[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
UNCLOGGING PIPELINE SECURITY: ARE THE LINES OF RESPONSIBILITY CLEAR?
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 19, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-62
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emmanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, U.S. Virgin Islands
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dana Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Al Green, Texas Daniel E. Lungren, California
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Tamla T. Scott, Director & Counsel
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Michael Russell, Senior Counsel
Kerry Kinirons, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 1
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 2
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Jack Fox, General Manager, Pipeline Security, Transportation
Sector Network Management, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Jeffrey Wiese, Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
Department of Transportation:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Paul W. Parfomak, Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure
Policy, Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Gary L. Forman, Chair, Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Panel II
Mr. Larry Gispert, Director, Hillsborough County Emergency
Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 43
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
Mr. Ron Rogers, Assistant Chief-Administration, Hillsborough
County Fire Rescue:
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
Colonel Ed Duncan, Commander, Department of Operational Support,
Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 49
Prepared Statement............................................. 51
For the Record
Mr. Jack Fox, General Manager, Pipeline Security, Transportation
Sector Network Management, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Map............................................................ 41
Graph.......................................................... 58
UNCLOGGING PIPELINE SECURITY: ARE THE LINES OF RESPONSIBILITY CLEAR?
----------
Monday, April 19, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight,
Plant City, FL.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
the Plant City City Hall, 302 West Reynolds Street, Plant City,
Florida, Hon. Christopher P. Carney [Chairman of the
subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Carney and Bilirakis.
Mr. Carney. The Subcommittee on Management, Investigations,
and Oversight will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Unclogging Pipeline Security: Are the Lines of Responsibility
Clear?''
I would like to thank everybody for joining us today and I
would especially like to thank my good friend and Ranking
Member Bilirakis for inviting me to his district to hold this
hearing. I am especially grateful after yesterday morning
waking up in northern Pennsylvania to snow. So being down here
in relatively warmer Florida is great. Frankly, the only thing
warmer than the weather is the reception that I have received
and I am very grateful to all of you for that.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the management of
the Nation's pipeline networks which transmit oil and gas
across the United States and have vital links to critical
infrastructure such as power plants, airports, and military
bases. The management and oversight of these systems present
unique homeland security challenges as they are vulnerable to
both accidents and terrorist attacks.
The National pipeline system is an extensive mode of
transportation. Virtually all the critical pipeline
infrastructure is owned or operated by private entities.
However, the Federal Government is responsible for regulating,
securing, and ensuring the safety of the National pipeline
system.
There are currently 168,900 miles of hazardous liquid
pipelines operated by over 200 companies. There are 320,500
miles of natural gas transmission pipelines operated by over
700 companies. There are 2.2 million miles of natural gas
distribution pipelines operated by over 1,300 companies. Now I
mention these statistics because I think they demonstrate just
how difficult of a job it is to secure these pipelines. But
there can be zero tolerance for failure in securing these
pipelines because of the potential lethality of the products
that they carry.
In 2008, in Plum Borough, Pennsylvania, a natural gas
explosion killed a man and seriously injured a 4-year-old girl
and three houses were destroyed and 11 others were seriously
damaged. The National Transportation Safety Board determined
that the probable cause of the explosion was excavation damage
to a 2-inch natural gas distribution pipeline that stripped the
pipe's protective coating and made the pipe susceptible to
corrosion and, consequently, failure.
In 2005, a pipeline exploded near a home near Moon
Township, Pennsylvania causing injuries to two people. This
explosion was caused as a result of a gas company worker who
ruptured a natural gas line and failed to report it to proper
authorities.
Of course, I am aware of the incident that happened close
to here in 2007 involving the release of ammonia after a
teenage boy drilled a hole into the pipeline.
Sometimes the damage to a pipeline is accidental and
sometimes it is deliberate. In fact, a prison just outside of
my district in Scranton, Pennsylvania holds a man who tried to
recruit al-Qaeda crews to strike natural gas pipelines in
Alaska, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Wyoming. Luckily, he was
not successful.
Now I mention these incidents because they show that we
must continue to improve the security of our pipeline
infrastructure.
Today, I will be interested in learning if sufficient
coordination exists between the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of Transportation. I would also like to
learn if the Transportation Security Administration has
sufficient capability and funding to deal with their role in
pipeline security.
Last, I will be interested in hearing from our witnesses if
written pipeline regulation is needed. Under the current
system, pipeline owners and operators are given guidelines that
should be followed. However, these are merely guidelines and
there is no enforcement authority that can mandate compliance.
Given the frequency of pipeline-related incidents that
occur throughout the country, coupled with the extent of both
human and economic loss that could result from these incidents,
it may be wise to consider whether the systems should have a
set of written regulations.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for their
participation and I look forward to their testimony.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, my good friend Gus Bilirakis from Florida.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, I appreciate it, Chris.
We are good friends, and this is an example of how Washington,
DC should work. We do work in a bipartisan manner and we are
very similar in philosophy. I am trying to get him to come over
to our side; he is very, very similar----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bilirakis. But in any case, safety and security is No.
1 as far as I am concerned.
I want to welcome everyone to the Ninth Congressional
District and a wonderful, wonderful town, one of my favorite
towns, Plant City. Thanks for being here, Chris, I appreciate
it so very much.
I am pleased the subcommittee is meeting to consider the
security of our Nation's pipelines. There are more than 2.5
million miles of pipelines within the United States.
Here in the Tampa Bay area, we have hundreds of miles of
pipelines carrying oil, gas, jet fuel, and other chemicals that
are very vital to this region, and economically as well. It is
so very, very important, the safety and the security.
Pipeline systems, both at home and abroad have been
targeted by terrorists. In June 2007, investigators arrested
four men who plotted to blow up JFK International Airport and
neighborhoods in Queens, New York by detonating a fuel pipeline
and storage tanks. Terrorists have also targeted pipelines in
Colombia, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom. In addition, there
have been reports of al-Qaeda encouraging attacks on American
pipelines. This does not get the attention and that is why we
are bringing this issue up today, the focus as usual being on
airlines. But this is so very important, very critical that we
protect this infrastructure.
Hillsborough County is no stranger to pipeline breaches, as
Chris mentioned. In November 2007, teenagers drilled into an
anhydrous ammonia pipeline after being told that the pipeline
contained money. This breach necessitated the evacuation of
hundreds of people and I understand the cost was $250,000, that
was the damage. These incidents serve to highlight the
potential vulnerabilities of our Nation's pipelines.
I am looking forward to hearing more about how Federal,
State, and local agencies and their private sector partners are
working together to ensure the security of this critical
infrastructure. I am specifically interested in discussing the
memorandum of understanding between the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Transportation relating to
pipeline security. Does the current MOU sufficiently delineate
the respective roles of DHS and DOT? Does it require updating?
The distinguished witnesses on our second panel will be
able to provide this subcommittee with valuable insight into
their pipeline security preparedness and response efforts and I
thank them for joining us here today.
With that, I would like to welcome all of our witnesses and
all of our spectators and look forward to your testimony. I
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for attending, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
Today's hearing will be divided into two panels. The first
panel is comprised of Government witnesses and the second will
be comprised of representatives of the local community. I want
to welcome each of our witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Jack Fox. Mr. Fox joined TSA in
September 2002 to start the pipeline security program. He is
responsible for the development and implementation of pipeline
security programs at TSA. Since starting at TSA, Mr. Fox has
conducted reviews of the security of the Nation's largest
pipeline companies. He has also worked closely with the Natural
Resources Canada on the vulnerability assessments that have
been completed on the cross-border pipeline infrastructure.
Before joining TSA, Mr. Fox worked as the investigator in
charge for pipeline accident investigations with the National
Transportation Safety Board, the NTSB, in Washington. During
his time with NTSB, he was responsible for leading pipeline
accident investigations and the preparation and submission of
the final accident reports to the Safety Board for approval of
the report and the safety recommendations that were being made.
Prior to working at NTSB, Mr. Fox worked in various
capacities in the pipeline industry in the United States for
over 30 years.
Mr. Fox currently lives in Virginia and he is a native of
Pennsylvania and a graduate of Penn State University.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carney. Just a bit of parochialism here, folks.
Our second witness is Mr. Jeffrey Wiese. Mr. Wiese serves
as the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety for the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or
PHMSA, in the United States Department of Transportation. In
this capacity, Mr. Wiese leads PHMSA's effort of regulations
covering the design, construction, operation, and maintenance
and spill response planning for the Nation's pipeline
transportation system.
Previously, Mr. Wiese served as PHMSA's Director of Program
Development for Pipeline Safety where he led several programs
to enhance PHMSA pipeline safety damage prevention and
community involvement initiatives, public awareness, field
implementation of the integrity management program rules,
research and development and the National pipeline mapping
system. Mr. Wiese also directed budget development, user fee
assessment and oil spill planning and preparedness for PHMSA's
pipeline safety program.
Our third witness is Dr. Paul Parfomak. Dr. Parfomak is a
specialist at the Congressional Research Service, or the CRS,
the non-partisan policy research and analysis agency of the
U.S. Congress, where his areas of expertise include energy
infrastructure development, critical infrastructure protection,
and terrorism threat analysis.
Prior to joining CRS, Dr. Parfomak was an associate
principal in the energy practice of McKenzie & Company, a
global management consulting firm.
Prior to McKenzie, he was a consultant at Barakat &
Chamberlin, where he assisted North American utilities in
developing and implementing energy conservation and load
management programs for their customers.
Dr. Parfomak earned a Ph.D. in engineering and public
policy from Carnegie Mellon University--another Pennsylvania
school----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carney [continuing]. Where he was an Argonne National
Laboratory research fellow. His undergraduate degree in
aeronautics and astronautics is from MIT. He has been a special
lecturer at the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon
and currently sits on the Washington, DC Advisory Council of
the Carnegie Institute of Technology.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Gary Forman. Mr. Forman has
worked for over 35 years in the energy field with experience in
engineering, operations, emergency management, and many other
facets of the industry.
Since late 2001, he has been a full-time security
professional serving first as chief security officer for the
NiSource Gas Transmission Companies and since March 2006 as the
Director of Corporate Security for NiSource, Inc.
Mr. Forman is a past chairman of the American Gas
Association Security Committee and past chairman of the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America Security
Committee. He has also served as the chair of the Oil and
Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council and as a member of the
Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security.
He is testifying today in his capacity as the chair of the
Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council.
Mr. Forman has a bachelor's of science in mechanical
engineering from West Virginia University, which is really
close to Pennsylvania.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carney. And a master's of business administration----
Mr. Bilirakis. I think this is all about Pennsylvania. You
stacked this hearing, Chris.
Mr. Carney. You do what you can.
And a master's of business administration from the
University of Richmond.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record and I now ask each witness to
summarize their statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr.
Fox.
STATEMENT OF JACK FOX, GENERAL MANAGER, PIPELINE SECURITY,
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Fox. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Carney and
Ranking Member Bilirakis.
As General Manager of the Pipeline Security Division of the
Transportation Security Administration, I am pleased to appear
today to discuss TSA's role in protecting the security of our
Nation's pipelines. I appreciate the subcommittee's interest in
this important infrastructure issue.
As stated, the United States relies on over 2.5 million
miles of pipelines operated by over 3,000 companies for
transporting petroleum and natural gas. This massive
infrastructure delivers approximately two-thirds of the
petroleum products and nearly all of the natural gas used in
the United States. Preserving the security of this system is
critical to our economic well-being and to our National
security.
Because our Nation's pipeline system is of such critical
importance, there is a risk that terrorists may target it with
the goal of producing mass casualties and significant economic
aftershocks. Less than 3 years ago, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations arrested members of a group allegedly plotting
to blow up supply tanks and the pipeline feeding the JFK
International Airport in New York. The threat to pipelines is
real and evolving and we must remain ever-vigilant to safeguard
our Nation's pipeline system.
TSA is dedicated to maintaining a robust Nation-wide
pipeline security program that instills public confidence in
the reliability of the Nation's critical energy infrastructure,
enhances public safety, and promotes the continued functioning
of other critical infrastructure sectors that depend on secure
and reliable sources of energy delivered by pipelines.
TSA maintains clear lines of communications and close
working relationships with Government and industry partners to
share critical information related to pipeline security. In
particular, we are continuing to build upon our strong working
relationship with the Department of Transportation's Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA. TSA
and PHMSA maintain virtually daily contact, including 24/7
communication and information sharing in the event of a
pipeline incident. Through close coordination with PHMSA and
vigorous outreach efforts to our pipeline industry
stakeholders, we have made substantial progress in defining and
solidifying the relative roles of TSA and PHMSA in coordinating
the protection of pipeline systems, with TSA having
responsibility for security matters and PHMSA having
responsibility for safety matters. In 2006, we signed an annex
to the Department of Homeland Security and Department of
Transportation Memorandum of Understanding documenting this
fact.
In addition to the close collaboration with PHMSA, TSA
works to maintain close relationships with State, local,
international, and non-governmental stakeholders. For example,
for the last 5 years, TSA and Natural Resources Canada have co-
hosted an annual international pipeline security forum to
enhance Government and pipeline industry domain awareness and
facilitate a dialogue on pipeline security issues. The
conference is attended by officials from the United States and
Canadian governments, pipeline associations, pipeline
operators, and representatives from the security, intelligence,
and law enforcement communities. The 2010 forum is planned for
October 28-29 in Philadelphia. The forum provides an
opportunity for pipeline industry, industry associations, and
Government representatives to exchange security information and
best practices.
TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve the
security of pipelines. I would like to highlight a few examples
of our key programs.
The first is pipeline corporate security review. This is
the centerpiece of TSA's pipeline security program. It was
begun in 2003 and these reviews have enabled TSA to build
relationships with pipeline operators to assess their corporate
security plans and programs and to provide them with
recommendations for improvement. TSA has taken a risk-based
approach and has conducted reviews on all the top 100 pipeline
systems in the country and is currently working on the second
round of reviews of these systems.
Pipeline security awareness training. TSA has developed a
30-minute training CD for pipeline operators. The training
covers topics such as security measures, awareness of
vulnerabilities, potential threats, and targeting. To date, TSA
has delivered training CDs to over 300 companies, providing
training to an estimated 61,000 pipeline employees. Also
presently in production is a video on pipeline security for
local law enforcement. This project is underway and will be
finished later this year.
TSA has issued smart practices reflecting the lessons
learned from our reviews over several years. A qualitative and
quantitative examination of data from our reviews, coupled with
literature research regarding pipeline security measures and
consultation with the pipeline industry, have identified smart
practices operators can implement to promote an effective
security program. This document is intended to assist operators
in their security planning and the implementation of security
measures to protect their facilities.
In conclusion, TSA will continue its efforts to enhance the
security of pipeline systems as directed by the 9/11 Act and
other statutory and DHS requirements. Although TSA has been
given clear authority and responsibility for the oversight and
enforcement of pipeline security, we recognize that the success
of this effort relies on the close coordination and on-going
cooperation with industry and Government partners, including
PHMSA. This coordination enhances TSA's ability to improve
pipeline security in a manner that is safe and allows for the
efficient flow of commerce.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee today. I will be happy to answer any questions you
might have.
[The statement of Mr. Fox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jack Fox
April 19, 2010
Good morning, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As General Manager of the
Pipeline Security Division (PSD) of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), I am pleased to appear today to discuss TSA's
role in protecting the security of our Nation's pipelines. I appreciate
the subcommittee's interest in this important infrastructure issue.
pipelines: a critical economic and security interest
The United States relies on over 2.5 million miles of pipelines,
operated by over 3,000 companies, for transporting petroleum and
natural gas. This includes 2.2 million miles of natural gas
distribution pipelines, 320,500 miles of natural gas transmission
pipelines, and 168,000 miles of hazardous liquid transmission
pipelines. This massive infrastructure delivers approximately two-
thirds of the petroleum products and nearly all of the natural gas used
in the United States. In delivering oil and gas resources, our pipeline
system provides jobs, heats homes, and allows businesses to operate
efficiently. It is part of the life blood of the American economy, a
vast network of underground transmission lines that provides energy to
residential neighborhoods, commercial sites, and industrial centers
across the country. Preserving the security of this system is critical
to our economic well-being and to our National security.
Because our Nation's pipeline system is of such critical
importance, there is a risk that terrorists may target it with the goal
of producing mass casualties and significant economic aftershocks. Less
than 3 years ago, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested
members of a group allegedly plotting to blow up supply tanks and
pipelines feeding fuel to the John F. Kennedy (JFK) International
Airport in New York. The threat to pipelines is real and evolving, and
we must remain ever vigilant to safeguard our Nation's pipeline system.
TSA is dedicated to maintaining a robust, Nation-wide pipeline
security program that instills public confidence in the reliability of
the Nation's critical energy infrastructure, enhances public safety,
and promotes the continued functioning of other critical infrastructure
sectors that depend on secure and reliable sources of energy delivered
by pipeline.
TSA's role in pipeline security has its genesis in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), passed by Congress in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. While aviation security
is a central component of ATSA, the act also confers upon TSA primary
responsibility for providing security in all modes of transportation,
including pipelines. Congress added substantial new pipeline-specific
mandates in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007 (9/11 Act). Pursuant to these authorities, and prioritizing
activities based on risk, TSA promotes pipeline security through
collaboration across the National pipeline network.
promoting pipeline security through a collaborative network
TSA maintains clear lines of communications and close working
relationships with Government and industry partners to share critical
information related to pipeline security. In particular, we are
continuing to build upon our strong working relationship with the
Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA). TSA and PHMSA maintain virtually daily contact,
including 24/7 communication and information sharing in the event of a
pipeline incident. Through close coordination with PHMSA and vigorous
outreach efforts to pipeline industry stakeholders, we have made
substantial progress in defining and solidifying the relative roles of
TSA and PHMSA in coordinating the protection of the pipeline system,
with TSA having primary responsibility for security matters and PHMSA
having primary responsibility for safety matters.
TSA and PHMSA have worked in close collaboration on a number of
initiatives designed to improve pipeline safety and security, such as
the Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Plan, the Transportation
Systems Sector Specific Plan, and the Pipeline Security Modal Annex.
Both agencies are active members in the Oil & Natural Gas (ONG)
Government Coordination Council and the Pipeline Government
Coordinating Council. Additionally, TSA and PHMSA participate in the
ONG Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council in which
Governmental agencies, pipeline industry stakeholders, and other
security partners collaborate on pipeline and critical infrastructure
security matters.
In addition to its close collaboration with PHMSA, TSA works to
maintain close relationships with State, local, international, and non-
Governmental stakeholders. For example, for the past 5 years, TSA and
Natural Resources Canada have co-hosted an annual International
Pipeline Security Forum to enhance Government and pipeline industry
domain awareness and facilitate a dialogue on pipeline security issues.
The conference is attended by officials from the U.S. and Canadian
governments, pipeline associations, pipeline operators, and
representatives from the security, intelligence, and law enforcement
communities. The 2010 Forum is planned for October 28-29 in
Philadelphia. The Forum provides an opportunity for pipeline industry,
industry association, and Government representatives to exchange
security information and best practices.
Additionally, TSA leverages the DHS Homeland Security Information
Network to share information between DHS and other Government, private
sector, and non-Governmental organizations involved in pipeline
antiterrorism and incident management activities.
current initiatives to improve security
TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve the security
of pipelines. I would like to highlight a few examples of our key
programs:
Pipeline Corporate Security Reviews: The centerpiece of TSA's
pipeline security program is the Pipeline Corporate Security Review
(PCSR). Begun in 2003, PCSRs have enabled TSA to build relationships
with pipeline operators to assess their corporate security plans and
programs and to provide them with recommendations for improvement. TSA
has conducted PCSRs on all of the top 100 pipeline systems and is
currently working on second-round reviews of these systems.
Pipeline Employee Security Awareness Training: TSA developed a 30-
minute training CD for pipeline operators. The training covers topics
such as security measures, awareness of vulnerabilities, potential
threats, and targeting. To date, TSA has delivered training CDs to over
300 companies, providing training to an estimated 61,000 pipeline
employees.
Pipeline Security Smart Practices: TSA's Pipeline Security Smart
Practices reflect the lessons learned from PCSRs over several years. A
qualitative and quantitative examination of data from PCSRs, coupled
with literature research regarding pipeline security measures and
consultation with the pipeline industry, identified smart practices
operators can implement to promote an effective security program. This
document is intended to assist operators in their security planning and
the implementation of security measures to protect their facilities.
Cross-Border Pipeline Assessments: Canada is one of the world's
largest producers and exporters of energy and is the top source for
U.S. oil and natural gas imports. In 2006, Canada exported to the
United States 2.3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day
(11 percent of the U.S. supply) and 3.6 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas (16 percent of the U.S. supply); this energy is overwhelmingly
moved by pipeline. TSA has been leading an in-depth analysis of cross-
border pipeline systems, as part of a team that included Natural
Resources Canada and private industry. Assessment teams of Canadian and
U.S. subject matter experts in pipeline operations, control systems,
infrastructure interdependencies, and assault planning visit critical
cross-border pipeline infrastructure, identify security gaps, and
recommend protective measures to address them. Pipeline operators have
used the assessment results to target improvements to the security of
their systems. To date, joint U.S.-Canadian teams have reviewed six of
the largest pipeline systems, or approximately 25 percent of the total
cross-border systems.
conclusion
TSA will continue its efforts to enhance the security of pipeline
systems as directed by the 9/11 Act and other statutory and DHS
requirements. Although TSA has been given clear authority and
responsibility for the oversight and enforcement of pipeline security,
we recognize that the success of this effort relies on the close
coordination and on-going cooperation with industry and Government
partners, including PHMSA. This coordination enhances TSA's ability to
improve pipeline security in a manner that is safe and allows for the
efficient flow of commerce. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before the subcommittee today. I would be happy to answer any questions
that you may have.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Fox.
