[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
LAYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE TASK AHEAD: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2010
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Serial No. 111-65
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emmanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, U.S. Virgin Islands
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dana Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Al Green, Texas Daniel E. Lungren, California
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Tamla T. Scott, Director & Counsel
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Michael Russell, Senior Counsel
Kerry Kinirons, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 1
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 2
Witnesses
Ms. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Dr. James Carafano, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director,
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies,
The Heritage Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
For the Record
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight:
DHS Jurisdictional Chart....................................... 4
LAYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE TASK AHEAD: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW
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Thursday, April 29, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher P.
Carney [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Carney, Pascrell, Green, and
Bilirakis.
Mr. Carney [presiding]. The Subcommittee on Management,
Investigations, and Oversight will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Laying the Framework for the Task Ahead: An Examination of
the Department of Homeland Security's Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review.''
Good morning. I would like to welcome everyone here today.
I would especially like to thank Deputy Secretary Lute for
participating in today's hearing. I am sure this will be a much
more constructive hearing because of her testimony.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the Department of
Homeland Security's completion of its first Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review, or QHSR. This subcommittee has held a
hearing and multiple briefings on the topic in both the 110th
and 111th Congresses.
I know that myself, the Ranking Member, and all Members of
this subcommittee took a particular interest in the QHSR
because we recognize how instrumental it is in shaping homeland
security policy and guiding the Department toward a better
protection of our country.
We will examine the Department's process for completing the
QHSR, its plans for implementing the new policies contained
within the document, and whether the final product meets
legislative requirements.
The QHSR is a comprehensive assessment outlining the long-
term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance
on the Department's programs, assets, capabilities, budget,
policies, and authorities.
According to statute, the first QHSR was required to be
submitted to Congress by December 31, 2009. However, it wasn't
until February 1, 2010--over a month after the required date--
that the Committee on Homeland Security received the QHSR.
The most frustrating thing about that missed deadline was
that, for a year-and-a-half prior to the deadline, this
subcommittee had repeatedly asked the Department if it was
going to be on time and if it needed more personnel or more
funding. We were consistently told the Department had
everything it needed to produce an on-time, quality product. We
now know that was not the case.
The 9/11 Act specifically delineates the information that
is required to be included in the QHSR, yet some of the
statutorily mandated items were not included in the QHSR.
Missing was a description of the interagency cooperation,
preparedness of Federal response assets, infrastructure, a
budget plan, and other elements of the homeland security
program.
An assessment of the organizational alignment of the
Department with the applicable National homeland security
strategy was also not included. Missing, too, was a discussion
of the status of cooperation among Federal agencies in the
effort to promote National homeland security.
There was no discussion of the status of cooperation
between the Federal Government and State, local, and Tribal
governments in preventing terrorist attacks and preparing for
emergency response to threats to National homeland security.
This is wholly unacceptable. These items were statutorily
mandated to be included in the QHSR. They were not suggestions,
and they were not optional. The lack of guidance on these items
undercuts our National security.
I am anxiously awaiting the release of the Bottom Up
Review. I was first told by the Department that the BUR, the B-
U-R, would be released in late March. Then I was told early
April, and then late April. I will be very interested in
hearing today whether the Department has set a date for the
release of the BUR.
Much of the information that was included in the BUR was
supposed to have been delivered in the QHSR almost 5 months
ago. The BUR is not a statutorily mandated report; the QHSR
was. It is my sincere hope that the next QHSR will be a
complete product that doesn't require a follow-on review to
complement it and excuses as to why it was not released on
time.
I would like to thank the witnesses for their
participation, and I do look forward to their testimony.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from Florida, my friend, Mr. Bilirakis, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it very
much.
Good morning. I am pleased that the subcommittee is meeting
today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's first
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
I must start by expressing my disappointment with the
Department's delay in transmitting the QHSR to Congress.
Despite repeated bipartisan inquiries into whether the
Department had sufficient time and resources to complete the
review and assurances from the Department that it would be
completed on time, the QHSR was over a month late and certainly
fell short of the statutory requirements of the Implementing
Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act.
Secretary Lute, it is for this reason that I am interested
in hearing more about the Department's progress in completing
its Bottom Up Review, which will contain the programmatic and
budgetary information that I believe should have been included
in the QHSR, in accordance with the 9/11 Act.
I would also like to discuss the QHSR in the context of the
President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department
of Homeland Security. In a February 8 CQ Homeland Security
article, Assistant Secretary for Policy David Heyman stated,
``We certainly had this strategic framework in mind when we
constructed the [fiscal 2011] budget.'' Yet in many instances,
the QHSR contains statements contradictory to the President's
fiscal year 2011 budget request.
The QHSR states that we must achieve effective control of
the physical borders and approaches to the United States, a
point on which we agree, Madam Secretary. Why, then, doesn't
the budget request include the funding for CBP to add any
additional miles of effective control in fiscal year 2011, and
why does it cut $225 million for fencing and technology along
the border?
I can give you more examples of ways in which the QHSR and
budget request conflict, but I will address them during my
questioning. In addition, I am interested in hearing about the
lessons learned from this QHSR process that can be applied as
the next QHSR is drafted.
Last, but certainly not least, while we are looking at the
task ahead, as suggested by the hearing's title, I strongly
agree with Dr. Carafano's comments in his written statement
about the immediate need for Congress to consolidate
jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security. The
Department is currently reporting to more than 100
Congressional committees and subcommittees, as you can see from
this chart on the monitors.
We have heard this recommendation time and time again from
many notable sources, including the 9/11 Commission and the WMD
Commission. I know this is an issue on which we agree, Mr.
Chairman, and I hope Members of this committee will work
together to take this very important step.
After all, the Department won't truly be able to accomplish
the goals set forth in the QHSR if it is continuously
distracted from its mission by the current broken oversight
system.
With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses, and I
look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Carney. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I welcome both of our witnesses. Our first witness is the
deputy secretary for homeland security, Ms. Jane Holl Lute.
Deputy Secretary Lute has over 30 years of military and senior
executive experience in the United States Government and is at
the heart of efforts to prevent and resolve international
crises.
Ms. Lute served as assistant secretary general of the
United Nations, responsible for support to peacekeeping
operations. In this capacity, she managed operational support
for the second-largest deployed military presence in the world.
At the United Nations, Ms. Lute led rapid response support
to a variety of operations and crises in some of the most
remote, austere, and dangerous environments in the world. She
also effectively directed the growth of United Nations
peacekeeping support from $1.8 billion to nearly $8 billion of
operations annually.
Most recently, Ms. Lute led the United Nations initiative
designed to coordinate efforts and build sustainable peace in
countries emerging from violent conflict. Prior to joining the
United Nations, Ms. Lute served on the National Security
Council staff under both President George H.W. Bush and
President William Jefferson Clinton.
Ms. Lute has a distinguished career in the United Nations
Army, including serving in the gulf during Operation Desert
Storm. Ms. Lute has a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford
University and a J.D. from Georgetown University.
Our second witness is Dr. James Carafano. Dr. Carafano, one
of the Nation's leading experts in defense National homeland
security, directs Heritage's Douglas and Sarah Allison Center
for Foreign Policy Studies.
In August 2009, Dr. Carafano was promoted to director of
the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, as well as to
deputy director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies.
Dr. Carafano, a 25-year veteran of the Army, manages day-
to-day research and program activities of the Allison Center,
in addition to overseeing the centers and projects at the Davis
Institute.
Before joining Heritage, he served 25 years in the U.S.
Army, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and was head
speechwriter for the Army chief of staff, the service's
highest-ranking officer. Dr. Carafano has also served as an
assistant professor at the U.S. military academy in West Point
and is currently a visiting professor at the National Defense
University and Georgetown University.
He is the author or co-author of numerous books, including
``Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating
Terrorism and Preserving Freedom,'' and the textbook ``Homeland
Security,'' which was designed as a practical introduction to
everyday life in the era of terrorism.
Dr. Carafano is a graduate of West Point. He holds a
master's degree and doctorate from Georgetown University, as
well as a master's in strategy from the U.S. Army War College.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize a
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Deputy Secretary Lute.
STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Lute. Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis,
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you today.
I am pleased to discuss the administration and our Nation's
first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the QHSR, that
the Department of Homeland Security submitted to Congress on
February 1 of this year.
Even nearly 8 years since 9/11 and 6 years since the
creation of the Department, questions regarding homeland
security--what is it, how is the homeland best secured, and
what does it mean to be prepared--still echo widely among
homeland security stakeholders.
The QHSR is a major step for our Department. It sets forth
a vision and framework to help answer these central questions
and shape the strategic direction of the Department and of
homeland security for the next 4 years.
As we have briefed Congress--as we have briefed
stakeholders in the homeland security enterprise, we see the
completion of the QHSR and the submission of the report as step
No. 1 of a three-step process. Step No. 2 is, Mr. Chairman, as
you noted, the Bottom Up Review, an exercise designed to
examine the Department from the activity level up to align our
programmatic activities and organizational structure with the
missions and goals that were identified in the QHSR.
Once completed and our work in the Department is completed,
the BUR will inform step No. 3, which is our budget building
process for fiscal year 2012 and for the 2012-2016 future years
FYHSP.
Let me mention just a few key concepts that we articulate
in the QHSR. First, the QHSR lays out a positive, forward-
looking vision for homeland security. What does it mean to have
a secure homeland? It means that we are trying to create a
safe, secure, resilient place where the American way of life
can thrive. We also discuss the concept of homeland security as
an enterprise, and we do this in order to capture the
collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal,
State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and
private-sector partners.
Mr. Chairman, I have spent my entire career in National
security, and there is a big difference between National
security and homeland security, and this--the QHSR recognizes
that difference, but also recognizes the essential connection
between the two.
In the QHSR, we identify what we see as the three pillars
for the foundation of homeland security: Security itself,
protecting the United States and its people, vital interests,
and way of life; resilience, fostering individual, community
and system robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid
recovery; and customs and exchange, that is, expediting and
enforcing lawful trades, travel, and immigration.
Finally, the QHSR grounds homeland security in five mission
sets, and we believe these mission sets are essential to
achieving the vision of a safe and secure and resilient
homeland protected from terrorism and other hazards where the
American way of life can thrive. Those missions are preventing
terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our
borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws, and
safeguarding security in--safeguarding and securing cyberspace,
and, finally, ensuring resilience to disasters.
The QHSR was produced with lessons in mind from the past 7
years with the lessons learned from the QDR process, which has
a much longer history than the QHSR, and with the very broad
input of literally thousands of individuals from across this
country, from Government, private, and nonprofit sectors, and
communities Nation-wide. We are proud of that accomplishment,
and we can be confident that the homeland security enterprise
will strengthen and mature over the next 4 years with a clear
sense of purpose and common understanding of the mission at
hand.
As you have noted, Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my full
statement for the record, and as well as a copy of the QHSR.* I
look forward to addressing the committee--the questions that
you and the committee may have.
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* The QHSR is available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
qhsr_report.pdf and has been retained in committee files.
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Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Lute follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jane Holl Lute
April 29, 2010
Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the recently completed Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
(QHSR).
The QHSR represents the most comprehensive strategic assessment of
homeland security to date, and it has set forth a vision and framework
that will shape the strategic direction of homeland security for the
next 4 years and guide all homeland security stakeholders toward common
goals and objectives. Today, I'd like to describe the major findings
and results of the QHSR, outline the approach we took in executing the
review, and articulate some of the lessons learned along the way that
we hope will inform the next QHSR.
Secretary Napolitano and I are particularly proud of the
substantive and consistent engagement with our Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and non-Governmental partners that produced this first QHSR.
