[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
SBINET: DOES IT PASS THE BORDER SECURITY TEST? PARTS I AND II
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME,
AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
with the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2010 and JUNE 17, 2010
__________
Serial No. 110-59
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
March 18, 2010
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana***
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico* Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York**
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emmanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, U.S. Virgin Islands
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
* Mr. Ben Ray Lujan of New Mexico resigned as a Member of the Committee
on Homeland Security May 5, 2010.
** Appointment of Mr. William L. Owens of New York to after Ms. Dina
Titus of New York pursuant to H. Res. 1334, May 6, 2010.
*** Mr. Mark E. Souder of Indiana resigned as a Member of the House of
Representatives, May 21, 2010.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
March 18, 2010
Henry Cuellar, Texas, Chairwoman
Loretta Sanchez, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Jane Harman, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Al Green, Texas Officio)
Vacancy
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Alison Northop, Staff Director
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Subcommittee Lead
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
March 18, 2010
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Al Green, Texas Daniel E. Lungren, California
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Tamla T. Scott, Director & Counsel
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Michael Russell, Senior Counsel
Kerry Kinirons, Minority Subcommittee Lead
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
June 17, 2010
Henry Cuellar, Texas, Chairwoman
Loretta Sanchez, California Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Jane Harman, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Lamar Smith, Texas
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Al Green, Texas Officio)
Vacancy
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Alison Northop, Staff Director
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Subcommittee Lead
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT
June 17, 2010
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Al Green, Texas Daniel E. Lungren, California
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Tamla T. Scott, Director & Counsel
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Michael Russell, Senior Counsel
Kerry Kinirons, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
March 18, 2010
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.......................... 1
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 3
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 6
WITNESSES
Mr. Mark Borkowski, Executive Director, Secure Border Initiative
Program Executive Office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Department of Homeland Security, Accompanied by Michael J.
Fisher, Acting Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 10
Mr. Randolph C. Hite, Director, IT Architecture & Systems Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Roger A. Krone, President, Network and Space Systems, Boeing
Defense, Space & Security, The Boeing Company:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Slide.......................................................... 30
STATEMENTS
June 17, 2010
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight:
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight...................... 50
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 55
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 53
WITNESSES
Mr. Randolph C. Hite, Director, IT Architecture & Systems Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 56
Prepared Statement............................................. 58
Mr. Mark Borkowski, Executive Director, Secure Border Initiative
Program Executive Office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Department of Homeland Security, Accompanied by Michael J.
Fisher, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 63
Prepared Statement............................................. 65
Mr. Roger A. Krone, President, Network and Space Systems, Boeing
Defense, Space & Security, The Boeing Company:
Oral Statement................................................. 68
Prepared Statement............................................. 69
SBINET: DOES IT PASS THE BORDER SECURITY TEST? PART I
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Thursday, March 18, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism,
joint with
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations,
and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism] presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and
Global Counterterrorism: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson,
Pascrell, Kirkpatrick, Bilirakis, and McCaul.
Present from the Subcommittee on Management,
Investigations, and Oversight: Representatives Carney,
Thompson, Pascrell, Kilroy, and Bilirakis.
Mr. Cuellar [presiding]. The subcommittees will come to
order. The Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism and the Subcommittee on Management,
Investigations, and Oversight are called to meeting today to
receive testimony on ``SBInet: Does It Pass the Border Security
Test?''
Today the subcommittees are meeting to examine SBInet, the
Department of Homeland Security's latest effort to secure our
Nation's borders using technology.
As a Member of Congress, I represent a district along the
U.S.-Mexico border, and I have been interested in this program
since its inception 4.5--or 4.5 years ago. I believe strongly
that technology does play a vital role in securing our border,
Americans' border.
Unfortunately, as you all know, I think we all agree, that
SBInet has had some technological problems and deployment
delays from the start.
Bottom line is that this hasn't had a good return on the
investment--when you look at SBInet. In fact, to date only 28
miles of SBInet technology has actually been deployed along the
border. Even those miles known as Project 28, it is of limited
operational value.
The slow pace of deployment has frustrated many of us,
especially in the face of the escalating drug trafficking and
violence just across the southern border.
At the rate of 28 miles every 4.5 years, we did a little
calculation. Twenty-eight miles every 4.5 years, it would take
us 320 years, or until the year 2030, to deploy the SBInet
technology across the Southwest border, using the pace we have
been going. If you look at the amount of dollars, I think it is
somewhere between $600 million, $700 million, you can do the
calculation also if you want to cover the whole Southwest
border.
I know that Secretary Napolitano understands what the
stakes are. As a former border Governor, she understands what
we are dealing with. We had an opportunity yesterday, Mr.
Chairman, as we flew down to the Federal training center in
Georgia and got to spend a little time in talking to her about
this particular issue.
We all agree we have to deploy security swiftly but
effectively. That is why I am pleased to have a witness from
the Government Accountability Office before us. Mr. Hite will
discuss the results of the latest in a series of Security
Border Initiative engagements the GAO has conducted at the
request of the Committee on Homeland Security.
We want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Thompson.
I am concerned about the GAO's finding that the number of
new defects identified in the SBInet is generally increasing
faster than the numbers are being fixed, meaning we are taking
one step forward, yet two steps back. Certainly interested in
the testimony that will be given by all the witnesses on this
particular point.
I am also troubled by the GAO's finding that changes made
to certain tests and procedures appeared to be designed to
``pass the test, instead of being designed to qualify the
system.''
If tests are being rigged, how do we know that the Border
Patrol won't ultimately be stuck with technology deserves a
failing grade.
Over the years GAO has conducted about 17 reviews, and I
emphasize 17 reviews, of DHS border security technology
deployment. While the DHS generally concurs with the GAO's
recommendations, DHS hasn't always followed the
recommendations. I know there is different stages that we are,
but I think the last ones were about eight recommendations
about 18 months ago, and we still believe DHS is still working
on them.
I hope that the Department will take this recommendation
seriously in the future on all the findings, now that we have
heard from Secretary Napolitano's recent announcement on the
SBInet, and certainly I support using the $50 million in
stimulus funds to purchase proven border security technology on
the border. I agree that we should be completing the on-going
deployments before deciding on or whether to proceed with
SBInet.
At the same time, I am concerned with the announcement that
this is a signal that SBInet is about to follow suit of its two
failed predecessor programs, the--and the American Shield
Initiative. I hope the Department is working on a Plan B, if
that is the case, because those along the border have waited
long enough for security--for a security solution that works on
the border.
Looking forward, I hope that Secretary Napolitano will
continue to look at other technology. For example, the UAV that
I know Michael McCaul and other folks--Texas have been working
on, requesting the UAVs along the Texas border, because that
covers about 1,200 miles of the whole U.S.-Mexico border.
As part of this--technology we ought to look at all this
technology, and I certainly feel that UAVs will be a way to
fill some of the gaps that the SBInet might not cover,
something to consider for the future, and of course, you know,
especially with this recent violence that we have had across
the river, escalated violence we have.
In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to
Chairman Thompson, who has provided the leadership to this
committee and on this particular issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman Thompson.
Chairman Carney, who does the oversight and management, has
done an excellent job, and certainly we look forward working
with him.
Also the former subcommittee Chairwoman, Loretta Sanchez,
for her longstanding efforts on this important issue. I
certainly want to thank her for all the foundation work that
she has done.
Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for joining us
here today, and I look forward to the testimony.
The Chair now recognizes--we don't have the Ranking Member,
Mr. Souder, so if it is okay with Michael McCaul, we will now
recognize the Chairman of the Management, Investigations,
Oversight Subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank you and your subcommittee for
agreeing to work with my subcommittee on this very important
issue.
Today we are here to examine efforts to secure the Nation's
borders through the Secure Border Initiative, or SBInet. The
Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee that I
chair has held multiple hearings and briefings on this issue,
including two joint subcommittee hearings in the 110th
Congress.
I continue to be greatly concerned that the SBInet will
continue to cost U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars
while not providing the services we were sold at the inception
of the program.
I am also concerned that deadlines continue to be set for
the program, only to be extended later.
I would like to commend Secretary Napolitano for ordering a
reassessment of SBInet. I also agree with her decision to
redirect the $50 million Recovery Act funding originally
located for SBInet instead of funding other tested,
commercially available security technology along the border.
It is my hope that the Department will work quickly on this
reassessment and soon deliver a solution that once and for all
will secure our borders in a timely and a cost-effective
manner.
I would have to echo the sentiments of my colleague, Mr.
Cuellar, on the use of UAVs. I think that is a technology that
could be put to great use at a very effective cost, to be quite
honest.
I am extremely interested in discussing with our witnesses
the GAO's latest SBInet report entitled ``Secure Border
Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance
Limitations that Place Key Technology Programs at Risk.''
In this report, the GAO was asked to determine whether
SBInet testing has been effectively managed, planned, and
executed. GAO was also asked to analyze the test results.
Some of the major findings of the report are as follows.
One, DHS has not effectively managed key aspects of SBI
testing.
Two, there is key evidence to suggest that changes made to
system qualification tests and procedures were designed to pass
the test instead of being designed to qualify the system.
From March 2008 to July 2009, about 1,300 SBI defects were
found, with the number of new defects outpacing those being
fixed. This is a signal that the system is worsening.
Given that key test events have yet to occur and other
problems will likely surface, it is important for DHS to
improve its procedures to address these problems. If it does
not, it is unlikely that SBInet will meet the Border Patrol's
needs and expectations, and it will continue to erode its
support in this Congress.
SBInet has been plagued with a number of technology and
systems integration issues, and therefore has so far failed to
live up to its billing by the Department and by Boeing.
SBInet's continued failure to meet expectations brings to mind
the Department's previous failed attempts at border security
technology programs. The Obama administration must assess the
system it inherited and determine whether to continue to move
forward with SBInet or to pursue other technology solutions as
part of its border security strategy.
Over $1.1 billion have been spent on the Secure Border
Initiative, and over $800 million has been spent on SBI alone.
I have to ask: Does it make sense for us to keep throwing money
at a program with so many problems? Maybe an even better
question is: Do we get a refund?
I thank the witnesses for their participation, and I look
forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, thank you, Mr. Carney.
At this time, the Chair will recognize the Chairman of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson,
for an opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank both of you for holding this very
important hearing.
I am pleased that while the Department is undergoing its
analysis of the SBInet program, we are also conducting very
rigorous oversight and holding hearings regarding the viability
of this costly effort. This committee has conducted 11 hearings
on SBI-related issues in an effort to ensure that taxpayers'
funds are being properly utilized for the execution of this
program.
Earlier this week, Secretary Napolitano announced that the
Department of Homeland Security is freezing all SBInet funding
until a full and comprehensive assessment of the program has
been conducted. It is vitally important to the security of this
country that we continue to utilize technology at our borders.
However, based on the reasons given by the Secretary for
reaching her decision, continued and repeated delays of SBInet
and its exorbitant costs, I agree with the Secretary's decision
to take a closer look at SBInet to determine whether it is a
viable option for securing our borders.
Approximately 4 years ago, DHS awarded a contract to Boeing
to help secure our Nation's borders by using technology to
create a virtual fence. Four-and-a-half years and over $800
million later, we are still without an effective technological
tool to secure our borders. Even more troubling, we are now
faced with the question of whether this program should even
proceed.
The Government Accountability Office has pointed out time
and time again the reasons the taxpayers have not seen a true
return on their investment. From poor planning and testing to
inadequate oversight and user input, we could go on and on
about what this administration inherited. Today, GAO is
releasing yet another report on the program. This report, which
focuses on the testing of SBInet systems, once again reveals
that SBInet has more problems than solutions.
For example, according to the report, from March 2008 to
July 2009, over 1,300 defects were found in the SBInet system.
During that same time, the number of new defects uncovered grew
at a faster rate than the ability to fix those that had already
been found. Moreover, more than 70 percent of the testing
procedures were rewritten as they were being executed because
the procedures that had been approved were not adequate. This
type of on-the-fly management lacks the quality and assurance
that is needed to assure effective testing and calls into
question whether the results would have been worse had these
changes not been made.
Furthermore, Border Patrol operators, the ultimate user of
SBInet, found among other things that the radar systems were
inadequate, many of the cameras were operationally
insufficient, and the quality of the video feed was blurry and
inconsistent. As a result, further delays on top of the delays
the program has already experienced are expected.
There is a saying that goes ``how you practice is how you
perform.'' If the test results are an indication of how SBInet
will perform, we will be exactly where we are 4 years ago--that
is, without an effective technological solution for
identifying, deterring, and responding to illegal breaches
between border ports of entry.
Let me also note that I am extremely displeased with the
fact that $833 million has been spent on SBInet without the
full utilization of small businesses. Both the number of small
businesses and small disadvantaged businesses that were used
were below target. Moreover, women-owned small businesses in
addition to service-connected disabled veterans-owned small
businesses were significantly below the target rate. This is
unacceptable. I am especially interested in hearing from Boeing
on this issue.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. I look forward
to your testimony. Again, I thank both chairmen for conducting
this joint hearing.
I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At this time, I will recognize Mr. McCaul, the gentleman
from Texas. He had a statement. Okay. He had a statement for
Mr. Souder.
So at this time, I will recognize Mr. Bilirakis for an
opening statement.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. I would like to submit
Mr. Souder's statement for the record, if that is okay.
Mr. Cuellar. Without objection.
[The statement of Mr. Souder follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Mark E. Souder
march 18, 2010
The Secure Border Initiative Network was announced in 2005 and
promised the capability to secure our borders, at least our southern
border, by 2013. Over the past 5 years, we have had close to a dozen
hearings on SBInet and border security. I have to say that this is the
first time that I've actually felt concern about the commitment from
the Department to find a solution to secure the borders.
During the hearing with Secretary Napolitano 3 weeks ago on the DHS
fiscal year 2011 budget request, I highlighted the flat-lining of
progress for gaining control of the border. According to CBP, we have
just over 900 miles under control and the goal is just to main that
through 2011. Now, with the announcement by the Secretary on Tuesday to
scale back and halt SBInet, I'm concerned that there is a chance we
could actually lose ground and have fewer miles under control.
I can't say whether SBInet should be continued or expanded or
halted. What I do know is that this Department has announced cutbacks
and has not provided any other plans or vision for enhancing security.
I appreciate that the Secretary included a plan in her Tuesday
announcement to redirect $50 million in Stimulus funds from SBInet to
purchase other technologies for use on the border. However, spending
funds on uncoordinated purchases that don't fit into a larger strategy
are not significantly better than where we are today.
I'm greatly concerned that we are not keeping the big picture in
mind. Securing the border matters. Gaining operational control is
critical.
Border violence is still a concern and we've all been reminded of
that with the tragic murders of three people with ties to the U.S.
Consulate last weekend. Drugs are coming across the border every day.
And we have a report that in the past year at least 270 Somalis have
illegally crossed the southwest border.
Where is the urgency?
My main questions for this hearing are:
What is the strategy for securing the border?
How long will it take?
And, is this timeline acceptable?
Who would have ever thought that building hundreds of miles of
actual fence would be easier and faster than deploying a camera and
radar system? The issue of fencing is something we need to take another
look at if we are no longer going to have a virtual fence.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you are as committed to finding a
solution for securing the border. It seems that a lot is in flux at DHS
right now regarding how to move forward. I would like to request that
we look into holding a hearing on how all of these different pieces--
fencing, SBInet, alternative technologies, etc.--fit together into a
cohesive plan.
Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, thank you.
Thank you, Chairman Cuellar and Chairman Carney, and of
course our overall Chair, our general Chair. I am pleased the
subcommittees are meeting today to continue our oversight of
the SBInet program. Nearly 5 years since the first announcement
of the program, we have little to show for the more than $1
billion we have spent to install detection and surveillance
technology along the border.
This program has experienced unacceptable cost overruns and
delays and is in desperate need of better management by the
Department and performance by the contractor. It is
unacceptable that we do not have better control over our
borders. At the end of fiscal year 2009, the Department
reported that it has effective control over only 936 miles of
the more than 6,000 miles of the U.S. border.
While the Border Patrol intends to maintain control of
these miles in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, they do not intend
to add any additional miles of effective control. Frankly, I
think we can do much better.
Secretary Napolitano stated earlier this week, and I
quote--``Not only do we have an obligation to secure our
borders, we have a responsibility to do so in the most
effective way possible,'' and as a result, has frozen all
SBInet funding beyond the Block 1 deployment and redeployed
Recovery Act funding originally designated for SBInet to other
border security technologies.
I share Secretary Napolitano's desire to be good stewards
of taxpayer dollars as we work to secure our borders. However,
I hope that this announcement is not an indication that the
Department is scaling back its commitment to secure the entire
border. We need to ensure that we have a comprehensive and
coordinated strategy to secure our borders.
I am particularly interested in hearing from Mr. Borkowski
about the status of the SBInet review mandated by the Secretary
and where the alternative technologies procured with the
Recovery Act funds, such as the mobile surveillance systems and
the remote video surveillance systems, will be deployed. I
would also like to hear from Chief Fisher about how the
Secretary's recent announcement impacts the Border Patrol
operations.
Mr. Chairman, we cannot declare defeat in our efforts to
strengthen border security. We must use the lessons learned
from our prior investments in SBInet. We must leverage these
capabilities to develop a coordinated border security strategy
that will allow us to achieve effective control of as much of
the border as we can as soon as possible, and of course, in the
most cost-effective manner.
Thank you, Mr Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you. I thank the gentleman from Florida
for his opening statement.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
At this time, I welcome our panel of witnesses. Thank you
very much for being here with us.
Our first witness is Chief Michael Fisher, who was named
acting chief of the Border Patrol on January 3 of this year,
2010. Congratulations and welcome, Mr. Fisher. Prior to this
appointment, he served as the chief of Border Patrol at the San
Diego sector.
Chief Fisher started his duty along the southwest border in
1987 in Douglas, Arizona. After completion of the selection
process for the Border Patrol's tactical unit in 1990, he was
selected as the field operations supervisor for the tactical
unit assigned to El Paso. Chief Fisher has also served in
Detroit, Tucson, and at the Border Patrol headquarters.
Again, congratulations on your appointment and welcome
here.
Our second witness is Mr. Mark Borkowski, that was named
executive director of the Secure Border Initiative program in
October, 2008. Again, welcome. Mr. Borkowski oversees the SBI
implementation at Customs and Border Protection.
Previously, he served as the executive director for mission
support at the Border Patrol headquarters. Before joining CBP,
you were also a program executive for the robotics lunar
exploration program at NASA headquarters.
Again, thank you for the work that you have done.
Our third witness is Mr. Randolph Hite, who is the director
of information technology architecture and systems issues at
GAO, where he is responsible for the GAO's work on IT issues
across Government, concerning architecture and systems
acquisitions, development, operations, and maintenance.
During his 30-year career with GAO, Mr. Hite has directed
the reviews of major Federal IT investments, including DHS
border security modernization programs.
Again, Mr. Hite, thank you and welcome.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Roger Krone, who is the president
of network and space systems for Boeing Company. Again,
welcome.
Before the formation of the network and space systems, Mr.
Krone was vice president and general manager of Boeing's Army
Systems Division.
He has held several other business management and finance
positions in Boeing's U.S. Army programs and military
rotorcraft and Boeing's military aircraft and missile systems.
Again, Mr. Krone, thank you very much for being here and
welcome.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask the witnesses to summarize
their statements for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Borkowski,
who will provide testimony for himself and for Chief Fisher.
So, Mr. Borkowski, thank you again, and you are welcome to
start.
STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SECURE BORDER
INITIATIVE PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ACCOMPANIED BY
MICHAEL J. FISHER, ACTING CHIEF, U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Borkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cueller, Chairman Carney, Chairman Thompson,
Ranking Member Souder and Ranking Member Bilirakis,
distinguished Members of the committee, we appreciate very much
the opportunity to come here and talk to you today about the
status of SBInet.
With me is Acting Chief Michael Fisher of the United States
Border Patrol. As you indicated, I will give a quick summary of
our joint statement here.
First, I want to talk about the assessment. As you
suggested, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary has announced an
extensive Department-wide assessment of the program. She did
this based on what she has seen over the last several months.
As you know, she is a former Governor of Arizona, and she was
familiar with the promise and the potential of SBInet, but she
was also familiar with the fact that it has not performed to
that promise to this point.
As a result of that, she has worked with CBP, and in
particular the past acting commissioner, Mr. Hearn, to
understand and to assess the path forward. Based on that
assessment and based on what she has learned over those months,
in January she directed a full Departmental-wide assessment of
the SBInet program.
In doing that, she had two major considerations. One, which
we have spoken about here already in your opening statements,
is the fact that the program has been delayed significantly.
Those delays raise significant questions about the viability
and the ultimate availability of this system to support the
very critical mission of border security.
The second concern, which, frankly, probably would have
existed even if SBInet had performed flawlessly, gets to the
question of the cost of the system and the basis on which we
would conclude that we would spend this money on this system
when there are alternative technologies that are less costly
and maybe ought to be traded off.
So those two things led to this assessment. The first, get
a status of the program and a prediction or an assessment of
whether or not it is really viable. But secondly, is it really
cost-effective?
The assessment will have two phases, a near-term and I
think, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the diversion of SBInet
funds to near-term technology immediately is part of that near-
term. Obviously, there is an urgent need for technology. The
Secretary understands that and has directed us to meet that
urgent need through the diversion of those funds.
The long-term assessment is the broader question about
whether or not SBInet as it stands is an effective option and
is cost-effective. The Secretary has directed that that will be
a science-based assessment, up to the normal industry standards
for these kinds of assessments, for these kinds of investments.
She has indicated very clearly that it does not make sense
to make investments of that magnitude that can't be defended
and supported by a science-based assessment.
Now, SBInet, if it proves to be viable, will be a candidate
and may continue; but if SBInet is not viable and is not cost-
effective, obviously, SBInet will not continue. That is why she
has frozen funds. She has directed us to continue Tucson-1 and
Ajo-1, which we will talk about, but not to spend any more
money until she has decided whether that is the right place to
spend it or it should be diverted to other technology.
I would emphasize that this is not a cancellation of
technology. The Secretary has been very clear in saying that we
must have technology. The question is, what technology should
that be?
With that, let me go briefly to SBInet Block 1, which is
the development, the relatively expensive system, and it is
designed to go across all of Arizona.
We are currently building the first two increments of that,
into areas called Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. Block 1 continues past
that into the rest of Arizona, but those are the funds that are
frozen, the ones past Tucson-1 and Ajo-1.
Tucson-1 is built and constructed. We had intended to have
it completely tested by now, and we do not, and we will welcome
questions about and attempt to explain where that is.
However, we have worked hard over the last year to improve
the system, and it is fairly solid. So starting February 6, we
actually turned it over to the Border Patrol for night
operations, and it has been--the feedback from the Border
Patrol has been very positive.
So we think that is a very encouraging turn of events, but
of course it is not the end of the story until we complete
testing, and I know Chief Fisher will look forward to answering
your questions about the results with Tucson-1.
Ajo-1, which is the second deployment, has started
construction. Part of the point of Ajo-1 is to build that in
what is a very critical area of the border, but also to see if
the recurring costs, the repeated costs, the costs for the next
deployment, will or will not mimic the kind of cost experience
that we have seen in the past that both Chairman Carney and
Chairman Cuellar reflected.
So that is the current status of the program. We look
forward to answering your questions. We recognize that the
program has been seriously delayed. We look forward to the
assessment of the Secretary. The Secretary obviously shares
your concern and we look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint statement of Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Fisher
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Mark Borkowski and Michael Fisher
March 18, 2010
Chairman Cuellar, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Souder, Ranking
Member Bilirakis, and distinguished Members of the committee, it is a
privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss SBInet. I
am Mark Borkowski, Executive Director of the Secure Border Initiative,
and with me today is Acting Chief of the United States Border Patrol,
Michael Fisher.
departmental-wide assessment
Before I begin to discuss where we are with SBInet development, I
want to briefly discuss the Department-wide reassessment that was
ordered by the Secretary back in January. As the Governor of Arizona,
Secretary Napolitano became uniquely aware of the promises that were
made about SBInet and the shortfalls it has faced. When she came into
the Department, she took a hard look at our progress with SBInet. She
gave my team at CBP a fair chance to prove that we were on the right
track. She asked hard questions about the future of the program and the
feasibility of where we were headed and directed then-Acting
Commissioner Jayson Ahern to provide his assessment of the path forward
for SBInet. Based upon the results of that review, she ordered a
Department-wide reassessment of the program to determine if there are
alternatives that may more efficiently, effectively, and economically
meet our Nation's border security needs.
The Department-wide review is motivated by two major
considerations. The first is that the continued and repeated delays in
SBInet raise fundamental questions about SBInet's viability and
availability to meet the need for technology along the border. The
second is that the high cost of SBInet obligates this administration to
conduct a full and comprehensive analysis of alternative options to
ensure we are maximizing the impact and effectiveness of the
substantial taxpayer resources we are devoting to border security
technology. Quite frankly, this type of investment can only be
justified if you know exactly what you are going to get, and this type
of comprehensive analysis of alternatives should have been undertaken
years ago. Secretary Napolitano recognized the need for such due
diligence, which is why we will conduct such an analysis under the
review she ordered.
