[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
U.S. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING JIHADIST
WEB SITES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-130
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, CONNIE MACK, Florida
FloridaAs of 5/6/ JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
10 deg. MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade
BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia TED POE, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
RON KLEIN, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Mansour Al-Hadj, Director, Reform in the Arab and Muslim
World Project, The Middle East Media Research Institute........ 6
Christopher Boucek, Ph.D., Associate, Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace..................... 16
Gregory S. McNeal, J.D., Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine
University..................................................... 23
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Mansour Al-Hadj: Prepared statement.......................... 8
Christopher Boucek, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 19
Gregory S. McNeal, J.D.: Prepared statement...................... 26
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
U.S. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING JIHADIST WEB SITES
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in
room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Sherman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Sherman. I want to thank our witnesses for being here.
I know that the title of this hearing uses the term
``jihadist,'' which is widely used in the intelligence and
antiterrorism community. I realize that the term ``jihad'' is
sometimes used in Islam to describe a personal struggle; and,
accordingly, I will use the word ``terrorist'' or
``extremist,'' not that the term ``jihadist'' does not also
carry with it the meaning, but it has secondary and tertiary
meanings as well, and obviously those engaged in a personal
reflection and struggles to improve themselves are not the
focus of these hearings.
We have seen extremists use the Internet for a growing
number of activities, including recruitment, propaganda,
psychological warfare, and soliciting financial support.
Today's hearing is to focus on how to best counter those
activities and basically to ask the question: Why aren't we
doing so?
The growing number of instances in which the Internet is
used for extremist activity is quite long. For example, in
March, the Washington Post reported that extremists used the
Internet to pass along U.S. operational information to
insurgents in Iraq. Perhaps the best-known example is Major
Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter who was influenced by extremist
propaganda on the Internet. The five men in Northern Virginia
who traveled via Pakistan to attack U.S. troops in Afghanistan
made contact with the extremist organization over the Web as
well.
We see groups like Fajr, which not only maintain their own
Web site but have a dedicated nexus to communicate with other
extremist groups. One can find the many books and essays
pushing the extremist position on the line, and you can find
instructions on how to download extremist content onto your
cell phone.
The question is, what is our response? The politically
correct response is for us to monitor what is going on and
maybe detect who is visiting these sites. We did a great job of
determining which sites Major Hasan visited after the terrorist
incident. Keep in mind that our enemies have decided that, even
though we have the capacity to monitor, the Internet serves
their purpose. So those that argue that our ability to monitor
means that extremist Web sites are helping us more than they
are helping our enemies have got to reflect on the fact that
our enemies have analyzed this and come to the exact opposite
conclusion. The other approach, also politically correct, is to
reply, read everything on the Internet, and write an essay as
to why the extremists are wrong and we are right.
Both of these responses to terrorists' use of the Internet
have a number of advantages. They are polite, they are
politically correct, and they involve hiring many people with
master's degrees in foreign affairs. Being polite and hiring
lots of people with master's degrees in foreign affairs may be
the chief mission of our State Department and other national
security bureaucracies.
I would prefer to see us shut down these sites. Now, you
can argue the First Amendment, but the fact is that while you
cannot scream fire in a crowded theater, you also cannot
legally try to raise money for terrorists or provide an article
how to ``Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom'' or advocate
that people do so. What we are talking about here are sites
that are not protected by the U.S. First Amendment.
The advocacy of taking violent action against Americans
certainly poses just as great a danger as yelling ``fire'' in a
crowded theater. We are going to be told that there are lots
and lots of Web sites, that is true, but they tend to get their
content from 5 or 10 or 15 providers. So if we should down
every Web site that provides original content, we will have
shut down the propaganda machine, the finance machine, the
recruitment machine that the terrorists are deploying on the
Internet.
Now, private citizens have been working to shut down
extremist Web sites by contacting companies who host these Web
sites and urging them to take them down. In addition, the U.S.
military, in at least one publicly reported case, decided to
shut down a Web site.
I am going to try to save some of your time by skipping
some of my prepared remarks here.
Yet we still have not only the many examples I mentioned
before, but also Colleen LaRose, commonly called Jihad Jane,
who was arrested in Philadelphia after months of trying to
recruit jihadist extremists in the United States. The Los
Angeles Times reports that this individual was just one of a
dozen domestic terrorist cases that the FBI disclosed in 2009,
all of which used the Internet as a tool.
Anwar al-Awlaki, an extremist leader with ties to al-Qaeda,
is now being credited as being the brains behind online
recruitment, particularly in a magazine written in English. I
mentioned his most famous article regarding making a bomb in a
kitchen.
The terrorists very much want to recruit operatives that
are legally entitled to be in the United States and culturally
familiar with the United States so that they can act without
creating suspicion. The best and easiest way for them to reach
out to American citizens, legal residents, and those familiar
with our culture is through the Internet.
During the Bush administration, the military began
formulating plans for a cyberattack to shut down a Saudi Web
site, which they reportedly did. Interestingly, the Web site,
according to the Washington Post, was being operated by a joint
Saudi-CIA operation in order to collect intelligence on the
extremists and possible Saudi insurgents. A better degree of
coordination might be called for in our efforts.
There is, of course, the naming and shaming, trying to get
Web site providers to take down certain Web sites. This is not
always successful. We have people here with technical expertise
who can perhaps advise us on whether the United States can do
what we are told high school students are able to do, and that
is to take down a Web site. And as I pointed out, we could
take, remove the content from hundreds of Web sites if we were
able to take down 5 or 10 other sites that are providing the
content.
Now, it is attractive to say, well, we should just read
what the jihadists put up or what the extremists and terrorists
put up and then respond. Because a lot of us grew up in
politics, and when you have a good argument, you prevail. I
have never had an argument good enough to get 99 percent of the
people in my district to agree with me and only 1 percent to
agree with my opponent.
But if I ever did come up with such a good argument, that
would be fine for my electoral purposes, but it wouldn't be
successful here. Because if 1 percent of those visiting these
Web sites do what the Web site authors want them to do, which
is to become terrorists, then the fact that 99 percent are
convinced to do otherwise hardly provides us with much solace.
The only way to be 100 percent convinced or 100 percent
sure that 100 percent of the people who are visiting a Web site
are not persuaded by it is to make sure that nobody is visiting
the Web site. Anything else leaves you struggling to get 50,
60, 70 percent of the people who are visiting that Web site to
not be convinced by it. So I look forward to using these
hearings to see whether we are going to be a polite country or
a safe country.
With that, I yield to the distinguished ranking member from
Orange County, California, Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I followed your argument there on the percentages, but I
thought it was interesting because I saw a story the other day
out of Pakistan that indicated that only 2 percent of people in
Pakistan believe that al-Qaeda was responsible for 9/11. So
perhaps the environment is even less conducive in terms of
trying to make a case when you are dealing with people that
have so much disinformation.
One of the questions all of us have is how is it possible
that this very dangerous jihadist ideology is spreading. The
argument that the heart of this is really being spread through
the Internet is an interesting one. I know personally from
conversations that I have had with a number of people who have
been radicalized that that played a key role, that that was at
the heart of how they came to these conclusions.
