they determined that that piece of equipment did not come
off the top.
But all that tells me is that this is an exceptionally
complex undertaking underwater, if not frustrating, that it
takes as long as it does to see results.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you. I would like to talk about
the use of dispersants. Representatives from the Southern
Shrimping Alliance, the director of which lives in my district,
they have expressed deep concern that the use of dispersants
poses a threat to certain species in the Gulf of Mexico,
including the shrimp. John Williams, who is executive director
of the alliance, wrote NOAA and EPA weeks ago but has not
received a response. My question is why are dispersants still
being used when the EPA called for BP weeks ago to find a less
toxic means of breaking up the oil slicks at the surface and we
have no clue what type of long-term ecological impact
dispersants have on the seafood industry, but in general. Are
there alternative technologies and then also if so, why are we
not using these technologies?
Adm. Neffenger. I think you rightfully note that the EPA is
the governing agency for use of dispersants and they have
been--we have worked very closely with them with respect to how
to use those and how to use them effectively. They have used
very carefully at the toxicity of the current dispersants, they
are continuing to conduct tests. I will tell you that the goal
is to minimize their use as much as possible.
If you have good weather windows, you can skim, burn, and
otherwise attack the oil mechanically and significantly reduce
the number of dispersants that you use. But the real tradeoff
is between shoreline impact, ultimately shoreline impact and
the potential environmental damage that that can do,
particularly in sensitive marsh areas and rookeries and the
like, and using dispersants to knock down that a bit. The other
reason that they use dispersants is to knock down the volatile
compounds coming up around the vessels because those pose, not
just hazards to human beings, but explosion hazards out on the
sea.
So to that end, EPA has worked very carefully to set levels
of dispersant use that they would like to see not exceeded.
Those for the most part have been adhered to, although there
have been times when operations have dictated use of higher
levels. The hope is that this week if they are able to shut the
well in, then we can stop using dispersants entirely because I
think that no one ever expected to be using dispersants over
this extended period of time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, I appreciate it. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Green for 5 minutes. We are going to adhere
closely to 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, admiral,
for your testimony today. I thank the other witness as well.
But I also thank you, admiral, for your service to our country.
We appreciate you greatly.
Admiral, there is not a one-size-fits-all response. You
indicated that you initially assumed that you had a major oil
spill. Do you make a distinction in your mind between a major
oil spill and what we have with reference to the wellhead and
oil continuing to flow from that wellhead at an enormous rate?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, I think that it is a new major oil
spill every day for us. That is the unprecedented piece. I mean
we have an event that has a beginning right now, but most oil
spills have a beginning, middle, and end, the Exxon Valdez,
even the very large ones are generally bound by an event. You
have a full release and then you are done.
So I think what makes this the most challenging oil spill
certainly that I have been involved in and probably that this
country has faced is the fact that it is on-going and it is
continuous. So even on a good day when you can collect a lot of
oil by skimming, you can burn a lot of it off and you can
collect a lot through the containment systems, you are still
facing another day the next day of the same thing.
Mr. Green. If I may, Admiral, because time is of the
essence, when did you first determine that you needed to throw
everything that you have at it?
Adm. Neffenger. I think when we saw those leaks, when we
realized that we did not have--the blowout preventer did not
work and when the first images of those individual leaks coming
off the riser pipe were seen, then we knew we had a real
problem.
Mr. Green. When did you conclude that you did not have
enough resources immediately available to contain this spill?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, I just think back in my own
experience, I've always assumed I do not have enough resources
available because you cannot get everything you need fast
enough. As an operational commander, I have always said send me
everything you can find and if I do not need it, I will send it
back home.
Mr. Green. In this case, when did you say send me
everything that you can find?
Adm. Neffenger. I think it was within the first few days of
discovering that we had that leak coming out.
Now again, I remind you that I became involved on the
second of May, but I can tell you that when I arrived down here
on the third of May, I saw people asking for everything they
could get their hands on. Now the interesting thing is that as
I mentioned before in my opening statement, there were only a
few thousand feet of boom being manufactured weekly in this
country prior to this spill, for obvious reasons. There was not
a great demand for it. So it takes some time to ramp up
production and it certainly takes some time to ramp up
production of bigger ticket items like skimmers, particularly
the types of skimmers that you need for in-shore and near-
shore.
Mr. Green. I have two additional questions, Admiral, so I
will have to intercede. One is this, have you received an
estimate or a guesstimate as to the size of the pool of oil
that the spill is emanating from?
Adm. Neffenger. The reservoir itself?
Mr. Green. Yes.
Adm. Neffenger. I just know that it is considered a
productive reservoir. I think I would refer that question to--
in fact, I can take that question back to the BP engineers to
get you an answer as to how much they might expect to produce
from that. But I do not have that answer at my fingertips.
Mr. Green. I would like for you to, if you would, give us a
written response.
Adm. Neffenger. I can do that.
Mr. Green. My next question is, given what has happened
this time and while your worst-case scenario, well, your major
oil spill did not coincide with what this has become, a worst-
case scenario, what would you need and what resources would you
need, and what would you do differently if you had the
opportunity to have the resources necessary? How would you go
about this, coping with this and making sure that you had
minimal impact by virtue of resources that you could utilize to
impact the spill itself?
Adm. Neffenger. I think we would always have been
challenged by moving resources in, because again, you have--
there are a lot of resources on the Gulf coast and most of
those moved right away, the large skimming vessels. So getting
out to the source was not the initial concern, it was really
preparing, getting enough boom and other protective devices and
materials and technologies along the beaches as you look at the
potential for an impact across a 5-State region. That is the
unprecedented piece and you have hundreds and hundreds of small
communities and sensitive areas and the like. Most oil spills
are limited in geography as well as limited in time. So you can
work to move those massive resources that you have to those
areas. So I think that the challenge is thinking about what
type of capacity do you need to have in reserve for something
that threatens this large of a geographic area.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Mr. Carney. Ms. Jackson Lee, 5 minutes, please.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, our colleague has to leave
and I will yield to my colleague from California.
Mr. Carney. All right.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, the gentlelady from Texas and
Mr. Chairman.
I am going to be very brief in my questions and if you
could answer as much as possible yes and no, that would be
greatly appreciated.
No. 1, Admiral, could you please provide to this committee
the time line for both the skimmers and the boom, how many we
have received, where we got them from and what is our plan
forward? You do not have to give it to us right this moment,
but within the next, preferably 48 hours, if you could give us
the time line. I know it has gone anywhere from 300 to 447 3
weeks ago to now I think somewhere around 500-something. I
think it is supposed to get to 750. So if you could let us
know, because I think that is a key point in how the recovery
or the response occurred.
My second question, Ms. Kayyem, clearly from the comments
that have been made from the first panel, there is a concern
about the terms of what is being communicated. I have watched
the admiral make his presentation, Admiral Allen, and although
it was excellent and all of that, to the general layman, it is
quite complicated. So would you please take back to the
Secretary for her very serious consideration of immediately,
not lessons learned next time, but now, how quickly can we get
a crew out here to begin to televise on a daily basis pictures
of what is happening, go out in the boats, so people will
accurately know what is going on. Because as I said in my
beginning comments, I have not found the coverage to be
accurate thus far, of what I viewed of the media in terms of
the entire coverage.
The next is----
Ms. Kayyem. Yes, I will. Thank you.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Admiral, if you would please--I do
not know if you had an opportunity to hear Mr. Guidry, but he
works for the State and when we were out there today in the
impacted marsh, he admitted from the State level that one of
the processes that they have used in the past has been to cut
and to allow the flow to go through. Apparently there is
disagreement out there in the sensitive area where we were,
which was Pass a Loutre, of allowing that. So would you please
double back and make a commitment to finding out if the State
has already allowed it, why is there a concern now in the
sensitive area? If I am not mistaken, you are in charge. So if
you are in charge, the Coast Guard is in charge, what my
request would be is if there is any disagreement, test one or
two, and if it works, then we know. But to hold back and to
allow it to sit there when that has not always been the
practice that has been used I think certainly merits your
review.
Adm. Neffenger. I will take a look at that and we will get
a report back to you.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Then my last comments that I just wanted to make was a
little bit of the facts of what I have learned, and I am on my
way to learn some more. One, I want to say that to my
knowledge, over 600 media individuals have been allowed the
opportunity to view what is going on. I do not think that has
been clearly communicated, that there has been a very free
moving back and forth.
No. 2, 75 Members of Congress have been out here. There are
46,000 workers out there working right now every day, many of
them from 6:00 a.m. in the morning until 10:00 at night, and
that is not being said.
No. 3, finally, what I think is most important, my closing
point, is to your liaisons. Commander Dan Precourt, who is in
the Tammany area in Slidell, and Commander Claudia Guiser, I
just want to say what incredible people and what they are doing
and the folks all who are working with them, not just with the
Coast Guard, but other teams as well, local, State, and so on.