This robust collaboration added immeasurable value to the analysis and
reinforced a foundational theme of the review that I will address
shortly--that homeland security is a vast enterprise which extends well
beyond just the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), leveraging
capabilities and capacities that reside across all levels of
government, the private and non-Governmental sectors, and among the
communities and citizens of this country.
introduction
As the subcommittee is aware, Section 2401 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 amends Title VII of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the Secretary of Homeland
Security to conduct a QHSR every 4 years beginning in 2009. Congress
was clear that the QHSR should delineate a homeland security strategy,
including an outline of priority mission areas. The QHSR legislation
also sought to better understand the resource and organizational
implications of a new strategic view of homeland security. What we
quickly discovered, however, was that any articulation of strategy or
analysis of specific programmatic or resource tradeoffs--either within
DHS or across the broader homeland security enterprise--had to be
firmly rooted within a comprehensive understanding of homeland
security. This understanding remained somewhat elusive, as questions
like: ``What is homeland security?''; ``How is the homeland best
secured?''; and, ``What does it mean to be prepared?'' still echoed
widely among homeland security stakeholders 8 years after 9/11.
To that end, the submission of the QHSR Report to Congress on Feb.
1, 2010 marked an important first step in a multi-step process to
examine and address fundamental issues that concern homeland security.
The QHSR describes the Nation's homeland security interests, identifies
the critical homeland security enterprise missions, and ultimately
defines a strategic approach to those missions by laying out the
principal goals, essential objectives, and key strategic outcomes
necessary for that strategic approach to succeed. A bottom-up review
(BUR) of the Department of Homeland Security was initiated in November
2009 as an immediate follow on and complement to the Congressionally
mandated QHSR, with the aim of aligning DHS' programmatic activities
and organizational structure with the broader mission sets and goals
identified in the QHSR. The BUR represents an intermediate substantive
follow-on step to the QHSR and the results will be reflected in the
President's 2012 budget submission and the DHS fiscal year 2012-2016
Future Years Homeland Security Program. These documents will propose
specific programmatic and resource adjustments.
It is also important to note that the QHSR is not an assessment of
the strategy, policy, or resource allocations of the Department of
Homeland Security. By no means was this an internal review of DHS or a
resource prioritization document. Rather, the QHSR was a strategic
analysis that is already serving as a basis for a deeper review of the
full range of homeland security enterprise missions.
qhsr results
The QHSR has resulted in a new strategic framework and a positive,
forward-looking vision for homeland security: A homeland that is safe,
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where
American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive. The QHSR
acknowledges existing relationships, roles, and responsibilities, and
seeks to set forth a shared vision of homeland security in order to
achieve unity of purpose going forward.
As referenced in my introduction, the QHSR introduces the concept
of the homeland security enterprise to capture the collective efforts
and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, Tribal,
territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector partners--as well as
individuals, families, and communities--to maintain critical homeland
security capabilities. The term ``enterprise'' connotes a broad-based
community with a common interest in the public safety and well-being of
America and American society that is composed of multiple actors and
stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities are distributed and
shared.
Second, in conceptualizing a new strategic framework for the
homeland security enterprise, several conclusions or principles
provided necessary context. The QHSR takes a more comprehensive
approach to homeland security threats by expanding the focus of
homeland security to specifically address high-consequence weapons of
mass destruction; al-Qaeda and global violent extremism; mass cyber
attacks, intrusions, and disruptions; pandemics and natural disasters;
and illegal trafficking and related transnational crime.
Third, the QHSR identifies three key concepts essential to the
foundation of homeland security and relevant to all homeland security
activities:
Security: Protecting the United States and its people, vital
interests, and way of life;
Resilience: Fostering individual, community, and system
robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery;
Customs and Exchange: Expediting and enforcing lawful trade,
travel, and immigration.
All homeland security activities must be built upon a foundation of
ensuring security and resilience in the normal, daily activities of
society and interchange with the world.
Informed by these principles, the QHSR Strategic Framework grounds
homeland security in five missions and their associated goals and
objectives that more completely capture the universe of activities
required to achieve homeland security.
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This framework recognizes that all-hazards emergency management is
part of homeland security, and restores ``mitigating hazards'' as a
strategic aim for Ensuring Resilience to Disasters. In addition, the
framework acknowledges the vital importance of Enforcing and
Administering Immigration Laws and Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace
by elevating these efforts to core homeland security missions.
The QHSR also emphasizes the importance of maturing and
strengthening the homeland security enterprise in recognition of the
critically important functional capabilities that support the mission
priorities outlined above. The goals in this area include:
Enhance Shared Awareness of Risks and Threats;
Build Capable Communities;
Foster Unity of Effort;
Foster Innovative Approaches and Solutions Through Leading-
Edge Science and Technology.
qhsr structure and approach
As I indicated previously, the QHSR benefited from the constructive
engagement of thousands of dedicated individuals from across the
country and, indeed, around the globe, including the key officials of
DHS, the heads of other Federal agencies, and other relevant
governmental and nongovernmental entities, including State, local,
Tribal, and territorial governments, as well as the broader public at
large. Although numbers alone cannot capture the depth and vibrancy of
the debates and discussions that occurred throughout the process of
preparing the QHSR, the process engaged more than 100 stakeholder
associations and several hundred experts from government at all levels,
as well as academia and the private sector. Our on-line National
Dialogues had over 20,000 visits, with over 3,000 comments submitted.
The core of the QHSR approach was the formation of seven study
groups that consisted of over 200 participants from 42 DHS
directorates, components, and offices. The study groups were each led
by a DHS official and facilitated by an independent subject-matter
expert, both of whom ensured that all viewpoints were aired and that
divergent opinions were brought forward. The study groups conducted
their analyses over a 5-month period, and consistently shared work
products with the other stakeholder groups via multiple collaboration
processes.
A Steering Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Policy (Strategic Plans) and consisting of the leads and facilitators
of each study group, ensured consistency and integration across the
review and raised issues for leadership consideration. At the
conclusion of the study group deliberation period, I convened more than
a dozen senior leadership meetings to review and reach concurrence on
study group recommendations. Final decisions on the recommendations
reflected Departmental acknowledgement of the major themes around which
the QHSR report was written.
DHS also worked closely and consistently with the White House,
National Security Staff and other Federal departments and agencies to
refine the QHSR and ensure consistency with National strategy and other
major security reviews, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and
the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Key mechanisms for
interagency coordination included six special sub-Interagency Policy
Committees established by the National Security Staff to provide a
forum for interagency input on study group work products, and a
Strategy Coordination Group which provided strategy and policy planners
from across the Government an opportunity to share perspectives and
provide feedback throughout the process. Congress was kept apprised of
QHSR status and process through testimony by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Policy (Strategic Plans) at the outset of the review, and
through 17 briefings to Congressional staff, including multiple
briefings to staff of the House Homeland Security Committee, the Senate
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, and the House and
Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security, as well as
briefings to staff of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the
House Judiciary Committee, the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, the Senate Commerce Committee, and the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
To ensure the broadest possible outreach to critical State, local,
and Tribal partners as well as the general public, the Secretary of
Homeland Security invited 118 homeland security stakeholder
organizations representing State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-
Governmental, and private-sector interests, to submit papers and other
materials relating to the QHSR study areas at the outset of the review.
Over 40 position papers were received and disseminated to study groups,
and these papers helped to frame and inform their deliberations. This
early engagement of homeland security stakeholders at the beginning of
the review process was a critical element of the QHSR.
Second, in a groundbreaking initiative, DHS held three on-line,
collaborative ``National Dialogue on the QHSR'' sessions to capture the
direct input and perspectives of a wide array of participants across
the homeland security enterprise. The National dialogues were open to
anyone who wanted to provide input on QHSR content, although DHS
engaged in deliberate outreach to several hundred organizations with
interests in homeland security. As I stated earlier, over the course of
three dialogues, more than 20,000 visits were logged, resulting in over
3,000 comments on study group material. National dialogue comments and
content ratings were provided to the study groups who used the
information to inform their iterative deliberations throughout the
analytic period of the review. Revised study group materials were
posted on each subsequent dialogue, demonstrating how materials evolved
over the course of the review and showing participants how their
comments informed study group work.
Last, the Secretary convened the leadership of ten key stakeholder
associations that are broadly representative of State, local, Tribal,
and territorial governments to form a ``virtual'' QHSR Executive
Committee.\1\ DHS held monthly teleconferences with the Executive
Committee throughout the analytic phase of the review to keep these
organizations appraised of review progress. These organizations also
participated in the collaborative events DHS held throughout the
review, such as Secretary Napolitano's call for comment at the
beginning of the review and the three National Dialogue sessions.
Finally, on Nov. 19, 2009, Secretary Napolitano met in person with
leadership representatives of the Executive Committee organizations to
share key findings and recommendations of the QHSR. This in-person
meeting provided key stakeholder organizations the opportunity to
comment on QHSR findings and recommendations in a similar manner to,
and at a similar time as, Federal department and agency leadership.
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\1\ The Executive Committee consisted of the leaders of the
following organizations: The National Governors Association, the
Council of State Governments, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the
National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, the
National Council of State Legislatures, the National Congress of
American Indians, the International City/County Management Association,
the National Emergency Management Association, and the International
Association of Emergency Managers.
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lessons learned and next steps
As we look toward the next QHSR, I would like to share with you a
few lessons learned. First, future Quadrennial Reviews should not be
conducted in transition years. Senior leadership engagement and support
is critical to any planning process of this scale, and the timeline of
the transition process creates significant challenges in the critically
important conceptualization and launch phases of a review. Based on the
foundation set by the 2009 QHSR, the next QHSR will involve significant
analytics during both the preparatory and early phases of the review,
which must be conducted with full buy-in and awareness of senior
leadership.
In addition, the other major quadrennial reviews, including the
Quadrennial Defense Review and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review, among others, must be synchronized. Today's security
environment demands whole of Government solutions and flexible and
adaptable policy responses to difficult challenges. Quadrennial reviews
offer an important opportunity to pause and ensure the strategy is
right and the organization is aligned. We must find ways to do this in
a way that meaningfully leverages the knowledge of each relevant
department and agency, as well as stakeholders beyond the Federal
Government.
Last, though the QHSR succeeded in breaking down bureaucratic and
other barriers to large-scale engagement with the public, there is
still more we can do. The technology and the tools are there for
Government to significantly enhance representative policymaking and we
must facilitate the use of such tools across the Government.
conclusion
The QHSR has been an incredibly valuable endeavor, both for the
results I've outlined here today, as well as the path we took in
getting here. It has already generated significant follow-on analysis
and examination within DHS, including the results of the BUR that will
be reflected in the 2012 President's budget submission, and other
important efforts to improve DHS strategic management and analysis. We
can be confident that the homeland security enterprise will proceed
over the next 4 years with a clear sense of purpose and a common
understanding of the mission at hand.
I look forward to addressing any questions that you may have. Thank
you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Ms. Lute.
Dr. Carafano for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF JAMES CARAFANO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE KATHRYN AND
SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND
DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Carafano. Thank you, sir.
I am deeply honored to be here, and I am very excited. I
think that this is a real opportunity. I think the Department
has produced a document that lays the foundation for a positive
and constructive--and maybe contentious--but a healthy and
useful dialogue between the Congress and the Department.
I mentioned three areas of observations and comments in my
statement. The first of those was analytics, and analytics is
basically, how do you decide what is really important to look
at, what is a big issue, and then how do you decide what is the
right way to analyze that issue and then use that data?