I think it is following the way in which this is being used
not only as a tool to recruit and indoctrinate but the way
that, beyond that, it is becoming sort of a virtual radical
Madrassa, these Deobandi schools that we see in Pakistan. Now
we have these on the Internet. They are walking people through
this logic or this argument, and they are being used to fund-
raise, they are being used to train, they are being used to
plot attacks. And if we think about 9/11, you know, al-Qaeda
used an extremist Web site to help plot that 9/11 attack.
Today Hezbollah is particularly adept. Following up on that
competing terrorist organization, they have become adept at
doing this; and, obviously, it is done pretty cheaply. So you
have got really a virtual caliphate, as somebody once mentioned
here. Obviously, many are using these Web sites to target
Americans with apparent success.
We had the 9-11 Commission report recently by Tom Kean and
Lee Hamilton. From time to time, they make pronouncements on,
you know, the current state of play and the war on terror and
they have warned about complacency about home-grown terrorism
and they said we have been--their words--``stumbling blindly''
trying to combat it.
We see the ever steady pace at which this recruiting and
these attacks are increasing. The report that was filed by the
members of the commission said they found it--again, their
words--``fundamentally troubling'' that there is no Federal
Government agency or department specifically charged with
identifying the radicalization and recruitment of Americans
into this process of being radicalized and then becoming
terrorists. And, of course, it is the Internet that is central
to that radicalization and recruitment.
So what to do about these Web sites? There is a debate
about whether they should be taken down or whether they should
be monitored, as the chairman referenced.
Intelligence can be gained on occasion, but we need the
tools and focus to aggressively attack these sites. At the end
of the day, we are at war. It is a declared war on the other
side. They have declared war on the U.S., and we should act
like we understand that. We should respond to that. One witness
offers legislative suggestions that I look forward to hearing.
I commend Mr. Poe, my colleague, who is not with us yet for
this hearing. He contacted YouTube, and he expressed his
concern over the rise of terrorist groups posting on it after
he witnessed some of these videos.
Some argue that we should be actively monitoring to counter
radical Internet messages, debating some of these finer points
over the justification of terrorist acts, for example. I
understand the concept, but I don't know if our Government has
the ability to effectively execute such a policy which requires
a set of specialized and uncommon skills and very deep
understanding, if you are thinking about somebody sitting there
engaged in this kind of a debate. We should know also, I think,
that a bad effort at this would do us harm. If we tried to do
this and do it badly, we would be in more trouble.
One academic calls radical Islam on the Internet ``a
virtual community of hatred.'' How you embark on this is a very
difficult question and they are very tough waters for a
bureaucracy to dive into.
Given that they have declared war on us on the Internet,
the answer is to take them down. The answer is the obvious
answer, don't give them the ability to continue to recruit and
to plan. I would have a bit more confidence if the
administration better understood the totalitarian ideology that
we are facing.
Six years ago, the 9-11 Commission found that ``we are not
threatened by `terrorism,' some `generic evil' but specifically
by `Islamist terrorism.' ''
This remains the threat today, but the commission's
straight talk is shunned by this administration which prefers
to speak of ``violent extremism.'' That's the very generic
threat that the commission rejected. They wanted to name this
threat for what it was. This blindness is one reason, perhaps,
that we are ``stumbling blindly,'' as Kean and Hamilton
regrettably concluded.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Sherman. I wonder if we have an opening statement from
the vice chairman of the committee.
Mr. Scott. Well, I will be very brief, but I would like to
make a couple of statements about this very timely and
important issue.
I think if there ever was an example of our becoming
servants of the machines that were created to serve us, this is
clearly an example of it.
The Internet sort of reminds me of the rope that is thrown
down to a man fallen from a cliff. He can either use that rope
to pull himself up or use that rope to hang himself.
The Internet and the use of it by terrorists and criminal
activity is just mushrooming, and we have got to have the
ability to be able to adapt our capability of thwarting the
terrorists' use of it as quickly as we can.
The topic of today's hearing is one of increasing
importance as we move through the 21st century and as we
continue our offensive against terrorist groups, be they
foreign or jihadist, including al-Qaeda, or domestic, as more
and more are rapidly becoming.
The rise of social network and communications platforms
like Facebook, Twitter, all allow for great, creative, and
political and economic promise for all of us. It could be a
rope to pull ourselves up.
But as we have seen all over the world, political movements
and demonstrations have been organized through such Internet
portals from the streets of Tehran to right here in Main
Street, U.S.A. Spreading messages to the masses has become far
easier in our interconnected world, and we have got to make
sure that the United States, our country, remains at the
forefront of the developing cyberworld in order to advance our
Nation's interests and to promote freedom and democracy abroad.
Likewise, this case of communications allows for enemies of
our basic freedoms, enemies of democracy, to recruit for their
destructive causes. While pursuing our strategic
communications, encountering the recruitment attempts of
terrorist groups, we also must make sure that we don't use this
to hang ourselves, that our vigilance is tempered by our
respects to those rights that are endowed by our Creator, that
we cherish and that are enumerated within our Constitution, the
values that we represent.
And this is what I believe should be our primary focus in
this hearing today. It is a delicate balance I think that we
walk.
We have got to be able to intercept and unscramble
encrypted messages. But we have got to balance it. We have got
to balance our security needs with protecting the privacy, with
protecting the democracy, protecting the freedoms.
Inherent in that freedom is our individual citizen's right
to privacy. So we have got a challenge here and let us hope
that at the end of the day that we use this rope we have to
indeed pull ourselves up to a better country, a better world,
and not allow it to hang us.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Manzullo, do you have an opening
statement?
Mr. Manzullo. No.
Mr. Sherman. I should note that both witnesses and members
will have 5 business days or longer, if they ask me for it
later, to put their full statements in the record.
I should also say--just to clarify things--I think we are
all talking about the same enemy, that is to say, those who
believe in the use of terrorism or other violent means and are
inspired by a corrupted interpretation of Islam and a corrupted
interpretation of the concept of Islamic jihad.
First, I would like to introduce our first witness, Mansour
Al-Hadj. He is the director of the Reform in the Arab and
Muslim World Project for the Middle East Media Research
Institute, MEMRI. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. MANSOUR AL-HADJ, DIRECTOR, REFORM IN THE ARAB
AND MUSLIM WORLD PROJECT, THE MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
Mr. Al-Hadj. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Royce, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
allowing me to serve as a panelist on this important topic.
My name is Mansour Al-Hadj. I was born and raised a devout
Muslim in Saudi Arabia. I earned my degree in Sharia and
Islamic Studies at the International University of Africa in
Sudan.
I am the director of MEMRI's Reform in the Arab and Muslim
World Project. My work involves focusing on liberal voices and
advocates of reform in the Arab and Muslim world, including
those who speak out against online jihad.
As a youth, I was taught to hate America, the West, Jews
and Christians. I was taught to love jihad and those who wage
it. Religious settlements and Islamist pamphlets turned me into
an extremist by teaching me that Muslims are backward because
we don't implement Sharia.