The people, what they are doing, the passion that they have,
they are doing everything that they can. If they could lay
their bodies out there and stop one more seep, they would do
so. I do not think enough people know it. It is our job to make
sure that they are aware of it and to give them the resources
that they need.
But I am very grateful for what has happened and hopefully
we will make sure that this never occurs again.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. Ms. Jackson Lee, you may reclaim
your time now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank the witnesses very much and to admiral, we meet again in
New Orleans, as you well know, it should be noted well that you
were ever present during Hurricane Katrina in being first on
the search and rescue of 22,000 individuals. That number may
have gone up out of the waters of Hurricane Katrina right out
of this city, and again, we want to offer our appreciation.
To Madam Secretary, let me just suggest beyond those who
are working here, to make it very clear that in the instance of
this administration, a quick response has been evident. The
President's establishment of a task force that included the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the many hours that the EPA
Administrator has been on the ground, the Secretary of the
Interior, collaborative work of the Secretary of Homeland
Security and, of course, the U.S. Coast Guard that has dual
jurisdiction in transportation and homeland security have been
ever-present. I think that is important because it is difficult
to explain the work that the Government is doing.
I was with the EPA Administrator this weekend and I know
that she has spent a number of hours, along with the
Secretaries, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Homeland
Security. This is important because as you heard the Colonel
say, are you going to leave us, are you going to stay and to
finish the mission?
My question to you, Madam Secretary, are we going to finish
the mission? Two, what are you doing to answer the question of
the mayor as it relates to more resources from BP to help them
with their tourism quandary that they are in? Also, his
question as to how we can translate technicalese language,
reporting language on conference calls to comforting language
to businesses and citizens.
Ms. Kayyem. Well, let me begin with the first one, which is
no one is going anywhere. I do not just speak for the Coast
Guard or the Department. To describe the number of Federal
agencies who are working with the States and localities on
everything ranging from the health issues and the EPA issues,
which you described, to worker exploitation, to the
environment, marshland, and clean-up is an amazing relationship
between the Federal Government, the States, and localities.
Part of what their job is, is to not only help right now, but
to lay a foundation for the important long-term reconstruction
and recovery of this area that is not just about the
environment and the waters, but of course about the people who
have lost jobs or who may have to change jobs. So all of those
are part of the mandate that Secretary Mabus, as the President
had described and one that we are in partnership with Secretary
Mabus' team. You know they have been down here a couple of
times already, because we view both the response and the long-
term recovery as hand-in-hand.
To the last point about the speaking in--being able to
speak to communities, we heard that, we hear that, and we will
continue to do that. Part of that is being able to explain to
people sort of outside the noise of a lot of the complaints
that we have received. We are not immune to what we see on TV
either and so I asked this morning, just to give you an
example, because I hear it. It sounds like we are not
permitting emergency permits given the speed by which we need
to get things done and I actually learned this morning that of
the emergency permits on the environmental side by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, they have gotten 101 permit requests,
79 have been issued, only 8 are pending.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I only have a few more seconds.
Ms. Kayyem. Yes. So in terms of putting this in perspective
for people to know the speed by which we are working.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Admiral, if you would, strike teams have been very
effective and I think people were confused about the line of
command and who was leading, if you will. I have always or I
have cited what is going on with BP as a cardiac surgeon having
the talent to operate on a patient but having no talent to
close the patient and the patient bleeds to death. What would
be helpful in terms of more resources, more knowledge on
technology on our strike teams? Secondarily, has BP, after the
June 9 letter of Admiral Watson, provided you with their
redundancy if Plan B and C do not work? What then are we
expecting and what kind of enforcement will the unified command
have, the strike teams have, the Federal Government have on the
fact that they have no further answers or making them get an
answer?
Adm. Neffenger. I will start with the first question on the
strike teams. I think that is a relevant question. You know, we
have three strike teams in the Coast Guard, they are managed
out of the National Strike Force Coordination Center in
Elizabeth City, North Carolina. I think it is important to take
a look at what type of resourcing we need there going forward
and what we learn out of this spill. They are sized for a
certain type of expectation and I think that this spill
response has taught us that maybe we need to take a look at
what those expectations are. So I think that is a good question
to ask.
Second, with respect to the letter to BP, they have indeed
provided a plan for redundancy. I described part of that plan
just a moment ago with this cap, but there is a significant
additional collection capacity that is on scene in the event
this cap does not work, that we believe will be adequate to
contain everything coming off of the top of that. If it is not,
then they will have to continue--well, I will put it this way,
if what they currently attach to it is not enough to collect
it, then they have got additional vessels on hand that we
expect them to bring into the fight to continue to collect.
So I think that moving forward, they have provided us with
assurances that they understand the need for redundancy, they
have not yet failed to provide anything that we have asked for
and we are hopeful that the combination of what they are
attempting this weekend and the additional vessels that have
come on scene should be enough to contain 100 percent of what
is coming out and/or close it in completely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You will not be giving up?
Adm. Neffenger. No, ma'am; no, as I said before, we are in
this until it is over, however long that is. So this is my job
for a long time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, ma'am. I hope not too long.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carney. But we are glad you are here.
Now the last SONS exercises in March of this year, were any
of the lessons learned there brought to bear in this particular
case?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, what I would say is you learn a lot
of immediate lessons out of exercises and communications is
always one of the first lessons. You have to talk to people up
and down and sideways. It is always the greatest challenge.
I think the real challenge in this one goes back to what I
mentioned earlier and that is that it affected so many
different communities so quickly and it is on-going. This is
really the first response where you are already dealing with
recovery and restoration issues in the middle of an on-going
response.
So some of those lessons are always carried forward. The
final after-action report I do not believe has been done yet
for that, but as I said, the initial lessons are that you need
to establish a National incident command, that was one that we
learned and we did that immediately as this was declared a
Spill of National Significance. You need to work very quickly
on establishing effective communications and getting a good
handle on the information flow. As you know, those have been
challenges, but we are getting better with that as we go along.
Ms. Kayyem. That was exactly the lesson that we learned
working with the Coast Guard, in the Office of the Secretary,
was the inner-governmental communications could not be fast
enough or constant enough given, in that case, an exercise that
just hit I think two States and the east coast. Given the
breadth and depth and just how long this has been, that is why
we have so many people deployed, that is why we established a
liaison program and, as I said, we are learning as we go along.
The States are one thing, and as you heard from the mayor, they
have communications issues within their own chain of command
and within their own State. Where did the $50 million go that
BP gave to the State, that is something that the States will
have to answer to and so there is a lot of--just because we are
talking to a Governor's office does not mean that that is going
to be acceptable or necessary for the locality. So that is why
we deployed these 80 folks into only local parishes or
jurisdictions.
Mr. Carney. One thing we learned from the previous panel is
the issue of flexibility. I think that word was said about half
a dozen times. In terms of communication, Madam Secretary,
where are you going to go with the flexibility of
communication, you know, to take input from locals who seem to
know how to respond, who have done it in the past and work that
all the way up to the President if need be?
Ms. Kayyem. I think some of them have. So I think part of
our lessons learned is, No. 1, do people know where to go to
actually--with their ideas or their response plans? I think, as
you heard, we have worked that through much better now. I think
part of that is because people see Coast Guard officials in
their local EOCs, they know how to access the Coast Guard at
the State EOCs. We have got a lot more people deployed, so they
know how to access it. That is the first thing.
The second is a much more difficult issue, which I will
just be blunt with you about. Sometimes we cannot get
agreement. I mean you have seen it on some of the more large,
grand proposals that have come out of some localities.
Sometimes there is just going to be reasonable disagreement.
What we are trying to do is explain to people why we are going
to go one path and not the other. So we are taking seriously
both the access to information issue and speaking maybe to more
people more effectively, and then also explaining why certain
decisions were made. Just quickly, the marsh issue, right?
There is reasonable disagreement--these are things I never knew
before--about why you would let oil sit in marshes and just
evaporate, because if you put a lot of people in there to clean
it up, you are going to kill the marshes. I did not know that,
we need to explain it better. I did not know that before and we
need to explain it better. That is a choice that we have made
through the unified command.
Mr. Carney. Oil does not kill the marshes?
Ms. Kayyem. Pardon? It does. These are the choices. None of
these are ideal choices. I mean we start every day knowing that
we are dealing with the worst environmental and oil spill. So
any time there is slightly good news, that is a better day, and
hopefully we are getting closer to some better days.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, as I noted in my opening statement, NOAA has
predicted this will be an active to extremely active as far as
the hurricane season is concerned. High winds and rough seas
from Hurricane Alex delayed response efforts. In addition to
the delay in the response efforts, what other impacts on the
response and clean-up do you anticipate if another hurricane
enters the Gulf and what impact might hurricanes have on the
trajectory of the oil and to what extent does the Unified
Command work with FEMA to define roles and responsibilities for
dealing with the potential of more oil coming ashore as a
result of a hurricane?