The assessment has an immediate and a long-term phase. This week,
the Department announced that it will be redeploying $50 million in
Recovery Act funds that were scheduled to be spent on SBInet to
alternative currently available, stand-alone technology, such as
remote-controlled camera systems called Remote Video Surveillance
Systems (RVSSs), truck-mounted systems with cameras and radar called
Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSSs), thermal imaging devices, ultra-
light detection, backscatter units, mobile radios, and cameras and
laptops for pursuit vehicles, that will immediately improve our ability
to secure the U.S.-Mexico border.
In the long-term phase, we will conduct a comprehensive, science-
based assessment of alternatives to SBInet to ensure that we are
utilizing the most efficient and effective technological and
operational solutions in all of our border security efforts. If this
analysis suggests that the SBInet capabilities are worth the cost, this
administration will extend deployment of these capabilities. If this
analysis suggests that alternative technology options represent the
best balance of capability and cost-effectiveness, this administration
will immediately begin redirecting resources currently allocated for
border security efforts to these stronger options.
role of technology
It has often been said that technology is one of three ``pillars''
that contribute to effective border security, with tactical
infrastructure, such as physical fencing, and personnel being the other
two. Physical fencing provides ``persistent impedance''--that is, it
delays the progress of people who attempt to cross our borders between
the ports of entry. These delays, in turn, provide more opportunity for
our Border Patrol agents to respond to and interdict those attempts.
From 2006 through 2008, the bulk of our funding within SBI focused on
completion of the physical fence along areas of the southwest border
where Border Patrol determined it was operationally necessary. Since
then, as that fence has largely been completed, we have shifted our
funding focus more towards technology.
Technology is primarily used to provide continual monitoring and
surveillance of a particular area, enhancing situational awareness for
Border Patrol agents, detecting activity between the ports of entry and
providing information about the type of activity (i.e. human or animal,
vehicle or pedestrian, transporting contraband or not transporting
contraband, etc.). This knowledge assists our Border Patrol agents in
responding to and interdicting criminal activity, and enhances their
safety by giving them information about the relative threat of any
group or individual and about how best to approach the threat.
CBP has already deployed technology to several specific areas of
the border. As mentioned above, we have deployed Remote Video
Surveillance Systems (RVSSs), which allow personnel to keep an eye on
selected areas by displaying pictures at a central dispatch location.
We have also deployed Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSSs), which
transmit radar and camera images to a terminal in the cab of the truck
where they are monitored by an operator. Finally, we have deployed
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), which can detect movement in their
vicinity. All of these systems provide important information to the
Border Patrol about activity in a particular area.
The goal of SBInet was to network a set of sensors that cover a
wide area into a Common Operating Picture, or COP--in contrast to the
individual, stand-alone systems described above, which are very useful
and relatively inexpensive, but also labor-intensive and limited in
coverage. By depicting a large amount of information in a small space,
SBInet was designed to allow fewer personnel to monitor and direct
operations across a larger area. Border Patrol agents would be able to
observe, manage, and respond to multiple events more effectively.
sbinet block 1
With respect to the development progress of SBInet, it is clear to
all who are paying attention that progress has been slower than
anticipated. Recent testing results suggests that SBInet Block 1 has
demonstrated some progress, but the time it has taken us to get to this
point is extremely discouraging and frustrating. As a partial
mitigation to the delays, we worked with Boeing to make a change in our
plans so that the Border Patrol could use parts of the system that are
not yet fully complete ``as is'' while engineering work continued. The
Border Patrol has been using these parts of the system in this capacity
since February 6 and the feedback has been positive from agents on the
frontlines. The next steps involve completing our engineering work and
conducting formal testing. We expect to conduct System Acceptance
Testing through August, and then to turn the system over to the Border
Patrol for formal Operational Testing and Evaluation starting in
September.
Construction on a second part of the system, known as Ajo-1,
started on January 25. Ajo-1 was delayed for several reasons, including
technical concerns and environmental considerations--Ajo-1 is located
in an environmentally sensitive area, so we have worked very closely
with the Department of the Interior to ensure that we protected it
appropriately. Much of the Ajo-1 AoR should be constructed by this
spring. By August, we expect to complete construction of Ajo-1. We will
then conduct acceptance and operational testing of Ajo-1 through the
end of this calendar year.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, we recognize that the
SBInet program has been a frustration. This committee and the entire
Congress has been supportive and patient with us as we have worked
through issues and delays encountered by the program. The comprehensive
review ordered by Secretary Napolitano demonstrates that she shares
your concern. Technology along the border is of critical importance to
our National security and the safety and effectiveness of our Border
Patrol agents working in the field. We need to ensure that we provide
them with proven, cost-effective tools that will help them do their
jobs and keep our Nation safe--whether that means large-scale networks
like SBInet or the inexpensive, stand-alone technology I mentioned
above. One thing is clear: The Secretary's review will require all of
us to go back and take a hard look at the assumptions that were made in
the past, and it will ensure that we proceed in a manner that both
bolsters the security of our Nation's borders while making the most out
of the resources that have been devoted to technology solutions to our
border security challenges. We look forward to answering your
questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Hite, you have got 5 minutes to summarize your
statement.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, IT ARCHITECTURE &
SYSTEMS ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Hite. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar, Chairman Carney,
Chairman Thompson. Let me begin by commending you for holding
this hearing today on SBInet testing. Today we are releasing
our January 2010 report on SBInet, which one could say really
details the good, the bad, and the ugly about how Block 1 has
been tested, how it has been planned, executed, and what the
results show.
Given that DHS is in the process of positioning itself to
begin the next major phase of testing, which is acceptance
testing, the timing and focus of this hearing could not be
better.
Before I summarize my written statement, let me first
provide two contextual remarks about testing.
First, testing is not a one-time event. It is a series of
incrementally expansive test events that build upon each other
and complement previous test events. This is, each test event
in the series can be viewed as a link in a chain, and thus each
link must be well-planned and executed for testing to
accomplish its intended purpose.
This brings me to my second contextual point, which is that
the purpose of testing is not to demonstrate the absence of
problems, it is to find problems restated, it is a given that
testing will result in the discovery of defects that will need
to be resolved, and it is vitally important that they be
resolved on the basis of assigned priorities and that their
resolution be tracked.
In so doing, meaningful understanding of the system's
maturity and readiness for further testing and operational use
can be gained.
Now, with that as a backdrop, my bottom-line message today
is that key aspects of the most recent SBInet test events,
which include nine component qualification tests and one system
qualification test, as well as the associated regression
testing, have not been effectively managed.
Specifically, while the plans for these 10 test events
define, for example, roles and responsibilities of those
involved and the items to be tested--and that is good--none
sufficiently described the risks associated with completing the
test and only one described the test schedule to be followed.
This is important because such omissions have contributed
to some test events not proceeding as expected and resources
not being available when needed.
Further, while most of the test cases associated with these
10 events describe test objectives, expected outputs and the
procedures to be followed--that is good--few describe either
test inputs, dependencies among test cases, or the facilities
and personnel needed to execute the test cases.
This is important because such omissions have precipitated
the need for additional time and effort to rerun test cases.
In addition, even though test procedures, as I just noted,
were largely defined for each of the test cases, the procedures
for about 70 percent of these test cases were not followed as
written, but instead were changed on the fly during test
execution.
Moreover, these changes were not subjected to written
quality assurance checks, and in some cases the changes were
extensive.
For example, some procedures were completely crossed out
and replaced with handwritten steps, while for others the
system requirement that the procedure was to demonstrate was
changed.
To make matters worse, some of the changes were
characterized as being made merely to pass the test case,
rather than to demonstrate that the system could function as
intended.
In my view, the volume and the nature of the changes made
to test procedures cast doubt on the sufficiency of the testing
performed, which in turn increases the likelihood that system
problems remain undiscovered.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the test events
nevertheless did identify a large number of defects. The latest
data available to us showed that over 1,300 problems were
discovered during a 17-month period when these tests were under
way in some form or another.
What is more of a concern, however, is not the total
number, but rather the fact that during this 17-month period
the number of new problems that were being discovered were
outpacing the number that were being closed.
The result is a trend in the number of unresolved defects
that is not indicative of a maturing system.
Exacerbating this 17-month trend are three factors.
First, some of the problems have proven to be significant
in that they caused lengthy delays to the program.
Second, additional problems were reported at the end of
this 17-month period based on an early assessment of the system
by the Border Patrol.
Third, the full magnitude of this upward trend is not
clear, because most of the 1,300-plus defects were not assigned
priorities based on their severity, thus limiting an
understanding of the system's maturity.
Now, having said all this, let me close on a positive note
by saying that our report and testimony contains
recommendations aimed at addressing these test-management and
problem-resolution limitations, and so the next phase of
testing would not suffer from the same ones.
To the Department's credit, they have told us that actions
are under way and planned to address them.
This concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Hite follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randolph C. Hite
March 18, 2010
gao-10-511t
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittees: Thank you for the
opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the technology
component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border
Initiative (SBI). My statement today is based on our report Secure
Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance
Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, which is being
released at this hearing.\1\
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\1\ GAO-10-158 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2010). Both the report and
this statement are based on work performed in accordance with generally
accepted Government standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained during the course of
this review does provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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As you know, SBI is intended to help secure the 6,000 miles of
international borders that the contiguous United States shares with
Canada and Mexico. The program, which began in November 2005, seeks to
enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration by improving
surveillance technologies, raising staffing levels, increasing domestic
enforcement of immigration laws, and improving physical infrastructure
along the Nation's borders. Within SBI, the Secure Border Initiative
Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program that includes the
acquisition, development, integration, deployment, and operation of
surveillance technologies--such as unattended ground sensors and radar
and cameras mounted on fixed and mobile towers--to create a ``virtual
fence'' along the border. In addition, command, control,
communications, and intelligence software and hardware are to use the
information gathered by the surveillance technologies to create a
common operating picture (COP) of activities within specific areas
along the border and transmit the information to command centers and
vehicles.
In September 2008, we reported to you that important aspects of
SBInet were ambiguous and in a continuous state of flux, making it
unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities were to be delivered
when. In addition, the program did not have an approved integrated
master schedule to guide the program's execution, and key milestones
continued to slip. This schedule-related risk was exacerbated by the
continuous change in and the absence of a clear definition of the
approach used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet.
Furthermore, different levels of SBInet requirements were not properly
aligned, and all requirements had not been properly defined and
validated. Also, the program office had not tested the individual
system components to be deployed to initial locations, even though the
contractor had initiated integration testing of these components with
other system components and subsystems, and its test management
strategy did not contain, among other things, a clear definition of
testing roles and responsibilities; or sufficient detail to effectively
guide planning for specific test events, such as milestones and
metrics. Accordingly, we made recommendations to address these
weaknesses which DHS largely agreed to implement.\2\
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\2\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, GAO-08-1086 (Washington,
DC: Sept. 22, 2008).
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In light of SBInet's important mission, high cost, and risks, you
asked us to conduct a series of four SBInet reviews. This statement and
report being released today provide the results for the first of these
reviews.\3\ Specifically, they address: (1) The extent to which SBInet
testing has been effectively managed, including identifying the types
of tests performed and whether they were well planned and executed; (2)
what the results of testing show; and (3) what processes are being used
to test and incorporate maturing technologies into SBInet.
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\3\ See attachment 1 for the objectives and status of the other
three reviews.
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In summary, SBInet testing has not been adequately managed, as
illustrated by poorly defined test plans and numerous and extensive
last-minute changes to test procedures. Further, testing that has been
performed identified a growing number of system performance and quality
problems--a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system that is
ready for deployment anytime soon. Further, while some of these
problems have been significant, the collective magnitude of the
problems is not clear because they have not been prioritized, user
reactions to the system continue to raise concerns, and key test events
remain to be conducted. Collectively, these limitations increase the
risk that the system will ultimately not perform as expected and will
take longer and cost more than necessary to implement. For DHS to
increase its chances of delivering a version of SBInet for operational
use, we are recommending that DHS improve the planning and execution of
future test events and the resolution and disclosure of system
problems. DHS agreed with our recommendations.
background
Managed by DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), SBInet is to
strengthen CBP's ability to detect, identify, classify, track, and
respond to illegal breaches at and between ports of entry. CBP's SBI
Program Office is responsible for managing key acquisition functions
associated with SBInet, including tracking and overseeing the prime
contractor.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year contract to the Boeing
Company for SBInet, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime
contractor, Boeing is responsible for designing, producing, testing,
deploying, and sustaining the system. In September 2009, CBP extended
its contract with Boeing for the first option year. CBP is acquiring
SBInet incrementally in a series of discrete units of capabilities,
referred to as ``blocks.'' Each block is to deliver one or more system
capabilities from a subset of the total system requirements.
In August 2008, the DHS Acquisition Review Board decided to delay
the initial deployment of Block 1 of SBInet so that fiscal year 2008
funding could be reallocated to complete physical infrastructure
projects. In addition, the board directed the SBInet System Program
Office (SPO) to deliver a range of program documentation, including an
updated Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP),\4\ detailed test plans,
and a detailed schedule for deploying Block 1 to two initial sites in
the Tucson Sector of the southwest border. This resulted in a revised
timeline for deploying Block 1, first to the Tucson Border Patrol
Station (TUS-1) in April 2009, and then to the Ajo Border Patrol
Station (AJO-1) in June 2009. Together, these two deployments are to
cover 53 miles of the 1,989-mile-long southern border. However, the SBI
Executive Director told us in December 2009 that these and other SBInet
scheduled milestones were being reevaluated. As of January 2010, the
TUS-1 system is scheduled for Government acceptance in September 2010,
with AJO-1 acceptance in November 2010. However, this schedule has yet
to be approved by CBP.
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\4\ The TEMP defines the program's integrated test and evaluation
approach, including the scope of testing and the staff, resources
(equipment and facilities), and funding requirements associated with
testing.
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dhs has not effectively managed sbinet testing
Testing is essential to knowing whether the system meets defined
requirements and performs as intended. Effective test management
involves, among other things, developing well-defined test plans and
procedures to guide test execution. It is intended to identify and
resolve system quality and performance problems as early as possible in
the system development life cycle.
DHS has not effectively managed key aspects of SBInet testing,
which has in turn increased the risk that the system will not perform
as expected and will take longer and cost more than necessary. While
the Department's testing approach appropriately consists of a series of
progressively expansive test events, some of which have yet to be
completed, test plans and test cases for recently executed test events
were not defined in accordance with relevant guidance. For example,
none of the plans for tests of system components addressed testing
risks and mitigation strategies.
Further, SBInet test procedures were generally not executed as
written. Specifically, about 70 percent of the procedures for key test
events were rewritten extemporaneously during execution because persons
conducting the tests determined that the approved procedures were not
sufficient or accurate. Moreover, changes to these procedures were not
made according to a documented quality assurance process but were
instead made based on an undocumented understanding that program
officials said they established with the contractor. While some of
these changes were relatively minor, others were significant, such as
adding requirements or completely rewriting verification steps. The
volume and nature of the changes made to the test procedures, in
conjunction with the lack of a documented quality assurance process,
increases the risk that system problems may not be discovered until
later in the sequence of testing. This concern is underscored by a
program office letter to the prime contractor stating that changes made
to system qualification test procedures appeared to be designed to pass
the test instead of being designed to qualify the system.
These limitations are due, among other things, to a lack of
detailed guidance in the TEMP, the program's aggressive milestones,
schedule, and ambiguities in requirements. Collectively, these
limitations increase the likelihood that testing will not discover
system issues or demonstrate the system's ability to perform as
intended.
sbinet testing results have identified a growing number of system
performance and quality problems
The number of new SBInet defects that have been discovered during
testing has increased faster than the number that has been fixed. (See
figure 1 for the trend in the number of open defects from March 2008 to
July 2009.) As we previously reported \5\ such an upward trend is
indicative of an immature system.
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\5\ GAO, Office of Personnel Management: Improvements Needed to
Ensure Successful Retirement Systems Modernization, GAO-08-345
(Washington, DC: Jan. 31, 2008).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Some of the defects found during testing have been significant,
prompting the DHS Acquisition Review Board in February 2009 to postpone
deployment of Block 1 capabilities to TUS-1 and AJO-1. These defects
included the radar circuit breaker frequently tripping when the radar
dish rotated beyond its intended limits, COP workstations crashing, and
blurry camera images, among others.
While program officials have characterized the defects and problems
found during development and testing as not being ``show stoppers,''
they have nevertheless caused delays, extended testing, and required
time and effort to fix. Moreover, the SPO and its contractor have
continued to find problems that further impact the program's schedule.
For example, the radar problems mentioned previously were addressed by
installing a workaround that included a remote ability to reactivate
the circuit breaker via software, which alleviated the need to send
maintenance workers out to the tower to manually reset the circuit.
However, this workaround did not fully resolve the problem, and program
officials said that root cause analysis continues on related radar
power spikes and unintended acceleration of the radar dish that
occasionally render the system inoperable. One factor that has
contributed to the time and resources needed to resolve this radar
problem, and potentially other problems, is the ability of the prime
contractor to effectively determine root causes for defects. According
to program officials, including the SBI Executive Director, the
contractor's initial efforts to isolate the cause of the radar problems
were flawed and inadequate. Program officials added, however, that they
have seen improvements in the contractor's efforts to resolve technical
issues.
Along with defects revealed by system testing, Border Patrol
operators participating in an April 2009 user assessment identified a
number of concerns. During the assessment, operators compared the
performance of Block 1 capabilities to those of existing technologies.
While Border Patrol agents noted that Block 1 offered functionality
above existing technologies, it was not adequate for optimal
effectiveness in detecting items of interest along the border. Users
also raised concerns about the accuracy of Block 1's radar, the range
of its cameras, and the quality of its video. Officials attributed some
of the identified problems to users' insufficient familiarity with
Block 1; however, Border Patrol officials reported that the
participating agents had experience with the existing technologies and
had received 2 days of training prior to the assessment. The Border
Patrol thus maintained that the concerns generated should be considered
operationally relevant.
Effectively managing identified defects requires a defined process
for, among other things, assigning priorities to each defect and
ensuring that more severe ones are given priority attention. However,
the SPO does not have such a documented approach but instead relies on
the prime contractor for doing so. Under this approach, defects were
not consistently assigned priorities. Specifically, about 60 percent
(or 801 of 1,333) of Block 1 defects identified from March 2008 to July
2009 were not assigned a priority. This is partly attributable to the
SPO's lack of a defined process for prioritizing and managing defects.
Officials acknowledge this and stated that they intend to have the
contractor prioritize all defects in advance of future test readiness
reviews. Until defects are managed on a priority basis, the program
office cannot fully understand Block 1's maturity or its exposure to
related risks, nor can it make informed decisions about allocating
limited resources to address defects.
dhs science and technology directorate testing process is being used to
leverage maturing technologies for sbinet
The SPO does not have its own process for testing the relevance to
SBInet of technologies that are maturing or otherwise available from
industry or other Government entities. Instead, it relies on DHS's
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), whose mission is to provide
technology solutions that assist DHS programs in achieving their
missions. To leverage S&T, CBP signed a multiyear Interagency Agreement
with the directorate in August 2007. According to this agreement, S&T
is to research, develop, assess, test, and report on available and
emerging technologies that could be incorporated into the SBInet
system. To date, S&T has focused on potential technologies to fill
known performance gaps or improve upon already-made technology choices,
such as gaps in the radar system's ability to distinguish true radar
hits from false alarms. S&T officials told us that they interact with
Department of Defense (DOD) components and research entities to
identify DOD systems for SBInet to leverage. In this regard, SPO
officials stated that the current SBInet system makes use of DOD
technologies, such as common operating picture software and radar
systems. Nevertheless, S&T officials added that defense-related
technologies are not always a good fit with SBInet, due to operational
differences.
gao is making recommendations to improve sbinet test management and
problem resolution
To improve the planning and execution of future test events and the
resolution and disclosure of system problems, we are making the
following four recommendations to DHS:
Revise the SBInet Test and Evaluation Master Plan to include
explicit criteria for assessing the quality of test
documentation and for analyzing, prioritizing, and resolving
defects.
Ensure that test schedules, plans, cases, and procedures are
adequately reviewed and approved consistent with the Test and
Evaluation Master Plan.
Ensure that sufficient time is provided for reviewing and
approving test documentation prior to beginning a given test
event.
Triage the full inventory of unresolved problems, including
identified user concerns, and periodically report the status of
the highest priority defects to Customs and Border Protection
and Department of Homeland Security leadership.
In written comments on a draft of our report, DHS stated that the
report was factually sound, and it agreed with our last three
recommendations and agreed with all but one aspect of the first one.
DHS also described actions under way or planned to address the
recommendations.
In closing, I would like to stress how integral effective testing
and problem resolution are to successfully acquiring and deploying a
large-scale, complex system, like SBInet Block 1. As such, it is
important that each phase of Block 1 testing be managed with rigor and
discipline. To do less increases the risk that a deployed version of
the system will not perform as intended, and will ultimately require
costly and time-consuming rework to fix problems found later rather
than sooner. Compounding this risk is the unfavorable trend in the
number of unresolved system problems, and the lack of visibility into
the true magnitude of these problems' severity. Given that major test
events remain to be planned and conducted, which in turn are likely to
identify additional system problems, it is important to correct these
testing and problem resolution weaknesses.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions that you or other Members of the subcommittees may
have.
Attachment 1--Summary of GAO's On-going SBInet Work for the Committee
on Homeland Security
SBInet's Commitment, Progress, and Acquisition Management. Our
objectives are to determine the extent to which DHS has: (1) Defined
the scope of its proposed system solution, (2) developed a reliable
schedule for delivering this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost-
effectiveness of this solution, (4) acquired this solution in
accordance with key life cycle management processes, and (5) addressed
our recent recommendations. We plan to report our results in April
2010.
SBInet's Contractor Management and Oversight. Our objectives are to
determine the extent to which DHS: (1) Has established and implemented
effective controls for managing and overseeing the SBInet prime
contractor and (2) is effectively monitoring the prime contractor's
progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations. We plan to report
our results during the summer of 2010.
Security Border Initiative Financial Management Controls Over
Contractor Oversight. Our objectives are to determine the extent to
which DHS has: (1) Developed internal control procedures over SBInet
contractor invoice processing and contractor compliance with selected
key contract terms and conditions and (2) implemented internal control
procedures to ensure payments to SBInet's prime contractor are proper
and in compliance with selected key contract terms and conditions. We
plan to report our results during the summer of 2010.
Mr. Cuellar. Sir, I thank you very much for your testimony.
At this time I recognize Mr. Krone for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROGER A. KRONE, PRESIDENT, NETWORK AND SPACE
SYSTEMS, BOEING DEFENSE, SPACE & SECURITY, THE BOEING COMPANY
Mr. Krone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman
Cuellar, Chairman Carney, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Members.
It has been 6 months since we last appeared here to discuss
SBInet. In that time, the Government and industry team has made
significant progress on the deployment of the SBInet Block 1
system, and we are now seeing real-world results and actual
Border Patrol operations in the Tucson sector.
In addition, we have started a second Block 1 deployment in
Ajo, and on the northern border we have delivered the Buffalo
Project, and we are within weeks of delivering the Detroit
Project.
Testing is a critical function of all developmental
programs. Its purpose is to understand system's performance,
ensure system's functionality, and demonstrate that the design
meets system's requirements.
In any test, we expect to find problems.
In many cases, we push the system to failure to understand
its detailed functionality and durability.
When issues are identified, we have a process in place to
capture them, prioritize them and address them. We utilize a
closed-loop, root-cause corrective action process to ensure we
fully understand each problem and have implemented a corrective
action that is both comprehensive and complete.
Late last fall, our systems qualification test revealed
several hardware and software changes that needed to be made.
In addition, analysis of the Playas test bed and the Tucson-1
production configuration identified differences in some
components which necessitated a limited set of assessments on
the Tucson-1 configuration to ensure traceability of and
verification of artifacts and to reduce risk.
At the same time, working closely with CBT and conscious of
GAO's concerns, we revised our systems acceptance test plan to
include an expanded set of routes and more precise success
criteria for the key performance parameters. These tests will
involve day and night operations along 60 or more Border
Patrol-identified trafficking routes. These factors drove the
schedule adjustment, which now has Tucson-1 acceptance testing
starting in late summer, concluding in early fall.
As you know, schedule delays drive costs. We are
aggressively pursuing opportunities to reclaim schedule and
reduce the cost of Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 deployments. However, in
terms of performance on the program, progress is evident. We
are not seeing any system-wide issues. We have plans in place
for remaining lower-level issues, and we are confident the
revised system acceptance test plan is robust and its success
criteria are well-understood.
This assessment is supported by the feedback we are getting
from early operations. Early operations began, as Mark said, on
February 6 and has provided the Border Patrol with the
opportunity to use the Tucson-1 system during swing and
midnight shifts, times that our engineers are not able to work
on the system for safety and security reasons. To date, about 4
dozen Border Patrol agents have taken the formal classroom
training program. The system has performed reliably and
effectively 7 days a week.
