[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
H.R. 5498: THE WMD PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2010
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS, CYBERSECURITY,
AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 15, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-70
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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2011
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Pete Olson, Texas
Laura Richardson, California Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Steve Austria, Ohio
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Vacancy
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
Yvette D. Clarke, New York, Chairwoman
Loretta Sanchez, California Daniel E. Lungren, California
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Paul C. Broun, Georgia
William L. Owens, New York Steve Austria, Ohio
Vacancy Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Jacob Olcott, Staff Director
Dr. Chris Beck, Senior Advisor for Science and Technology
Ryan Caldwell, Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Yvette D. Clark, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 4
Witnesses
Ms. Sara (Sally) T. Beatrice, Assistant Commissioner, Public
Health Laboratory Director, New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Randall S. Murch, Associate Director, Research Program
Development, National Capital Region, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Dr. Robert P. Kadlec, Vice President, Global Public Sector, PRTM
Management Consulting:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Ms. Julie E. Fischer, Senior Associate, Global Health Security
Program, Henry L. Stimson Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
For The Record
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Bill Pascrell, Jr., a
Representative in Congress From the State of New Jersey:
Chart.......................................................... 39
H.R. 5498: THE WMD PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2010
----------
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Yvette D. Clarke
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Clark, Thompson, Lungren, and
Austria.
Also present: Representative Pascrell.
Ms. Clarke [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland Security
will come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive
testimony on H.R. 5498, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010. Good afternoon.
The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism, the WMD Commission, put out a report entitled
``World at Risk'' in 2008. In that report they told us that
they believe that a terrorist act would occur somewhere in the
world by 2013 and that it was more likely to be an act of
biological terrorism.
Although we have not seen WMD attacks here in the United
States really come to fruition since 9/11 and the anthrax
events of 2001, the threat is real. We have heard it from the
WMD Commission. We have heard it from the 9/11 Commission. We
have heard it from the intelligence community. We have heard it
from law enforcement. We have heard it from the military. We
have heard it from State and local officials. We have heard it
from the private sector. We have seen successful attacks occur
overseas, and we have seen aborted and failed terrorist
attempts actually occur here in the United States.
While we continue to reach out through diplomatic channels
to those who may wish to do us harm, we fully realize that the
diplomatic solution may not be possible. Therefore, it is clear
that we need to enhance our homeland security by improving
efforts to counter a WMD attack, especially using a biological
weapon.
This is the purpose of H.R. 5498, the WMD Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2010. With this bill we recognize that we
will need to prevent and deter the threat; that we must prepare
for an attack if prevention and deterrence fail; that while we
are continuing to prepare, an attack may occur that we will
need to detect before people and animals get sick or injured,
or die; that once we detect an event, we need to attribute the
crime to someone or some entity; that we need to respond
immediately; that we will need to recover from the attack, and
that all of these actions are not the sole responsibility of
the Federal Government, so we need to integrate partners in the
public, private, and global sectors.
We addressed each of these elements--prevention,
deterrence, preparedness, detection, attribution, response, and
recovery--in H.R. 5498.
One of the determinations of the WMD Commission was that
the Nation has not done enough to counter the biological
threat. I agree, but I also want to point out that much has
been done and is being done.
In H.R. 5498 we take this into account, and authorize and
address a number of things that already exist in the Executive
branch, including but not limited to the National intelligence
strategy for countering biological threats, export enforcement
for counter proliferation, material threat determinations,
promotion of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the
BWC), BioWatch, System Assessment and Validation for Emergency
Responders (the SAVER program), the Laboratory Response Network
for Bioterrorism, training to investigate biological threats
and demonstration projects to recover from a biological attack.
Still, we agree with the WMD Commission that much more
needs to be done to counter the WMD threat in general, and the
biological threat specifically.
With this in mind, through H.R. 5498, we call for a number
of new programs and activities, such as the National
Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from WMD, the
creation of a top tier of select agents that pose a material
threat to the Nation--the Tier 1 Material Threat Agents--
enhanced measures to better secure these Tier 1 Material Threat
Agents, grants to help laboratories that possess Tier 1
Material Threat Agents increase their security, sharing
laboratory biosecurity information and threat-related
information and guidance with State and local officials,
reviewing criminal statutes to ensure their application will
result in the prosecutions we need, a policy review to allow
for first responders and others to get immunized for different
threat agents as a preventive measure before attacks occur,
international engagement to enhance biodefense and biosecurity,
a study of forensic science in homeland security by the
National Academy of Science, and the National Medical
Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy.
Finally, in H.R. 5498, we are looking to fix some
problematic programs, such as the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center.
This is a bipartisan bill, developed through careful
consideration of varying viewpoints and the input of experts
and interested parties in both the public and private sectors.
We look forward to continuing that process with our
witnesses today, and I thank you for appearing today.
[The statement of Chairwoman Clarke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke
June 15, 2010
The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism--``the WMD Commission''--put out a report entitled ``World at
Risk'' in 2008. In that report, they told us that they believed that a
terrorist act would occur somewhere in the world by 2013, and that it
was more likely to be an act of biological terrorism. Although we have
not seen WMD attacks here in the United States really come to fruition
since 9/11 and the anthrax events of 2001, the threat is real.
We have heard it from the WMD Commission; we have heard it from the
9/11 Commission; we have heard it from the intelligence community; we
have heard it from Federal law enforcement; we have heard it from the
military; we have heard it from State and local officials; we have
heard it from the private sector; we have seen successful attacks occur
overseas; AND we have seen aborted and failed terrorist attempts
actually occur here in the United States.
While we continue to reach out through diplomatic channels to those
who may wish to do us harm, we fully realize that the diplomatic
solution may not be possible. Therefore, it is clear that we need to
enhance our homeland security by improving efforts to counter a WMD
attack--especially using a biological weapon. This is the purpose of
H.R. 5498, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010.
With this bill we recognize:
That we need to prevent and deter the threat;
That we must prepare for an attack if prevention and
deterrence fail;
That while we continue to prepare, an event may occur that
we will need to detect before people and animals get sick or
injured, or die;
That once we detect an event, we need to attribute the crime
to someone or some entity, and we need to respond immediately;
That we will need to recover from the event; and
That all of these actions are not the sole responsibility of
the Federal Government, so we need to integrate partners in the
public, private, and global sectors.
We addressed each of these elements--prevention, deterrence,
preparedness, detection, attribution, response, and recovery--in H.R.
5498, the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010.
One of the determinations of the WMD Commission was that the Nation
has not done enough to counter the biological threat. I agree, but I
also want to point out that much has been done and is being done. In
H.R. 5498 we take this into account, and authorize and address a number
of things that already exist in the Executive branch, including but not
limited to:
The National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats;
Export Enforcement for Counter Proliferation;
Material Threat Determinations;
Promotion of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(the BWC);
BioWatch;
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders;
and
The Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism.
Still, we agree with the WMD Commission that much more needs to be
done to counter the WMD threat in general, and the biological threat
specifically. With this in mind, through H.R. 5498, we call for a
number of new programs and activities, such as:
A National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat
from WMD;
The creation of a top tier of Select Agents that pose a
material threat to the Nation--the Tier 1 Material Threat
Agents;
Enhanced measures to better secure these Tier 1 Material
Threat Agents;
Grants to help laboratories that possess Tier 1 Material
Threat Agents to increase their security;
Sharing laboratory biosecurity information, and threat-
related information and guidance with State and local
officials;
Reviewing criminal statutes to ensure their application will
result in the prosecutions we need;
A policy review to allow first responders and others to get
immunized for different threat agents as a preventive measure,
before attacks occur;
International engagement to enhance biodefense and
biosecurity;
A study on Forensic Science in Homeland Security by the
National Academy of Science; and
A National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy.
Finally, in H.R. 5498, we are looking to fix some problematic
programs, such as the National Biosurveillance Integration Center.
This is a bipartisan bill, developed through careful consideration
of varying viewpoints, and the input of experts and interested parties
in both the public and private sectors. We look forward to continuing
that process with our witnesses today.
Ms. Clarke. I would now like to ask for unanimous consent
for Mr. Pascrell, who is not a Member of this subcommittee, to
participate in this hearing.
Without objection, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Pascrell, is authorized to question the witnesses and obtain
testimony for this subcommittee hearing.
I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey and
the sponsor of this legislation, Mr. Pascrell, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Pascrell. Chairwoman, I want to thank you for yielding
me as much time, or 2 minutes of yours--I want to thank you for
your leadership and the leadership of Ranking Member Lungren.
He and I have been talking for many a moon regarding what we
need to do to defend the Nation and the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act, H.R. 5498, which
Mr. King and I introduced last week. Mr. King, of course, is
the Ranking Member of the entire committee.
This hearing is critical to understand the necessity for
our legislation and to highlight our lack of preparedness at
all levels for the threat of weapons of mass destruction. I
would like to be here today to say that the threat of weapons
of mass destruction is one restricted only to Hollywood
thrillers or is a distant reality we need not worry about
today. This is not the case.
Let me be clear about the reality. In all that we have
read, all that we have heard, we can conclude in unison that
weapons of mass destruction constitute the greatest
catastrophic risk we face anywhere in the world today. We know
from reports that terror groups like al-Qaeda remain committed
to obtaining nuclear and biological weapons.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has said that
under current readiness, a weapons of mass destruction attack
is likely to occur by 2013. Recent terror attempts, including
the incident at Times Square, demonstrate that our enemies
continue to probe our homeland security infrastructure, looking
for weaknesses, probing, probing every day. The message is
clear. We need to be more than vigilant.
Let me be even more clear. Either we can pass the
legislation and be prepared for this threat or we can ignore
it, hope that the best-case scenario plays out. That is the
kind of short-term thinking that BP used for the disaster we
see in the Gulf of Mexico.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has made one
thing very clear in the reports, Madam Chairwoman. Almost 9
years after 9/11, we still do not have a comprehensive National
strategy to counter the grave threat that weapons of mass
destruction pose for our Nation. You referred to this in your
opening.
I am proud to say that the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission, headed by former Senator Graham and former Senator
Talent, has endorsed our legislation. That it has a truly
comprehensive approach within it to securing the Nation against
weapons of mass destruction by looking at all angles--
prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection, attribution,
response, and finally, recovery. We did it all within 100
pages.
Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to hearing the testimony
today, moving forward with the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Prevention and Preparedness Act. I yield back and thank you for
yielding to me.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Clarke, for
your leadership on this critical issue and for your willingness
to begin this hearing early to accommodate a scheduling
conflict I have. I have to go be part of a panel to interview
the three finalists for the job of inspector general of the
House of Representatives. It was scheduled with four other
people, so I can't change that. So I thank you for that.
The American people face no greater or more urgent threat
in my estimation than a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass
destruction. It is my greatest fear, shared by others, that a
WMD would be used against our Nation. We have no greater
responsibility as Members of Congress to protect the American
people from such a horrific attack and to do everything in our
power to try and accomplish that.
The WMD Commission predicted in 2008 that ``a terrorist
attack with a WMD weapon is more likely than not to occur in
2013.'' Some people, I think, want to shy away from that,
because they think that means that it will be a completed or
successful attack. They didn't say that. They said that they
believe there will be a terrorist attack with that weapon. So
we have to do everything we can to ensure that does not occur,
and if it does occur, to minimize the damage as best we can and
to recover from it.
The commission also reminded us in last January's report
card that the Government's progress in preventing and
responding to nuclear biological attack is inadequate, and so
much more work needs to be done.
As one who believes that intelligence is our best defense
against terrorist attack, particularly a WMD attack, I am
strongly supportive of Title 1 of the bill, which establishes a
National intelligence strategy to improve U.S. capability to
collect, analyze, and disseminate weapons of mass destruction
intelligence. Better intelligence will hopefully prevent such
an attack from ever happening, which is the only satisfactory
outcome.
We also need to prepare for and recover from such attack.
However, my focus will be on prevention. This legislation is
urgently needed and long overdue. It does provide a
comprehensive approach to enhance DHS' effort to both prevent
and deter as well as detect, respond to, and recover from a WMD
attack.
While New York City and the New York, New Jersey area is
unquestionably a terrorist target, all urban areas in this
country and critical infrastructure across our Nation could be
devastated by a nuclear biological attack. We need to
understand that. The American people need to understand that
this is not just for the New York area. This is for the entire
Nation.
As a result, this bipartisan legislation is urgently
needed, and I look forward to working with both of you and the
other Members of our committee to enact this legislation.
I do want to thank our witnesses for their testimony on
this legislation--more importantly, for the work that you have
done in the past and the expert advice that you have given us,
we appreciate that. We have tried to benefit from suggestions
from you and your colleagues, and this piece of legislation is
a product of that consultation, and we hope it will continue. I
look forward to hearing your comments.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Lungren.
We will be joined by our Chairman, Mr. Thompson, shortly,
but we are going to proceed with this hearing in the interim.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
subcommittee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I would like to welcome our witnesses. Our first witness,
Dr. Sally Beatrice, is the assistant commissioner and director
for the New York City Public Health Laboratory.
Our second witness is Dr. Bob Kadlec, former special
assistant to the President for homeland security and senior
director for biological defense policy. Currently, he is the
vice president for the global public sector at PRTM. We commend
him for his long military career.
Our third witness is Dr. Randy Murch, who holds a number of
positions at Virginia Tech, including associate director for
research program development. Dr. Murch had a long career, as a
special agent in the FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
where among many programs, he created the Hazardous Materials
Response Unit.
Our fourth witness, Dr. Julie Fischer, is a senior
associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where she leads their
global health security program.
We thank all of our witnesses for being here today. Without
objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in
the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his or her
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Dr. Beatrice.
STATEMENT OF SARA (SALLY) T. BEATRICE, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY DIRECTOR, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE
Dr. Beatrice. Good afternoon, Chairperson Clarke, Mr.
Lungren, Mr. Pascrell. I am Sara Beatrice, assistant
commissioner of health and director of the New York City Public
Health Laboratory.
The Public Health Lab is one player among many local,
State, and Federal entities comprising the anti-terrorism
preparedness and response efforts in New York City. It is our
duty to provide the necessary surveillance and routine surge
testing to support emergency preparedness and response for the
city. We need the support of our Federal, State, and local
partners to be able to do this.
As you know, New York City is a high-threat jurisdiction.
Our approach to bioterrorism preparedness is not theoretical.
We have been attacked. We are acutely aware that it could
happen again, and we in the health department are fortunate to
have a mayor who understands that public health is an integral
part of biothreat preparedness and response.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I
would like to share some of our challenges over the past decade
that may be helpful as you consider legislation to improve the
Federal structure in support of bioterrorism preparedness and
response.