Adm. Neffenger. With respect to the planning that we are
concerned about. As you know, there are mature structures in
place, mature plans in place for hurricanes along the Gulf
coast. So we have a lot of experience, just like the State.
Working together with them to plan for the normal types of
evacuations that you might expect to see. In our case, it is
evacuating people from offshore and/or conducting the various
rescue operations that generally come with weather systems that
move offshore.
The spill, of course, added some significant complexity to
that. We have a lot of critical resources now that we have put
to bear on this spill, whether it be skimming equipment,
specialized vessels, boom and the like. So without speaking
about the interruption of the actual attempt to clean, you have
got to think about how you protect that equipment by retrieving
it, putting it into safe harbors and/or safekeeping and then
immediately putting it back on scene after the hurricane
passes.
So in real terms, you are probably looking at about a 2-
week interruption by the time you get that equipment out, and
we have been working with logisticians and the DOD and others
to think about how you would actually take 6,000-plus vessels
out of the region, protect them, over 3.5 million feet of boom
out of the region, protect it, and get it re-established, re-
deployed. So that is a significant challenge. I do not say that
lightly because I think that it is likely that it would be
difficult to save all the boom, for example. In fact, most of
it you would have to consider lost, but it will do its own
damage.
Storm systems typically push in from the south, as you
know, so you are going to get strong southerly winds. Alex is a
good example of some of the challenges that we would face. It
raised the storm tides by about a foot and a half and we
suddenly saw tar balls coming into Lake Pontchatrain. That is
because of the surge action from a storm that was in the
southwest of the Gulf. That flushed back out fortunately and we
saw many of those tar balls come back out of Lake Pontchatrain.
But you would see some type of impact like that.
With respect to FEMA, we have been working very closely
with FEMA over the past month and a half to define
responsibilities, respective responsibilities, under this spill
response. The definitions are already there for a normal
hurricane but we had to determine what happens with this spill
response. The basics of what happens is that the Federal on-
scene coordinator remains the Federal on-scene coordinator for
clean-up of any oil impact from this spill. FEMA has
responsibility for the Stafford Act declaration that might
follow and the normal assistance and support to the State and
localities that would result from that. So we have drawn a very
clear line and if you are interested, there is actually a very
detailed hurricane plan for this response, which we can
provide.
Mr. Bilirakis. We would like that.
Adm. Neffenger. Okay.
Mr. Bilirakis. Madam Secretary, would you like to respond
as well?
Ms. Kayyem. Just to make absolutely clear to you that for
purposes of the individuals who would be impacted by a
hurricane, what they know, which is the Stafford Act regime,
will apply. So there is no--there is this bright line because
what we heard from the Secretary and the President was we do
not want to mix anything up. So just to be clear that that
regime of remedy would still absolutely apply regardless if the
spill had stopped, was on-going or whatever else.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Admiral, do you have sufficient resources to carry out your
additional missions? Can you answer that question? Because I
know this is a big responsibility, and how can we help as
Members of Congress?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, I think as I said to somebody once,
you know, there is no operational commander who will ever say
no to additional resources. But as I look at it, the real
challenge for any agency going forward would be surging to this
extent for an extended period of time. We have a significant
number of our personnel assigned to this response, a
significant number of our vessels, quite a few aircraft, and we
have to do that while balancing the needs around the rest of
the country. We are fortunate in that we have no other major
incidents occurring in this country right now. But if we were
to have one, it would--we would be stretched thin I believe.
So I think the question going forward is what is the--how
much surge capacity do you need a single agency to have and if
you cannot afford the surge capacity you think it should have,
how best to integrate all the other arms of Government to be
part of this, because honestly this event, there is no single
agency that could manage an event like this by itself, you
really do need all those other departmental agencies to be part
of it as well. So I think that moving forward, the planning has
to take into account how you integrate, effectively integrate,
all those different arms of Government to take their various
roles. But I think that it will remain a challenge for us
moving forward if this were to extend for another extended
period of time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
appreciate it.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One question, admiral. The BP worst-case scenario plan,
that plan is something that you were privy to: True?
Adm. Neffenger. For this particular well?
Mr. Green. Yes.
Adm. Neffenger. No, sir, there is no requirement for the
Coast Guard to have reviewed the plan that was submitted to the
Minerals Management Service. We required a plan for the vessel,
for the mobile offshore drilling unit, because it is classified
as a vessel. We required a response plan for that----
Mr. Green. Have you had occasion to review the plan at all?
Adm. Neffenger. I have reviewed the plan since this event;
yes, sir.
Mr. Green. All right, given that you have reviewed the
plan, whether you were required to or not, what is your
assessment of that worst-case scenario plan?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, I would say that it did not envision
this type of scenario. Their plan, as most plans do, envisioned
a bounded event, an event that had a beginning, middle, and
end. So it did not take into account the potential for a well
that was uncontrolled for this period of time.
Mr. Green. The plan has been criticized, as you know, in
the various media outlets. Some of the criticisms have gone to
animals that were to be preserved that no longer exist; persons
that were to be contacted that are no longer with us. What
other deficiencies did you find in the plan? I want you to be a
little bit specific if you can, please?
Adm. Neffenger. Well, I can give you a more complete answer
for the record, but I would say in general terms, if--and going
forward, I think that we need to look at closing that gap, so
that--it is clear to me that we need to have--if the Coast
Guard is responsible for overseeing and ensuring the effective
response to oil spills in the maritime environment, then I
would like to know what the plans are associated with those,
all the plans associated with the potential for oil to spill in
the maritime environment. I think a detailed review of that
plan is in order, as are all other plans associated with the
potential for oils to spill, not just from vessels but from any
entity on the outer continental shelf, because I think that
that would be helpful in terms of our response.
I will say though that regardless, we prepare--I always
assume it's going to be the worst possible thing that is going
to happen. Because as I said before, you can always turn things
around and send them home. But with respect to specific
deficiencies, I think that what I would like to do is let some
of the investigations really play out and see what they
recommend coming out of this. I know that there are a number of
investigative arms that are taking a good hard look at that,
and I am interested in seeing what their recommendations are
for how to improve those plans in the future.
Mr. Green. I will yield back the balance of my time, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Okay, Mr. Cao is here, so he gets to ask a
question.
Mr. Cao. I just have one question to the Secretary. Post-
Katrina, we saw a lack of communications between Federal
agencies. Now in regards to the oil spill, we again see a lack
of communications between the different Federal agencies with,
for example, just looking at the construction of the berms, the
Army Corps of Engineers would say build and then someone else
would come and say well, let us stop, move the pipe someplace
else. It generated all kinds of confusion for the State as well
as for the local governments.
What do you have planned to promote better inter-agency
communications in the event of a future natural disaster or a
future oil spill?
Ms. Kayyem. Well, let me talk generally and then to that
specific issue. So twice a day, both the cabinet Secretaries
and then the White House hosts an inter-agency call as well,
just to get the Federal family in place because of that concern
that we wanted to have everyone on the same page. There are a
number of important equities involved with this response. We
take the environmental concern seriously, we take the response
concern seriously, everyone has a seat at the table. Even
within the Federal family, we may not always agree, but
everyone has a place at the table for the ultimate decision-
maker, which is of course the President, but the National
incident command structure, which oversees this.
So in terms of communication, that is how we are trying to
get a unified--that is how we sort-of demand a unified voice by
the Federal Government. Then as I described earlier, the sort
of outreach to the States and localities about what it is that
we are doing and why we are doing it, and we have lessons
learned in terms of how we are communicating. So, for example,
you know, on almost every sort of major initiative
announcement, say the Ken Feinberg claims announcement, we were
very, very clear about what that would mean and what it did not
mean and then we are sort of a unified Federal family.
On the issue about the berm, and obviously a very
controversial, very, very public--you know, we have an Army
Corps of Engineers that is running quickly on its emergency
permits, it has issued all but one in less than 17 days. So we
are focusing on the big one, but we are focusing on the
minority in terms of what the Army Corps of Engineers is doing
every day. If someone heard the Army Corps of Engineers say
this is advancing, apologies for that, but actually the Army
Corps of Engineers always knew it was not the ultimate decider.
So even if it had approved something, which it had only
approved a piece of it, ultimately the decision is made by the
National incident commander. The Army Corps of Engineers is
just looking at the feasibility of doing this; the National
incident commander is looking at is this actually something
that is going to be--a larger question which is, is this part
of the response or feasible response plan.
Reasonable people disagree about that, but that is why it
may appear the focus of where we are, but we have heard you and
others concerned about was that red tape. For us, that was
actually the necessary sort of different equities that had sort
of a strong--different agencies having a strong equity in the
ultimate decision.
Mr. Cao. What I have seen at the ground level obviously is
the inability of the Federal Government to make quick
decisions. In situations such as an oil spill, we do not have a
period of weeks or months to do one study and another study and
another study. Quick decisions have to be made and again, there
seems to be the inability of the Federal Government to do that.