I would like to relay to the committee my personal
observations from a visit I made to Tucson sector less than 2
weeks ago. I spent an evening in the command-and-control center
at Tucson sector headquarters observing agents at three
consoles of the Block 1 system, and I spent the following day
visiting tower sites. I was struck by the speed with which
agents are adapting to the system both at the consoles and in
the field, and the skill they are displaying even at this early
stage.
Also apparent is the increased tactical advantage agents
now have because of the significantly improved situational
awareness the system provides them. The sensor information SBI
collection relays to the agent in the field really does give
him or her greater ability to deal with each encounter
effectively and safely.
So does SBInet pass the Border Security test? Based upon
all the activities of the recent days, I would say there are
three questions. Are we testing the system adequately? Does the
system work? Does it provide value, best value to the Border
Patrol?
On testing, yes, the majority of the delay in our testing
program is to bring the configuration of the system up to its
production level and to conduct more rigorous testing, and we
are seeing signs of a maturing system out in the field.
Second question: Does it work? Definitely yes, it works
today. I would ask you to direct your questions to Mark and to
Chief Fisher, and it will get better as we finish the
development and construction of the system. But more
importantly, value--is this good value for money? Our job at
Boeing is to design, develop, and deploy the system. Value is
really a Customs and Border Patrol decision, but based upon my
experience, the Tucson-1 system gives the agent in the field a
significant tactical advantage, an increase in situation
awareness, especially in night operations.
So I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today. I
look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Krone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger A. Krone
March 18, 2010
Good morning.
It has been 6 months since we last appeared to discuss SBInet. In
that time, the Boeing Team has made significant progress on the
deployment of the SBInet Block 1 System, and we are seeing real-world
results in actual Border Patrol operations in the Tucson Sector. In
addition, we have started a second Block 1 deployment in the Ajo area.
On the northern border, we have delivered the Buffalo project and are
within weeks of delivering the Detroit project.
This progress has been achieved through application of a
disciplined engineering approach and lessons learned along the way. As
we have discussed previously, there is inherent complexity associated
with integrating multiple commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components
into a complex system.
Testing is a critical function of all developmental programs. Its
purpose is to ensure system functionality and that the design meets
system requirements. In any test, we expect to find problems, and in
many cases, we push the system to failure to understand its detailed
functionality and durability. When issues are identified, we have a
process in place to capture them, prioritize them, and address them. We
utilize a closed-loop Root Cause Corrective Action (RCCA) process to
ensure we fully understand each problem and have implemented a
corrective action that is both comprehensive and complete.
schedule
Late last fall, our System Qualification Test (SQT) revealed
several hardware and software changes that needed to be made in the
system before entering into System Acceptance Test (SAT). In addition,
subsequent analysis of the Playas test bed and Tucson 1 (TUS1)
configurations identified differences in some of the COTS hardware and
software components, which necessitated we conduct a limited set of
assessments on the TUS1 configuration to ensure traceability of our
verification artifacts and reduce risk to a successful System
Acceptance Test and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
At the same time, working closely with CBP, we revised our SAT plan
to include an expanded set of routes and a more precise set of success
criteria for the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). These tests will
involve daytime and nighttime operations along more than 60 Border
Patrol-identified trafficking routes. To ensure that the tests are
statistically valid, multi-kilometer segments along each route will be
walked multiple times by various group sizes. In addition to
pedestrians, vehicles will also be evaluated. This is a time-consuming
and labor-intensive process necessary to ensure the accuracy of the
testing. These factors are the reason for delaying the start and
extending the duration of SAT. TUS1 acceptance testing is now expected
to start in late summer and conclude in early fall.
cost
The cost growth we have experienced on the program has been driven
by the schedule delays. We are aggressively pursuing opportunities to
reduce the cost of the TUS1 and AJO1 deployments. Our team has
identified a number of opportunities in our TUS1 schedule to accelerate
milestones and realize cost reductions as a result. In consideration
for these delays, Boeing has committed to apply the fee that we receive
for the TUS1 Deployment toward system enhancements that will be
identified by the Border Patrol. In addition, Boeing has also committed
company resources to establish a senior technical team to independently
evaluate the readiness of the Block 1 System and to make
recommendations on key areas that will enhance the system performance
and availability.
Based on where we are today in the program, the progress is
evident. We are not seeing any system-wide issues; we have plans in
place for the remaining lower-level issues and we are confident we have
a robust SAT plan with well-understood success criteria. We are on the
way to deliver a system with the capabilities and means to become a
reliable force multiplier for the Border Patrol and one from which CBP
and the Border Patrol can develop Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTP) to meet our Nation's evolving border security needs.
early operations
Our current view of the system is supported by the feedback we are
getting from Early Operations. Early Operations began on Feb. 6, 2010,
and has provided the Border Patrol with the opportunity to use the TUS1
System during swing and midnight shifts, times that our engineers are
not able to work on the system for safety and security reasons. To
date, about four dozen Border Patrol Agents have taken the formal
classroom training program at the Production Support Facility in
Tucson. After the 3-day training session, the agents are able to use
the TUS1 System to support Border Patrol operations in the Sasabe Port
of Entry area. During Early Operations, Boeing engineers work side-by-
side with the agents to provide technical support as required. The
feedback that we have received to date from the agents has been very
positive and complimentary of the improvement over Project 28 and the
impact on mission performance. To date, the system has performed
reliably and effectively, 7 days per week.
I'd like to relay to the committee my personal observations from a
visit to the Tucson Sector less than 2 weeks ago. I spent an evening in
the Command and Control Center at the Tucson Sector Headquarters
observing three agents at the consoles of the Block 1 System and the
following day visiting tower sites. I was struck by the speed with
which the agents are adapting to the system--both at the consoles and
in the field--and the skill they are displaying even at this early
stage. Also very apparent is the increased tactical advantage agents
now have because of the significantly improved situational awareness
the system provides. The information the system relays to the agent in
the field really does give him or her greater ability to deal with each
encounter effectively and safely.
As Early Operations progresses, we will work closely with the
SBInet Program Office to capture issues and feedback. A formal system
is in place to disposition issues as they arise, either in the form of
corrections that need to be made prior to acceptance or as potential
enhancements to be made after OT&E.
ajo1
In late January, we began the second deployment of Block 1
technology, called AJO1, near the Lukeville Port of Entry in an
environmentally sensitive area of the Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument. The 6-month delay to the start of the AJO1 Deployment was
driven primarily by environmental and land management assessments and
permits that were required before construction could begin. Since late
January, we have erected five towers and our teams are actively at work
at all the remaining sites where we have permission to work. The Ajo
Station Command and Control Center was recently completed, and the full
system will be ready for Operational Test & Evaluation late this
calendar year. The speed at which AJO1 is erected, tested, and accepted
by the CBP will demonstrate the increased maturity of the Block 1
System.
northern border projects
We also have significant progress to report on our northern border
projects where we are installing the Remote Video Surveillance System
(RVSS) to enhance agent surveillance capabilities in the river
environments near Buffalo and Detroit. The Buffalo deployment was
completed and accepted by CBP on Feb. 26, 2010, and is now part of
operations of the Border Patrol. The completion of the Detroit
deployment has been delayed by an issue with a Government vendor, but
is expected to be delivered to CBP early next month. The delivery of
both of these projects is in accord with the schedule outlined in the
hearing last September.
mobile surveillance systems
In addition, Boeing has been providing logistics sustainment for
the Border Patrol's Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS) since April 2009.
These highly modified vehicles provide mobile radar and camera
surveillance capability. When Boeing began this effort, the
availability of the 41 MSS was less than 50 percent. Today, through
close collaboration with CBP, the availability of the MSS is greater
than 90 percent.
conclusion
While SBInet has been a difficult and challenging program, we
believe the original concept of providing timely and actionable
situational awareness to Border Patrol Agents remains a sound one. With
the support of CBP, we now have a version of the Block 1 System in use
today by the Border Patrol--providing value to their operations. To
date, we are more than three-quarters complete with the first two
deployments and are within months of starting formal acceptance testing
for the TUS1 system.
So, does SBInet pass the border security test? Based on the
capabilities developed, the engineering rigor, and the positive mission
impact of Early Operations, the answer is ``yes.''
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Krone, for your testimony.
At this time, I remind each Member that he or she will have
5 minutes to question the witnesses.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Borkowski, let me ask you this. The way I see this is
we have GAO that goes and looks at your systems, and I think
they have done it about 17 times. I understand you just came in
just recently. I understand that.
But one of the things I would like to see is the agency, if
you agree with the recommendations, and my understanding is
pretty much all have agreed to the recommendations. The last
set of recommendations I think were about 18 months ago, Mr.
Hite, is that correct?
But then after you all get the recommendations, then you
all talk about that. I haven't seen the improvement or the
completion of those recommendations. You know, and the reason I
say this, because you all should be looking at this
cooperative, instead of adversarial, and I almost feel like,
you know, you all feel, the Department feels that GAO is out to
get you, but I see it more as an improvement.
Where are we with those recommendations and when are we
going to finish them? I know your background. You are new, but
somebody has to answer those questions.
Mr. Borkowski. Right. Absolutely. First of all, we concur
with the GAO recommendations largely because we agree that they
reflect best practices in the way that you manage a program of
this complexity. We agree that the program did not have those
practices in place.
I just want to comment on a couple of things, though. One
is, yes, we are working toward that kind of structure and
discipline, but you don't undo 2 and 3 years in, you know, 15
minutes. So that is a work in progress. It is going to take
some time to close all of those.
The second thing, though, that I would point out is that
the GAO report we are talking about today is based on analysis
of things that essentially were looked at last spring. So for
example, when you talk about test procedures being adjusted, if
you go into the report--and by the way, I have a draft report;
we haven't seen the final, but I assume the draft is close--if
you go in and you look at that, you will see that the GAO
acknowledges that in April 2009, it was the program office that
said to Boeing, ``It looks like you did this.'' So the point I
am trying to make is that I think we are on it.
The other thing is that between then and now, we have
focused on a lot of the things that GAO also identified. We saw
the same things. So that is a work in progress. I can't promise
you, Mr. Chairman, that it will be done overnight. I can
promise to you that we are very committed to increasing that
discipline. I do think that the kind of things we are seeing in
the initial ops, the fact that the system is not crashing when
we turn it over to the Border Patrol, is in some measure due to
the imposition of what discipline we have been able to achieve
by this point.
But you are absolutely right. This will go on for longer
than today, tomorrow, and the next several months.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. If you can just keep the committee
informed as to the progress itself.
The other question is dealing with the $50 million that the
Secretary just redeployed. Sensitivity--I am not asking you to
give me details as to what equipment you are going to buy, but
just generally what are we looking at? How does that improve
value to the border security? How is Mr. Fisher, Border Patrol,
included in buying that equipment? We had this conversation
yesterday, but for the record.
Mr. Borkowski. We actually asked. SBI did not make a
determination of what equipment we should buy. We actually
asked not only the Border Patrol, but the Office of Field
Operations, the Office of Air and Marine, the Office of
Intelligence for their priorities. We worked in kind of an
integrated way to come up with those priorities.
But the types of things we are looking at are the mobile
surveillance systems, the remote video surveillance systems
which are in use today. There are scope trucks that give night
vision that the Border Patrol is very interested in. There are
some additional sensors on aircraft. There are radars to detect
low-flying aircraft. There are cameras and laptops for pursuit
vehicles for the Office of Field Operations. There is equipment
to support field operations, southbound operations. So we have
a whole list of things that we collected from the agents and
officers themselves and that is what we will use to build that
$50 million plant.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. You heard my statement at the beginning.
At the current rate of 28 miles every 4.5 years, it would take
us 320 years to complete, which would be the year 2330 at that
rate.
If we look at--how much have we spent so far--$600 million,
$700 million, including R&D and all that?
Mr. Borkowski. Right, right. It is in the $700 million--
about $615 million to Boeing has been spent, and then another
$100 million, $200 million on other costs related to that that
were not Boeing.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. You do understand what our concerns are
on costs and time, especially with the violence escalating
across the river. CBP Air Marine--are the ones that operate the
UAVs. I know they have to work out the cost, the certificates
of authorization with the FAA. How is that coordinated--how is
that coordinated with the SBI? UAVs or technology is
technology, and one of the letters that I sent is I wanted to
ask what is the long plan for the CAVs for the northern border,
for the southern border, and my understanding is that Coast
Guard working with CBP is working on the UAVs for the coastal
areas.
Mr. Borkowski. Well, I know you are aware that we have
plans to buy UAVs, and I think you are right--that needs to be
integrated. That is one of the reasons, I think, that the
Secretary has directed this assessment is because UAVs should
be part of the tradeoff against things like SBInet, against
things like other technology. That evaluation should include a
sense of how they work together.
So part of, I think, the Secretary's intention in dealing
with this assessment is also to get to that question.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Krone, I think it was earlier this week or last week, I
saw--I think you had a tape of how your project has worked, the
new one, and to me it looked pretty clear. I am not Border
Patrol, and we will ask Mr. Fisher. But I saw there was some
good things from what I saw, but at the same time, it is mixed,
as Mr. Hite has mentioned. But what I saw was some good things
coming in. It was clear, and my understanding is Border Patrol,
and I will ask Mr. Fisher to add to this, but was they can play
with a couple of screens, where they can get a couple of
screens at one time that makes it, I think, more useful to look
at different things at one time.
My understanding also, and Mr. Fisher, I am asking I guess
both of you all, was--it is easier, friendly for the agents to
use this, or time for it to be trained? If you can just address
that, and Mr. Fisher, tell us how you all see what is being
done right now. Because again, look, for the record, Mr. Krone,
if we are going to be paying this much money, I want Boeing to
succeed, okay? I want you all to succeed. But I hope you all
understand that we have got concerns about time and cost and
some of the issues that have been brought up by GAO, Mr. Hite.
Mr. Krone. Right. I will make a few comments and then
clearly we all want to hear from the chief.
So, again, I had the opportunity to go out to the Tucson
command and control center. If you can imagine with me what the
layout looks like, in the front row we have three consoles for
Tucson-1, and each console controls three towers.
Immediately behind that we have the old P28 system. So you
can literally stand there and watch the P28 Border Patrol
operators operating the old P28 system and the new system.
For the Members and those of us who have been involved in
this program for a long time know that we redesigned the
interface software, which we call the common operating picture,
when we moved from P28 to Tucson-1, and we did that in a very
collaborative process with Border Patrol agents and actually
brought them into the design early, a criticism that we had in
P28, with the intent to make it extremely user-friendly and to
reduce the training time that it would take agents to learn the
new system.
Just my observation being out in the command and control
center is we provide 3 days' worth of training to the agents
and then they are allowed to use the system--these early
operations.
I am extremely impressed at how significantly they have
been able to use the Tucson-1 system vice the P28 even at this
early stage. So I think we have got what I believe is a pretty
good success in the user interface and the ability for the
agents to adapt quickly to the system and, frankly, to use it
effectively in engagements.
But I would also like to hear from Chief Fisher.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Fisher, if you can summarize. My time is
up. But if you can just tell us your perspective on the system.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you
for the opportunity to be here this morning.
I will tell you first, I haven't seen firsthand the new
developments that we are talking about personally, although I
will have an opportunity at the end of the month to do so. But
I have worked in Tucson over the years. I have seen the early
developments when the system and the common operational system
was being put together, and I will tell you, I think later
there is a film, a short clip perhaps, that is going to show
the capabilities.
One of the things that impressed me when I first saw this
the other day was certainly, as you have mentioned, sir, the
clarity of the picture and everything.
But what really impressed me from an operator's perspective
was the sense of how protected the Border Patrol agents in the
field are going to be because of this. Again, I am not
projecting, you know, long-term this is going to be--certainly
this is not the silver bullet.
But what impressed me was the fact that an operator, a
Border Patrol agent, back away from these smugglers, was able
to provide in advance information to the Border Patrol agents
on the field, relaying that information to them in real time,
providing back-up perhaps of getting other agents to be able to
move into position, and providing the interdiction, cover, and
concealment if you will, and oversight that historically we
just didn't have in the Border Patrol before.
It does look promising. I am going to hold judgment until
the actual testing and when the Border Patrol actually looks at
it beyond what we have done so far in interim steps. But I will
tell you that it has given us a general sense of better
situational awareness just beyond some of the clarity with
respect to some of the other detection capabilities that we
have implemented along the southwest border over the years,
sir.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. Thank you.
Chair now will recognize other Members for questions they
may wish to ask of the witnesses. According to--committee rules
and practice, I will recognize Members who were here present at
the beginning based on seniority of the subcommittee,
alternating between Majority and Minority.
Those Members coming in at a later time will be recognized
in the order of arrival.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Carney, for 5 minutes. Thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I
appreciate the joint hearing.
I am not sure where to start on this.
So, Mr. Borkowski, I guess you are first on this one. As we
all know, we have experienced significant delays with SBInet in
Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. In fact, every time Congress was given a
date for their completion, the date has come and gone.
For example, in December 2008 we were told that Tucson-1
and Ajo-1 would be completed in September 2009 and December
2009, respectively. Then, in February 2009, those dates were
pushed back to November 2009 and mid-2010.
In April 2009, further delays caused the dates to be moved
from--or to December 2009 and June 2010. Once again, in
January--once January 2010 rolled around, we were told not to
expect a timely completion because the system would not be
finished until later in the year.
Now, tests show that the date is moved further into the
future than originally expected. I am afraid to ask, but, you
know, we are here, I am going to ask, when do you expect full
deployment of Tucson-1 and Ajo-1?
Mr. Borkowski. We expect Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 to be
completely in the hands of the Border Patrol by the end of this
calendar year or very early next calender year. That is the
short answer to your question.
Now, turning it to the hands of the Border Patrol, the
Border Patrol has options of doing some operational tests
during that period for as long as they care to do it. But both
of those we anticipate will be in the hands of the Border
Patrol for operations toward the end of the year.
Mr. Carney. That gives you a bit of wiggle room, doesn't
it?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, I can give you the precise dates.
Mr. Carney. Yes, yes, that would be great.
Mr. Borkowski. Okay. We expect to have Tucson-1 completed
through its system acceptance testing by September 15, and at
September 15 we would turn it over to the Border Patrol for
their operational test and evaluation.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Mr. Borkowski. In the case of Ajo-1, Ajo-1 is going through
construction. Some of the delay there, by the way, was
environmental. That is a highly sensitive environmental area.
So some of the construction was delayed due to that.
We are constructing it as we speak. There will be a kind of
shutdown for a couple months for Sonora and prong-horn fawning
season in the spring going into the summer, but that should be
all constructed by the middle of August.
Then the system acceptance testing for Ajo-1 will go on
into about till November of this year, and after, again, system
acceptance testing it would be turned over to the Border
Patrol.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Okay. Thank you. Appreciate that.
Mr. Krone, I got to tell you, I have to commend you for
your ability to spin this situation. It was truly an inspired--
an inspired performance.
One question I have. How many miles of either Ajo-1 or
Tucson-1 are actually under control using your technology?
Mr. Krone. Well, all of Tucson-1 is under control with P28.
P28 is up and operational. Then at night we double down, we
have both P28 and the Block-1 system. But on Ajo we are in
tower construction. So there is none of Ajo today and all of
Tucson-1, essentially with two systems.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Now, is that what was originally sold? Is
that what you originally told us?
Mr. Krone. Was that a schedule question?
Mr. Carney. Yes.
Mr. Krone. Clearly not. You know, whether we want to go and
pick a particular date or a particular point in time.
So it is a developmental program, Congressman Carney. We
have made a decision to move from a schedule-based program to
an event-based program.
Now, what do I mean by that?
Mr. Carney. No, I understand what you mean by that.
Mr. Krone. Okay.
Mr. Carney. I got it.
Mr. Hite, I was really fascinated with your testimony here.
I liked the good, the bad, the ugly part. Not so much the bad
and the ugly.
Are there proven technologies, other proven technologies
out there that would accomplish the same thing, that they are
already in existence?
Mr. Hite. The short answer would be yes. I think that is
the purpose of the assessment that the Secretary wants. There
is a recognition that there are other technologies, that there
is not necessarily one panacea that is going to satisfy the
Border Patrol's needs across the entire border. They want to
look at what are the options out there, and then what is the
best allocation of those options across the border.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Where might these technologies be in use
right now, the other ones?
Mr. Hite. Where they are actually in use, sir? I couldn't
give you an answer----
Mr. Carney. Are they in use--so you don't know if they are
in use in Iraq or in Israel or places like that?
Mr. Hite. Unfortunately, I can't give you the answer to
that. I don't know for certain.
Mr. Carney. Okay. If you could look and let us know----
Mr. Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carney [continuing]. That would be great.
Finally, Mr. Hite, you mentioned that 70 percent or so of
the testing was changed on the fly. Who approved those changes?
Who makes the decision to, in the middle of the test, change
the test?
Mr. Hite. Yes, sir. That was 70 percent of the procedures
within--I am sorry, 70 percent of the test cases the procedures
were changed to varying degrees, some of which were minor
changes, some of which were more significant.
The rules governing those changes were not laid out in a
document at quality assurance process. Rather it was an
informal agreement between the parties within the program
office and Boeing. They described to us what that process was,
and we in fact validated that that unwritten set of procedures
was, in fact, followed, and that there were quality assurance
sign-off on those changes at the time.
Mr. Carney. You know, I got to tell you, it doesn't pass
the smell test. I used to be a professor. You don't change a
test in the middle of the test. I don't care who signs off on
it.
Mr. Hite. I would agree with you, particularly the volume
of the changes that were made and how extensive they were.
What it is indicative of is that, well, we didn't have the
test procedures right to begin with, so we are going to try and
fix them to try and get them right here at the last minute.
Now, you run a risk of trying to do something like that on
the fly, you know, at the last minute.
Mr. Carney. So, hold on, if the test--if the test wasn't
right, we are not even far enough along on the project to know
what questions to ask?
Mr. Hite. Well, what we were dealing, when you design a
test, you are designing it to a requirement. Part of the
problem here was the requirement in some cases was not well-
defined. If you are trying to write a test to execute a
requirement that is not well-defined, you are going to run into
difficulty in doing that.
So what contributed to this situation relative to changes
in test procedures were a number of things that didn't occur
earlier on in the system development, because making sure that
a system like this is successful and involves doing many things
over many years means you got to have a lot of stars to align
to form this constellation.
All those early stars that were out there weren't aligned
very well.
Mr. Carney. I agree.
Okay. I am way over my time. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
look forward to the next round.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentleman from
Pennsylvania.
At this time, I recognize the gentleman from the State of
Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much.
Mr. Borkowski, in your statement you discuss the SBInet
review required by Secretary Napolitano. Who is responsible for
conducting the review? What is the status now? When will the
results be available?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, the review is run by the Department.
It is managed by the Secretary's office. There is a facilitator
who is the chief of staff to the under secretary of management.
We have met over the last couple of months to lay out structure
and timelines and such.
The Secretary's office is still working those, though,
because on the one hand, the Secretary is very committed. She
wants the technology now, as you can imagine. On the other
hand, she does not want to go back to the earlier mistakes of
not having done an analysis to justify significant investments.
So the exact timelines are in review with the Secretary's
office as we speak.
Mr. Bilirakis. So are we talking about maybe getting
something by the summer?
Mr. Borkowski. My understanding is that the Secretary would
like to have results to advise future budget decisions. That is
about as much as I can say at this point about the timeline.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Chairman, I would request a review,
maybe the office can brief us on the results, if that is
possible.
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, we will do that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
Okay, Mr. Krone, I understand that CBC has requested you
consider alternative locations for the tower Ajo-1 due to
issues with GSA. If you identify a viable alternative location,
what steps must be taken to begin construction of the tower?
What impact will that have on the completion of Ajo-1?
Mr. Krone. I actually think we are--I think we are past
that. I think all of the towers at Ajo-1 have been approved and
the environmental impact assessments have been complete. What
is holding us up on Ajo-1 really is this antelope fawning
season, and our inability to move heavy construction equipment
into the area to complete construction of those towers.
But all of the tower sites in Ajo-1, I think the
environmentalist assessment has been complete and we are
really--go ahead, Mark.
Mr. Borkowski. If I might. As you suggest, there is an
issue with a communications tower at the Lukeville port of
entry, which is a site that we have located and intended to
use. We have been asked about relocating that tower to deal
with some other CBP needs. So we are in the process of figuring
out what the right way to handle that is. I don't think Mr.
Krone is aware of that just yet, but we are in the process of--
--
Mr. Bilirakis. Have you identified a location?
Mr. Borkowski. No, not yet. We are looking at candidate
locations. We haven't also identified that we have to move our
tower just yet, but we are in the process of doing that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Will you keep us informed?
Mr. Borkowski. Absolutely. I think that will be a very
significant effort, yes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
Mr. Borkowski, what impact will the Secretary's
announcement to redeploy $50 million of recovery funds, funding
originally located for Block 1, have on the Block 1 deployment?
Will this further delay the completion of Block 1? Will the
technology procured with the redirected Recovery Act funding be
deployed? Will these technologies provide Border Patrol agents
with a common operating picture?