My observation there is, I think we can simply go a lot
farther. I commend the Secretary and the deputy secretary for
taking this process very seriously. I watched this as a member
of the HSAC. They did give it the attention and leadership it
deserved, and I did see improvements over the course of the
year.
But I think there is an awful long way to go. There is
actually a fair amount of capacity already existent that the
Department can harness in both the FFRDCs and the University of
Excellence program, but you have got to organize it and harness
it and be forward-looking in terms of thinking your problems
and then build additional capabilities.
I think QHSRs, to really be a strong, powerful document,
have to have powerful analytics behind them. You know, I think
we are just not there yet.
The second area that I focused on in my comments is on
enhancing the cooperation and the dialogue. How can we get the
most out of this QHSR process for the Congress and Department
to move forward together? That is two areas in there that I
want to particularly highlight.
One is Congressional oversight, which I think that this is
the most significant issue. The 9/11 Commission report stated
that this is a critical, vital issue, that you cannot have
dysfunctional and diffuse oversight of the Department and
expect to have it go forward in a strategic direction, and I
think that is an incredibly significant challenge.
When you look at the QHSR and you have tried to look
forward about how you can work on these things, it is just
very, very difficult to me to foresee with the current
oversight of the Congress and the--how we are going to be able
to move forward in an integrated and systematized matter.
The other point I noted in there was the position of under
secretary for policy and planning. I think there is a good
parallel here in DOD. There is a reason why DOD, whether you
like their QDR or not, whether they have a very demonstrably
effective QDR process, and why policy and strategy really do
drive the Department, and why there is a powerful link in that
Department between policy planning and budgeting, and a lot of
it has to do with the fact that the person that has the hot
button in terms of policy and planning process is that at the
appropriate level of leadership in the Department, and I think
that is simply important for the Department of Homeland
Security, as well.
The third area which I really think is what we really
should put the focus of our discussion is, there is a long
laundry list of here in the Department of things that need to
get done, and the Department I think rightly pointed in the
QHSR that the single-most important obligation or duty or thing
to go forward is to really build a National homeland security
enterprise.
It doesn't mean that Department of Homeland Security is
running everything, but it does mean that there is a community
of people that are looking after American citizens that bridges
Federal, State, local, Tribal, private sector, non-
Governmental, and even international partners. Building that
enterprise is an enormous challenge, and I listed some areas
that I would propose or the--you know, the things that have to
go to the top of the to-do list.
I will just run through those very quickly. The first one
of those, it was a response and resiliency, which I think are
very important topics, and what I would like to highlight for
the committee there is the administration is in the middle of
writing HSPD-7, HSPD-8. I think these are critical documents. I
think it is vitally important that the Department's leadership
role in the interagency process be appropriately recognized in
these documents, and if it is not, I think we are in real
trouble, particularly disturbed that--on the planning side.
The Department develops something called an integrated
planning system, never really got off the ground, and it is a
huge deficit. The fact that we don't have a way to have
coherent planning at all level--integrated at all levels of
governments is a serious problem. Quite frankly, I think we
have not made anywhere near the progress we need to do that.
I also talk a bit about international cooperation, which I
think, you know, we all think Department of Homeland Security
and we think internally, but, really, it is what the Department
does as a global leader that makes a difference. You are only
as strong as the weakest link, and virtually every aspect of
homeland security has an international dimension to it.
This is an area that we just haven't given appropriate
attention. At the end of the day, I think the Department needs
a toolset that looks a lot more like the Department of Defense.
We think of individual education and training, IMET program, or
other types of lend-lease programs and training programs. I
think the Department ought to look a lot more like that.
Counterterrorism, I think, is something also this committee
ought to take a serious look at. I don't think the Intelligence
Reorganization Act I don't think well served the Department. I
don't think its leadership role in counterterrorism and
intelligence was properly recognized.
I think there is an enormous amount of counterterrorism
capability within the Department that can be harnessed and
integrated with other Federal agencies. So I think that--and
stopping terrorist attacks, of course, should be our top
priority.
The last one is cyber. I commend the Department for putting
that one on the list. It is a tough one. My observation there
is, you know, we all--when we talk about cyber, we tend to talk
a lot about kind of foot soldiers, you know, more analysts, you
know, more of this, more of that.
You know, cyber has simply become something that has
transcended every element in our society. The problem with it
is we all haven't caught up.
In virtually every organization today, when somebody uses
the word ``computer'' or ``Internet,'' the COO says--turns to
the CIO and says, ``Take care of that.'' We are long past the
age when this is CIO business. This is leadership business.
Leaders at every level need to be cyber competent.
I think we tend not to put enough emphasis on human
capital, and particularly not enough evidence on training
leadership. I think that is where the party really needs to go.
We could debate whether these should be the top of the to-
do list, but I definitely think we would be ill-served if that
wasn't a very important part of our discussion. But thank you
again for having me, and I look very forward to hearing your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Carafano
April 29, 2010
My name is Dr. James Jay Carafano. I am the Deputy Director of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and
the Director of Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this
testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any
official position of The Heritage Foundation.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today
and address this vital subject. In my testimony today I would like to
address what I see as the key lessons from the process of conducting
the first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and what can be
done to enhance the oversight role of Congress and the dialogue between
the Legislative branch and the Department of Homeland Security. I will
focus my comments on: (1) Improving methods of analysis, (2) enhancing
cooperation with the Congress, and (3) establishing priorities for
implementation.
My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising
all the foundation's research on public policy concerning foreign
policy and National security. Homeland security has been a particular
Heritage research priority. The foundation produced the first major
assessment of domestic security after 9/11.\1\ Over the past 9 years we
have assembled a robust, talented, and dedicated research team. I have
had the honor and privilege of leading them for over 8 years. Heritage
analysts have studied and written authoritatively on virtually every
aspect of homeland security and homeland defense. The results of all
our research are publicly available on the Heritage Web site at
www.heritage.org. We collaborate frequently with the homeland security
research community, including: The Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), the Aspen Institute, the Center for
National Policy, the Hudson Institute, the George Washington University
Homeland Security Policy Institute, and the Strategic Studies Institute
and Center for Strategic Leadership at the Army War College. Heritage
analysts also serve on a variety of Government advisory efforts,
including task forces under the Homeland Security Advisory Council and
Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of
Civil Authorities. Our research programs are non-partisan, dedicated to
developing policy proposals that will keep the Nation safe, free, and
prosperous.
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\1\ L. Paul Bremer III and Edwin Meese III, Defending the American
Homeland: A Report of the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task
Force (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2002).
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call to action
In 2004 David Heyman, who headed the Homeland Security program at
CSIS (and who now is assistant secretary for policy at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security), and I led a research project that
produced ``DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,''
the first comprehensive review of the newly established Department of
Homeland Security.\2\ One of the key steps we proposed for implementing
the recommendations in the report was that ``Congress should establish
a requirement for DHS to conduct quadrennial reviews . . .'' \3\ The
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
established the requirement for this review.\4\
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\2\ James Jay Carafano and David Heyman, ``DHS 2.0 Rethinking the
Department of Homeland Security,'' Heritage Foundation Special Report,
SR-02, December 13, 2004, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/
2004/12/DHS-20-Rethinking-the-Department-of-Homeland-Security.
\3\ James Jay Carafano, testimony before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Government Affairs, January 25, 2005 at
www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/Before-the-Senate-Committee-on-
Homeland-Security-and-Government-Affairs.
\4\ Jena Baker McNeill, ``The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review:
A Vital Tool for the Obama Administration,'' Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2215, December 12, 2008, at http://s3.amazonaws.com/
thf_media/2008/pdf/bg2215.pdf.
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I had an opportunity to observe the process of conducting the
review as a member of the Department's Quadrennial Review Advisory
Committee. The committee met periodically with the management team
overseeing the review and the leadership of the Department through each
step of the process of determining the structure of the review, through
data collection and outreach, the assessment phase, and the production
of the final report.
The Department should be commended for the seriousness with which
it undertook the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) process.
When the Department of Defense undertook its first Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) in 1996, it had the advantage of being a standing
department with an almost 50-year history, a large support staff and a
well-developed set of analytical tools, strategies, and policies on
which to draw. DHS had none of these. Furthermore, it had undertaken
the review during the Department's first-ever transition in
Presidential leadership. Given all these conditions, completing a
thoughtful and relevant assessment that met statutory guidelines was a
real achievement. In addition, DHS should be commended in the
transparency that it allowed during the review, as well as its effort
to reach out to stakeholders.\5\
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\5\ While DHS should be commended for its outreach effort, the
process for prioritizing, gathering, assessing, and integrating
stakeholders was immature, inefficient, and of doubtful value. I
commend the recommendations of the report by a panel of the National
Academy of Public Administration which analyzed the outreach effort.
See, Franklin, S. Reader, et al. ``The National Dialogue on the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,'' National Academy of Public
Administration, April 2010, at www.napawash.org/pc_management_studies/
DHS/QHSR/QHSRFinalReport.pdf (April 25, 2010).
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As a result of the Department's effort Congress has a document that
can serve as a basis for dialogue on our National homeland security
enterprise. To me the report suggests a clear ``to-do list'' for both
the administration and the Congress. Three items should top the agenda.
no. 1 improve methods of analysis
One clear limitation of the QHSR was that the Department lacks a
methodology to identify issues and appropriate methods of analysis to
address them as well as sufficient analytical tools to undertake the
analysis.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For more on this issue see James Jay Carafano, ``Thinking the
Future,'' The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International
Relations (Summer/Fall 2009), pp. 27-38, at www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/
Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-
A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=112018 (April 25, 2010).
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Homeland security presents a uniquely challenging set of public
policy issues. The National homeland security enterprise is a vast,
complex system that includes a vast array of Federal, State, local,
Tribal, private sector, community, non-governmental, and international
entities.\7\ A system is ``any set of regularly interacting factors and
activities that has definable boundaries and that produces measurable
outputs.''\8\ The complexity of a system is determined by the number
and diversity of interacting components. When systems become overly
complex, their behavior cannot be easily predicted by traditional
methods of analysis (breaking a system into its component parts and
analyzing elements in detail).\9\ These systems are described as
complex ``non-linear.'' Non-linear environments make it extremely
difficult to map the cause and effect between variables. Indeed, in
such environments isolating independent variables (a single factor that
can be manipulated that will drive the behavior of the whole system)
may be impossible. In a complex system, elements are so interconnected
and their relationship so multifaceted that their properties cannot be
properly understood without assessing their interrelationship with each
other as well as their relationship with the wider system and its
environment. Many homeland security challenges require mastering an
understanding of complex, non-linear systems.\10\
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\7\ David Heyman and James Jay Carafano, ``Homeland Security 3.0:
Building a National Enterprise to Keep America Safe, Free, and
Prosperous,'' The Heritage Foundation and the Center for International
and Strategic Studies,
\8\ Richard L. Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security
Affairs: New Methods for a New Era (Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 2006), p. 218.
\9\ L.A.N. Amaral and J.M. Ottino, ``Complex Networks: Augmenting
the Framework for the Study of Complex Systems,'' The European Physical
Journal, May 14, 2004, at amaral.northwestern.edu/Publications/Papers/
Amaral-2004-Eur.Phys.J.B-38-147.pdf (April 13, 2009).
\10\ Yaneer Bar-Yam, ``Multiscale Representation Phase I,'' New
England Complex Systems Institute, August 1, 2001, at www.necsi.edu/
projects/yaneer/SSG_NECSI_1_CROP.pdf (April 13, 2009); James Jay
Carafano and Richard Weitz, ``Complex Systems Analysis: A Necessary
Tool for Homeland Security,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
2261, April 16, 2009, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/
bg2261.cfm.