What ways can we streamline----
Ms. Kayyem. We had the similar concern and so over the
course of two and a half or however long we have been doing
this, the summer of 2010, part of what we have been doing is to
ensure that the Coast Guard and all the agencies are flat-
lining their decision-making authority. It does not mean--the
deputy incident command structure that is established, it is
the liaison structure that we have in place with these 80 folks
who are making sort of basic decisions. So flat-lining it so
the decisions are made quickly about the deployment of assets,
when things are coming in, making sure that every Federal
partner knows the seriousness of this so, once again, people
believe the Corps of Engineers is studying, studying, studying,
when you actually look at the numbers, 79 have been issued out
of 101 permits with 12 of those withdrawn because they were
never going to satisfy the Corps. So we have only done two
denials and we issued all but one of them with in 17 days. That
is not ideal, you want decisions made in a day, but that is
pretty fast from the perspective of the kinds of projects that
we want forward. The movement of boom is always related to the
weather, we are making those decisions every single morning.
So we are concerned about that, we have heard it, we are
trying to flat-line the Federal family and work with the States
about what are they doing and what assets are they utilizing
that can support us. So as you know, 17,000 National Guard had
been authorized by Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Gates in
that first week to be used. Only a small fraction are being
utilized by the States. What can the States bring to the table
as well on the Federal bill, and ultimately the BP bill
actually, to assist in getting to yes, very, very quickly. So
we look forward to working with the States in sort of the
expansive use of their National Guard as well.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Questions always start mounting when you
hear other Members raise concerns.
Let me pose to you, admiral, I represent a large segment of
the Gulf region that has individuals who live off the Gulf,
whether it is fishermen and shrimpers, and when I say
represent, they are in the region in Texas and we have worked
with them through different hurricanes as a Member of the
Homeland Security Committee. But also thousands of innocent
workers who are in the oil and gas industry, who live off those
types of opportunities, if you will, and many around the Nation
do not understand that. I think one of the witnesses said they
were sitting next to shrimpers and people in the industry and
both saying the same thing about the need to preserve their way
of life, their opportunity for an income.
With that in mind, you have been very careful not to step
on jurisdictional toes and I respect that, but I want from your
experience just as you have seen the building blocks come
together, would you think it would be important that we ramp up
and make more stringent, for example, the kind of recovery
redundancy plans, the kinds of plans that the industry has
previously had to file on something as catastrophic as this oil
spill is?
Adm. Neffenger. I think that is a major lesson learned
already, that we need to revisit the types of plans that we
require and what those plans contain. I think that is something
that we are already looking at inside the Coast Guard.
Ms. Jackson Lee. One of the ideas that I have and let me
say it and not necessarily ask you to comment unless you feel
positively inspired. But I like you being gracious about the
many agencies and I think the collaboration has been wonderful,
but after 9/11, America woke up and said we need a general, we
need a chief, we need someone to protect the homeland. It is
the Department of Homeland Security, we cannot get away from
it. Frankly, as I looked at a legislative fix, I think it is
enormously important to vest that authority, even more so, in
the Department of Homeland Security, which then raises the ante
for the component that you may have, for example, because I
think the Coast Guard, who has been very effective on the high
seas of going and boarding ships and arresting people if
necessary for the ills of the sea, has the kind of authority
that can make it clear that your recovery plan must be of a
great level of excellence and that there be no tomfoolery at
relates to this kind of business which can be very dangerous.
It can be very positive, but it can be very dangerous.
Do you have thoughts about the need to ensure a better
enforcement so that we can be attuned to who is not following
the law and who is?
Adm. Neffenger. I think your points are spot on. With
respect to the particular planning enforcement, it goes back to
my earlier comment about what I have already seen to be a gap
between the requirements of what was the Minerals Management
Service for producing plans, and the requirement of the Coast
Guard for producing vessel plans. Those two did not come
together. In retrospect, those are two things that should come
together. So I absolutely agree that at a minimum, we need to
look at closing that gap, so that those agencies, such as the
Coast Guard, that are responsible for responding to and
overseeing cleanup of oil spills on the water, understand all
the potential oil spills that might occur.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, very quickly, I am going to
suggest that we try to overcome those sticky jurisdictional
issues and look at coming together, the vessel plans and the
rig plans; but I know you have an answer. But let me just
quickly throw this to you as my time goes.
First of all, you can go back to the Secretary and indicate
that Congresswoman Jackson Lee wants the Coast Guard to have
arrest powers as they go on the drilling rigs if they are not
going to adhere to the commands that are being made, if there
is a dangerous situation.
But I do want to ask you quickly about this claims system
which, again, is ad hoc. We think the person who has had great
history with 9/11, but I think there should be a better claims
process, independent claims process, that comes under an
umbrella of some agency when it is required, beyond FEMA
because this is not a natural disaster, has not been declared.
What about a claims system that would be based or have some
connection to the Department of Homeland Security and are you
all ensuring that this claims system is working? I do not think
it will because there is a push-back by BP for shrimpers and
oyster men, where are their receipts, where are the
restaurants' receipts? It does not work that way.
Ms. Kayyem. So, just very quickly, we do have confidence in
the independent assessments and claims process that Ken
Feinberg is sort of reviewing right now. He is going to be
completely up and running within 2 weeks, he has spent a lot of
time in the field. In the interim, the Secretary recognizing
the same thing that--most people know Stafford, we have got to
deliver on their needs. She set up with Tracy Waring, who is
behind me, is the lead in integrated services team that is
taking all the claims available to folks and all the money that
might be accessible, explaining it to them, providing them
information. So in terms of claims, just even today, 53,000
total checks have been written, 160,000 claims filed. So that
is about 50 percent right now.
The biggest issue right now is ensuring that what is in
place now and the Ken Feinberg regime which is going to be up
and running within 2 weeks, that it is perfect for the
individuals and the businesses. That is what we are committed
to, so that is why we are going to continue with the integrated
services teams.
On the moratorium issue and the 100 million that was
reserved, we have been pushing BP to determine what in fact is
going to be covered by that 100 million. I believe today or
tomorrow, the Department of Justice will be issuing a letter to
BP regarding what are the plans in terms of those who may be
further down, sort of involved with issues related to the
economic impact of the spill and so----
Mr. Carney. Madam Secretary, I am going to cut you off
there. We are going long, we have a number of folks that need
to get on a plane and we still have another panel to go.
I would like to thank both you and the admiral for your
testimony. As all good panels do, you stimulate more questions
and boy, we are going to let you have it. Please respond
promptly once we send them, but we need to start the third
panel.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Dempsey, are you awake?
Mr. Dempsey. I am, sir.
Mr. Carney. Good for you, that is great.
I think we are just going to jump right into it.
Okay, our only witness on this panel is Mr. Ray Dempsey,
Vice President of Strategy for BP America. Mr. Dempsey is
currently deployed as part of the Deepwater Horizon response
team, leading external affair activities across the State of
Florida. For the response, Mr. Dempsey is based in the Florida
peninsula command post in Miami.
Prior to being deployed on the response, Mr. Dempsey has
been Vice President of Strategy and Portfolio for BP's Chicago-
based Fuels Value Change Strategic Performance Unit, a Fortune
100-size division of BP. Mr. Dempsey's responsibilities include
crude oil and fuel products market analysis, development of
long-term strategy and business plans, business development,
portfolio management, and project implementation.
Previous to this current role, Mr. Dempsey was the Vice
President and Regional Director for BP's Latin America and
Caribbean Region with responsibility for external affairs,
crisis management, planning, and strategy.
Over his 20-year career, he has held various engineering,
environmental, strategy, and financial roles in BP's refining,
retail, and corporate staff organizations. Mr. Dempsey holds a
bachelor's degree in industrial engineering from Kansas State
University in Manhattan, Kansas and a master's degree in
business administration from Northwestern University's Kellogg
Graduate School of Management in Evanston, Illinois.
Mr. Dempsey is a member of the Board of Directors for the
BP Foundation and is a member of the Deans' Advisory Council
for the College of Engineering at his alma mater, Kansas State.
Mr. Dempsey also is a member of the BP Advisory Board for the
National Society of Black Engineers and is a Board liaison for
the National Action Council for Minorities in Engineering,
NACME.
Without objection, the witness' full statement will be
inserted into the record. I will now ask Mr. Dempsey to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF RAY DEMPSEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF STRATEGY, BP
AMERICA
Mr. Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member
Bilirakis, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
invitation to appear today before this subcommittee to discuss
information-sharing practices related to the oil spill response
efforts.
I have worked for BP for 20 years, as you noted. On May 6,
2010, I became a senior BP official in the St. Petersburg
Unified Command, which directs the spill response efforts for
the west coast of Florida and works together with incident
command centers throughout the Gulf region. As part of my
responsibilities, I also oversaw the St. Petersburg Joint
Information Center where BP worked with the Coast Guard and
other Federal and State government representatives to share
information on spill-related efforts.