Mr. Borkowski. The intent of our SBInet stimulus funds was
to buy what we call long-lead cameras, radars, equipment to
build towers so that we would be spring-loaded to go build
those once we were done with Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. So the effect
of diverting the funds on the one hand, on SBInet, might have
an impact on our ability to speedily, if we decide it makes
sense--which again, the assessment hasn't yet concluded it
does--to speedily continue deployment of Block 1.
But on the other hand, the immediate diversion of those
funds likely gives us quicker some technology that meets the
needs of the Border Patrol than we would have gotten with
SBInet. So there is a little trade-off here. There may be an
impact on our ability to get SBInet if we decide to build more,
but certainly it should result in quicker other technologies to
the border to meet the needs of the agents and officers there.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
A question for Mr. Fisher. What impact have the delays in
SBInet deployment had on the Border Patrol operations?
Mr. Fisher. Well, sir, when you look at our capabilities
and what we currently have, and the deployment and the
evolution of our strategy under a border security context. Now
what we are seeing in the deployment in Tucson, specifically
with SBInet, is an on-going effort to provide beyond what our
current detection capabilities are.
We are going to continue--as a matter of fact, I had this
discussion with the staff here and the field commanders when I
first came up in January. I said we are going to continue. We
are going to have objectives. We are going to continue to have
objectives as it relates to our ability to, one, reduce the
likelihood that dangerous people and dangerous things get into
this country, and at the tactical level, make sure that we are
able to gain, maintain, and expand operational control.
We are going to have the ability to use personnel,
technology, and infrastructure as part of our existing
strategy. We also have to be cognizant of the fact that we are
dealing with a threat that is ever-evolving and changing. So as
we look at that, it is not a one-term solution as it relates to
that right combination.
Now, with respect to SBInet in Tucson, what we are seeing,
although it has taken a lot longer than perhaps the operators
would have liked, we are doing it right. I think at the end of
the day, what we want to be able to do is use that, not to
replace all of our detection capability, but add that to a
suite of other things and other capabilities that the Border
Patrol agents will have today and will have in the future to
maintain that operational control.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Last question for Mr. Krone. What is Boeing doing to
prioritize and resolve defects identified during the testing?
Mr. Krone. Yes, we have got to discipline both software and
hardware defect management. It is a best practice. By the way,
we will get together with Mr. Hite so we understand the 1,300
issues that he has identified in his report. We have had
trouble tracking to that number, but we have what we call a
joint software review board with Customs and Border Patrol. We
also have the change configuration board where we deal with
hardware and software.
We essentially put these defects and issues into five
levels and prioritize them. Then we work cooperatively with
Mark and his team to prioritize which ones get fixed
immediately, which ones get rolled into the next block, and
which ones, if you will, have no impact into systems operation
and it is not a best value decision to go correct them.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. Yield back the
balance.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, thank you.
The gentleman from Florida, thank you very much.
At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi,
Chairman Thompson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask the clerk to display a slide for the
committee, please.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Thompson. What you have displayed is a capsule of what
Congress and this committee was promised when we started the
SBInet program. We were promised completion by 2008. We were
told that somehow the costs would be less than $2 billion, and
that the coverage would be the entire southwest border, some
1,933 miles.
Based on what we have heard today, we are a long ways from
completion, somewhere around $833 million, and--am I correct?--
around maybe 20 miles of control. So we have a long ways to go.
Mr. Hite, you heard Mr. Krone indicate that Boeing looks at
how they would view their system in three areas: Testing, the
work, and value. In all those areas, he indicated that in his
estimation, Boeing had passed; that the testing phase was
complete; the work was complete; and that the value of the
system as determined by CBP is good also.
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Hite. A couple of thoughts on that. When you critique
something, or critique oneself, you do it against some type of
baseline. The baselines that you have put up on the screen here
talk about the timing of when that was going to get done, at
what cost.
If you look at what was promised from the outset on this
program in terms of where we are right now, promises were made
relative to deployment over a large geographic area--the entire
southwest border--that we are about 8 years off of. Promises
were made relative to sectors that we are probably about 3
years off of. Then when you get down to specific locations,
like Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, promises were made that we are
probably somewhere between 12 and 15 months off of.
So to evaluate performance and, you know, Mr. Krone was
talking about where the system is right now, and he was talking
about, you know, it is working; we have worked off these
defects; it is being used by the Border Patrol; they like it.
I am not going to take issue with precisely where the
system is right now, but if you are going to measure yourself,
measure yourself against some type of baseline.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Borkowski, you talked about the $50 million purchase of
equipment. How much operational control will we have of the
border with the purchase of that equipment?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, the equipment by itself doesn't get
you operational control of the border. SBInet by itself doesn't
get you operational control of the border. It is a combination
of the personnel, the infrastructure--for example, fence--and
the technology.
So I can't really answer that question. I can tell you that
we have asked the Border Patrol. We have asked the Office of
Field Operations. We have asked the Office of Air and Marine
where they would like us to put priority in putting this
equipment. Then it will be up to them to apply the equipment
with the other elements, the other three pillars of the stool,
to determine how far they can get with operational control.
I don't know--perhaps Chief Fisher might be better
postured.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think, you know, a point
worth making is the fact that not a piece of tower or one
technology solution, not 10 or 15 Border Patrol agents in a
particular zone, nor an access road or primary fence or
secondary fence in and of themselves is going to, in our
tactical operational definition, achieve operational control.
So in areas where we do have effective operational control,
which means our field commanders over a period of time have
deployed or redeployed resources, took out a lot of factors to
make a determination that those sections of the border were
either at what we called the controlled or managed level. They
have made an assessment, more so on the conditions as opposed
to attributing specifically whether it was the Border Patrol
agents or whether it was the fence or whether it was the
technology that caused that area to be under effective control.
Mr. Thompson. Well, let me ask it another way. Did you ask
the Border Patrol, Mr. Borkowski, ``What do you need to do your
job?'', or did you say, ``We have $50 million, go spend it''?
Mr. Borkowski. We have done both. In fact, we have
completely restructured the way we design what we do for
technology, what we need. So we have done both.
As part of that process, the $50 million is in fact kind of
the highest priority, most obvious kind of opportunities.
Obviously, as we make future investments--and, for example,
the Secretary has frozen the other SBInet so that it is
available, if appropriate, to divert to other technologies--as
we make other investments and as those dollars become
increasingly significant, we will want to do more detailed
cost-effectiveness analysis.
But right now, yes, we have gone to the Border Patrol and
ask that question.
Mr. Thompson. Yes. What I guess I am trying to figure out
is, now that we are spending $50 million because of
shortcomings with SBInet, are you saying we just get a better
operational control of certain areas? Is that 10 miles? Is that
20 miles? Is it 50 miles?
Mr. Borkowski. Mr. Chairman, I don't have that number
handy. We would have to go and work with the Border Patrol on
where they want to deploy it.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I think you need to get it to us,
because we are just throwing up a $50 million figure, and you
can't provide the committee any information as to what we get
for it other than some redundancy and some other things within
existing systems, and that is fine.
Mr. Krone, there is some question about Boeing's
utilization of small service-connected disabled veterans within
the different tracks. Can you provide the committee with the
current statistical data within a week?
Mr. Krone. Yes, sir, we would be happy to provide the
committee with the information. Let me just give you a couple
summary numbers today.
As you know, we have a small-business goal on the program
of 40 percent content. Right now on the program when you
include the steel and the fence construction, we are at 33,
about 34 percent small business.
We were actually over our goal before we signed up to
manage the steel supply chain as part of the construction of
the physical fence. If we removed the purchase of the steel
from our numbers, we would actually exceed the goal of 40
percent. We would be at 48 percent.
But we have the details, and we would be pleased to provide
them to your office.
Mr. Thompson. If you will not only provide the percentages,
but the name of the companies, so we can make sure they do fit
the criteria----
Mr. Krone. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. Of small and service connected--
--
Mr. Krone. We would be pleased to do that.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. And other things.
Mr. Borkowski, at what point can we receive copies of the
requested assessment that the Secretary indicated was under
way?
Mr. Borkowski. I will have to check with the Department on
that because that is actually in the control of the Secretary's
office. But we will ask the Department to answer that question.
Mr. Thompson. Well, we were told it would take 5 weeks. I
think we are in week 6 or 7 right now. So if you can provide
that, we are anxiously awaiting the results of the assessment
that the Secretary indicated would be forthcoming.
I beg the indulgence.
Mr. Hite, the question of testing came into some of the
testimony now. When you test the systems and found the thing,
who was present? What staff was involved? Who was around?
Mr. Hite. We did not actually test the system. We----
Mr. Thompson. Who provided the information?
Mr. Hite. The Department of Homeland Security, the SBInet
program office provided us the information.
Mr. Thompson. So you were provided information indicating
that tests had failed. Am I correct?
Mr. Hite. We were provided the information surrounding the
plans that were prepared for testing. The actual test cases, we
could analyze them to see how complete they were. We were
provided the results of testing. We actually went through the
test cases, went through the results.
So we didn't actually conduct the tests ourselves, we
analyzed what was done.
Mr. Thompson. In your estimation, that was incomplete?
Mr. Hite. Yes, sir. For tests to be well-planned, they
needed to have certain characteristics, contain certain
information, and that information was missing.
So that made it, in our view, not adequate, and there were
consequences associated with those omissions.
Mr. Thompson. Last question, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Borkowski, what was the official position of the
Department on this GAO review?
Mr. Borkowski. The GAO, the Department largely concurred.
We took some exception, a partial exception to a discussion
about a particular kind of document, called a test and
evaluation master plan, which is one of the many types of
documents. But in general we concurred with the GAO report.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
McCaul, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The recent killings in Juarez of U.S. Consulate officials I
think demonstrate the dire situation down at the U.S.-Mexico
border, across from El Paso, my home State of Texas.
Last year in Mexico over 6,000 people were murdered at the
hands of the drug cartels, many in very horrific execution-
style slayings.
There is a war going on, and the president of Mexico calls
that--calls it a war, because it is. We can't afford to delay
and delay and wait. We met with Secretary Napolitano this
morning, and she said, ``You know, I want to take a time-out
and review this situation and assess SBInet.'' That is fine, I
respect her opinion on that.
But we can't afford any more time-outs. I mean, 2008, then
2013. Then we were told that the earliest this could be
completed would be 2016.
Meanwhile, there is a war going on. There are people being
killed. It is going to spill over into this country. It is a
threat--security threat--not only to Mexico, but a National
security threat to the United States. People in our State see
it up close and personal.
I have the video clip I want to show. There is an operation
going on at SBInet Block 1 in the Tucson sector that began on
February 6 where about four dozen Border Patrol agents, even
though it is being tested, are making it operational, even
though it hasn't had final approval.
Chief Fisher, I would like for you to go ahead, if you may,
and narrate what we are seeing on this video.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir, I would be happy to.
This happened last month in the Tucson area of
responsibility. What you are seeing here in the middle of the
screen are six backpackers coming in from Mexico. They were
detected and are being tracked now. You can see carrying
marijuana, what turned out to be almost 200 pounds of
marijuana.
Now, as the screen switches and you see the white hot, you
see in the upper corner, you will see a Border Patrol agent
lying in wait. His partner is up ahead of the group, waiting to
do the interdiction.
What is also happening, as you can see as it pans out, is
the Border Patrol agent that is operating the system at the
command and control is taking a look at their surrounding area
to provide security for those two Border Patrol agents who are
about to do the interdiction. At the same time, command and
control will be calling out to other Border Patrol agents to
start moving into the area to provide cover.
Now, the other thing of note I would like you to see is
when the interdiction is made and the Border Patrol agent in
front starts challenging the group, identifies himself or
herself as a Border Patrol agent, the group starts to run,
except for the person that is first in line with the dopers.
What happens a lot of times is this person is the guide,
person who knows where they are going. In some cases in this
particular area that person may be armed.
What is happening here is we have a better sense of
situational awareness, we have a better sense of identifying
the particular threat. That information would be relayed to the
Border Patrol agents prior to that interdiction being made.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I want to thank CBP for sharing this
video with us, with the committee, with myself. I viewed this
video a couple days ago and it seems to be working pretty
effectively. I know that there is even more technology where
they can put a laser on the dopers crossing to better guide the
Border Patrol agents to where they are.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. So it works.
Mr. Borkowski, why is this going to take so much longer to
finally get approved and get ready? Because, you know, our
State, home State of Texas has zero, we have nothing on our
border. The Texas-Mexico border has nothing down there. That is
where a lot of the killings are taking place.
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, it does work, but what you see there is
a system which has some patches. We are finalizing--we want the
final version of the software, for example. So you have got
beta versions of software, for example.
It has to go through something called certification and
accreditation. So, for example, on your home computer,
occasionally, you know, Windows sends you a note says there is
a security patch you need to download. Because we were working
on the software we didn't download any of those. We have held
them all in abeyance. We have got to get those in. That takes
some time.
Some of the issue is making sure we do have a good test
plan for the final measurement because we are going to use that
to make a decision about spending potentially a lot of money on
more of these.
So it is important, I think, that we do this right (a), and
that at the end of the day this looks very, very promising, but
we make sure we have really tested it, much in line with what
Mr. Hite has said.
Mr. McCaul. I can appreciate that.
What is your time frame--because we saw a successful
apprehension--what is your time frame for getting this
approved?
Mr. Borkowski. As we said, the plan that we have right now
is to get all of this--these clean-up activities done. The
system acceptance test should run basically through August and
we should be ready to turn it over to the Border Patrol for
their operational tests. They get a chance to say,
notwithstanding the engineering, they like it, they don't like
it, very formally. So that should happen in September.
Mr. Borkowski. We are building Ajo, and one of the reasons
we are building Ajo is to start to demonstrate, if we decided
we want more, how quickly they can go up and what they will
actually cost.
So Ajo is very important, I think, to your consideration,
Congressman, because that will give us evidence of whether or
not it can go up quickly, how long it would take, where it
would make sense.
Mr. McCaul. If all goes well and it is approved in short
order, how soon can be--because 2016 is a very long time out in
the future. As I mentioned earlier, I don't think we have time.
We are running out of time here. What can we do to expedite
this?
Mr. Borkowski. Again, I think the thing to do to expedite
this is to divert funds immediately to other technologies which
are perhaps not quite this effective, but still very effective,
to those critical areas based on Border Patrol priorities. We
have started that. We have started diverting funds. The
Secretary has said this is urgent. There are areas where we
need something today and if that means this existing
technology, we are going to do that.
If it turns out that SBInet Block 1 should be done more
broadly, then we will have to have a discussion with the
Congress about the pace and the funding and the budgets
required for that, but we are just not there yet. In the mean
time, the Secretary has said technology is urgent; divert some
funds for some of these other technologies to plug those holes.
Mr. McCaul. Well, this issue has been largely ignored, in
my view, by the Congress. I think we need to prioritize this
issue. There is nothing more important, I think, to a lot of my
constituents.
Last question, the Chairman mentioned the UAVs. I have been
a big proponent of that. I had an amendment on the floor that
was unfortunately defeated, to provide more UAVs down there.
There are some. I think it has been very successful in terms of
surveillance. The Governor from the State of Texas has
requested additional UAVs to add more resources down to the
border.
Would anybody on the panel care to comment on that?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I am working
with the assistant commissioner for CBP's Air and Marine,
General Kostelnik, and one of the things we are looking at is
trying to expand that capability across the southwest border.
We are continuing to work with FAA.
I think it was mentioned earlier that the certificates of
authorization in trying to get us airspace to be able to, you
know, deploy those UASs beyond our current capability right
now. That is going to help our ability to achieve operational
control even beyond some of those areas where we can fly those
UASs. We are looking at that, sir.
Mr. McCaul. The Secretary didn't mention the airspace
issue. Is there anything that I can do to help you? I am here
to help, so thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. I want to thank the gentleman from Texas.
Let me just add one point. I did meet with CBP Air and
Marine on the UAVs, and they said they were waiting for FAA to
give them the CAOs for the State of Texas based there in Corpus
Christi and to cover Corpus--and all the way up. So I called
the FAA administrator, Mr. Babbitt, and he told me he has not
officially gotten the request from CBP.
I know there has been communication and maybe they have a
different opinion what a official request is, but I would ask
you all to contact Mr. Babbitt because I was trying to help you
all to move this along, because I know we can't fly if we don't
get those COAs. But I just want to let you know what Mr.
Babbitt officially told me was that he has not received the
official request from CBP to get that UAV.
So whatever that means, I would appreciate an answer as
soon as you can.
At this, I would like to----
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. If I might for one moment.
Just to continue briefly on this vein of UAV use. We know
that a Predator A with a full sensor sweep, very robust sensor
sweep, day-night, you know--is about $8 million a copy,
something like that. You know, you could buy several of those
for the money that Secretary Napolitano set aside and still
have money left for other things.
So, you know, as a proponent of this particular system, I
think, you know, you really ought to consider it. But in any
event, I yield. Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much.
At this time, I want to thank again the gentleman from
Texas.
But at this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman
from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The aerial border operation that we had working in 2006,
2007, it was discontinued to address what the gentleman from
Texas was talking about. Has that been continued? Mr.
Borkowski.
Mr. Borkowski. I am not familiar with that. I am sorry,
Congressman.
Chief, are you aware of----
Mr. Pascrell. Acting Director Fisher.
Mr. Fisher. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat that, please?
Mr. Pascrell. Yes, we had an aerial operation which was
very effective, and both governments said it was very
effective--Mexico and the United States. I want to know whether
we have decided to renew that capability again or have we not?
Mr. Fisher. I am not specifically sure which operation you
are referencing, but I will find out and let you know, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Which brings me to the question of
accountability. I listened very carefully. In fact, I read your
testimony, Mr. Hite. The GAO found a lot of inadequacies in
terms of not only the testing, but the management. I mean,
somebody is in charge from Homeland Security to review whether
the testing is proper and going on.
I think, and any time I ask questions about Homeland
Security, I want to know who is accountable, because we know
what happens. The bigger the bureaucracy, the less ability you
have in any manner, shape, or form, to find out who is
accountable. Who is accountable, Mr. Borkowski?
Mr. Borkowski. Ultimately, I am. I am accountable.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, during this period of testing, you had
a management team, did you not?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, I did.
Mr. Pascrell. Who was the management? I don't want to know
names, but you appointed them? How did they get their jobs? I
mean, we have a serious charge of 70 percent of the testing was
doctored. That is pretty serious.
Mr. Borkowski. Congressman, 70 percent of the testing was
not doctored.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, let's use another word--changed.
Mr. Borkowski. Right.
Mr. Pascrell. At the last moment. How is that? How does
that term suit you?
Mr. Borkowski. That is true. That is fine.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay. Go ahead, tell me.
Mr. Borkowski. A certain amount of that typically goes on,
but I agree with Mr. Hite--70 percent is too much. I would also
point out that----
Mr. Pascrell. But you don't disagree with the figure, the
percentage?
Mr. Borkowski. No.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay. Okay.
Mr. Borkowski. I would point out that a good deal of that
is what my team caught and is what my team has been dealing
with.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay, then, who was held accountable for
that? What did you do to the contractor? What did you do to the
folks who perhaps let it slip by?
Mr. Borkowski. The folks that I have who, by the way, have
worked very hard, Mr. Pascrell, and I do need to defend them.
The folks that I have have tried very hard to handle this
program, and I do not believe that they felt they had the
support from the people at my level. I believe they feel that
now and we are improving this.
Mr. Pascrell. Every problem we address, whether it is this
subcommittee or the other subcommittees, we really never get to
the fundamental problems of who pushed Jake. We say that the
problem is too complex. The operation is too complex. We are
still out there testing, but no one is ever held accountable.
We are talking about people's lives here.
The fact that we have tried to implement a very intricate
technical system is in direct contrast to what we are doing on
the northern border, which is twice as big, whether it is
Detroit--regardless of where it is. In fact, in the northern
border, the construction of cameras, let's say in the Buffalo
region, is complete. They are much more simplistic. They don't
include radar capabilities. Why not?
Mr. Borkowski. Because the idea on the--and again, talking
with the northern border, and we also were using the money that
had been earmarked by this Congress. We looked at the best use
of that money. What they needed was some of the systems that
are currently available on the southwest border, but had not
been on the northern border. That is their down payment,
frankly, and it is a reasonable down payment, and it is one
that the operators there thought would be very effective.
Mr. Pascrell. Do you know what percentage of the northern
border is unprotected?
Mr. Borkowski. Perhaps the chief can talk to that. I would
not.
Mr. Fisher. Sir, just for clarification, I am not quite
sure when you say ``unprotected.'' We have deployment of--
agents. We have a little bit of infrastructure, not much, and
some technology that Mr. Borkowski talked about. Some areas, in
the Buffalo area and Detroit as well, having additional----
Mr. Pascrell. You have very little infrastructure in the
north, and when you look at the number of patrols that you have
patrol--border patrolmen that you have along the border, do you
know the small percentage that exist per mile in that area?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. I do.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Fisher, I know you recently took over as
the head of the Border Patrol.
Mr. Fisher. In acting capacity----
Mr. Pascrell. Yes, I wish you well.
Mr. Fisher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. I know you have considerable experience in
the field, especially along the southwest border. Considering
that experience, I want to ask you, and I want you to give me a
straight answer, as you usually do, what you feel is the most
effective way to secure the border. To be clear, are we
creating an over-reliance on technology instead of hiring more
border agents, more physical barriers, et cetera, and using
more traditional methods to patrol the border?
Finally, isn't this especially true since the technology we
have spent so much money on and will continue to spend money on
doesn't seem to be ready for prime time? I think that is a fair
question.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. I would agree. I think generally my
response to that would be our ability to achieve operational
control and protect the American people is always
fundamentally, again in my opinion, going to come down to the
brave men and women that put on this uniform every day and
recognize that this threat, at least in my lifetime, is not
going to go away.
Now, to the extent that we can get additional technology,
and a lot of different ways, shapes, or forms--I mean, one of
the things that we look at when we talk about the
implementation of the strategy, and it is not necessarily so
simplistic. I am not suggesting that anybody on this particular
committee. You understand the challenges that we face in an air
and marine and land threat environment.
When you take into consideration the environments in which
we have worked, in the urban, the rural, the remote areas, and
the fact that the northern border is different from the
southern border, and the fact that, yes, over the last few
years we are looking at a workforce now that over 45 percent
has less than 2.5 years experience, we get that.
I can tell you, sir, with certainty, what I can guarantee
you, that each and every day when I put on this uniform and I
talk with those men and women, is we are going to commit to
achieving this objective.
If it means there is going to be an SBI tower in a
particular area, perhaps in south Texas, if that is what the
field commanders are telling me that is what they need to be
able to increase probability of detection and apprehension, we
are going to do that, sir. If it also means that we are going
to increase our ability to respond--I apologize, I am new at
this, sir--we are going to continue to do that as well.
But I will also tell you that the implementation of the
strategy, how we do this, is always going to come down to the
training, the recruiting and Border Patrol agents, both men and
women, who fundamentally understand this threat and are
committed.
When they take that oath of office, and when they say that
they are going to swear to support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic,
there is no technology that can guarantee that, sir. That is
something that I am charged with, to maintain that this culture
that we are developing will continue to develop in the Border
Patrol is--continues to be impressed upon the organization.
Yes, the technology is going to help us do that, sir, and
it may be a tower, it may be a--surveillance system, may be
some additional UASes down the road. But fundamentally it is
that one Border Patrol agent who this afternoon is going to go
out there and may not have the technology right now, but
understands that it is not going to happen on their watch.
So thank you, sir, for that question. I hope that answered
it.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Acting Chief Fisher. I hope you
become the chief.
Mr. Fisher. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey
for his line of questioning.
At this time I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from
Ohio, Ms. Kilroy.
Ms. Kilroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the panelists for your time here this morning.
Mr. Borkowski, I would like to ask, you indicated that the
next steps would be completing the engineering and to taking a
look at what tools are proven and effective. I would like to
understand, can you tell us what you are doing to strengthen
the capacity for systems engineering at the program office
level?
Mr. Borkowski. Certainly. I thank you for the question
because that is very critical to how we got here in the first
place.
We have actually within the Secure Border Initiative itself
reorganized the office in recognition of the fact that there
are some critical capabilities that a Government program office
has to have in order to effectively manage a contractor.
One of those things is to build an office that is focused
on developing a Government competency for system engineering
that can be applied not only to this program, but to other
technology programs as they evolve.
In addition to that, the Department itself has put a great
deal of focus on this. The Department, in its chief procurement
officer, its Acquisition Program Management Division, has also
established a function to develop a core competency in system
engineering.
That is a critical function, and it is often--the lack of
that function is often the cause of the kinds of problems we
have seen in the last several years on this program.
So we are building that. It will take some time. We have to
hire people. We have to train people. But we recognize the
significance of it.
Ms. Kilroy. So we had that core competency in place, could
we have avoided some of the issues like the last minute changes
in the testing procedures?
Mr. Borkowski. Absolutely. Much of the kinds of things that
Mr. Hite is telling you about are tied to a failure to have
established a core competency in things like systems
engineering, yes.