My transformation away from extremism came after reading
the writing of a peace activist who denounced violence and
supports the use of nonviolent means of social change. Today, I
see many Muslims stuck in the same conflict I was. The
difference is that today Muslims have much more access to the
source of extremist ideas online through jihadist forums and
Web sites.
Jihadist forums on Web sites have played a role in several
recent terror acts in the United States such as the Fort Hood
shooting and the failed Times Square bombing. I personally
witnessed the powerful effect a propaganda campaign can have on
a young mind. As a student in Sudan, one government recruitment
effort during the civil war was a jihadist TV series. This show
documented jihadi fighters imparting their love for jihad. I
still remember how fascinated I was by their stories and how I
longed to become one of them.
Just as the Sudanese Government managed to market the war
to recruit thousands to join their jihad, terror organizations
such as al-Qaeda are actively recruiting thousands through the
Internet. Islamist organizations primarily use the Internet for
spreading their message and propaganda. It is considered to be
an integral part of their jihad, and they invest tremendous
resource in it.
It is impossible to imagine the development of global jihad
movement without the Internet. Through MEMRI's research of
jihadi Web sites, it has discovered that many of them are
hosted by Internet service providers in the U.S. that are
unaware of the content due to the language barrier.
MEMRI addressed Congress on this issue in July, 2007. We
suggested dealing with the problem by notifying ISPs in the
United States about what they host in the hope that they would
voluntarily remove the sites. In the week that followed, 32 out
of 50 ISPs questioned removed the jihadi sites.
Opposition to closing these sites came in several
varieties. First Amendment rights, the Web sites are a source
of valuable intelligence, and the difficulty in dealing with a
large number of Web sites were all given as a reason to keep
the sites active.
However, we at MEMRI believe that if the key jihadi Web
sites are shut down, the rest of them will dry up. Most
importantly, the number of jihadist Web sites has decreased in
recent years. Currently, the number of highly dangerous sites
is less than 10.
It is important to mention that terrorist organizations are
always on the lookout for other channels to propagate their
ideology. As jihadists encounter increasing difficulty with
their Web sites, they discovered Western social media outlets
such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.
In fact, YouTube is a primary clearinghouse for one of
America's most wanted terrorists, Anwar al-Awlaki, who provided
spiritual guidance and inspiration for several recent
successful and failed terror attacks in the U.S. al-Awlaki's's
presence in YouTube is the result of the shutting down of his
Web site shortly after the Fort Hood shooting.
At that time, MEMRI reported that al-Awlaki's Web site was
hosted by an ISP in California. Within 2 hours of the report's
publication, the ISP removed al-Awlaki's Web site.
In conclusion, online jihad is a dangerous foe. The U.S.
must confront it exactly as it confronts other forms of
extremism on other fronts around the world, both within and
beyond its border. As with its military ventures, the U.S. must
initiate cooperation with its allies, international
organizations, and the business community. Experience shows
that this can indeed be done.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks. Thank you
again for inviting me today. I welcome any questions that you
or the members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Al-Hadj follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sherman. I want to thank you for that testimony and I
believe your written testimony is longer and, without
objection, will be made as a part of the record. I recommend to
my colleagues the first illustrative paragraph of your written
testimony.
Next I would like to introduce Christopher Boucek. He is an
associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program where his
research focuses on security challenges in the Arabian Gulf and
North Africa. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BOUCEK, PH.D., ASSOCIATE, MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Boucek. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to be here today to speak about this very important
topic. I think I would like to keep my remarks relatively
brief, as my written testimony has been entered into the
record, so we can move on to questions that you may have.
As we all know and as was mentioned in the opening
statements, the issue of Web sites promoting and propagating
jihadist terrorist ideology is a serious concern. I think it is
important that we keep in mind what the Internet does and how
this plays with recruitment and radicalization. It serves as a
system to propagate and perpetuate an ideology as well as
provide ideological cohesion and a sense of belonging across
great distances. It is an unrivaled source for connectivity for
sharing information, as well as knowledge, inspiration,
propaganda, recruitment, and fund-raising efforts.
What I would really like to do is focus on three aspects
that I outlined in my written testimony.
The first is a need for measured response, which I think
would fall somewhere between the polite versus safe setup that
we heard in the opening remarks. I would propose that there is
a need for a very strong and coordinated approach to dealing
with these issues, and I think that has to come from a basis of
understanding what these issues are all about and how the
Internet is being used. There are times that I would say that
certain Web sites should be shut down or named and shamed, as
have been outlined.
I would also say that we need to weigh this against the
unintended consequences that can arise from doing so. There is
a value, a considerable value for keeping some of these Web
sites available for law enforcement intelligence as well as
research efforts. I think we also need to keep in mind that
over the last several years a number of experts have pointed
out how there is a decreasing value in both shutting these down
and as using them for surveillance or research methods. So I
think this issue has an awful lot of nuance in it.
I would like to pick up on a point that was made by the
previous witness, which is the use of YouTube, especially the
use of YouTube by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. About 3
months ago, a new YouTube channel appeared branded as AQAP, the
Islamist al-Qaeda organization based in Yemen, their media
outlet. This features all of AQAP's videos subtitled into
English.
No longer do you need to have access to Arabic. No longer
do you need to be able to navigate Web forums. In conjunction
with English language propaganda material, you can now use
Google and YouTube to access this material, and it is
everywhere. Taken in the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, his sermons
and lectures are available widespread, not just on YouTube but
on an infinite number of outlets.
It is important to keep in mind that shutting down these
Web sites will not completely eliminate the sentiment behind
them, and I think this leads me into my next point, which is
the need for an increased sense of counter-engagement, I guess
the read and talk aspect.
And I think what I would say here is that it is important,
I think, for us to keep in mind that al-Qaeda is fueled by an
ideology and a set of ideas and a set of grievances, and we
need to understand these, and there are some individuals--there
are multiple pathways to radicalization, and there are some
individuals who are motivated through religion, who benefit
from religious discussion. And there are a number of programs
in other countries--Internet-based, radio-based, television-
based interactive programs--to discuss these issues.
We don't need to do this all ourselves, and oftentimes we
probably should not be, and there are ways in which I think we
can support these programs in other countries. We can support
moderate--moderate voices that speak out in the region against
violence. This comes with a caveat that some of those voices
that are speaking out against violence are probably also
speaking out on issues that would be of great displeasure to a
number of people in this country. So we need to weigh the
balance of these issues.
The last point I would like to make is how we look forward
on some suggestions, and this is why I would highlight need for
research and further research. I guess this is no surprise
coming from an academic and a researcher. I think, basically, I
would say that it is unbelievable to me that almost 10 years
into this struggle we have yet to fully set up a way to address
dealing with these issues.
If you look 10 years into the Cold War, we had a much, much
better developed understanding of the Soviet Union, China,
communism, socialism, the Russian language, Chinese. We are
nowhere near that dealing with this issue. Across military,
universities, higher education, I mean, this is shocking to me
and I think this is something that we need to fix straightaway.