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QHSR findings would have greatly benefited from robust analytical
complex systems analysis. There are several areas where the lack of
analytical capacity is clearly apparent.
Defense Support to Civil Authorities.--Military support to
civil authorities for homeland security missions is vital. Yet,
DHS still lacks the capacity to develop requirements for this
support. As a result, an opportunity was lost to link the
analysis done in the Defense Department's QDR with the QHSR.
This had immediate and detrimental impact. The QDR cut the
number of specially trained and equipped forces prepared to
respond to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and
high explosive attacks by almost 20 percent. The Pentagon,
however, is pushing forward with realignment plans by
decreasing the number of Consequence Management Response Forces
(CCMRF) from three to one and moving personnel from two CCMRFs
to 10 smaller Homeland Response Forces in each of the FEMA
districts. The Pentagon claims this is a slight structural
realignment, but such an organizational change and personnel
decrease would have a major impact on the ability of the United
States to respond to a large-scale disaster by reducing the
sheer number of specially prepared, dedicated forces to such a
response.\11\ Meanwhile, the QHSR remained virtually silent on
military support requirements.
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\11\ Jena Baker McNeill, ``Quadrennial Defense Review's Homeland
Defense Realignment Leaves U.S. Less Prepared,'' Heritage Foundation
WebMemo No. 2865, April 15, 2010, at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/
2010/04/Quadrennial-Defense-Reviews-Homeland-Defense-Realignment-
Leaves-US-Less-Prepared (April 25, 2010); James Jay Carafano, ``Obama
is Unprepared for Disaster,'' Washington Examiner, March 29, 2010 at
www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Obama_s-U_S_-is-unprepared-
for-disaster-89360027.html (April 25, 2010).
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Immigration and Border Security.--The QHSR identifies
``Securing and Managing Our Borders'' and ``Enforcing and
Administering Our Immigration Laws'' as priority Departmental
missions. Together the border and commerce, transnational
criminal, and migration flows constitute a complex system.\12\
Yet, DHS lacks the capacity to analyze the border and migration
flows as an integrated system. The administration supports
legislation that would grant amnesty to the millions unlawfully
present in the United States, arguing this would enhance
Government's capacity to control the border, improve public
safety, grow the economy, and enforce immigration laws. When
this strategy was attempted in 1986, however, it utterly
failed. The QHSR provides no analytical basis for suggesting
why the system would not fail again in the same way. Nor did it
assess alternative strategies that might better address the
problem.\13\
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\12\ David B. Muhlhausen, Ph.D., ``Building a Better Border: What
the Experts Say,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1952, July 17,
2006, at www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/
61B2F37CAC2EEC388C2444D8BF5E892D.pdf. James Jay Carafano, ``Border
Security and State Safety and Security: Addressing Common Agendas'' in
Simon Hakim and Erwin A. Blackstone, eds., Safeguarding Homeland
Security: Governors and Mayors Speak Out (New York: Springer, 2009);
James Jay Carafano, ``Safeguarding America's Sovereignty: A `System of
Systems' Approach to Border Security,'' Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 1898, November 28, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/
Reports/2005/11/Safeguarding-Americas-Sovereignty-A-System-of-Systems-
Approach-to-Border-Security.
\13\ Edwin Meese III, James Jay Carafano, Matthew Spalding, and
Paul Rosenzweig, ``Alternatives to Amnesty: Proposals for Fair and
Effective Immigration Reform,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
1858, June 5, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2005/06/
Alternatives-to-Amnesty-Proposals-for-Fair-and-Effective-Immigration-
Reform.
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National Preparedness and National Risk.--The legislation
establishing the QHSR required DHS to assess National
preparedness. In addition, the QHSR established as a priority
``national-level homeland security risk assessments'' (p. 65).
These requirements seem intuitively valuable. In practice, they
would likely amount to little more than ``shelfware,'' studies
that have no meaningful application. There is no analytical
basis to determine if these assessments are achievable and
meaningful. Understanding risk and preparedness requires
context. There are so many variables in each kind and type
assessment, and they are so complex and different, that is
difficult to imagine how aggregating them would provide useful
insights into mitigating risks.\14\
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\14\ For an assessment of risk management see, James Jay Carafano,
testimony before the Sub-Committee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland Security United States
House of Representatives June 24, 2008, at homeland.house.gov/
SiteDocuments/20080625151302-26534.pdf (April 25, 2010).
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recommendations
Congress and DHS should work together to address the shortfalls in
the Department's analytical capabilities.
Congress should demand an action plan.--DHS must have a
program to institutionalize multidisciplinary analysis,
including expertise in complex systems analysis in the National
homeland security enterprise.\15\
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\15\ James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, ``Complex Systems
Analysis: A Necessary Tool for Homeland Security,'' Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 2261, April 16, 2009, at www.heritage.org/Research/
Reports/2009/04/Complex-Systems-Analysis-A-Necessary-Tool-for-Homeland-
Security.
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DHS should integrate complex systems analysis into a net
assessment office.--Net assessment, a widely used tool within
the intelligence community, complements and contributes to
complex systems analysis. Net assessment is based on the
understanding that all National security challenges are a
series of actions and counteractions between competitors. The
purpose of examining these actions and counteractions is to
assess how these competitions could develop in the future. The
Department of Homeland Security has considered establishing an
Office of Net Assessment within its policy and planning
directorate. This office should include developing expertise in
employing complex systems analysis to develop policy
recommendations.\16\
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\16\ James Jay Carafano, Frank J. Cilluffo, Richard Weitz, and Jan
Lane, ``Stopping Surprise Attacks: Thinking Smarter About Homeland
Security,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2026, April 23, 2007,
at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2026.cfm (April 13,
2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS should add complex systems analysis to the Homeland
Security Professional Development Program.--Homeland security
needs the foundation of a professional development system that
will provide the cadre of leaders required to meet the demands
of the 21st Century. This foundation must include education,
training assignments, and accreditation tools that can help
develop professionals for homeland security and other critical
interagency National security activities. Developing expertise
in critical systems and multidisciplinary analysis should be a
core component of any professional development curriculum. The
government should have a ``brick and mortar'' homeland security
university dedicated to teaching these and other essential
National security management, leadership, and decision-making
skills.\17\
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\17\ James Jay Carafano, ``Missing Pieces in Homeland Security:
Interagency Education, Assignments, and Professional Accreditation,''
Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 1013, October 16, 2006, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/em1013.cfm (April 25, 2010).
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no. 2 enhance cooperation with congress
One clear advantage of conducting the QHSR in the first year of the
administration is that it allows the Secretary to undertake a through
strategic assessment and use the review to help establish long-term
goals as well as engage the Congress on the most critical homeland
security priorities. In order for this effort to be as efficient and
effective as possible, a permanent QHSR office must be established and
maintained to undertake preparatory efforts, including working with the
Congress on determining the statutory requirements for the report;
conducting long-term analytical studies to support QHSR analysis; and
coordinating with the interagency community and State, local, Tribal,
private sector, and international partners. Having this office in place
and conducting the long-term preparations for the QHSR would
significantly reduce the time and effort required for a new
administration to undertake a review during its first year.
The QHSR should also be seen as an on-going process that includes
not only developing statutory reporting requirements, but also
consultation during the review process and after the report is
delivered. The review can and should be the premier instrument for
strategic dialogue with the Congress, but established procedures for
systematic consultation should be implemented and maintained during the
years before and after the submission of the report. A permanent QHSR
office could best facilitate this activity.
recommendations
Congress can also take additional actions to ensure that the
dialogue between the DHS and other Federal agencies and the Legislative
branch is improved. Congress should:
Consolidate jurisdiction over DHS into single committees in
each chamber.--Congress cannot serve as effective partner in
assessing and implementing the QHSR as long as oversight of DHS
remains fractured and diffuse. The final report of the 9/11
Commission reaffirmed the importance of fixing Congressional
oversight. The commission held that ``Congress should create a
single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland
security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what
committee should have jurisdiction over this department [DHS]
and its duties. But we believe Congress has the obligation to
choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this
committee should be a permanent standing committee with a
nonpartisan staff.'' As the report also noted, one expert
witness appearing before the commission testified that the lack
of effective Congressional oversight is perhaps the single
greatest obstacle impeding the successful development of
DHS.\18\
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\18\ Carafano and Heyman, ``DHS 2.0,'' p. 19.
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Create an Under Secretary for Policy and Planning.--The
Under Secretary should serve as the Secretary's chief policy
official within the Department. The responsibilities of the
Under Secretary for Policy should include: (1) Coordinating DHS
policy, (2) establishing and directing a formal policymaking
process for the Department and oversee a policymaking board,
(3) conducting long-range policy planning, (4) preparing
critical strategic documents, (5) conducting program analysis,
and (6) preparing net assessments.\19\
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\19\ James Jay Carafano, Richard Weitz, and Alane Kochems,
``Department of Homeland Security Needs Under Secretary for Policy,''
Heritage Backgrounder No. 1788, August 17, 2004, at www.heritage.org/
Research/Reports/2004/08/Department-of-Homeland-Security-Needs-Under-
Secretary-for-Policy.
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Establish a bipartisan caucus that meets regularly to
consider issues affecting the National homeland security
enterprise.--Congress currently lacks a forum to inform members
on these issues in a holistic manner. A caucus could help
fulfill this role.\20\
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\20\ Heyman and Carafano, ``Homeland Security 3.0,'' p. 5.
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no. 3 establish priorities for implementation
The greatest virtue of the QHSR is that it provides a framework to
organize the roles and missions of the Department in terms of strategic
ends, ways, and means. As Professor Cindy Williams at MIT pointed out
in an authoritative study in 2008, ``[f]ive years later, the nation's
homeland security effort is anything but unified. Core legacy
organizations that migrated into DHS still generally set their own
agendas, often with strong backing from supporters in Congress.''\21\
The QHSR offers a mechanism to more thoroughly integrate and prioritize
the operations of the Department.
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\21\ Cindy Williams, ``Strengthening Homeland Security: Reforming
Planning and Resource Allocation,'' Report for the 2008 Presidential
Transition Series of the IBM Center for the Business of Government
(Washington, DC: IBM, 2008), p. 6.
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The QHSR rightly recognizes that the Department must serve as the
steward of a National homeland security enterprise. The Department and
the Congress should give highest priority to the initiatives that will
strengthen the leadership role of DHS over the National enterprise.
recommendations
In particular, Congress and the administration should strengthen
the Department's role in:
Resiliency and Response.--The administration is currently
rewriting HSPD-7 and HSPD-8, two key Presidential directives
that govern the protection of critical infrastructure and
disaster preparedness. The administration should strengthen the
Department's leadership role in both policy directives. In
particular, the Federal Government should develop and implement
a National planning capability for preparedness and response to
guide resource allocation and investment across the Federal
Government and to State and local communities. In particular,
the Integrated Planning System needs to be revitalized and
implemented and renewed emphasis must be given to disaster
scenarios including updating them to address emergent threats
such Electromagnetic Pulse and armed assaults on the U.S.
homeland.\22\
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\22\ James Jay Carafano, ``Preparations Means Planning Ahead of
Time,'' Washington Examiner, December 14, 2009, at
www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/Preparation-means-planning-
ahead-of-time-8655242-79171502.html (April 25, 2010); Matt A. Mayer and
James Jay Carafano, ``National Disaster Planning Slowed by Inadequate
Interagency Process,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2079,
October 24, 2007, at www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/
13040.pdf; Jena Baker McNeill and Richard Weitz, ``Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) Attack: A Preventable Homeland Security Catastrophe,''
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2199, October 8, 2008, at
www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/10/Electromagnetic-Pulse-EMP-
Attack-A-Preventable-Homeland-Security-Catastrophe; James Jay Carafano,
``Lessons from Mumbai: Assessing Armed Assault Threats to the United
States,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2219, December 10, 2008,
at www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/12/Lessons-from-Mumbai-
Assessing-Armed-Assault-Threats-to-the-United-States.