Ms. Kilroy. Mr. Hite, what do you see that we need to do to
go forward to improve systems, to address maybe a lack of rigor
or lack of cooperation or lack of competency? Or are there
other issues that you see that would be able to improve these
processes for SBInet or others that we are engaged in?
Mr. Hite. Yes, ma'am. What you see that has transpired with
this program over the years in many ways is a microcosm of the
Department. I would say that the Department has been challenged
since its inception in being able to manage large-scale
acquisitions like SBInet.
There is a number of factors that have contributed to that.
Just like in performing any type of operation, you accomplish
things, so you effectively manage a program like this by
bringing to bear three things. You bring people with the
knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute these critical
functions. You define them in a way that is clear and
transparent and so that they can be consistently applied. Then
you provide them with the tools they need in order to execute
these functions.
In the case of SBInet in particular, from the outset I
think this program was underestimated in terms of its size and
complexity. I think it was driven by the need to meet a pre-
defined schedule as opposed to what is it going to take to put
this kind of system in place. For the sake of schedule, you
were willing to bypass some of the discipline that comes with
defined processes executed by adequately staffed and
knowledgeable people.
I see that changing now. I have the utmost respect for Mr.
Borkowski. He is a very competent individual. He came into a
situation where you had a train moving down a track and you
needed to change it while it was moving. You just can't stop--
you just couldn't stop it and say, ``Let me build the capacity
to do this thing right while this train is moving, I have got
to do these things simultaneously.'' That is not an easy thing
to do, it is not going to happen overnight. Progress is being
made in that direction.
Ms. Kilroy. Thank you. I appreciate the need for competency
in all of these areas, starting from writing the specs for the
contracts and writing the contracts themselves, all the way--
all the way through to managing the projects, holding vendors
accountable.
But I would also say that there is responsibilities on the
part of the vendor as well to live up to things and to bring
problems to attention in a timely manner.
So, Mr. Krone, is this, the experiences that you are having
with this particular contract, is that in any way different or
atypical from other Federal contracts that Boeing has acquired?
Mr. Krone. Thank you for that question. We have been
involved in the SBInet program, ma'am, as you know, for 4 or 5
years. There are clearly different types of contracts under
what we call the IDIQ umbrella. So there were fixed-price
elements of this and there are cost-plus and cost-plus
incentive--award fee.
Boeing has executed development programs under all those
types of contract structure, and just as we have across our
portfolio of programs, delivered some on cost and on schedule,
some early, and some late. If we look at the task orders under
the IDIQ umbrella, under SBInet, you would find that there are
parts of the program that we delivered on cost and on schedule,
in fact some ahead of schedule; there are some that we have
delivered on time; but we are here today because on the Arizona
deployment task order we are over cost and behind schedule, and
we regret that.
But if you look at the totality of the SBInet program, from
P28, northern border, to the fence fabrication, the steel, we
have a fence lab that we constructed, I think overall the
Government has gotten good value for their money.
Ms. Kilroy. What steps would you recommend to prevent more
delays in the future?
Mr. Krone. I think most of recommendations that we might
have, have already been implemented, and I would like to second
Mr. Hite's comment about the addition of Mark Borkowski to the
SBInet team.
Since Mark has taken over as program manager of the SBInet
program, frankly, ma'am, everything has been working much, much
better. We have done more system engineering, we have slowed
down when we have needed to. We have had the latitude of doing
appropriate analysis ahead of moving systems in the field.
We feel as good about this program as we have in the last 4
years and really looking forward to SAT, the systems acceptance
testing, and turning the system over in OT&E in both Tucson and
Ajo.
Ms. Kilroy. One last question, directed to Chief Fisher or
to Mr. Borkowski.
As Custom and Border Patrol officers have begun using the
Block 1 technology, are you seeing an increase in
effectiveness? Are they preventing or deterring more illegal
crossings, covering more territory out of one station?
Mr. Fisher. Although it hasn't been going on too long, what
we are seeing is, it is increasing our capacity in a variety of
ways.
One, it is helping us understand what is actually occurring
on the ground there. Two, I think it is teaching the Border
Patrol agents who are at the command-and-control station how to
think a little bit differently about approaching this
particular threat.
So early indications are it is helping us achieve our
overarching objective, and it is teaching the Border Patrol
agents--who, by the way, aren't just going to stay their whole
career looking at the cameras at the command-and-control, they
are going to go back down into the field to have to work these
groups, and it is going to give them a better perspective when
they do that.
So it is helping, yes, ma'am.
Mr. Borkowski. Again, I think Chief Fisher is authoritative
on it. I think it is just interesting to pass on some of the
feedback that we have gotten, which is one of the things that
this system provides--and, again, it is very costly--but one of
the things that this system provides that nothing else we have
seen or have does is the ability for an agent to observe the
entire area and everything that is going on in that area at the
same time.
Other systems are kind-of localized, so an agent here will
know this is going on and an agent there will know that is
going on. But to be able to see four or five or six groups all
at the same time and to be able to deploy resources to deal
with each of those, and in fact to see the kinds of things that
at least the agents have told us about where a group perhaps of
drug smugglers will lay up and wait for another group to move
so that the Border Patrol will divert to that group and then
these drug smugglers can come in behind, now the Border Patrol
sees all of that and can stop that.
Now, we still need time to see how that evolves. As Chief
Fisher properly notes, it is very, very early. But that
opportunity to see the whole area at once in one place and to
be able to allocate resources to deal with four or five groups
at a time from a central location looks like it could be very
significant.
Ms. Kilroy. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you. I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio
for her lines of questioning.
A couple of things, and we will go down one more round
quickly, but I just have a couple of questions.
Mr. Fisher, back on February 16 of this year I sent the
acting deputy commissioner, Mr. Aguilar--the letter was asking
him about the UAVs. What are the plans for the northern border
coverage? I know there is some in parts of it and I know there
is parts in the southwest also. What is planned for for the
northern border, for the southern border, or the time table,
including the coastal area where the Coast Guard, along with
the Air and Marine are working together on some of the testing.
I would like to have a request, and I know you have got
your Congressional folks here, but will you remind Mr. Aguilar
that it has been 30 days plus 2 days, and that I will ask
that--and I will ask--work with the committee that 5 working
days from today that I expect to see that letter. I think that
is more than sufficient time so he can give us an idea of what
his plans are on that, No. 1.
No. 2, we also have a testing coming up I believe in
April--I believe in April for the DIA. I talked to Boeing,
talked to Mr. Borkowski also and so did Mr. Fisher. They are
doing a testing. As you know, DIA, they do use taxpayers'
dollars and they have done a lot of research and development
also. They have used a lot of this equipment in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and if it is tested and it works for the military,
I have no idea what we can use some of that equipment. Because
I assume we are not going to use one patch for the whole
border. I think we are going to use different areas.
So I want to ask you, and Mr. Borkowski I know we have
talked about this and we talked about it again yesterday, is,
one, for you all to sit down with the DIA and see what ideas.
You know, it might be that maybe the equipment is not
sufficient, but at least let's sit down with them. I certainly
want to invite you and the committee Members to Laredo, and the
committee will give us the exact date for that testing. They
are doing that testing there. They have done it in the south.
They have gone to the north. So I certainly want to invite all
the witnesses to join us at that time.
I have no further questions. At this time, I will recognize
Mr. McCaul, the gentleman from Texas, for his lines of
questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me echo your
sentiments. The Department of Defense is testing this type of
capability. Certainly, with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, we
have some serious--I mean that is a serious border issue as
well. There is no reason why you couldn't apply the same
technology they are advancing there on our--on our U.S.-Mexico
border.
I know the Chairman I think is planning a CODEL I think
down to look at this facility in Texas, and I hope to join you
on that.
When I was down in El Paso, and chief, you do have some
great men and women working for you. I was down there in El
Paso last time when they were killing police officers in
Juarez. I said, ``What do you perceive to be the biggest threat
still?'' He said, ``It is the terrorist threat. It is the human
trafficking. It is the terrorist threat.''
This situation actually kind of reminds me a lot of where
we were in the Iraq war where there was loss of confidence on
the part of Congress in the operation. Then we had Secretary
Gates and General Petraeus came in and they restored confidence
on the part of the Congress and on the mission itself.
I am hopeful that Mr. Borkowski and Chief Fisher, you all
are going to be able to play that role here, to restore faith
in the Congress that this can be done. But like Gates and
Petraeus, they came forward and basically were very honest with
us. They weren't trying to spin anything. They got the
confidence of the Congress by being sincere and honest and
admitting where we made mistakes.
But they also came up with a game plan--you know, a surge,
the Sunni awakening, the de-Baathification. You know, a lot of
things that at the end of the day worked--counterinsurgency
plans. I see a lot of analogies in what happened there to this.
I think what we are really asking for is for you all to come up
with a game plan. You know, be honest with us. Come up with
some metrics that actually are realistic, some quantifiable
numbers, so that we can be assured, you know, that we are back
on track here.
You know, tell us that you know what, here are the
problems, but we are looking at adding in terms of the virtual
fence, if you will, you know, 200 miles a year or whatever it
is. But you know, this is--it is so unquantifiable right now,
it is hard to get a handle on where we are.
I think as representatives of the American people, I really
think that is where the American people are with this. They
just want to know, you know, when is this going to get done. Be
honest with us and realistic in your assessment. Then I think
you are going to find if you do that, like in Iraq and that
situation, you are going to you are going to have a lot more
support on the part of the Congress.
I think Mr. Borkowski and Chief Fisher, you have a unique
opportunity coming in sort of as a fresh face to this to turn
this thing around and put it in the right direction. I don't
know if there are any comments to that. If there are, I would
be happy to hear that.
Mr. Fisher. Sir, you have my commitment that I will always
be forthright with this committee and all committees, and I
will do my level best to make sure that our border security
mission, that we achieve those objectives and we are able to
articulate the extent to which we are able to do that during my
command. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Borkowski. I would just add, I think you make a very
good point, sir. I think we are getting to the point where we
better understand where we are, but I think what is missing is
the: ``What is the game plan forward?''. I believe that that is
a large part of the Secretary's intent in going through this
assessment is to require us to present a game plan forward.
Mr. McCaul. Because you have, you know, you have good
technology here. I know Boeing has been working hard on this. I
know you all have as well. But I know the Secretary has taken a
deep breath and is looking at all this. But I would, you know,
that is just my advice to you.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. Again, I agree and I
certainly want to echo the statement by my friend from the
State of Texas. I think following up on that point, I think the
fact that the Secretary sat back and is looking at the big
picture, I think that is good for all of us, and certainly we
want to be team players with you on this endeavor.
I understand it is a very difficult situation. I know
technology is only a component. You know, the men and women
that are out there, I know a lot of them. They live in my
neighborhood there in Laredo and I am sure we have got them all
over the southern-northern border. We appreciate the work.
Technology is one part of it. It is one component, but it
is an important component to this.
So I want to thank all of you. I know this is a very
difficult situation, but it is one that we have to win. We just
have to win this one.
So I want to thank all the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. Members may have
additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask you to
respond to those questions in writing as soon as possible.
Hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
SBINET: DOES IT PASS THE BORDER SECURITY TEST? PART II
----------
Thursday, June 17, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight,
joint with
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher P.
Carney [Chairman of the Management, Investigations, and
Oversight subcommittee] presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Management,
Investigations, and Oversight: Representatives Carney, Green,
and Bilirakis.
Present from the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and
Global Counterterrorism: Representatives Cuellar, Sanchez,
Kirkpatrick, Miller, McCaul, Rogers, and Smith.
Mr. Carney [presiding]. The subcommittees will come to
order. The Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and
Oversight and the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism are meeting today to receive testimony on
``SBInet: Does it Pass the Border Security Test? Part Two.''
Good morning, and I would like to take a second to thank
Chairman Cuellar and his subcommittee for continuing to work
with my subcommittee on this issue, so thank you, Henry.
Today we are here to receive testimony on the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to secure the Nation's borders
through the Secure Border Initiative technology or SBI, also
known as SBInet.
According to the GAO report released today entitled
``Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider its
Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program,'' poorly defined
requirements and limitations in the capabilities of
commercially available system components have led the
Department to downgrade its expectations for SBInet.
The result will be a deployed and operational system that,
like Project 28, may not live up to expectations and provide
less mission support than was originally envisioned. As Boeing
developed the system, it became clear it would not meet the
requirements established by the Department.
As opposed to ensuring that the requirements were
satisfied, the number of component-level requirements was
reduced from 1,286 to 880, or by about 32 percent.
Some examples of requirements that received waivers or
deviations include, unattended ground sensors that could not
differentiate between human, vehicle, and animal targets. Since
they were only able to identify potential vehicles, not humans
and animals, this requirement was changed.
The daytime cameras to identify humans were judged to be
operationally ineffective over 5 kilometers, while the
requirement indicated that the cameras should be effective to
10 kilometers.
The laser range finder was determined to have an effective
range of less than 2 kilometers, while the requirement for the
effective range was again 10 kilometers.
The geographic locations that will deploy SBInet
capabilities have also been reduced. As of September 2008, the
initial Block 1 deployment was to span three Border Patrol
sectors--Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso--for a total of 655 miles.
Deployment to these three areas was the priority of the Border
Patrol, due to the high threat levels.
At present, the only areas expected to be covered by SBInet
technology on the southwest border are Tucson and Ajo-1.
Together, these two for--that is Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. Together,
these two deployments cover a mere 53 miles of the 1,989-mile
southern border.
The Department has not yet estimated a reliable life-cycle
cost of deploying Block 1, in violation of OMB regulations. The
cost estimate should include all Government and contractor
costs over the program's full life-cycle, from program
inception, through design, development, deployment, operation,
and maintenance all the way to retirement.
According to the GAO, the cost estimate calculated by the
Department does not include all relevant costs, such as support
contractor costs, costs associated with system and software
design, development, and all testing activities.
Furthermore, the cost estimate has not been updated to
reflect program changes that have occurred since its
development.
In response to GAO's findings, Department officials
indicated that the DHS Cost Analysis Division was unable to
prepare an accurate cost estimate due to a shortage in the
personnel and the tools needed to do so.
It also has indicated that as of July 2009, there were only
eight cost estimators, six in headquarters and two in program
offices, for the entire Department of Homeland Security.
SBInet has been plagued with a number of technology and
systems integration issues, as highlighted by GAO. Over $1.1
billion has been spent on a Secure Border Initiative, and over
$800 million has been spent on SBInet alone. Fifty-three miles
at a cost of $1.1 billion is unacceptable.
At our last hearing on SBInet in March, I asked if we could
get a refund, and I believe the taxpayers would still like one.
Now perhaps some good has come from this program, but not
nearly enough to justify the funding and the time that has been
spent on this program. I urge the Department to continue to
explore alternative means to secure the border in a timely and
effective manner.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I look
forward to hearing from them.
[The statement of Chairman Carney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Christopher P. Carney
June 17, 2010
Today we are here to receive testimony on the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to secure the Nation's borders
through the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) technology component known
as SBInet. According to the GAO report released today entitled ``Secure
Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider its Proposed Investment in
Key Technology Program,'' poorly defined requirements and limitations
in the capabilities of commercially available system components have
led the Department to downgrade its expectations for SBInet. The result
will be a deployed and operational system that, like Project 28, may
not live up to expectations and provide less mission support than was
originally envisioned.
As Boeing developed the system, it became clear it would not meet
the requirements established by the Department. As opposed to ensuring
that the requirements were satisfied, the number of component-level
requirements was reduced from 1,286 to 880, or by about 32 percent.
Some examples of requirements that received waivers or deviations
include:
Unattended ground sensors that could not differentiate between
human, vehicle, and animal targets. Since they were only able to
identify potential vehicles--not humans and animals--this requirement
was changed.
The daytime cameras to identify humans were judged to be
operationally ineffective over 5 kilometers, while the requirement
indicated that the cameras should be effective to 10 kilometers.
The laser range finder was determined to have an effective range of
less than 2 kilometers, while the requirement for the effective range
was 10 kilometers.
The geographic locations that will deploy SBInet capabilities have
also been reduced. As of September 2008, the initial Block 1 deployment
was to span three Border Patrol sectors: Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso--for
a total of 655 miles. Deployment to these three areas was the priority
of the Border Patrol, due to the high threat levels. At present, the
only areas expected to be covered by SBInet technology on the southwest
border are Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. Together, these two deployments cover a
mere 53 miles of the 1,989-mile southern border.
The Department has not yet estimated a reliable life-cycle cost of
deploying Block 1, in violation of OMB regulations. The cost estimate
should include all Government and contractor costs over the program's
full life-cycle, from program inception, through design, development,
deployment, operation, and maintenance all the way to retirement.
According to the GAO, the cost estimate calculated by the Department
does not include all relevant costs, such as support contractor costs,
costs associated with system and software design, development, and all
testing activities. Furthermore, the cost estimate has not been updated
to reflect program changes that have occurred since its development.
In response to GAO's findings, Department officials indicated that
the DHS Cost Analysis Division was unable to prepare an accurate cost
estimate due to a shortage in the personnel and tools needed to do so.
It was also indicated that, as of July 2009, there were only eight cost
estimators (6 in headquarters and 2 in program offices) for the entire
Department of Homeland Security.
SBInet has been plagued with a number of technology and systems
integration issues, as highlighted by GAO. Over $1.1 billion has been
spent on the Secure Border Initiative, and over $800 million has been
spent on SBInet alone. Fifty-three miles at a cost of $1.1 billion is
unacceptable. At our last hearing on SBInet in March, I asked if we
could get a refund and I believe the taxpayers would still like one. I
believe some good has come from this program, but not nearly enough to
justify the funding and time that has been spent on this program. I
urge the Department to continue to explore alternate means to secure
the border in a timely and effective manner.
Mr. Carney. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee, the
gentleman from Florida, for an opening statement.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
the witnesses. The Committee on Homeland Security and its
subcommittees have held no less than eight hearings on the
Secure Border Initiative and its technology piece, SBInet,
since 109th Congress. Unfortunately the news has not gotten
better over time.
I am extremely concerned with GAO's conclusion in its most
recent SBInet review that DHS has yet to demonstrate that its
proposed SBInet solution is cost-effective--is the cost-
effective course of action, and thus whether the considerable
time and money being invested to acquire and deploy it is a
wise and prudent use of limited resources.
As I noted at our last hearing on SBInet in March, it is
simply unacceptable that our borders are not secure. I, along
with many of my colleagues, am anxiously awaiting the results
of the Secretary's assessment of SBInet and her strategy for
securing the border going forward.
I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about when we
can anticipate the completion of this assessment. What is the
status of the plan to redeploy $50 million in Recovery Act
funds originally intended for Block 1 to other commercially
available border security technologies. When? Where and when
will this technology be deployed?
I am also supportive of deploying National Guard troops to
the border, but once again, the requirement has not provided
this committee with the details of its plan. This piecemeal
approach and consistent lack of details makes me question
whether the Secretary has a comprehensive strategy for securing
our borders.
I am also troubled by the themes that run through many of
the Department's large-scale procurements. Many of the GAO
findings related to SBInet also apply to other large-scale DHS
procurements.
The GAO finding that the Department lacks the basis to
determine whether the proposed SBInet system will work and is
cost-effective is similar to the GAO findings on procurements
such as a transformation and systems consolidation, the
Department's financial management consolidation effort.
In both procurements, there is an inability to reliably
estimate the overall cost of the projects. Mr. Chairman, we on
this--the management subcommittee, must work to ensure that the
Department has the resources and staffing it needs to develop
the vital acquisition management capabilities such as cost
estimation.
Until we can mature these functions at the headquarters
level, I fear that we will continue to see problems in these
large-scale procurements. With that, I would like to welcome
our witnesses, again. I look forward to your testimony.
Securing our borders is essential to homeland security, and we
have to get it right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee, the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for an opening statement.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carney. I
appreciate that both of our committees are working together, so
I want to thank you and your Members on that.
Today, the subcommittees come together to continue our
examination of the SBInet to discuss the finding of a new
report from the Government Accountability Office. Almost 3
months ago, we heard from this same panel of witnesses on the
Department's on-going efforts to deploy technology at our
Nation's ports.
As you all know, there has been some good spots and there
has been some other areas that we need to improve. I know Mr.
Borkowski you have been down to the border and I appreciate
your effort. Hopefully we will spend some time with the new
chief also on that.
But we really appreciate, you know, the good efforts that
are being made. But there is still some issues, as we all know,
about SBInet. A number of problems the SBInet was growing
faster than the numbers being fixed.
There has been some questions as to whether the testing
procedures have been modified to help the system pass the test
instead of ensuring that the system delivered as promised.
This is not what we envisioned back in 2006 when this got
started. At that time, DHS called SBInet a ``strategic
partnership'' that would allow the Department to ``exploit the
private sector ingenuity and expertise to quickly secure our
Nation's borders.''
Unfortunately, as you know, there has been issues about
planning, missed deadlines, technology issues and questions
about oversight. Again, we talked about this and we will spend
a little bit more time talking about that.
Again, I am one of those that I like to recognize the good
parts because there are some improvements. But we still have
got to look at some of the efforts.
As you know, I do represent a border district and I have
been following SBInet's development and progress and working
with our former Chair Loretta Sanchez. We have been working on
the SBInet along with our Chairman on this particular issue.
We, you know, of course we are going to talk about and
certainly want to see the responses to the GAO's findings, you
know, that promises made at the start of the program still
remain unfulfilled as the expected scope and capabilities of
SBInet have continued to shrink over the last few years.
For example, the initial SBInet deployment was supposed to
cover 655 miles and three Border Patrol sectors, Tucson, Yuma,
and El Paso. However, the initial deployment at now best covers
only 387 miles and includes only Tucson and the Yuma sectors.
Over the last 15 months, the number of system requirements
has dropped from 1,286 to 880 or 32 percent. Again, those are
things that we have to look at. SBInet was created to
strengthen the ability to detect, identify, and respond to
unauthorized entries, and certainly some of the performance
capabilities have been relaxed.
I am one of those I feel that using, in my personal
opinion, using a fence is a 14th century solution to a 21st
century problem that we have. This is why the right mixture of
technology, personnel, the overall procedures that Border
Patrol and the other folks use are so important.
But again, you know, these are issues that we need to look
at very carefully. One of my concerns is trying to get the
border covered as soon as possible. If you look at it, for the
last 4 years I think we spent about $1.3 billion.
If you look at the page, you know, if you just work with me
on the addition, the covered amounts that we have covered so
far cover the--almost 2,000 miles. It will take us roughly to
the year 2034--2034.
Then if you multiply $1.3 billion every 4 years and get to
2034, that will give you a large number. I know we can do
better and I know we can do this quicker than the year 2034 to
secure 2,000 miles of border.
So certainly, Mr. Borkowski and your folks, Mr. Fisher, we
appreciate the work and I certainly commend Secretary
Napolitano for taking the reviews so we can step back, take a
breath, see what works. You know, how do we make this thing
work as soon as possible?
So certainly I appreciate all the good work that you all
are doing, but we do have some issues that we need to address.
I think by working together, by addressing these issues, we
will be able to address it.
At this time I want to thank the witnesses for being here.
Keep in mind that we are not here to try and catch anybody. We
are trying to see how do we make things work so it is not us
versus you? It is not us versus you. It is all of us working
together to find that security.
[The statement of Hon. Cuellar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Henry Cuellar
June 17, 2010
Today, the subcommittees have come together to continue our
examination of SBInet and discuss the findings of a new report from the
Government Accountability Office. Almost 3 months ago, we heard from
this same panel of witnesses on the Department's on-going effort to
deploy integrated technology at our Nation's borders.
The testimony was worrisome: The number of problems with SBInet was
growing faster than the number being fixed. Testing procedures appeared
to have been modified to help the system ``pass the test'' instead of
ensuring the system delivered as promised.
The state of this program is not what was envisioned when it was
initiated in 2006. At that time, DHS called SBInet a ``strategic
partnership'' that would allow the Department ``to exploit private
sector ingenuity and expertise to quickly secure our Nation's
borders.''\1\
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\1\ Michael Chertoff, DHS Secretary, ``DHS Announces SBInet
Contract Award to Boeing,'' Department of Homeland Security Press
Release, September 21, 2006, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/
releases/pr_1158876536376.shtm.
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Unfortunately, in the years since, SBInet has been plagued by poor
planning, missed deadlines, technology issues, and inadequate
oversight. I have the privilege of representing a district along the
southern border and, as a result, I have been closely following
SBInet's development and progress.
People along the southern border have been eagerly awaiting the
additional support promised by SBInet in the face of growing violence.
However, as the GAO's findings indicate, the promises made at the start
of the program remain unfulfilled as the expected scope and
capabilities of SBInet have continued to shrink over the last few
years.
For example, the initial SBInet deployment was supposed to cover
655 miles and three border patrol sectors: Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso.
However, the initial deployment will now, at best, cover only 387 miles
and include only Tucson and Yuma sectors. Over the last 15 months, the
number of system requirements has dropped from 1286 to 880 or 32
percent.
The reductions to SBInet do not end there.