When the New York City Public Health Lab joined the
Laboratory Response Network in 1999, the goal was to establish
a laboratory that could detect a bio attack through clinical
specimens from patients presenting at emergency departments.
Instead, the anthrax attacks of 2001 revealed itself in both
clinical and environmental samples.
We were prepared to receive a few specimens. We received
thousands. Our Federal partners came to our aid with six tons
of supplies and personnel to perform testing and to train our
staff. Within a week the New York City laboratory was able to
handle hundreds of environmental and clinical specimens a day.
An initial increase in Federal support in 2002 gave us the
ability to build a highly robust biothreat response laboratory.
Unfortunately, while the threat of another attack has not
decreased, funding has been reduced with each fiscal year. Even
with the added resources of the Urban Area Security Initiative
funding, it is a challenge to maintain the level of excellence
established by 2003. One-time and interment funding are
helpful, but not sufficient to maintain our capability.
We strongly support section 2135 of the bill, which will
provide funding for Laboratory Response Network activities, and
we appreciate the bill's authors for recognizing this need. We
urge you to consider the necessity for consistent and sustained
funding for the long term.
BioWatch is an excellent example of a well-intentioned
program that was implemented without sufficient funds to
address the true needs of this program. Basic funding for
technologists, reagents, and equipment was the extent of
Federal funding for the laboratory. What wasn't funded was a
comprehensive quality system to ensure the consistency of
reagents and the training and competency of staff performing
the testing, nor was there funding to ensure quality and
consistent testing across jurisdictions, and nor was the cost
to set up and maintain infrastructure of the local laboratory
provided.
Also, clear roles and responsibilities for the Federal,
local, and contracted entities involved in the BioWatch program
need to be better defined, and jurisdictions need centralized
Federal guidance for consequence management planning in the
event of a BioWatch actionable result.
I am sure this committee is well aware of the consequences
of unreliable BioWatch results, and I want to thank the office
for recognizing the need for additional financial support in
section 2132 of the bill.
I also have some concerns about section 2104, which
redefines a set of Tier 1 agents that required enhanced
security. Again, I cannot overemphasize the importance of
appropriate and sustained funding to support the enhanced
biosecurity that will be required of facilities that handle
these agents.
An additional concern is intergovernmental information
sharing. The public health community believes biodefense needs
to address both intentional and accidental releases of
biological threat agents. Local and State public health
agencies need to have access to detailed information related to
the biological agents and biosafety programs at each laboratory
regulated by the select agent program in their jurisdiction. At
this time this information is not shared locally.
It is our hope that the information required by sections
2105 and 2107 will be shared with State and local health
departments to mitigate and respond to select agent incidents
in laboratories within the locale.
While I have limited my comments to issues related to the
New York City Public Health Lab, the city would like the
opportunity to both provide more detailed comments on the
entire bill, reflecting the concerns of all of our key
emergency response agencies. We stand ready to assist the
committee to develop and implement these critical initiatives.
Again, thank you for the opportunity of testifying here today.
[The statement of Dr. Beatrice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sara (Sally) T. Beatrice
June 15, 2010
Good afternoon, Chairperson Clarke and subcommittee Members. I am
Dr. Sara T. Beatrice, Assistant Commissioner of Health and Director of
the New York City Public Health Laboratory (NYC PHL), a Bureau of the
NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH). Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on H.R. 5498, the ``WMD Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2010.''
The NYC PHL provides quality laboratory testing services that are
needed by NYC DOHMH and its partner agencies, and our city's laboratory
and health care community as they respond to clinical and environmental
public health concerns. The NYC PHL has been a member of the Laboratory
Response Network (LRN), an international network of laboratories able
to respond quickly to public health threats and emergencies, since its
inception in 1999. New York City has been a member of the BioWatch
pathogen detection program since it was deployed in 2003, and is
working with our Federal partners in the assessment of new technologies
and quality systems for this program. I am going to describe some of
our challenges and experiences of the past decade in the hopes that it
may be helpful to you as you consider legislation to improve the
Federal structure and support of bioterrorism preparedness and
response.
New York City is a high-threat jurisdiction. Our approach to
bioterrorism preparedness is not theoretical; we have been attacked
several times, and we are acutely aware that the city is a likely
repeat target for terrorists. There will always be a need for
significant bioterror response laboratory capacity and capability in
the city to ensure our ability to rapidly and effectively respond to an
event caused by the dissemination of a biological threat agent. In
1999, the NYC PHL received its first Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) grant to establish a biothreat response laboratory
(BTRL). The first BTRL consisted of a single room situated in the
middle of routine testing laboratories. Security was basic; there were
padlocks for the evidence locker and a punch-code door lock at the
entry. Later, the room access was upgraded to swipe card control and
video surveillance was added. Reagents and resources were minimal;
formal training was limited to one CDC-funded person attending a course
on methods of agent identification at the CDC. In short, the NYC BTRL
was a one-room space staffed by two laboratorians trained in standard
safety methods for routine bacteriology work. There was only basic
supporting infrastructure--there was no secure specimen receiving area,
no secure computer database, no dedicated sample accessioning system,
no standard report functions. Samples were delivered directly to the
BTRL by first responders and tested for a collection of agents, and
hand-written reports were sent to describe the results of the
microbiological testing. All procedures were manual. There was no
capacity for high throughput or Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) testing
at that time. When the laboratory first became operational, the FBI
submitted only approximately one specimen per month.
In October, 2001, on the same day that the index case of cutaneous
anthrax was confirmed, law enforcement delivered a Bacillus anthracis-
contaminated letter received at NBC by Tom Brokaw's staff. The BTRL
sample load rapidly multiplied from a baseline of 10 samples in the
previous year to hundreds of samples per day. Within days, the BTRL was
transformed. Six tons of supplies were flown in from the CDC. Staffing
went from two to 75 laboratorians, including staff from CDC and the
Department of Defense (DOD). Rapid, molecular testing was brought on
board. Dedicated space was increased by almost twenty-fold and included
10 laboratories, evidence rooms, support and storage areas, and a
command center. Databases and computers were brought in and
standardized testing protocols were developed.
New York City has received funding from several sources for
biothreat preparedness activities. CDC's Public Health Emergency
Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement provides funding to the NYC
DOHMH, and a portion of this funding is allocated by the DOHMH to the
PHL. However, PHEP funding is increasingly dedicated to specific
initiatives, and is decreasing with each fiscal year. Public health
agencies receiving PHEP funding were authorized to use this support to
enhance responses not only to bioterrorism but to other intentional and
unintentional incidents that could evolve into public health
emergencies.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) provides funding,
through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to the city of New
York. UASI funds are allocated annually by the city to programs,
including the PHL. Procurement of an All-Hazards Receipt Facility
(AHRF) was funded with $1.5 million from UASI. This facility was
deployed to ensure that unknown samples could be screened for hazards
(i.e.: chemical, radiological, etc.) before entering the laboratory. An
AHRF is considered a safety necessity; however, many jurisdictions will
not have adequate funding for this purpose.
PHEP, UASI and city funding has enabled the NYC BTRL to develop
into its current iteration. The city is fortunate to have a mayor who
understands that public health is an integral part of biothreat
preparedness and response, and Mayor Bloomberg has provided significant
city tax levy monies for laboratory infrastructure. NYC dedicated $20
million of city capital funds to renovate the BTRL and Mycobacteriology
laboratories after we were unsuccessful in getting Federal capital
funding for this essential project. This included a biosafety level 3
(BSL3) facility necessary for working with highly infectious organisms.
Security upgrades were included as well. Physical barriers keep
unauthorized vehicles from entering the PHL premises. There is 24-hour
police presence in the building, which is enhanced when necessary, and
extensive closed-circuit security system was installed in the building.
We believe that Federal mandates for biosecurity enhancements must
be Federally funded. While the BTRL has moved far beyond a one-room
operation, there are upgrades and required maintenance to facilities,
equipment, and instrumentation that we struggle to finance because
external funding falls short, and the city and State dollars used to
make up the difference are becoming increasingly scarce as well.
Today, many of the samples received by the BTRL are suspicious
substances, such as unknown powders, that are found in envelopes or
other packages. The samples are submitted by local (NYPD) and Federal
(FBI) law enforcement and originate from a variety of places. In 2009
and 2010 the laboratory has tested suspicious substances from many
locations, including banks, financial businesses and organizations (37
percent), governmental organizations (courts, transit, law enforcement
agencies, 26 percent), embassies, consulates, diplomatic missions and
the United Nations (26 percent), and hospitals, media organizations,
and other businesses (11 percent). New York City is unique in that
considerable portions of the NYC PHL budget are utilized to test
samples which are collected from locations such as diplomatic missions
and consulates that are considered ``foreign soil''.
Our Federal and local partners, including in particular the NYPD,
are responsible for responding to incidents involving suspicious
substances and assigning a risk level to the event based on
predetermined criteria. A decision is made whether testing is
appropriate, and a priority is assigned to the sample. Many samples
arrive at the PHL at the end of the work day and may require evening
and weekend testing, and the overtime adds additional pressures on our
budget. Maintaining a group of trained and competent on-call staff that
can effectively respond 24/7 to a surge in sample volume is
challenging.
If a suspicious substance were submitted and tested positive for
the presence of a Select Agent, an immediate and significant
environmental investigation would be launched, resulting in a surge of
sample collection and confirmatory testing similar to that experienced
during the 2001 anthrax event. We need to build and maintain a stable
infrastructure of staffing, state-of-the-art testing methods, and a
cache of reagents available to seamlessly move into a surge mode at any
time. The NYC DOHMH, and the PHL in particular, recently challenged and
proved the soundness of our system during the H1N1 outbreak of 2009.
However, without adequate, consistent funding for staff, training,
instrumentation, and reagents, this capacity will not be sustainable.
We strongly support section 2135 of H.R. 5498 which would provide
funding for LRN activities, and we appreciate the bill's authors for
recognizing this need.
NYC's involvement in the BioWatch program has been more substantial
than in any other jurisdiction. Beginning in January 2003, NYC
participated in the first deployment of BioWatch, a limited array of
air collectors designed to detect the airborne release of select
biological agents. The laboratory assays used in BioWatch were derived
from those developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
and CDC for the Biological Aerosol Sentry Information System (BASIS)
program. During the initial BioWatch deployment in NYC, the BASIS
mobile laboratory was deployed for approximately 2 weeks to NYC,
assisting PHL staff to process and analyze BioWatch filters pending
completion of the PHL BioWatch laboratory. When the BASIS laboratory
staff left NYC, much of the testing equipment remained at the PHL to
help initiate the establishment of this laboratory.
Soon thereafter, PHL recognized that additional support would be
necessary for the BioWatch laboratory to become fully functional and
self-sufficient. Instrumentation, reagents, informatics and staff, not
accounted for when the program was established, would be needed. To
assist PHL during this period, LLNL provided equipment and supplies
directly from LLNL ``push packs'' (instrument and reagents required to
do the testing) and dedicated staff were hired through the CDC.
PHL continued developing relationships with our Federal partners
during the next 12 months and embarked on the first of many pilot
programs to enhance the capability and capacity of the NYC BioWatch
laboratory. In February of 2004, LLNL provided DHS with a cost analysis
to expand the laboratory capability that included additional
instrumentation, implementation of sample tracking system, high-
throughput sample processing and modified reagent contracts and
formats. In March 2004, NYC staff was trained at LLNL in these new
procedures with the goal to have the high-throughput laboratory in-
place for the 2004 Republican National Convention (RNC). Based on the
success of these initial programs, NYC, LLNL, DHS and CDC initiated 3
additional pilot programs beginning in 2004 to address IT enhancements,
autonomous detection systems (APDS) and an improved platform for high-
throughput testing (Luminex). The goal was to then provide other
jurisdictions with these enhanced capabilities.
PHL, LLNL, CDC and DHS maintained close working relationships from
2004-2009 during the development, deployment, and testing of the APDS
program. In addition, BioWatch stakeholders throughout the city have
been increasingly involved with DHS and CDC regarding the BioWatch
mission, and we welcome continued involvement and collaboration.
Efforts have been made in the past 6 months to improve communication
and interaction between local, State, and Federal stakeholders who have
invested much time and effort since 2003 in the BioWatch program.
One NYC experience illustrates the importance of improved
communication. In 2003, NYC and Federal partners began planning for
special biosurveillance to be conducted during the 2004 Republican
National Convention (RNC). Routine BioWatch testing was to be conducted
by PHL, and Federal partners were to collect National Security Special
Event (NSSE) samples and test them at PHL. Weekly planning meetings
with all partners were held for nearly a year to prepare for the event.
The NYC DOHMH worked closely with local, State, and Federal law
enforcement agencies to develop a series of temporary security
enhancements and procedures to ensure the safety of our staff,
visitors, and information during the RNC event. Analytes were coded per
mandate to ensure security, and testing was to be performed under
``secret'' conditions. Less than 48 hours prior to the Convention's
start, our Federal partners changed the reporting protocol. PHL was
notified by the National Laboratory Program Manager that all NSSE data
was to be reported directly to the National Laboratory Director. The
National Laboratory Director was to notify the National Laboratory
Program Manager. The National Laboratory Program Manager was to then
report the results to our Federal partner. Despite nearly a year of
planning that involved all local and Federal partners, the structure
and processes were changed at the ``eleventh hour''. While the ``new''
reporting algorithm was not objectionable, the lack of communication
and lack of transparency was counter-productive to the mission.
NYC's long involvement in the BioWatch program has resulted in some
insight into the program. Based on our experience, we urge Congress to
clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the entities
involved--CDC, DHS, the contracting agent responsible for laboratory
personnel, and the host laboratories. In addition, there is a need for
a central Federal entity to guide consequence management planning in
the event of a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR).
We are concerned that DHS have adequate resources to support the
additional responsibilities provided in this legislation. DHS is
relatively new, and currently appears to be under-resourced. For
example, the BioWatch program suffers from underfunding. The program
was deployed hastily, and without an apparent understanding of what the
true program costs would be. It is not clear that the correct funding
algorithm for this program has yet been developed. Testing personnel,
instruments, and reagents are Federally funded. Local scientific and
administrative oversight, laboratory support, security personnel and
infrastructure, and overhead, such as space, waste disposal, equipment
(e.g., autoclaves and biological safety cabinets), and office support
are not Federally funded, and represent a significant burden on
laboratory budgets. Resources to build a quality system for the program
are urgently needed. I am sure this committee is well aware of the
consequences of unreliable BioWatch results, and I want to thank the
authors for recognizing this need in section 2132 of H.R. 5498, which
would provide additional financial support.