I think we also need to keep in mind that the Internet is
not always a perfect mirror for what is going on in the ground
in a lot of these countries. I think it is very easy to use the
Internet to try to understand what is going in places where
most Americans don't go, if it is Peshawar or Marab or other
places, but there is no replacement for actual on-the-ground
field research and interaction with people.
With that, I would like to highlight several other points,
and I think that there are ways that, because this is an
argument based on ideology and ideas, we can highlight the
flaws and the inherent discrepancies in these arguments. I
think doing this in conjunction with the more rigorous shut-
down approach is probably where I would say we should head
forward.
With that, I would like to conclude my remarks. Thank you
very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucek follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sherman. We will now hear from our third witness, Mr.
Gregory McNeal. Mr. McNeal is an associate professor of law at
Pepperdine University School of Law located immediately
adjacent to the 27th Congressional District and previously
found in the 24th Congressional District of California. He has
also served in an advisory capacity on counterterrorism policy
to the Departments of Defense and Justice.
Mr. McNeal.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY S. MCNEAL, J.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
LAW, PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY
Mr. McNeal. Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Royce,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be
here today to speak about the threat of terrorist Web sites and
the U.S. strategy to counter them.
As a professor at Pepperdine University, I specialize in
national security law and policy, and I have written
specifically about the threat of terrorist Web sites.
As a California resident, it is an honor to be here
speaking before the subcommittee, which has been so ably led by
California representatives, Congressmen Sherman and Royce.
In the era of home-grown terrorist plots, terrorist Web
sites are a grave threat to national security, which require a
three-pronged approach to combating them. That approach
combines monitoring for intelligence value, elimination and
destruction for operational gains, and co-optation for
propaganda and ideological value. My remarks today and my
written testimony focus on the elimination and destruction of
terrorist Web sites.
Eliminating selected extremist Web sites will enhance our
ability to collect intelligence by narrowing the field of enemy
sites we must monitor. A small number of Web sites will allow
for target efforts to undermine the jihadist message. Finally,
efforts which keep the enemy on the move impose costs on them.
They delegitimize them and at the margins make it more
difficult for potential recruits to become radicalized.
Today's headlines about a plot to engage in coordinated
Mumbai-style terrorist attacks reveals the critical importance
of countering the terrorist Web presence. Home-grown, low-
sophistication, high-casualty plots are increasingly
facilitated by jihadist Web sites.
Consider just a handful of our close calls here within the
United States.
Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood attacker, was inspired by and
radicalized by terrorist Web sites. Those Web sites now hold
him up as a symbol of successful, home-grown attacks.
Najibullah Zazi, who planned a second series of attacks
against the New York City subway system, was radicalized and
educated through jihadist Web sites.
Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, was radicalized
through terrorist Web sites. It was there that he found his
inspiration and fixity of purpose that drove him to carry out
his attack.
Internet images of jihad were the singular tie binding
together the efforts of the Fort Dix plotters. And, moreover,
in the case of Ohio terrorists Mohammad Amawi, Marwan El-Hindi
and Wassam Mazloum, terrorist Web sites were the motivating and
enabling factor in the recruitment, providing them with
information about how to build bombs.
The common theme running throughout nearly every attempted
attack since September 11 is a radical ideology. That ideology
finds its home in a small core of Web sites with close
operational ties to al-Qaeda. Those core forums are the
mainstream media of extremist ideology. They have the label of
legitimacy. Their stories, videos, training materials, and
directives are picked up by mirror sites and repeated
throughout the Web. We should be disrupting their operations.
I would like to address a common myth that shutting down
terrorist Web sites does not work. I say this is a myth
because, to date, there has been no concerted government effort
to shut down these sites. I readily admit that the terrorist
Web presence cannot be eliminated, but that is not the goal of
what I am advocating for. Rather, the goal I believe we should
be pursuing is to impose costs on our enemies in time and
resources to narrow their potential Web hosts and corral them
into places of our choosing so we can monitor and co-op them.
It should not be easy for our enemies to recruit, train, and
proselytize.
The Internet is not a battlefield that should operate
according to the directives of our enemies. Rather, it is a
battle space that we should own. On the traditional
battlefield, few would argue that we should forego killing and
capturing terrorists merely because they may be quickly
replaced. Yet when it comes to the Internet that is exactly
what those who are opposed to shutting down these Web sites are
advocating for. Now, I am speaking in terms of warfare.
However, the fight against terrorist Web sites must be an
interagency effort. The intelligence community, the military,
law enforcement, and the State Department are all key players
in a comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of jihadist
Web sites. However, this should not be solely the province of
the executive branch. In fact, I believe that comprehensive
legislation directing and prescribing the activities of each
agency in the cyber realm is essential to national security.
Congress can and should make its mark before the executive
branch takes actions on its own, forming precedent without
policy. The threat of jihadist Web sites is one part of a
broader need for legislation directing of our Nation's cyber
war efforts. The key to countering the influence of terrorist
Web sites is to first ensure that those Web sites do not
receive any support from U.S. Web hosts. This can be
accomplished through application of existing laws and shaming
techniques. Second, we should eliminate selected sites using
existing statutes and Treasury regulations. Third, we should
work with allies to target those individuals who are supporting
Web sites abroad that are beyond the reach of our law. And,
finally, when necessary, actions should be taken by the
Pentagon's Joint Functional Component Command Network-Warfare
Unit and Cyber Command to shut down selected Web sites.
However, this should only be done after coordination and
consultation with the intelligence, law enforcement, and
diplomatic community; and Congress should be regularly informed
of these actions. Following these steps will go a long way
toward countering the influence of jihadist Web sites.
This concludes my formal remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McNeal follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sherman. I thank you, Professor, and since you are
suggesting legislation--my law school professors used to assign
homework. I have always wanted to reverse that. So if you
haven't done so already, your homework assignment is to draft
proposed legislation implementing what you are talking about.
Unless you have already done that.
Mr. McNeal. Mr. Sherman, I would be happy to work with the
committee on drafting that legislation.
Mr. Sherman. And they say this job doesn't have perks. I
just gave a homework assignment to a law professor.
We are going to hear, first, questions from our ranking
member, Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Let me ask a question of Mansour. You mentioned
that your move away from radical Islam or jihadist thinking
came as a result of an article that you read. I wondered if you
had read that on a Web site or if it was a pamphlet. I am
wondering how that idea got in circulation. You were in Sudan,
I think, at the time?
Mr. Al-Hadj. Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Royce. Saudi Arabia. I would also ask if--that is
Khales--what did you say his name was? Khales Jalabi?
Mr. Al-Hadj. Khales Jalabi, yes.
Mr. Royce. Is he widely read today? Is there sort of a
movement in Saudi Arabia?
No, not really?
Mr. Al-Hadj. Not really. He basically is considered like a
bad guy or something because he is against jihad. I mean, he
interprets Koran and jihad in Koran in another way, in a
peaceful way, and the radicals don't like him.
Mr. Royce. Tell me a little bit, real quickly.
Somebody behind you wanted to make a comment, I guess.
Ms. Alhani. Yes, because you were asking him about Khales
Jalabi, I would just add something he didn't know maybe, that
he is a Syrian writer. He writes--but, as you know, a writer.