SBInet was created to strengthen the ability to detect, identify,
and respond to unauthorized entries. However, its performance
capability has been relaxed. Under new thresholds, SBInet performance
is acceptable if it identifies a mere 49 percent of items of interest.
As even my two daughters know, 49 percent is not even close to a
passing grade.
After numerous hearings and GAO reports since the inception of the
program, it is my sincere hope that DHS can take the lessons learned
and apply them in a meaningful way. After more than 4 years and
approximately $1.3 billion, we need to get on the same page about what
a technology solution at the border looks like.
I am curious to learn more about the status of the Department's on-
going assessment of SBInet and what it means for the future of the
program. I commend Secretary Napolitano for undertaking this review.
Most importantly, I want to hear a commitment to doing more to
secure our borders sooner rather than later, whether through additional
personnel or proven technologies. Border communities, like those I
represent, have waited long enough.
Mr. Cuellar. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee,
the gentlewoman from Michigan, for an opening statement. Mrs.
Miller.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.
Chairman. I appreciate you both holding this joint hearing
today; interested listening to the comments about SBInet and
the experience that our Nation has had on the southern border.
I would like to make a couple of comments about our
experience with SBInet on the northern border. We have a
modified version of SBInet, mainly involving camera towers and
mobile surveillance equipment that has been deployed in two
primary locations, both in Buffalo and Detroit.
In the Detroit sector, which actually runs through my
Congressional district, so I am very familiar with it, we have
10 of the 11 towers that have been proposed already installed.
They cover approximately 37 miles along the St. Clair River,
which is an international river between Michigan and Canada.
If you think of the map of Michigan, St. Clair River is
running sort of along from the tip of the thumb here--oh,
excuse me, not quite the tip of the thumb, but right from about
this knuckle down the St. Clair River there.
According to the reports from the Detroit sector chief, who
has worked very, very diligently I might say, on the roll-out
and the community outreach related to this initiative, and I
would like to recognize Mr. Borkowski who was there when we had
our community roll-out which went very, very well.
The towers and the cameras have been installed. They are
operating with minor delays, and the CBP actually accepted the
program, the system in April of this year. In fact, the
``Detroit News'' is going to be writing a very large article
about SBInet on the northern border this weekend.
I think it is important that the current review of SBInet
under way in the Department also includes a review of what is
happening on the northern border sites. I think about how we
might expand these programs.
Operational control of the border must be a top and urgent
priority, and I understand what is happening on the southern
border. I understand the problems there. Believe me, I am
sensitive to them.
I still think it is important to point out there is a lot
we don't know about illegal activity happening on the northern
border because we lack sufficient Border Patrol resources and
technology. In fact, there are only 32 miles considered to be
under effective control on the northern border, which is a
4,000-mile long border.
I think when we have our first big ``get,'' if we could
call it that, with the SBInet on the northern border, I think
people's eyes will pop out when they see what is coming across
the northern border as well.
I think one of the things that concerns me is the sort of
matter-of-fact way that canceling the SBInet is being
discussed. We have invested nearly $1 billion in this
technology, and so we don't want to let it go to waste.
I think as the Department moves ahead either with SBInet or
another system, I think we obviously all have to think about,
as has already been mentioned, we need to be good stewards of
the taxpayer money and make use of the investments that we have
made in SBInet thus far.
I am also a bit concerned by the Department's backtracking
on the end goal of providing essential detection and
identification capability for the Border Patrol.
I would say one of the things that concerns me most about
the efforts to secure the border is the lack of a cohesive or a
coherent plan from the Department on how to move forward. We
find that nearly every month either the Department or
particularly the White House announces a new initiative or
assessment. But then we don't see any results or progress.
I would just mention in January, Secretary Napolitano
announced the review of SBInet plus an assessment of
alternatives to see what other technology could be used on the
border. That has been 6 months, and I don't think we are any
closer to knowing how we are going to proceed. Hopefully
today's hearing will shed a bit of light on that.
As has also been mentioned, last month the Obama
administration took the first step in acknowledging that we
need more to be done on the southwest border and by requesting
$500 million in emergency spending up to 1,200 additional
National Guard troops, I think everybody welcomed this change.
But again, it has been 23 days since that announcement has
been made. Incredibly no additional information has been
provided on how the money would be spent, how many additional
Border Patrol agents could be added, when and how the National
Guard will operate.
It seems as though the administration perhaps made this
announcement in a vacuum without even--I know the DHS can't
comment on this, but it seems as though they were not consulted
on this prior to the announcement.
I would just close by mentioning one other issue that has
been in the news this week. That is that this week ICE
announced significant changes for illegal aliens in their
detention standards. This may not be the place to talk about
that, but I will mention this because it had a lot of interest
around the Nation.
Apparently moving forward a number of the facilities will
now be offering bingo and dance classes, 12-hour visitation
rights and a snack bar. I raise that because I think this shows
a disconnect between the priorities of this administration and
of the majority of the American people about the will that we
have as a Nation for securing our borders.
I think we certainly need to see a sense of urgency from
the administration to develop a very clear strategy for gaining
control of the border.
With that I would yield back my time. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mrs. Miller.
Other Members of the subcommittees are reminded that under
committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
June 17, 2010
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security announced its plan to
install technology along the southwest border that would serve as a
virtual fence and provide Border Patrol with the information it needs
to secure the border.
Four years and $1 billion later, we are still without the plan that
was originally envisioned.
To make matters worse, this was not our first opportunity to get
this right.
Two former border technology programs--the Integrated Surveillance
Intelligence System (ISIS) and the American Shield Initiative (ASI)--
were eliminated due to mismanagement and equipment failure.
The third time, as they say, was supposed to be a charm.
This committee's oversight, along with the report that GAO will
release at today's hearing, indicates otherwise.
Regrettably, the partnership between DHS and Boeing has produced
more missed deadlines and excuses than results.
When Boeing was awarded the SBInet contract in 2006, we were told
that SBInet technology would be deployed along 655 miles of the
southwest border in Tucson, El Paso, and Yuma by the end of 2008, to
help the Border Patrol gain operational control of the southwest
border.
Four years later, and 2 years beyond the original deadline, SBInet
technology is only being deployed along 23 miles in what is called
Tucson-1 and 30 miles along what is referred to as Ajo-1 totaling a
mere 53 miles; which is a far cry from 655.
According to my calculations, that equals nearly $20 million per
mile.
Furthermore, the capability of what is being deployed along those
53 miles is far less than what was originally expected.
The original plan was to approve equipment that met a threshold of
95 percent for detecting and identifying items of interest that crossed
the border.
When it was determined that the system in place would not meet that
standard, instead of attempting to improve what we had, Boeing and the
Department lowered the standard to 70 percent.
As we learned in our last hearing on this issue, this same type of
numbers game was also used when the system was tested.
As a result, I have little to no confidence in the usability of
this system, despite its exorbitant cost.
I am convinced that DHS and Boeing grossly underestimated the task
of standing up SBInet.
I am pleased that the Secretary is conducting an evaluation of
SBInet's future, including Boeing's performance under its contractual
obligations.
I would urge the Department to continue to look to the innovation
of this great country for border security technology, as opposed to
continuing to use taxpayer dollars on a system that does not live up to
our expectations.
Mr. Carney. I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses
today. Our first witness is Mr. Randolph Hite. He is director
of information technology architecture and systems issues at
GAO, where he is responsible for GAO's work on IT issues across
the Government concerning architecture and systems acquisition,
development, operations, and maintenance.
During his 30-year career with GAO, Mr. Hite has directed
reviews of major Federal IT investments, including DHS' border
security modernization programs.
Our second witness is Mr. Mark Borkowski. Mr. Borkowski was
named executive director of the Secure Border Initiative
Program Executive Office in October 2008. Mr. Borkowski
oversees SBI implementation at Customs and Border Protection.
Previously, Mr. Borkowski served as the executive director
for mission support at Border Patrol headquarters. Before
joining CBP, Mr. Borkowski was a program executive for the
robotic lunar exploration program at NASA headquarters.
Our third witness, Chief Michael J. Fisher, was named chief
of the Border Patrol on May 7, 2010. In that role, Chief Fisher
serves as the Nation's highest-ranking Border Patrol agent and
directs the enforcement efforts of more than 20,000 Border
Patrol agents responsible for patrolling our Nation's borders
between the official ports of entry.
From January 3, 2010 until his May appointment, Chief
Fisher served as the acting chief. Prior to that appointment he
served as chief of Border Patrol's San Diego sector. Chief
Fisher started his duty along the southwest border in 1987 in
Douglas, Arizona.
After completion of the selection process for the Border
Patrol Tactical Unit in 1990, he was selected as a field
operations supervisor for the tactical unit assigned to El
Paso. Chief Fisher has also served in Detroit and Tucson at the
Border Patrol headquarters.
Our fourth witness, Mr. Roger Krone, is president of
Network and Space Systems for the Boeing Company. Before the
formation of Network and Space Systems, Mr. Krone was vice
president and general manager of Boeing's Army Systems
Division.
He has held several other business management and financial
positions at Boeing's U.S. Army programs in military rotorcraft
and Boeing Military Aircraft and Missile Systems.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask the witnesses to summarize
their statements for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Hite.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, IT ARCHITECTURE AND
SYSTEMS ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Hite. Thank you, Chairman Carney, Chairman Cuellar.
Before I begin, let me first commend each of you for your
oversight, the oversight by you and your staffs on SBInet.
In my opinion you have made a difference in bringing
attention to a program that from the outset has been troubled.
Despite the addition of some new and qualified program
leadership, it has struggled to right itself over the last 18
months.
Today we are releasing the latest in a series of reports
that we have done on SBInet. This report was issued to you on
May 5 of this year. Like the prior report in this series, we
continue to sound the alarm about program uncertainties,
management weaknesses, performance shortfalls, and risks.
In particular, we reported early on that DHS was investing
heavily in a system solution without committing to what system
capabilities would be delivered by when and at what cost and
without linking capabilities to measurable mission outcomes or
benefits.
We also reported that the manner in which the program was
being executed was extremely wanting, to the point that it was
unlikely that the delivery system would meet mission needs and
perform as intended.
We further reported that changes to the program milestones
were all too frequent, and the program's exposure to risk
because of the uncertainties, the shortfalls and the
weaknesses, was not being adequately disclosed and mitigated.
More recently we reported what I described in this hearing
room 3 months ago as ``The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,'' about
how SBInet was being tested, as well as a disconcerting trend
in the number of unresolved system problems that was not
indicative of a maturing system.
Our latest report continues to raise serious concerns about
the program's commitments and its execution. I will summarize
the report's message by making four points.
Point No. 1, while DHS is finally committed to what
capabilities the first increment of SBInet is to include, these
capabilities have continued to shrink in terms of what the
system is to do and how well and where it is to do it.
One example of that deals with the geographic footprint
that many of you have already described. Another deals with the
system performance of the system that has been relaxed to the
point that it will be deemed accessible if but 49 percent of
the items of interest across the border can be identified.
Point No. 2, the schedule being used to execute the program
that was available at the time of our review did not adequately
capture when and in what order the work needed to deliver the
system would occur.
At the same time milestones for the program have continued
to be pushed out into the future. As a result, we do not have
any confidence that the most recent set of program milestones
associated with accepting the system will be met.
Point No. 3, DHS has yet to demonstrate, and many of you
have made this point as well, that SBInet will not produce
mission benefits that are commensurate with the system's
December 2008 estimated cost of $1.3 billion.
In particular, this estimate is not reliable for a litany
of reasons, and measureable benefits expected from the system
will not be known, according to DHS, until the system has been
deployed and can be operationally evaluated.
In effect, DHS is saying that it will have to invest more
than a billion dollars in SBInet before it will know whether
doing so is economically justified and cost-effective vis-a-vis
other technology alternatives.
Point No. 4, DHS has continued to fall short in its
application of acquisition management discipline and rigor
associated with, for example, requirements definition and
management. Such discipline is absolutely necessary to
reasonably ensure the capability, benefit, cost, and schedule
commitments on a program like SBInet can be met.
Not surprisingly, DHS has established a pattern of not
living up to SBInet commitments. Simply put, the answers to the
two most basic questions associated with successfully acquiring
a system like SBInet, namely: ``Are we doing the right thing?
Are we doing it the right way?''
Right now, the answers would be, ``We don't know,'' and
``No, we are not.'' As many of you mentioned, after having
invested almost a billion dollars in 5 years, the answers to
these questions should be, ``Yes.''
In closing, let me end on a positive note by saying that
DHS has agreed with many of our recommendations and has already
taken action aimed at addressing them. For example, the program
office has taken steps to improve its risk management efforts.
Also, the DHS Secretary has ordered an assessment of SBInet
vis-a-vis alternative system solutions and has decided to limit
further investment in the initial increment until this
assessment is completed.
Both actions are consistent with the key recommendations in
our report. I should add, however--excuse me--I should add,
however, that such an assessment, frankly, should have been
done years ago.
With that I will conclude my statement and be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Hite follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randolph C. Hite
June 17, 2010
gao-10-840t
Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the subcommittees: I appreciate the
opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the technology
component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border
Initiative (SBI). My statement today is based on our report, Secure
Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in
Key Technology Program, which is being released at this hearing.\1\
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\1\ GAO-10-340 (Washington, DC: May 5, 2010). Both the report and
this statement are based on work performed in accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained during the
course of this review does provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you know, SBI is intended to help secure the 6,000 miles of
international borders that the contiguous United States shares with
Canada and Mexico. The program, which began in November 2005, seeks to
enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration by improving
surveillance technologies, raising staffing levels, increasing domestic
enforcement of immigration laws, and improving physical infrastructure
along the Nation's borders. Within SBI, the Secure Border Initiative
Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program that includes the
acquisition, development, integration, deployment, and operation of
surveillance technologies--such as unattended ground sensors and radar
and cameras mounted on fixed and mobile towers--to create a ``virtual
border fence.'' In addition, command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) software and hardware are to use the information
gathered by the surveillance technologies to create a real-time picture
of what is transpiring within specific areas along the border and
transmit the information to command centers and vehicles.
Since 2007, we have identified a range of management weaknesses and
risks facing SBInet, and we have made a number of recommendations to
address them that DHS has largely agreed with and, to varying degrees,
taken actions to address. Recently, in September 2008, we reported that
important aspects of SBInet were still ambiguous and in a continuous
state of flux 3 years after the program began, making it unclear and
uncertain what technology capabilities were to be delivered when.\2\ In
addition, the program still lacked an approved schedule to guide its
execution, and key milestones continued to slip. This schedule-related
risk was exacerbated by the absence of a clearly defined approach used
for developing and deploying SBInet. Furthermore, different levels of
SBInet requirements were not properly aligned, and not all requirements
had been properly defined and validated. Also, the program office was
not effectively managing early test events. We thus emphasized at that
time that the program was not on a path for success and that change was
needed. In March 2010, we reported that recently completed test events
were not adequate, as illustrated by poorly defined test plans and
numerous and extensive last-minute changes to test procedures, and we
reported on a growing number of system performance and quality
problems, which we said was not indicative of a maturing system.\3\ We
have also reported multiple times on the impact that SBInet performance
limitations have had on Border Patrol operations. In particular, we
reported that the instability of the cameras, mechanical problems with
the tower-mounted radar, and the sensitivity of the radar have limited
system reliability and contributed to significant delays in system
deployment along the southwest border. As a result, Border Patrol
agents have been forced to rely on existing technologies that have
their own limitations, such as cameras mounted on towers that
intermittently lose signals.\4\
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\2\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, GAO-08-1086 (Washington,
DC: Sept. 22, 2008).
\3\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution
Challenges Put Delivery of Technology Program at Risk, GAO-10-511T
(Washington, DC: Mar. 18, 2010).
\4\ See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced
Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border,
GAO-10-651T (Washington, DC: May 4, 2010).
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My statement today summarizes our most recent report on SBInet,
which is being released publicly at this hearing. In summary, the
report provided a timely and compelling case for DHS to rethink the
plans it had in place at the beginning of this year for investing in
SBInet. In this regard, we showed that the scope of the initial
system's capabilities and areas of deployment have continued to shrink,
thus making it unclear what capabilities are to be delivered when.
Moreover, DHS had yet to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the
proposed SBInet solution, and thus whether the considerable time and
money being invested represented a prudent use of limited resources.
Further, DHS had not employed the kind of acquisition management rigor
and discipline needed to reasonably ensure that the proposed system
capabilities would be delivered on time and within budget.
Collectively, we concluded that these limitations increased the risk
that the proposed solution would not meet the Department's stated
border security and immigration management goals. To minimize the
program's exposure to risk, we recommended that DHS determine whether
its proposed SBInet solution satisfied the Department's border security
needs in the most cost-effective manner and that the Department improve
several key life-cycle management areas. DHS largely agreed with our
recommendations. More importantly, since receiving these
recommendations in a draft of our report in March 2010, the Secretary
of Homeland Security has taken action to limit the Department's near-
term investment in SBInet pending its completion of an analysis of
alternative investment options. This and other planned actions are
consistent with the intent of our recommendations.
background
Managed by DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), SBInet is
intended to strengthen CBP's ability to detect, identify, classify,
track, and respond to illegal breaches at and between ports of entry.
The SBI Program Executive Office, which is organizationally within CBP,
is responsible for managing key acquisition functions associated with
SBInet, such as requirements management and risk management. Within the
Executive Office, the SBInet System Program Office (SPO) is responsible
for managing the day-to-day development and deployment of SBInet.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year contract to the Boeing
Company for SBI, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime
contractor, Boeing is responsible for designing, producing, testing,
deploying, and sustaining the system. In September 2009, CBP extended
its contract with Boeing for the first option year. CBP is acquiring
SBInet incrementally in a series of discrete units of capabilities,
referred to as ``blocks.'' Each block is to deliver one or more system
capabilities from a subset of the total system requirements. The first
block, known as Block 1, is to include a mix of surveillance
technologies (e.g., cameras, radars, and sensors) and C3I technologies
that are to produce a common operating picture--a uniform presentation
of activities within specific areas along the border. Block 1 is to be
initially deployed within the Tucson Sector to the Tucson Border Patrol
Station (TUS-1) and to the Ajo Border Patrol Station (AJO-1). As of May
2010, the TUS-1 system is scheduled for Government acceptance in
September 2010, with AJO-1 acceptance in November 2010.\5\
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\5\ This schedule has yet to be approved by CBP.
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In January 2010, the DHS Secretary ordered a Department-wide
reassessment of the program to include a comprehensive assessment of
alternatives to SBInet to ensure that the Department utilizes the most
efficient and effective technological and operational solutions to
secure the border. Pending the results of the assessment, the Secretary
also froze all Block 1 expenditures beyond those needed to complete the
implementation of the initial SBInet deployments to TUS-1 and AJO-1.
Further, in March 2010, the Department announced its plans to redeploy
$50 million from its American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
funding to purchase currently available, stand-alone technology, such
as remote-controlled camera systems called Remote Video Surveillance
Systems, and truck-mounted systems with cameras and radar, called
Mobile Surveillance Systems, to meet near-term operational needs.
block 1 capabilities, geographic coverage, and performance standards
have continued to decrease
In order to measure system acquisition progress and promote
accountability for results, organizations need to establish clear
commitments around what system capabilities will be delivered, and when
and where they will be delivered. In September 2008, we reported that
the scope of SBInet was becoming more limited without becoming more
specific, thus making it unclear and uncertain what system capabilities
would be delivered when and to what locations.\6\ Accordingly, we
recommended that DHS establish and baseline the specific program
commitments, including the specific system functional and performance
capabilities that are to be deployed to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso
Sectors, and establish when these capabilities are to be deployed and
are to be operational.
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\6\ GAO-08-1086.
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To its credit, the SPO subsequently defined the scope of the first
incremental block of SBInet capabilities that it intended to deploy and
make operational; however, these capabilities and the number of
geographic locations to which they are to be deployed have continued to
shrink. For example, the number of component-level requirements \7\ to
be deployed to the TUS-1 and AJO-1 locations has decreased by about 32
percent since October 2008 (see fig. 1).
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\7\ Component-level requirements describe required features of
various surveillance components (e.g., cameras and radars) and
infrastructure (e.g., communications).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In addition, the number of sectors that the system is to be
deployed to was reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655
miles to two sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency
of the performance measures was relaxed, to the point that system
performance is now deemed acceptable if it identifies less than 50
percent of items of interest that cross the border. According to
program officials, the decreases are due to poorly defined requirements
and limitations in the capabilities of commercially available system
components. The result will be a deployed and operational system that
does not live up to user expectations and provides less mission support
than was envisioned.
a reliable schedule for completing block 1 has not been developed
The success of a large-scale system acquisition program, like
SBInet, depends in part on having a reliable schedule of when the
program's set of work activities and milestone events will occur, how
long they will take, and how they are related to one another. Among
other things, a reliable schedule provides a road map for systematic
execution of a program and the means by which to gauge progress,
identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. In
September 2008, we reported that the program did not have an approved
master schedule that could be used to guide the development of SBInet.
Accordingly, we recommended that the SPO finalize and approve an
integrated master schedule that reflects the timing and sequencing of
SBInet tasks.
However, DHS has yet to develop a reliable integrated master
schedule for delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the
August 2009 SBInet integrated master schedule, which was the most
current version available at the time of our review, did not
sufficiently comply with seven of nine schedule estimating practices
that relevant guidance \8\ states are important to having a reliable
schedule.\9\ For example, the schedule did not adequately capture all
necessary activities to be performed, including those to be performed
by the Government, such as obtaining environmental permits in order to
construct towers. Further, the schedule did not include a valid
critical path, which represents the chain of dependent activities with
the longest total duration in the schedule, and it does not reflect a
schedule risk analysis, which would allow the program to better
understand the schedule's vulnerability to slippages in the completion
of tasks.
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\8\ GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices
for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP
(Washington, DC: March 2009), 218-224.
\9\ These are: (1) Capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all
activities, (3) assigning resources to all activities, (4) establishing
the duration of all activities, (5) integrating activities horizontally
and vertically, (6) establishing the critical path for all activities,
(7) identifying reasonable float between activities, (8) conducting a
schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and
durations.
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These limitations are due, in part, to the program's use of the
prime contractor to develop and maintain the integrated master
schedule, whose processes and tools do not allow it to include in the
schedule work that it does not have under contract to perform, as well
as the constantly changing nature of the work to be performed. Without
having a reliable schedule, it is unclear when the first block will be
completed, and schedule delays are likely to continue.
cost-effectiveness of block 1 has not been demonstrated
The decision to invest in any system, or major system increment,
should be based on reliable estimates of costs and meaningful forecasts
of quantifiable and qualitative benefits over the system's useful life.
However, DHS has not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of Block 1. In
particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs of this block over
its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to ensure that the
estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance \10\ states are
important to having an estimate that is comprehensive, well-documented,
accurate, and credible. However, DHS's cost estimate for Block 1, which
is about $1.3 billion, does not sufficiently possess any of these
characteristics.
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\10\ GAO-09-3SP, 8-13.
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Further, DHS has yet to identify expected quantifiable or
qualitative benefits from this block and analyze them relative to
costs. According to program officials, it is premature to project such
benefits given the uncertainties surrounding the role that Block 1 will
ultimately play in overall border control operations, and that
operational experience with Block 1 is first needed in order to
estimate such benefits. While we recognize the value of operationally
evaluating an early, prototypical version of a system in order to
better inform investment decisions, we question the basis for spending
in excess of a billion dollars to gain this operational experience.
Without a meaningful understanding of SBInet costs and benefits, DHS
lacks an adequate basis for knowing whether the initial system solution
is cost-effective.
block 1 has not been managed in accordance with key life cycle
management processes
Successful management of large information technology programs,
like SBInet, depends in large part on having clearly defined and
consistently applied life cycle management processes. In September
2008, we reported that the SBInet life cycle management approach had
not been clearly defined. Accordingly, we recommended that the SPO
revise, approve, and implement its life cycle management approach,
including implementing key requirements development and management
practices, to reflect relevant Federal guidance and leading practices.
To the SPO's credit, it has defined key life-cycle management processes
that are largely consistent with relevant guidance and associated best
practices. However, it has not effectively implemented these processes.
In particular:
The SPO revised its Systems Engineering Plan, which documents its life-
cycle management approach for SBInet definition, development, testing,
deployment, and sustainment, in November 2008, and this plan is largely
consistent with DHS and other relevant guidance. For example, it
defines a number of key life-cycle milestone or ``gate'' reviews that
are important in managing the program, such as initial planning
reviews, requirements reviews, system design reviews, and test reviews.
The plan also requires most key artifacts and program documents that
DHS guidance identified as important to each gate review, such as a
risk management plan and requirements documentation. However, the SPO
has not consistently implemented these life-cycle management activities
for Block 1. For example, the SPO did not review or consider key
artifacts, including plans for testing and evaluating the performance
of the system, as well as assessing the robustness of the system's
security capabilities, during its Critical Design Review, which is the
point when, according to the plan, verification and testing plans are
to be in place.