In ``The World at Risk,'' the Commission for the Prevention of WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism also recommended new Government investments
in biosafety and oversight of laboratories working with select agents.
Comprehensive biodefense needs to address both intentional and
accidental releases of biological threat agents. The NYC DOHMH is
responsible for detecting and mitigating the impacts from any
infectious disease outbreak that threatens public health, whether it is
caused naturally, intentionally, or accidentally. However, the NYC
DOHMH does not have access to information that would enable it to
mitigate vulnerabilities in certain laboratories before an accident
occurs, or to be confident that spills and other accidents in NYC
laboratories working with select agents would be reported promptly to
the NYC DOHMH. Academic research laboratories are not regulated by New
York City or New York State government, and through the Select Agent
Act, the Federal Government provides the only oversight of biosecurity
and biosafety within these facilities. The CDC releases only contact
information to local and State public health agencies for laboratories
regulated by the Select Agent Act. It is possible, for example, that a
researcher could be exposed to a select agent through a laboratory
accident, become ill, and expose others outside that laboratory. A
second, limited SARS outbreak in 2004 resulted from just such a
breakdown in biosafety in a Chinese laboratory. In the proposed bill,
we hope that sections 2105 and 2107 will provide for the sharing of
information with public health departments that would be needed to
mitigate and respond to select agent incidents in laboratories within
their jurisdictions. As responsibility for Tier 1 and Select Agent
Programs shifts from the Department of Health and Human Services to
DHS, we encourage the Federal Government to take steps that address the
public health requirements of jurisdictions within which select agent
research takes place. Local and State public health agencies need to
have access to detailed information related to the biological agents
and biosafety programs at each laboratory regulated by the Select Agent
Program.
The proposal in section 2104 of H.R. 5498, to redefine a set of
select agents as Tier 1 agents that require enhanced security, makes
sense. However, the concordant enhanced biosecurity that will be
required of facilities that handle these agents needs to be resourced
appropriately and annually. Additional requirements will necessitate
additional personnel. Currently, the NYC PHL Select Agents program has
a Responsible Official (RO) and an Alternate Responsible Official
(ARO); both are senior-level laboratorians that manage the program as
one of their regular duties. Over time, increased duties for the RO and
ARO in the form of increased responsibility for inspections and
oversight, added requirements for conducting drills of increasing
complexity, and requirements for detailed after-action reports have
significantly increased workloads. However, there has been no
concomitant increase in funding. Proposed additional requirements for
handling select agents and Tier 1 agents need to be accompanied by an
increase in funding for affected laboratories, including allocations
for high-level personnel to oversee the program. Enhanced biosecurity
for Tier 1 agents proposed in the legislation will be costly.
Public health laboratories are subject to regulation from a number
of agencies. In addition to the LRN, the NYC PHL is a member of the
Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), the environmental Laboratory
Response Network (eLRN), and the chemical Laboratory Response Network
(LRN-c). The development of the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory
Networks (ICLN), as provided in section 2136 of the proposed bill,
promises to integrate and streamline regulations. We have yet to see
benefits from the ICLN. We are still required at the public health
laboratory level to input data into multiple, distinct data management
systems, and the data is analyzed by each individual Federal agency.
The public health laboratory community has advocated for several years
the use of a single laboratory data information management system, but
this has not yet come to fruition. We support the participation of
public health laboratories in the ICLN and look forward to a more
focused and determined approach to integration. Organization through
the ICLN could result in increased efficiency of resource use.
The NYC PHL is one player among many local, State, and Federal
entities comprising the antiterrorism preparedness and response efforts
in NYC. It is our duty to be prepared to provide the necessary
surveillance, routine, and surge testing to support the emergency
preparedness and response effort of the city. We need the support of
our Federal, State, and local partners to be able to do this.
Preparedness means not only meeting the threats of today, but also
anticipating the threats of tomorrow. The building housing the NYC PHL
was designed in the late 1950s and was opened nearly 45 years ago. An
updated and upgraded facility is badly needed, and we are developing
plans for a state-of-the-art facility that incorporates needed
biosecurity and containment measures, as well as the technologies
needed to detect emerging and re-emerging pathogens. However, the city
faces challenges in funding construction of the new facility,
particularly in the current economic climate. To optimally prepare for
the future, the city would welcome the collaboration of the Federal
Government in planning, funding, and ensuring the further development
of a state-of-the-art public health laboratory for highly-at-risk New
Yorkers and for the Nation.
The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
appreciates the opportunity to testify on the development and
implementation of the important measures outlined within H.R. 5498, the
``WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010.'' While I have limited
my comments today to issues related to the NYC PHL, the city would like
the opportunity to provide more detailed comments on the entire bill
reflecting the concerns of all of our key emergency response agencies.
The NYC DOHMH stands ready to assist the committee, and our Nation, in
any way possible, to develop and implement these critical initiatives.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Ms. Clarke. We thank you, Dr. Beatrice, for your testimony.
I now recognize Dr. Murch to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF RANDALL S. MURCH, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, RESEARCH
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, VIRGINIA
POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
Dr. Murch. Thank you, Chairwoman Clarke and Members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come before you
today.
You know from the Chairwoman's comments on my background it
is heavily involved in sciences technology intelligence
operations involving counterterrorism and weapons of mass
destruction terrorism. I will summarize my comments from that
perspective.
I strongly support the development and coordination and
implementation of a National intelligence strategy. I believe
it is an important roadmap for the Nation. But while creating
and vetting such a strategy is important, as with many
endeavors and Government and public policy and programs,
implementation requires plans, measures of progress, and
accountability. There are plenty of good ideas that never go
anywhere and good strategies and plans that go adrift for lack
of focus or interest.
So in my view it is not important simply to state where we
should be heading, but what we are going to do, when we are
going to do it, who is responsible for what, and measure how
well we are doing. It is also important for us to know how well
we know how well we are doing.
These should come through clearly articulated goals and
objectives, assignments, and responsibility requirements,
expectations, and measures of success. I am very gratified to
see that provisions have been made in the legislation for
planning and reporting.
It is also important to have someone clearly in charge.
When everyone is in charge, no one is in charge. I hope that
the DNI would take that role. Congress, too, has an important
responsibility for oversight in this legislation and beyond.
This is a very complex system that we are trying to
address. For those who participate, priorities and assignments
and responsibilities should be well matched to the department
and agency authorities, responsibilities, and capacities. For
example, the copy of the legislation that I saw noted that the
director of national intelligence should develop and implement
a strategy in consultation with the Secretary of homeland
security and heads of other departments and agencies.
It is important that DHS be involved, clearly, but in my
view it is absolutely necessary to raise the involvement of the
other non-DHS Federal departments and agencies that have more
direct front-line responsibilities and roles in domestic
security, law enforcement, and intelligence as equal partners.
Those latter agencies do indeed have many years of experience
and expertise and committed resources in areas such as WMD
intelligence and response.
Perhaps more better focused and more innovative and
integrated initiatives are necessary to address these very
substantial challenges and gaps we face with WMD intelligence,
but we should acknowledge that DHS is a relative newcomer.
I would like to move on now to the National intelligence
strategy for countering biological threats. Many of the points
I made above are applicable here, but I think the key point
that I would like to make with you is to tightly couple the
strategy with the broader National intelligence strategy, that
they are closely interrelated.
It is known in a number of quarters inside and outside the
intelligence that bio-intelligence, that colloquial phrase that
is often used, is very important. It is a fundamentally very
hard problem, and it is going to take innovation, creativity,
resources, planning, and commitment over many years. It is not
going to happen overnight. It is probably not going to happen
in a single budget year.
We can learn lessons again by going back to an Institute of
Medicine study that was published in 2006 called
``Globalization Biosecurity and the Future of the Life
Sciences'' to really teach us how complex life sciences and its
misuse can be and how we might tackle it in a more effective
way.
Unfortunately, the intelligence and law enforcement
communities cannot focus only on that, so we need to be in the
right place at the right time focused on the right people, the
right processes, a very significant challenge.
In the aforementioned IOM study, it also addressed the
problem of--or the opportunity of engaging biological experts
outside of the Government. I actually offered that
recommendation, and I think it was the only one that was taken
up from that study. I support that. I think there are tools and
programs that could be built on, such as the biological
sciences experts group that was started by the National Counter
Proliferation Center some years ago.
Now, we quickly move on to the bioterrorism risk
assessment, section 2103, to make a quick point. These
bioterrorism risk assessments have been on-going, and they will
continue to deliver important contributions.
However, one point I wish to make is that in 2006 the
Department of Homeland Security engaged the National Research
Council for review of their methodology. As a result, the NRC
committee actually came up with a very detailed, pointed,
critical assessment of the bioterrorism risk assessment.
To my knowledge, and no one I have talked to knows whether
or not DHS has accepted or rejected those recommendations,
whether or not has anything been done, and whether or not the
NRC committee got it right or wrong. I think it is important to
reconcile that before going forward.
Moving on to the issue of attribution, one that is near and
dear to my professional existence over the last 15 years since
I created the National program, I think it is important that we
focus properly on a National microbial forensics strategy which
is bigger and broader than the R&D strategy that was just
published, which is a very important contribution, but it is
not enough. We need to go beyond and incorporate some of the
other aspects of forensic science that need to be incorporated
and a robust approach to a National microbial forensics
repository.
Ms. Clarke. Dr. Murch, can you just sort of summarize? We
will probably get into some more of your findings through
questions.
Dr. Murch. Yes, ma'am.
So the National microbial forensics repository needs its
own sub-strategy to effectively move forward.
A couple of quick points--law enforcement training for
investigating biological threats. I would strongly recommend
the Department of Homeland Security, if they are going to
undertake this, be assigned this role, that they engage the FBI
and the public health community, as they have been working on
this for 15 years, and we don't want to compete or conflict
with what is already on-going in the field and the broader
community.
Then two other quick points here on response. Integrated
plume modeling is mentioned in your legislation. I would
encourage the Department of Homeland Security, if they go
forward, that they work with the Department of Defense and
Department of Energy, who has been working on these models for
many years and spent many millions of dollars of taxpayers'
funds, rather than duplicate.
Then last, I strongly encourage, having been involved in
two National Academy studies involving forensic science, one of
which was involved in nuclear forensics, that the academies be
engaged by the Department to take on a broader study--not
simply the role of forensic science in homeland security, but
also outlining forensic science in DHS with where the rest of
the enterprise is going.
Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Murch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randall S. Murch
June 15, 2010
Chairwoman Clarke, Members of the subcommittee and committee staff,
thank you for the invitation to present a statement before you today
and have my comments entered into the record regarding this important
and timely legislation before the Congress.
My name is Randall Murch. I am a faculty member at the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, which is more commonly
known as Virginia Tech. Prior to joining Virginia Tech, I had a 23-year
career as a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
during which I was heavily involved in counterterrorism and weapons of
mass destruction terrorism and counterterrorism from the operational,
investigative, intelligence, planning, science and technology, and
forensic perspectives. In my FBI career, I spent 10 years in the FBI
Laboratory and over 8 years in the technical surveillance program and
oversaw forensic investigative and technical investigative support
efforts for a number of well-known domestic and international terrorist
attacks. During this period, the Nation endured the attacks in Oklahoma
City, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the U.S.S. Cole, the U.S.
Embassies in East Africa and 9/11, among other events. I created our
National WMD forensic program in the FBI Laboratory in 1996 and oversaw
its early development in partnership with other U.S. Government
agencies. In my career, I served not only in the FBI, but was also
detailed from that agency to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency during
the latter part of my career. Later, I was loaned to the Department of
Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate from Virginia
Tech for 1 year. Since 2000, I have participated in several National
Academies and Department of Defense studies related to weapons of mass
destruction or homeland security. I still work in relevant areas and
provide pro bono advice to the Government in these areas, in addition
to others.
Today, I will provide comments for your consideration to some
specific sections of the proposed legislation.
TITLE 1: INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Section 101. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
the Threat from WMD
I strongly support the development, coordination, and
implementation of a National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the
Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction as recommended by the WMD
Commission to be led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
While the creation and vetting of such a strategy is important to lay
out a high-level roadmap, as with many other endeavors in Government,
public policy, and programs, successful implementation through plans
with measures of progress and accountability are crucial. There are
plenty of good ideas that never go anywhere, or good strategies and
plans that go adrift because focus or interest is lost.
In my view, it is not just important to state ``where we should be
heading'' but also to state ``what we are going to do'' and ``when are
we going to do it'' and ``who is responsible for what'', and ``measure
how well are we doing'' and knowing ``how well we know how we are
doing''. These should come through clearly articulated goals and
objectives, assignments of responsibility, requirements or
expectations, and measures of success. I am gratified to see that
provisions have been made in the legislation for plans and reporting.
Also someone has to be actively ``in charge''; when every one is in
charge, no one is in charge. My hope is that the DNI will fill that
role and do so well. The enterprise should be held accountable,
otherwise having a strategy and a plan is not particularly useful or
meaningful. Course corrections can be made as needed. Congress
certainly has a role here through its oversight responsibilities.
No one entity can put a strategy and such as this and the
associated ``complex system'' into play. For those who participate, the
priorities, assignments, and responsibilities should be well matched to
what department and agency authorities, responsibilities, and
capacities are or should be. For example, the copy of the proposed
legislation I have notes that the Director of National Intelligence
should develop and implement the strategy ``in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the heads of other appropriate
Departments and agencies''. The Department of Homeland Security does
have important coordination and consumer roles in the envisioned
process and outcomes, some DHS agencies are ``operational contributors
and users''.
However, in my view it is absolutely necessary to improving our
capabilities and performance that those non-DHS Federal departments and
agencies that have more direct front-line roles in domestic security,
law enforcement, and intelligence must be fully and aggressively
leveraged and involved as equal partners. Those latter agencies I am
alluding to have many years of expertise, experience and committed
resources, in some cases substantial in each category, devoted to WMD
intelligence and response. Perhaps more, better, better focused, and
more innovative and integrated initiatives and approaches are required
to address the very substantial challenges and gaps we face with WMD
intelligence, but we should acknowledge that DHS is a relative
newcomer.
Also, during the planning process and before new initiatives and
improvements are embraced, it may also be quite cost-effective and
operationally beneficial for the DNI to commission a comprehensive and
rigorous ``systems analysis'' which would identify the specific and
relevant capabilities that already exist and assess their
effectiveness, and provide the prioritization for gaps, needs, and
opportunities across the enterprise. This would be the informed and
testable basis for designing and commissioning all initiatives going
forward across the intelligence community.