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International Leadership.--The Department has substantial
international responsibilities yet lacks technical and
statutory authority to engage overseas partners. In particular,
the Department should have expanded authority in providing
international assistance and development. The United States
should establish security assistance sales, lease, and grant
programs that allow DHS to assist countries in obtaining
equipment, support, and financing for homeland security
functions. One option, for example, would be to establish a
``security for freedom fund'' to provide the Department a
Congressional authorized program for assisting other nations in
developing their homeland security systems.\23\ The Department
should also establish a formal, integrated education and
training program similar to IMET. This would include training
in the United States, mobile training teams that would deploy
overseas, and support for international programs.\24\ Research
and development is another area of international cooperation.
The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
(SAFETY) Act lowered the liability risks of manufacturers that
provide products and services used in combating terrorism. The
act, passed in 2002, protects the incentive to produce products
that the Secretary of Homeland Security designates as
``Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technologies.'' DHS should work to
engage other nations in a serious dialogue on expanding the
umbrella of liability protection for developing effective anti-
terrorism technologies by encouraging cooperative and
reciprocal liability protection programs.\25\
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\23\ James Jay Carafano and Henry Brands, ``Building a Global
Freedom Coalition with a New Security for Freedom Fund,'' Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 2236, February 4, 2009, at
www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/02/Building-a-Global-Freedom-
Coalition-with-a-New-Security-for-Freedom-Fund.
\24\ James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, ``Enhancing
International Collaboration for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2078, October
18, 2007, at s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2007/pdf/bg2078.pdf.
\25\ James Jay Carafano, ``Fighting Terrorism, Addressing
Liability: A Global Proposal,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
2138, May 21, 2008, at http://safetyactconsultants.com/
yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/Heritage_Foundation_SAFETY_Act_5-21-
2008.32823618.pdf.
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Counterterrorism Operations.--The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 neglected DHS's role in
counterterrorism operations. Congress and the administration
should consider whether the Department should play a more
prominent leadership role in the Terrorist Screening Center and
the National Counterterrorism Center. In addition, Congress and
the administration should consider how to better integrate the
myriad of counterterrorism capabilities, operations, and
activities in the command, possibly through a ``joint''
structure similar to that employed by the U.S. military
Combatant Commands or by emulating operations such as those
conducted by Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West.
The President should issue an Executive Order establishing a
National domestic counterterrorism and intelligence framework
that clearly articulates how intelligence operations at all
levels should function to combat terrorism, while keeping
citizens safe, free, and prosperous.\26\
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\26\ Heyman and Carafano, ``Homeland Security 3.0,'' pp. 14-17.
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Cyber Leadership.--The QHSR emphasizes the important role
the Department should play in promoting cybersecurity knowledge
and innovation (pp. 56-57). The top priority of this effort
should be in promoting cutting-edge research and developing the
``human capital'' for National cybersecurity leadership. The
United States needs leaders who understand the need for
strategies of resiliency--methods for ensuring that basic
structures of global, National, and local economies remain
strong after a cyber attack, other malicious acts, or
disasters. A cyber-strategic leadership program is necessary
for constructing a resiliency strategy for the 21st Century.
Cyber-strategic leadership is a set of knowledge, skills, and
attributes essential to all leaders at all levels of government
and the private sector. The Obama administration should build
on the National Security Professional Development process to
educate, certify, and track National security professionals.
This program should be modified based on the experience of the
past 2 years in attempting to implement the program and be used
to develop leaders skilled in cyber-strategic leadership and
other critical National security missions. Research is also
vital. A 2007 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
research report rightly concluded that Government's research
agenda is deeply flawed. The report goes on to lay out an
appropriate research agenda, including such issues as deterring
would-be attackers and managing the degradation and
reconstitution of systems in the face of concerted attacks.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Toward A Safer
and More Secure Cyberspace (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2007); The White House, ``Executive Order: National Security
Professional Development,'' May 2007, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2007/05/20070517-6.html (December 2, 2008); James Jay
Carafano, ``Missing Pieces in Homeland Security: Interagency Education,
Assignments, and Professional Accreditation,'' Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum No. 1013, October 16, 2006, at www.heritage.org/
Research/HomelandSecurity/em1013.cfm.
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Thank you for the opportunity to address the QHSR and the next
steps that the Department and the Congress should take together to keep
the Nation safe, free, and prosperous. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Dr. Carafano.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I will
remind each Member that he will--and there is no she right
here--will have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Deputy Secretary Lute, according to numerous GAO and Office
of Inspector General reports, in addition to the Department's
own budget request process, the Department lacks a sufficient
acquisition workforce. We will start with that. Fortunately,
the budget seeks to expand this workforce. However, as it
currently stands, there are shortages in every aspect of the
acquisition workforce.
Notwithstanding this fact, the 9/11 Act specifically
requires the Department to review and assess the Department's
mechanisms for turning the requirements developed in the QHSR
into an acquisition strategy. How are we going to do that?
Ms. Lute. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
The way--strategy is the connection of end, ways and means,
and what are you trying to do? At the end of the day, what does
success look like? The QHSR document lays that out. It is the
vision of a safe, secure, resilient place where we can thrive.
It also lays out all the elements of the homeland security
enterprise that needs doing.
Connected to that will be the results of the Bottom Up
Review that looks specifically at the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Carney. Is an acquisition strategy going to be part of
the BUR?
Ms. Lute. The third part of our effort here is the 2012
submission and the 2012 to 2016 FYHSP. Taken together, all
three of those will lay out the ends we are trying to achieve,
the ways in which we are trying to do that, with a focus on
three specific things.
How do we execute our mission sets? How do we do it
programmatically? What are the activities involved in those
programs? Then what are the budgetary resources in 2012 and in
the out-years over the quadrennial that will feed that process?
How will we execute those mission sets? How will we run
ourselves? How will we account for the resources that are
entrusted to us?
Mr. Carney. You will be satisfied that that will meet the
statutorily mandated requirement for the 9/11 Act, right?
Ms. Lute. In the provision of acquisitions----
Mr. Carney. Yes, that is what I meant.
Ms. Lute [continuing]. I am satisfied that it will
articulate to Congress our vision of how to address that
question.
Mr. Carney. As long as we are on the line of financial
issues, the Department has yet to produce a clean audit. The
QHSR and the BUR hopefully will reveal what financial
management structures is going to be in place.
How far along are you in aligning the financial structure
with the Department's missions, goals, strategies, et cetera?
Ms. Lute. Part of the--part of the BUR process, Mr.
Chairman, has been to look at exactly this set of issues. We
have developed in the Department over the past several years a
playbook on internal controls which are precisely to get to the
heart of careful and competent stewardship of resources,
leading to clean audits across the board for all of our
operating components in the headquarters, as well. We are
looking at that.
We have a problem in the Department, Mr. Chairman. We don't
have budget comparability currently. We cannot compare how much
we spend on personnel across our components in any consistent
way. We don't in consequence have very good costing models. We
know what we are spending, but we don't have very good
visibility into how the cost actually of a service or a
commodity relates to what we are spending.
We have been working on that as part of the Bottom Up
Review process and going forward into the 2012 build and the
2012-2016 FYHSP. We are addressing exactly all of these issues
in order to position the Department and profile the Department
correctly moving forward.
Mr. Carney. So we will see the Department's plan--I am
getting a handle on that--in the BUR, in the Bottom Up Review?
Ms. Lute. You will see the resource implications in the
2012 submission----
Mr. Carney. We understand the resource implications. We
want to know how you are going to fix it.
Ms. Lute. That is part of that, as well, because the other
thing we have to do, Mr. Chairman, which I know you appreciate
especially, is we need to fundamentally retool our performance
measures. So budgetary alignment, account alignment, resource
prioritization, performance measure, re-profiling, that will
all come in the 2012 submission based on the activity review in
the BUR and the findings in programmatic areas of emphasis in
the BUR, which reflect the strategic imperatives laid out in
the QHSR.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Let's talk about the BUR just for a
moment here to start. The BUR infers that you are doing a deep
dive, if I can characterize it that way, into the Department
and each of the components to determine the programming needs.
Ms. Lute. Yes.
Mr. Carney. How many times did the staff working on the BUR
meet specifically with representatives from each component?
Ms. Lute. What I can tell you is we have spent hundreds of
hours on the activities review in the Department with the
components together. I have held numerous meetings with the
component leadership. We can go back and see if we can compile
a list of the actual meetings.
Mr. Carney. Yes, please do. What was the nature of those
meetings? What happened? What was the----
Ms. Lute. What we said was, look, we have just come out in
the QHSR with a strategic vision and a sense of mission
priorities. Within those mission priorities, we lay out goals.
What will it take to prevent another terrorist attack? What
will it take to secure our borders, enforce our immigration
laws, ensure cybersecurity and resilience in the face of
disasters? How do we know success when we see it? What do we
need to be doing?
We then looked at what we were currently doing, because the
QHSR looks at more than the Department. So we said it takes an
enterprise. The Department can't do all that needs doing. But
what is the Department doing in each of these mission areas?
How is what we are doing every single day matching up to those
requirements? Where are the gaps? What needs strengthening?
What are we doing pretty well and how can we leverage those
successes?
Where do we need to innovate? Again, we took a 4-year
forward-looking view of the kinds of things that we would want
to strengthen from an activities level. That was the nature of
the conversation.
Mr. Carney. Okay. I am way over time. I yield 5 minutes to
the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you--okay, didn't work.
I would like to return to an issue that I raised during my
opening statements about conflicts I believe exist between the
QHSR and the Department's fiscal year 2011 budget request. The
QHSR recognizes the border security missions of the Department
and states that the first priority is achieving effective
control of the physical borders and approaches to the United
States.
However, the fiscal year 2011 budget submission fails to
include funds or plans to increase control over the border. We
have 936 miles under control now and no expectation that we
will secure more of the border over the next 2 years. How can
there be such a wide disparity between the budget request and
the QHSR? Does the Department have a time frame for when we
will have more miles of the border under control? How long will
it take to have even half of the border under effective
control?
Ms. Lute. Congressman Bilirakis, what I can say to you is
that the QHSR, the BUR, and the 2012 budget process is the
three-part framework that we have used for that. But we were
working on the QHSR when we did the 2011 submission. In a
number of areas, that submission reflects the five-part mission
priorities that I outlined.
As the Secretary has said, the southwest border, the border
of the United States and the northern border have never been
more secure. The budget reflects a commitment in that regard
with respect to CBP agents, the presence of ICE, and other
assets at the border, the improvement of border ports of entry,
for the first time ever, 100 percent scanning of southbound
rail traffic, for example, and other initiatives.
Mr. Bilirakis. Dr. Carafano, would you like to comment?
Mr. Carafano. Well, my observation is--and this goes back
to my comment on analytics, which is, where is the assessment
of the complex system that suggests that these investments are
right or that the administration in looking forward to looking
at how it is going to deal with immigration reform, that that
is right?
You know, we know for a fact that people vote with their
feet, right? We have seen, actually, as we increase border
security over the years, we actually saw an increase in
unlawful population in the United States because people just
stayed. We also saw a decrease because people left because the
economy turned down.