He is Islamic, but he is not a radicalist or criminalist
either.
Mr. Royce. I see.
Mr. Sherman. Normally, we don't hear from anyone sitting in
the audience, but you are allowed to--but the one requirement
is that the woman who just spoke needs to identify herself for
the record. Can you give us your name, please?
Ms. Alhani. I am Fawziah Alhani. I am a human rights
activist. I was attending another conference here.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you for your name.
Mr. Royce. What I was trying to understand better was, in
society, you went to a particular school and in that school
these ideas were prevalent. Was the institution that you were
in dissimilar in some ways to other schools or do you think
this is sort of the mindset that many teachers have?
Mr. Al-Hadj. Yes. I went to college in Sudan, the
International University of Africa. In that university there
are students from all parts of Africa and the world. Actually,
there are American students, too.
That is an Islamic university. The things that they are
teaching there are just anti-Western things; and, actually,
one--many of the students at the time when I was there, they go
and wage jihad. They are highly respected. They don't have to
attend any classes, and they would really pass the exams
without anything. And, actually, one of my professors died--he
lost his life in this jihad.
So the Islamist Government of Sudan, doing this, you know,
to spread their ideology, they want to have as many Islamic
States in Africa or around the world. So they are spreading
this through bringing students, giving them free scholarships
to come to this particular school, and teaching them this anti-
Western and anti-human rights and things.
So the day of the 9/11, when the Towers hit, I was there. I
was a student there, and all that you hear is the cheers and
people were very happy, without knowing what happened, who did
that. Just because America was hit, it's something very happy
for them.
Mr. Royce. I have been to Sudan and Darfur. One of the
concerns I have about the particular institutions that we are
talking about is the way they push martyrdom but also the way
they pushed sort of a genocidal campaign, originally in South
Sudan, and now it is in Darfur. But in South Sudan that is when
you were there, they were pushing this idea.
And just to get off the topic for a minute, is it realistic
to think that the government in Khartoum, with this recent
history of promoting the type of jihad that we saw carried out,
including the genocidal campaigns, would be willing to allow
for the south to secede if that is the referendum's outcome
that is in Sudan? You don't have to answer that, but I do
wonder.
The Sudan Government has made this agreement, but given
what the old National Islamic Front Government did in terms of
creating this atmosphere, I wonder if it is possible for them
to live with the result of the referendum in the south.
Mr. Al-Hadj. Well, right now, they are coming with some
ideas. They actually are thinking of delaying the referendum;
and, you know, they are really bothered by, you know, American
support for the right for southern Sudanese to choose whether
they stay united with one Sudan or have their own country. But
for them that would be problematic, and I don't think they
would allow that to happen.
Mr. Royce. One other quick question. In Saudi Arabia, how
prevalent do you think the teaching in the textbooks and so
forth--what is the prevailing view on this kind of activity?
What is the mindset in the schools?
Mr. Al-Hadj. Well, I was--I went to school in Saudi Arabia,
and the textbooks are really--they are anti-Western things.
They teach us that, you know, a Muslim and Jewish are enemies
at the end of the day, and sometimes in the future they will
fight each other. And even the trees and stone will help the
Muslim kill the Jewish. So these things, I--you know, they
taught me these things.
Mr. Royce. Yes.
Mr. Al-Hadj. And one of the things that, you know, I now
feel really sorry about it, that, in the past, they taught us
the story of our Prophet Muhammad killing a whole tribe, the
Banu Qurayza tribe in Medina, because of treason or something.
When I hear that story, when I was young, you know, it didn't
make any difference. I didn't feel any sorry. I didn't think
that the Prophet, you know, had done something really horrible.
So, you know, there is no way of questioning the history of
Islam. And, actually, right now, one religious guy in Saudi
Arabia, he is one of the writers of the textbooks, the new
textbooks. He is really radical, and he actually wants to have
like separation in the grand mosques so women can be, you know,
on one side and men can be on the other side, and he is one of
the people who is writing the books for kids.
So it is in there, and it needs to be reformed.
Mr. Royce. If I could ask one more question, and I will ask
that of Dr. McNeal.
You mentioned in your testimony, Dr. McNeal, that Treasury
has not aggressively attempted to cut off cyber services to
terrorism supporters, not even key al-Qaeda facilitators. I was
going to ask you why, and what grade would you give that effort
in the last administration as well as in this administration?
What is afoot here?
Mr. McNeal. I would be hesitant to give a, grade only
because I haven't seen all the papers before me to grade all of
them. But Treasury can do more, and it is obvious they can do
more. In my written remarks, I highlighted a Web site of a key
al-Qaeda facilitator who is still receiving domain-name
services from a company in Oregon. This was as of Monday, I
conducted the search and found the Web site myself. It included
some Google-translated passages of advocacy of jihad. So that
suggests to me on the surface that there could be a resource
issue or a focus issue.
So that is not meant to disparage the efforts of those at
Treasury, but, rather, suggest that maybe greater direction or
focus needs to be placed on this problem. And I don't think
across the executive branch there has been a focus on these Web
sites, as indicated by both your opening remarks and
Congressman Sherman's opening remarks. So it is a matter of
motivation rather than a matter of desire, I think.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
I am out of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Royce.
I should point out that Congressman Ellison may be back. He
is not a member of this subcommittee, but he does have the
great honor of serving on the full committee, and he will be
allowed to ask questions of the witnesses after members of the
subcommittee have completed their questioning.
With that, I will recognize Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Al-Hadj, your testimony and your comments are both
enlightening and yet troubling, because it seems to me the
culture of many of our Muslim countries and the whole attitude
of the younger generations that are coming along, the anti-
West, anti-United States, anti-Jewish sentiment appears to be
growing instead of receding. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Al-Hadj. I think so, yes, because of many things. These
things, they are in the saying of the prophet. And the media in
the Middle East is always trying to show the U.S. as the cause
of every problem on Muslim people around the world. So it is an
anti-Western notion that really keeps on growing. And something
that the Muslim community here in the United States are not
doing is to speak out and go and tell people that we are not
disenfranchised here in America. We enjoy all the freedom and
things.
I came to this country 5 years ago. And when I chat with my
friends, they ask me, Hey, are you allowed to go to the mosque?
Does nobody cause you any problems? Are Muslims hated in
America? But this is not true. I don't see an anti-Muslim
thing. But when you see the media and the Muslim activists or
Muslim organizations when they appear in the media, they are
always trying to make themselves as victims, and there is
really anti-Muslim things going on in America, but this is not
true.
Mr. Scott. There has to be some element of responsibility
taken by the leadership in some of our more moderate Muslim
countries. What is holding that back? Is there a fear, there is
a reluctance? Because no matter what we do--I mean, if somebody
hates you because you are Jewish or if somebody hates you
because you are from the United States, no matter what we do,
we are not the instrument that can change that.
Something has to change within the culture over there, and
I just don't see positive forward leadership on the part of
people who you would feel--educated, who work with this
country, have relationships with it--not taking the leadership
in these Muslim communities to correct this perception. No
matter what we do, we may get interception dealing with the
Internet, but that is not going to stop until we can change
some attitudes and reverse this trend of anti-Americanism and
anti-Israel and Jewish feelings within the Muslim world.