Section 102. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats
Many of the points I noted above for the National WMD Intelligence
Strategy could also be considered, if not embraced, for the next
generation of the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats. The latter could, and even should, be clearly
viewed and undertaken as being tightly connected to the former. They
are not separate, competing, or mutually exclusive, but should be
developed and implemented as being closely related, with many
interrelationships and interdependencies.
Without spending more time on this strategy itself, permit me to
briefly turn to two issues, one which is often stated as ``the need for
better `bio-intelligence' '' and the second which is stated in the
proposed legislation as ``expand efforts to create a national cadre of
biological experts''.
First, it has been well known for a number of years and in many
quarters inside and outside the intelligence community that effective
and timely intelligence on adversaries' or proliferators' intentions,
capabilities, plans, and actions are crucial in order to prevent,
anticipate, disrupt, interdict illicit events and activities or, if an
event or transaction of interest occurs, to respond, attribute, or
prevent subsequent activities of concern. This is not a new revelation.
Those who call most vocally for more and better ``bio-intelligence''
are often fundamentally are unaware of how significantly different and
challenging obtaining and leveraging the most precious, timely, and
sought-after nuggets of ``bio-intelligence'' really is. This truly is a
``hard problem''. If we agree that ``bio-intelligence'' is a high
priority and essentially an unaddressed gap, then we should begin by
defining and ``unpacking'' it so that all concerned know what it is and
what ``it'' entails. From my personal experience, the term ``bio-
intelligence'' was first coined by Dr. George Whitesides of Harvard
University approximately 10 years ago. Then, he knew what he meant and
those of us working with him on studies for the Department of Defense
knew what he meant. Today, I'm not sure there is a single, accepted
definition of what ``bio-intelligence'' is. What it means depends on
who one is talking to. If a universal definition and description of the
component elements can be agreed to, i.e. ``terms of reference'', it
may be a boon to harmonizing interagency and stakeholder communication,
collaboration, and action on recognized priorities. The next edition of
this Strategy could assist with this.
In 2006, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies
published an important study entitled Globalization, Biosecurity and
the Future of the Life Sciences, that still helps us to frame the
complexity and uncertainty of what we face with the future of life
science knowledge and technology and their misuse. The reality is that
we contend with is a complex, dynamic global ecosystem of rapidly
advancing, diversifying, scalable, and accessible life science
knowledge and applications. The vast majority of this endeavor is used
for noble and beneficial purposes, and cannot be controlled. However,
in this ecosystem are some who are embedded or hidden in, peripheral
to, and protected who acquire, develop, test, and seek to use or profit
from biotechnology and expertise for illicit and nefarious purposes.
Intentional and actual misuse can occur by many ways and means, by many
actors, from and in many places. The effects and impacts are scalable;
one does not have to kill millions to cause significant impact. A
little bioagent effectively deployed can make a big mess, as we
experienced with the anthrax attacks in 2001.
Intelligence and law enforcement cannot be everywhere, know
everything all of the time, and be solely focused on ``bio-
intelligence'', either domestically or globally. Thus, either we accept
the realities we face and limitations of the capabilities and resources
we have, or we design, fund, and institute a sustained program that
identifies the most important priorities to focus on, being at the
right places, at the right times, focused on just the right people and
process nodes, all of which takes advantage of the best available
expertise here and with our allies. Advancing and applying new
knowledge and understanding, policies and practices, technology, and
leveraging innovation, creativity, and calculated risk-taking must be
the foundation upon which this effort is built. This would apply to
gathering and making sense of large amounts of open source technical
information, new infectious disease surveillance approaches, better
connecting public health with intelligence and law enforcement, as well
as new methods and techniques in human intelligence. There is no
``silver bullet'' for better ``bio-intelligence'' and I'm not convinced
that simply throwing money at the problem will get us any further down
the road. If we agree that a new or improved approach is necessary, we
should be prepared to properly choose and resource our priorities and
stay focused and committed. Success will not likely be achieved
overnight or even in a single budget year.
With regard to better engagement of biological experts for
intelligence, this, too, is not a new idea. In my estimation, this is a
particularly useful goal which should provide useful outcomes. In the
aforementioned IOM study, such a recommendation was made, which I
authored. As far as I am aware, it was the only recommendation from
that study that was acted on. Soon after the study was published, the
National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) created the Biological
Sciences Experts Group, which reportedly has run well and meaningfully
under strong leadership at NCPC since then. However, the pool of highly
qualified and available experts is not limitless; it is difficult to
hire and retain these experts as Federal employees. Some agencies, such
as the Department of Defense, have long and effectively used external
experts to study and report on ``very hard'' science and technology-
based problems, including those related to biological weapons and
biotechnology. Other key agencies, such as the FBI, are still primarily
focused on outside experts for scientific research and development or
episodic support to investigations or for liaison purposes, rather than
to support their respective mission and responsibilities in
intelligence. Perhaps working with the Congress, the DNI, and outside
senior experts, those agencies that do not have sufficient access to
outside experts can improve access to support their intelligence-
related missions and help address ``grand challenges'', gaps, needs,
and opportunities. This could occur through a single cadre available to
the entire intelligence community, perhaps by expanding the BSEG and
tailoring as needed, or creating similar groups for each agency that
are modified. However, with agencies creating their own versions they
could well run up against a shortage of knowledgeable, experienced
experts. In reality there are only so many highly qualified experts to
go around.
I now wish to address to five other sections in the proposed
legislation.
TITLE II. HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Prevention and Deterrence
Section 2103. Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
This subsection ``requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security,
in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments
and agencies, to produce biennial integrated Bioterrorism Risk
Assessments to identify and assess evolving biological risks to the
nation''. It is well recognized in the community of interest that this
activity makes critical contributions to risk management and risk
reduction by supporting strategies, plans and programs, investment
decisions, and public policy. When properly designed, conducted, and
used, these assessments will continue to prove to be important to the
future of our National counter-bioterrorism and biodefense enterprise.
However, just as it is important to perform and provide these
assessments, it is also important to conduct them in a rigorous,
accurate, reliable, scientifically-sound, and defensible manner. The
users of and stakeholders for these assessments should be able to rely
on these assessments with confidence.
In 2006, at the request of the Department of Homeland Security, the
National Research Council established a committee to provide a review
of DHS' Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) methodology. This study
resulted in an interim report focused on near-term improvements and a
final report which included recommendations for longer-term
improvements. The latter was published in the open literature in 2008.
The final report, which includes the interim report in an appendix,
provided a detailed, pointed, critical assessment of DHS' Bioterrorism
Risk Assessment methodology and provided a number of recommendations
for improvement. To my knowledge and through queries in the community
of interest including those in the Government, DHS has not
substantively or publicly responded to this report. We do not know
whether DHS agrees or disagrees with or has acted on any or all of the
NRC's observations and recommendations. If they disagreed, we should
know why this is justified. If they have addressed some or all of the
NRC's concerns, this would provide us with greater confidence that the
BTRA is on the right track. Concomitantly, we do not know whether there
is a basis for concern that the NRC got it wrong all or in part. If
that is the case, there should be pause with future studies coming out
of the NRC, since the National Academies reputation is built on
performance that is expected to embrace independence, objectivity,
relevance, and quality.
Going forward, a point-by-point response by DHS to this particular
NRC report is not an unrealistic or outlandish expectation. All that is
being asked for is to come full circle on the BTRA peer-review process.
Good science often leads to sound public policy, programs, and benefits
and gives all concerned greater confidence. Sometimes peer review can
be harsh; I know this first hand as one who helped lead the FBI
Laboratory through a very difficult time in the mid-to-late 1990s in an
intense period of scrutiny from many quarters resulting from
allegations that the quality of its science and performers were sub-
optimal. Further, sometimes peer reviewers are peer reviewed themselves
with surprising results. But the process is universally accepted and is
designed to make the science and its performers better. This situation
should be treated no differently, especially because of its importance.
Given the importance of the BTRA and the observations,
recommendations, and conclusions reported by our Nation's leading body
of scientific, medical, and engineering experts, this should be
resolved and done in a manner that gives all concerned confidence that
future BTRAs will always be performed using the best possible
methodology and provide the most useful and reliable assessments. This
action should also inform the interagency task force that is called for
in the legislation.
Subtitle D--Attribution
Section 2141. Bioforensics Capability and Strategy
Bioforensics is a discipline and National capability that has been
near and dear to my heart and professional existence for the past 15
years. I initiated the latter from the FBI Laboratory in prior to the
1996 Olympic Games which gave birth to the former, and oversaw their
early development and have been heavily involved various aspects ever
since. I still do believe strongly that an effective, reliable,
testable, defensible, credible forensic capability for biological
agents, toxins, and associated traditional physical evidence is an
important ``tool'' in our Nation's biosecurity ``kit'' specifically to
support attribution decisions, legal prosecutions, policy decisions,
and possibly significant follow-on actions. Though DHS is prominently
mentioned in this legislation and previous policy documents and
legislation, they are one of a family of agencies that have stakes in
an encompassing and robust capability with the attributes I mentioned
above.
We have made significant progress in a number of areas within
microbial forensics over the past 15 years, but much remains to be done
to bring our capability to full fruit so that can address likely
events, predictable contingencies, and perhaps some exigencies with
some surety. While good science exists to draw upon and many lessons
have been learned from prior events, there are many gaps in the science
and practice, unaddressed forensic requirements, infrastructure needs,
and National assets that have yet to be established. One important
contribution to moving forward was the recently-published National
Microbial Forensics R&D Strategy led by The Office of Science and
Technology Policy which is useful to harmonize the community and
encourage collaboration and reduce duplication.
A broader, more overarching strategy document is needed which
encompasses not only scientific advancements but also addresses common
practices, standards, and shared infrastructure resources such as a
National Microbial Forensics Repository, which is also mentioned in
this section. Future legislative and policy documents not only need to
mention what needs to be done, but also enable ``the how'' and ``who''
and what should the outcomes sought should be. These documents should
do so to address and balance all appropriate needs and equities of key
agencies, now and into the future.
Having a properly constructed, populated, operated, and maintained
repository of known samples against which evidentiary samples can be
compared is essential to the proper performance of forensic analyses
and rendering conclusions, to include those that support attribution
decisions. A repository of this nature can also provide important
resources for research, method development, and testing. DHS is an
important player and has been assigned a leading role in establishing
the Repository, as alluded to in the legislation. However, it cannot
and should not do this in a vacuum or without the cooperation,
collaboration, participation, and shared value and risk of other
Federal partners and other constituencies. For agencies to simply give
samples to the National Bioforensics Analysis Center does not make a
properly designed, functioning, and responsive National Microbial
Forensics Repository, de facto. The call for a National Repository has
been percolating in the microbial forensic (bioforensic) community for
several years. There are differing views of experts as to how it should
be designed and structured, what it should contain, how it should be
organized and function, what standards should govern the science, and
how best it can meet the needs, equities, and expectations of all
prospective users and stakeholders.
As this effort would be very complex with many issues yet to be
defined, I have recommended to my colleagues in this community that a
well-constructed and conducted systems analysis could provide the
proper foundation the desired capability. This would define the ``what,
why, where, when, who, and how'' for future planning and execution.
Section 2142. Law Enforcement Training to Investigate
Biological Threats
I must admit reading this section gave me some concerns, largely
because DHS which is fundamentally not the lead involved in the law
enforcement or public health investigations of biological threats is
now being given a role in training those communities. At the Federal
level, for nearly 15 years the responsibility for lead agency rests
with the FBI and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention which
have been working closely together since 1996 to establish and improve
investigative response and resolution. These two agencies, their parent
departments and the communities they work with closely at the State and
local levels have been doing this collaboratively for many years.
Protocols, practices, and methods have been developed and are
continually being refined. Many years of practical case experience
resides with these agencies and the communities they work with.
More training may be needed but it should not be designed, planned,
or provided so as to compete or conflict with what is being provided or
the investigative processes and protocols that have been developed and
used by the FBI and their field WMD Coordinators, the FBI Laboratory's
Hazardous Materials Response Unit, FBI field office Hazardous Materials
Response Teams, the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the CDC,
State, and local public health and emergency services agencies, the
Laboratory Response Network and others. To do otherwise could
potentially threaten the health and safety of responders and integrity
and success of bioterrorism investigations and prosecutions.
If DHS does provide this training now, or will be expected to, they
should meet the requirements and expectations of the principal law
enforcement and public health agencies that have the lead and who work
most closely those who support these investigations. Close coordination
with other appropriate agencies should be required; those agencies
should monitor or participate in what DHS provides. Perhaps National
standards should be developed, validated, and adhered to by all
training providers to ensure the highest uniformity and quality.
Subtitle E--Response
Section 2152. Integrated Plume Modeling for Collective
Response
This legislation calls for the Secretary (of Homeland Security) to
``acquire, use and disseminate timely integrated plume models to enable
rapid response activities following a chemical, biological, nuclear or
radiological event.''
Two key points with regard to this section: The Departments of
Defense, including the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as well as
others in DOD, and the Department of Energy in several of their
National Laboratories, have spent many millions of taxpayers' dollars,
have developed substantial expertise, and have produced usable plume
models as a result of many years of effort. It is recommended that the
Department of Homeland Security begin its search for, and assessment
and acquisition of models in these Departments with leading experts. It
is highly likely that it will be a massive and unwarranted waste of
Federal funds for DHS to initiate its own de novo plume model research
and development program.
With regard to the dissemination of plume models, I ask the
questions ``who are these models to be disseminated to?'' and ``if the
recipients have no going-in capacity to effectively work with these
technologies, who will provide training, seamless handoff, and
reachback after the modeling technology has been provided?'' In my
opinion, even if well-intentioned, simply ``throwing technology over
the transom'' will not be beneficial to those it is intended to help.
If DHS will be in position to acquire, use and share DOD- and DOE-
developed plume models, or from other sources that are recognized as
``gold standard'', then it should ensure that it has the requisite
expertise to use them and provide effective training and reachback to
those it provides the models to and expects to use them for improved
planning, exercises, response, and recovery. I worry that this
technology will be provided to the first responder community and just
sit on the shelf and not be used or not be used effectively.
Section 208. National Academy of Sciences Study of Forensic
Sciences in Homeland Security
I strongly support your legislative initiative for DHS to engage
the National Academy of Sciences for a study on the role of forensic
sciences in homeland security. This door was opened in the NAS study
published in 2009 which was entitled Strengthening Forensic Science in
the United States: A Path Forward. I was a member of the committee that
produced this report and contributed to the section on forensic science
and homeland security. This landmark study has been met with great
interest and angst, and is beginning to change how forensic science
will be funded, trained, performed, managed, scrutinized, and used in
the courts, and is viewed by the media and public for years to come.