The SBInet Requirements Development and Management Plan states that:
(1) A baseline set of requirements should be established by the time of
the Critical Design Review; (2) requirements should be achievable,
verifiable, unambiguous, and complete; and (3) requirements should be
bi-directionally traceable from high-level operational requirements
through detailed low-level requirements to test plans. Further, the
plan states that ensuring traceability of requirements from lower-level
requirements to higher-level requirements is an integral part of
ensuring that testing is properly planned and conducted. However, not
all Block 1 component requirements were sufficiently defined at the
time that they were baselined at the Critical Design Review. Further,
operational requirements continue to be unclear and unverifiable, which
has contributed to testing challenges, including the need to
extemporaneously rewrite test cases during test execution. In addition,
while requirements are now largely traceable backwards to operational
requirements and forward to design requirements and verification
methods, this traceability has not been used until recently to verify
that higher-level requirements have been satisfied.
In 2008, the SPO documented a risk management approach that largely
complies with relevant guidance. However, it has not effectively
implemented this approach for all risks. Moreover, available
documentation does not demonstrate that significant risks were
disclosed to DHS and Congressional decision-makers in a timely fashion
as we previously recommended, and, while risk disclosure to DHS
leadership has recently improved, not all risks have been formally
captured and thus shared. For example, some of the risks that have not
been formally captured include the lack of well-defined acquisition
management processes, staff with the appropriate acquisition expertise,
and agreement on key system performance parameters. However, the SPO
recently established a risk management process for capturing SBI
enterprise-wide risks, including the lack of well-defined acquisition
management processes and staff expertise.
Reasons cited by program officials for not implementing these
processes include their decision to rely on task order requirements
that were developed prior to the Systems Engineering Plan and competing
SPO priorities, including meeting an aggressive deployment schedule.
Until the SPO consistently implements these processes, it will remain
challenged in its ability to successfully deliver SBInet.
dhs has agreed to implement gao recommendations aimed at addressing
sbinet long-standing uncertainties and risks
To address the program's risks, uncertainties, and acquisition
management weaknesses, our report being released today provides 12
recommendations.
In summary, we recommended that DHS limit future investment in
SBInet to work that is either already under contract and supports the
completion of Block 1 activities for deployment to TUS-1 and AJO-1 and/
or provides a basis for a Departmental decision on what, if any,
expanded investment in SBInet is justifiable as a prudent use of DHS's
resources for carrying out its border security and immigration
management mission. As part of this recommendation, we reiterated prior
recommendations pertaining to program management challenges and
recommended that DHS address weaknesses identified in our report by,
for example, ensuring that the SBInet integrated master schedule, Block
1 requirements, and the Systems Engineering Plan, among other program
elements, are consistent with best practices.
We also recommended that the program undertake a detailed cost-
benefit analysis of any incremental block of SBInet capabilities beyond
Block 1 and report the results of such analyses to CBP and DHS
leadership. Further, we recommended that DHS decide whether proceeding
with expanded investment in SBInet represents a prudent use of the
Department's resources, and report the decision, and the basis for it,
to the Department's authorization and appropriations committees.
To DHS's credit, it has initiated actions to address our
recommendations. In particular, and as previously mentioned, the
Department froze all funding beyond the initial TUS-1 and AJO-1
deployments until it completes a comprehensive reassessment of the
program that includes an analysis of the cost and projected benefits of
additional SBInet deployments, as well as the cost and mission
effectiveness of alternative technologies.
Further, in written comments on a draft of our report, DHS
described steps it is taking to fully incorporate best practices into
its management of the program. For example, DHS stated that, in
response to our previous recommendations, it has instituted more
rigorous oversight of SBInet, requiring the program to report to the
Department's Acquisition Review Board at specified milestones and
receive approval before proceeding with the next deployment increment.
With respect to our new recommendations, DHS stated that it is, among
other things, taking steps to bring the Block 1 schedule into alignment
with best practices, verifying requirements and validating performance
parameters, updating its Systems Engineering Plan, and improving its
risk management process.
In closing, let me emphasize our long-held position that SBInet is
a risky program. To minimize the program's exposure to risk, it is
imperative for DHS to follow through on its stated commitment to ensure
that SBInet, as proposed, is the right course of action for meeting its
stated border security and immigration management goals and outcomes,
and once this is established, for it to ensure that the program is
executed in accordance with proven acquisition management best
practices. To do less will perpetuate a program that has for too long
been oversold and under-delivered.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions that you or other Members of the subcommittees may
have.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Hite.
I now recognize Mr. Borkowski for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SECURE BORDER
INITIATIVE PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ACCOMPANIED BY
MICHAEL J. FISHER, CHIEF, U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Borkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Carney,
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Miller, distinguished Members
of the committee. Thank you again for this opportunity to
describe what we are trying to do to deal with the issues you
have described.
This is a continuation of the hearing from March, and our
written testimony is pretty much that testimony, but I will try
to recap a little bit and give an update as to where we are
compared to what we said in March.
As we discussed then, the Secretary has ordered a
reassessment of the program, and in fact has frozen funds
beyond those required to complete what is already started.
Those are the two areas of SBInet Block 1 deployment known as
Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, those areas that you described.
That is driven by the same concerns the Secretary has come
to--the same conclusions that the committee has already
identified, as has the GAO--which is that we suffer from two
fundamental flaws. One is we need to become convinced that the
program we have designed is actually even viable.
The second is that we need to become convinced that even if
it is viable that it is the right way to spend money, that we
are getting value for that money. So that is the purpose of the
Secretary's assessment is to answer those two questions before
we invest more money in SBInet Block 1.
Now, I would like to be clear about what we mean by SBInet
Block 1, because we often use SBI and SBInet and technology
interchangeably. SBInet Block 1 is a certain kind of
technology. It is a technology which we don't yet have but
which we have endeavored to develop. It includes fixed towers
that have radars and cameras.
It includes the computer software and the communication
network that allows all of that information from all of those
towers to be combined in one place so it can be acted on by the
Border Patrol. So it is that technology configuration, and it
is that technology configuration that is designed to work at
the beginning in Arizona. We call that SBInet Block 1.
There is other technology that SBI provides, for example,
the northern border technology that Congresswoman Miller talked
about or mobile surveillance systems. So we do have
alternatives and we do have options.
But SBInet Block 1 is the development of something that we
hoped would give us a step function increase in capability by
allowing us to network a depiction of what is going on in one
area.
We have, frankly, failed in delivering what was promised at
the beginning, so we would not argue with your
characterization, Chairman Carney. So the question for us has
been what do we do now?
So we are looking at this system, and we are looking at
this, the cost-effectiveness of it. There are two fundamental
questions, as I said, that the Secretary's assessment is
designed to get at. One is: Is the system viable?
The way that we intend to assess that is by completing
Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, going through the testing that is required
to characterize it and then using that as a quantitative
measure of what this system does.
We will also, of course, know what it costs at that point,
not just what it cost to develop but what it costs to produce
in a recurring way. So that will give us insight into the
viability. As I told you in March, we expected to have the
engineering test results for Tucson-1 by September, and we are
still on schedule for that.
We expected to have engineering test results for Ajo-1 by
the end of the calendar year, and we are still on schedule for
that.
The other part of the assessment is the question of whether
or not it is--even if it works is it worth it? There are other
technologies so I can have less capability at less dollars,
more capability at more dollars. The question is do I get value
for those more dollars?
That is the quantitative science-based assessment the
Secretary has talked about, and we are doing that in some
phases because it is a deliberative effort. The first of those
we should have data by the end of June. That data will be
focused on an analysis of Arizona and then based on that we can
extend that analysis to other parts of the border.
But what that is designed to do is to compare SBInet Block
1 to other technology options in a very quantitative science-
based way so we can make more intelligent decisions about where
it makes sense to spend money on this system.
That quantitative analysis, depending on how that looks,
will continue into other areas of the border before we make any
commitments to those areas of the border.
I also wanted to mention that we also talked about a near-
term assessment where we would look at the $50 million of
stimulus funds that had been originally designed for SBInet
Block 1. In fact, we have concluded to divert those to other
technology, including many more mobile surveillance systems,
sensors for our aircraft, backscatter radars for Border Patrol
checkpoints and even pursuit cameras for our office of field
operations, Customs and Border Protection officers at the
ports.
So we are in the process of acquiring those, and we expect
to start to see delivery of those within a matter of some
months here. That is the quick and dirty summary and recap of
where we are, what we said we would be doing last March and how
we are doing on it. I will look forward to your questions going
forward.
[The joint statement of Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Fisher
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Mark Borkowski and Michael Fisher
June 17, 2010
Chairman Carney, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Bilirakis,
Ranking Member Miller, and distinguished Members of the committee, it
is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss
SBInet. I am Mark Borkowski, Executive Director of the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI), and with me today is the Chief of the United States
Border Patrol, Michael Fisher.
departmental-wide assessment
Before I begin to discuss where we are with SBInet development, I
want to briefly discuss the Department-wide reassessment that was
ordered by the Secretary back in January. As the Governor of Arizona,
Secretary Napolitano became uniquely aware of the promises that were
made about SBInet and the shortfalls it has faced. When she came into
the Department, she took a hard look at our progress with SBInet. She
gave my team at CBP a fair chance to prove that we were on the right
track. She asked hard questions about the future of the program and the
feasibility of where we were headed and directed then-Acting
Commissioner Jayson Ahern to provide his assessment of the path forward
for SBInet. Based upon the results of that review, she ordered a
Department-wide reassessment of the program to determine if there are
alternatives that may more efficiently, effectively, and economically
meet our Nation's border security needs. Secretary Napolitano also
ordered a freeze on all SBInet funding beyond SBInet Block 1's initial
deployment to the Tucson and Ajo regions until the assessment is
completed.
The Department-wide review is motivated by two major
considerations. The first is that the continued and repeated delays in
SBInet raise fundamental questions about SBInet's viability and
availability to meet the need for technology along the border. The
second is that the high cost of SBInet obligates this administration to
conduct a full and comprehensive analysis of alternative options to
ensure we are maximizing the impact and effectiveness of the
substantial taxpayer resources we are devoting to border security
technology. Quite frankly, this type of investment can only be
justified if you know exactly what you are going to get, and this type
of comprehensive analysis of alternatives should have been undertaken
years ago. Secretary Napolitano recognized the need for such due
diligence, which is why we will conduct such an analysis under the
review she ordered.
The assessment has an immediate and a long-term phase. In March,
the Department announced it was redeploying $50 million in Recovery Act
funds that were scheduled to be spent on SBInet to alternatives
currently available, stand-alone technology, such as remote-controlled
camera systems called Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSSs), truck-
mounted systems with cameras and radar called Mobile Surveillance
Systems (MSSs), thermal imaging devices, ultra-light detection,
backscatter units, mobile radios, and cameras and laptops for pursuit
vehicles, that will immediately improve our ability to secure the U.S.-
Mexico border.
In the long-term phase, we will conduct a comprehensive, science-
based assessment of alternatives to SBInet to ensure that we are
utilizing the most efficient and effective technological and
operational solutions in all of our border security efforts. If this
analysis suggests that the SBInet capabilities are worth the cost, this
administration will extend deployment of these capabilities. If this
analysis suggests that alternative technology options represent the
best balance of capability and cost-effectiveness, this administration
will assess options for redirecting resources to these stronger border
technology options.
role of technology
It has often been said that technology is one of three ``pillars''
that contribute to effective border security, with tactical
infrastructure, such as physical fencing, and personnel being the other
two. Physical fencing provides ``persistent impedance''--that is, it
delays the progress of people who attempt to cross our borders between
the ports of entry. These delays, in turn, provide more opportunity for
our Border Patrol agents to respond to and interdict those attempts.
From 2006 through 2008, the bulk of our funding within SBI focused on
completion of the physical fence along areas of the southwest border
where Border Patrol determined it was operationally necessary. Since
then, as that fence has largely been completed, we have shifted our
funding focus more towards technology.
Technology is primarily used to provide continual monitoring and
surveillance of a particular area, enhancing situational awareness for
Border Patrol agents, detecting activity between the ports of entry and
providing information about the type of activity (i.e. human or animal,
vehicle or pedestrian, transporting contraband or not transporting
contraband, etc.). This knowledge assists our Border Patrol agents in
responding to and interdicting criminal activity, and enhances their
safety by giving them information about the relative threat of any
group or individual and about how best to approach the threat.
CBP has already deployed technology to several specific areas of
the border. As mentioned above, we have deployed Remote Video
Surveillance Systems (RVSSs), which allow personnel to keep an eye on
selected areas by displaying pictures at a central dispatch location.
We have also deployed Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSSs), which use
truck-mounted radar and camera to provide greater situational awareness
to operators in the field. Finally, we have deployed Unattended Ground
Sensors (UGS), which can detect movement in their vicinity. All of
these systems provide important information to the Border Patrol about
activity in a particular area.
The goal of SBInet was to network a set of sensors that cover a
wide area into a Common Operating Picture, or COP--in contrast to the
individual, stand-alone systems described above, which are very useful
and relatively inexpensive, but also labor-intensive and limited in
coverage. By depicting a large amount of information in a small space,
SBInet was designed to allow fewer personnel to monitor and direct
operations across a larger area. Border Patrol agents would be able to
observe, manage, and respond to multiple events more effectively.
sbinet block 1
With respect to the development of SBInet, it is clear that
progress has been slower than anticipated. Recent testing suggests that
SBInet Block 1 has demonstrated some progress, but the time it has
taken us to get to this point is extremely discouraging and
frustrating. As a partial mitigation to the delays, we worked with
Boeing to make a change in our plans so that the Border Patrol could
use parts of the system that are not yet fully complete ``as is'' while
engineering work continued. The Border Patrol has been using these
parts of the system in this capacity since February 6 and the feedback
has been positive from agents on the front lines. The next steps
involve completing our engineering work and conducting formal testing.
We expect to conduct System Acceptance Testing through August, and then
to turn the system over to the Border Patrol for formal Operational
Testing and Evaluation starting in September.
Construction on a second part of the system, known as Ajo-1, was
delayed for several reasons, including technical concerns and
environmental considerations. Ajo-1 is located in an environmentally
sensitive area, so we have worked very closely with the Department of
the Interior to ensure that we protected it appropriately. Much of the
Ajo-1 Area of Responsibility (AoR) has been constructed, and most of
the system will be completed by August. We will then conduct acceptance
and operational testing of Ajo-1 through the end of this calendar year.
sbi efforts on the northern border
In addition to our activities on the southwest border, CBP has
continued to make investments in technology on the northern border to
enhance situational awareness and capabilities of the Border Patrol.
As a part of SBI's Northern Border Project, CBP has deployed proven
surveillance systems, including Remote Video Surveillance Systems
(RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS), to the Buffalo, Detroit,
and Swanton Border Patrol Sectors. Two MSSs were deployed to the
Swanton Sector in 2009. The Buffalo Sector deployment, completed in
February 2010, consists of 5 RVSS sites along the upper Niagara River,
expanding upon an earlier deployment of 4 remote video surveillance
cameras in 2003. The Detroit Sector deployment consists of 1 MSS and 11
RVSS sites along the St. Clair River, covering approximately 35 miles
from Lake Huron to Lake St. Clair. Ten of the sites are completed and
operational, with the eleventh scheduled for completion by the end of
the year.
These technology deployments provide an immediate capability to
help Border Patrol agents expand their ability to detect, identify,
classify, respond to, and resolve illegal cross-border activity, while
providing lessons learned that will enable CBP to design better-
tailored, longer-term technology options for the northern border. CBP
chose the Buffalo, Detroit, and Swanton Sectors based on the needs of
the Border Patrol and the unique operational area, which includes
coastal maritime, river, urban, and rural environments.
In the fiscal year 2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance,
and Continuing Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 110-329), Congress directed
$40 million within the Border Security, Fencing, Infrastructure, and
Technology account towards a ``Northern border security technology
investment.'' CBP is using these funds to conduct a demonstration of
capabilities in the Detroit area that will attempt to integrate sensors
and data from a variety of sources. The goals of the pilot project are
to improve operational integration of border security efforts in the
Detroit area, improve detection capabilities in the vicinity of the St.
Clair River area, and enhance situational awareness for CBP and their
mission partners in the region.
To that end, construction is currently underway for the
establishment of an Operational Integration Center (OIC). The OIC will
provide a collaborative work area and communications capabilities for
representatives of CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, other DHS components, Federal
law enforcement agencies, State and local law enforcement, and Canadian
officials. This facility will serve as a laboratory for border security
agencies to explore and evaluate enhanced border security capabilities.
Additionally, the OIC is intended to enhance situational awareness by
providing multiple information feeds within one single location.
Initial operations at the OIC are scheduled to begin October 2010.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, we recognize that the
SBInet program has been a frustration. This committee and the entire
Congress has been supportive and patient with us as we have worked
through issues and delays encountered by the program. The comprehensive
review ordered by Secretary Napolitano demonstrates that she shares
your concern. Technology along the border is of critical importance to
our National security and the safety and effectiveness of our Border
Patrol agents working in the field. We need to ensure that we provide
them with proven, cost-effective tools that will help them do their
jobs and keep our Nation safe--whether that means large-scale networks
like SBInet or stand-alone technology I mentioned above. One thing is
clear: the Secretary's review will require all of us to go back and
take a hard look at the assumptions that were made in the past, and it
will ensure that we proceed in a manner that both bolsters the security
of our Nation's borders while making the most out of the resources that
have been devoted to technology solutions to our border security
challenges. We look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Borkowski.
I understand Chief Fisher was a joint statement, so Mr.
Krone for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF ROGER A. KRONE, PRESIDENT, NETWORK AND SPACE
SYSTEMS, BOEING DEFENSE, SPACE & SECURITY, THE BOEING COMPANY
Mr. Krone. Oh, excuse me. Thank you, Chairman Carney,
Chairman Cuellar and Members of the committee. It has been 3
months since we last appeared here to discuss the SBInet
program, and I am pleased to be able to report good performance
by our team and excellent progress in meeting the milestones of
all the projects we are working on.
The two northern border projects have been accepted by the
Customs and Border Patrol, and the two southern projects are on
track for completion on the schedules we discussed in March.
Early operations of the Tucson-1 system continues to be very
successful, and we plan to extend early operations to our
second deployment, Ajo-1, in August.
With continued good performance we expect to have both of
the systems permanently in the hands of the Border Patrol by
the end of the year.
This program was transferred to my business unit in August
2007. I would like to provide a little background that might
put some perspective on the comments from the Government
Accountability Office that we are discussing here today.
The original concept of SBInet was to create a spiral
development program utilizing to the maximum degree commercial
off-the-shelf equipment in order to get a capability to the
southwest border as quickly as possible.
As such, many of the 12 best practice program management
recommendations by the GAO in today's report were not proposed,
bid, nor implemented in the original SBInet program.
However, since the program transitioned from what I would
call the P28 phase to the Block 1 phase, many of the suggested
scheduling, systems engineering, requirements, and baseline
management and risk management processes have been implemented.
Today, the program is run in a manner very similar to a
Department of Defense ACAT I or ACAT II program.
The GAO questions whether the SBInet is ``a cost-effective
course of action.'' Although the value question is best
addressed by the Customs and Border Patrol relative to other
means of securing the border, I would like to clarify where the
Government's money has been spent on the program to date.
The GAO states, ``SBInet is being acquired and deployed in
incremental blocks of capability with the first block to cost
about $1.3 billion.'' This representation is not entirely
accurate and bears some clarification.
First, of the $1.3 billion, $441 million has been spent to
construct 32 miles of physical fence and purchase 140,000 tons
of steel mesh for other fence construction. Utilizing the
numbers in Table One of the GAO report, updated for current
cost performance, we can see the remaining $828 million has
been spent in the following way.
Four hundred eighty-four million dollars has been spent for
non-recurring design development, supplier, and program
management and the construction of the Systems Integration Lab
in Playas, New Mexico for the Block 1 system. Construction of a
network operation center and systems operation center in
Springfield, Virginia.
Most of this investment will not be repeated if we complete
additional deployments beyond those under contract. Eighty
million dollars was spent for design and development of the
command and control software to drive the Block 1 system,
referred to as the common operating environment, also a non-
recurring investment.
Seventy-one million dollars has been spent for contractor
logistics support of P28 Block 1 and other border surveillance
systems. So of the $1.3 billion, only $195 million has been
spent on actual deployments of technology solutions to the
border under the SBInet program.
Of that, $20 million has been spent on the Buffalo and
Detroit northern border towers, $20 million has been spent for
P28 that covers 28 miles of Arizona border and $155 million,
which is our current estimated complete, what we call the
Arizona Deployment Task Order, more commonly known as Tucson-1
and Ajo-1, which will cover 25 and 30 miles of the border
respectively, a total of 55 miles.
We know today that we have a system that the Border Patrol
agents helped design and are using in real operations along the
Arizona-Mexico border. In September we expect to have
successfully accomplished system acceptance test for Tucson-1
and to complete system acceptance testing of Ajo-1 by the end
of the year.
The Government has almost finished its investment in the
development of the Block 1 system. Deployments beyond Tucson-1
and Ajo-1 will be done on a fixed-price basis at prices
significantly lower than those of the Arizona Deployment Task
Order, with reliable schedules based upon demonstrated
performance.
The GAO recommends that the Government answer the question
as to the value of the SBInet program. At Boeing we are hopeful
that such assessments will lead to a positive outcome, and we
can get restarted on further deployments and help our customer
secure the border.
Thank you very much, and I am prepared to answer any
questions you might have.
[The statement of Mr. Krone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger A. Krone
June 17, 2010
Thank you, Mr. Chairman
It's been 3 months since we last appeared here to discuss the
SBInet Program.
At that time, I described the status of our two southern and two
northern border deployments, the work remaining on SBInet Block 1
technology to achieve System Acceptance from the Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) customer, and our positive experience with Early
Operations, an initiative that allows the Border Patrol to use the
Tucson-1 (TUS1) System during the swing and night shifts when our
contractor team must clear the operational area where the towers are
located.
On all these projects, I am able to report strong performance by
our team and excellent progress in meeting the milestones of the
program.
northern border
On the northern border, we have completed the Detroit and Buffalo
Projects, both of which included installing cameras along the St. Clair
and Upper Niagara Rivers, respectively. Both projects have been
accepted by CBP and are now part of daily operations for the agents
there.
tucson-1
In March, I discussed the remaining developmental issues for the
first deployment of the SBInet Block 1 technology known as Tucson-1
(TUS1). The TUS1 deployment, covering approximately 24 linear miles of
border and 1,000 square miles around the Sasabe Port of Entry, has
incorporated expanded testing into the program plan to validate system
success and acceptance by the customer. We have now incorporated the
hardware fixes identified by earlier testing and updated the software
to address critical program change requests (PCR).
Our progress over the past 3 months puts the program into position
to start the preliminary readiness activities and tests that lead into
System Acceptance Test (SAT). We will complete the Preliminary Test
Readiness Review (PTRR) this month and will then begin conducting dry
run tests of the routes used during SAT. With satisfactory completion
of the dry runs, we will proceed to the Test Readiness Review (TRR) and
then to System Acceptance Test runs for record in July.
All of this progress is the result of hard work and dedication by
the Boeing, CBP, and Border Patrol teams. We are adhering to the
Integrated Master Schedule that was developed in February 2010, and
have focused on critical path management and risk management.
Challenges remain, but we are tracking to a mid-September delivery to
CBP.
ajo-1
The second deployment, Ajo-1 (AJO1), covering approximately 30
linear miles of border and 1,500 square miles around the Lukeville Port
of Entry in an environmentally sensitive area, is progressing well.
Seven of the 10 towers have been erected as we speak, and most have the
sensors packages installed. We have begun the tower characterization
step, which will provide the initial check-out of each completed tower.
System Acceptance Test for AJO1 is scheduled to begin early this fall
with final delivery to CBP around the end of the calendar year.
Similar to TUS1, the CBP and Boeing team has been focused on
managing the critical path to schedule completion. Improvement in risk
management, including bi-weekly Risk Management Board meetings and
increased discipline in risk and issue identification and resolution
have helped to ensure that the schedule is realistic and manageable.
cost-effectiveness
Throughout the development and deployment of TUS1 and AJO1, Boeing
has maintained a detailed cost database and developed an in-depth life-
cycle cost model that we continue to refine. We are sharing this
information with CBP and are committed to identify potential cost
savings that will be reflected in future deployments.
system component performance
The user assessment conducted in Playas, New Mexico, in 2009
identified deficiencies in performance in the ground surveillance
radar, the electro-optical camera and the laser range finder. Playas is
the representational testbed we established to test and validate the
system, and I can tell you today that the issues identified there
during the user assessment have been addressed. Boeing worked directly
with the radar component's original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to
develop software changes that improved the performance of the radar and
provide the user with more controls. Working closely with the CBP and
the camera OEM, settings were adjusted in the daylight, electro-optical
cameras, resulting in significant performance improvement. Regarding
the laser range finder, Border Patrol agents are using it today in TUS1
Early Operations to enhance the accuracy of coordinates when
appropriate.