Mr. Wiese, 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY WIESE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
PIPELINE SAFETY, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Wiese. Thank you, Chairman Carney and Ranking Member
Bilirakis; and thank you very much for the invitation to come
down and speak to you today, appreciate it.
I would like to tell you that I live in either Florida or
Pennsylvania, but we are somewhere in between, we are in
Virginia, so . . . Thanks for your invitation to speak today.
My name is Jeff Wiese, Associate Administrator of the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--that is a
mouthful. We are the office of pipeline safety within PHMSA,
that is a little easier to get a grip on. Our job is pipeline
safety.
We greatly appreciate this subcommittee's attention to our
efforts to advance safety. These are the top priorities of
Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and PHMSA Administrator
Cynthia Quarterman.
As you have heard, the Nation's 2.5 million miles of
natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines are a significant
part of our country's critical infrastructure, that are
essential to our economy and our way of life. PHMSA bears a
large responsibility in ensuring that any failure of these
critical components does not impact the safety of our most
important stakeholders, American citizens.
Today, I will speak to the challenges we face in helping
our communities live safely with the critical infrastructure
upon which they depend.
With over 30,000 miles of pipelines, Florida has a
significant piece of this critical network right here within
its borders. Our partnerships with State agencies like the
Florida Public Service Commission help us deal with this vast
majority of energy pipelines, especially those located in the
high-risk areas such as natural gas distribution pipelines. In
Florida, with the exception of these natural gas distribution
pipelines, PHMSA is chartered with the inspection, enforcement,
and safety assurance of pipelines, including anhydrous ammonia
lines.
Our record in pipeline safety is good. We have seen a
number of serious pipeline accidents, those involving death or
injury, decline by 30 percent for the 10-year period 1999 to
2008. We believe this data is indicative that our strategy of
enhancing our oversight is working. However, as was stated at
the beginning of the hearing, our goal is and must remain no
serious accidents, no harm to the public and hopefully no harm
to any workers associated with them.
One thing is clear, however--and thank you for bringing
that up--the leading cause of accidents relating to pipelines
in which people are hurt or killed is damage caused by third
parties. This type of damage, which does include vandalism but
also prominently features excavation into underground
utilities, can either cause an immediate rupture of those
facilities or damage that later grows to failure.
Vandalism to pipeline facilities is something PHMSA takes
very seriously. It not only causes severe safety risks to the
party or parties directly involved, but it can dramatically
affect people in surrounding communities and lead to drastic
environmental consequences.
When pipeline security situations such as vandalism arise,
PHMSA turns to our Federal business partner, the Transportation
Security Administration. PHMSA and TSA created, as you noted,
an annex to an MOU to clarify each agency's unique
responsibilities and to detail our numerous areas of
cooperation. The effectiveness of our cooperation and
coordination was put to the test here in Florida in 2007, as
you know well, following a vandalism-related incident on
anhydrous ammonia pipeline.
As with any pipeline incident with security implications,
PHMSA immediately held discussions with TSA to identify
jurisdictional authority, roles and responsibilities, possible
subsequent actions of each agency to remediate the situation.
PHMSA was not only concerned about the vandalism activity
itself, we investigated the company's response and evaluated
the adequacy of their processes, training, and equipment that
they needed to prepare for and respond to threats to their
pipeline. We also examined the company's operations well beyond
its emergency response issues.
Our investigation found that the company's response
procedures were inadequate in a number of areas and resulted in
our issuance of an enforcement action, including a proposed
civil penalty and a compliance order directing corrective
actions.
Our inspection of the operator and our participation in a
subsequent multi-agency after-action review meeting and
discussion with the Hillsborough emergency response community
led to two different emergency response roundtables to discuss
and share safety perspectives and best practices. The workshops
further advanced each participant's knowledge of anhydrous
ammonia and their understanding of how to appropriately respond
to incidents should they occur.
In addition to similar workshops, PHMSA has also helped
communities deal with other pipeline safety issues for many
years. At the top of our list remains educating the public and
others about best practices to help prevent excavation damage
to underground utilities, including the use of the call before
you dig 8-1-1 number.
Other ways that we have been trying to help communities
include making safer land use decisions near pipelines through
our Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliance, best practices
compilation exercise as well as providing access at a community
level to maps showing where the pipelines reside.
Sometimes despite our best efforts, pipeline accidents
still happen. In almost all incidents, it is our firefighters
and other emergency officials who are first to arrive at the
scene and they are the last line of defense in our communities.
Through our long relationship with the National Association of
State Fire Marshals and the International Association of Fire
Chiefs, PHMSA has gained a better understanding of the needs of
the fire service. From this partnership has sprung a pipeline
emergencies curriculum for local emergency responders which is
now being distributed and taught across the country. PHMSA has
learned that leveraging partnerships with State and local
officials can dramatically improve the effectiveness of our
safety and prevention efforts.
Thank you for the opportunity to represent the many
dedicated public servants at PHMSA and to report on our
pipeline safety program. We share your commitment to improving
safety, environmental protection, and reliability of our
Nation's pipeline system.
This concludes my remarks. I will be happy to answer any
questions at the appropriate time.
[The statement of Mr. Wiese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Wiese
April 19, 2010
Chairman Carney, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to speak to each of you today. My name is Jeff Wiese,
Associate Administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration's (PHMSA) pipeline safety program.
We greatly appreciate this subcommittee's attention to our efforts
in advancing safety, which is the top priority of Transportation
Secretary Ray LaHood and PHMSA Administrator Cynthia Quarterman.
As the only modal administration within the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) that doesn't involve moving people, PHMSA still
bears a significant responsibility in ensuring the safety of our most
important stakeholders, American citizens. Today, I will speak to the
challenges we face in the coexistence of people and pipelines in our
communities and the ways we are working to address safety risks.
The Nation's pipelines, our energy highways, are a significant part
of our country's critical infrastructure and are essential to our
economy and our way of life. Over 2.5 million miles of natural gas and
hazardous liquid pipelines crisscross the country transporting nearly
two-thirds of the energy products we consume annually. Pipelines are by
far the safest way to transport such enormous quantities of hazardous
products over long distances in short time intervals.
safety: phmsa's primary mission
Strong oversight has been an important strategy in strengthening
pipeline safety. Ensuring the safety of the Nation's hazardous liquid
and natural gas pipeline network is an enormous task. To assist us in
this feat, PHMSA utilizes the help of its State agency partners, giving
us the opportunity to employ over 400 additional inspectors to oversee
81 percent of the infrastructure. State and Federal inspectors train
together to enforce National regulatory pipeline safety standards. We
aim to function as a coordinated workforce to safeguard the American
public from the risks pipelines pose. With over 30,000 miles of
pipelines in the State, Florida has a significant piece of this
critical network right here within its borders. To assist us in our
efforts, PHMSA has an agreement with the Florida Public Service
Commission to oversee intrastate natural gas pipelines--those that
provide gas to homes and businesses. For all other pipelines in
Florida, including anhydrous ammonia lines, PHMSA is chartered with the
inspection, enforcement, and safety assurance of pipelines. The
Federal-State partnership is a crucial component to our safety strategy
and our ultimate success.
Over the years, PHMSA has taken a hard look at incidents, their
causes, and what can be done to prevent them. One thing is clear--the
leading cause of incidents in which people are hurt or killed is a
result of third-party damages. This type of damage, which includes
vandalism, causes an immediate rupture or damage that later grows to
failure. Third-party damage most often occurs on natural gas
distribution systems located in areas where people live and work, but
it also poses a significant threat to larger pipelines such as
anhydrous ammonia, natural gas, crude oil, and other hazardous liquid
pipelines.
Our record in pipeline safety is good. We have seen the number of
serious pipeline accidents--those involving death or injury--decline by
an average of 30 percent for the 10-year period of 1999-2008. In
Florida, the State has seen an average of one serious pipeline accident
a year over the past 5 years compared to a National 5-year average of
41. This data is proof that our strategy of enhancing our oversight is
working. Nevertheless, we recognize that one serious pipeline accident
per year in Florida is still one too many and our ultimate goal is
zero.
addressing the november 2007 pipeline incident
Throughout the country anhydrous ammonia is commonly used as a
chemical compound for agricultural fertilizer because of its rich
nitrogen composition. The product is also used as an industrial
refrigerant for agricultural retailers.
The United States contains nearly 4,500 miles of anhydrous ammonia
transmission pipelines and PHMSA is the primary safety regulator for
all of them. There have been 53 reported accidents on anhydrous ammonia
pipelines since 2002 and of these, 15 percent were attributed to
vandalism.
As we have seen here in Florida, occurrences with anhydrous ammonia
pipelines can result in very tragic consequences. Since the year 2000,
Tampa Bay Pipeline Company (TBPC) experienced three incidents involving
its anhydrous ammonia pipeline, two of which were caused by vandalism.
The most recent incident occurred on November 12, 2007 in which three
teenagers drilled a hole into the pipe, immediately releasing product
and a vapor cloud into the surrounding area, causing serious injuries
to one of the teens and requiring the hospitalization of several fire
fighters. In addition to these consequences, 300 people were evacuated
from their homes as a safety precaution.
Vandalism to pipeline facilities is considered a deliberate act of
sabotage and is therefore a security-related issue. To ensure security-
related issues concerning pipelines are adequately addressed, PHMSA
entered into an Annex to a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) acknowledging TSA's lead
role in transportation security. Both agencies possess a shared
commitment to a systems risk-based approach and to the development of
practical solutions. The Annex recognizes that each agency brings core
competencies, legal authority, resources, and expertise to this shared
mission of protecting the public, but that the ultimate authority for
pipeline security lies with the TSA.
As with any pipeline incident with security implications, PHMSA
immediately held discussions with the TSA to identify jurisdictional
authority, roles, responsibilities, and possible subsequent actions of
each agency to remediate the situation following the November 2007 TBPC
failure.
We investigated the company's response and evaluated the adequacy
of their processes, training, and equipment to prepare for and respond
to threats to their pipeline. Pipeline operators are required by law to
have emergency procedures, conduct emergency training, and maintain
liaison with local public officials and emergency responders. In
addition, to augment our understanding of the company's response
activities, PHMSA participated in a multi-agency ``After Action''
review meeting with emergency responders, law enforcement, Florida
transportation and environmental management agencies, local school
officials, and the media. Finally, PHMSA completed a comprehensive
follow-up inspection, examining TBPC well beyond its emergency response
issues.
When examining operator compliance, PHMSA looks for more than just
fulfillment of routine maintenance requirements. We expect operators to
incorporate all Federal and State regulations, including training
staff, educating the public, and installing effective emergency
response procedures.
During our investigation of the TBPC accident, we found the
company's response procedures were inadequate in a number of areas
including public awareness, record-keeping, personnel qualification,
liaison with public officials, emergency response procedures, and
training. As a result of our investigation, PHMSA issued TBPC a Notice
of Probable Violation which included a Proposed Civil Penalty of
$398,000 and a Proposed Compliance Order to restore safety assurance
and readiness within its pipeline operations.
keeping communities ready to respond
Looking at the TBPC incident and holding discussions with the
Hillsborough County emergency response community, PHMSA decided to
increase its efforts in promoting anhydrous ammonia transportation
safety in the Tampa area. In late August 2008, PHMSA hosted its
Emergency Response to Anhydrous Ammonia Transportation Incidents
Roundtable before an audience of emergency response management
personnel, anhydrous ammonia industry stakeholders, and transportation
industry representatives to discuss and share safety perspectives and
best practices. The workshop further advanced the emergency response
community's knowledge of anhydrous ammonia and their understanding of
how to appropriately respond to incidents should they occur. In
addition, PHMSA worked with the TSA to hold an additional invitation-
only workshop for law enforcement and security agencies involved in
planning for Super Bowl activities in the Tampa area. The law
enforcement community was able to benefit from discussions about
pipeline security and threats and vulnerabilities concerning ammonia
transportation.
Damage Prevention.--Helping communities deal with pipeline safety
has always been a priority of PHMSA. At the top of our list remains
using the best information available to guide our excavation damage
prevention efforts. Working with the Common Ground Alliance and all the
underground damage prevention stakeholders, we have supported educating
the public on the importance of calling the National 811 phone number,
to help prevent damage to pipelines during an excavation. Pipeline
operators believe that this number is effective in preventing damage to
their facilities, and many are voluntarily adding this number to their
permanent pipeline markers. In addition, we target for assistance those
States whose risk of construction-related damage is the greatest or
those States in which the potential for improvement is real. We are
putting representatives in the field to help explain the benefits of
effective damage prevention and have invested in research to improve
excavation location and communications technology so that the one call
notification system is more accurate, works faster, and contributes to
a safer work place.
Guiding Safe Land Use Decisions.--There are other ways to help
communities live safely with pipelines. One of the most important of
these is guiding communities to make safe land use decisions. Building
on the model of the Common Ground Alliance, we have called stakeholders
together in a similar model, called Pipeline and Informed Planning
Alliance (PIPA). This is a follow-up activity to a mandate of the
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act (PSIA) of 2002, and results from a
recommendation by the National Academy of Science's Transportation
Research Board.
National Pipeline Mapping System.--A companion effort is helping
communities understand where pipelines are located, who owns and
operates them, and what other information is available for community
planning. Following the passage of the PIPES Act, PHMSA worked with the
Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration
to resolve concerns about security sensitive information. Vital
information that communities need for land use, environmental and
emergency planning around pipelines is publicly available through
PHMSA's National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS). We continue to work
with States, industry and other stakeholders to make the NPMS
information more accurate and more useful. Additionally, we have
completed a review of thousands of operators' public education programs
and provide operators with feedback.
PHMSA works hard to provide communities with the information they
need to make informed decisions and live safely with pipelines, but
like the ammonia incident, accidents can and do still happen. In almost
all instances, it is our firefighters and other emergency officials who
are first to arrive at the scene of a dangerous pipeline incident. In
light of this, we support the development of training material and
educational seminars to help educate emergency responders in how to
safely respond to emergency pipeline situations.
Emergency Responder Training Materials.--Through our relationship
with the National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM), PHMSA has
gained a better understanding of the informational needs of the fire
service and utilized NASFM State contacts to conduct outreach and
training for local emergency responders. Our Pipeline Emergencies
training curriculum and course materials offers a comprehensive,
integrated emergency response training program designed to teach
emergency responders and pipeline industry personnel to safely respond
and effectively manage pipeline incidents. In addition, PHMSA is
providing $500,000 to NASFM this year to support the update of Pipeline
Emergencies, including new hardcopy training books and DVD material
that can be distributed to local fire service personnel. The training
material will also include new sections on transportation of
alternative fuels via pipelines and how to respond to ethanol pipeline
incidents.
conclusion
As you can see, our expanded partnerships with State and local
officials are helping us to strengthen the effectiveness of our safety
and prevention efforts.
PHMSA very much appreciates the opportunity to report on our
pipeline safety program. We share your commitment to improving safety,
environmental protection, and reliability of our Nation's pipeline
system.
Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you have.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Wiese.
Dr. Parfomak now for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF PAUL W. PARFOMAK, SPECIALIST IN ENERGY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Mr. Parfomak. Good morning, Chairman Carney and Ranking
Member Bilirakis. My name is Paul Parfomak, Specialist in
Energy and Infrastructure Policy at the Congressional Research
Service. CRS appreciates the opportunity to testify here today
about the Federal role in pipeline security. This testimony
focuses on the evolution and current status of key Federal
agency responsibilities. In accordance with our enabling
statutes, CRS takes no position on any related legislation.
As has been stated, nearly half a million miles of
hazardous liquids and natural gas transmission pipeline cross
the United States. While a fundamentally safe means of
transport, pipelines have been a focus of terrorist activity in
North America. Recent incidents include the 2007 JFK
International incident and the conviction of a U.S. citizen
trying to conspire with al-Qaeda to attack the Trans-Alaska
pipeline system. To date, there have been no known terrorist
attacks on U.S. pipelines, but the threat of such attacks is
credible.
Under Federal statutes, the Department of Transportation is
given primary authority to regulate key aspects of interstate
pipeline safety. To fulfill this mission, the DOT employs
approximately 200 pipeline safety staff, including field
inspectors. The Department also delegates authority to its
State pipeline safety offices where over 400 State pipeline
safety inspectors are available.
The Clinton administration added to the DOT a lead
responsibility for pipeline security in 1998. In 2001,
President Bush placed the DOT's pipeline security authority
within the newly established Transportation Security
Administration, which was transferred to the new Department of
Homeland Security the following year.
Given the important roles that both the DOT and TSA have
played in pipeline security, Congress has long been concerned
about the appropriate division of pipeline security authority
between the two agencies. In 2006, the agency signed an
agreement to delineate clear lines of authority and
responsibility and promote communications, efficiency, and non-
duplication of effort. The agencies subsequently developed a
multi-year action plan to execute key elements of the Federal
pipeline security program. Although the DOT and TSA jointly
developed this action plan, a DOT Inspector General assessment
in 2008 was not satisfied with it, stating that further actions
needed to be taken with a sense of urgency because the current
situation was far from an end-state for enhancing U.S. pipeline
security. According to TSA, cooperation with the DOT has
improved drastically since the release of the Inspector General
report. The two agencies maintain daily contact, share
information in a timely manner, and collaborate on security
guidelines and incident response planning.
While TSA and the DOT seem to have improved their
cooperation in pipeline security, key questions remain
regarding what this cooperation entails and the on-going roles
of the two agencies. In this context, two specific issues may
warrant further Congressional consideration: (1) TSA's pipeline
security resources, and (2) potential pipeline security
regulations.
TSA's pipeline budget currently funds 13 full-time-
equivalent staff to conduct pipeline security inspections,
maintain TSA's pipeline asset database, support TSA's risk
models and develop new security standards. At this staffing
level, TSA's pipelines division has limited field presence for
the inspection and possible enforcement under either the
current voluntary standards or any future regulations.
TSA's handful of inspection staff stands in contrast to the
hundreds of inspection staff available to the DOT at the
Federal and State levels. Given this disparity, it is logical
to consider whether DOT's field staff, who are charged with
inspecting the same pipeline systems as TSA, could somehow be
deployed to help fulfill the Nation's pipeline security
objectives.
Federal pipeline security activities to date have relied
upon voluntary industry compliance. However, the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 directs TSA to promulgate pipeline
security regulations and carry out necessary inspection and
enforcement if the agency determines that regulations are
appropriate. Unlike maintaining voluntary standards, developing
pipeline security regulations would involve a complex and
potentially contentious rulemaking process. Should Congress
choose to mandate such regulations, it is not clear that TSA's
pipeline security division as currently configured would be up
to the task. By comparison, the DOT has a history of
developing, enforcing, and updating extensive pipeline safety
regulations. Notwithstanding this well-established regulatory
infrastructure at the DOT, given the division of authority
between the agencies, it is not clear that TSA could draw upon
those regulatory capabilities if they should be needed.
In conclusion, while the DOT and TSA have distinct
missions, pipeline safety and security are intertwined. As
oversight of the Federal role in pipeline security continues,
questions may be raised concerning the relationship between TSA
and the DOT with respect to pipeline security. In particular,
given the limited staff in TSA's pipeline security division and
the comparatively large pipeline safety staff in the DOT,
Congress may consider whether staff resources across both
agencies are optimally aligned. Pipeline safety and security
necessarily involve many groups--Federal agencies, State
agencies, pipeline industry associations, large and small
pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these
groups work together could be an oversight challenge for
Congress.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
committee today. I look forward to any questions you may have.
[The statement of Dr. Parfomak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul W. Parfomak
April 19, 2010
Good morning Chairman Carney and Ranking Member Bilirakis. My name
is Paul Parfomak, Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy at the
Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS appreciates the opportunity
to testify here today about the Federal role in pipeline security. At
the committee's request, this testimony focuses on the evolution and
current status of key agency responsibilities. In accordance with our
enabling statutes, CRS takes no position on any related legislation.
introduction
Nearly half a million miles of hazardous liquids and natural gas
transmission pipeline crisscross the United States. These pipelines are
integral to U.S. energy supply and have vital links to other critical
infrastructure, such as power plants, airports, and military bases.
While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many
pipelines carry volatile, flammable, or toxic materials with the
potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The Nation's
pipeline networks are also widespread, running alternately through
remote and densely populated regions; consequently, these systems are
vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack.