This is very useful reading for how forensic science should be advanced
and improved. I am aware that the Senate Judiciary Committee is in the
process of introducing legislations that acts on most of the
recommendations of this report.
A forthcoming NAS study on the Nation's nuclear forensics
capabilities, for which DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was one
of three sponsors, will also provide valuable insights in this
particular specialty of forensic science. I was a member of the
committee that produced this report, as well. The NAS is also currently
conducting a study for the FBI to assess the science that was developed
and applied to the bioforensic evidence collected and analyzed to
support the anthrax investigations which began in October 2001. DHS
supported those investigations by scientific support from the National
Bioforensic Analysis Centers and through others. Thus, the stage is
certainly set to go forward with a new study by the NAS which focuses
on forensic science and homeland security more broadly. Requiring a
study by the NAS of forensic science for homeland security is a
substantially good intention.
But, because of the legitimate concerns with forensic science and
its use in our legal system, and the uncharted waters of forensic
science being used to support policy decisions, I strongly recommend
that the NAS study not only address the role of forensic science in
homeland security but also be focused on the current state of forensic
science in DHS as it is developed, validated, used and practiced,
planned, managed, and intended in all of the agencies and components
that have forensic science programs and capabilities of any sort or
type. This aspect of the study should be comprehensive from traditional
forensic science disciplines such as pattern evidence, DNA and
chemistry and specialties such as bioforensics (microbial forensics),
and nuclear forensics. Without this additional aspect, any NAS study on
forensic science for homeland security would be incomplete, and be an
opportunity missed. The Nation should demand that its forensic science
enterprise will meet or exceed requirements and expectations and
embrace best science and practice wherever it resides or for whatever
mission it supports, including within DHS.
This concludes my testimony. I'll be pleased to try to answer your
questions or address your comments. Thank you.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Dr. Murch. Thank you for
your testimony here today.
I now recognize Dr. Kadlec to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. KADLEC, VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL PUBLIC
SECTOR, PRTM MANAGEMENT CONSULTING
Dr. Kadlec. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Mr.
Lungren and Mr. Pascrell. It is a great honor and privilege to
be here today. I have dedicated most of my professional life in
and out of uniform to address this issue of biological warfare
and bioterrorism because of my deep conviction that the
successful use of biological weapons can radically and forever
change our Nation and our way of life.
I would like to applaud you and your colleagues for holding
this hearing and congratulate you in particular,
Representatives Pascrell and King and their staffs, Dr. George,
for their newly drafted bill, H.R. 5498. I think it is a
welcome addition to the other important pieces of legislation
Congress has introduced and passed to address this serious
problem.
During my tenure as special assistant to the President, I
was able to basically provide him an analysis that indicated
that if there were to be a successful attack with anthrax in a
major metropolitan city, that that could result in several
hundred thousand casualties and cost the Government $1.5
trillion in immediate direct costs.
It is clearly an issue that in these economic hard times
that some people say we can't afford to do this to be fully
prepared, but I suggest to you that we can't afford not to do
it. With that, I would like to just spend a couple of moments
to highlight some of the great provisions that you have in your
bill.
Clearly, your bill is comprehensive. Clearly, it is one
that is going to take further study by a variety of experts and
provide input to your staff. But I believe it is an important
contribution to the overall dialogue and again I think results
in the right form and tone in the sense of urgency that must be
taken to address this issue.
First of all, subject to the issues of biosecurity and
laboratory security, I welcome the notion that the select agent
list is probably too long and too arduous and doesn't reflect
the issues and agents that represent the greatest risk and
potential impact to our country.
But I think it is worthwhile that the negotiated rulemaking
that is identified in this bill includes the Department of
Homeland Security as well as the secretaries of HHS and USDA to
basically address that, as well as stakeholders from academia
and the private and public communities, to make sure that they
understand what they have to abide to as well as provide input
into this and get the right balance.
I also want to strongly endorse the creation of the high
containment biological security grants. I think you heard from
the previous witness the costs that are associated with
enhanced security. Sometimes this cost comes at the expense of
conducting either vital scientific work or day-to-day
activities in these research and public health institutions.
Providing grants to offset the current and likely increases in
security is essential to the success of this entire effort.
I also want to reiterate the importance of the work that
you are doing in the area of protection and biological
identification, particularly increasing the ability to
understand and increase situational awareness. Obviously, the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center is a matter of
contention, and I welcome questions on that.
I also want to underscore the role that you have for the
EPA and OSHA in the area of recovery and restoration. The costs
that we could not necessarily calculate as a result of this
analysis that was conducted by the Council of Economic Advisors
to the President was the notion of how long it would take and
how much it would cost to restore a metropolitan area once
again so that normal livelihood and business could be
conducted.
Another area that I think is closely linked to this
recovery and restoration from a biological attack is an issue
that you have identified under Title 3 of the public health
matters, and that is a National Pre-Event Vaccination and
Antimicrobial Distribution Policy Review. It is probably the
most, I would say, urgent issue that needs to be addressed
within your bill, primarily because the best way to ensure that
our responders will do their jobs effectively and safely is for
them and their families to be afforded the highest level of
protection possible.
In light of that approach, pre-event vaccination and
distribution of antibiotics not only makes sense, but is
essential. I am deeply disturbed about our current approach--we
have vaccines, such as an FDA-approved vaccine for anthrax,
that is expiring on the shelves of the strategic National
stockpile. Expired vaccines are useless to everyone, but a
vaccinated first responder is priceless to everyone.
I also hope that you will have the opportunity to ensure
that families of first responders have the opportunity to have
an FDA-approved med kit that can be pre-positioned at homes or
places of work to ensure that their first responders' families
can go about their business without worrying about their
families. It is interesting to note that in many airports as
part of the U.S. postal program, delivery program, that
volunteer postal workers have in their possession antibiotics
for themselves and their families in case of biological attack.
In closing, I want to again congratulate and endorse the
work of this committee and the responsible members of its
staff. This bill will go a long way to advance the status of
preparedness of this country for a threat that is unthinkable,
but likely. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you and look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Kadlec follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert P. Kadlec
June 15, 2010
INTRODUCTION
Madam Chairwoman it is both a privilege and honor to appear before
you and your colleagues to discuss this issue of great importance to
America's National security. I have dedicated most of my professional
life to address the issue of biological warfare and bioterrorism
because of my deep conviction that the successful use of biological
weapons can radically and forever change our Nation and our way of
life. I note that Senators Graham and Talent made the risk from
biological weapons their central theme of their 2008 report ``World at
Risk'' and their 2010 report card. I too share their concern about the
risk of complacency and false assumptions that currently affect our
preparations for the consequences of this threat.
I would like to applaud you and your colleagues for holding this
hearing and congratulate you and in particular Representatives Pascrell
and King and their staffs for their newly drafted bill: H.R. 5498. As I
will highlight in a few moments it represents a welcome addition to the
other important pieces of legislation Congress has introduced and
passed to address this serious problem.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO THE THREAT
I would like to start by briefly underscoring the central tenets
that shape my words and indeed shaped my actions over the last two
decades. Biological warfare and bioterrorism have largely remained a
current hypothetical threat. We were fortunate in 2001 that the likely
perpetrator of the anthrax letter attacks only intended to scare and
not kill scores of Americans. We likely won't be that lucky next time.
There are some who wrongly equate those attacks with the kind of threat
we may confront in the future. This kind of wishful thinking is not
only wrong but dangerous. Further, the notion that is now a frequent
comment made by some equating natural threats like pandemics and
emerging diseases to bioterrorism, noting that Mother Nature is a
pretty good terrorist, is similarly wrong and also dangerous. Assuming
that bioterrorism is equal or some kind of lesser included case of
natural events like pandemics is irresponsible and demonstrates the
lack of understanding of the nature of the threat.
Mother Nature is not a thinking enemy as Clausewitz noted in his
seminal work on military strategy. Mother Nature is not trying to
create pathogens in a 3-5 micron particle size aerosol that is optimum
to infect and deliberately kill men, women, and children in a given
city or geographic area for a political cause. Mother Nature does not
deliberately create pathogens that circumvent our defenses such as
antibiotics. She does so incidentally not because she chooses to but
because we choose to use antibiotics in a way that makes it more
likely. Mother Nature does not care about political boundaries.
Terrorists and adversaries of the United States would use biological
weapons as part of a deliberate plan to exploit our vulnerabilities and
attack innocents to destroy our country and way of life.
I don't make these comments based on personal opinion but on the
basis of knowing the facts of what the United States demonstrated in
the 1950's and 1960's. During the course of the U.S. offensive program
that ended in 1969, actual field tests such as Red Cloud Shady Grove
and many others using live agents demonstrated the equivalent lethality
of biological weapons to our most potent nuclear weapons--hydrogen
bombs.
President Nixon and his advisors understood that biological weapons
were strategic weapons that worked too well. Their greatest value was
not on the battlefield but in cities as weapons of terror that could
kill civilian populations potentially directly or starving them by
attacking animal and agricultural targets. Counting on the America's
nuclear superiority in a bipolar world, Nixon chose to renounce these
weapons unilaterally and supported a global ban prohibiting the
development and use of the entire class of weapons. The historical
context to this decision was the United States and the rest of the
world stood at the cusp of the biotechnology revolution.
America's moral high road leadership did much to galvanize
responsible nations to choose against biological weapons. We now know
that the Soviet Union used the veil of biological arms control to
pursue the most extensive and advanced biological weapons program known
to man. They succeeded in ways that boggle the mind and tear at the
heart: Weaponizing highly virulent strains of small pox at the time
when the world was seeking to eradicate that scourge; creating strains
of anthrax and plague that were resistant to multiple types of
antibiotics; and seeking to create new pathogenic agents whose effects
would confound medical diagnostics and have now treatments. The
whereabouts of these weapons and more importantly the information and
the people who made them is still in doubt. The recently published
Pulitzer Prize-winning book ``The Dead Hand'' by David Hoffman offers
glimpses into the Soviet's biological plans and programs and is an
authoritative account of their deception and duplicity.
This is a history that many have forgotten. More recently during my
tenure as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Biodefense Policy for President Bush, analyses we sponsored revisited
some of these lessons forgotten and provided a current context to the
risk. A single attack by a terrorist organization or a group of
disaffected individuals could threaten the lives of several hundred
thousand and have a direct cost over $1.5 trillion. When critics argue
we can't afford in today's economic hard times to prepare fully, I
suggest that we cannot afford not to. I urge you Madam Chairwoman and
your colleagues to revisit the lessons learned and regrettably
forgotten from our former program to fully understand the great
challenge that we are confronted with.
COMMENTS ON H.R. 5498
The bill that is the subject of today's hearing is a welcome and
helpful significant step forward. It is comprehensive and highlights a
number of areas where more progress is needed urgently.
I would like to comment on certain aspects of the bill that deserve
special mention.
Title II: Homeland Security Matters
Subtitle A: Prevention and Deterrence: Enhanced Biosecurity
Measures
First, the bill addresses the need to update and streamline the
measures used to ensure that work with dangerous pathogens is both safe
and secure. I know first-hand the challenges that exist trying to find
the right kind of balance to permit important, no vital work with high-
risk pathogens to ensure with have the necessary antibiotics, vaccines,
and antidotes while ensure the risk of malicious diversion. I note that
your language requires the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and
Agriculture to work with the Secretary of Homeland Security using
negotiated rule-making.
The premise of this provision I think is the right one which is
that the list of agents of concern should be for the biological or
toxin agents of greatest risk. The current list of Select Agents is too
long and not reflective of the agents that represent the greatest risk
and potential impact. I think it is also essential and noted in your
bill language that representatives from the academic, private, and
public communities should have a seat at the table to ensure that the
standards and practices set have been discussed and agreed to by the
entities that will have to abide and implement such rules. In the end,
I anticipate that the right balance of responsibility for safety and
security and reasonableness will prevail.
I also note and strongly endorse that creation of High Containment
Biological Security Grants. Up to this point, the costs of enhanced
security have come at the expense of conducting the vital scientific
work at these research institutions. Providing grants to offset the
current and likely increases in security required is essential to the
success of the entire effort.
Finally, I note that your Senate colleagues, Senators Lieberman and
Collins have written similar provisions in their Bill Senate 1649.
While there are differences between these two pieces of legislation,
the opportunity to create a realistic and less onerous mechanism to
oversee high-risk pathogens is a great one.
Subtitle B: Preparedness: Detection of Biological Attack
There is an important provision contained in your bill that I
wholeheartedly endorse and wish to expound on.
The provision devoted to ``Detection of Biological Attacks'' is
vitally important to fully implement. Unless we have more rapid
environmental detection of biological attacks, we will not likely be
able to mount an effective response to a large-scale bioterrorism
attack. BioWatch as originally created was viewed as the best we could
do 7 years ago. The system has performed admirably to date and has had
the added benefit of compelling the public health and emergency
response communities to address the opportunity that environmental
detection offers by verifying the release of a biological agent before
anyone becomes clinically ill.
As good as the system is now; it is too slow to mount the kind of
response that will be necessary should an attack happen. Accelerating
the development and deployment of automated biological detection in
conjunction with advanced point of care diagnostics for the agents of
greatest concern should be one of the highest priorities. I note with
great confidence the role of the Under Secretary of DHS in both
environmental detection and rapid biological threat detection and
identification and her ability to successfully achieve these tasks.
Subtitle F: Recovery: Recovery and Restoration From a
Biological Attack or Incident Guidelines
I strongly endorse the provision contained in this section of the
bill. One of the major unknowns that we confront from the risks of a
biological attack is the residual threat. While there are anecdotal
experiences that indicate that there may be significant residual
hazards from indoor and outdoor releases.
There is a great need to better understand and validate these
potential risks. Furthermore, there is a need to promote the
development of capabilities to address the possible consequences. I
applaud your language that enlists the involvement of EPA and OSHA to
reconcile before an event the standards that constitute safe and
effective for the response community and general public.
Title III: Public Health Matters National Pre-event Vaccination and
Antimicrobial Distribution Policy Review
A prepared response workforce is our best hedge against
uncertainty. One of the best ways to ensure that our responders will do
their jobs effectively and safely is for them and their families to be
afforded the highest level of protection. In light of that approach
pre-event vaccination and distribution of antibiotics not only makes
sense but is essential.