The St. Petersburg Incident Command Post is now a branch of
the Miami-based Florida Peninsula Command Post which I joined
in early June. While I am directly responsible for supporting
BP's response efforts in Florida, I also work closely with my
colleagues across the Gulf region and have spent time along the
Gulf coast as we stand united in this unprecedented response
effort.
We are devastated by this horrendous accident. It has
profoundly touched all of us and we are committed to doing the
right thing for the people affected by this spill. The friends,
family, and loved ones of those who lost their lives in this
tragic accident remain in my thoughts and prayers. Even as we
absorb the human dimensions of this tragedy, we are also
committed to doing everything possible to minimize and mitigate
the environmental and economic impacts of the spill on the Gulf
coast.
As you have heard in earlier testimony, the overall region-
wide spill response efforts are led by the Unified Area Command
and retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen is the National
Incident Commander with ultimate responsibility for the overall
response effort. Coast Guard Admiral James Watson is the
Federal On-Scene Coordinator and the Unified Area Command
currently based here in New Orleans includes personnel from BP,
Transocean, the Coast Guard, multiple Federal agencies, and the
affected States.
To support the Unified Area Command, Incident Command Posts
have been established in Mobile, Alabama; Houma, Louisiana; and
Miami, Florida. The Incident Command Posts facilitate direct
communication with State, city, parish, Tribal, and county
officials and direct a significant portion of the near-shore
and on-shore response efforts. BP personnel play key roles in
supporting the incident command posts along with personnel from
the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security and other
Federal and State personnel. In addition, the BP Command Center
based in Houston, which focuses on the source control, is
supportive of the Unified Area Command.
Importantly, all sub-sea, surface, and shoreline response
efforts are coordinated through and must ultimately be approved
by the Unified Area Command. The response currently involves
approximately 46,000 personnel, over 6,000 vessels and 118
aircraft. As a result of the efforts, approximately 740,000
barrels of oil have been collected or flared by available
containment systems and approximately 3 million feet of boom
have been deployed.
BP has committed tremendous global resources to the
response effort. Our efforts are focused on two goals--stopping
the flow of oil and minimizing the environmental and economic
impacts from the spill. Towards this end, BP is deploying
resources to fight the spill at the sub-sea, the surface, and
the shoreline. These activities are carried out under the
direction of the Unified Area Command.
A key responsibility of the Unified Area Command is the
timely, accurate information sharing. This is critical to the
success of our operations and our obligations to governments,
businesses, and individuals in the Gulf who have been affected
by the spill. Our information-sharing expectations and
objectives can be summed up rather simply--to ensure the
timely, accurate updates to the public, to ensure close
alignment and communications within the Unified Area Command to
facilitate effective operations, and to effectively liaison
with local officials, the private sector, and nongovernmental
groups to address concerns and assure that recommendations are
fully considered and implemented as appropriate.
To successfully meet our goals, we have developed a number
of formal and informal channels of communication.
First, the Unified Area Command holds regularly scheduled
meetings to facilitate timely information sharing among the
Unified Area Command members.
Second, in addition to the formal briefings, the Incident
Command Posts communicate with the Unified Area Command
multiple times throughout the day. Decisions and
recommendations made in the Incident Command Post are
communicated up through ordinary command and through the
Government and BP channels.
Third, BP, within the context of the Unified Command and as
the responsible party, regularly responds to information
requests from key Federal and State entities such as OSHA, the
Department of the Interior, the Department of Energy. Moreover,
Federal Government personnel, including the Coast Guard, have
been a continuous presence at the BP Houston command center.
Finally, the Unified Area Command's external communications
are largely handled by the Department of Homeland Security's
Emergency Support Function Number 15, which includes the Joint
Information Center, a Government affairs team and a community
affairs team.
We believe the Unified Area Command structure in place has
been largely effective. With any undertaking of this size and
complexity, there is always room for improvement. We are
committed to making these improvements every day.
BP is under no illusions about the seriousness of the
situation that we face. The world is watching us. President
Obama and members of his cabinet have visited the Gulf region
and made clear their expectations of BP and our industry. So
have Governors and local officials, Members of Congress, and
the American people. We know that we will be judged by our
response to this crisis and I can assure you that my colleagues
and I at BP are fully committed to ensuring that we do the
right thing. We are mounting the largest spill response effort
in history. The complexities, as you have heard described, are
unprecedented. We and the entire industry will learn from this
terrible event, and will emerge from it stronger, smarter, and
safer.
I am very happy to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Dempsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ray Dempsey
July 12, 2010 \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The data described throughout this testimony is accurate to the
best of my knowledge as of Friday, July 9, 2010, when this testimony
was prepared. The information that we have continues to develop as our
response to the incident continues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis, Members of the
subcommittee, I am Ray Dempsey, Vice President for Strategy & Portfolio
for BP America. I am pleased to appear today before this subcommittee
to discuss information sharing practices related to the oil spill
response efforts.
I have worked for BP for 20 years. On May 6, 2010, I joined the St.
Petersburg Unified Command, which directs spill response efforts for
the west coast of Florida and works together with incident command
centers throughout the Gulf region, as a senior BP official. As part of
my responsibilities, I also oversaw the St. Petersburg Joint
Information Center, where BP worked with the Coast Guard and other
Federal and State government representatives to share information on
spill-related efforts. The St. Petersburg Incident Command Post is now
a branch of the Miami-based Florida Peninsula Command Post, which I
joined in early June. While I am directly responsible for supporting
BP's response efforts in Florida, I also work closely with my
colleagues across the Gulf region and have spent time along the Gulf
Coast as we stand united in this unprecedented response effort.
There is an enormous team working on the response efforts, with
over 47,000 personnel deployed throughout the Gulf region. In my role,
I focus on information sharing within the Unified Area Command
generally, and the Florida Peninsula Command Post more specifically.
We are devastated by this horrendous accident. This incident has
profoundly touched all of us, and we are all committed to doing the
right thing for the people affected by this spill. Even as we absorb
the human dimensions of this tragedy, we are committed to doing
everything possible to minimize the environmental and economic impacts
of the oil spill on the Gulf Coast. I volunteered for my current
assignment because I want to help the company respond to this spill and
to address the needs of the people in the Gulf Coast region.
THE UNIFIED AREA COMMAND STRUCTURE
Overall region-wide spill response efforts are led by the Unified
Area Command (``UAC''). Retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen is the
National Incident Commander with ultimate responsibility for the
overall response effort, and Coast Guard Admiral James Watson is the
Federal On-Scene Coordinator. The UAC, currently based in New Orleans,
Louisiana, includes personnel from BP and Transocean, the Coast Guard,
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(``BOE''), and other Federal entities such as the Departments of
Homeland Security (``DHS''), Energy, and Defense, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (``NOAA''), the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service (``USFWS''), the National Marine Fisheries Service (``NMFS''),
the Environmental Protection Agency (``EPA''), the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (``OSHA''), and the affected States.
To support the UAC, Incident Command Posts (``ICPs'') have been
established in Mobile, Alabama; Houma, Louisiana; and Miami, Florida.
The ICPs facilitate direct communication with State, city, parish,
Tribal, and county officials and direct a significant portion of the
near-shore and on-shore response efforts. BP personnel play key roles
in supporting the ICPs, along with personnel from the Coast Guard and
DHS and other Federal and State personnel. Twenty branch locations
(nine serve under the Houma ICP, nine under the Mobile ICP, and two
under the Miami ICP) serve as Forward Operating Bases to help protect
the shoreline and provide locations for efficient storage and
deployment of the equipment, materials, and personnel needed for this
response. Local government personnel engage with the BP and U.S. Coast
Guard personnel at these branches. In addition, the BP Command Center
based in Houston, which focuses on source control, also supports the
UAC.
Importantly, all subsea, surface, and shoreline response efforts
are coordinated through, and must ultimately be approved by, the UAC.
The response currently involves approximately 47,000 personnel, 6,670
vessels and 118 aircraft. As a result of these efforts, approximately
740,000 barrels of oil have been collected or flared by available
containment systems and approximately 3 million feet of boom has been
deployed. These actions have all been carried out under the direction
of the UAC.
BP'S ROLE IN THE UAC
BP has committed tremendous global resources to the response
effort. Our efforts are focused on two goals: Stopping the flow of oil
and minimizing the environmental and economic impacts from the spill.
Towards this end, BP is deploying resources to fight the spill at the
subsea, surface, and shoreline.
For example, immediately following the explosion, in coordination
with the Unified Command, BP activated its pre-approved spill response
plan and began mobilizing oil spill response resources including
skimmers, storage barges, tugs, aircraft, dispersant, and open-water
and near shore boom. Today, BP carries out these activities through the
ICPs. Currently, the Houma ICP directs offshore and near-shore
skimming, dispersants, and controlled burn efforts. The nine branches
serving under the Houma ICP direct the tactical response for near-shore
skimming, marsh, and beach clean-up activities. Similarly, the Mobile
ICP and its branch locations direct near shore, marsh, and beach
activities for their area of responsibility. The UAC provides high-
level strategic oversight of all ICP activities.