Quite honestly, the tragedy of the situation is that if it
does not happen, we are headed down a very, very dangerous road
here if we don't get some cooperation from the Muslim world and
the leadership to help correct this perception. Because if what
you say is true of how these younger people are just getting
this hatred, unfounded, we are not the answer to that because
we are the devil to them, we are the Satan to them. It has to
come from the Muslim community itself.
I don't want to belabor that, but I hope we have some signs
of hope there. Do we? Do we have some signs of hope that we can
get some counter--to me that is the best counterterrorism we
could have, help coming from the Muslim communities to
straighten out a lot of the misinformation that is formulating
these attitudes that make these young people ripe for
recruitment.
I just came from a trip over into Africa and went into the
Casablanca area. And that country, Morocco, surprisingly, is a
leading country in recruiting terrorists. And supposedly it is
our friend. I mean, we give money there, Rick's Cafe is there;
a great American movie was named for it called Casablanca--you
probably don't remember that--starring Humphrey Bogart some
years ago.
But anyway, I would hope that this committee hearing can at
least--we can make a dramatic statement that we need to get
greater cooperation from the moderate Muslim leadership in the
world to help us in this. I think that is going to be the way
it will do.
But let me ask you, Mr. McNeal, in your testimony you wrote
that independent watchdog sites stand in the best position to
monitor jihadi extremist sites. Let me ask you in relationship
to that, what is being done to ensure that independent watchdog
sites are acting legally and appropriately?
Mr. McNeal. It would be difficult to imagine how, short of
them shutting a Web site down themselves, how they would be
violating the law. Generally, these independent watchdog sites
monitor these Web sites and then use shaming techniques to try
to get the Web sites shut down.
We heard Mr. Al-Hadj's example about--I think it was 32 out
of 50 or something, pretty good result, of Internet service
providers who, once they are notified that these jihadist Web
sites are present on their servers, they shut them down
voluntarily. And so, short of these watchdog groups engaging in
some sort of denial of service attack, there isn't a violation
of the law there.
And I think actually that these watchdog groups should be
encouraged in that respect, because the Web is so expansive,
the Web sites are so dynamic in switching servers that the
Federal Government wouldn't be able to do it on its own. This
is sort of the equivalent of your local neighborhood watch
providing tips to law enforcement about crimes being committed
in the community.
I think the shortfall is that when these Web sites inform
law enforcement--or Treasury, let's say, about the presence--
when these watchdogs inform law enforcement about the presence
of these Web sites, it is not always followed up on. And we
have tools to issue cease-and-desist orders to Web hosts who
are providing services to designated groups; however, if it is
a nondesignated group, it is just a person advocating jihad,
there is currently no law which allows us to have that type of
material removed from a Web site. The YouTube examples that
were cited earlier are a prime example of that. But I think for
the most part these groups, unless they are conducting direct
attacks against Web sites, are not violating the law.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Let me go back to you for a moment, Mr.
Boucek--I don't mean to murder everybody's name up there, but I
did get McNeal right. I could handle that.
You wrote that to get ahead of al-Qaeda and Islamic
extremism more broadly, we will need to shift to be proactive
and not just reactive.
That brings me to the point I mentioned first in my
questioning with Mr. Al-Hadj; and that is, what more can we do
to encourage the moderate voices? Because I sincerely believe
this is the key going forward. We have got to figure out a way
to break down this wall and to turn this attitude around or
else we are just chasing our tail here.
What do you think more we could do to encourage the
moderate voices in the Arab and Muslim world, some that have
already, to a degree, spoken out against violence and
extremism? What more can we do, or should we be doing to
encourage this? Are you satisfied with where we are?
Mr. Boucek. Thank you very much.
I think this is an excellent question. I think there is an
awful lot that we can do, because there are an increasing
number of moderate voices speaking out against violence in the
region. I think you could come up with a huge list of clerics
and sheiks and officials throughout the Muslim world, in Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, who have spoken out saying that violence and
terrorism is wrong and have taken action to criminalize these
activities.
I think there are things we can do to help get that message
out. I think we can begin by probably starting from a position
that we need to know more about them so we can talk about them.
But also I think there are ways that we can help get those
messages out by promoting cooperation amongst different
countries. So sharing best practices and technologies for how
to get these messages out, how to do education. I also think
there are probably ways that you can manipulate search results
and do other things, which is far beyond my technical
education.
I think another interesting point that I think leads to
something you mentioned earlier in your remarks is this issue
of this rising anti-American or anti-Western sentiment. I think
there are lots of causes for that. And I think it is not just
religious motivation, I think it is a whole range of things
from social conditions, governments, education, corruption,
that feed into this process. So I think we need to step back
and say that there is a much larger cause for it.
I think we also need to recognize that as there are many
pathways of how people do get into violence or radicalization,
people do step back from it. There is a growing body of
research to suggest that people do leave militant groups and
terrorist organizations. Once we understand this better, we can
help facilitate that process, I think.
Mr. Sherman. I will now call upon Mr. Ellison for 5 minutes
of questioning.
Mr. Ellison. Well, let me thank Chairman Sherman for this
hearing. I think it is very important. Unfortunately, due to
multiple demands, I wasn't able to hear all of the testimony,
but I appreciate the work that you all have done. I think it is
important.
I think that we don't know nearly enough, and the pursuit
of how to be more effective in countering violent
radicalization is something we all have to devote more time and
energy to. But since I didn't get to hear everything, let me
just throw out a few ideas I have had and perhaps I can get
your reaction.
I think that what needs to happen most of all here is that
these Web sites need to have some competition of ideas. And
what I mean by that is that if you suppress a Web site--and any
Web site that is proposing violent radicalization or how to--I
think you just get rid of it and that is the right thing to do.
But one that is just offering these extremist ideas, I think it
may be more effective to compete with their ideology rather
than simply suppress it. And the reason why is that these
people who--it seems to me their essential argument is that
America is at war with Islam. America is not at war with any
religion. America is at peace with all religions.
But if they want to argue that America is at war with
Islam, the most effective thing to do is not simply to suppress
the argument, but to actually take that argument head-on by
talking about a number of things like our Constitution and
freedom of religion, by talking about how Muslim Americans are
doing, actually prospering pretty well; by talking about how
leaders like Michael Bloomberg have stood up and said that the
Manhattan Islamic Center has as much right to be there as any
other institution does; how the President stood up and spoke on
this issue; and how leaders--Muslim, Christian, Jewish of
various faiths--said that the threatened Koran burning was
reprehensible.
I mean, I think that we should take on this claim that
America is at war with Islam, because I am clear that it is
not; and yet if we just suppress it and don't really offer a
competing vision, then we may be missing an opportunity, and we
might even hand these people an opportunity to say, See, this
is just them trying to--they don't want you to hear our side,
kind of, argument.