Congress has recently passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of
2006 and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007, to improve pipeline safety and security practices. The 111th
Congress is overseeing the implementation of these acts and considering
new legislation related to the Nation's pipeline network. Recent
legislative proposals include the Transportation Security
Administration Authorization Act (H.R. 2200), which would mandate a new
Federal pipeline security study regarding the roles and
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Transportation with respect to pipeline security.
pipeline security risks
Pipelines are vulnerable to vandalism and terrorist attack with
firearms, with explosives, or by other physical means. Some pipelines
may also be vulnerable to ``cyber-attacks'' on computer control systems
or attacks on electricity grids or telecommunications networks.\1\ Oil
and natural gas pipelines have been a recent focus of terrorist
activity overseas and in North America. For example, in January 2006,
Federal authorities reportedly acknowledged the discovery of a detailed
posting on a web site purportedly linked to al-Qaeda that encouraged
attacks on U.S. pipelines, using weapons or hidden explosives.\2\ In
June, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested members of a
terrorist group planning to attack jet fuel pipelines and storage tanks
at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport in New York.\3\ A
Mexican rebel group detonated multiple bombs along Mexican oil and
natural gas pipelines in July and September, 2007.\4\ In November 2007
a U.S. citizen was convicted of trying to conspire with al-Qaeda to
attack the Trans Alaska Pipeline System and a major natural gas
pipeline in the eastern United States.\5\ Natural gas pipelines in
British Columbia, Canada were bombed six times between October 2008 and
July 2009 by unknown perpetrators.\6\ To date, there have been no known
al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. pipelines, but the threat of such attacks
remains credible.
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\1\ J.L. Shreeve, ``Science & Technology: The Enemy Within,'' The
Independent. London, UK, May 31, 2006, p. 8.
\2\ W. Loy, ``Web Post Urges Jihadists to Attack Alaska Pipeline,''
Anchorage Daily News, January 19, 2006.
\3\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, ``Four Individuals Charged in Plot to
bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport,'' Press release, June 2,
2007.
\4\ Reed Johnson, ``Six Pipelines Blown Up in Mexico,'' Los Angeles
Times, September 11, 2007. p A-3.
\5\ U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle District of Pennsylvania, ``Man
Convicted of Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda
Sentenced to 30 Years' Imprisonment,'' Press release, November 6, 2007;
A. Lubrano and J. Shiffman, ``Pa. Man Accused of Terrorist Plot,''
Philadelphia Inquirer, February 12, 2006, p. A1.
\6\ Elise Stolte, ``EnCana Puts Record $1M on Bomber's Head,''
Edmonton Journal, July 31, 2009.
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Although accidental releases from pipelines in the United States,
on the whole, cause few annual fatalities compared to other product
transportation modes, uncontrolled or intentional pipeline releases
could be catastrophic in specific cases. For example, a 1999 gasoline
pipeline accident in Bellingham, Washington, killed two children and an
18-year-old man, and caused $45 million in damage to a city water plant
and other property. In 2000, a natural gas pipeline accident near
Carlsbad, New Mexico, killed 12 campers, including four children.\7\ In
2006, corroded pipelines on the North Slope of Alaska leaked over
200,000 gallons of crude oil in an environmentally sensitive area. In
2007, the release of anhydrous ammonia from a pipeline in Hillsborough
County, Florida due to vandalism, severely burned the perpetrator and
required an emergency evacuation of the surrounding community.\8\ Such
accidents have generated substantial scrutiny of pipeline regulation
and increased State and community activity related to pipeline safety
and security.\9\
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\7\ National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Report
PAR-03-01, February 2003.
\8\ Nicole Hutcheson and Abbie Vansickle, ``Better Security Urged
For Ammonia Pipeline,'' St. Petersburg Times, January 18, 2008.
\9\ See, for example: Bellingham Herald Editorial Board, ``Citizens
Need Panel To Monitor Pipeline Safety,'' Bellingham Herald (WA),
January 24, 2010; Janet Zink, ``Fueling the Resistance,'' St.
Petersburg Times, December 16, 2007; W. Loy, ``Slope Mayor Questions
Leak Detection,'' Anchorage Daily News, March 14, 2006; J. Nesmith and
R. K. M. Haurwitz, ``Pipelines: The Invisible Danger,'' Austin
American-Statesman, July 22, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the early federal role in pipeline security
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 and the Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979 are two of the key early acts establishing
the Federal role in pipeline operations. Under both statutes, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) is given primary authority to
regulate key aspects of interstate pipeline safety: Design,
construction, operation and maintenance, and spill response planning.
To fulfill this mission, the DOT employs approximately 200 full-time
equivalent pipeline safety staff, including field inspectors, based in
Washington, DC, Atlanta, Kansas City, Houston, and Denver.\10\ In
addition to its own staff, the DOT delegates authority to State
pipeline safety offices for those sections of interstate pipelines
within their boundaries.\11\ Over 400 State pipeline safety inspectors
are available in 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2011: Appendix, February 2010, p. 989.
\11\ 49 U.S.C. 601. States may recover up to 50% of their costs for
these programs from the Federal Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Presidential Decision Directive 63, issued by the Clinton
administration in 1998, assigned to the DOT lead responsibility for
pipeline security as well.\12\ Under this authority, after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the DOT conducted a
vulnerability assessment to identify critical pipeline facilities and
worked with industry groups and State pipeline safety organizations to
assess the industry's readiness to prepare for, withstand, and respond
to a terrorist attack.\13\ Together with the Department of Energy and
State pipeline agencies, the DOT promoted the development of consensus
standards for security measures tiered to correspond with the five
levels of threat warnings issued by the Office of Homeland
Security.\14\ The DOT also developed protocols for inspections of
critical facilities to ensure that operators implemented appropriate
security practices. To convey emergency information and warnings, the
DOT established a variety of communication links to key staff at the
most critical pipeline facilities throughout the country. The DOT also
began identifying near-term technology to enhance deterrence,
detection, response, and recovery, and began seeking to advance public
and private sector planning for response and recovery.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting the Nation's
Critical Infrastructures, May 22, 1998.
\13\ Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), RSPA
Pipeline Security Preparedness, December 2001.
\14\ Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and
Air Quality, House Energy and Commerce Committee, March 19, 2002.
\15\ Ellen Engleman, Administrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), statement before the Subcommittee on Highways
and Transit, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
February 13, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2002, the DOT circulated formal guidance developed in
cooperation with the pipeline industry associations defining the
agency's security program recommendations and implementation
expectations. This guidance recommended that operators identify
critical facilities, develop security plans consistent with prior trade
association security guidance, implement these plans, and review them
annually.\16\ While the guidance was voluntary, the DOT expected
compliance and informed operators of its intent to begin reviewing
security programs within 12 months, potentially as part of more
comprehensive safety inspections.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ James K. O'Steen, Research and Special Programs Administration
(RSPA), Implementation of RSPA Security Guidance, presentation to the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, February 25,
2003.
\17\ Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), personal communication, June
10, 2003.
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transferring pipeline security to tsa
In 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, placing the DOT's pipeline security authority within the
department's newly established Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). The act specified for TSA a range of duties and powers related
to general transportation security, such as intelligence management,
threat assessment, mitigation, security measure oversight and
enforcement, among others. President Bush subsequently signed the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferring TSA to the newly established
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In December 2003, President Bush
issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 maintaining DHS as
the lead agency for pipeline security and instructing the DOT to
``collaborate in regulating the transportation of hazardous materials
by all modes (including pipelines).''
In 2003, among other pipeline-related initiatives, TSA initiated
its on-going Corporate Security Review (CSR) program as the centerpiece
of its pipeline security activities. Under the CSR program, the agency
visits the largest pipeline and natural gas distribution operators to
review their security plans and inspect their facilities. During the
reviews, TSA evaluates whether each company is following the intent of
the DOT's security guidance as updated by TSA. TSA has completed CSR's
covering all of the largest 100 pipeline systems (84% of total U.S.
energy pipeline throughput) and had completed revisits of 41 systems
determined to be at highest security risk. The agency plans to conduct
12 additional reviews in 2010.\18\ According to TSA, recent results
indicate that the majority of U.S. pipeline systems ``do a good job in
regards to pipeline security'' although there are areas in which
pipeline security can be improved.\19\ Past corporate security reviews
have identified inadequacies in some company security programs such as
not updating security plans, lack of management support, poor employee
involvement, inadequate threat intelligence, and employee apathy or
error.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Transportation Security Administration, personal
communication, February 2, 2010.
\19\ Ibid.
\20\ Mike Gillenwater, TSA, ``Pipeline Security Overview,''
Presented to the Alabama Public Service Commission Gas Pipeline Safety
Seminar, Montgomery, AL, December 11, 2007.
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In January, 2007 testimony before Congress, the TSA Administrator
stated that the agency intended to conduct a pipeline infrastructure
study to identify the ``highest risk'' pipeline assets, building upon
such a list developed through the CSR program. He also stated that the
agency would use its on-going security review process to determine the
future implementation of baseline risk standards against which to set
measurable pipeline risk reduction targets.\21\ Provisions in the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
required TSA, in consultation with the DOT, to develop a plan for the
Federal Government to provide increased security support to the ``most
critical'' pipelines at high or severe security alert levels and when
there is specific security threat information relating to such pipeline
infrastructure. The act also required a recovery protocol plan in the
event of an incident affecting the interstate and intrastate pipeline
system. According to TSA, a draft plan has been completed and is
currently under review in the TSA/DHS clearance process.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Hawley, Kip, Asst. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security,
testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for Rail and Surface
Transportation Security, January 18, 2007.
\22\ Transportation Security Administration, personal
communication, February 2, 2010.
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the relationship between dot and tsa
Congress has long had concerns about the appropriate division of
pipeline security authority between the DOT and TSA.\23\ Both the DOT
and TSA have played important roles in the Federal pipeline security
program, with TSA the designated lead agency since 2002. In 2004, the
DOT and DHS entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning
their respective security roles in all modes of transportation. The MOU
notes that DHS has the primary responsibility for transportation
security with support from the DOT, and establishes a general framework
for cooperation and coordination. On August 9, 2006, the departments
signed an annex ``to delineate clear lines of authority and
responsibility and promote communications, efficiency, and
nonduplication of effort through cooperation and collaboration between
the parties in the area of transportation security.''\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ For example, see Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., statement at
the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee
on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines, hearing on Pipeline Safety, March
16, 2006.
\24\ Transportation Security Admin. and Pipelines and Hazardous
Materials Safety Admin., ``Transportation Security Administration and
Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Cooperation on
Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Transportation Security,'' August 9,
2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January, 2007, DOT officials testified before Congress that the
agency had established a joint working group with TSA ``to improve
interagency coordination on transportation security and safety matters,
and to develop and advance plans for improving transportation
security,'' presumably including pipeline security.\25\ According to
TSA, the working group developed a multi-year action plan specifically
delineating roles, responsibilities, resources, and actions to execute
11 program elements: identification of critical infrastructure/key
resources and risk assessments; strategic planning; developing
regulations and guidelines; conducting inspections and enforcement;
providing technical support; sharing information during emergencies;
communications; stakeholder relations; research and development;
legislative matters; and budgeting.\26\ Nonetheless, a DOT Inspector
General (IG) assessment published May 2008 was not satisfied with this
plan. The IG report states that, although the agencies
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Barrett, T.J., Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA), Testimony before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing on Federal Efforts for
Rail and Surface Transportation Security, January 18, 2007.
\26\ Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Security
Division, personal communication, July 6, 2007.
``have taken initial steps toward formulating an action plan to
implement the provisions of the pipeline security annex . . . further
actions need to be taken with a sense of urgency because the current
situation is far from an `end state' for enhancing the security of the
Nation's pipelines.''\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General,
Actions Needed to Enhance Pipeline Security, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, Report No. AV-2008-053, May 21, 2008,
p. 3.
The assessment recommended that the DOT and TSA finalize and
execute their security annex action plan, clarify their respective
roles, and jointly develop a pipeline security strategy that maximizes
the effectiveness of their respective capabilities and efforts.\28\
According to TSA, working with the DOT ``improved drastically'' after
the release of the IG report; the two agencies began maintaining daily
contact, sharing information in a timely manner, and collaborating on
security guidelines and incident response planning.\29\ TSA and the DOT
``continue to enjoy a 24/7 communication and coordination relationship
in regards to all pipeline security and safety incidents.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Ibid. pp. 5-6.
\29\ Transportation Security Administration, personal
communication, February 2, 2010.
\30\ TSA, Pipeline Security Division, personal communication, July
6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
key policy issues
While TSA and the DOT appear to have improved their cooperation
under the terms of the pipeline security annex, key questions remain
regarding what this cooperation entails and the on-going roles of the
two agencies with respect to pipeline security. In this context, two
specific issues may warrant further Congressional consideration: (1)
TSA's pipeline security resources, and (2) potential pipeline security
regulations.
TSA Pipeline Security Resources
Some Members of Congress have been critical in the past of TSA's
funding of non-aviation security activities, including pipeline
activities. For example, as one Member remarked in 2005, ``aviation
security has received 90% of TSA's funds and virtually all of its
attention. There is simply not enough being done to address . . .
pipeline security.''\31\ With respect to pipeline security funding,
little may have changed since 2005. The President's fiscal year 2011
budget request for DHS does not include a separate line item for TSA's
pipeline security activities. The budget request does include a $137.6
million line item for ``Surface Transportation Security,'' which
encompasses security activities in non-aviation transportation modes,
including pipelines.\32\ TSA's pipeline division has traditionally
received from the agency's general operational budget an allocation for
routine operations, travel, and outreach. The budget currently funds 13
full-time equivalent staff to conduct pipeline security inspections,
maintain TSA's pipeline asset database, support TSA's multi-modal risk
models, develop new security standards, and issue regulations, as
required.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, opening statement before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, hearing on the
President's fiscal year 2006 Budget Request for the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), February 15, 2005.
\32\ U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 2011: Appendix, February 2010, p. 526.
\33\ Transportation Security Administration, Pipeline Security
Division, personal communication, February 2, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At its current staffing level, TSA's pipelines division has limited
field presence for inspections and possible enforcement under the
current voluntary standards or future regulations. In conducting a
pipeline corporate security review, for example, TSA typically sends
one to three staff to hold a 3- to 4-hour interview with the operator's
security representatives followed by a visit to only one or two of the
operator's pipeline assets.\34\ There is concern by some that the
agency's CSRs as currently structured may not allow for rigorous
security plan verification nor a credible threat of enforcement, so
operator compliance with security guidance may be inadequate. The
limited number of CSR's the agency can complete in a year is also a
concern to some, even within TSA. According to a 2009 Government
Accountability Office report, ``TSA's pipeline division stated that
they would like more staff in order to conduct its corporate security
reviews more frequently,'' in part because other staff responsibilities
such as ``analyzing secondary or indirect consequences of a terrorist
attack and developing strategic risk objectives required much time and
effort.''\35\
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\34\ Department of Homeland Security, ``Intent to Request Approval
from OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Pipeline
Corporate Security Review,'' 74 Federal Register 42086, August 20,
2009.
\35\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Transportation
Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger Internal Controls
Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation,'' GAO-09-492, March
2009, p. 30, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09492.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA's handful of field inspection staff stands in contrast to the
hundreds of inspection staff available to the DOT at the Federal and
State levels. Given this disparity, it is logical to consider whether
DOT's field staff, who are charged with inspecting the same pipeline
systems as TSA, could somehow be deployed to help fulfill the Nation's
pipeline security objectives. The question also arises whether having
separate inspections of the same pipeline systems for safety and
security may be inherently inefficient, or may miss an opportunity for
more frequent or thorough examination of pipeline security.
Pipeline Security Regulations
Federal pipeline security activities to date have relied upon
voluntary industry compliance with DOT security guidance and TSA
security best practices. By initiating this voluntary approach in 2002,
DOT sought to speed adoption of security measures by industry and avoid
the publication of sensitive security information (e.g., critical asset
lists) that would normally be required in public rulemaking.\36\
However, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 directs TSA to promulgate
pipeline security regulations and carry out necessary inspection and
enforcement--if the agency determines that regulations are appropriate.
Addressing this issue, the 2008 IG report states that ``TSA's current
security guidance . . . remains unenforceable unless a regulation is
issued to require industry compliance.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ GAO, Pipeline Security and Safety: Improved Workforce Planning
and Communication Needed, GAO-02-785, August 2002, p. 22.
\37\ U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, May
21, 2008, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although TSA's fiscal year 2005 budget justification stated that
the agency would ``issue regulations where appropriate to improve the
security of the [non-aviation transportation] modes,'' the agency has
not done so for pipelines, and is not currently working on such
regulations.\38\ The pipelines industry has expressed concern that new
security regulations and related requirements may be ``redundant'' and
``may not be necessary to increase pipeline security.''\39\ The DOT has
testified in the past that enhancing security ``does not necessarily
mean that we must impose regulatory requirements.''\40\ TSA officials
have also questioned the IG assertions regarding pipeline security
regulations, arguing that the agency is complying with the letter of
its statutory requirements and that its pipeline operator security
reviews are more than paper reviews.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security
Administration Fiscal Year 2005 Congressional Budget Justification,
Washington, DC, February 2, 2004, p. 20; TSA, Pipeline Security
Division, personal communication, February 17, 2009.
\39\ American Gas Association (AGA), American Petroleum Institute
(API), Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL), and American Public Gas
Association (APGA), joint letter to members of the Senate Commerce
Committee providing views on S. 1052, August 22, 2005.
\40\ Barrett, T.J. January 18, 2007.
\41\ Sammon, John, Transportation Security Administration,
Testimony before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee hearing on
Implementation of the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and
Safety Act of 2006, June 24, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike maintaining voluntary standards, developing pipeline
security regulations--with provisions for pipeline operations,
inspection, reporting, and enforcement--would involve a complex and
potentially contentious rulemaking process involving multiple
stakeholders. Should Congress choose to mandate the promulgation of
such regulations, it is not clear that TSA's pipeline security division
as currently configured would be up to the task. Indeed, the agency's
relatively limited proposal last year to collect security-related
information from pipeline operators, including reports about security
incidents, was criticized by some in the pipeline industry as
potentially exposing them to civil liability and including ``overbroad
and unnecessary data categories,'' especially with respect to
``suspicious'' activity, which TSA did not clearly define.\42\ By
comparison, the DOT has a history of developing, enforcing, and
updating extensive pipeline safety regulations. Notwithstanding this
well-established regulatory infrastructure, given the division of
pipeline authority between the agencies and their cooperative
agreement, it is not clear that TSA could draw upon the regulatory
capabilities of the DOT should new pipeline security regulations be
required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, ``Re: Intent to
Request Approval from OMB of One New Public Collection of Information:
Pipeline Operator Security Information,'' Letter to the Transportation
Security Administration, September 28, 2009, http://www.ingaa.org/cms/
30/9093.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
Both Government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve
pipeline security since 2001. While the DOT and TSA have distinct
missions, pipeline safety and security are intertwined. As oversight of
the Federal role in pipeline security continues, questions may be
raised concerning the relationship between DHS and the DOT with respect
to pipeline security. In particular, given the limited staff in TSA's
pipeline security division, and the comparatively large pipeline safety
staff in the DOT, Congress may consider whether the agencies' pipeline
security annex optimally aligns staff resources across both agencies to
fulfill the Nation's overall pipeline safety and security mission. In
addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the
various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit
together in the Nation's overall strategy to protect transportation
infrastructure. For example, diverting pipeline resources away from
safety to enhance security might further reduce terror risk, but not
overall pipeline risk, if safety programs become less effective as a
result. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve many groups:
Federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small
pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups
work together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge
for Congress.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Forman for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF GARY L. FORMAN, CHAIR, PIPELINE SECTOR
COORDINATING COUNCIL
Mr. Forman. Thank you, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member
Bilirakis. We appreciate the opportunity for industry to be a
part of this hearing.
As previously indicated, I am the Director of Corporate
Security for NiSource, Inc. NiSource is engaged in natural gas
transmission, storage, and distribution as well as electric
generation, transmission, and distribution.
Regarding pipelines, we own and operate nearly 15,000 miles
of interstate pipelines in 14 States and one of the Nation's
largest natural gas storage systems.
I am here today in my capacity as Chair of the Oil and
Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council, Pipeline Working
Group, a group that is also known as the Pipeline Sector
Coordinating Council. Again, I very much appreciate the
opportunity to participate in this hearing and provide the
input from the pipeline industry.
As a security professional, I believe the lines of
responsibility regarding pipeline security are clear. I believe
that it is the responsibility of pipeline operators to operate
facilities in a safe, secure manner and to work in cooperation
with law enforcement agencies and area residents to provide the
day-to-day security of facilities.
In regard to the responsibilities of the Federal agencies,
the Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, PHMSA, is responsible for
pipeline safety. The Transportation Security Administration,
Pipeline Security Division, is responsible for pipeline
security.
Historically, safety of pipelines has been driven by Title
49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. DOT administers these
regulations through PHMSA with a focus on numerous aspects of
safety, including design, construction, operation of facilities
and management of emergencies.
On September 5, 2002, DOT issued a circular that
recommended that operators identify critical facilities,
develop security plans, implement these plans and review them
annually.
Then on December 17, 2003, a change for us occurred in the
responsible agency for pipeline security when President Bush
issued Homeland Security Directive 7 that identifies DHS as the
lead agency for pipeline security.