So we know that we can kind of affect people's behavior. In
1986, we did a broad amnesty, and the result of that was we had
an enormous increase in the unlawful population in the United
States. Now we are talking about doing a broad amnesty again,
which would seem to me would overwhelm all security efforts.
You know, looking at things--that we are inspecting 100
percent of southbound rail, okay, but I am not really sure--
relevant to that.
Now, you know, we could debate all these points as a matter
of strategy--and I think that is fine--but the point is, is
what the QHSR certainly did not do is it--and I don't believe
the Department still has--is really kind of an analytical
foundation to really justify their assessments in the context
of all the issues that they are dealing with, commerce, trade,
transnational crime, and immigration.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, continuing along the line, the QHSR
advocates for the enhancement of community disaster response
programs. It advocates for that. Certainly as a member from an
area that frequently experiences hurricanes, I believe in the
need for individual and families to be well informed and
prepared in the event of disasters, which is why I am pleased
with the QHSR's emphasis of this issue.
However, while on the one hand the QHSR advocates for
enhanced community preparedness efforts and mentions the
Citizens Corps program by name, on the other hand, the budget,
the 2011 budget request proposed to eliminate the Citizens
Corps program. Can you explain that?
Ms. Lute. Again, Congressman, the QHSR is directly going to
inform the 2012 budget build and the coming quadrennial and the
2012-2016 FYHSP. On the whole question of resilience and
preparedness in the face of disaster, frankly, the Nation has
learned a lot of lessons from Florida. The Department of
Homeland Security benefits from Craig Fugate, who is now the
head of FEMA.
What do we base our resilience argument on? A three-part
structure that you yourself identified. Empowered individuals,
individuals who have the information they need and the tools
they need to be able to withstand disaster, respond, and aid
their neighbors when necessary.
Capable communities, precisely as you identify, communities
that have the training, equipment, knowledge, of the
understanding of their vulnerabilities, as well as their
strengths, to be able to respond to their needs and assist
others, again, in a mutual aid fashion.
Then, finally, we highlight the need for a responsive
Federal system who understands its place and knows its
opportunities for leverage and comparative advantage to assist
when disaster strikes. It is all three of these pieces that we
are working towards, both programmatically within the
Department, from a resource perspective, and then as we
importantly engage not only with Congress, but with State and
local, municipal leaders, as well, to get this balance right.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, Secretary Heyman, as I said before,
said that the administration had a QHSR in mind while crafting
the fiscal year 2011 budget. Was he wrong?
Ms. Lute. No, also, Congressman, as I have said, we looked
at 2011 as a partial down payment on the direction we were
headed with the QHSR, but we were explicitly pointing to the
2012 build and the 2012-2016 FYHSP to reflect the priorities
that we outlined through the QHSR-BUR process.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes my good friend from Texas, Mr.
Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for appearing, as well.
I am concerned about a statement that was made. I am
confident that there will be others who will want to have some
additional evidence presented, so I will simply allow the
deputy secretary to elaborate.
You said the border is as secure now as it has ever been--
perhaps I am paraphrasing, and I am not quoting you exactly,
but if you would like to elaborate on that, I would give you
the opportunity to at this time.
Ms. Lute. Congressman, I was reflecting what the Secretary
herself has said recently, drawing on her deep experience as a
former Governor of Arizona and deep experience with the
southwest border and the understanding that we have in the
Department of Homeland Security the border is more secure than
it has ever been.
Mr. Green. All right, let me just--as a follow-up to border
security--ask about something that has been promoted as of
late, and that is having the National Guard move to the border.
In assessing this type of circumstance, how would what we are
proposing address having the National Guard on the border?
Ms. Lute. The potential deployment of the National Guard
reflects, frankly, its ability potentially to contribute
additional capabilities to law enforcement agencies in their
border security mission. It is just one of a number of options
that are being considered.
Mr. Green. In considering this, I am confident that it will
be done this way, but I will ask just for clarity purposes,
would you also talk to the various military persons who would
be in the loop? You are obviously a part of the Executive.
Because we have two wars, one in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and
we have troops deployed. Do you--in making this decision, you
would not just simply make that as an internal decision. There
is a lot more to it than simply deciding to deploy troops, I am
sure you agree, deploy the Guard.
Ms. Lute. Congressman, forgive me for smiling. The Lutes
are very familiar with the requirements that you outlined. In
the interest of full disclosure, my husband works at the White
House for the President on Afghanistan and Pakistan and
previously served on the issues relating to Iraq, as well.
We are very mindful of the requirements. I am both
personally--we are institutionally, and we are in a very robust
dialogue with Department of Defense.
Mr. Green. Thank you. I mention it because I am not sure
that every person who says, ``Send the Guard,'' has thought
through all of what that entails. I want border security. I
think that we should have proper personnel there. I assume that
we will review the adequacy of personnel and make the proper
adjustments. True or false?
Ms. Lute. We will.
Mr. Green. Now, with reference to the Bottom Up Review, can
you kindly for me in your mind give me what bottom--where is
the bottom in the Bottom Up? Where is that starting point?
Ms. Lute. That is a very fair question, Congressman. The
bottom actually begins with an activity review. It is not a
zero-based budgeting or a zero-based review, as if we were
starting with a clean state and only mission requirements.
This looks at our mission activities that are undertaken by
the operating components and compares them against the mission
sets that we say are essential in the QHSR for achieving that
vision of a secure homeland.
Mr. Green. What is the anticipated--you may have given the
answer--but what is the anticipated completion date of the BUR?
Ms. Lute. The analytic work of the BUR is completed, and we
are looking to finish the interagency review of our work
shortly.
Mr. Green. Could you define shortly please?
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would expect that
before the end of May.
Mr. Green. From time to time, it has been my experience, is
that we don't always meet the goals that we set for ourselves.
If you find that you are running long as opposed to short,
meaning short, completing it early, long, you are going to go
past the goal, the anticipated completion date, how would we
receive notice of that?
Ms. Lute. Unfortunately, Congressman, there is no more
early for us here. But I would, as I have in the past, be in
touch with the Chairman on the prospects for delivery.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Green.
Mr. Pascrell, do you have questions?
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Deputy Secretary Lute, thank you for your service,
extending beyond homeland security. I have questions about the
bureaucracy of the Department which you represent. I looked
through the chronology since August 2007 to the present time
about reviewing that bureaucracy and the Department.
If I have stressed one thing as a Member of this
committee--and you and I have talked about this--it is that the
bureaucracy itself is as great a threat to our National
security as anything else. That is my opinion. I have tried to
point out how I think that plays out within the Department
itself.
I think it had something to do with the confusion on
December 25 last year, which is not the total responsibility of
Homeland Security. I understand that. You are a collector. You
are not making decisions on the intelligence level, your
Department, that is.
When we created the Department in the wake of September 11,
it was the largest United States Government reorganization in
over 50 years, since the Department of Defense was created in
1947. We consolidated 22 separate agencies into one Department.
It is the third-largest in the Government behind only the
Department of Defense and Veterans Administration.
So this is a big deal we are talking about here. When you
have that realization in mind, it is not hard to understand
that why we desperately need to re-evaluate everything within
DHS to find all the missing links and efficiencies and why the
committee on both sides of the aisle is very impatient and has
a lot of anxiety about waiting beyond the scheduled time,
because we are talking about the defense of this country and
protecting our neighborhoods, so we cannot be late with any
reports, no excuses accepted.
Madam Secretary, can you talk about what steps you have
taken in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and within
your long-term plan to help cut down on the layers of
bureaucracy and get the Department to work more effectively?
Can you tell us, for the record?
Ms. Lute. Thanks, Congressman. We have talked. We are both
from New Jersey. There are no excuses for what is not done, but
I will explain to you what we have done and what we will do.
I will also say to you that I am personally answerable to
the Secretary for the progress or lack of it that we have made
on the QHSR and the BUR, in the 2012 build process, and the
2012-2016 FYHSP, and the totality of this comprehensive
examination of the Department that you are talking about.
You talk also about bureaucracy. Congressman, I am an
operator. I spent 30 years operating in large, far-flung,
unwieldy bureaucracies. I began my career in the Army in the
1970s. I spent a lot of time in the United Nations. Now I am in
homeland security.
So I would respectfully say to you, bureaucracy and
homeland security, compared to what? This is a Department of
210,000 full-time civil servants approximately, Coast Guardsmen
and others, 207,000 of which are in operating agencies. It is a
headquarters bureaucracy of 3,000 people for this Department.
Mr. Pascrell. Very small administration.
Ms. Lute. Very small. So when you speak bureaucracy, what I
see are men and women every single day who come into work
supporting the operational activities that we have at the
borders, at the airports, on the water, in defense of security
of this homeland.
So I take very seriously everything you say, particularly
defense of the homeland and the responsibilities we have. It
resonates with me personally, having begun my professional
career as a soldier.
What we are doing is taking a look at our activities
against the QHSR. In the QHSR, we said, this is what we are
aiming for, a safe, secure, resilient place where the American
way of life can thrive, protect ourselves against terrorism and
other hazards. What does that mean we need to do? It means we
need to do the five mission sets that we have laid out in the
QHSR.
How do we do that? We need to look ourselves in the
Department, and we have done this through the BUR process
comprehensively, including an examination--the unglamorous
knuckle drill of examining the plumbing and wiring of the
budget processes of the Department, the acquisition processes,
our account structures, our organizational fidelity and
coherence, as well.
There are a number of areas that we can streamline. When
you are standing up a Department, when you are starting up an
activity--and I have done it several times in my career--I can
tell you, nobody is lining the streets tuning up the band
because you are getting ready to march down the aisle.
Everybody is waiting to see how you can fall.
Congress has been remarkably supportive of this Department
and this enterprise, and we appreciate that. We have a long way
to go. We know that, as well. We are going to--we are going to
look at how we can consolidate our operational activities
against the mission sets that are articulated in the QHSR. We
are going to look at the value proposition of the headquarters.
How can headquarters add value to the frontline operators, to
the men and women who are opening trunks, inspecting suitcases,
manning the waterways, ensuring maritime safety and security,
as well?
But we are beginning, Congressman, with a very lean
bureaucracy to begin with.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think that I have confidence in Under
Secretary Lute to follow through on what you have talked about
many times, Members of this committee, the Ranking Member, Mr.
Green. There are many impediments that we create ourselves or
allow to exist.
I hope that this committee and the administration will be
strong enough and courageous enough not only to see reports and
make reports, but to follow through on recommendations, because
we are heading towards consolidation. Otherwise, what are we
doing here?
Now, are we going to have the courage to support your
efforts and maybe instead of having 22, we have 8, instead of
having X amount of people, should all of those people--207,000,
210,000--be in one Department? Should parts of the Department
be other places? Has the intelligence breakdowns we have had
indicate that there should be not only a collection--Homeland
Security should not only be a collection agency for
intelligence, but should be part of the very apparatus which
seeks to find out who is trying to harm us?
These are going to be--you know, we have got to make those
decisions, too. We have personal responsibility. I remember
when the select committee went to a full committee, this
Homeland Security, and it was stacked with Chairmen from other
subcommittees. Well, you know what the heck happened. They all
wanted to fight for turf, and then one person wouldn't show up
because he was insulted that his committee wasn't even--I mean,
it was a zoo. You would never know that you were protecting the
United States of America and our neighborhoods. It was insane.
I hope we will have the courage to go to the next step.
That is all I hope. Thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
I guess I would like to echo some of his sentiments, Mr.