Let me also offer you these ideas because I know the title
of this hearing today is Jihadist Web sites. Personally, I
don't like the terminology. And the reason why is that, to a
Western audience the word ``jihad'' is a foreign word, it
sounds scary, it is certainly used in a scary way, and so it
whips us up over here in America. But to the Arabic-speaking
world, it is much more akin to the term ``freedom fighter.'' So
why would we let----
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Ellison, in my opening remarks I did
comment on the preferred term being something along the lines
of ``terrorist'' or ``extremist,'' and discussed how the word
``jihadist'' might----
Mr. Ellison. Yes. And that is not meant as a critique, and
I appreciate your acknowledging that, Chairman Sherman. And let
me just say this quite simply, and you all may agree or
disagree, from the standpoint of Anwar al-Awlaki, he wants to
associate what he is talking about with Islam so that he can go
out to the Muslim world and say, I am the standard bearer for
Islam and I want you to do this in defense of Islam. Well, we
should strip them of that and say, You are not representing
Islam, you are representing murder and killing. And so they
would love to use Islam as a veneer to sort of market their
ideas, and I think we should really figure out how do we deny
them that.
I was making this point with somebody a few months ago and
they said, Well, this is what they call themselves. I said,
Well, that is exactly why we shouldn't call them that. None of
us would say that Timothy McVeigh is a freedom fighter, even if
he called himself that; we call him a mass murderer. Well, we
should call Anwar al-Awlaki a promoter of mass murder and we
should call Osama bin Ladenan actual mass murderer.
So whenever we say Islamic terrorists, Islamic--we are
always associating it with Islam. I think that we think we are
standing up against the bad guys, but I think we may
unwittingly be actually helping to reinforce their argument.
I haven't dropped it yet, but I am actually really sort of
thinking a lot about perhaps a study bill on violent
radicalization. I know Jane Harman has done this in the past.
It was met by many people in the civil rights and civil
liberties community with opposition, because they thought it
would lead to violation of human and civil rights.
I guess I am running out of time, but if I may, could I
wrap up, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Sherman. You may.
Mr. Ellison. I think that we don't know enough about the
topic, which is why we profile, which is why we stop the guy
with the worry beads and the beard and kick him off the plane,
when we are letting the other one go by who is the real danger.
I have pontificated long enough. Thank you very much for
listening. And if there is ever any time, I would love to hear
your views on what I said.
Mr. Sherman. I thank the gentleman.
I would comment that in my district, a mosque is being
built, and the only controversy is whether it has enough
parking spaces.
An article in the Case Western Reserve University Journal
of International Law discusses the strategy for containing and
removing terrorist material through a process of shaming those
who provide the Web sites to extremists. Limiting the countries
which host these Web sites, they argue, will make it easier to
track and control.
Dr. Boucek, is the strategy of just naming, shaming,
viable? And in particular, in your testimony you talk about
YouTube, and apparently al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has a
site. I know I have a site, Keith has a site, David has a site.
Is that site still up just because nobody has bothered to
contact YouTube, or is it up because YouTube has decided to
leave it up?
Mr. Boucek. Thank you very much.
Taking your last point first, I cannot tell you why it is
still up. At least earlier this week, on Monday----
Mr. Sherman. Are you aware of anybody who has contacted
YouTube and said, ``Hey, do you know about this?''
Mr. Boucek. There are some people who have mentioned this
before. I don't think it is very well known that there is this
site. Probably more disturbing, the video content that is
available has been replicated across any number of other sites
now. The very concerning thing to me, though----
Mr. Sherman. You obviously find these sites. When you
personally find them, do you drop a line to YouTube? Do they
read their mail?
Mr. Boucek. In this case, no, I have not.
Mr. Sherman. Well, homework assignments are not limited to
law professors. To start this out, give me a list of the sites.
I will put a letterhead on top of it just to make sure that it
is read by somebody at a more senior level and we will see what
happens.
Mr. McNeal. Chairman Sherman, just on that point, may I
interject?
Mr. Sherman. Yes.
Mr. McNeal. About a year ago, Senator Lieberman sent
letters to YouTube requesting this, and their response was they
will evaluate content that is flagged as inappropriate, but
they value individuals' free-speech rights. So we have a legal
limitation because under section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, Web providers, it is up to them whether or not
they can take something down and determine whether or not it is
obscene.
Mr. Sherman. Well, this is not obscene; this is put up by a
terrorist organization. This seems to have some of the content
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This is the official site
of al-Qaeda. I don't think there is any doubt that our
terrorism laws do not allow U.S. corporations to do business
with terrorist organizations.
Mr. Boucek. I am able to explain why this particular
YouTube channel is still available.
Over the summer, in July----
Mr. Sherman. Well, we have a law professor here as well.
Let's say somebody is inspired by this site, and let's say they
kill somebody; are you certain that YouTube would escape civil
liability?
Mr. McNeal. I am certain they would escape criminal
liability. I am not certain if they would escape civil
liability. I believe the issue and the argument that was put
forth by YouTube, when this came up last year, is that it is
difficult for them to isolate the identity of who it is. And so
their site may say, We are the official YouTube channel of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But YouTube is unable to verify
that, and therefore their policy is one of openness and
dialogue and shout-down, that type of thing.
Mr. Sherman. Terrorism laws would be absolutely meaningless
if you could do business with a terrorist organization
operating under its own name and say, ``Well, there was no
certified letter from a deity proving that there was in fact a
terrorist organization.''
Mr. McNeal. Chairman Sherman, we are in agreement on this.
I think that more action needs to be taken and screws need to
be turned against these service providers, whether they are the
biggest, YouTube, or the smallest----
Mr. Sherman. Well, I don't know how much money YouTube
makes and how much its executives make, but they are
endangering people throughout America for their own profit. And
it is not out of great loyalty to the concept of the First
Amendment, it is out of great loyalty to money. They feel that
if they let everybody on, that just makes a little bit more
money for them. And for them to endanger lives nationwide for
that reason is a decision that they have made. And if they want
to take down my site, they are welcome to. As a matter of fact,
this will be up on my site.
Yes.
Mr. Boucek. I think the only point that I can contribute to
this is that in the beginning of July there was the release of
this English-speaking magazine, ``Inspire,'' that you had
alluded to in your opening remarks. Shortly thereafter, this
channel appeared. I think one can draw the conclusion that
there is a connection. As of this week when I checked this
channel, all of the videos are still available, and this person
is accessing this site frequently and updating this material.
Mr. Sherman. So this is a secondary site that is taking its
content from the site of YouTube----
Mr. Boucek. No. This is the YouTube channel that we have
been discussing.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. So this is a channel that brands itself
as the official site of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Mr. Boucek. That is correct. It brands itself as the media
arm for AQAP. And the very concerning thing, which I think we
have all highlighted, is that you no longer need to have much
knowledge or language capacity to access this. You can get all
of these videos and you can consume them, just knowing English
from anywhere.
Mr. Sherman. Now, does the content of this site advocate
violent action against Americans?
Mr. Boucek. I think al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has
been very clear about its positions.
Mr. Sherman. I know what their positions are, but in terms
of what they have chosen to put up.