Pipeline operators and our trade associations in response
to the new environment created by September 11, 2001, and also
in response to the expectations of agencies including TSA and
DOT, have developed security guidelines for our industry.
Responsible operators have developed company-focused security
programs, conducted risk assessments and implemented security
plans. Pipeline operators have also leveraged years of
experience as well as the requirements of 49 CFR and continue
to maintain emergency response plans that are effective for
security as well as safety incidents.
Pipeline operators have also been instrumental in
developing the Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council
and the Pipeline Working Group as a means of fostering
communications between security personnel in the industry and
with representatives of the various agencies. TSA and DOT have
been active partners in the Energy Sector Government
Coordinating Council and have actively participated in the
joint meetings that occur with the industry's SCC.
TSA has worked closely with relevant agencies and
appropriate industry representatives to develop a responsible
approach to pipeline security. The Transportation System Sector
Specific Plan and Pipeline Modal Annex was developed as an
extension of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. This
document provides direction to operators when establishing
realistic risk-based security programs.
TSA has conducted numerous corporate security reviews and
critical facility inspections to determine if pipeline
operators are developing appropriate security programs,
identifying critical facilities and implementing plans as
appropriate. TSA has shared what they consider to be smart
practices with industry and they also have provided various
other services to the pipeline companies, including training
videos and annually sponsoring the International Pipeline
Security Forum.
Even though DOT working with industry had the original
agency responsibility for security as well as safety of
pipelines, it has been made clear to pipeline operators that
TSA is now the lead agency for issues of pipeline security.
Operators know that in the event of a significant pipeline
safety incident, they need to contact DOT; and in the event of
a pipeline security-related incident, they contact TSA. A
mechanical failure or unintentional act resulting in
significant damage to a pipeline will be reported to DOT
through the National Response Center. An intentional act of
damage or act of suspicious nature involving a pipeline will be
reported to TSA through the Transportation Security Operating
Center. All involved parties must work in cooperation with law
enforcement, local agencies, and first responders to minimize
damage and danger to communities and critical facilities.
In my experience, pipeline operators, TSA, and DOT have
shown a willingness and ability to work together and with other
agencies and local communities in the interest of pipeline
security.
Thank you again. This concludes my testimony and I am happy
to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Forman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary L. Forman
April 19, 2010
introduction
My name is Gary L. Forman and I am currently Director, Corporate
Security for NiSource Inc. NiSource Inc., based in Merrillville,
Indiana, is a Fortune 500 company engaged in natural gas transmission,
storage, and distribution, as well as electric generation,
transmission, and distribution. NiSource operating companies deliver
energy to approximately 3.8 million customers located within a corridor
that runs from the Gulf Coast through the Midwest to New England.
NiSource's Gas Transmission and Storage Operations subsidiaries own
and operate nearly 15 thousand miles of interstate natural gas
transmission pipelines, serving customers in 16 northeastern, mid-
Atlantic, midwestern, and southern States and the District of Columbia.
In addition, the companies operate over 100 compressor stations with a
total of over 1 million horsepower. One of NiSource's Transmission and
Storage subsidiaries owns and operates one of North America's largest
underground natural gas storage systems, operating 37 storage fields in
four States (Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and New York). NiSource
also is one of the Nation's largest natural gas distribution companies,
as measured by number of customers, delivering natural gas to over 3.3
million customers in seven States and operating approximately 58,000
miles of pipeline.
I have over 35 years of experience in the pipeline industry, and
since November 2001, I have been engaged full-time as a security
professional. I am actively involved with the security committees of
industry trade associations, including the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America and the American Gas Association. I have been an
active member of the Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council
(ONG SCC) since it was created in 2004, including service as Chair of
the Council in 2006. I currently am Chair of the ONG SCC Pipeline
Working Group, which also serves as the Pipeline Sector Coordinating
Council (Pipeline SCC). I also held this position in 2006 and 2007. It
is in this capacity, as Chair of the ONG SCC Pipeline Working Group
that I testify before the subcommittee today.
summary
Prudent operators in the pipeline industry take their
responsibility for facility and system security very seriously. The
Department of Transportation and the Transportation Security
Administration have provided guidance and expectations for the
practices and procedures necessary to secure the Nation's critical
pipeline infrastructure. Members of industry and trade associations,
working together and through the Sector Coordinating Councils, have
developed guidelines that are consistent with these expectations. The
typical operator has developed security programs, conducted risk
assessments on their facilities and implemented sound practices that
provide for effective and practical security of their facilities.
When considering the current responsibilities of Federal agencies,
I believe the lines of responsibility regarding pipeline security are
clear. The Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (DOT PHMSA) is responsible for pipeline
safety. The Transportation Security Administration Pipeline Security
Division (TSA PSD) is responsible for pipeline security.
A mechanical failure or unintentional act resulting in significant
damage to a pipeline will be reported to DOT PHMSA through the National
Response Center (NRC). An intentional act of damage, or act of a
suspicious nature involving a pipeline, will be reported to TSA PSD
through the Transportation Security Operating Center (TSOC). If serious
injury, a potential loss of life, or property damages in excess of
$50,000 occurs, the incident must be reported to the NRC.
The emergency response practices prescribed by DOT are used in the
event of any incident, whether intentional or accidental. All involved
parties must work cooperatively with law enforcement, local agencies,
and first responders to minimize damage and danger to local communities
and critical facilities.
In my experience, pipeline operators, TSA PSD and DOT PHMSA have
shown the willingness and ability to work together, with other agencies
and local communities in the interest of pipeline security.
background
Safety has historically played a role of paramount importance in
the operations of pipeline networks. As prescribed in Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, pipeline safety, including emergency
management has been the purview of DOT through the former Office of
Pipeline Safety (OPS) and now PHMSA. Prior to September 11, 2001,
pipeline security played a less prominent role. Following the events of
September 11, 2001, pipeline security has received a much greater
focus.
The earliest formal guidance that pipeline operators received
(after 9/11) regarding pipeline security was through the OPS circular
that was published on September 5, 2002. This guidance recommended that
operators identify critical facilities, develop security plans,
implement these plans, and review them annually.
On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive--7 (HSPD-7). HSPD-7 identified DHS as the lead
agency for pipeline security. The order directs DHS and other Federal
agencies to collaborate with appropriate private sector entities in the
protection of critical infrastructure. In September 2004, a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) was signed by representatives of TSA and DOT.
This MOU again identified DHS as having the primary responsibility for
security of all modes of transportation.
industry activity
Following the attacks on September 11, the focus on security
changed for the Nation and for pipeline operators. As the DOT security
circular was being developed and issued in 2002, industry trade
associations such as the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
(INGAA), the American Gas Association (AGA), and American Petroleum
Institute (API) worked diligently to develop security guidelines
specific to their part of the industry. These guidelines typically
described a practical, risk-based approach to security of oil and
natural gas facilities, including pipelines. Based on these guidelines,
prudent operators then developed or refined company-specific security
programs to meet the needs of their company.
While specifics may vary across industry operators, effective
security programs typically focus on five phases: Planning,
preparation, protection, incident response, and recovery. The planning
phase includes development of a written program that will cover such
areas as methods for vulnerability and risk assessment, protection of
sensitive information, threat responses, cooperation with public safety
personnel, and physical and cybersecurity practices. Preparation
focuses on the completion of facility risk assessments; implementation
of physical and cybersecurity plans, including installation of security
devices where appropriate; and open and clear communication with local,
State, and Federal agencies to remain abreast of possible threats to
the industry. Preparation should also include communications that
encourages land owners and others to report any suspicious activity
that occurs in the vicinity of a pipeline. Protection is the actual
day-to-day use of security components such as fencing, cameras, and
guards. These physical protection components are used in accordance
with facility risk and vulnerability assessments. Local law enforcement
also plays a significant role in the protection of critical
infrastructure, and as such, industry operators are well served to
maintain a close, cooperative relationship with these agencies.
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations continues to govern the
response aspect of security planning. Pipeline companies have years of
experience responding to emergency incidents and are required by DOT to
have effective emergency plans in place. Operators are also required to
report significant incidents--those resulting in serious injury,
potential loss of life, and/or property damage greater than $50,000--to
the NRC.
Responding to a pipeline failure that has been caused by an
intentional act varies little from the response to a mechanical failure
or an unintentional act. However, operators must exercise caution and
recognize that the incident may be criminal in nature and must be
treated accordingly. If the failure was caused by an intentional act,
the operator is also expected to report the incident to TSA, as well as
local law enforcement. Facility restoration is the final component of
an industry security initiative. Specific plans will vary among
operators based on the criticality of pipelines and factors such as
location and time of year.
sector coordinating council
In 2004, at the request of DHS, Sector Coordinating Councils were
formed to coordinate the security initiatives of various different
facets of the Nation's critical infrastructure. The Oil and Natural Gas
Sector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC) was formed cooperatively by 19
industry trade associations to coordinate communications between
industry security professionals and representatives of the Energy
Sector Government Coordinating Council. (See attachment 1)
Subsequent to the formation of the ONG SCC, the Pipeline Working
Group (Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council) was formed to further
enhance communication and collaboration among pipeline operators and
various Government agencies. (See attachment 2)*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Document has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ONG SCC provides a forum for discussion of relevant security
issues and coordination and communication with agency counterparts.
Quarterly meetings are held with SCC representatives and also jointly
with members of the Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council
(GCC). The Energy GCC is chaired by a representative of the Department
of Energy and the GCC includes members of numerous agencies, including
TSA and DOT. The ONG SCC serves as a point of coordination for broad
communication with the security representatives of the oil and natural
gas industry and our partners in State and Federal Government. Members
of the ONG SCC provided significant input to DOE during the development
of the Energy Sector Specific (Security) Plan that was included as part
of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan process.
The ONG SCC has several different working groups that specialize in
key security areas, such as Information Sharing--Homeland Security
Information Network, Cyber Security, and Pipeline Security. The
Pipeline Working Group includes representatives of industry operators
and four of its major trade associations: API, AGA, INGAA, and the
Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL). The group meets as part of the ONG
SCC. In its role as the Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council it also
meets periodically with its counterparts in the Pipeline Government
Coordinating Council. The Pipeline GCC is chaired by a representative
of TSA PSD and includes representatives of DOT and other Federal
agencies. Members of the Pipeline Working Group have provided
significant input to TSA PSD to assist in its development of pipeline
security guidelines. The Pipeline SCC and GCC have been proven to be a
sound avenue of communications between industry and the agencies.
activity of tsa pipeline security division (psd)
TSA's Pipeline Security Division regularly conducts Corporate
Security Reviews (CSR) of major pipeline operators. The CSRs have
focused on the overall security plan implementation of these major
operators.
TSA PSD has also conducted Critical Facility Inspections (CFI) of
identified pipeline locations. The CFIs have focused on the
implementation of security plans and actual day-to-day security
practices at these critical facilities. Results of these reviews have
been used to develop security ``smart practices'' to be shared widely
throughout the industry.
TSA has also provided industry with other valuable services such as
a Pipeline Security Training video available for use by operators and
by sponsoring an annual International Pipeline Security Conference that
brings together pipeline security professionals and representatives of
appropriate agencies. These programs have not only been a means of
evaluating the actual security practices of the pipeline operators, but
they have also been a means of promoting industry familiarity with the
responsibilities and personnel of the TSA PSD.
TSA PSD has also promoted the use of the Transportation Security
Operations Center (TSOC) as a point of contact for pipeline operators
to report any significant security incidents or suspicious activities.
The TSOC is staffed 24 hours per day and disseminates the information
it receives to the appropriate agency or division for response.
In May 2007, TSA issued the Transportation Systems Sector Specific
Plan and Pipeline Modal Annex that is part of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. The Pipeline Modal Annex includes such
items as a description of risk-based security programs, security
program management, and site and program assessment.
Since 2008, TSA PSD has also been developing more specific Pipeline
Security Guidelines. During the development of the Pipeline Modal Annex
and the pipeline Security Guidelines, TSA PSD has taken a practical and
reasoned approach to pipeline security. TSA PSD has worked with
agencies including DOT and DOE and with industry, through the ONG SCC
and the Pipeline SCC, to identify effective and practical security
practices for pipeline operators.
conclusion
Pipeline operators have worked through their industry trade
associations to develop security guidelines. Prudent operators have
developed effective, risk-based security programs and implemented
practices that follow the guidance of TSA PSD and DOT.
Even though DOT had the original responsibility to work with
pipeline operators regarding issues of security, it has been made clear
to pipeline operators through HSPD-7 and coordination and
communications with pipeline operators through the ONC SCC and Pipeline
SCC and member trade associations that TSA PSD is the lead agency for
issues of pipeline security. TSA PSD has reinforced this message by
their contact with pipeline operators during the CSR and CFI process
and by providing relevant security support to industry. Operators know
that in the event of a significant pipeline safety incident they need
to contact DOT PHMSA. In the event of a pipeline security-related
incident they need to contact TSA PSD. A mechanical failure or
unintentional act resulting in significant damage to a pipeline will be
reported to DOT PHMSA through the National Response Center (NRC). An
intentional act of damage or act of a suspicious nature involving a
pipeline will be reported to TSA PSD through the Transportation
Security Operating Center (TSOC). If there are serious injuries,
potential loss of life or damages in excess of $50,000 any incident
must be reported to the NRC. All involved parties must work
cooperatively with law enforcement, local agencies, and first
responders in the event of any incident in order to minimize damage and
danger to persons or property.
In my experience, pipeline operators, TSA PSD and DOT PHMSA have
shown the willingness and ability to work together, with other agencies
and local communities in the interest of pipeline security.
Attachment.--Example: Pipeline Security-Related Incident
As an example of how a security-related incident should be handled,
I am sharing the following.
On April 4, 2010, a representative of Columbia Gas Transmission
Corp (a NiSource company) operations monitoring center received a
report of a significant leak in a pipeline that serves a small mid-
western town. Following established emergency procedures, local
operations personnel responded to the call. Upon arrival they found
that a 6-inch diameter natural gas pipeline that operates at
approximately 170 psig appeared to have been punctured. The line is
suspended over an irrigation canal and is the sole natural gas feed to
this small town. Continuing to follow established emergency procedures,
the operations personnel allowed pressure to be reduced on the line,
and then they made a temporary repair with a plug and clamp. While
making the repair, the supervisor observed that the hole appeared to
have been made by a bullet. As soon as repairs were completed the
supervisor notified Corporate Security and local law enforcement. As
the Corporate Security representative, I notified the TSOC. By
following established emergency procedures, service was maintained to
customers and operations personnel were able to make appropriate short-
term repairs while not endangering individuals or property. More
permanent repairs will be made at an appropriate future time. Also due
to established procedures and the training of the operations personnel,
they made appropriate contact with local law enforcement and corporate
security and the TSOC was notified. Currently the incident is deemed an
act of random vandalism; however, the area and facilities will be
monitored for any future occurrences.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Forman.
That concludes the opening statements. I want to thank all
of you for your testimony and we will now go to the question
section of the hearing. Mr. Bilirakis and I will trade off for
5 minutes at a time here and I will recognize myself for 5
minutes.
Mr. Fox, it was mentioned earlier that there is the
requirement to promulgate regulations. Do you see it as
necessary to do that?
Mr. Fox. The 9/11 Act does have a stipulation in it that we
have to make a determination and, if felt necessary, to
promulgate regulations.
At this point, we are continuing to work with a public/
private partnership that has been established and working well
with industry. It is a subject that we continue to look at. If
we would find that our recommendations are not being heeded--
when we make recommendations, they are actually expectations
that we are putting out, and if industry is not following
those, we would immediately turn to going into regulations. But
at this point, we are still working on this partnership that we
have with the private industry.
Mr. Carney. Do you agree, Mr. Forman?
Mr. Forman. Yes, I do, that is very appropriate.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Parfomak, do you think that is right?
Mr. Parfomak. Not all sectors of critical infrastructure
are subject to security regulations. Some are--nuclear power
plants are, chemical plants are, port facilities are. Some are
not--trucking is not, mass transit is not. You know, we know
there are critical threats to mass transit, happens in Europe,
bombings, that sort of thing. So just because there are
credible threats to it does not necessarily mean that there
must be security regulations applied to those things. So it is
an open question.
I think the issue of whether there should be security
regulations or not does depend on how comfortable Congress
feels about whether the pipeline system is secure. I think the
challenge here is that given the limitations in how closely TSA
can look at the systems and the time elapsed between when they
look at them, it is hard to know for sure whether they really
are or not. I mean you can go and look at them, you can look at
12 systems a year and you can say well, these 12 systems we
just visited and, you know, we met with their staff, we looked
at a couple of spots on the system and it looks like they are
following it and we believe they are sincere. But, you know,
there is 100 others that we did not look at that year or have
not looked at in 3 or 4 years. You know, privately owned
companies, as we know and we have seen many times in the safety
area, even in their best efforts, sometimes they lapse,
sometimes priorities shift, sometimes there are budget
constraints. So we really just do not know for sure because we
do not have the data, because it is not required.
Mr. Carney. Our concern I think is probably shared by
everybody who is in Congress is that there is no problem until
there is a problem, until something happens. Then they will say
well, why was that not regulated? So are we being as
proactive--this is for everybody, you can all jump in on this
one. Are we being as proactive as we need to be or are there
things that we need to do better?
Mr. Forman. Chairman Carney, if I may.
Mr. Carney. Yes.
Mr. Forman. I agree with Mr. Fox, I think the approach that
has been taken, you know, the partnership approach,
particularly on security, is a very good way to continue to
wait and see. Jack and his group--Mr. Fox and his group--works
very closely with the Pipeline Safety Coordinating Council. We
as industry recognize and understand and preach to our members
and other companies that it is our responsibility to be
proactive in security. We do have good guidance out there and
we need to be responsible companies. As Mr. Fox said, they do
CSRs, they do facility reviews, if he determines that there are
companies that are not doing that, then maybe somebody needs to
back up and take another look at it, but we need to be flexible
on the way we approach the security.
One of the things we found when we had regulations, through
some of the other regulations, they tend to be--you know, some
places regulations are really good, but regulations tend to be
very prescriptive. You do the same thing every place. In
security, you waste a lot of resources doing that. When you are
wasting resources on something that is unnecessary one place,
you are really missing and you are wasting and you do not have
the resources to do the things that you need to do at maybe
another potentially critical location. That is one of the
issues I have if we go through a regulatory approach.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Wiese.
Mr. Wiese. I have to say that philosophically I agree with
Mr. Forman's take. The daily threat to pipelines in this
country comes from things like excavation, improperly conducted
excavation, or lack of proper maintenance or lack of proper
operation of the system. That said, I do not think anyone is
interested in downplaying the risk from potential terrorist
activity or vandalism.
I would say that the decision on regulation, really Jack
Fox and his group are intimately more involved and informed
than I am on that matter. But I will tell you that the
partnership between TSA and PHMSA is working quite well.
If Jack came to us, for example--to my knowledge, no
operator has ever told TSA that they would not implement their
recommendations. But even if push came to shove, I think we
would try to use our authority to define that through a
corrective action order or safety order to that operator.
Mr. Carney. Okay, thank you. My time is up, this 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Can everyone hear us in the
audience? Okay. Can you hear also--okay, very good--the
presenters? Okay, very good.
My first question is to Mr. Fox. The first pipeline
security guidelines were issued by DOT in 2002. Section 1557 of
the 9/11 Act required TSA to update security recommendations
and transmit them to owner/operators by February 2009. Where is
TSA in meeting this requirement? That is my first question.
Mr. Fox. That is a very good question. The updated security
guidelines have been finished. We worked with our Government
partners as well as with private industry on those. They have
been finished and currently they are at TSA under review. They
have not been issued to industry at present.
Mr. Bilirakis. Give me some specific obstacles that have
prevented a more timely release of updated guidelines to
pipeline owners and operators. What were the obstacles, why is
it taking so long?
Mr. Fox. Our legal staff obviously has been busy with lots
of regulations that they are working on for some of the other
modes. They have to get clearance through legal before we can
release them.
There is also something referred to as the Paperwork
Reduction Act that if we ask more than nine companies for a
certain piece of information, we must file notice in the
Federal Register that we are going to do this. In the new
guidelines, there are two different requests for information.
One is we asked for the name and 24-hour contact number of
security directors of the pipeline companies so that we can
reach them any time day or night. The second is if they see
something suspicious, asking them to call our Security
Operations Center. We have gone through the 60-day notice and
have only received I believe five comments from industry. We
have adjudicated those and we are in the process of releasing a
30-day notice which is required prior to release of the
guidelines.
So they are not far away, but they are not released at this
time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
For Mr. Forman, what is the extent of the Pipeline Sector
Coordinating Council and other industry input that was included
in the draft of the new pipeline security guidelines?
Mr. Forman. We were very much included in the process. We
were asked to participate and provide input to Mr. Fox and his
staff. They had representatives, a good cross-section of
physical and cyber-security representatives, to be able to
provide input into the document and the document that I have
seen at this point, since it has not been finally released to
us, is a very good, common-sense, realistic approach to
security for pipeline companies and the industry.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir.
Again for Mr. Fox, in his written testimony Director
Gispert noted that his office has not had contact with your
office since the ammonia workshop in August 2008--he may want
to elaborate on this when he testifies--and that he would
welcome the opportunity to share information with TSA.