What is deeply disturbing about our current approach we have
vaccines such as FDA-Approved anthrax vaccine that is expiring on
shelves in the Strategic National Stockpile when it could be offered
voluntarily to first responders in areas where the risk of a biological
attack is evaluated higher than others. Expired vaccines are useless to
everyone, but a vaccinated first responder is priceless to everyone.
Furthermore, looking at the opportunity to ensure that the families
of first responders are take care of opens the possibility of
developing FDA-approved MEDKITS that can be pre-positioned at homes or
places of work that ensure that first responders are not worried about
taking care of their families. This has been shown to be invaluable in
the case of postal workers in Minneapolis who have volunteered to be
part of the U.S. Postal program. Antibiotics are prescribed for both
the volunteer postal worker and his or her family. In case of a
biological attack, the responder can go do his or her duty without
worrying about their families.
There is one last subject I would like to mention subject to your
bill and that is to emphasize the importance of situational awareness
as it relates to the evolution of a biological attack. As we
experienced most recently with the H1N1 pandemic and even during the
on-going crisis in the Gulf with oil spill, situational awareness--
knowing what is going on with a high degree of confidence--is
essential. There have been several attempts to address this critical
enabling element in our biodefense strategy. Again and again we have
come up short. I note that your bill highlights that important function
and I endorse the goal and the importance of it.
In closing, I want again to congratulate and endorse the work of
this committee and the responsible Members and staff. This bill will go
a long way to advance the status of preparedness of this country for a
threat that is unthinkable but likely. I very much appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you and look forward to your questions.
Ms. Clarke. We thank you, Dr. Kadlec, for your testimony
here today.
I now recognize Dr. Fischer to summarize her statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JULIE E. FISCHER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, GLOBAL HEALTH
SECURITY PROGRAM, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER
Dr. Fischer. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman,
Mr. Lungren, Mr. Pascrell, distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity
to offer comments on this important piece of legislation.
Following the anthrax assault of 2001, Congress hardened
the regulations that governed access to the so-called select
agents, those pathogens and toxins deemed a serious threat to
public health and security. The Departments of Health and Human
Services and Agriculture administered oversight of the
laboratories that possessed, used, and transferred these
pathogens.
Since the implementation of the regulations, they have
negotiated a delicate balancing act--how to apply the
regulations in a way that effectively promotes biosecurity
without hindering absolutely critical research, which is all
the more important, because this research builds the public
health toolkit that offers us protections from infectious
diseases, including those that might be biological weapons.
Although they are aimed primarily at U.S. laboratories, the
select agent regulations and many of the measures here affect
international collaborations--research has become a global
enterprise, and talented researchers within emerging economies
increasingly engage in collaborative investigations with their
U.S. counterparts.
These professional relationships build trust. They build
shared norms. They foster open scientific exchange during
international public health crises. Ultimately, they protect
health and safety at home and abroad.
Many of the pathogens on the select agent list cause
natural disease outbreaks in Asia, Africa, Latin America. The
U.S. and international researchers based in countries where the
pathogens are prevalent benefit mutually from open partnerships
that include sharing of knowledge, skills, and specimens. An
unknown number of U.S. researchers severed such international
collaborations following the implementation of the select agent
regulations.
The costs and benefits of security measures that might
further imperil such collaborations or obstruct cooperation
during an international public health crisis must be considered
carefully.
A common criticism of the select agent regulations has been
the application of a one-size-fits-all security strategy, and
the proposed legislation would require enhanced biosecurity
measures for laboratories using Tier 1 material agents. This is
a good start in recognizing that there are tiered levels of
biological risks sensitive to the context as well as to the
pathogens themselves. Greater emphasis on risk-based security
could allow stakeholders to set priorities more effectively.
The proposed legislation implies that this list will be
smaller than the current select agent list, specifying only
inclusion of bioterrorism risk assessments, as referenced by
Dr. Murch, which suggests an evidence-based approach. But the
criteria that would be used to distinguish these Tier 1 agents
from select agents is not yet described in detail.
The legislation does not yet make clear how these new Tier
1 practices would be managed in relationship to the existing
select agent regulations at the National institutional level,
although those standards will be relaxed to those institutions
possessing select agents newly categorized as lower risk.
While the awards to offset the increased security costs
mentioned here at Tier 1 laboratories would be strongly
welcomed, it is unclear how risk will be evaluated or whether
the organizations that receive such funds could use them to
help their overseas partners comply with any new controls on
pathogen acquisition, storage, transfer, and use. It is
difficult to say, pending that detail, whether these measures
might further isolate U.S. researchers who are investigating
Tier 1 pathogens from their international counterparts.
The proposed network that would emphasize enhanced customs
and export regulation and enforcement under DHS emphasize this
operational relationship to not new authorities, but the
committee must be aware that in this context the emphasis could
reinvigorate apprehensions among the research community at home
and abroad about the open sharing of information resulting from
unclassified scientific research.
Biosurveillance systems have now faced new demands to
provide warning of extraordinary events. As the SARS outbreak
demonstrated in 2003, the costs when one nation lacks the
ability or will to report emerging infectious disease before it
spreads across borders can be enormous. This outbreak helped
catalyze the adoption of the revised international health
regulations by the member states of the World Health
Organization in 2005.
All 194 state parties are required to strengthen the
capacity through public health surveillance and response and
report any deliberate natural or accidental events that might
affect health across national borders.
Unlike other global health initiatives to strengthen
capacities, these are legally binding. They enjoy widespread
international support and complement the objectives of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the recently
revised U.S. National security strategy for countering
biological threats.
The United States is also stuck with its efforts to
integrate its fragmented surveillance from networks, including,
as mentioned, the National Biosurveillance Integration System
and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, an effort
slowed at its outset by logistical and management challenges.
In the mean time the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 21 charged HHS with developing a National
biosurveillance strategy for human health HHS.
As the legislation points out, DHS could play a much
stronger leadership role in leveraging the operationally useful
health-related data and information that comes from this
surveillance framework and existing arbitrary networks, as
there are monitoring programs for decision-makers across all
levels of government.
Finally, I would just like to say that the situational
awareness for biological risk depends on capabilities far
beyond U.S. borders. No nation in an era of accelerated
globalization, no matter how technologically advanced, can
build tall enough walls to keep out infectious diseases. This
legislation acknowledges the critical need for the United
States to support capacity building in other nations. We
already have an endorsement of principles under the National
strategy for countering biological threats to support
principles consistent with the IHR 2005.
Stressing validated data on biological attacks does not
parallel the terminology of the IHR and could eventually
undermine or jeopardize U.S. and National efforts to support
implementation of the IHR as a common global platform for
disease protection and response, including for common
biological threats.
Ms. Clarke. Dr. Fischer, would you summarize?
Dr. Fischer. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Dr. Fischer. So I would just strongly encourage the
committee, and I hope that the committee will consider
implementing the language within this very necessary
legislation whether any measures might undermine U.S. support
for mitigating risks from natural, accidental, or deliberate
disease outbreaks under the IHR 2005 framework and through our
collaborations with international partners. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Fischer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Julie E. Fischer
June 16, 2010
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Clarke, Congressman Lungren, Congressman
Pascrell, Congressman King, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to
offer comments on H.R. 5498, the proposed WMD Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2010.
National and international responses to biological threats have
evolved dramatically in the past decade. Following the anthrax assaults
of 2001, Congress created legislation to promote biosecurity in the
Nation's research and clinical laboratories, and to strengthen National
capacities to respond effectively to public health crises. Measures
broadened the regulations that govern access to ``Select Agents,''
pathogens and toxins deemed a serious threat to public health and
security if released. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
administers oversight of laboratories that possess, use, or transfer
human pathogens on the Select Agent list, and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) serves a parallel role for laboratories that study
plant and animal pathogens. These two agencies, together with the
Departments of Defense, State, and others, have also invested in
disease detection and response capacities abroad, through jointly owned
research programs as well as training, funding, and technical
assistance.
Since the implementation of the Select Agent regulations, these
agencies and the biomedical research community have sought a delicate
balance: How to apply the regulations in a way that meaningfully
enhances biosecurity, without hindering the ability of laboratories to
conduct legitimate clinical testing and research. The latter is all the
more significant in that the research under scrutiny ultimately builds
the public health toolkit of diagnostics, vaccines, and treatments
against infectious diseases, including those that might be used as
biological weapons.
Although primarily aimed at U.S. clinical and biomedical research
laboratories, the Select Agent regulations have affected international
collaborations. Life sciences research has become a global enterprise,
and talented researchers within emerging economies increasingly engage
in collaborative investigations with their U.S. counterparts. These
professional relationships build trust and shared norms, foster open
scientific exchange during international public health crises, and
ultimately protect health and safety at home and abroad. Many pathogens
on the Select Agent list cause natural disease outbreaks in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S. and international
researchers based in countries where such pathogens are prevalent
benefit mutually from partnerships that include sharing of knowledge,
skills, and specimens. An unknown number of U.S. researchers severed
international collaborations following implementation of the Select
Agent regulations, impairing progress and reducing the influence of
U.S. scientists within international communities of practice. The costs
and benefits of security measures that might further imperil such
collaborations, or obstruct cooperation during an international public
health emergency, must be weighed carefully.
The legislation introduced by Congressmen Pascrell and King would
address many of the lessons learned since 2001, including
recommendations by the bipartisan Commission for the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. The proposed
act recognizes gaps in our abilities to respond to events that could
jeopardize public health and National security. Public and private
sector stakeholders in the life sciences still struggle to balance
cultures of responsibility and fear in addressing potential
vulnerabilities. The proposed legislation confronts another balancing
act: How to improve coordination and integration of the myriad programs
that have evolved to tackle biological threats without creating new
layers of oversight that might rob existing efforts of their momentum.
PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE
A common criticism of the Select Agent regulations has been the
application of a ``one size fits all'' security strategy to all of the
listed pathogens, even though the public health, scientific, and
security communities recognize a gradient of risks. The proposed
legislation would require enhanced biosecurity measures for
laboratories that possess, use, and transfer ``Tier 1 Material Threat
Agents.'' This is a good start in recognizing tiered levels of
biological risks that are sensitive to context as well as pathogen
characteristics. Greater emphasis on risk-based security measures could
allow stakeholders to set priorities more effectively, focusing their
resources on the subset of laboratories where challenges are most
evident.
The proposed legislation implies that the list of ``Tier 1'' agents
would be smaller than the current Select Agent list. The mechanisms
described would give broad latitude to the stakeholders in identifying
``Tier 1'' agents, specifying only the inclusion of Bioterrorism Risk
Assessments, which suggests an evidence-based approach. However, the
criteria that would be used to distinguish ``Tier 1'' agents from
Select Agents are not described in detail. The legislation would
designate the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead an
interagency rule-making process to develop the enhanced biosecurity
measures, including laboratory practices. Although a laudable attempt
to mandate inclusion of the broader stakeholder community, this could
further complicate existing dual HHS and USDA oversight. The proposed
legislation does not describe how these new ``Tier 1'' practices would
be managed in relationship to the existing Select Agent regulations at
the National or institutional level, or whether standards would be
relaxed for institutions possessing Select Agents newly categorized as
lower-risk.
The legislation would authorize awards to offset increased security
costs at ``Tier 1'' laboratories, based on risk. While a welcome
response, it is unclear how risk would be evaluated, or whether
academic and non-profit organizations that receive such funds could use
them to help overseas partners comply with any new controls on pathogen
acquisition, storage, transfer, and use. In the absence of such
assurance, and pending further detail on the Tier 1 Material Threat
Agent determination process, it is difficult to say whether these
measures might further isolate U.S. researchers investigating Tier 1
pathogens from their international counterparts.
The proposed network to coordinate customs and export regulation
enforcement under DHS emphasizes enhanced operational relationships,
rather than new authorities. However, in this context--particularly
given the reference to ``dual-use'' technologies, a term that includes
a broader swath of activities and materials in the life sciences than
commonly applied to commodities with military applications--this
emphasis could reinvigorate apprehensions at home and abroad about the
open sharing of information resulting from unclassified research.
DETECTION
Biosurveillance systems face new demands to provide warning of
extraordinary events. In response, stakeholders have expanded their
capabilities to detect and characterize public health events that could
become National, or transnational, threats.
The 2003 SARS outbreak vividly demonstrated the costs when one
nation lacks the ability or will to report an emerging infectious
disease outbreak before it spills over borders. The human, political,
and economic tolls helped catalyze adoption of the revised
International Health Regulations by the World Health Organization's
member states in 2005 [IHR (2005)]. The IHR (2005) require the 194
state parties to strengthen their capacities for public health
surveillance and response, and to report any deliberate, natural, or
accidental events that might affect health across national borders. The
regulations also vested WHO with new authorities to collect and share
information on such events. Unlike other global health initiatives that
aim to strengthen capacities for disease detection, assessment,
reporting, and response, the IHR (2005) are legally binding. They enjoy
relatively widespread international support, and complement the
objectives of both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the
recently released U.S. National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats.
The United States has also stepped up its attempts to integrate its
fragmented disease surveillance networks. Public Law 110-53 charged DHS
with overseeing the development and operation of the National
Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS), including the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center, an effort slowed at its outset by
logistical and management challenges. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive--21 delegated the task of establishing a National
biosurveillance system for human health to HHS. With input from the
interagency Federal Biosurveillance Work Group and other stakeholder
committees, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
developed the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health
delivered in February 2010. This strategy outlines steps for improving
the timely, multi-directional flow of health-related information among
local, State, and Federal stakeholders and with global partners. As
implied by the proposed legislation, DHS could play a stronger
leadership role in leveraging operationally useful health-related data
and information for decision-makers across all levels of Government.
This should build upon the existing National biosurveillance strategy
for human health, laboratory networks, and biomonitoring programs.
ATTRIBUTION
The legislation would require public and private entities that have
received Federal funding to provide samples of biological agents and
toxins for a proposed National bioforensics repository collection.
Others here today will doubtless comment more comprehensively on the
tools for attributing biological attacks to likely perpetrators. I
would like to highlight additional sensitivities in including organisms
derived from international partnerships or collections.
Many emerging economies already perceive the motives of the U.S.
and the international community in collecting specimens for legitimate
public health interventions as less than transparent. The proposed
repository would explicitly include international collections and
implicitly encompass agents originally derived by U.S. researchers from
international partnerships. Including agents that trace their origins
to international collaborations, perhaps even to third-party countries,
could inflame tensions that already endanger specimen sharing under the
IHR (2005) and other global disease surveillance agreements. The
potential effects on U.S. engagement in global health should be
factored into the examination of access and participation issues laid
out in the proposed legislation.