Mr. Boucek. In some of the videos they have been advocating
violence against American interests, American allies, American
partners. I think that there is no reason why this should be
available. I can't give you an answer on that.
Mr. Sherman. And is there material there that provides
useful information to those who wish to be terrorists as to how
to make a bomb, how to sneak in a bomb?
Mr. Boucek. Just real quickly I would say, as opposed to
``Inspire'' magazine that provides actual tactical
information--how to assemble explosives, what to bring on
jihad, how to engage in operations--what this does is provide
you with the theological and ideological justifications to get
you to that point.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. But it is a little bit more provable
that something is reprehensible when it says, Here is how to
make a bomb, rather than, ``Here is why American foreign policy
is so bad that you should hate America.'' There are aspects of
U.S. policy that I personally hate.
Let me hear from Mr. Al-Hadj.
Mr. Al-Hadj. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I was coming to this hearing, one of the jihadi Web
sites linked its site to a Facebook account. And the last thing
I saw was a post on how you can make a car bomb like the one
Faisal Shahzad did. And they are encouraging people, like
specific details on how you can make----
Mr. Sherman. I am going to ask you to suspend for just 1
second.
Please proceed.
Mr. Al-Hadj. Yes. As I was coming here, there was this post
on Facebook----
Mr. Sherman. And let me just remark for the record, the
U.S. Government does have efforts to put things up on the Web
that are part of our public diplomacy program to debunk what
terrorists have to say. I know that is important to the
gentleman from Minnesota.
As to whether there will be further efforts is something I
can talk to him about on the floor. But I do think the record
should reflect that while we are discussing what the terrorists
are doing on the Web site, we are of course using the Internet
to communicate a much more wholesome message.
The gentleman will proceed.
Mr. Al-Hadj. So Facebook was posting the same post that was
on this jihadi Web site, encouraging lone wolves or individuals
who want to persecute an operation or a suicide mission, how
specifically--with small details how to make a car bomb, what
should you buy, like materials, easy materials, very accessible
to everybody--how you can make a car bomb and do it.
Mr. Sherman. So you go to Facebook, and then that refers
you to a site that gives you not just ideology, but ``how to''
practical information for terrorism.
Mr. Al-Hadj. You go to the jihadi Web site and there is a
Facebook sign on it saying, ``You can join us on Facebook.'' So
once you click there, you will receive whatever they post in
there.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. McNeal, we can always ask somebody to take material
down. Some sites in certain countries won't do that. How easy
is it for us as a technical matter to just use cyber attack and
take the site down?
Mr. McNeal. We have the capacity. There was an example I
think that you alluded to in your opening remarks that was
reported in the Washington Post about a site that was known
as--the term in the field is a ``honey pot.'' It is
purposefully set up to bring in terrorists and track them. This
was a joint operation between the CIA and the Saudi Government.
Mr. Sherman. And that is the one we took down?
Mr. McNeal. That is the one we took down. But actually, the
debate over it was a healthy one that we should be having more
of. The reason we took it down is that our commanding general
in Iraq, General Odienero, said that this site was in fact
costing American lives. And there was an interagency fight
between DOD and the Intelligence Community on whether or not to
take the site down.
Mr. Sherman. Was it taken down because it was a site
sponsored by the U.S. Government and they just flipped the off
switch, or did we cyber attack a site that another government
agency was paying to put up?
Mr. McNeal. From the public reports, we took out a site
that was run by the Saudi Government, with the cooperation of
the Central Intelligence Agency. The rationale for it was that
the site was providing information about how to conduct
coordinated attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq. And what happens in
these types of interagency----
Mr. Sherman. Did we use a cyber attack to take it down?
Mr. McNeal. Yes, it was a denial-of-service attack. The
collateral consequences of that, though, were that not only was
this site taken down, there were some sites in Texas and other
places that were affected by taking out the server.
The reason these debates come up is--it was partly alluded
to in my written remarks, in that there are many who believe
that keeping these sites up provides an intelligence value. And
so the fight between DOD and the Intelligence Community was
that if you leave it up, we could continue to observe and learn
more about what these individuals are doing. And that is the
primary push from the Intelligence Community's perspective is
always to gather more information to connect the dots.
It was healthy, I think, that we had that debate between
taking it out and leaving it up, but it was an ad hoc one
through a task force, rather than an agency or a division
within an agency structure to force us to have that type of
communication.
Mr. Sherman. Now, with regard to sites that are not
maintained by ourselves or other governments that we are
cooperating with, are we able to determine at least the e-mail
address of those who are visiting the sites?
Mr. McNeal. Not necessarily the e-mail address, but IP
address logs, server logs, can tell us----
Mr. Sherman. That is only if the Web site server and
provider cooperates with us. So if there is, for example, in
Iran a Web site server and the Iranian Government chooses not
to cooperate with us, then by monitoring the site we can know
what the terrorists want to say, but we have no idea who they
are saying it to.
Mr. McNeal. For the most part, that is correct, Mr.
Chairman. There are people who, through covert methods, can
infiltrate networks and find information out irrespective of
the location of the network.
The bigger challenge, I think, is that, particularly with
regard to foreign Web hosts, is that because they are beyond
the reach oftentimes of U.S. laws, we don't have a lot of ways
to turn the screws to them, unless we were to back out sort of
one level from that site and, almost like a trade embargo, say
that you, Web provider, can no longer do Internet business with
U.S. service providers if you continue to provide service to
that Web site.
And then the Iranian company, to use your example, would
have to choose between supporting this one Web site or losing
all of its commercial traffic from the United States. I think
that would probably be an easy choice.
Mr. Sherman. But the argument is gathering intelligence
versus taking down the terrorist site. And the question is, are
we really able to gather valuable intelligence? And there are
two aspects of this intelligence: What do terrorists want to
say? Second, which individuals seem interested in what
terrorists have to say--which, by the way, includes many people
in this room.
And you are saying that the second type of information is
probably available only with the cooperation of the site Web
provider.
Mr. McNeal. These are more forums than Web sites, so unless
an individual posing as a member of the forum could get inside
and be seen as a legitimate person who is communicating and
supporting ongoing activities.
Mr. Sherman. And even if you knew somebody was part of that
forum, they might not use their real name.
Mr. McNeal. Right. But the goal, Mr. Chairman, would be to
engage that person in conversation about operational plots they
might want to take part in, and then go from the cyber world to
the real world. There are some examples of us doing this in
cooperation with law enforcement in Europe.
Mr. Sherman. Well, I think we end this hearing with more
specific knowledge, but we end this hearing in the same
position; and that is that we will use the Internet for our own
public diplomacy effort. We will certainly monitor what
terrorists have to say, and that will help us with our own
public diplomacy. And we will occasionally be able to detect
who on these sites mean us harm.
But we are unsuccessful in taking down sites--often we are
unsuccessful--by sending people letters, and we are manifestly
unable to take down these sites through cyber attack, because
we are constrained by our own politeness. And being polite is
good as long as it doesn't cost American lives.
So I thank everyone for coming. Additional statements can
be made for the record. I believe we are being called for a
vote. I want to thank our vice chair and our ranking member for
being here at the hearing.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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