What mechanisms do you have in place to share information
with State and local emergency response officials when either
you or they feel the need arises? I think this is very
important.
Mr. Fox. If we felt the need arise for a certain incident,
we would reach out directly to them, making a phone call or
making a visit, depending on what the situation was. But we
would reach out if we felt the need.
If in fact they felt a need to reach us for something, we
have a website, a link to a website where people can drop an e-
mail to us, we have contact phone numbers where they can reach
out to us. We have many mechanisms, either by telephone or by
e-mail where they could reach out to us.
Frequently we give speeches about pipeline security at
various locations. If we are asked to come, we typically will
do that. If a State asks us to come and speak--actually Florida
has an association of pipelines that has a meeting this July
that we will be speaking at to those operators that are in
attendance.
Any time information is asked of us, we do our best to get
back as promptly as we can and support whoever that is, if it
is pertaining to pipeline security.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Fox, let us deviate slightly here and talk about the
2011 budget request. I see that there is not a separate line
item for TSA's pipeline security activities. The budget does
include $137-million-plus for surface transportation security.
Do you fall under that?
Mr. Fox. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carney. Can you elaborate, kind of a breakdown on how
much resource you have?
Mr. Fox. This current year's budget is about $4 million
that is directly related to our pipeline group; slightly less
than $2 million of that is for salaries and benefits. The
remaining is for projects that we have on-going, outstanding
contracts. As I mentioned, we have a video in production right
now on pipeline security to assist local law enforcement in
understanding what pipelines do and the security. We have a
second video about improvised explosive devices and training
for first responders, that is also in production this year.
Mr. Carney. Right. Could you tell me your office's budget,
how many FTEs you have, how many contractors you have working
for you?
Mr. Fox. Currently we have budgeted for 13 FTEs.
Contractors, we have none on staff. We do have a contract force
that is helping us with one of our programs referred to as our
critical facility inspection. Critical facility inspections
were required of us under the 9/11 Act. There is approximately
in the United States 380 critical pipeline facilities, by a
definition that we have. With TSA and contract forces that are
helping us with this review, we have conducted reviews of
slightly more than 200 of those locations at this point. We
hope to be finished by the end of the year 2011 with that
project.
Mr. Carney. Are 13 people enough?
Mr. Fox. Well, we have one of our staff that is out with
two contract folks on these reviews.
Mr. Carney. I am talking about the whole office here, Mr.
Fox.
Mr. Fox. Can I get back to you on that?
Mr. Carney. I would prefer you answer now. You are
perfectly welcome to say that you need more resources, would
not break my heart a bit.
Mr. Fox. Presently the agency--we have just added--we had
12, we are adding a 13th person right now. We continue to grow
the program, it is a slow process, we are in competition with
some other modes, as you know. We try and use whatever
resources the agency gives us the best we can to get as much as
we can for the money that we have available.
Mr. Carney. I appreciate the efficiency with which you are
working. I think I got the other answer out of that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carney. You know, what almost every one of you have
talked about in terms of pipeline issues is the cyber-threat.
You know, everything is computer controlled now or most things
are computer controlled now and we know that we are under
constant attack from within and without this country on the
cyber-security network. You know, what are we doing there? Mr.
Fox first and then Mr. Forman.
Mr. Fox. Using the guidelines that will be out shortly, we
have a section in there on cyber-security. We have used the
services of Johns Hopkins University's applied physics lab to
assist us with this and also private industry brought in some
of their SCADA security experts to work with us on this
project. It is something that I know industry values very much,
it is a concern. If someone did hack into a SCADA system, it
could be shut down. They are designed so it should not make
them explode or do anything else, but it could cause
disruption, it could cause them to shut down, but it should not
cause a failure to the system.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Forman, please.
Mr. Forman. First of all, I wanted to agree with Mr. Fox on
his last comment that a SCADA system failure, somebody hacking
in, probably the worst they could do is we could be shut down,
which could be certainly significant, depending on the
marketplace, the time of year, and all that kind of stuff. But
it is not as bad as it is on the electric side. Electric is
instantaneous, if you lose a SCADA system on electric, you have
got a serious problem. Typically the oil and natural gas side
and the pipeline side still has--can maintain some degree of
control. But we are very focused on that. Again, through our
Sector Coordinating Council, we have a cyber group, some of the
experts within the industry, that provided input to Mr. Fox's
guidelines but also developing the day-to-day kind of guidance
that we need in the industry also.
Mr. Carney. How many cyber attacks do you think the
pipeline industry has faced?
Mr. Forman. My expertise is the physical security side, so
I cannot give you a really good answer on that but I would say
anybody that has cyber facilities, there are certainly hundreds
and hundreds of day-to-day kind of issues, you know, somebody
always trying to slam into firewalls and those kinds of things.
I do not know the right technical terms for it, but there are a
lot of issues with it and all of us major pipeline operators
have our own cybersecurity professionals that work for us too.
Mr. Carney. We will revisit this on my next turn. Mr.
Bilirakis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As a follow-up to Chairman Carney's question, to what
extent does your office work with National Cyber Security
Division to ensure that cybersecurity is included in any
guidance provided to pipeline operators?
Mr. Forman. For me?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, for you, sir.
Mr. Forman. Again, we have--within our companies, we all
have cybersecurity professionals. We have to have people that
are focused on the cyber side of it and work with not only Mr.
Fox's agency but they work with the FBI through the InfraGard,
they work with all the cyber experts so that we can have good
coverage and maintain protection for particularly our SCADA and
control systems, let alone our day-to-day business systems.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Fox.
Mr. Fox. Thank you. We do work with Cyber Security Division
of DHS. One of the things that our office does, we hold a
monthly teleconference for industry, held the third Tuesday of
each month. We have brought in a speaker from Cyber Security
Division to let industry know what services would be made
available or could be made available to them. Actually later
this week, tomorrow and Wednesday in New Orleans, the American
Petroleum Institute is having their annual pipeline conference.
I will be speaking on pipeline security, but following the
pipeline conference is a cybernetics conference and I have made
arrangements for someone from the cyber group of DHS to be one
of the cybernetics conference speakers at that event.
So we do work with them as we can and get information out
to industry when we can as to a service that can be made
available to them.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Question for Mr. Wiese. To what degree are DOT pipeline
inspectors utilized to check for security compliance as well as
safety?
Mr. Wiese. That is a good question. We have worked with
Jack and his staff for quite some time to work on the corporate
security reviews when invited. You know, when they are going to
the top 100, we have pledged support of their group, so we will
go along and try to lend our expertise as well. So I think on a
regular basis, annually, we work on the corporate security
reviews.
You know, on the inspector basis, we talk on almost a daily
basis. I think as we said, we are all tied into the National
response framework and the communications that come under that.
So I think we are also meeting quarterly to exchange
information. But the inspectors and I think that extends as
well to the State inspectors, there are quite a few inspectors
in each of the States, with the exception of Hawaii and Alaska,
and Jack and his folks work with the State inspectors as well.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
A question for Mr. Forman. You state in your testimony that
the lines of responsibility between TSA and DOT are clear. Do
you believe that experience with actual responses to incidents
reflects this as well and do you believe that the smaller
owners and operators and local emergency response officials are
clear on who is responsible at the Federal level? I think this
is very important. How about coordination between TSA and the
U.S. Coast Guard which has responsibility for responding to
incidents on the waterways?
Mr. Forman. I think for those of us in the pipeline
industry that do work full time in security, I think it is
pretty clear that DOT is safety and TSA is security, because we
have worked on it extensively.
Mr. Bilirakis. It is clear in the private sector?
Mr. Forman. In the private sector, certainly through the
sector council. In our sector council, the Oil and Natural Gas
Sector Council, we represent 23 trade associations, roughly--
let me put it that way, roughly 20 trade associations now. So
that filters down to the members and hopefully to all those
smaller members also. I certainly cannot guarantee that it has
reached everybody, but I think it probably has in some form or
fashion. So I think it is pretty well known on the industry
side.
Personal experience with response, whether it was a safety
incident or a security incident, whether I have had to call
National Response Center or the TSOC, I received good response
and it has been very clear. You know, DOT responds when they
are supposed to and TSA has responded. I have gotten the right
questions from the right people. So again, that has been my
experience with it.
You asked about the Coast Guard. The lines were somewhat
blurred when the Coast Guard came out with some of their MTSA,
Maritime Transportation Security Act, regulations a number of
years ago. I think there was a number of issues when that first
came out. But I think now, as we have worked through it, I do
not know of any real major issues right now between the Coast
Guard and TSA on facilities. There are certainly some overlaps.
You know, in some facilities, there will be multiple agencies
who will have some form of responsibility. But I think that, at
least from my experience, it has been working well.
Mr. Bilirakis. Can you explain, and maybe the rest of the
panel can chime in, why TSA should have responsibility over
security and DOT over safety? Why can it not just be one
agency?
Mr. Forman. One agency?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yeah.
Mr. Forman. I do not know that I can give you a real good
answer on that, but from my perspective, the answer would be
TSA is the transportation security agency for all forms of
transportation. Pipelines are a form of transportation. And to
me, that is why they have the security responsibility for it.
We have always worked closely with DOT on the safety side, but
I can see no real reason that TSA has not--would not have the
security responsibility for those same pipelines because they
are a form of transportation.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, anyone else want to add to that?
Mr. Fox. I think ATSA, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, made it clear that TSA would be the Federal
agency responsible for security of six modes of transportation,
including pipelines. Actually now, since then, one mode, the
maritime mode, the Coast Guard is the actual lead agency, but
the other five modes, TSA is the lead agency for security of
those modes. It has been backed up by Presidential Directive as
well.
But it is a different expertise. Our folks concentrate on
the security and have the expertise. It is not--there is an
intertwining of safety and security, but companies separate,
larger companies have people that are responsible for safety
and people responsible for security. There is a separation and
different duties within the company, in the industry, as well
as in the Federal Government.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else?
Mr. Parfomak. Where to put pipelines has always been a
little bit tricky because they are a mode of transportation but
it's not like a ferry or an aircraft or a subway system or
trucks----
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Mr. Parfomak [continuing]. On highways where you have got
lots of people that might be killed. I mean it could happen in
a pipeline terrorist attack. More likely, you would have a
disruption like when the BP Alaska pipeline shut down Prudhoe
Bay oilfields for some time and that was 10 percent of our oil
supplies from Alaska were interrupted because of corrosion in
those systems. So there is economic implications.
It is a mode of transportation, but it is really considered
part of the energy sector and so Congress has always struggled
where to put this. You know, TSA, they know the security stuff,
they know about incidents, they are listening in on the
chatter, they are tied in directly with who is looking at al-
Qaeda and ecoterrorists and other folks. You know, let us not
forget that there have been pipeline attacks in British
Columbia, several in the last couple of years, that were most
likely not Islamic terrorists, but nonetheless somebody was
blowing them up. So there is a whole range of things that TSA
potentially has the information, the risk management, how to
coordinate response impacts, cascading impacts. If you shut
down a pipeline what happens to downstream facilities, those
are all the sorts of things that TSA is intended to be good at.
On the other hand, you could argue that the history and the
experience with the pipeline systems and the level of staff
resides in the DOT. So I mean, you know, Congress has decided
with the past President's help where this ought to go. One
could argue either way. This is the way it is right now.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, appreciate it.
Why don't I yield back? I have a couple in the next round.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
Mr. Wiese, you were going to finish up.
Mr. Wiese. If you would allow me. You know, I have wondered
about this question myself. To be honest with you, there is no
clean line. I think we have to work well across the lines. One
of the things I will say about pipelines, you have to think of
them as the overwhelming majority of pipelines are shippers,
just shippers. They do not own the product. They move the
product from someone who is delivering to someone who is
consuming. So in many ways, it does fit well within the
Department of Transportation, which regulates shippers. But
that is it.
I mean clearly we have to work well with others, whether it
is the TSA or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the
Department of Energy. That speaks to the need for interagency
coordination. So just wanted to draw out the fact that we do
regulate shippers in a rate-constrained environment as well.
Mr. Carney. I appreciate that. One of the frustrations--I
have been working in some capacity in the Federal Government
for many, many years and one of the profound frustrations that
I have felt are these sort of distinct lines that you do not
cross. So you end up creating seams in Government activity.
While we tend to get a little bit uncomfortable with gray area
or fuzzy lines or whatever, I for one happen to think that it
might work. If you guys are making this work and if the
industry is content and if the outside viewers seem to think
that it is okay so far, you know, I think this is something
that could be examples for other things going forward.
I do not know how many interagency meetings I have sat in
on on the defense-related side of things. They are exasperating
because the concern is protecting of bureaucratic turf more
than actual doing the job. My concern actually frankly, Mr.
Fox, is that you guys do not have enough resources to do what
you are supposed to do. But that has been a concern of mine
across a number of issues.
Dr. Parfomak, I really want to get your views on a couple
of things. First of all, is the industry and DOT, TSA doing the
cyber-security thing correctly from your perspective? Are they
testing the system? Are they doing that sort of thing?
Secondly, do you think that more resources are needed at TSA?
Mr. Parfomak. I am not really qualified to get into details
of the cybersecurity specifics. I can say that they have been
active in going to reputable places to get help and look at
these issues, and as the agencies have said, they have been
addressing them proactively.
I think there is an awareness across the utility industry,
both in pipelines, electric power, and natural gas and
petroleum, that cybersecurity is a really big deal. There have
been very prominent cybersecurity attacks on critical energy
infrastructure in the United States and everybody knows that,
everybody knows that they are vulnerable. In the electric power
sector, which is probably the most vulnerable to attacks by
cybersecurity, there are regulations for cybersecurity. So I
can say that I have not heard or read anything that suggests
that not enough attention is being given to this issue in the
pipeline sector.
I have forgotten your second question.
Oh, do I think----
Mr. Carney. Are they resourced adequately?
Mr. Parfomak. Well, it depends on what you want them to do.
Mr. Carney. Well, okay, there is about 13 of them
apparently and 2.5 million miles of pipeline.
Mr. Parfomak. If Congress is satisfied that folks from TSA
can physically go and visit a dozen major systems a year, and
let us say there are 100 that are really important, that I
think carry 85 percent of the volume throughput in the country.
Mr. Carney. Uh-huh.
Mr. Parfomak. That on those visits they can--a lot of this
is documented in the GAO report on the subject, including Mr.
Fox's statement that he would like more staff to do CSRs more
frequently.
Mr. Carney. See, you can tell me that directly, too, you
know that, it is fine.
Mr. Parfomak. Which would be my testimony, I believe.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Parfomak. So, you know, it depends. If you think that
they are doing a good job and they just need an occasional
checkup and that, you know, you are comfortable with several
years between actually going and seeing a system, and in
between time, you are really taking their word for it; then,
you know, they are doing a fine job and that is what they are
doing.
You know, history in the pipeline safety world suggests
that that might not be enough. I mean even--as you may know,
there have been a lot of very prominent pipeline safety
incidents over the last 15 years and DOT has done a really,
really good job, sometimes under the lash of Congress, of
updating their pipeline safety regulations and putting in
integrity management systems. But these are very complex, very
sophisticated risk-based regulations. Even then, we have things
like the Prudhoe Bay pipeline shutting down. There are still,
notwithstanding hundreds and hundreds of inspectors and very
stringent, very specific, very well-thought-out regulations,
hundreds and hundreds of incidents of safety violations from
these inspections.
So, notwithstanding having what some would hold up as a
model safety regulatory regime and good relationships between
the Government and operators, there are still many, many
violations reported. So you have to ask yourself: Do you
believe that there are no security regulations in the pipeline
system?
I do not know the answer to that, but, you know, that is a
question for Congress.
Mr. Carney. Sure.
Mr. Wiese, what is different in terms of the security
aspect that you do as opposed to TSA or is--I assume you do
some security. You say safety, but----
Mr. Wiese. There are light security provisions in some of
our regulations but they are really meant not to deter someone
who is determined to cause damage. They are meant for site
security, trying to keep people out of areas where there is
rotating equipment or just general light protection around the
facility. It is clearly not meant, you know, for someone who is
determined to cause havoc. That is really where our friends at
TSA come in.
So there is an overlap in there, but clearly when it gets
down to that level of threat, we are talking about TSA and our
job there I think we understand is to support them.
Mr. Carney. Sure.
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I am in
agreement with you, we need more positions, more resources for
TSA, so we need to do something about that.
For Mr. Fox, how do you measure the progress of all
pipeline systems in meeting the security guidelines? Do you
maintain statistics on how facilities have implemented the
guidelines? Do you have inspectors to ensure that they are
actually being complied with or do you rely on self-reporting?
Mr. Fox. As I stated before, we have two different
programs. One is what we refer to as the corporate security
reviews and we have reviewed the top 100 systems and now we are
back and have probably done 40 percent on a second review. It
indicates to us by these reviews that the security of the
Nation's pipelines is improving. But that is a paper review in
an office.
We also, by our corporate facility inspections, as required
of us under the 9/11 Act, are actually having boots on the
ground, people out at each of the critical facilities. As I
stated previously, we have done slightly over 200 out of the
380 in the country. For the most part, security is very good.
Where we see weaknesses in security, we review that with
the company right on site--what we feel they need to do. How
they need to do it is up to them, we do not specify exactly how
to do it but we tell them what the desired result or the
necessary result is. A report is written up after the fact and
then given to the company with those recommendations in it.
We are going to be starting with--we have talked recently
of starting a program of now following up with the companies to
see the status of those recommendations. On this date, we told
you you ought to do this: Where does it stand? So that is
something that we are just starting at this time.
But we have two different programs. One is more of a
corporate basis and the other is boots on the ground of people
out in the field with fantastic security expertise meeting with
the companies and going out.
Mr. Bilirakis. I would be interested in getting a progress
report every so often if that is possible.
Mr. Fox. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
The next question is for Mr. Forman. How often does the
Pipeline Working Group SCC receive threat information,
classified or unclassified, regarding pipeline security?
Mr. Forman. We have a monthly conference call with
unclassified type of threat information that we receive through
DHS. We also have a monthly call with TSA that focuses on cyber
and physical. Then they also make available to us twice a year
typically, a classified briefing for those of us that actually
have a security clearance.
Mr. Bilirakis. Good.
Mr. Forman. If I might expand on that just a little bit.
That is probably one of the best services that can be provided
to us as industry. You know, we can do a lot on our own
security, we can do a lot on determining the consequences of
individual facilities. Where we have issues is determining what
the real threats really are that are out there.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Mr. Forman. The Government really does play a major role in
providing that to us. They are getting better.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Anyone else want to comment on
that?
Mr. Fox. Yes, I would like to comment. It is rare, but at
times we do get specific information about a company,
classified information about a company, that they are under
surveillance or what-have-you. We then work directly with that
company, share with them what we can. Typically their security
managers have a clearance, we can share that classified
information with them and also work with them on making sure
they are doing all they can to protect their facilities. We
worked with a company involved on the JFK Airport. We have had
three or four other instances in the last 5 years where we have
actually brought companies in, reviewed classified data with
them and then put a team together out in the field to help them
better harden their facilities that were under observation.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Anyone else that would like to
comment?
[No response.]
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. To what--this is for Mr. Forman. To
what degree does the Department of Energy play a role in
pipeline security?
Mr. Forman. DOE plays a significant role in the overall
security for the energy organizations or energy industry. The
Energy Sector Specific Security Plan that was written, DOE is
the sector-specific agency for that. For our Oil and Natural
Gas Sector Coordinating Council, they are the counterpart lead
or chair for the Government Sector Coordinating Council, so
they certainly do play a role. Again, if you separate the
energy away from the pipeline side, they are a major player.
But the reality is, as we have talked about all the way through
this, it is a partnership. DOE works with TSA and certainly as
we have looked at DOE's sector-specific plan, there are no
conflicts between that plan and the plan that was developed by
TSA for pipelines. If we had conflicts, we would have had a
real problem, but we do not have those conflicts. In fact, they
are very compatible plans, so they work together on it.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
A question for Mr. Wiese. How many emergency responders
have received training from your emergency responder training
materials and is there a cost to local emergency response
providers wishing to receive these materials?
Mr. Wiese. Thank you for that question. Actually there is
no cost.
Mr. Bilirakis. There is no cost?
Mr. Wiese. There is none. That was a provision of our
cooperative agreement with the National Association of State
Fire Marshals. They could assess a recovery fee to others, but
not to emergency responders. That was the benefit of our grant
to them fundamentally.
You know, I cannot answer precisely the number who have
been trained. I would be happy to submit that for the record,
but I know that there have been hundreds of trainers trained.
Our initial round was to go out and teach the folks who go into
the emergency response community and conduct training. So we
have gone out State by State----
Mr. Bilirakis. Are these trainers locals?
Mr. Wiese. Yes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Oh, okay.
Mr. Wiese. They would be in a county setting or in some
cases in the fire academies or what-not. But to do the training
of the trainers. So I cannot actually answer but I could ask
and try to inquire and get you an answer back about the
students receiving it.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, can you get back to us on that?
Mr. Wiese. I certainly will.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very important. Thank you. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis.
We have heard a couple of times now about the corrosion in
Alaska in the pipeline. Is corrosion an issue across the
network?