In addition, all source control procedures and activities
undertaken by BP's Houston command center are approved through the UAC
prior to execution.
INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE UNIFIED AREA COMMAND
As a senior BP official in the Florida Unified Command, I have
spent substantial time working with government officials at all levels
to address concerns, to discuss requests and recommendations, and
ultimately to take the appropriate actions to meet our responsibilities
in the Gulf region. This is a key responsibility of the UAC--timely,
accurate information sharing is both critical to the success of our
operations and our obligations to the governments, businesses, and
individuals in the Gulf who have been affected by this spill. Our
information sharing expectations and objectives can be summarized
simply: Ensure timely, accurate updates to the public; ensure close
alignment of communications within the UAC to facilitate effective
operations; and effectively liaison with local officials, the private
sector and non-governmental groups to address concerns and ensure that
recommendations are fully considered and implemented as appropriate. To
successfully meet our goals, we have developed a number of formal and
informal channels of communication.
First, the UAC holds regularly scheduled meetings to facilitate
timely information sharing among UAC members. Under the Incident
Command System (``ICS''), the UAC must hold regular situation updates,
briefings, and meetings. For example, daily situation briefings are
held twice each day. They are attended by section heads, including BP
and the Coast Guard (although any member of the UAC is able to attend),
and led by the planning section chief, as prescribed by ICS.
The UAC also holds daily area command briefings, which include
personnel from BP, the Coast Guard, and Government agencies, including
Federal and State officials. Participants receive briefings from the
ICPs, discuss requests, and receive updates on weather, oil movement,
and status of operations.
Second, in addition to the formal briefings, the ICPs communicate
with the UAC multiple times throughout the day. The ICPs were
established to ensure more direct access to and communication with
local officials, businesses, and residents. Decisions and
recommendations made in the ICPs are communicated up through ordinary
command and through Government and BP channels. Moreover, IPCs
continually seek input from localities, consider seriously any concerns
and issues raised, and do our best to address them accordingly. As a
result, our operations and information-sharing practices are constantly
evolving. As a result, our operations and information-sharing practices
are constantly evolving. For example, we just recently enhanced our
Florida unified command structure to include additional branch
locations in the Panhandle region. This is intended to bring an
enhanced level of command and control that includes representatives of
local government. Local government best understands the needs of their
communities, and we are striving better to integrate them into response
efforts.
Third, BP, both within the context of the UAC and as a responsible
party, communicates directly with Federal and State government
officials. BP regularly responds to information requests from key
Federal and State entities, such as OSHA, the Department of the
Interior, and the Department of Energy. Moreover, Federal Government
personnel, including the Coast Guard, have been a continuous presence
at the BP Houston command center. Through these activities, BP seeks to
ensure up-to-the-minute information-sharing with key Federal and State
personnel.
Finally, the UAC's external communications are largely handled by
DHS's Emergency Support Function (``ESF'') No. 15. ESF No. 15 has
external affairs staff (led by the Coast Guard), including the Joint
Information Center, which is staffed by representatives from BP, the
Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, and Federal agencies (e.g.,
EPA, NOAA, USFWS), and which is responsible for responding to media
inquiries. There is also a Governmental affairs team composed of
liaison officers who provide information to and coordinate visits from
elected officials and other interested parties. The community affairs
team, composed of community liaisons, coordinates with BP and DHS
community representatives working at the ICPs and branches. Community
liaisons are responsible for working with affected members of the
public and local officials in the affected areas and elevating issues
to the UAC when necessary.
CONCLUSION
We believe the UAC structure in place has been largely effective.
With any undertaking of this size and complexity, there is always room
for improvement. We are committed to making these improvements every
day.
BP is under no illusions about the seriousness of the situation we
face. The world is watching us. President Obama and members of his
Cabinet have visited the Gulf region and made clear their expectations
of BP and our industry. So have Governors and local officials, Members
of Congress, and the American people.
We know that we will be judged by our response to this crisis. I
can assure you that my colleagues at BP and I are fully committed to
ensuring that we do the right thing. We are mounting the largest spill
response effort in history. The complexities are unprecedented. We and
the entire industry will learn from this terrible event, and emerge
from it stronger, smarter, and safer.
Mr. Carney. Thank you for your testimony. We are going to
go out of order in this case to respect Mr. Green's need for a
flight. So I recognize Mr. Green for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to make a distinction between BP
high-level management and BP rank-and-file with reference to my
statements. The high-level management is where the policy
emanates and I am going to address my questions to high-level
management.
People are unhappy with BP. I am one of those persons. BP
has become synonymous with broken promises. BP has a record
that in my opinion indicates someone in high management is not
doing his or her job, and possibly many people.
Texas City, 15 people killed, a report indicating that
there was willful neglect. Willful neglect in the sense that
there was knowledge that a problem existed and the problem was
not corrected at Texas City. The North Slope of Alaska where
penalties were paid. Now we have 11 additional person dying
right here with the Deepwater Horizon.
BP is not only going to be judged by how well BP responded
to this incident, BP ought to be judged also by how well BP
performed, allowing this incident to occur. An investigation
ought to take place, people ought to be investigated. Oil
companies themselves do not commit crimes, people do when they
fail to take the proper measures to protect human life. We
cannot allow another BP tragedy to occur. The public is not
going to forgive us.
It has been said that this was a wake-up call. This indeed
was more than a wake-up call. The wake-up call was in Texas
City when we lost 15 lives. This is a second alarm and I am not
sure that we will have an opportunity to convince the public
that we have done our jobs if a third alarm should occur, if
something else should occur. I think that we have got to do
what we must do, and that is have an external investigation of
BP. I separate the rank-and-file workers from the upper-level
management where these policies and decisions are being made.
Someone has to understand that the American people are not
going to allow this kind of negligence to continue. I believe
it to be negligence based upon the reports that I have seen
thus far. If other reports to the contrary are presented, I
will review them. But I am not happy with BP. I think that it
is time for BP to understand that you cannot come in after the
fact and throw your money around and then in some way think
that you have now compensated for the lives that have been
lost.
I think that what is happening to this economy as a result
of BP is also something that must be investigated such that not
only will those persons who are closely related to these
damages that they are suffering, but also those that are
remotely related will receive some degree of compensation as
well.
This incident has to be the last straw for BP. We cannot
continue to allow this company to continue to behave the way it
has through the years--15 lives, 11 lives, and God knows what
is ahead of us. So I am just letting you know that I am going
to push for a thorough investigation of this process. I am
interested in the response, but I also want to know what
happened to allow this to occur again.
No more deaths. BP has got to keep some of these promises
that it continues to make.
Finally this, I appreciate you being here today. Your
credentials seem to be impeccable. You are at one level and I
am confident that you are capable, competent, qualified. But at
some point, I am hopeful that we will get the President of BP
or someone in that policy-making room with the President to
come before a committee and give us some responses. I
understand how you arrived here today, no disrespect to you,
sir, but I just want you to know that I am speaking for a lot
of people who cannot speak for themselves who are fed up with
BP and the way it has responded to other crises that have
already occurred, such that this one has now risen its ugly
head. BP has got to do better if it is going to continue to do
business in this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no time to yield back and I
appreciate your courtesy.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Green.
I will recognize myself for 5 minutes now.
Mr. Dempsey, did BP participate in the SONS 2002 exercise
in New Orleans?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, I understand that BP has been a
participant in a number of exercises around the Gulf for a
number of years. In an earlier role of my own, I was
accountable for the crisis management team through the United
States. My understanding is that yes, indeed, we were part of
the SONS exercise in 2002.
Mr. Carney. Okay. The lessons learned from your
participation or BP's participation, were they applied in this
incident?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, I believe that in every case of
an exercise of the type that was conducted, there is a very
thorough debrief, there is a very thorough reflection on what
were the lessons learned and what changes can be implemented
within our industry and within the Governmental agencies with
whom we work. I believe that those lessons learned from that
exercise have indeed been applied in BP and throughout our
industry.
Mr. Carney. What were those lessons learned in 2002?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the most
important observations that relates to this response and
relates to our previous exercises is very much about a subject
you have heard described throughout this hearing by previous
panelists. A critical priority is to ensure the early and
continuous involvement of local officials, officials who have
deep knowledge and understanding of their geography, of the
waters in their areas and of the concerns and priorities within
their area of responsibility.
Mr. Carney. Okay, I want to ask you a question. The number
of gallons or barrels per day leaking started at zero and now
it is somewhere between 60- and 100,000. How was that
determined, how do you arrive at that number?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, in the early weeks of this
response, the flow rates were developed and supported by the
Unified Area Command and that was based on data provided by BP.
In more recent weeks----
Mr. Carney. Stop right there. So BP provides Unified Area
Command with a number of the flow, right?