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND ENGAGEMENT TO ENHANCE BIODEFENSE AND
BIOSECURITY
As recognized by the legislation's authors and articulated in the
recommendations of the Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, situational awareness for
biological risks depends on capabilities far beyond U.S. borders. In an
era of accelerated globalization, no nation, no matter how
technologically advanced, can build tall enough walls to keep out
infectious diseases and other public health risks.
This legislation acknowledges the critical need for the United
States to support capacity-building in other nations. Many nations will
require significant technical and financial assistance to strengthen
mechanisms for detecting and reporting unusual events that could
presage a deliberate, accidental, or natural infectious disease
outbreak. A large number of Federal agencies and organizations already
play key roles in U.S. global health security engagement. The proposed
legislation effectively recognizes the unique role of the State
Department's Biosecurity Engagement Program. However, other Federal
agencies and divisions, including the Department of Defense, HHS
(including CDC and the National Institutes of Health), USDA, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and elements of the U.S.
National laboratories, have significant presence and track records in
promoting biosecurity engagement and information exchange abroad.
Because these agencies have different institutional goals, they have
not always pursued coordinated strategies for building comprehensive
biorisk management. The endorsement of principles consistent with the
IHR (2005) in the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
offered a platform for stronger interagency coordination, using an
operational framework already shared by international partners. The
proposed legislation's focus on building capacity to report ``validated
data on biological attacks'' to United Nations organizations does not
parallel the terminology of the IHR (2005), which refer to detecting
and reporting ``public health emergencies of international concern.''
This might inadvertently jeopardize U.S. and international efforts to
support implementation of the IHR (2005) as a common global platform
for disease detection and response, including deliberate biological
threats.
International collaboration is an important tool in building shared
norms, and U.S.-supported capacity-building projects in the life
sciences increasingly build long-term partnerships that promote trust,
openness, and converging research priorities. The proposed legislation
acknowledges the benefits of such engagement, directing the Secretary
of State to support partner nations' efforts to enhance biosafety and
biosecurity, taking their own priorities in comprehensive biorisk
management into account. Language in the proposed provisions that would
generally promote data-sharing among Federally supported programs
abroad for biosecurity purposes might reinforce negative perceptions of
U.S. transparency and motives.
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON BEST PRACTICES FOR GLOBAL BIOPREPAREDNESS
The last decade has witnessed a rapid growth of public health
preparedness capabilities at home and abroad. Domestically, the United
States has supported efforts to share lessons learned during events and
exercises among first responders in an effort to strengthen all-hazards
preparedness at the local, State, and Federal levels. Clearly, other
nations face the same need to build response capabilities across levels
of government, and many do so without the resources available in the
United States and other high-income nations. Concerns about exposing
homeland security vulnerabilities have limited open information-sharing
about lessons learned in disaster response with first responders
outside of the United States. The United States is certainly not the
only Nation to hold the results of simulations and self-assessments in
public health preparedness close.
Several recently developed mechanisms answer the need to help
nations identify and implement best practices to prevent, detect, or
respond to biological and other catastrophic threats. The IHR (2005),
under the aegis of WHO, provide an international forum for assessing
and strengthening the global architecture for public health
preparedness. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, through
the work of the 1540 Committee, provides an information clearinghouse
and means for capacity building to prevent proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, including bioweapons. The United States plays a
significant role in assisting partner nations with their obligations
under these frameworks.
By authorizing a U.S. interagency task force on global
biopreparedness architecture, the legislation would spark a discussion
of new developments and persistent gaps among a broadly inclusive group
of stakeholders. The result, if viewed as a map of needs,
vulnerabilities, and potential partnerships, could help the United
States develop a more targeted engagement strategy for building global
pathogen surveillance and response capacities. It is unclear whether
this task force would be charged with considering only the architecture
for a deliberate biological event, or for natural outbreaks and
accidental releases as well. It is possible that this task force could
overlap substantially with activities currently being developed under
the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. It is also
possible that recommendations for a global preparedness architecture
developed outside of any international forum in which the United States
is a key stakeholder may not be adopted with wholesale enthusiasm by
the international community.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the proposed legislation would address many weaknesses in
sharing and integration of health-related information domestically,
particularly at the State and local level. The ``customer base'' for
information on biological hazards has expanded dramatically in the past
decade, creating new requirements for data analysis and dissemination.
Stronger integration of public health expertise into the security and
intelligence communities could help make data on disease threats more
relevant for strategic and tactical planning across all levels of
government.
Many provisions in H.R. 5498 consider concerns of paramount
importance to the public health and life sciences communities as well
as the security and intelligence communities, and carefully recognize
the very dynamic nature of the field. This is crucial to strengthening
a foundation for biorisk management that supports other U.S. strategic
goals in the long term, whether through a more nuanced response that
conserves research resources at home, or a coordinated approach to
priority-setting for biosecurity engagement abroad. After years of
struggling to find a palatable framework for building truly global
disease detection and response capabilities, the international
community has finally begun to make progress under the IHR (2005). The
National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats enshrined the U.S.
commitment to the principles of the IHR (2005), a compact for
reciprocal responsibility among nations whose success is not yet
guaranteed. As the subcommittee moves forward with its deliberations on
the proposed WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010, I hope that
it will avoid any measures that might undermine U.S. support for
mitigating risks from natural, accidental, and deliberate disease
outbreaks under the IHR (2005) framework.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you, too, Dr. Fischer.
I thank all of our witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel. I will now recognize myself for
questions at this time.
This question is for the entire panel. We believe there is
a need to create a top tier of agents in the select agent
program that are thought to pose material threats to the Nation
and therefore should be better secured. Tier 1 Material Threat
Agents should be secured Tier 1 Material Threat Agents.
In addition to the material threat determination, what
other criteria should be used to determine what agent is a Tier
1 Material Threat Agent?
We will start with Dr. Murch.
Dr. Murch. I am afraid I don't have a deep knowledge of the
processes, but I think one thing that would be important is to
incorporate the viewpoints of the operational community, the
intelligence community, as opposed to simply the scientific and
medical community. It is very hard to measure these sorts of
criteria that the intelligence and operational community use to
measure threat, for example, but I think it is an important
ingredient.
Dr. Kadlec. I would just highlight that one of the things
mentioned in your bill is the biological threat risk
assessment. That may be a very useful tool to again kind of
factor in many of the issues that I think Dr. Murch alluded to,
and that is the availability of appropriate FDA-approved
countermeasures and a variety of other things that can modify
your view of what the risk would be. Again, I think that is a
notable inclusion in your bill on that account.
Ms. Clarke. Does anyone want to add any other comment?
Dr. Fischer.
Dr. Fischer. I do agree that the intelligence community has
a strong strategic view. I welcome in this legislation the
broader inclusion of the stakeholder community that does
include the academic and nonprofit community explicitly,
because there are elements of technical achievement and ease of
cultivation that should be factored in in terms of the ability
not only to grow and access these agents, but to convert them
effectively into a weapon, recognize that that is not always a
set of skills at the fingertips of the average laboratorian.
Ms. Clarke. I just want to say to Dr. Beatrice that it did
not pass me when you discussed in your testimony the idea of we
are going to raise a higher level of security for Tier 1
Material Threat Agents--there should be some commensurate
support for those entities that would have these agents as part
of their programs or as part of their environs, so that didn't
pass me by.
Dr. Beatrice, we want to commend you and your colleagues on
your participation in the BioWatch program, despite some
frustration over the years. Can you talk to us about your
experience with the BioWatch program and how well or how
quickly has BioWatch data been shared with the New York City
Public Health Lab?
Dr. Beatrice. Certainly. I will say that my experience with
the BioWatch program actually started with a phone call from
Dr. Kadlec in 2003. It was an interesting experience in that
the Public Health Laboratory was used to supporting
environmental and clinical testing, and we were now introduced
to the world of biothreat in a slightly different way.
Dr. Kadlec indicated that there was a desire to roll out a
new program across the country to urban areas and that these
were going to be secret laboratories that would be installed
within public health labs. So a growing together of two
cultures needed to occur, because the concept of the military
or law enforcement approach to testing and public health were
slightly different.
Our experience has been one in which New York City has had
a very strong partnership with both the participants at DHS and
also with our partners at CDC. The initial rollout of the
BioWatch program was based on a team effort in which the
scientists from the National labs at DHS and CDC and the New
York City Public Health Lab worked very closely to ensure that
the quality of the reagents, the testing, and the training of
the individuals would be as good as possible. The
communications back and forth between Federal and local
partners was very good.
I would say that during 2008 and 2009, we entered into a
time where transparency became almost nonexistent and changes
in the program that resulted in quality of the reagents were
not--we were not alerted to those, and what resulted was an
increase in some challenges in the program.
It took New York City outreaching again to both DHS and to
CDC, alerting them to the problems in the program, to really
bring the process back to one of strong communication and
teamwork. We are in the process of working through the
difficulties in operations. There has been strong commitment on
the part of our Federal partners to work through these
difficulties, and we are very optimistic that we will get to a
place that we were in previous years.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Dr. Beatrice. My time has
expired, but we will revisit this.
I would like to recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for
his questions at this time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Dr. Kadlec, I found your testimony--I found everybody's
testimony--interesting, but I found yours particularly
interesting about the historical record that President Nixon,
his advisors, decided that we should not pursue biological
weapons, that we should try and pursue an effort to
unilaterally renounce these weapons and support a global ban,
but the Soviet Union, under the veil of that, continued to
press forward.
So in some ways we took the moral high ground, as we should
have, but the Soviet Union took advantage of us in that respect
and proceeded apace and probably had more knowledge about this,
about the production and so forth. You go on to say in your
testimony that we may not know where all of the whereabouts of
these weapons are. More importantly, the information on the
people who made them are still in doubt.
As part of our bill, we stress giving the DNI the
responsibility for coming together with a comprehensive
intelligence approach on this. How difficult do you think it
will be for us to build that up, No. 1? No. 2, how successful
do you think we can be with that? How immediate is the problem
that we address it?
Dr. Kadlec. To sort of kind of take your answers all in one
thing, I think a lot more can be done. We have showed a dismal
record in our intelligence efforts against this problem over
the many years--decades, if you will, if we had to look at the
situation with the former Soviet Union. It was a great surprise
until a couple of defectors came out in the late 1980s, early
1990s, that really gave us an understanding of how large and
sophisticated that program was.
I think, similarly, we found ourselves in difficult straits
when we had to deal with Iraq. Then most recently with al-
Qaeda, it is interesting to note that even despite having a
public fatwa by Osama bin Laden in 1998, and their efforts
began in 1999 to include building a dedicated laboratory in
Kandahar, Afghanistan, we were unaware of that effort--highly
compartmented, parallel effort--until 2002, when we invaded
Afghanistan and uncovered that lab and then evidence of those
efforts.
So, quite frankly, we can do a lot better at it. The issue
is what is it going to take? Well, I think it is going to take
priority. It is going to take a unified voice between the
President and Congress and the oversight of Congress to ensure
that this issue gets the kind of attention and the resources
that it deserves.
It has been a poor stepchild of the nuclear issue. Clearly,
we have a lot of vivid imageries of the Nagasakis of the world
and Hiroshimas. Unfortunately, we don't have one of a
biological threat.
But I note that Henry Kissinger gave a testimony recently
about the START Treaty and said, ``Well, one day when they wake
up and hear that, 500,000 people will have died.'' Then we know
from the Graham and Talent commission that that likelihood is
probably going to be a biological event.
So there is much more that we could do. I think it is going
to take a joint effort between Congress and the administration
to kind of keep the interest up, the focus on. Certainly, the
oversight role of Congress is going to be essential for this.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Murch.
Dr. Murch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. In terms of the capability that we have in the
intelligence community, where are we in that with respect to
what Dr. Kadlec just talked about? Is there more that we can do
in this legislation with respect to the intelligence side of
things?
We have made a start, I think, with Title 1, but I happen
to personally believe that unless we give the DNI the authority
and the direction and that is accepted by the other agencies
and departments, it is not going to work.
Dr. Murch. I agree.
Mr. Lungren. Having seen some recent commentary about DNI
position thus far, it bothers me. Generally speaking, do you
disagree or agree with Dr. Kadlec about the urgency of the
matter with respect to intelligence, No. 1?
No. 2, can you comment on what we have in this legislation
and anything else you think might be important? Because I think
all parts of this legislation are important, but frankly, if we
don't have the intelligence, we cannot prevent and deter. That
is the linchpin, it seems to me.
Dr. Murch. It is indeed a linchpin, and where we should be
headed is moving our activities to the left, meaning
anticipation, prevention, interdiction, disruption and so
forth, as opposed to the reaction, surprise, response, finger-
pointing and beyond, way to the right, my time-risk continuum.
Clearly, the DNI has to have the authority. I believe it
has to be done in a methodical and structured approach. One
technique that is often used by the Department of Defense is to
use what is called a systems analysis. Where are we? Where do
we need to get to? How are we going to get there in a very
rigorous, methodical way? I think that will be informative to
the process.
I also think we need to think beyond simply state-sponsored
programs or sub-state down to a single individual, a lone wolf,
which is the hardest of the hard problems. How do we scale our
intelligence capabilities in an integrated systems fashion,
ranging from our external collection and analytic and special
operations capabilities all the way down to the domestic as
well?
It has to be completely seamless between--very hard, with
the number of agencies involved and perspectives and cultures,
but again, under single leadership and commitment by the
administration and the Congress and the institutions
themselves, and also pull upon external resources, because all
of the good ideas are not in the Federal Government.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Austria, for his questions at this time.
Mr. Austria. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you to the panel for your testimony today.
Let me just kind of go back a little bit. I think I was
glad to hear the last, by Dr. Murch as far as you described
moving to the left, from preventative standpoint, being
prepared for this ahead of time, rather than the reactive,
which I think is extremely important.
I guess to the entire panel, I would like to get your
thoughts on why you think--I know this has been addressed in
the past--and maybe identify some of the reasons why we haven't
been successful in moving in this direction in the past, and
why you think this legislation, which I think does a very good
job and works towards correcting one of the major deficiencies
by expanding the list of entities to which DHS disseminates
information to the appropriate different levels, whether it be
State, local, and Federal, which I think has been a problem in
coordinating that communication, why you think it would be
this--we can be successful this time, and identify maybe some
of the hurdles that we faced in the past as to why we weren't
successful doing this in the past.
I will open up that to any member of the panel that wants
to take the start of that.