Mr. Wiese. I would be glad to take a first swing at that
one.
Mr. Carney. Sure.
Mr. Wiese. Absolutely. Any time you have ferrous materials,
you know, in contact with soil and other things, you are going
to have corrosion, and contact with salt water or salt mist or
spray. So it is a constant threat, but it is one that is pretty
well understood in the pipeline community. The question is the
level of maintenance and the level of integrity assessment that
the companies put forward.
One of things I should add with your permission is to say
that the pipeline operator--I had this conversation earlier--
really bears the ultimate responsibility. They are the ones
deriving the economic benefit from the shipping. It is their
responsibility. Our regulations set the parameters for that,
but clearly most operators go beyond the regulations in certain
areas. Some go under the regulations. Our job is to provide a
deterrence to that, you know. But again, I want to underline,
whether it is security or safety, I think the matter is the
same, the pipeline operator bears the responsibility for doing
that in line with the guidance that is provided.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Forman, how many miles of pipeline are
replaced every year, do you know?
Mr. Forman. I have no idea how many are replaced every
year.
Mr. Carney. You know, just on routine maintenance. Not
sure?
Mr. Forman. I do not know. Mr. Wiese may have a better idea
than I do. Again, my focus is security and I have not been on
that operating side for a long time.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Mr. Forman. My apologies.
Mr. Carney. You know, I kind of want to look a little bit
into the future now. I obviously represent an area with the
Marcellus shale formation and the natural gas that it contains.
By some estimates, almost every estimate that I have read, it
is 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the biggest natural
gas plate in America. I imagine that is going to entail a few
more pipelines. Do we have any estimates on how many more miles
of pipeline are going to be built in the next 20 or 30 years? I
am not talking just about Pennsylvania, New York State, and
Ohio and West Virginia, but generally.
Mr. Wiese. I will answer in two ways. One is there was a
recent study issued by the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America in which they projected annual construction. To the
best of my ability to recall this--and it has been a little
while since I saw it--they are projecting somewhere on the
order of 2,000 to 3,000 miles per year of gas transmission
pipeline. That is actually down from the past couple of years.
There was a real spike in construction activity. So that is the
first part.
In terms of the large diameter long distance pipelines,
there will be plenty coming from the Marcellus shale. They are
going to take it to the markets where it is needed and will be
consumed.
But there is another sector of the pipeline that I think
you will also see in Marcellus which are gas gathering, which
are smaller ones that take it from a wellhead somewhere to a
place where it is processed and then moved into the
transportation network.
Mr. Carney. The way the industry has described it to me is
a web.
Mr. Wiese. Yes, spaghetti bowl, I have seen that one before
too.
Mr. Carney. I hope it is not a spaghetti bowl.
Mr. Wiese. But eventually, you have got to get the gas from
the wellhead to the transportation artery system, so I really
cannot project that one, but I know it will be significant in
the shale gas plate.
Mr. Carney. So if it is going to be a significant increase
in miles of line and gathering line and things like that, do we
see a significant increased opportunity for those who want to
do ill to have a place to strike?
Mr. Parfomak. I think the issue is not how many miles of
pipeline, but where they are. Historically natural gas from the
west, while you had enormous pipelines going through the middle
of nowhere, sage grouse country, not that they are not
important, but----
Mr. Carney. They are delicious.
Mr. Parfomak [continuing]. You know, there were not a whole
lot of people there and so your security concerns would be
about disruption of supplies, not injuring people necessarily,
although it could certainly happen out there. But when you get
to the east, east of the Mississippi, you have much more
populated areas and so the concern there is that you are
building comparable lengths of pipeline, but they are proximate
to far, far greater numbers of people.
Now FERC has regulatory jurisdiction of the siting of the
natural gas transmission pipelines and they are not here. They
would be good people to talk to about, you know, where they
anticipate that and how they are viewing that. Certainly FERC
takes safety and security considerations into account in their
siting decisions, but you would have to speak directly to them
to figure out how--to learn how they are dealing with expansion
due to Marcellus shale and the other gas shale plates.
Mr. Carney. Thanks.
Mr. Forman. If I could add just a little bit. One of the
things that I have found is that the historical facilities,
when they were built, security was not a consideration because
it just was not--you know, prior to 9/11, it really was not at
the forefront of things you thought about when you built a
pipeline facility because it was not a big issue. Now it is.
Just like safety, just like all--operational integrity and all
the other things. When new facilities are built, security is
one of those components. You know, the operating guys come talk
to the security guys and it is part of the consideration when
those new facilities are built.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Mr. Wiese.
Mr. Wiese. I wonder if I might just add something. You
know, we have looked at this too, but from a different
standpoint. When there is a natural disaster, whether it is a
hurricane or something else. One thing I will say, our studies
on this in looking at the system is it is fairly robust. The
system can take a shock locally and Nationally you will not see
a huge impact. But I do want to say that the impacts locally
are not to be diminished, I am not trying to do that. I am just
drawing back on it for a second to say the system is fairly
flexible. Gas can be--particularly gas--can be redirected
fairly easily.
So a lot of the companies prestore pipe too and so the line
would be shut down automatically but then it would probably
take on the order of 5 to 7 days to restore flow again. So I do
not want to diminish the impact because locally that is felt
and it can be significant, but Nationally I think the system
can take a shock like that and absorb it fairly easily.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Fox.
Mr. Fox. If I may. I believe in front of you, you have a
map of the continental United States that shows the
transmission network.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Fox. Yes, sir. The blue lines are existing natural gas
transmission lines. So as Mr. Wiese stated, it is a very robust
system. If there is a failure or an attack on one line, many
times there are other systems that the products or natural gas
can be rerouted. So this map with all these lines shows, as we
have stated, 2.5 million miles of pipelines. These are just the
transmission lines, so it is about half a million miles. So
there are 2 million more miles of distribution lines not shown
here, but it gives you an idea of where we are getting our
natural gas and our oils and where we are shipping them to.
Mr. Carney. I would like to see this map updated in 5 years
to see where the lines are. I suspect the northeast will be a
little darker blue.
Mr. Fox. I agree.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Bilirakis, any further questions?
Mr. Bilirakis. No, I am finished. Thank you very much for
your testimony, appreciate it.
Mr. Carney. I want to thank you all. We likely will have
further questions. The good thing about these hearings is that
the more questions you ask, the more questions you want to ask,
but we do not have time. So if we do respond in writing with
questions, please get back to us with your answers in a short
order so we do not have to call you back before us again to
answer them directly.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony, for your
insight and your expertise and for what you are doing. We will
conclude this panel one and we will take a 5-minute recess for
people to refresh and then we will get right back to it with
the second panel.
[Recess.]
Mr. Carney. I would like to welcome our second panel to the
hearing today.
Our first witness is Mr. Larry Gispert. Mr. Gispert has
lived in the Tampa area for most of his life and has been
employed by the Hillsborough County Emergency Management since
1980 and has been the director in charge of the county's
emergency management program since 1993. Mr. Gispert is
certified by the Florida Emergency Preparedness Association, or
FEPA, as a professional emergency manager. He is also actively
involved with FEPA and served as the treasurer from 1998 to
1999 and the president in 2000. He has also served in various
positions with the International Association of Emergency
Managers, including the Region 4 president from 2004 to 2006,
the first vice president in 2007 and the president in 2008. Mr.
Gispert holds an Associate of Arts from St. Petersburg Junior
College, an Associate of Science from Tampa Technical and a
Bachelor of Science from the University of Tampa.
Our second witness is Mr. Ron Rogers. Mr. Rogers is the
assistant chief administrator with Hillsborough County Fire and
Rescue and the program manager for the Florida USAR Task Force
3. Mr. Rogers is the past chairman of the Florida Association
for Search and Rescue, FASAR, and the past chairman of the
Florida Association of HazMat Responders. He has worked in
various positions in emergency response within Hillsborough
County for over 29 years. He spent a majority of that time
providing emergency medical care to the citizens of
Hillsborough County as a paramedic for 15 years and as the
special operations chief for 9 years. I was a paramedic too,
sir, worked my way through college that way. During major
events, Mr. Rogers is responsible for coordinating specialty
resources for ACFR Florida and TF 3 and was responsible for the
coordination of all search and rescue resources during 2004 and
2005 hurricane seasons. This involved him in responding in
advance to the storms to coordinate these joint Federal/State
USAR efforts. As part of the State's effort to coordinate
domestic preparedness, he serves as one of the co-chairs of the
Regional Domestic Security Task Force.
Our third witness is Colonel Ed Duncan. Colonel Duncan
served the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office in 1978--
joined, I am sorry, joined the Hillsborough County Sheriff's
Office in 1978 and is currently the commander of the Department
of Operations Support. He supervises the operations for all
emergency preparedness initiatives and tactical operations,
including the special weapons and tactics team, crisis
negotiations team, criminal intelligence unit, bomb squad and
dive team, along with the marine, K9 and aviation units.
Colonel Duncan also supervises criminal investigations
addressing environmental and agricultural crimes. That is a
hell of a resume. During his tenure at the sheriff's office,
Colonel Duncan has served as a patrol deputy, organized crimes
detective, internal affairs corporal, tactical section
sergeant, patrol lieutenant, criminal investigations division
deputy commander and commander of the homeland security
division. Colonel Duncan has also served as an active SWAT team
member and assistant team leader. Colonel Duncan has a Bachelor
of Arts in criminal justice from St. Leo University and is a
graduate of the Ninth Session of the Senior Leadership Program
at the Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute. He has
attended the United States Secret Service Dignitary Protection
Seminar and various other law enforcement and tactical training
courses. Colonel Duncan is currently the co-chairman of
Florida's Region 4 Urban Area Security Initiative, committee
chair for the Regional Domestic Terrorism Task Force, a voting
member of the Medical Emergency Planning Committee for
Hillsborough County and an active member of the Plant City
Rotary Club.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record.
I will now ask each witness to summarize his statement for
5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Gispert.
STATEMENT OF LARRY GISPERT, DIRECTOR, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Gispert. Before we get started, let me welcome you guys
to beautiful Plant City, one of the three cities in
Hillsborough County, which is on the west coast of Florida. We
used to have a football team, and we have a pretty good
baseball team going, but our football is coming back together.
Chairman Carney and Ranking Member Bilirakis and Members of
the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify
today. I am Larry Gispert, the Director of Emergency Management
for Hillsborough County, Florida, where we are meeting today. I
am testifying today on behalf of the citizens of Hillsborough
County, approximately 1.2 million people. I have 30 years
experience in emergency management with 17 as the Hillsborough
County Director. I am a past president of the International
Association of Emergency Management, IAEM, and also served as
past president of the Florida Emergency Preparedness
Association, FEPA.
Before I get started on my testimony, my daddy always said,
``Larry, when a guy asks you the time of day, do not tell him
how to build a watch.'' You asked a question--``Unclogging
Pipeline Security: Are the Lines of Responsibility Clear?''
Speaking strictly from the local level, the answer is no.
There are more than 300 miles of transmission pipelines in
Hillsborough County carrying jet fuel, diesel, natural gas, and
ammonia. There are many more miles of residential natural gas
distribution lines in our county. I have been asked to address
how we plan and respond to pipeline incidents, our interaction
with Federal authorities, our relationship with pipeline
operators, challenges we face, and concerns we have.
Since July 2007, there has been close to 100 incidents
involving pipelines reported in Hillsborough County and a
number of full hazmat responses. In many cases, there were
evacuations, road closures, and disruptions. Fortunately there
was only one serious injury and no fatalities in these
incidents. It is important to note that more than 90 percent of
these incidents were from natural gas distribution lines and
almost all of these were construction-related, a contractor
with a backhoe digging up a line. In the 30-year history of the
ammonia pipeline, there have been two major releases; one in
May 2003 in the Fishhawk area and again in November 2007. Both
of these releases were the result of intentional individual
actions.
In the past 2\1/2\ years, we have worked closely with
Federal authorities to improve our abilities to respond to
pipeline incidents and work towards preventing them altogether.
We meet regularly with the United States Coast Guard and have
contact with the Department of Homeland Security and
Transportation Security Administration. We have met with
Commandant Allen of the Coast Guard and talked with the past
Administrator of the Department of Transportation Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, PHMSA. In August
2008, we assisted PHMSA in hosting a roundtable on emergency
response to anhydrous ammonia transportation incidents. There
were approximately 130 people in attendance at the roundtable
in Tampa. Those attending included representatives from local,
State, and Federal Government, area first responders, and
ammonia users from across the country, ammonia transporters
(pipeline, rail, and truck), and academics. As a result of the
success of that roundtable, it was decided to hold a similar
workshop for chlorine gas. The chlorine workshop took place in
March 2009. An indirect result of the roundtable was the
agreement worked out with CSX Railroad and their customers to
limit or stop the movement of railcars containing toxic
inhalation substances during Super Bowl week of 2009.
Since the November 2007 Riverview incident, we have been in
regular contact with area pipeline operators (Kinder Morgan-
Central Florida Pipeline, Gulf Stream Natural Gas System,
Florida Gas Transmission Company and Peoples Gas) and in
particular Tampa Bay Pipeline Corporation. We worked with the
companies and have produced new maps of the pipeline which have
been distributed to area planners and first responders. Exposed
portions of the ammonia pipeline now have jacketing to help
prevent a recurrence similar to the 2007 incident. As
Congressman Bilirakis said, a young kid drilled into it--cannot
do it now.
We understand that the responsibility for the security of
our pipeline lies first with the operators and then with the
locals. The Federal Government has a department who is
responsible for the safety of pipelines, basically everything
except security. There is a separate agency--responsible
agency--responsible for pipeline security. This division has 11
personnel--we now know that they have 13 or soon to have 13--
and is responsible for the entire United States pipeline
system. Memorandums of Understanding, MOUs, between PHMSA and
TSA notwithstanding, the separation of pipeline safety from
pipeline security is a distinction without a difference to
anyone except in Washington. To the best of my knowledge, my
department has had no contact with anyone from the TSA Pipeline
Security Division since the ammonia workshop. This is of
concern to us and we would welcome the opportunity to share
information.
There seems to be a major disconnect between the goals and
objectives of TSA and PHMSA and this is of major concern to us
and area operators. This has led to confusion in the past and
until reconciled will likely lead to future confusion. Mainly
you have one agency whose goal is to make the location of
buried pipelines as visible as possible so no one accidentally
digs them up, and another Federal agency that would like to
make them invisible so no one can intentionally blow them up.
The question is do we continue to juggle safety and security
until some sort of balance is reached or do we look for an
alternate solution? In this day and age there ought to be a
better system in place, one that assures both safety and
security.
We in Hillsborough County and the Tampa Bay region will
remain vigilant. We will train, plan, and exercise so that we
can continue to respond quickly, appropriately, and safely when
things go wrong. They will go wrong. We will share any lessons
learned and strive to remain a great example of cooperative
effort. As I like to say to everyone, we are always ready to
help you with your disaster, which means we prefer not to have
them ourselves, we like to go help somebody else. But God does
not grant us that all the time.
Again, I would like to thank the subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify and for their interest. I will be happy
to answer any questions you may have at the appropriate time.
[The statement of Mr. Gispert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Larry Gispert
Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis and Members of the
subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today.
I am Larry Gispert, the Director of Emergency Management for
Hillsborough County Florida where we are meeting today. I am testifying
today on behalf of the citizens of Hillsborough County. I have 30 years
experience in Emergency Management with 17 as the Hillsborough County
Director. I am a past President of the International Association of
Emergency Management (IAEM) and have also served as President of the
Florida Emergency Preparedness Association.
There are more than 300 miles of transmission pipelines in
Hillsborough County carrying jet fuel, diesel, natural gas, and
ammonia. There are many more miles of residential natural gas
distribution lines in our county. I have been asked to address how we
plan and respond to pipeline incidents, our interaction with Federal
authorities, our relationship with pipeline operators, challenges we
face and concerns we have.
Since July 2007 there has been close to 100 incidents involving
pipelines reported in Hillsborough County and a number of full Hazmat
responses. In many cases there were evacuations, road closures, and
disruptions; fortunately there was only one serious injury and no
fatalities in these incidents. It is important to note that more than
90 percent of these incidents were from Natural Gas distribution lines
and almost all of these were construction-related accidents. In the
near 30-year history of the ammonia pipeline there have been two major
releases, one in May 2003 and again in November 2007. Both of these
releases were the result of intentional individual actions.
In the past 2\1/2\ years we have worked closely with Federal
authorities to improve our abilities to respond to pipeline incidents
and work towards preventing them all together. We meet regularly with
the United States Coast Guard and have contact with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). We have met with Commandant Allen of the Coast Guard and talked
with the past Administrator of the Department of Transportation
Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). In August
2008 we assisted PHMSA in hosting a Roundtable on Emergency Response to
Anhydrous Ammonia Transportation Incidents. There were approximately
130 people in attendance at the Roundtable in Tampa. Those
participating included representatives from local, State, and Federal
Government, area first responders, and ammonia users from across the
country, ammonia transporters (pipeline, rail, and truck) and
academics. As a result of the success of this Roundtable it was decided
to hold a similar workshop for Chlorine gas. The Chlorine Workshop took
place in March, 2009. An indirect result of the Roundtable was the
agreement worked out with CSX Railroad and their customers to limit or
stop the movement of railcars containing Toxic Inhalation Substances
during Super Bowl week 2009.
Since the November 2007 Riverview incident we have been in regular
contact with area pipeline operators (Kinder Morgan--Central Florida
Pipeline Co, Gulf Stream Natural Gas System, Florida Gas Transmission
Co, and Peoples Gas) in particular Tampa Bay Pipeline Corporation. We
worked with the company and have produced new maps of the pipeline
which have been distributed to area planners and first responders.
Exposed portions of the Ammonia pipeline now have jacketing to help
prevent a reoccurrence.
We understand that the responsibility for the security of our
pipelines lies first with the operators and then with the locals. The
Federal Government has a department who is responsible for the safety
of pipelines--basically everything except security. There is a separate
agency responsible for pipeline security. This division has eleven
personnel (including two managers and four branch chiefs) and is
responsible for all U.S. pipelines. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)
between PHMSA and TSA notwithstanding, the separation of pipeline
safety from pipeline security are a distinction without a difference to
anyone except in Washington. To the best of my knowledge my department
has had no contact with anyone from the TSA Pipeline Security Division
since the Ammonia Workshop. This is of concern to us and we would
welcome the opportunity to share information.
There seems to be a major disconnect between the goals and
objectives of TSA and PHMSA and this is of major concern to us and area
operators. This has lead to confusion in the past and until reconciled
will likely lead to further confusion. Mainly you have one agency whose
goal is to make the location of buried pipelines as visible as possible
so no one accidently digs them up and another agency that would like to
make them invisible so no one can intentionally blow them up. The
question is do we continue to juggle safety and security until some
sort of balance is reached or do we look for an alternate solution? In
this day and age there ought to be a better system in place, one that
assures both safety and security.
We in Hillsborough County and the Tampa Bay region will remain
vigilant. We will train, plan, and exercise so that we can continue to
respond quickly, appropriately, and safely when things go wrong. We
will share any lessons learned and strive to remain a great example of
cooperative effort. As I like to say we are always ready to help you in
your disaster.
Again I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
testify and for their interest. I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have at the appropriate time.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Gispert.
Mr. Rogers for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF RON ROGERS, ASSISTANT CHIEF-ADMINISTRATION,
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY FIRE RESCUE
Mr. Rogers. Good morning, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member
Bilirakis; thank you for having us here.
As mentioned earlier, I am Ron Rogers, I am the Assistant
Chief for Administration for Hillsborough County Fire Rescue. I
previously served for 9 years as the special operations chief
for our department. The primary mission of that position was
overseeing hazmat response and also search and rescue,
technical rescue type of things.
In addition to the experience that was mentioned in my
background information, I had the fortune or misfortune of
working in the chemical industry in my early years while I was
going to school. Had a lot of experience working in the
fertilizer industry using ammonia, so I have a lot of personal
experience with these chemicals that are transported in these
pipelines.
As has been discussed in other testimony, Hillsborough
County has a significant chemical pipeline network that
presents the possibility of a major release at any time. Since
July 2007, there has been close to 100 incidents involving
pipelines reported in Hillsborough County. In many cases, there
were evacuations, road closures, as Larry has mentioned. The
important thing is that we have had two significant incidents
involving the ammonia pipeline. Again, as mentioned, in 2003
and in 2007, these releases were the result of persons
interfering with the pipeline causing intentional releases.
Throughout that process, the only interaction we have had
with the pipeline operator was in direct response to those
incidents. That includes no prior training, no interaction with
the operators. We operate as well with them as we can in time
of emergency, but one of the things that we would like to point
out is that there needs to be, either in the guidelines or
regulation if it is decided that that is the direction to go
in, that there be a requirement for these operators to have
regular hands-on training with the first responders that may be
required to respond to these incidents. Currently there is no
requirement. We recommended that after the 2007 incident. To
date, the pipeline training that we have participated in has
not been what we consider training, it has been more
demonstrations. We have one this week, the Tampa Bay Pipeline
is bringing first responders together with some of their
companies for a demonstration of their capabilities. But it
needs to go beyond the demonstration. It needs to be our
personnel working with their personnel on a simulated release,
learning the techniques and the equipment that we need to use
in a time of a real event. Because as Larry said, it is not a
matter of if, it is when.