Pascrell's sentiments, that, you know, despite appearances, we
are pretty smart here, and we have--truly, I know. We have
talked about organization of Homeland Security many times,
privately, you know, over beers at the club or on the floor or
whatever.
That is a question I have. You know, and we don't get a
sense of that from the QHSR, the QHSR--or I hope maybe we will
from the BUR--is reorganization considered in either one of the
documents really?
Ms. Lute. So, Chairman, reorganization is a radioactive
word.
Mr. Carney. Okay, let's say moving assets.
Ms. Lute. Well, there has been a lot of moving assets and
there has been a lot of churn masquerading as reorganization.
It covers a multitude of sins. Churn is debilitating to an
organization. It is debilitating to a workforce.
People want some very fundamental things when they show up
for work every single day. They want to have the training, the
tools, and the leadership, and the frontline supervision
competent to help them get a job done. They want to have an
organizational structure that is built to purpose. What are we
trying to do? Are we organized well to do it? What pieces of
the effort that it takes to achieve that purpose are we
missing? Or else who has got it? Do I have replicable models of
success for getting it when I need it? Or do we encounter every
problem as if for the first time?
Mr. Carney. I agree. We really want to help you with that,
but we can't if we have a QHSR that doesn't answer the
questions required statutorily, and we can't do it if we don't
see the BUR.
Madam Secretary, I have to tell you, from what we have
talked about over the last roughly hour or so, everything that
wasn't in the QHSR is supposed to be in the BUR. What is not
going to be in the BUR is going to be in the 2012 budget
report? Am I getting that right? Not even the 2011, but the
2012 budget report?
Ms. Lute. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carney. Can I ask, when exactly--within a month or 2--
will the first QHSR actually be completed, given all the
components that you have mentioned? The goal posts seem to be
going further--this is the bad dream where I can't quite get to
the end of the hall as fast as I run.
Ms. Lute. I am living the dream, Mr. Chairman. I guess what
I would tell you is, beginning last year, we set ourselves out
an 18-month process to execute these three pieces of the
puzzle. Congress originally gave the Department of Homeland
Security 2 years to do the QHSR as its outlined statutorily.
I think that is about the right amount of time that you
need to fully conduct an analytic examination of the mission
sets that need doing, the strategy. What are we trying to do?
How are we going to do it? What does it take to do that?
I think that we learned some lessons. This shouldn't
straddle a transition of an administration. It essentially
means you are at a standing start, not a sitting start, not
lying down, but a standing start when a new administration
comes in.
There is an enormous requirement for stakeholder outreach
that we have. We had no precedent. We had no experience in the
Department. This was the first ever that we have done. What we
are building towards is this three-part submission.
I think the specific answer to your question, Mr. Chairman,
is when the budget is presented to Congress for 2012, all of
the pieces of the puzzle will be in place. However, you can
also say that we are required by the statute governing the
QHSR--and I believe that we have been faithful to this--to
engage in comprehensive consultations with a number of
stakeholders, including Congress, and we will certainly
continue that process.
Mr. Carney. Well, I appreciate the consultation, but now I
know how my dissertation committee felt when I didn't get my
chapters in on time. But, you know, that is what we are looking
at.
Dr. Carafano, you sat on the QHSR advisory board. Great
job. I really want to hear your opinion of the process, the
pros, the cons, et cetera. Just hold forth, please.
Mr. Carafano. Yes, well, I would actually just like to
address this very specific issue. You know, it is important for
Congress to ask tough questions, but it is also important for
Congress to ask questions the Department can actually answer.
I think one of the lessons learned was perhaps the first
QHSR was a bit overambitious in the expectations of what the
Department could actually do. I think there are two parts to
solving that on both sides.
You know, on the Congressional side, if you think of--in
terms of asking questions, you are not terribly well-armed. You
have GAO, which is great if you have a process question, but
GAO can't ask--help you really kind of think through kind of
deeply strategic analytical questions, and you have CRS,
Congressional Research Service, which is great at kind of
telling you what people are thinking, but they are not an
analytic organization, either.
So there is kind of a whole in terms of the Congressional
support to the committee in terms of thinking, what are the
right questions to ask? We know what we want, but what can the
system actually produce for us?
On the Department side--and here is where I might disagree
with the Secretary--I do think you have to do this in the first
year of the administration. You have to. I mean, I have been on
this QDR thing forever, right, about first-year, second-year,
third--whatever. You have got to do it in the first year,
because you have got to set your priorities, because otherwise
you run out of time to implement it.
You have got to do it from a standing start. If you are
lucky, you get two shots at the apple, right, you get re-
elected, you get--you know, and the same team is on board.
But so what is that? I think you really have to have a
permanent structure within the Department that is going to do
this day in and day out for the 4 years running up to it.
Now, you get two things out of that. One you get is when
the standing team comes in, they may want to shift a focus,
they may want to look at questions differently, but at least
there is an analytical foundation and an infrastructure there
that can support that. That is going to make all the difference
in the world.
To me, that was the big learning lesson. Alan and Dave and
the Secretary, you know, they really had to build--you know,
they really had to build the house. So that was a double tough
thing for them.
But the other thing to me, which is actually much, much
more important, is if you have, in a sense, a permanent sell,
then you have a partner to dialogue with. Then what you can be
mulling over is both the questions of--what are the--you can
have a back-and-forth between what are the tough questions we
need to ask next time and what are the Department's
capabilities to actually address and answer those questions?
So I think that, you know, if we walk away from this and we
don't figure out how we are going to have the dialogue for the
next QHSR, so when we write the statutory requirements, not
only do they get to the issues which are important to you and
which are tough, but the Department can actually give me
meaningful answers.
Mr. Carney. Are you suggesting the answers we are getting
today are not meaningful?
Mr. Carafano. You know, again, I thought the Department--
you know, that the Department did a great job trying to address
all the issues in the report and to deliver the report on time.
I can't speak for the Department or the administration, but my
feeling was, is that if the Department could have delivered a
report in December to meet the statutory requirement, and they
didn't have to run through all the interagency stuff you have
to run through, that that would have happened.
But, again, you know, I will just offer an example. One of
the requirements in the report was National preparedness. That
is a really interesting question. This is one of the questions
we have to ask completely. Is that kind of the right question?
I mean, you have prepared for what?
I mean, at the end of the day, I can give you a metric and
a measurement, but what can you really do with it? Is it
meaningful? The Department came back and said, ``We need to do
a National risk assessment.'' Well, I really questioned as a
member of the HSAC kind of the--where that is coming from and
how that makes sense.
I mean, we live in a country of infinite vulnerabilities.
Okay, a risk assessment is a combination of criticality,
vulnerability, and threat. Okay, so when one of your variables
is infinite, you know, how are you going to come up with
something like that?
So I kind of question what the analytical foundation in
that is, as well. But I thought the--you know, I will say, from
the HSAC perspective, we thought we got great feedback, great
transparency, great interaction. I really applauded the
Department's effort to do outreach. I think there are some real
issues there and some real lessons learned there, as well.
You know, you always get 80/20 on anything, which is 20
percent of the people do 80 percent of the work. So when you
try to do broad, strategic outreach, you get a lot of feedback
from the 20 percent of the people that want to give you
feedback, but then the question is, are those the right people?
Is that feedback really meaningful? Can you actually do
anything with it?
That I think was a great learning lesson for the
Department, as well. But I do think both sides here have to
build the structure for dialogue if you want a better outcome
next time.
Mr. Carney. Are we asking the right people the questions
from this subcommittee?
Mr. Carafano. I am sorry. I don't understand the question.
Mr. Carney. You just said we have to--you know, are you
part of the 20 percent that----
Mr. Carafano. No, but, you know, it all goes back to kind
of, what do you really want to know? Then who do you really
outreach to? I mean, you can't say we need to outreach to all
of the stakeholders, because the stakeholders are infinite.
Mr. Carney. We will re-engage on this.
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Carafano, with regard to consolidating--the Congress
consolidating their oversight over the Department of Homeland
Security, it is long overdue, I think we will all agree on
that. What would be your best model for oversight of the House
committee?
Mr. Carafano. One. Actually----
Mr. Bilirakis. That is good, sounds good.
Mr. Carafano. But, no, well, you know, obviously, you know,
here is the simple answer, right? Here is the standard. If you
can't do at least as good as the Department of Defense, that is
fundamentally wrong, right? The Department of Defense is a key
National security instrument, right? I mean, it doesn't have a
committee of one. It does have to answer to multiple
committees.
But it is much more like something that is reasonable than
what we have now. So if you can't make it look at least like
that, then you have failed. Just to put a point on this, I
mean, I have always felt that one of the problems in terms of
consolidation is you have a chief operating officer with too
many operating agencies.
It was a problem that we pointed out in Homeland Security--
Department of Homeland Security 2.0, and at some point, you
have got to get your business model right, and the business
units have to equal the span of control that their chief
operating officers can actually handle it. It is just that
simple.
Then the instruments that they have to manage that have to
be right, which is why I raise the issue of the under
secretary. I mean, let's be honest. We are never, ever, ever
going to get to a consolidation of the Department of Homeland
Security with a chart that looks like that. It is never going
to happen unless a lot of people die, and that is when the
Congress will be shamed into doing the right thing, and I think
that that is the greatest tragedy that you could possibly
imagine.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, Dr. Carafano's testimony offers
interesting criticism of the lack of analytical support
included in the QHSR and other DHS proposals to advocate the
need for amnesty legislation. Has the Department reviewed the--
I know you touched on this--has the Department reviewed the
1986 laws and why they failed in order to justify advocating
for a repeat legislative performance in legalizing millions of
people?
I think you brought it up, Dr. Carafano.
Could you answer that question, please, Madam Secretary?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, with respect to the 1986 law on
immigration, you know, the Department reviewed an extensive
amount of its history relevant to the key mission areas that
identified--one which was enforcing and ensuring effective
enforcement of our immigration laws. Why? Because we believe
fundamentally that a basic right of a country is to know who
lives and works within your borders.
The Department, as the administration, supports
comprehensive immigration reform. As you know, that has a
number of elements, including enforcement.
Mr. Carafano lays out a set of arguments, particularly
related to the analytics of the QHSR. Analytics are not
sufficient for an organization like the Department of Homeland
Security. I am an operator. Maybe what you are hearing is the
difference between an academic and an operator's approach to
this. It is not just what we know; it is what we do about what
we know and how we organize to do it and how we prioritize the
activities that those organizations undertake to execute the
mission sets that we say are important.
That is what we tried to do beginning with the QHSR through
the BUR and the 2012 build. I think there are a number of
things on which reasonable people can disagree. You know,
should there be a permanent capacity for the QHSR? Absolutely
not, in my view. Absolutely not.
The American people have a right to expect that the
leadership of the Department of Homeland Security can come
together from time to time, whether it is quadrennial or not--
and I actually agree that the timing of the QHSR ought to
coincide with the first year of an administration. It ought
just not to straddle administrations. That essentially reduces
your effective time to conduct the review that you want to do
comprehensively.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, when did the review take place, if it
did take place, when and where, of the 1986 laws?
Ms. Lute. We will have to get back to you on that,
Congressman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Has this information, this review been
shared with Congress?
Ms. Lute. I will have to get back to you, Congressman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Please do.
Okay, Dr. Carafano, just last week, the full committee
received testimony from Senators Graham and Talent on the WMD
Commission who discussed the likelihood of a WMD attack on the
United States in the coming years. Your testimony details your
concern with the lack of coordination between QHSR and QDR,
especially as it relates to military support to civil
authorities.
What impact would the Pentagon's proposal to downsize the
number of military forces prepare to respond to a WMD attack
have on the domestic response capabilities?