Dr. Murch. I will go first. Certainly, the report by the
WMD Commission highlights in a more coherent fashion. I think
that is No. 1. It has been commented on by a number of
different sources in the media, obviously, here in the
Congress, the administration and so forth. So I think it is
important.
The problem has been stated and the road ahead has been
stated in a coherent fashion. Action has been taken quickly by
the Congress. I think there is a time now when a unity of
purpose can be engineered and be sustained, and I haven't seen
it to this point in my time in the Government, which for me
working on WMD terrorism goes back to the early 1980s when I
was a young agent in Los Angeles, it turns out.
But I believe going forward, strategies and plans are
important for agencies for better collaboration--not simple
cooperation, but collaboration, not duplicating it, but staying
in their lanes and doing it well. I think that will help.
Again, it is leadership. It is oversight. It is measurement
of progress, which we don't seem to do very well. We don't stay
focused very well on that. With all due respect, I am not a big
believer in simply throwing money at a problem. It is coupling
money with purpose and measuring effectiveness and holding
people accountable. We don't seem to do that very well either.
Mr. Austria. Dr. Murch, let me follow up on that comment,
because I think there are those that would argue that this
legislation is actually going to grow DHS. There is going to be
more bureaucracy. You know, then there is the argument of
whether that would be less efficient, whether it be more
wasteful spending or whether this would be able to work. I
would like to get your comments on that, if I could.
Dr. Murch. Sure. Well, you begin the legislation, I
believe, at the right point. You start with the strategy. It is
ready, aim, shoot, not shoot, ready, aim. Starting with a
strategy and planning and reporting and authorities and
responsibilities which are embedded in that is the right place
to start.
There are clearly a number of other initiatives captured in
the legislation, which fit underneath that, which are part of a
broader strategy that is yet to be built. So my hope is is that
you are on an intelligent strategy. As the Member from New
Jersey pointed out, we don't have a comprehensive strategy yet.
I think that yet has to be constructed and put in place. We are
not done yet.
Mr. Austria. Dr. Fischer.
Dr. Fischer. Thank you, sir. I think that the other part to
complement that, as Dr. Murch pointed out, once you have got
the information, once you have the tools in place, you also
have to have the skills integrated to analyze that information
and to present it in a form that is useful for decision-makers
for both operational or tactical decision-making and strategic
decision-making. The customer base for that kind of information
has expanded at the local and State level in ways we would
never have anticipated only a decade ago.
So I think one of the challenges that this legislation does
address is expanding the public health intelligence presence at
the State and local level through mechanisms such as the fusion
centers, which were intended to do that in the first place. But
there are operational barriers to that.
There are professional culture barriers to that that I
think will not be solved very--you know, they are not going to
be solved immediately by simply dictating that there should be
that capacity. There are obstacles that I think should be
explored within those communities.
I also believe that the proposal here to move NVIC, which
has had its problems, back into the intel portion of the
Department of Homeland Security, can more effectively move the
stream of information there, but only if there are people with
the appropriate expertise within that directorate to
understand, process, analyze, and produce it in a way that is
useful for operational decision-making. So it is not
necessarily growing the agency, but moving the appropriate
expertise into that particular division.
Mr. Austria. Yes?
Dr. Kadlec. Sir, very briefly, to answer your question
about, you know, why we haven't made more progress. First, it
is hard. This is not Mother Nature at work. This is a
deliberate thing of the enemy. It is complicated. Subject to
the success of a response to a biological event, it is going to
be more dependent on people in Sally Beatrice's lab and the
funding and the staffing that they have as it is whatever the
Federal Government is going to do, because they are at the tip
of the spear. It is expensive. Quite frankly, we have not
embraced this as a National security issue for our country.
If we look at the--and again, not to dispute the issue of
throwing money at the problem, but what we spend about annually
$5 billion. If you ask yourselves what do we spend on nuclear
security and nuclear defense and offense, it runs about $50
billion, of which is that $15 billion is for defensive
purposes. If you look at what we are going to spend on cyber,
it is approaching $30 billion and probably will be $50 billion
before too long.
Somehow we need to recognize that this is not just an
extension of public health. This is an extension of National
security and subject to everything that Congress has done.
Congress has done a lot, and in no other area that I know of
that has Congress done more, and more needs to be done.
But we are subject to a political process, and this notion
of imperfect incrementalism is the one we need and, you know,
we live with. The notion that we will go through other due
processes and learn by doing imperfectly and adjusting as we
have, I think, is a pretty extraordinary legacy that Congress
has left in this area. Thank you.
Mr. Austria. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I know my time is
up. Thank you.
Thank you to the panel.
Ms. Clarke. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman
from New Jersey, the author of this legislation, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
I just want to bring something to Dr. Murch's attention,
because I think you asked very pertinent questions or brought
up important points about section 2103 in the legislation,
which deals with the bioterrorism risk assessments. On page 16
under that particular section, there is a very specific
requirement, which goes to the heart of one of the points you
are making.
The Secretary shall convene an interagency task force of
relevant subject matter experts to provide recommendations to
the under secretary for science and technology as to the
adequacy of the methodology--which is in parentheses, your
point--used in the assessments and to establish requirements
for the standards for those assessments. We believe that the
National Academy of Sciences should be on the task force. I
just wanted to make that clear.
Some questions for our panelists. I think we have come a
long way in the last 5 months, 6 months, on this to bring the
legislation forward. But I would like to ask Dr. Murch and Dr.
Kadlec and Dr. Fischer, have we as a country or the world
sufficiently criminalized acts of bioterrorism and/or
biological warfare?
We have a provision, for instance, in section 402 that
seeks to address the need to support other countries in
criminalizing such acts. Would any of you care to respond to
that?
Dr. Murch. Well, I actually am familiar with that section,
and I do appreciate that there will be activities in that
regard. Clearly, in the United States--and I am speaking as a
former FBI agent working under Federal law--and it seemed to me
within the United States there is sufficient attention under
the law to criminalization of bioterrorism and related acts.
However, it is a global problem. It is not simply a
domestic problem, and we need to work very closely with those
countries that we usually work with, but also those where we
have some concerns over their commitment to criminalizing
bioterrorism misuse of the life sciences.
Lots of different processes have been undertaken--
coordination, conferences, discussions and so forth, bilaterals
and so on--but we have moved all the way up to the Biological
Weapons and Toxins Convention and the fact that even though it
defines illicit behavior, there is no enforcement provision.
That is something we have to contend with, in my mind.
Mr. Pascrell. Can you envision any enforcement mechanism?
Dr. Murch. Not off the top of my head, actually, sir. But I
think with the proper discussions, we can probably do that. But
obviously, it requires almost uniform international cooperation
to get there, which has been the struggle.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me ask you this question, then. We have
seen the study of the National Academy of Sciences just last
year. That study was very explicit--noted that only 2 pages had
been dedicated to forensics and homeland security.
Dr. Murch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. I think we could use some more dedicated
effort in that subject, forensics in homeland security. What do
you think should be included in such a study? You know we have
a provision in section 208 that attempts to deal with it. Maybe
you feel it is adequate or inadequate.
Dr. Murch. Yes, sir. I actually was on the committee that
is strengthening forensic science in the United States, and I
actually wrote the somewhat limited treatment of forensic
science in homeland security. Really by design that study was
limited to a very short section.
I believe very strongly--very strongly--that forensic
science in homeland security--nay, the Department of Homeland
Security--must be aligned with the directions and expectation
that forensic science in general is having laid on it. Those
provisions in the legislation by the Senate--that is being
worked in the Senate Judiciary Committee right now, taking on
the recommendations of the strengthening of forensic science--
should be applied to homeland security. Homeland security is
not special just because it is labeled homeland security. So I
think an overlay of that kind of treatment would be helpful.
In addition, it has to extend to those special disciplines
that are somewhat unique in homeland security--bioforensics,
nuclear forensics. I actually was also on the committee at the
National academies that has finished up a study on America's
nuclear forensic capability, and that study should be out soon.
So it is more embracing. It is more encompassing. It is not
simply the role to include innovation, being creative, but also
performance in the Department as it stands now.
Mr. Pascrell. If I may, Madam Chairwoman?
Have all of you seen the draft of how we broke down this
legislation according to the 13 different departments that are
affected? Have you all seen that and how each of those
departments fall under those major areas, as Mr. Austria was
pointing out the major emphasis on prevention and deterrence
and preparedness?
This was a guideline for us to whenever we got off into the
clouds, you know, to bring us back down to Earth, because you
are dealing with multiple departments here. You are trying to
get them coordinated, which is something new for us, you know.
You know, in the words of George Kennan when he was talking
about this great democracy, it needs its tail whacked once in a
while so that there is movement and progress forward, rather
than simply words and words and words.
I am very, very, very glad that we did this this way so
that we have proper references to the specific 13
recommendations that were made by the WMD Commission. We are
going--well, probably as the Chairwoman will say in a few
moments, we will keep the record open for any, you know,
direction that you folks want to give to us. I really want to
thank the panel.
I want to thank the Chair of this committee. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
We have been joined by the Chairman of the full committee,
Mr. Thompson, and without objection the Chairman's full
statement will be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
Today, our Nation is facing a number of different challenges--
challenges which demand a great deal of attention. There are those who
say that we should just concentrate on cleaning up the oil spill in the
Gulf, or supporting our military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, or
getting our economy back on track.
Even in the face of these seemingly overwhelming challenges, we
cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the ever-present terrorist threat.
The attempted Times Square and Christmas Day attacks certainly
underscore the need to stay vigilant.
We also need to avoid the ``failures in imagination'' that the 9/11
Commission identified prior to that devastating attack. Now, more than
ever, we have to address emerging terrorist threats--because our
enemies are constantly coming up with innovative ways to attack this
Nation.
That's why H.R. 5498--the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of
2010--is so important. With this bipartisan bill, we are telling our
enemies that we are taking steps right now to prevent, deter, prepare
for, detect, attribute, respond to, and recover from a WMD attack.
By taking this comprehensive approach--addressing homeland
security, intelligence, public health, and foreign affairs matters--
H.R. 5498 puts us in better stead to counter the WMD threat before
another attack occurs.
The bipartisan WMD Commission--with its reports and testimony
before this committee--has warned us that unless we ``act with great
urgency,'' a WMD terrorist event will occur somewhere in the world by
2013, and that such an event would most likely be a biological attack.
In response, with H.R. 5498, we address the WMD threat in general
and the biological threat specifically. The bill has the support of the
WMD Commission, but we need more than that.
We need the cooperation of our colleagues on the Hill to help us
swiftly pass this bill and deliver it to the President for his
signature. As the WMD Commission has pointed out, we cannot afford to
allow turf battles and fights over jurisdiction to keep us from doing
the right thing by better securing our Nation against the threat of
WMD.
Ms. Clarke. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman
from Mississippi, the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Thompson,
for questions.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman.
I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses.
I think that the two key points--first of all, Mr.
Pascrell, I would like to thank you and Mr. King for your
leadership on bringing this bill forward. It is the right thing
to do. Everybody said it should have been done in the past, and
we have not made it happen.
But there are a couple of comments, Dr. Beatrice. In your
experience have you found that the Federal Government does a
decent job of sharing the threat information to the State and
locals? I understand Mr. Austria here talked a little bit about
it. But I am trying to reinforce why this bill is so important
that we really--if we have not done a good job, then this is an
opportunity to do it. I would like your opinion again for the
record.
Dr. Beatrice. Unfortunately, I do not believe the Federal
Government has done a good job in information sharing in this
area. As I said in my testimony, there are times when it is
very important for the public health infrastructure to be aware
of what bioagents are in place, not only where bioagents are in
place, but the quality of the biosafety programs that are
available in both academic institutions and other institutions
within the jurisdiction of the public health organizations so
that we can outreach to them, ensure that the appropriate steps
are in place, know what agents might be at risk.
We know that accidental exposure can result in a rather
massive need for public health response, and yet we do not know
how and where that response may be needed. Therefore, the
public health community cannot prepare plans in advance and
work with our partners in our locales. This information is
available in the Federal Government and is not being shared.
Mr. Thompson. So basically, I think one of the provisions
of this bill would mandate that. So clearly, from the initial
sponsor of the bill, I am sure that was our intent, because so
many times when situations happen, sometimes the State and
locals are the first people on the scene, and they need to have
access to whatever information that is available.
Another aspect of this is that with the 9/11 Act, we
authorized the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. Dr.
Kadlec, can you give this committee your opinion as to whether
or not there has been a real use of this entity?
Dr. Kadlec. Sir, I would just say briefly that it has been
a great idea that has not lived up to the expectations. Quite
frankly, I think that challenge has been to basically get the
interagency to contribute to it, because in the end it really
is the assimilation of all data, this integration that may
exist in public health, that may exist in the medical
community, may exist from environmental sampling, and may exist
from a variety of sources that would be brought together and
evaluated collectively.
Quite frankly, it has been a historical challenge to have
the different agencies come to the table to do that.
Mr. Thompson. So as long as it is sort of a voluntary, come
if you please effort, the participation is severely lacking.
Dr. Kadlec. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Thompson. So how would you suggest that Members of
Congress fix that?
Dr. Kadlec. Well, sir, I think by mandating it, No. 1,
mandating the entity and mandating the participation of the
appropriate agencies to participate as part of it. In some ways
it was what you said, sir--you know, come if you please.
This is such a critical issue, and I think the recent
events, not only through the H1N1 pandemic, indicated that
situational awareness is kind of like the fog of war. I mean,
it really does affect the ability of senior policymakers and
responders to act in a timely fashion, where even in the Gulf
spill we know that we have suffered from the imperfect
exchanging of information.
So as much as the information resides in the Federal
Government, it does reside in the private sector and the public
sector that really requires their participation as well.
Mr. Thompson. I thank you, because another one of the
points in this bill is that we mandate that those agencies
participate. So again, we are trying to fix the shortcomings of
some things that clearly we thought would work voluntarily.
Last point on that--do you think that we should move that
center out of the Office of Health Affairs at DHS, or have you
looked at it in any----
Dr. Kadlec. Sir, I am somewhat agnostic to the idea. I
think the fact of the matter is that need strong leadership. It
needs to be in a place where the business is information
sharing. I think in the case that you have identified within
the area of DHS that does information sharing and intelligence
analysis, that may be a better place.
Certainly, it has not lived up to what it was supposed to
be in the past, so clearly, there is opportunity, I think, for
a little bit of experimentation, but it really does require a
fair bit of oversight. Obviously, it has your attention, sir,
and that should go a long way.
Mr. Thompson. Good answer.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions. The Members of the
subcommittee may have additional questions for you as
witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing
to those questions.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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