In particular, going beyond just the requirements for
training, in order for us to interact in a critical situation
with the personnel from the pipeline companies, we have to know
beforehand preferably that their personnel have the proper
training as required by the OSHA standards to go into a zone
where there is hazardous chemicals being released actively. We
have to know that they can go in with our personnel and that
they have met all the training requirements to go in just like
our personnel meet. Right now, today, we do not have any
records of that. We do not have any knowledge of that
information.
It presented a real situation in the 2007 incident. It was
attributed that we prevented their personnel from entering the
hot zone and working on the pipeline. That is a factual
statement. What was left out of that testimony was the fact
that we would not let them go in because we had no idea what
their experience and training was. It would be no different
than a citizen approaching us and saying I can go in there and
help, but having no documentation that they have any skills or
competency to do that.
Going beyond that, another requirement of the OSHA
standards for personnel operating in a hazardous environment is
that they have baseline medical monitoring. That is again
something we asked the vendor at the time, during an on-going
release: Do you have anything to support that your personnel
have had that baseline monitoring? To date, we have no
knowledge of that, we have seen no records of that. Even if
they presented a policy that said we do this, that is all we
are looking for.
It is our recommendation that that be either instituted in
the guidelines or in the regulations. We want to make the
process of responding to those events that will happen as
seamless as possible, give our personnel the ability to work
with those people, to know those people before we show up on an
emergency and proceed with the mitigation of that incident.
In closing, we are here to help. We would like to be part
of the process, to work with the operators to make the response
to these things better. We believe that there is a process in
place at the local emergency planning committee to facilitate
the training. They do a very good job with a fixed site, fixed
chemical facilities, and they would do a very good job managing
this also.
Hillsborough County is here to help. We will be happy to
answer any other questions that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ron Rogers
Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis and Members of the
subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today.
I am Ron Rogers, the Assistant Chief-Administration for
Hillsborough County Fire Rescue in Hillsborough County, Florida where
we are meeting today. I am testifying today on behalf of the citizens
of Hillsborough County. I have 29 years experience in Emergency Service
experience in Hillsborough County (nine as the Special Operations
Chief). I am a past Chairman of the Association for Search and Rescue
(FASAR) and a past Chairman of the Florida Association of HazMat
Responders (FLAHR).
As has been discussed in other testimony, Hillsborough County has a
significant chemical pipeline network that presents the possibility of
a major release at any time. Since July 2007 there has been close to
100 incidents involving pipelines reported in Hillsborough County and a
number of full Hazmat responses. In many cases there were evacuations,
road closures, and disruptions; fortunately there was only one serious
injury and no fatalities in these incidents. It is important to note
that more than 90 percent of these incidents were from Natural Gas
distribution lines and almost all of these were construction-related
accidents. In the near 30-year history of the ammonia pipeline there
have been many minor releases and two major releases, one in May 2003
and again in November 2007. Both of these releases were the result of
intentional individual actions.
The pipeline damaged in these incidents is one of two owned and
operated by the Tampa Bay Pipeline Company. The pipeline that was
damaged was constructed in 1981, the other in 1979. It is 6 inches in
diameter, approximately 30 miles long and carries liquid anhydrous
ammonia from a storage facility in Port Sutton to chemical
manufacturing facilities in Hillsborough and Polk Counties. In the past
2\1/2\ years we have worked closely with other County agencies and
Federal authorities to improve our ability to respond to these types of
pipeline incidents and work towards preventing them all together.
One area that continues to need improvement is on the documentation
of training and medical monitoring that complies with Federal standards
and joint interagency training. During the 2007 incident, a lack of
training documentation prevented us from allowing the pipeline
operators personnel from assisting in the hazard area. This issue was
noted on Page 5 and 6 of the PHMSA Notice of Probable Violation
Proposed Civil Penalty and Proposed Compliance Order dated May 7, 2008.
Based on the previous issues, we would like to offer the following
recommendations:
Training.--It is the recommendation of Hillsborough County Fire
Rescue that regular hands-on training be required that requires the
owners of transmission pipelines to conduct regular hands-on training
with the HazMat teams that would normally respond to an incident
involving a release from their pipeline.
Training Documentation.--It is the recommendation of Hillsborough
County Fire Rescue that documentation be regularly provided to these
HazMat teams documenting the completion of a minimum of hazardous
materials technician level training as outlined in 29 CFR
1910.120(q)(6)(iii).
Medical Surveillance Documentation.--It is the recommendation of
Hillsborough County Fire Rescue that documentation be regularly
provided to these HazMat teams documenting the completion of a Medical
Surveillance program in compliance with 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(9)(i) for
all pipeline response personnel that may be expected to work in the Hot
Zone during an emergency response. (See the attached letter dated March
3, 2008)
The above requirements could be monitored as part of the Local
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) system currently in place. It is
our opinion that if implemented these requirements would significantly
improve the readiness for response of the pipeline operators and HazMat
responders.
Hillsborough County Fire Rescue will continue to assist in the
preparedness for any future release as may be needed to assure the
greatest level of protections to the population and environment. Thank
you once again for the opportunity to testify and for your interest. I
will be happy to answer any questions you may have at the appropriate
time.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
Colonel Duncan, 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL ED DUNCAN, COMMANDER, DEPARTMENT OF
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
Colonel Duncan. Good morning, Chairman Carney, Ranking
Member Bilirakis and subcommittee Members. On behalf of Sheriff
David Gee of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, I would
like to thank you for convening this hearing and for your
efforts to improve our Nation's pipeline security. As already
stated, I am Colonel Ed Duncan. I have been employed with the
Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office for 32 years, and have
been responsible for overseeing the agency's tactical
operations for 20 of those years.
As you are aware, Hillsborough County has experienced three
major chemical releases which required substantial citizen
evacuations over the past several years. In each of these
situations, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office
responsibilities included:
Securing the incident site.
Evacuating citizens if necessary, and taking other measures
necessary to protect human life.
Investigating any criminal activity associated with the
security breach.
Implementing and controlling alternative traffic patterns.
Our most recent chemical release requiring citizen
evacuation was the anhydrous ammonia release of November 2007.
This release was a result of a juvenile puncturing a pipeline
based on his unfortunate mistaken belief that the pipeline was
a conduit to banks which contained money. There were no
fatalities from this event, but hundreds of citizens were
evacuated as a safety measure.
Since the 2007 incident, there have been significant
improvements to pipeline security. Pipeline vendors have placed
security sheathing on above-ground pipes and installed enhanced
locking mechanisms on valves and valve housing sites. Training
drills related specifically to chemical releases are now
conducted to maintain optimal response practices. The Tampa Bay
Regional Security Task Force and the Urban Area Initiative are
now more particularly focused on hazardous material security.
Our local Critical Infrastructure Committee has increased its
inspections on anhydrous ammonia pipe sites. Today, through
Site Profiler, which is a web-based assessment tool, the Tampa
Bay area has continuous access to constantly updated mapping
and data information on all local chemical pipelines and
facilities.
An important partner in our local security efforts is
Assistant Federal Security Director Greg Mertz of the local
office of TSA. Mr. Mertz routinely participates with emergency
response agencies through our Urban Area Security Initiative
and Regional Domestic Terrorism Task Force. Recently they have
conducted inspections on some of our pipelines that are located
within our facility, which is much needed and appreciated. For
example, last summer, the local TSA sponsored a roundtable
entitled ``Emergency Response to Anhydrous Ammonia
Transportation Incidents'' which was attended by several of our
public safety and emergency response leaders. As a result of
this and dozens of other similar collaborations over the past
2\1/2\ years, our region's public safety partners have become
much better equipped to prevent and respond to chemical
incidents.
Yet, there is critical work to be done. Today, no Federal,
State, or local agency has clear regulatory authority to impose
security improvements on companies involved in the production
and transportation of chemicals through public areas.
Currently, they rely on voluntary compliance to these
guidelines. Regulations of the chemical production and
transportation community is not a role that the local
government is authorized to control. Such regulations can only
be developed and instilled through Federal leadership,
legislation, and action. If you ask my agency what one single
step remains to be taken that would most improve our Nation's
pipeline security, our response is that the Federal Government
should empower the TSA to both establish and enforce security
regulations on pipeline producers and transporters. We hope the
work of this committee leads to a successful accomplishment of
this key step.
Going forward, it is our understanding that TSA Pipeline
Security Division is publishing updated pipeline security
guidelines this year. We eagerly await receipt of these
guidelines and hope that they contain provisions to help ensure
more stringent security measures are maintained by the
companies responsible for producing, transporting hazardous
materials in and near our communities. If there is anything the
Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office can do to assist in this
effort, we stand by and ready.
Thank you.
[The statement of Colonel Duncan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colonel Ed Duncan on behalf of Sheriff David Gee
April 19, 2010
Hello, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Bilirakis and subcommittee
Members. On behalf of Sheriff David Gee of the Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Office, I would like to thank you for convening this hearing,
and for your efforts to improve our Nation's pipeline security. I'm
Colonel Ed Duncan. I've been employed with the Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Office for 32 years, and have been responsible for overseeing
our tactical operations for 20 of those years.
As you are aware, Hillsborough County has experienced three major
chemical release situations which required substantial citizen
evacuations over the past several years. In each of these situations,
the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office's responsibilities included:
1. Securing the incident site.
2. Evacuating citizens, if necessary, and taking other measures
necessary to protect human life.
3. Investigating any criminal activity associated with the security
breach.
4. Implementing and controlling alternative traffic patterns.
Our most recent chemical release requiring citizen evacuation was
the anhydrous ammonia release of November 12-14, 2007. This leak was a
result of a juvenile puncturing the pipeline, based on his
unfortunately mistaken belief that the pipeline was a conduit for money
between banks. There were no fatalities from that event, but hundreds
of citizens were evacuated as a safety measure.
Since the 2007 incident, there have been significant improvements
to local pipeline security. Pipeline vendors have placed security
sheathing on above-ground pipes and installed enhanced locking
mechanisms on valves and valve housing sites. Training drills related
specifically to chemical releases are now conducted to maintain optimal
response practices. The Tampa Bay Regional Domestic Security Task Force
and Urban Area Security Initiative are now more particularly focused on
hazardous materials security. Our local Critical Infrastructure
Committee has increased its inspections of anhydrous pipeline sites.
And today, through Site Profiler, all public safety and emergency
response partners in Tampa Bay have continuous access to constantly-
updated mapping and data information for all local chemical pipelines
and facilities.
An important partner in our local security efforts is Assistant
Federal Security Director Gregory Mertz, of the local office of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). SA Mertz routinely
participates with emergency response agencies through our Urban Area
Security Initiative and Regional Domestic Security Task Force. For
example, last summer the local TSA sponsored a roundtable titled
``Emergency Response to Anhydrous Ammonia Transportation Incidents''
which was attended by approximately 50 public safety and emergency
response leaders. As a result of this, and dozens of other similar
collaborations over the past 2\1/2\ years, our region's public safety
partners have become much better equipped to prevent and respond to a
chemical incident.
Yet, there is still critical work that must be done. Today, no
Federal, State, or local agency has clear regulatory authority to
impose security improvements on companies involved in the production
and transportation of chemicals through public areas. Regulation of the
chemical production and transportation community is not a role that
local government is authorized to control. Such regulation can only be
developed and instilled through Federal leadership, legislation, and
action. If you ask my agency what one single step remains to be taken
that would most improve our Nation's pipeline security, our response is
that the Federal Government should empower the Transportation Security
Administration to both establish and enforce security regulations on
chemical producers and transporters. We hope the work of this committee
leads it to be successful in accomplishing this key step.
Going forward, it is our understanding that the TSA Pipeline
Security Division is publishing updated pipeline securities guidelines
this year. We eagerly await receipt of these guidelines, and hope that
they contain provisions that help ensure more stringent security
measures are maintained by the companies responsible for producing and
transporting hazardous materials in and near our communities. If there
is anything the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office can do to assist
in this effort, we stand ready.
Thank you very much Chairman Carney, and committee Members, for
your proactive leadership in this important domestic security issue.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Colonel Duncan.
And I thank each of you for your testimonies and we will do
a round of questions like we did in the previous panel. I will
begin with myself.
I guess I need to ask Mr. Gispert and Mr. Rogers this. Do
you agree with the assessment of Colonel Duncan that there
needs to be regulation rather than just recommendations?
Mr. Gispert. Yes.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Mr. Gispert. We at the local level are very simple. We want
one button to push, we want one Federal agency that we can go
to and say we are having a problem with this and they can say
thou shalt do this. Right now, it is a collaboration and let's
try to get--this is dangerous stuff. These people need to say
you do not have a choice, you will do this.
Mr. Rogers. I agree completely. Especially in tough
economic times like we are in right now, guidelines tend to get
pushed aside; regulations, it is a lot more difficult to do
that.
Mr. Carney. So it is the considered opinion of the three
experts, local experts here, that regulations need to be
promulgated. Okay.
Mr. Rogers, you said something that was striking to me,
that you are not trained when people do demonstrations to you.
Can you elaborate a little bit on that?
Mr. Rogers. One of the issues that was raised in the 2003
and the 2007 pipeline releases was the fact that the first time
our hazmat team had any interaction with the pipeline company
representatives was with that release, the first one in 2003.
Again, there was no training or any involvement between them
between 2003 and 2007. It was less of an issue in the 2003
release because that was a plug taken out of a valve in a valve
box, there was very little that we could do to really do
anything with that other than just wait for the pressure to
drop, because you had basically a quarter-inch hole that was
down in a confined area, we couldn't do a whole lot with it.
The 2007 release was a hole in the side of the pipeline
that was fairly easy to access but we don't have equipment for
that type of pressurized release. You have an issue where it is
coming out under pressure, has a high expansion factor, plus
the fact that it is cold, it is very cold. Our method of
handling that is you essentially mitigate the release as best
you can with water streams and wait for the pressure to drop to
the point where we can go in and do something.
We had a lot of people from the pipeline company say that
they could do different things, but we did not have any
confidence in their ability to do that because when questioned,
they did not seem to really be able to answer our questions
very well. Not having any hands-on experience with them before
the release, actually going in and watching them or working
with them side-by-side, our hazmat team and their personnel
should be training side-by-side, actually going in and stopping
releases in a controlled environment so that when you have
these uncontrolled releases, that you know that the two teams
can go in and work together and manage these releases.
What came out after the release, when we were having our
after-action, was they had never even tried this before. There
were companies that were not related to the pipeline company
that said they could stop a release like this but Tampa Bay
Pipeline had never attempted to stop a release like this. So it
turns out they were just basically telling us what they thought
we wanted to hear.
Other issues that came up were just their availability to
bring in resources in a timely manner. It was only because of
pressure from us to get people in quicker that--they were
debating whether to bring the guy from Louisiana or the guy
from Texas to put the stop on. Those are the kinds of things
you do not work out in a crisis, that is worked out ahead of
time.
Mr. Carney. Right. Now you expressed these concerns to me.
Did you express them also to the pipeline owners?
Mr. Rogers. Yes, sir. It has been expressed to the
pipeline, it has been expressed as part of the compliance
review by PHMSA. We actually testified in the review of that,
related to the proposed fine, and have voiced that throughout
that process.
Mr. Carney. What was the pipeline owner's response?
Mr. Rogers. Their response is--I believe part of it is
misinterpretation on their part that they believe that
demonstrations are training. They are the ones actually
sponsoring the demonstration that is this week. They have
labeled that training but when I have checked into what is
actually going to happen, it is going to be a demonstration of
their contractors and their personnel, not a direct hands-on
interaction with our personnel.
Mr. Carney. You and I did not get to be paramedics by
watching Emergency 911.
Mr. Rogers. No, sir. You do hands-on.
Mr. Carney. I gotcha, okay.
No further questions in this round. Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, appreciate it.
Thank you for your testimony; thanks for your attendance;
thanks for doing such a great job for Florida and specifically
Hillsborough County.
I know you touched on this, Mr. Gispert, but I am going to
give you another opportunity as well. Your comments about the
differing perspectives between PHMSA and TSA regarding
pipelines are quite interesting. Specifically you highlighted
the fact that PHMSA wants people to know these pipelines are
dangerous so people will stay away while TSA wants them hidden
so they will not be considered targets of opportunity. Which is
the right answer? How do we strike a balance? I know you
brought it up. In your opinion and based on your observations,
are TSA and PHMSA working together to coalesce around a unified
message on issues related to pipeline security? I probably know
the answer but I want to get your--you can elaborate if you
wish.
Mr. Gispert. When we get involved, the security has already
been breached.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
Mr. Gispert. So, we would love for a sign saying hey,
dummy, there is a pipeline here, do not dig your backhoe here,
do not do this and everything else.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Mr. Gispert. I do understand that people that want to do
bad things against a community will take that and that is where
they will dig. But 90 percent of the time or more, it is a
contractor digging a trench to lay an electrical line or
something that hits it with a backhoe that causes us to
evacuate hundreds of people. We feel that the balance should be
struck, but it should be struck to the knowledge of where
things are.
Part of the problem that Ron brought up is the
understanding of how much ammonia was still in the line. They
debated for hours on how much ammonia was in the line because
they have reversing valves and stuff like this, and where are
the reversing valves located.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Mr. Gispert. It depends--you do mathematical formulas. That
should be known. They should walk up and say okay, Mr. Hazmat
Responder, there is 100 pounds of product still in there and we
estimate that it will be out of there in 20 minutes. Instead of
saying--all they could see is the stuff was spitting out and
continued to spit out. We said how much have you got in there?
That should be known. That is why he wants to train with these
people so they have a comfort level.
We need to know where the stuff is, we need to know where
those valve boxes are. That was a big deal and Colonel Duncan
will tell you, how could he know whether they were secure or
not if you did not know where they were? What we found out, now
they have done a big issue and our critical infrastructure
people have identified it, they put special locks on it and
stuff like that. But we have got to know where this stuff is.
By the way, there is more stuff, as you stated, coming.
They are going to do a liquid natural gas port device right off
the coast for those big ships. We need to know where that stuff
is.
I do not get invited by the Chamber of Commerce to talk all
the time because they are sending 8 by 10 glossies northward
saying yankees, come down here and live and do business, this
is a beautiful place. Well, you talk about hurricanes,
tornadoes--do you realize that 50 percent of the hazardous
materials in the whole State of Florida come in and out of that
port of Tampa every day? I have a full time planner that keeps
information on over 300 business locations that have extremely
hazardous substances that exceed the maximum threshold. There
is a lot of chemicals in this community. Now they make your
life worth living when they are used right, but they get
outside their containers, they can kill you.
So we have to be vigilant. So we always default to what is
going on, how much have we got, where is it at, who knows this,
who knows that.
There should be a striking point between those two
agencies. If you are going to bifurcate the responsibility,
then there should be a clear understanding amongst them. Part
of the problem when we had our after-action report, we kept
asking: Who the hell is in charge? The one thing that the
pipeline company knew, it was not the locals. We had no ability
to tell them to do anything. It had to be the Federal
Government. But was it the Coast Guard? Did not happen on the
waterways, no. Was it U.S. DOT, we think? But it was a security
issue because a kid drilled a hole, so it was TSA. So we
bounced back and forth on who was really in charge. I do not
think we have really answered the question yet, have we, Ron?
Mr. Rogers. Not really.
Mr. Gispert. Not really, not to our satisfaction.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you for your frankness.
Anyone else? This is what we need to hear.
Mr. Rogers. Larry brought up an outstanding point. One of
the other things that we asked for, both in 2003 and in 2007,
related to the release was some clear information from the
company how long can we expect this release to go on, assuming
we cannot stop it, which in both cases we could not. To me,
having a background in hazardous materials response, one of the
things we look at is modeling. I am also what you would call a
geek, I know there is a lot of computer modeling technology out
there. It seems logical that you have a known vessel--it is a
pipeline and when you close the valves, it is a vessel. Knowing
the distance between those valves and which valves are closed
and what was in the pipeline before that, you know the
properties of the chemical, it seems logical that there would
be something that would be able to tell you there is this much
in that pipeline and with the size of leak that we think you
have--and you never know because you cannot get up and see the
exact size, but you have got an idea. You can see it is a
fairly small release. How long is it going to take to come out
of there with the current weather conditions? That is something
they did not have. We have asked for it, it is actually in the
PHMSA reports and our after-action report, and to our
knowledge, there still is nothing that has been done to
identify that.
It is particularly an issue with the liquefied ammonia
pipelines and then with the liquefied natural gas pipeline that
they are bringing in because when you compress or refrigerate a
liquid to make it--a gas to make it liquid, when it comes out
of that vessel that it is in and comes back to atmospheric
temperature, it has an expansion factor that is significant. So
you may have a gallon of liquid but when it expands to gas, it
is going to be a much greater volume.
That is the kind of information we need. How do we know
what kind of area even to evacuate? We have got some programs
that are out there, Cameo, Aloha, Marplot, that type of family
of programs, but they do not work on pipelines, they are based
around a tank. That is one of the issues that really should not
be the responsibility of the pipeline company, but that should
be the responsibility of somebody at the Federal level to
develop that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Colonel.