Mr. Dempsey. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. The data provided by BP
relates to the imagery which many of us have seen, it relates
to the amount of oil that has been contained or burned through
the series of exercises going on on the surface. Based on that
data, estimates were made in a cooperative way by Unified Area
Command and now, sir, by the Flow Rate Technical Group, which
is an independent body appointed by the National Incident
Commander. We continue to provide data to the Flow Rate
Technical Group who have developed the most recent estimates
for the amount of flow coming from the well.
Mr. Carney. So it is true that BP was part of a team and
not providing the initial assessments of the flow--of the
output?
Mr. Dempsey. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that has indeed been
the case.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Now does BP have an interest in reporting
or urging for lower flow rates as opposed to higher ones? Is
there some liability that BP may face if the flow rates are
actually higher than lower?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, I do not know of any specific
distinction that would be made in terms of liability as a
function of the flow rate. I can assure you that the response
that has been mounted here has not been a function of an
estimate of the flow rate, it has been based on the reality of
the oil that has been identified on the surface and the threat
that we have perceived as it relates to shoreline response and
response efforts. The resources that have been deployed are a
function of BP bringing to bear the entire resources of our
company from around the world, and they have been put into
place to address whatever oil and whatever threat is identified
through the decision-making of the Unified Area Command.
Mr. Carney. So what you are saying is BP does not face a
larger or smaller fiduciary responsibility based on how much
oil has flowed out of the well?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of any
distinction in the liability that would be a function of this
response that relates to the flow rate.
Mr. Carney. Okay. If you learn differently, or please
investigate that and send your answer back to the subcommittee.
Mr. Dempsey. I will.
Mr. Carney. I now recognize Mr. Bilirakis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What is your response plan for the west coast of Florida,
God forbid the oil comes near us?
Mr. Dempsey. Congressman Bilirakis, I have personally been
involved in the planning and the preparation for response on
the west coast of Florida. As I noted in my testimony, I was
assigned--I volunteered, frankly--to go to St. Petersburg and
arrived there on the 6th of May, where I became a senior BP
official. One of the earliest priorities that we identified was
to invite in representatives from each of the counties in the
13-county area in the St. Petersburg sector, which starts in
Taylor County in the north down to Collier County in the south.
Our aim was to work with each of those counties on the Area
Contingency Plans to make sure that there was a real sense of
clarity about the sensitive areas within their counties, about
the protective strategies that were in place according to those
Area Contingency Plans, and that any adjustments that were
needed in respect of this particular response were made and
made in full cooperation with the counties and local officials.
At this time, the planning and the preparation which
includes the development of those Area Contingency Plans has
been put into place and, as has been noted in earlier
testimony, we are in the process now of engaging through the
liaison team to go deeper into communities and make sure we are
aware of the priorities, the concerns that are raised by
communities and by local officials, and that our response plans
continue to be responsive to those priorities.
Mr. Bilirakis. Will you include the cities as well?
Mr. Dempsey. Congressman Bilirakis, I have met personally
with Mayor Hibbard on at least two occasions that come
immediately to mind. Indeed, part of my priority over the last
month has been to meet with local elected officials, community
leaders, business leaders and citizens around the State, and
particularly around the west coast. Just last week, I was in a
couple of counties up in the eastern edge of the panhandle with
Congressman Allen Boyd, where we held a series of community
meetings with his constituents to make sure that we listened to
their priorities, their concerns and that we helped to share
information with them about the preparation that has already
taken place and is continuing and the potential threat to their
coastlines.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
So, you do not think that this miscalculation with the flow
rate had any effect on the response; is that what you are
saying?
Mr. Dempsey. Congressman, my understanding of the way we
have mounted this response from the very beginning, which began
frankly on the day of the incident; and on the day after the
incident, BP personnel were here in New Orleans, with Admiral
Mary Landry, who at that time was identified as the Federal On-
Scene Coordinator. Admiral Landry put into place the Unified
Area Command structure and from that point we have mounted a
response that is focused on addressing the threat that comes
from the well. Without specific regard to the estimate of the
amount coming from the well, the resources that have been
deployed including the activity at the spill site, the near-
shore response and the clean-up efforts have been a function of
what is there. Therefore, my assertion to you, Congressman,
would be that the estimates of the flow rate did not limit our
ability to mount this response.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, next question. I understand there has
been a problem with the claims process in the State of Florida
and that BP is working on that issue. Can you please give me
maybe an update on that?
Mr. Dempsey. Congressman, I would say to you that the
claims process has been quite a learning experience in many
ways. In 84 days now of this response, you may know that we
received over 100,000 claims, we have paid out more than half
of those or roughly half of those in an amount totaling roughly
$165 million. We have made a commitment of a $20 billion fund
to be administered over time, and as you may also be aware, we
have appointed or we have had appointed an independent
administrator, Mr. Kenneth Feinberg, who brings deep experience
in this process from the work that he did post-9/11.
In Florida, we have managed to pay out individual claims
now in a time of about 4 to 5 days. We now are paying out
business claims in a time which is roughly 6 to 8 days. Our
priority in recent days has been to streamline and improve the
process for the local government entity claims process and just
in the last week we have completed payments to a number of
counties in the panhandle that had expended resources in this
response and monies have been transmitted to them in
reimbursement for their costs that have been put into place for
this response.
I know that Administrator Feinberg and his team will build
into their plans ways to further increase the efficiency, the
pace and the assurance that the objective here is to get money
into the hands of those who ought to have it just as quickly
and efficiently as we can.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. I have heard reports that BP----
Mr. Carney. Mr. Bilirakis, we will do another round.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you very much.
Mr. Carney. Ms. Jackson Lee, please.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Dempsey, for appearing here
today.
I know that BP has a command site in Houston, Texas in its
corporate headquarters. My question to you is the willingness
of BP to meet with me and my constituents as Texas prepares for
the possibility of a hurricane and the intrusion of some of the
oil spill in our region. Could you arrange that and ensure that
we would have the opportunity to meet with locally elected
officials, emergency preparedness individuals, to talk about
being prepared in the State of Texas?
Mr. Dempsey. Congresswoman, I would be very happy to go
back with my colleagues in Houston and ensure that we can
facilitate just such a meeting.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Does BP intend to file
bankruptcy?
Mr. Dempsey. Congresswoman, I have been asked this question
before. A month ago in Washington, DC in a Senate hearing, I
was asked a similar question by one of your colleagues.
What I can tell you is that we are certainly committed to
this response and we have brought to bear the full resources of
our company to ensure that we stop the flow of the oil and we
mitigate and minimize the environmental and economic impacts.
We provide information to our shareholders and we provide
information to Wall Street security analysts community and the
City of London. They have made their own analyses of the
potential liabilities, the potential costs, and they have drawn
their own conclusions about whether or not BP will go out of
business.
I can tell you that within the organization, I have not
been privy to any discussions that suggests that that is an
intent that we would pursue.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just say this, and I thank
you for that answer. I think BP owes the American people a
forthright pronouncement that they will not file bankruptcy and
they will not file to the detriment of those who are still
suffering.
The second part of my question is I have repeatedly asked
BP to understand the uniqueness of small restaurants, the
tourism business, oyster, fishermen, et cetera. My visit here,
my first visit, was to oystermen, fishermen, and others and
asked BP to provide them with a lump sum payment. To date, the
restaurant is still on the brink of closing or already closed,
the owner cannot pay her mortgage, and fishermen and oystermen
have not gotten compensation based upon BP's, if you will,
entangled process of calling for receipts.
I do not think these people are trying to defraud BP and
the question is can BP move this process along now that the
independent claims person has it? I frankly do not believe it
is going to move any quicker if we have the same standards that
BP is using. What are you doing to help these people who do not
have traditional financial records?
Mr. Dempsey. Congresswoman, I can tell you that from the
early days of the claims process, we----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Dempsey, I do not want to interrupt
you, but my time is very short too and I am leaving for the
airport. Are you going to work with these individuals to
provide them with funding? Can I get this back in writing? Why
do I not just ask for an answer back in writing about the
payment to these individuals. I will just move on.
The other question is, quickly: What you are doing
regarding health concerns and mental health concerns, which I
think is also challenging? In addition, there have been many
who have technology and I know that you cannot answer
everyone's call but there are individuals such as an African-
American who has discovered a technology that is now presently
on hold and I am trying to find the individual's name--Rodney
Whitney--been on hold for 6 weeks and has not been able to get
a response from BP on utilization of this technology.
Do you have any insight on small contractors who are
waiting to be helpful and seemingly cannot get a response,
along with the mental health issue?
Mr. Dempsey. Congresswoman, just as it relates to your
earlier question, I am not familiar with the specifics of the
case that you were describing there, but I am happy to follow
up with you and I will follow up to pursue that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that, thank you.
Mr. Dempsey. We share your concerns around mental health
impacts and I know that there is a conversation underway with
States around the region to get clarity as to the best and the
most effective way to support those concerns.