Mr. Carafano. Well, it would depend on the scale of the
response. On a very, very large response, basically, the
Department of Defense answer is, we will backfill that with
kind of general purpose forces.
The problem is, on a very, very large response, the crisis
is more immediate, you have to get there faster, and you kind
of don't have time to kind of learn as you go. So the fact is,
is that, on that situation, you want the first team to get in
to be trained and equipped and prepared for it.
The Department of Defense has actually moved in the
opposite direction. They went from 16,000 troops to 13,000
troops.
Their argument is, well, we did an assessment, we did
analysis. Then when you ask them, well, how does that compare
with the Department of Homeland Security's analysis? There is
no Department of Homeland Security analysis. I think this is
just an example of where requirements are lacking.
I mean, DHS still really doesn't have the capacity to
really in a meaningful way articulate to DOD what are
requirements. Therefore, I think the DOD is just going in its
own direction. I honestly believe that the DOD decision, it was
driven by personnel. It was just--they needed to cut 3,000
people, so they did, and then they made it sound like they were
doing more with less, which I don't think is true. That is just
my honest opinion.
It is hard for the Department to have a meaningful
dialogue, so I think that is an example of where an opportunity
was missed, because I think DHS just has a lack of capacity to
really engage in a meaningful dialogue.
Mr. Bilirakis. One last question, if I can--okay. Dr.
Carafano, shortly after the release of both the QHSR and the
QDR, you expressed your concern about references to climate
change on both documents and the link they made--the link made
to National security. Would you please discuss your concerns?
Mr. Carafano. Well, of course, one concern is drift, right?
If everything is National security, then nothing is National
security. Again, I would like to compliment the QHSR and the
effort of the Department to really focus on identifying what
the key missions of the Department are.
So that is one concern, is that, as you broaden National
security, then everything becomes National security. Then, of
course, when things are National security, that is the
responsibility of the Federal Government, and then we tend to
be more centralized and more focused, you know, at the center.
We tend to increase the Federal investments in things.
Then many times, that is not the best answer and, of
course, particularly in homeland security, where it is a
diverse, complex, lots of partners. Over-centralization, over-
authority is actually a bad idea.
So I am not sure, you know, that that is meaningful and
helpful to have the departments looking at this. Then I have
also written on this before, is that, you know, the climate
change--you know, there is this kind of magic thing. It is,
well, the world is going to get warmer and everything is going
to get worse and we are going to need a lot more National
security and, therefore, we have to keep the world from getting
warmer.
Well, that is a very simplistic and unrealistic way to look
at how things really work in the world. The world is a very,
very complex system. When the climate changes--which it always
has, and sometimes things get worse, sometimes things get
better--but, you know, making simple predictive outcomes that,
you know, we are going to need a lot more National security or
we are going to have to change the way the economy works, and
those are our only two options, that is not--those are
judgments. They are not based on any kind of real science.
I am not questioning or talking about the science about
what--question the science about people looking at the
predictions on climate and then for that inferring about what
governments can or should need to do over the long term.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
Mr. Green, please.
Mr. Green. Yes, thank you.
Let me ask the Secretary, assistant secretary, to respond.
I believe the contention was put forth that DHS does not have
the capacity to respond to DOD. Would you like to respond to
that, please, Madam?
Ms. Lute. What I would say, Congressman, is that--of course
we do. What we can't do is match DOD pound for pound in terms
of its ability and the deliberate planning process, or nor do
we model in the same way its demand functions.
But every single day, we generate requirements for
ourselves as an operating agency for our operators, and a lot
of these processes parallel. What is true is that we have a
long way to go in our dialogue with DOD on the support to
civilian authorities and the kinds of contingencies that are
represented across the whole front of homeland security
challenges.
Mr. Green. There was also the proposition--and you may have
responded to it, but I would like to go back. Mr. Carafano
indicated that we need some sort of on-going analysis taking
place. Is that correct, Mr. Carafano?
Mr. Carafano. Yes, sir, I think that is right, particularly
when you look at the kinds of questions that are asked in the
QDR. Many of those questions actually take months and years to
answer, so if you ask them--the statutory requirement is in
place and a new administration starts to ask them at the
beginning, they will never get the answers in that year.
So many of those questions actually have to be asked years
before you actually do the QHSR, which is if you have in any
sense an on-going brain in the Department that is being
forward-looking in anticipating the QHSR questions, you can ask
them in time to actually do the deep analytical dive.
I must say, I have never--of all the criticisms I have had
in my life, being an academic was never one of them, but I
guess that is a good thing.
Mr. Green. Well, before I move to the assistant secretary,
would you explain how you would have this on-going activity
work? Would it be housed in a given area? Would you give it a
name? How would you have this perfected?
Mr. Carafano. Yes, sir. I mean, the QDR is actually a very
good model for that. There is a permanent QDR office. It is
under the under secretary for policy. Basically what it does is
it does all the preparatory work. It makes sure----
Mr. Green. If we have this in place, do you assume that
they don't do this type of analytical work?
Mr. Carafano. That QDR office won't actually do analytical
work, right? It is basically a coordinating body. So what it
has to do is it has to reach out to the analytics that are
available to the Department in the FFRDCs, in the universities,
and kind of give them guidance, along with the Secretary for
Science and Technology and Policy, to make sure that the
preparatory research is done, so when the new administration
needs those deep dives, that they are available for them.
Mr. Green. Madam Deputy Secretary, would you care to
respond?
Ms. Lute. It is just my view, Congressman, that one of the
lessons we have learned in doing the QHSR is that there is no
substitute for leadership engagement and that this is not
something that we can hand off to an analytic capability,
although that is essential for doing careful work and ensuring
that there is some perspective on the work that you are doing.
I do believe that we need to be thinking about the next
QHSR beginning now, and we have been. We need to have this
dynamic impetus to renew ourselves organizationally every 4
years, because an organization structure in the public sector,
in my experience--which is a long one--is that organizations
really only serve you well for about 5 to 7 years. You need an
opportunity to refresh. The QHSR gives us that process.
But more than that, it gives us the opportunity for
dialogue with stakeholders, for an intensive dialogue with
Congress about the kinds of larger strategic issues that really
ought to be guiding the security of this homeland. That is
important to do. I just don't know that we need a large
permanent office to do it.
Mr. Green. Well, let me thank both of you for your
testimony. Clearly, you have given us much to consider, and I
greatly appreciate the way you have approached it. I think you
have been frank with us, and I think that is very important, to
get that kind of candor, so thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Green.
Secretary Lute, I think I agree with Dr. Carafano on the
need for some sort of a permanent office. I don't know how
large it needs to be, but I think that probably the QDR model
is the right way.
Dr. Carafano, when the first QDR was done, how much
satisfaction was there with that report? Did it raise the kind
of consternation and questions that we are raising today?
Mr. Carafano. Well, you know, I am a historian, so I feel--
--
Mr. Carney. That is why I asked you.
Mr. Carafano. You know, it is really not comparable,
because if you think about it, the Department of Defense had--
you know, when they formed the National Military Establishment,
which was really the precursor to the Department of Defense, I
mean, that was by the law in 1947.
So the Department already had a large staff. It had an
under secretary for policy. It did massive analytical analysis.
It had an established doctrine. I mean, it knew who it was. So
even though the few first----
Mr. Carney. But let me stop you with that. You know, as a
sailor, we have a different culture than the Army that has a
different culture than the Army Air Corps that had a different
culture than the Marines. So what we are trying to--22 separate
agencies with different cultures are trying to come together
here.
So I don't know that it is that distinct, in terms of the
historical precedent here.
Mr. Carafano. Well, again, even then, you know, by the time
you got to the first QDR, I mean, you already had the--I mean,
you already had the----
Mr. Carney. Yes.
Mr. Carafano [continuing]. You already had the 1986 Reform
Act and you already had the beginnings of jointness. You know,
DOD had a long time to beat the guys over the head to try to
get them all in line.
So, I mean, in fairness to the Department--and, you know, I
am an independent. I am nonpartisan. I am just going to judge
them here. I am a guy that has followed this from day 1. When
you look at the magnitude of the report card that you ask for
them and what the Secretary had to do when they came on-board
and the capacity that they had to do that, this is not a bad
job.
Actually, I think, if the Department of Defense had to do a
QDR in 1950, I am not sure it would have looked any different.
Mr. Carney. I guess that is good-ish.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Lute. All things-ish. Actually, I thought historians
were academics.
But, Mr. Chairman, I guess just inviting myself to the
dance at this moment, you know, I would say something----
Mr. Carney. You are always welcome.
Ms. Lute. Thank you. I went into the Army in 1976, basic
training. The first QDR was in the 1990s--1993, 1994? What had
happened in the intervening time, in my view, importantly
informed DOD's ability to do a QDR.
The evolution of the Army after Vietnam was an
extraordinary thing to see. The leadership said we are going to
master the doctrine of how to fight. We are going to train to
that doctrine, and we are going to buy the proper equipment for
our forces.
So they began to rebuild the institutionalized Army around
those three things, training, doctrine and equipment. Over the
course of the decade that followed, they added to that
logistical support and sustainability, an emphasis on
leadership and integrity.
So much so, by the time Desert Storm came around, the Army
no longer deployed soldiers, deployed forces. It deployed
military solutions. DOD had itself evolved to a state of
thinking about what it did and how to do it that permitted the
kind of comprehensive cross-service analysis that the QDR now
reflects.
Homeland Security needs to evolve to that point where we
can look across our capabilities and see how they blend
together at our borders, in the interior, abroad, to achieve
that vision that I talked about, and that is a path we are on
with your help.
Mr. Carney. Well, we will provide the help, certainly, but,
you know, we have got to hit those benchmarks, you know? I was
concerned when I started to hear things are going to be pushed
to the 2012 budget, that that is unacceptable. You know, we
have got to do better than that.
But you need to understand the historic nature of the first
report. I mean, it sets the tone going forward. From this, it
has to have the evolutionary nature to it, but you can't just
start over out of whole cloth, I don't think, every 4 years. I
don't think that that makes much sense, that if you are going
to have a culture of homeland security, if you are going to
have folks in place who have a history of the institution, as
institutional memory is vital no matter what we are talking
about, if it is Department of Ag or Department of
Transportation or Homeland Security.
I think you probably ought to have something in the QHSR
realm that is permanent within the Department. You get to
determine how many folks that might entail.
But, you know, we are frustrated and concerned at the
subcommittee and the full committee that we don't have the
things that we asked for. Dr. Carafano said we may be asking
questions that are unanswerable. We never got that kind of
response.
Let's make sure we have a relationship with you so we
completely understand what it is we are trying to both
understand about homeland security, the development of the
Department, and the relationship that you have with us. This is
a partnership; it is not an adversarial relationship. It may
sound like it occasionally, but this in the end is a
partnership.
You know, I get frustrated, too, every time we see this.
You know, I would love each of you some evening on the back of
a napkin to sketch out how you think this ought to look, how we
can streamline it, how we can make this a more reasonable
relationship with Congress and the Department.
I will work my rear end off to get that to happen. I will
go to the mat with the other committee Chairs and subcommittee
Chairs. You know, this is ours. It should be, because this is a
committee that if something happened on the Congressional side
we can look at first. They are not going to look at
transportation. They are not going to--they are going to look
at the Homeland Security Committee.
So I think it is important--so working with both of you,
whomever wants to jump in, and lends an idea on the
relationship that does better than this, I welcome it.
All right. Mr. Green, any further questions?
All right. I thank you both for your testimony, and I
promise we will have further questions in writing. Please
answer them quickly.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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