Colonel Duncan. One of the things that I noticed in this
event, the 2007 event, we did have a lot of people coming to
the scene offering some information. However, we got no clear
direction, like Ron was saying earlier. There was some
speculation, if you would.
What that impacted from a law enforcement side is that we
had citizens that were displaced for long periods of time. We
had a main north-south thoroughfare, highway 301, that was
shut-down that affected us tremendously.
So the resources that we had to allocate to mitigate this
problem from the law enforcement standpoint was substantial. I
must say though that since that incident, we have had an
opportunity to meet. The first responders have all met and sat
down and there still is some uncertainty as to, again: Who is
the one responsible for this? Of the boots on the ground, who
is going to take the lead? It ultimately fell back on the
locals to take the lead because fortunately in this community,
I must say, in Region 4 here, we have a very close partnership
with all of our local, State, and Federal partners. Most of us
grew up together in this community, so we are very familiar
with one another. That helped us resolve our issues. They were
prolonged because of the lack of direction. However, we were
able to work through those as we have normally done in the
past. But in other areas where they may not have that----
Mr. Bilirakis. It may not be like that in Pennsylvania.
Colonel Duncan. Correct.
Mr. Bilirakis. Actually Pennsylvania is my second favorite
State. I just had to say that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bilirakis. My dad was raised in Pittsburgh. I had to
say that.
Colonel Duncan. But one of the issues that I was thinking
earlier as we discussed the regulations, it is based solely now
on someone's voluntary compliance. Whereas, maybe one community
and one region of the State has a good working relationship and
they want to be a good partner or be a good collaborative
effort. That is not always necessarily true.
So if you do not have these strict guidelines or
regulations that we can impose, then what are we doing? We are
hoping that everyone will be on their best behavior and play
well in the sand box.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Gispert.
Mr. Gispert. We do not want to come off banging Tampa Bay
Pipeline. They are a part of our community, they are a very
great economic generator, jobs and stuff like that.
What we are trying to tell you is if you want to be
regulated, pass it down to the locals, hell, we will regulate
them. But under the current scenario, we are not permitted to.
None of the local agencies can tell them anything. We could
have probably back in these zoning--when they wanted to locate,
say no, you cannot be there. But once they are there, they are
there. All we do is you call, we haul, we respond.
Somebody has got to grab a hold and say this is serious
stuff. Voluntary compliance does not work when it is serious.
This is serious, these are people's lives and a lot of
economics. So somebody at the Federal level--because nobody at
the State level has that ability as far as we know.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Mr. Gispert. Somebody at the Federal level has got to say
okay, I am the one in charge, and by the way, thou shalt do
this, you have no choice. Or we will pull your license to
operate.
Because by the way, we sit all day long saying it is going
to happen, it is going to happen. We think there, we drink, we
eat, we sleep, we are saying it is going to happen, the big one
is coming. Everybody says you guys are a bunch of schmoes, you
are doomsday. It is going to happen. It may not be tomorrow
but, by the way, it is going to happen. We have got to be ready
because if we are not ready, then the community is really
severely impacted, many of them will die.
Mr. Carney. Let us use the 2007 example. Did you get
conflicting information from TSA and DOT? Did they not show up?
Did they show up and work together? What was your experience in
that regard?
Mr. Rogers. I know DOT was there, the Coast Guard was there
very early. The Coast Guard was there within a matter of hours.
DOT was there probably the next day.
Mr. Carney. How long did this plume last, by the way?
Mr. Rogers. Our response as far as from release to when we
considered it under control was 40 hours.
Mr. Carney. Forty hours.
Mr. Rogers. Yes.
Mr. Bilirakis. When DOT was there, were they calling the
shots or----
Mr. Rogers. They were part--we had a unified command and
when you have a unified command, there is not necessarily a
specific agency or person in charge, it kind of rotates
depending on what the issue is. DOT was part of the unified
command. I honestly do not remember if TSA was ever involved.
Colonel Duncan may be able to answer that.
Colonel Duncan. I cannot answer that, sir. I do not know if
they were on scene or not that day.
Mr. Carney. I am going to do something that is sort of
unusual for Congressional hearings. I am going to ask a couple
of panelists from the previous panel if they would like to
respond.
Mr. Fox, Mr. Wiese, do you want to give your points of view
on this, please?
Mr. Fox. Thank you for the opportunity. In fact, in front
of you there is another graph that we handed out which shows
lines of responsibility graphically.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Fox. At the time of a release, PHMSA is then--they have
the responsibility and the authority for repair and
restoration. That is in their regulations. So TSA's role
diminishes at the time of a release. We have a stronger role up
through intel or what-have-you, and then FBI takes over and
PHMSA takes over on repair and release. Now I do know TSA had
folks there on the day after the release, they met with the
pipeline company, local TSA folks came to town and met with the
pipeline company and then I had a team there 3 or 4 weeks later
and we did a complete review of that pipeline system and made
security recommendations.
We have followed up and the company actually followed and
did every recommendation for security that we made to them,
within say the following year everything was completed.
Your local law enforcement works well. On Saturday
afternoon, I went to the site of this on 301, I was trying to
stop to get down and look at it and the State police stopped me
and asked me what I was doing there. So your local law
enforcement worked very well.
But TSA did have some folks there, but our role--as soon as
the release happens, our role diminishes and PHMSA's role takes
over at that time.
Mr. Wiese. I think Jack pretty accurately portrayed that.
Our job initially is to set a regulatory framework for safety
and then to inspect and provide the deterrents to non-
compliance for that. The operator was inspected on the order of
every other year. There have been a number of minor issues that
we have brought to the operator's attention over the years. In
this particular case, as Jack said, once the event happened, we
dispatched someone to come down and work with people, both in
the after-action and then forward. But we also initiated a
fairly intensive investigation. I know it is not satisfying to
the responders because that is after-the-fact, but it is one of
the ways in which you try to correct remedies, you know, is to
do the investigation. We have initiated an enforcement action
and I am not really at liberty to discuss that one, but it is
fairly near to being finalized.
Mr. Carney. Well, people hate being the test case on these
things.
Mr. Wiese, Mr. Fox, who should have been giving direction
to locals or from your perspective, is it the locals'
responsibility?
Mr. Wiese. No, I think in that case, it is really the
pipeline operator's responsibility, both in terms of our
regulations and TSA guidance, to maintain on-going liaison with
emergency responders and have a familiarity with one another
such that, as was raised here, in the event of an emergency,
they can integrate and work well together. I think there was
just a bit of a lack of interchange on the liaison end.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Rogers, was that your experience? What was
your experience with this?
Mr. Rogers. Our experience before the--up until the 2007
release, the only way we knew the company representatives for
the 2007 release was because of the 2003 release. There has
been some on-going interaction with Tampa Bay Pipeline since
the release, but it has not met our expectations.
Mr. Carney. So you have had two releases and now there is--
you would characterize that as minimal contact?
Mr. Rogers. Well, I think honestly the company is doing the
best that they can. I think they are trying, but again, I think
it goes back to the fact that there are no--there is no written
regulations that clearly delineate, these are the things that
you are expected to do. If you look at the chemical industry,
the fixed facilities, there are very specific steps that they
have to do. We have regular interaction with them. They
participate in the local emergency planning committee process.
We have biennial exercises and that works. That does not happen
with the pipeline companies and it is not just Tampa Bay
Pipeline, it is all the pipelines.
Mr. Gispert. Let me clarify. We were not looking for big
father to be on the scene and saying you guys are doing this
wrong, do it this way. That is not what we are talking about.
What we are talking about is Ron's problem of interacting with
the facility, knowing their operators, knowing their
qualifications. The only person that can make that happen is
the Federal person.
As far as on scene, these guys are well qualified, they do
not need no onlookers looking over their shoulder.
Mr. Carney. Sure.
Mr. Gispert. But they needed to know that the pipeline was
telling them the right thing about how much product is there.
Mr. Carney. Right, right, gotcha.
Mr. Gispert. But the Federal regulators can do that, not
the locals.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Wiese.
Mr. Wiese. You know, I would say that there are regulations
that require on-going liaison with the emergency responders. If
you look at the enforcement action that the agency moved
subsequent to this, it really orbits around that. It is
basically echoing what you are hearing here. There is a
requirement for on-going liaison and that does establish roles
and responsibilities up-front.
You know, in our view and based on our investigation, our
allegation is that that was inadequate in this case. That led
to the confusion in the emergency response.
Mr. Carney. Okay, it is inadequate because it was not
promulgated properly? It is inadequate because it is not
clearly defining the chain of command?
Mr. Wiese. No, operationally. I think that the paper was
there, the operator has plans and records. You know, could they
be improved? Probably. You know, but the real issue is the
operationalization of that so that the regular interchange with
the emergency responders so they have the maps and records,
they knew where the block valves would be, where the check
valve would be, and they would know what the company's
capabilities would be.
Mr. Carney. Great. Ron.
Mr. Rogers. The concern I have as a local responder and
somebody that lives in the community--my parents live
immediately adjacent to one of the natural gas transmission
lines--we are focusing--a lot of what I have talked about today
is the ammonia pipeline but there are other pipelines in our
county, there are a lot of other pipelines in the country.
The issue is, we have had a lot of interaction with the
companies as far as just--you know, we go to meetings with
them, we go to table top exercises and they participate to
various degrees in the planning process, but our personnel in
the field that are the ones that are going to have to put the
suits on and go into the incident, do not have regular
interaction with those people.
The requirement for liaison is not the same as a
requirement for regular interactive training.That is what I am
saying. Liaison just means that my boss knows your boss and we
can meet and greet each other by first name when we are
together. That is not what I am looking for. I am looking for
the ability for our personnel to interact with the pipeline
operators and be comfortable that they can go into an extremely
hazardous environment and work with those people and know that
they are not going to get killed by the person next to them
doing something stupid.
Mr. Carney. Do you agree, Mr. Wiese?
Mr. Wiese. I would agree with the importance of that. I
think you can hear me.
Mr. Carney. Yeah, go ahead.
Mr. Wiese. I would agree absolutely with the importance of
what he just said. The only difference I am trying to draw is
that we think in this case, it did not happen. The requirement
is there to do it, it just did not happen to the degree that it
should have. That is the nature of the allegations.
Mr. Carney. So the regulation that exists seems to be--can
be amended to say training rather than liaison.
Mr. Wiese. It actually does say ``issues relating to,
including'' is the phrase in there, ``including training and
response exercises.'' But it is not to say--it is well
received, I am listening to that, that you want a more explicit
requirement for exercising that plan.
Mr. Carney. Okay, all right.
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir.
I think this has been very informative and we know what our
task is when we go back to the District of Columbia.
Mr. Gispert, in your testimony, you mentioned that as a
result of the relationship developed during the chlorine
workshop, you were able to work with CSX Railroad executives to
stop the movement of toxic inhalation substances during the
Super Bowl week in 2009. How did that agreement develop and who
were the players involved? Did TSA participate in those
discussions? If so, what was their level of involvement?
Mr. Gispert. I can say yes, it did happen and I am going to
pass it to Colonel Duncan because Colonel Duncan was involved
in the security aspects and that is where it came up as a
potential security issue.
Colonel Duncan. Yes, sir. When we started meeting on the
Super Bowl, we approached all facets of potential threats to
the environment and to the footprint of the stadium. As a
result, we had representatives from all of our Federal, State,
and local partners and TSA was a part of that, local assistant
director Greg Mertz was available for us. Along with his
assistance and the DOT, we were able to implement that request
to stop all that type of traffic during the time frame of the
Super Bowl.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else involved?
Mr. Gispert. I will state that there are some academians
that would wish that none of that toxic material goes through
an urban city at all. The problem that we have got is the
chemicals come in to the port and then you must get the
chemicals from the port to where they actually do it and we are
not going to dig another port. So it is going to be physically
impossible for Tampa to make a prohibition that thou shalt not
transport these chemicals through these areas because they must
go there.
So unfortunately--it would be nice in a perfect world if
none of this stuff went anywhere close to anybody and I think
the Congressman and I were talking about the airport scenario.
When we built Tampa International Airport a long time ago, it
was out in the bushes. Then as people came down here and
visited, the next thing you know, residences start popping up
and guess what, they started complaining about the noise.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Mr. Gispert. You are: Wait a minute, when we built the
airport, you were not there.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yeah.
Mr. Gispert. But now that you are there, you want us to
close the airport down. No can do.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right. Thank you.
Colonel, you mentioned the role of the assistant Federal
secretary Director George Mertz and his routine participation
in emergency response scenarios. That is refreshing of course
to hear. Are you concerned, however, that Mr. Mertz' non-
pipeline security-related responsibilities monopolize his time?
Do you think TSA's Federal security director should be TSA's
point person for pipeline security issues?
Colonel Duncan. To answer that question from the local
boots-on-the-ground perspective, it is great to have someone
like Greg Mertz that we are all familiar with and we can reach
and contact him immediately.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Colonel Duncan. Greg is very responsive to us. In speaking
with him, he has a group of pipeline inspectors, they have a
pipeline division under his local branch of TSA. They have no
authority other than the fact that they go out and they do some
inspections and they can make recommendations as far as what
these people should do. In talking with Mr. Mertz, his
biggest--as you can imagine, being at Tampa International
Airport, his biggest responsibility and his main focus is on
the safety of passengers, whether they be with the rail or
flight.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Colonel Duncan. So he is very busy with that. The pipeline
part of it probably occupies a small amount of his time and
probably deserve equally as much of his attention.
Mr. Bilirakis. Do you have any suggestions of what we can
do?
Colonel Duncan. The question was asked earlier of the panel
about additional personnel for TSA.
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Colonel Duncan. I must say with the staffing that they
currently have and the volume of work that is being placed upon
those personnel, I think it would be obvious that an increase
of staffing would be beneficial to all parties concerned, not
even the locals but also the citizens which we as the local
groups serve.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else?
Mr. Rogers. I agree completely with that. I was quite
frankly startled with the budget and the number of FTEs they
have. That sounds like a local agency, not an agency
responsible for the whole country.
Mr. Bilirakis. I have got a couple more, but I will do one
more.
Mr. Carney. No, finish up.
Mr. Bilirakis. How frequently do you exercise your
emergency response plans as they relate to pipeline incidents?
Do operators participate in these exercises?
Mr. Gispert. To be honest with you, we do not exercise the
pipeline probably but every couple of years because the biggest
threat to this area, as you may know being from Florida, is the
weather. We exercise that quite often.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes.
Mr. Gispert. We probably should exercise a lot of our
things, but can I put a pitch in for the fact that the economy
is tearing us up at the local level? We are laying people off
at the local level and so I lost 600 of my team members this
year that went out the door because of the budget. I told my
county administrator our ability to respond has been diminished
as such.
So if I taxed what little people we had with a drill every
week, they would kill me. So we try to maximize and focus on
our biggest threats. So we do not traditionally practice the
pipeline scenario. We do practice terrorism responses, but
normally to large venues such as stadiums and stuff like that.
So we do not practice the pipeline that often.
Mr. Rogers. If I may----
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Rogers. One of things that actually, as much as we hate
it, if there is a regulatory requirement that we participate in
those exercises, that is actually the stick sometimes that
pushes us to do that as well. We all have priorities, as Larry
mentioned, you know, there has been staffing cuts, but we fit
in the things that we have to fit in. So sometimes we need that
nudge too.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. I frankly have no further questions. I have
found this extremely enlightening and frustrating and
heartening and all kinds of things. It is probably one of the
more useful subcommittee hearings we have had, to be quite
honest. Because it does not just apply to Tampa Bay region, it
applies to the entire Nation.
My concern is that the frustrations you felt in 2007 and
the 2003 event are not--I imagine they probably are, but I
would hope that they were not shared with your counterparts
elsewhere in the country with other pipeline events.
I really appreciate your expertise. You know, the folks
most directly involved in the ground are the ones, you know,
that really resonate with me and we need to figure out what we
can do from our chairs in Washington. We hear constantly that
the Government is too big or there's too much regulation and
this sort of thing. Maybe in some cases, that might be true,
but when it comes down to protecting lives, I think we probably
ought to err on the side of security, to be honest.
Mr. Bilirakis. I agree. I have a couple more questions, but
this is where we should be putting the money, on safety and
security.
Can I ask a couple more, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Carney. You absolutely can.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, excellent.
This is for all the witnesses. Have you used grant funding
received from the Department of Homeland Security to enhance
your pipeline security efforts? If you have not, can we be of
assistance?
Mr. Gispert. The answer is yes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
Mr. Gispert. We are expecting that grant money to fade away
as the Federal Government looks for money to pay for other
issues. We have proudly, and we will confront any of our
Congressmen and say we used every Federal dollar smartly that
you sent us. If you sent us more, we would do more.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Well, let us assist in that area.
Anyone else want to respond?
Colonel Duncan. Yes, sir. Earlier in my testimony, I
mentioned Site Profiler, it is a risk management system that we
actually deployed with the assistance of the Tampa Bay Pipeline
and the other pipeline vendors here in our community. We have
been able to input all that information and so we know exactly
where all of our pipelines are that go through our community.
That Site Profiler system was purchased through our grant
dollars, through the Urban Area Security Initiative.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good.
Mr. Rogers. A lot of the training and exercises that we do
is funded through the Federal grant funds. So that is a
significant contribution, as well as the equipment that we have
that enables us to respond. Obviously being a response agency,
that is our primary focus, but there has been a significant
improvement in the funding for security across the State. A lot
of the things that came about as a result of 9/11 have really
helped bring agencies together as well and a lot of that is
funded by grant funding. But as Larry said, there is never
enough.
Mr. Gispert. We would like to tell you that you are sitting
in the most prepared community in the country. We have got so
much more we need to do. So do not go back up in Washington and
forget that fact and think that well, you have got $4.3 billion
over 5 years. Once again, we can answer the question any day:
Did we use the Federal dollars right? Yes. Could we use more?
Yes. If you gave us more, we would do more.
Tampa is such an attractive place from all different
reasons of people visiting, our industry, our port, and
everything else like that, so we are sitting in hectic times
with budget issues and the fact that the security people will
tell you that the security issues seem to ramp up. So remember
us when you are up in Washington. Send us a couple of bucks.
Mr. Bilirakis. I hear you.
Last question for all the witnesses. I think this is pretty
important. Do you have mutual aid agreements with surrounding
counties if you need additional support during response to a
pipeline incident? I know that happens with the fire
department, the local agreements, but can you answer that
question? Do you have agreements with the surrounding counties?
Mr. Rogers. One of the things--as you know, Florida has a
significant vulnerability to hurricanes. As a result of that,
we have a very robust structure for deploying resources
throughout the State and as was illustrated in 2005 with
Katrina, the ability to distribute those resources regionally.
Florida was the first mutual aid resources to reach Mississippi
within 12 hours of Katrina making landfall, and contributed
significantly to that across the board, not just fire rescue
but law enforcement, emergency management. There is a saying
that Florida saved Mississippi and that has a lot of truth to
it and that was relayed by the Governor of Mississippi. So we
do have--there is a very robust structure for deploying
resources that is being modeled, or used as a model for some of
the things that are trying to be done to address issues like we
faced in Katrina.
Mr. Gispert. Florida has, since the early 1990s, a State-
wide mutual aid agreement which is signatory to all 67
counties, all 400-plus municipalities, water management
districts and all that other stuff. All the paperwork, all the
who pays for workmen's comp--what happens if Ron goes to
Pensacola and gets hurt, who is going to pay his workmen's
comp? What is the reimbursement?--and by the way, if the
Federal Government reimburses us, fine; if they do not, we
still get paid because a part of that mutual aid agreement is
if I ask you for help, I will pay you. All the rates are
established, so it is all there. So we do not need individual
agreements, we have a State-wide agreement.
Colonel Duncan. Yes, sir, that applies to all the law
enforcement as well. Also just to, if I could, throw another
tout for our community here, the Tampa Police Department, the
large city agency within this county, all it takes from me is a
phone call to them and they send resources as well. So we have
those mutual understandings available for deployment at any
given time.
Mr. Rogers. That is the case on the fire rescue side as
well. We respond with each other every day.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, I appreciate it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
I really want to thank the panel for their testimony and
their insight, it was great.
I do, from a personal note, want to really echo what Mr.
Bilirakis said earlier at the outset of the first panel, that
we work pretty well together, the Ranking Member and myself,
and when it comes to homeland security and that sort of thing,
the partisanship aspect you keep hearing about is out the
window, it does not happen. We work as hard as we can together
to keep this country safe and it is something that we all take
seriously. Just so you have a view from the other side, it is
important to understand that.
Mr. Bilirakis. I wish that the other committees worked as
well as we do. The Veterans Committee does a good job with
bipartisanship and we work on behalf of our Nation's heroes
together. But Chris is an outstanding Chairman and, like I
said, we agree on most everything and it is just a good model
to have.
But thank you very much for presenting today and please be
in touch with our office. I want to meet with you guys again
real soon, so we can see how I can help you up in the District
of Columbia. Thanks so much, appreciate it.
Thanks to the City of Plant City for hosting us.
Mr. Carney. We may have further questions, and if so, we
will ask them and please respond in writing.
Having no further business before the subcommittee this
morning, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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