As it relates to the third part of your question there, I
am sorry, will you please----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mental and physical health concerns.
Mr. Dempsey. Right and there was----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Compensating for that.
Mr. Dempsey. There was a third part to your question,
Congresswoman and I----
Ms. Jackson Lee. It was the small business.
Mr. Dempsey. Small businesses.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Dempsey. Yes, that is right; thank you for the
reminder.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The independent claims, whether or not you
are able to move forward on paying people that do not have the
traditional financial records that BP seems to be insisting on.
Everybody is committing fraud, as we seemingly--they are
interpreting that everyone is trying to, you know, take
advantage of BP and these people are dying.
Mr. Dempsey. Thank you, I will go back to that and then
return to the question around the ideas.
So from early in the process, we created an advance payment
facility for fishermen and a boat captain could go into any of
the 35 claims offices around the region and in many cases with
very little documentation, presumably a payroll stub or some
sort of a bank deposit receipt, could walk out of the claims
office with a check for $5,000. A deck hand similarly could
walk into a claims office with very little in the way of
documentation, again, a check stub, a payroll receipt; and in
many cases, frankly, Congresswoman, we would make a call to a
boat captain to confirm their employment, and those deck hands
could leave the claims office with a check for $2,500. The
substantiation that would follow would give the opportunity for
us to true-up their true compensation. So in the event that a
boat captain earned more than that, they would be trued up in
the following month.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I could just have you answer the other
questions in writing. What you are repeating to me, there are
those that are saying that they have not gotten checks in
months and literally they are dying on the vine.
Let me just conclude and thank the Chairman for this
excellent hearing and say to you, Mr. Dempsey, that I too
represent thousands who are innocent that are in the industry
and I would only say that I believe your company and the entire
industry owes, in a stand-up way, the American people an
apology and an explanation of who the oil industry is. Not
putting their head in the sand, and begin to talk about how
they can do better and how they can work together with the
American people to preserve what we have and to improve upon
what needs to be improved. They owe us an apology and they are
my constituents, because you are hurting not only the American
people, but you are hurting all these innocent workers who are
frightened for their jobs. That means those in the oil industry
that I represent. Leadership owes a pronouncement to the
American people that we will not go bankrupt. Your partners
need to come out of hiding and they need to stand with you and
own up to paying the American people, because everyone knows
there are more than just BP on that rig. These individuals are
hiding and you should not allow them to hide.
So, Mr. Chairman, I hope as we try to construct a better
management or command structure, that we also look at all the
parties that were involved in this catastrophe, we call them
out, let them stand before the American public and tell us how
they will fix it.
Mr. Dempsey, I appreciate your leadership and what you are
trying to do. But you are trying to climb up the rough side of
the mountain and you need your leadership to recognize that.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee; thank you for your
questions.
Mr. Dempsey, media reports after the explosion occurred
indicated, ``There was no one in charge aboard the rig.'' Who
was actually in charge or who should have been in charge? Was
it BP, was it Transocean, who?
Mr. Dempsey. Congressman--Mr. Chairman, I should say that I
think this answer is also a bit responsive to the comments made
by Congressman Green and the comments made just now by
Congresswoman Jackson Lee. I think it is really important to
note that, first of all, this is indeed an unprecedented event
and it is something that is beyond the scope of our previous
experiences. There is an investigation underway and as Mr.
Green called for and as Ms. Jackson Lee also called for, I want
to make sure that it is clear that there is an investigation
underway, both by BP and by the Federal Government.
I am certain that given the conclusion of those
investigations, we will learn what went wrong here and I
believe that we will put into place changes in the policies,
the practices, and the procedures to ensure that this kind of
incident cannot happen again.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. From your experience watching the
flow of information up and down the chain of command, where do
you see the bottlenecks? Where do you see constrictions in flow
and response?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, I think that the unified command
structure is actually quite purposeful in that it brings
together expertise from different parties. The role that BP
plays in the unified command structure is probably quite
different from that that could be brought by the Coast Guard
and by the other associated State and Federal agencies.
I think that because there is a need for us to work
cooperatively and collaboratively, there have been occasions
where the time it takes to understand each others' points of
view, to understand the most effective ways to protect the
shoreline have taken more time than many of us might like. I am
not sure that I could point, Mr. Chairman, at any particular
constriction, but it is important to note that working in the
unified command structure, there is indeed a decision-making
process and we are working very carefully within that to ensure
that we make the right choices to maximize our protection of
the shoreline.
Mr. Carney. Thank you very much. Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Getting back to the claims process, I know there is a
claims process now going on with BP and the $20 billion trust
fund, which Mr. Feinberg is in charge of, the independent trust
fund. How is that going to jibe in, how is that going to work?
Is he going to be responsible for all the claims once the
guidelines are established? You know, my constituents need to
know where to go to, where to turn to.
Mr. Dempsey. I understand. So, Congressman Bilirakis, I
believe that the independent claims administrator, Mr.
Feinberg, will make very clear over the next couple of weeks
the scope and the range of the work that he and his team will
do. My expectation is that they will indeed take accountability
for executing the claims process for individuals, for
businesses, and for local Government entities.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. With regard to the relief wells, there
was a report I guess 3 or 4 days ago that the one well at least
will be on-line by possibly July 20. I know that the target
date is mid-August. Tell me something about that. Can you give
me an estimation when it will be completed?
Mr. Dempsey. Yes, sir. Congressman, I am as anxious as the
rest of the world to know that we have successfully completed
the relief wells and will have killed the well. I listen every
morning to the briefing provided by Admiral Allen, the National
Incident Commander, as to the progress and the status and the
expectations as to the timing of the completion. I believe that
his briefings are thorough and comprehensive and the estimates
that he provides are the best authoritative view as to when
that work will be completed.
Mr. Bilirakis. How about the latest containment method that
is going on right now, anything on that?
Mr. Dempsey. Earlier today, Congressman, Admiral Allen
provided a briefing on the placement of the containment cap.
From my perspective, he was quite hopeful that within a matter
of days now, we will have some clarity as to our ability to
contain the flow from the well and will make some judgments
about how best to ensure that that work is continued, but that
the ultimate ending for this remains with the completion of the
relief wells.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, last question. In your testimony, you
noted that local government best understands the needs of their
communities. This is something of course that I strongly agree
with. I am pleased that you indicate BP is striving better to
integrate them into response efforts, especially considering
the comments we heard from Mayor Hibbard about the need for
better communication efforts with local communities. What
changes are you making to better integrate the expertise of
State and local officials and businesses into the response
efforts?
Mr. Dempsey. Congressman, I think the most powerful example
of the adjustments that we have made as we have been learning
throughout this process is the implementation of these deputy
incident commanders and the branches in the States throughout
the region. In the State of Florida in particular, we have
established a Florida Command Post based now in Tallahassee,
led by a unified command structure that includes the Department
of Environmental Protection Secretary Mike Sole, a BP Incident
Commander Mary Schaefer-Maliki and Coast Guard Commander Joe
Boudreau. Their accountability now will be to bring much more
closely to the local jurisdictions, the counties, and the
municipalities, to understand the planning, the preparation,
and the response efforts that are underway in their communities
and ensure that we understand their concerns and that we make
adjustments in real time for maximum protection of their
coastlines. This development of this deputy incident command
came directly out of the understanding and the learning that
the operations being directed from Mobile, while very
comprehensive, left a distance from the voices of those on the
ground within the counties and the municipalities.
Mr. Bilirakis. If my constituents have questions or issues,
can we contact you directly?
Mr. Dempsey. Congressman; yes, sir, you may. I would be
very happy to try to address any concerns by those constituents
based in the State of Florida, as that is my primary
accountability.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
appreciate it and I appreciate you holding this hearing.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Dempsey, one more question and we can end for the day.
Will BP make this situation whole, fix this situation
regardless of the cost?
Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, I remember early in this
exercise, early in the response, there were questions about the
$75 million liability cap to which we suggested----
Mr. Carney. Yes or no.
Mr. Dempsey [continuing]. That we were not going to be
focused on that. My answer, Mr. Chairman, is yes, BP is
committed to bring the full resources of our company to meet
the requirements of this response for as long as it takes.
Mr. Carney. Thank you very much.
I really want to thank everybody who came today, everybody
who stuck around today. I especially want to thank the staff of
the courthouse for going way above and way beyond. This is I
think a very important hearing to hold, it affects New Orleans,
it affects the region and it affects the Gulf, it affects the
entire Nation. So your efforts on our behalf are truly
appreciated; thank you all on the staff.
Once again, the staff that we have on our subcommittee is
amazing, they do a great deal of work to prepare us for this,
for these hearings. We are not done with this, we will be
asking questions long into the future.
Mr. Dempsey, I imagine you will receive some questions in
writing, I appreciate your candor and we will get back to it at
some point.
But right now, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon at 6:01, the subcommittee was adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