Probably more significant is the overall performance of the Block 1
technology in the Tucson area of responsibility. Observations from
Early Operations and feedback from the end-users tell us those
component-level issues are not present in TUS1. Moreover, we are seeing
improved performance of the total system through interaction and
integration with other border security systems and personnel resources.
early operations
In March, we also discussed Early Operations of the TUS1 system. At
that time, the Border Patrol had been using the TUS1 system for nightly
operations for about 5 weeks. At the request of Rep. McCaul, a video of
an encounter using the system was shown and narrated by Chief Fisher.
As he said then, the system gives agents ``a better sense of
situational awareness, we have a better sense of identifying the
particular threat.''
Today, we have more than 4 months of Early Operations experience
totaling nearly 5,000 agent-hours on the system. Availability has been
excellent despite interruptions due to our planned developmental work,
and we continue to get very positive feedback from the agents. The high
utilization rate of the system, in my opinion, is evidence that the
agents want to use the TUS1 capabilities whenever possible.
While we have a considerable amount of testing left to accomplish
before Government acceptance of the system later this summer, the fact
that the system has been in the hands of the operators, being used in
actual operations for thousands of hours, makes a strong statement
about its maturity and its suitability for use along the southern
border.
SAT will provide the official measurement of whether the system
meets the requirements set out for it in the contract. We are on
schedule to complete that by mid-September.
next steps
We know today that we have a system that Border Patrol agents
helped design and are using in real operations along the Arizona-Mexico
Border. In September, we expect to have successfully accomplished SAT
for TUS1 and to complete AJO1 by the end of the calendar year. This
brings us to the questions of, where do we deploy the Block 1 System
next; how long will it take to build; and, how much will it cost?
These are questions for the Government to answer, but it has always
been our position that once the technology is proven, we could embark
on serial deployments of the system that would be rapid, efficient, and
cost-effective.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. I would like to thank all the
witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the witnesses, and I will recognize myself
for 5 minutes. Begin with you, Mr. Hite, as you know the
Secretary suspended future spending on SBInet until the
analysis is done on its viability. Frankly, do you think the
project can be saved or is it time to move to other options?
Mr. Hite. See, I hesitate to give you a definitive answer
on that. You know, making those kind of tough decisions
requires access to data that I haven't seen. It certainly is a
legitimate question to pose at this point in time, but if I was
in a position to make that decision now based on what I know, I
would be asking for more information to inform my decision.
Mr. Carney. Certainly the original project as contracted
and envisioned it is far and away a lot greater than we have in
reality today with the project.
Mr. Hite. Absolutely.
Mr. Carney. Why? What has happened to see sort of a
shrinkage of capability?
Mr. Hite. A lot of things in combination have contributed
to that, not the least of which is an underestimation and over-
optimism about what could be delivered, what it would take in
order to accomplish that, optimism surrounding what is
available in the commercial marketplace. Underestimating what
it is going to take to integrate those components.
As the witness mentioned, the program originally set out
under a spiral development approach, which my personal opinion
is a risky approach to take. It evolved over time and so the
definition and the implementation of the kind of acquisition of
rigor that my experience has shown can contribute to a
successful program wasn't there from the outset.
I don't think the program had the people it needed to run
it successfully from the outset. So I mean this, as I mentioned
in my oral statement is this program was in trouble months
after it was started. It was spiraling downhill after that.
So, you know, I, as I mentioned, despite here in the last
18 to 24 months bringing in more capability, trying to address
some of these limitations, it is hard to, you know, redirect an
iceberg once it has started moving in one direction. That is,
you know, what we have been faced with.
Mr. Carney. At least icebergs can block something. Why have
the thresholds been so constrained? I mean the parameters have
changed. It is, you know, I am struck by the fact that cameras
only work at five clicks rather than 10, that the laser only
works to two rather than 10.
Mr. Borkowski or Mr. Krone, can you answer that question?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, first of all I think we have improved
the cameras. But having said that, what we did is we selected
commercially available off-the-shelf hardware. We tried to do
that in a way at the time, and this in hindsight may have been
a mistake so I am not trying to make excuses for it.
But at the time when we had a very ambitious schedule, what
we did is we compromised on performance of some of the hardware
in order to get it in time to meet the then-anticipated
schedule.
Now, in hindsight that turned out not to be wise because we
both failed to meet that schedule and ended up with cameras
that were probably less than optimal. Now, having said that, we
have made some improvements to the cameras, and I don't want
people to think we haven't.
But those two things sort of conspired, the interest in
commercially available, quickly available to support a schedule
and to support a cost ended up causing us to make compromises
in specific components.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Krone.
Mr. Krone. See, I would concur with that. I would also, I
think, mention that we, in tweaking with the cameras and
working on their performance in many scenarios today, they
actually exceed the 10 kilometer range.
But the range in which they work is certainly dependent
upon the environment, the atmospheric conditions, and there are
some conditions where they don't have the 10 kilometer range.
But in other places we have actually seen them in operations,
in early operations, where they have exceeded the range.
The initial deployment of the COTS hardware didn't meet
spec or our expectations, and we have been working hard with
the Customs and Border Patrol to improve their performance.
Mr. Carney. Okay, thank you. I imagine we will have a
couple of rounds of questions.
I now recognize the Ranking Member from Florida for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Again, just before the subcommittee's last hearing on
SBInet, the Secretary announced her intention to use, as I said
during my statement and I know you said, the $50 million in the
recovery funds.
I am aware that there is promising DOD technology, Mr.
Borkowski, being used on the border. Will the redeployed
Recovery Act funding be used to leverage this technology?
Mr. Borkowski. The specific DOD technology, no, not with
the stimulus funding. However, as we go forward and make
decisions about what is the right technology we have talked to
the DOD. In fact, many elements of DOD as well as, by the way,
many, many vendors, probably well over hundreds of
conversations I have had both with DOD and vendors.
We will use all of that as candidates for the appropriate
technology. So we have talked to DOD but it is not in this
initial $50 million.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Fisher, I have long been concerned about the impact of
the border violence on CBPOs and the Border Patrol agents. I
understand in fiscal year 2009 there were nearly 1,100 assaults
on Border Patrol agents.
Based on CBP statistics recently provided to the committee,
through May 31 there have been nearly 800 assaults on Border
Patrol agents this fiscal year, with more than 100 assaults
alone in May.
What is the reason for this escalation of violence against
the Border Patrol agents? What resources do CBPOs and Border
Patrol agents have in terms of protective equipment and
training to ensure their safety and the protection of lawful
travelers as well?
Mr. Fisher. Congressman, with respect to your first
question as it relates to the cause of the violence across the
southwest border at--in between the ports of entry, I will just
offer a general statement because there is a lot of different
reasons depending upon the area. Depending upon which
transnational criminal organization happens to own that area in
which we are operating.
But in general terms, what we have seen over the years and
consistent with what we are seeing so far this year, is that
there is generally a cause and effect of what we do with
respect to our enforcement posture at the ports of entry and
between the ports of entry.
By the way, I should mention those aren't being done
independently. Those are being done collectively within the
field leadership because we recognize that the criminal
organizations historically have tried to exploit at the ports
and in between the ports.
So what we are doing in our joint planning, joint
enforcement posture, is we are making a difference in the
criminal organizations to operate in these particular areas
where historically they have operated with impunity.
Where we are making a difference, the criminal
organizations are adjusting their tactics. Some of those
tactics do include aggressive assaults against Border Patrol
agents, again CBP officers, in the hopes that we will pull
further away from the border and allow them to again operate
within some of those same areas.
So that is a general statement we have seen that over time
and certainly we are seeing that as well this year.
Mr. Bilirakis. How about the protective equipment? Can you
answer that as well?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir, I can. Again, throughout the year as
we start seeing the evolution, if you will, of that threat, as
an operator we take that into consideration in planning and
making sure that the agents and officers are trained properly,
they have the equipment.
What we have instituted over the years we are currently
deploying today, are forms of less lethal capabilities. That
would take the form of FN 303s, pepper ball systems, riot gear.
We also had specially trained CBP officers and Border
Patrol agents that when we know we need to go into a particular
area and the threat assessment indicates that the propensity of
violence may be high, we go ahead and deploy those troops in
advance with extra equipment, extra training.
To make sure that when we do go in and enforce those areas
that we do have the appropriate agents that are trained and
equipped to handle the commensurate threat.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Mr. Krone, in your testimony you
stated that should DHS decide to continue to deploy SBInet
technology beyond Block 1 it could be deployed rapidly,
efficiently, and cost-effectively. How much would it cost and
how long would it take to deploy this technology to additional
Border Patrol sectors?
Mr. Krone. At the time that we were put on stop work, we
had three additional deployments that we had done some initial
planning, what we call the Tohono O'odham Nation 60-mile
sector, the Nogales 30-mile sector and the Sonoita 30-mile
sector.
At that time we had rough order of magnitude estimates at
complete, again, these are not contractual numbers, and when we
are put on contract I am sure we will have a negotiation with
Mark on the actual numbers. But for the TON deployment, which
is about 60 miles, that is in the order of $100 million to $110
million.
For Nogales about 30 miles in the $50 million to $60
million range and Sonoita would be about the same, 30 miles at
about the $50 million to $60 million, or at a cost per mile
around $2 million per mile of border.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Chairman
Cuellar for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. One of the things when we talk
about securing the border is we have got--and we are using
taxpayers' dollars--is we want to know is the--what we are
trying to do, is it efficient? Is it effective? Is it
accountable to the taxpayers?
But the other thing is that we ought to ask for, is it
worthwhile on that? That is where I am coming from on this
particular issue.
So let us go back to my basic question. If you have
somebody in Brownsville, Texas, for example, or similar in
another part of the four States that border Mexico, when can we
tell the taxpayers that we can secure our border using this
technology?
I understand that we can use different technology. There is
not going to be a cookie-cutter situation. It depends, you
know, in west Texas you might use something else and in Arizona
you might use something else. You can make an argument that in
Texas you have a Rio Grande that provides a natural boundary so
you use something else.
In Arizona you might use a fence because you can step from
one side to the other side, so I understand all that. My
question to all of you all is when can we say to the taxpayer
that we can secure the border? How much would it cost?
Mr. Borkowski. Chairman Cuellar, and I apologize in advance
for this, but we can't secure the border with just technology,
okay?
Mr. Cuellar. No, no, I understand.
Mr. Borkowski. Okay.
Mr. Cuellar. A mixture of technology, a mixture of
personnel----
Mr. Borkowski. All right.
Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. A mixture of the operation
strategy.
Mr. Borkowski. Right.
Mr. Cuellar. I understand that. When can we say that we
have sufficient technology to address that? Because I mean
there is areas that certainly I would like to see those towers
and fences and cameras and--up and down the border.
But I mean just for example, Mike McCaul and ourselves, we
got in one of those civil air patrol planes the other day,
actually last year, and we just very low flying we flew up from
Laredo, followed the river all the way for a couple hours down
all the way to Brownsville.
Of course, I was making my argument on how do you put a
fence all around there, but nevertheless how do you secure that
area? That is only one part from Laredo down to Brownsville. So
how do we address this issue?
Mr. Borkowski. Well----
Mr. Cuellar. How much would it cost us, time and money?
Mr. Borkowski. Okay. Probably the worst case, the worst
case would be if we decided to take SBInet Block 1 or whatever
is up--the appropriate iteration, put that all along the
southwest border with some ambitious but potentially realistic
funding assumptions.
We have talked about those numbers before. We talked about
$8 billion. We have talked about 2016, 2017.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes.
Mr. Borkowski. That is probably worst case, and by the way,
probably very unlikely because I doubt that we would conclude
that SBInet is the right answer for the entire border.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Mr. Borkowski. But that is a worst-case assessment. So the
challenge for the Secretary's assessment, the Department now is
saying, okay, now we have got that worst-case assessment. It
has very ambitious funding assumptions because obviously it
would slip based on funding.
But is that the right answer? Can we get some things more
quickly if we go to other technology, less expensively if we go
to other technology? We expect the Secretary's assessment to
advise that.
So worst case, very ambitious funding assumptions, and by
very ambitious I am talking like a billion dollars a year into
technology, okay, 2016, 2017 if you used SBInet Block 1.
We are hopeful that through this assessment process we can
identify and better tailor technology so that we can accelerate
that with the appropriate technology at lower cost compared to
that kind of worst-case SBInet baseline. But we haven't built
that yet and won't build that until we have completed the
assessment.
Mr. Cuellar. So roughly 2016, 2017 for the 2,000 miles, at
least in the southern border, and we are not even talking about
the northern border----
Mr. Borkowski. Right.
Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. But let us say the southern
border, 2016, 2017.
Mr. Borkowski. In order to have technology SBInet Block 1
with some ambitious budgeting. Again, we hope we can do better
after we go through the assessment, but that is kind of the way
the baseline was laid out. Don't expect to execute that
baseline. I want to be very clear of that, but in order to size
the problem that is probably the best place to start.
Mr. Cuellar. Money-wise?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, the estimate for SBInet across the
southwest border was $8 billion. Now again, to be fair, that
estimate suffers from some of the deficiencies that Mr. Hite
has described, but that is the estimate that we have had up to
this point.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. So I am sorry--so how much again for
2016, 2017 in U.S. dollars?
Mr. Borkowski. 2016, 2017 about $8 billion if we put in
SBInet Block 1. Again, I want to reemphasize, I don't expect us
to do that. That is a worst case, I believe.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. So worst-case scenario might be $8
billion up to 2016, but if you use different type of technology
it might be faster. That is the worst-case scenario. Give me
the best-case scenario.
Mr. Borkowski. I guess I am hesitant to do that because I
would be speculating at this point, Chairman Cuellar. That
would be pretty dangerous for me. So if I could defer I would--
--
Mr. Cuellar. Finally, the last question I have for all of
you all, do you talk to GAO besides the time that we are here
in a committee? Because I mean GAO comes up with term findings
and I know you are not going to agree with. That includes also
Mr. Krone, all of you all. I mean do you all talk to each other
before we come to the committee?
I mean, the way I see it is GAO is not doing a catch you--
hey, we have got you here. I mean to me it is I look at the
findings. You work with them, fix them, the ones that you agree
with. The ones you don't agree with then debate them on that.
But do you all talk, seriously? I know you are going to say
yes, but do you really talk to each other before you come to
this committee hearing?
Mr. Borkowski. First of all, Chairman Cuellar, I do agree
with most of the GAO findings. What I look for in the GAO is
whether they found something I didn't already know, okay? So I
agree with the findings. I might disagree with some of the
technical or packaging of it, but I agree wholeheartedly with
the findings. The GAO has identified weaknesses in this
program.
Yes, we do talk. Now, we don't get together before the day
of the hearing and compare notes. But the GAO is with us all
the time. We have many exchanges of data. They interview us for
their findings. They come in and they tell us what they are
seeing and ask us, are we aware of it? Have we seen it?
Mr. Hite and I are not, you know, drinking friends, but he
does come into the office from time to time----
Mr. Cuellar. Maybe you should be drinking friends.
Mr. Borkowski. Well, maybe we should.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Borkowski. In fact, that is not a bad idea. But he does
come in and share his ideas on--not on every an every week
basis but probably every couple of months. So yes, we do
compare notes.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Let me just give you, again, my personal
opinion. I appreciate your attitude because we have had other
folks in the past, and I am not talking about your program, but
other folks that are very defensive when it comes to the GAO.
I like your attitude as, you know, whether it improves,
doesn't improve, you know, I like that attitude. So I just, Mr.
Borkowski, I appreciate that type, and I thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
McCaul for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for being here
today, and I think I felt like we just did this a few weeks
ago. But I don't really need to tell you all about the threats
that exist at the border. There is a war going on.
We have U.S. officials targeted in Nuevo Laredo, Juarez. We
had a deputy sheriff in Arizona shot. We just had a shooting in
the El Paso, Juarez border. Every day we hear a news story
about some violent killing. More people died in Mexico at the
hand of the drug cartels than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
combined.
So my constituents and the American people, they get
frustrated and they want this to happen now. When they hear
2016, 2017 and I know all of you understand this, that to them
that is not acceptable. I don't think it is either. I think we
can do better.
I think Mr. Borkowski, you and Mr. Fisher have a--being new
to the scene have a great opportunity to get this done right.
There are some good technologies out there. I think, you know,
I showed a video of Block 1 last hearing and it seems to be
working relatively well. The agents seem to like.
As I understand your testimony, by the end of June, Mr.
Borkowski you will have an assessment on that?
Mr. Borkowski. Not of that. By the end of June what we will
have done is this so-called quantitative science-based
assessment to say with SBInet we expect it to do, compared to
what other technology could do, what SBInet would cost to do
it, what other technology would cost to do it. What is the best
trade-off in cost and benefit for Arizona? That is the end of
June.
In terms of taking the experience of the agents, and which
has been very encouraging, but it is not quantitative. It is
subjective. So to put that in other words what the agents are
seeing and doing they like. What we don't know is, are we
seeing and doing all the things that we are supposed to be
seeing and doing?
That is the system acceptance testing we talked about that
would be completed for Tucson-1 in September. So we will
combine that. That will be measurable. We will have some
measures. We will combine that with the qualitative assessments
of the agents and we will characterize the system.
Mr. McCaul. Okay, so by the end of September you will have
a better idea----
Mr. Borkowski. Yes.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. On it? I appreciate your
comprehensive approach. I think there are a lot of good
technologies out there. I think as Congressman Cuellar and I
talked about we have seen--well, you and I took a trip down to
the border and saw technologies that we are using in
Afghanistan on the Pakistan borders that the taxpayers already
paid for.
It seems to me we ought to be using that. Not duplicate
efforts and use that same technology on the southwest border
where it is needed. I think you agree with that, got good
sensor technologies, surveillance technology.
We saw an operation the other day that uses radio frequency
to shut down vehicles, boats. I mean think about the
applications that that would have. So I think you are smart to
look at all the menu of technologies out there and to using
best for the taxpayer.
UAVs, do you--and Mr. Fisher and Borkowski, do you value
the use of UAVs down there?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman, we do.
Mr. McCaul. I would like to see more of them down there.
Would that be helpful to your mission?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman, it would.
Mr. McCaul. We just, you know, we have several in Arizona
but not enough in Texas in my view where I come from.
I know my time is limited, but I wanted to follow up on
something, Mr. Borkowski, you said, and that is we can't secure
the border with just technology. I think technology is an
important piece. The fence is by and large finished except for
those parts litigated. Can you explain what other--what else
you were talking about?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, what we are talking about here is
technology, tactical infrastructure which includes fence but
also things like roads and lights and then personnel. So
technology, what we use technology primarily for is to give us
an awareness of what is going on.
Technology can't respond to that awareness. By the way,
people can give us that awareness. So there is a trade-off
there between what can I have technology do, what I have people
do, for example.
Mr. McCaul. I agree, but the President's budget basically
proposed a decrease in SBInet down to $574 million from the
previous year funding of $800 million, and cuts to Border
Patrol agent staffing. I don't think that is the right
direction.
Now, I know that the President just came out recently and I
commend him for it, that $500 million emergency spending and
1,200 National Guard. Did the President talk to you, Mr.
Fisher, about this proposal?
Mr. Fisher. No, sir. The President did not speak to me
about that.
Mr. McCaul. No. You are the chief of the Border Patrol,
right?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. Okay. Don't you think it would be good to
get your input in terms of how many National Guard are needed
on the southwest border?
Mr. Fisher. Well, I can tell you, sir, that my
requirements, operational requirements that I get from the
field, the chiefs in the field, my collective staff here in
headquarters, gets packaged with all of CBP's requirements for
border security efforts. It gets funneled through the
Secretary, so ostensibly my requirements are being heard. I am
just not doing it personally.
Mr. McCaul. Do you think 1,200 is sufficient?
Mr. Fisher. Twelve hundred, sir of the----
Mr. McCaul. Additional National Guard?
Mr. Fisher. Up to 1,200 National Guard will help us and in
those priority areas to achieve higher levels of what we
tactically define as operational effective control of the
border.
Mr. McCaul. The Governor of my State has requested a
thousand just on the Texas and Mexico border. My constituents
are very frustrated about the use of the National Guard. They
don't understand why they can't do what they are trained to do
down there. That they are basically assigned to desks and they
push paper as opposed to providing security on the border.
I share in that frustration. I know there are some legal
obstacles to that, but what do you see as the use of the
National Guard on the border?
Mr. Fisher. Well, sir, and certainly I wouldn't argue with
your constituents' perception with respect to what the Guard
may or may not be able to do. I will tell you that they add
value.
What we have seen in using the Guard over the years, we use
them in many cases to perform services such as auto mechanics,
surveillance operators for some of the camera systems Mr.
Borkowski has mentioned.
Because what that does, that allows a Border Patrol agent
who is currently doing that to then free them up to go and do
the patrols that have and those agents have the arrest
authority where the National Guard does not.
They also provide in terms of entry identification teams.
What that means is we have National Guard members who, along
with Border Patrol agents, get up to a high point where perhaps
we don't have the technology solution yet. They perform a
valuable function detecting that which we can't see otherwise
so that Border Patrol agents can then respond.
It increases our capacity to not only have some situational
awareness that reduces those vulnerabilities with those
additional force multipliers on the ground. So they do add
value to our operations in my opinion.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I hope you can fully utilize their
experience because they have tremendous experience. They could
be, you know, brought to bear on the border.
I look forward to working with the two of you more in the
future. You are, again, you are new to this so we are not going
to blame the new guy. But I think we have a good opportunity as
well in terms of fixing this problem.
With that I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the other gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses
for appearing today. I especially thank you, Mr. Fisher,
because you are a part of the front line. I don't think you get
enough of indications, if you will, that you have a tough job
and you are trying to do it as best you can.
So I appreciate what you are trying to do under exceedingly
difficult circumstances, and you are to be commended. Thank
you.
I would like to start with the basic premise from which
securing the border has to emanate. That premise is this, a
definition of secure. When we say we want to secure the border,
the public hears ``prevent people from entering.'' That is what
the public hears.
What have we codified as the definition of securing the
border? Who is best suited to do this? If you want to raise a
hand I will recognize you or you will just start talking?
Mr. Fisher. I will start that, sir, and thank you for the
comments and thank you for your continued support on our
mission. I, too, have been thinking over the years and more
recently over the last few months about securing the border,
and hearing also both, you know, within the organization as we
look at our strategy and what that means.
We do have tactical definitions by which we measure that
because each and every day the field chiefs along with their
field commanders assess to what extent are they achieving the
objectives? We start there from an operational perspective.
What that tells us is when we look at prevention, we look
at identification and classification and responding and all the
things we try to measure how well we are doing against that,
the ultimate objective and what we are trying to accomplish
ultimately, is to be able to reduce the likelihood that
dangerous people and dangerous capabilities enter between the
ports of entry.
Now, what you didn't hear when--also is thrown in to secure
the border, is sealing the border. What is interesting when you
look at as measures and what is it that we are trying to
accomplish and be measured with? There is an expectation
certainly, and then there are areas, for instance, where we
have detection capability, and we have infrastructure.
We have the vast majority of Border Patrol agents, and we
have those areas we have gained effective operational control.
Again, the highest operational and tactical definition which
tells us levels of activity in terms of how many people are
coming in and how many people are we arresting?
Even in some of those areas, the vulnerabilities exist when
they tunnel underneath us, when they use ultralights to go over
top. So all of a sudden we start, again, adjusting and trying
to anticipate what that threat is going to do because it is a
dynamic threat environment in which we are faced.
So when you say securing the border, I can put it in terms
of the Arizona Corridor, for instance, where when I was a
Border Patrol agent last there, just a short 10 years ago,
there was over 420 arrests in a particular area.
Then you compare that with today, and I am not suggesting
that 240 apprehensions last year was good. I am just saying the
comparative that would suggest that we are doing something in
reducing the likelihood.
Because what we are seeing also as we reduce the likelihood
that those dangerous people and dangerous capabilities can come
in, we also are able to move some of that threat and put them
out into some areas where we do have time. Try to get them out
of those urban areas where historically they have operated.
Mr. Green. Thank you, sir. I have one additional question
and I would like for Mr. Hite and Mr. Krone to respond to this
question. If the plan is 100 percent effective, what percentage
of people will we prevent from entering the country?
We will start with you, Mr. Krone, if you would please.
Mr. Krone. Let us see, it is a great question. I can tell
you on a given day what the radar will do, what the camera will
do. I can tell you the performance that we have observed. I can
talk about probabilities of detect and probabilities to I.D.
that individual once we detect them. Those are all parameters
of the system, right, that Boeing has been asked to design.
But I don't, as the contractor, have the ability to answer
the whole question. When you combine tactical infrastructure,
the Border Patrol agents and the technology of what that
overall number would be, that is really a composite view of the
border which I think is best addressed by the Customs and
Border Patrol.
But I would be happy to go----
Mr. Green. How likely is----
Mr. Krone [continuing]. Through the specifications of the
operating----
Mr. Green. No, no, no, no.
Mr. Krone [continuing]. But that doesn't address your
question.
Mr. Green. I understand. My time is very limited. Now, I am
already over, but let us move to Mr. Hite and perhaps Mr.
Fisher, but Mr. Hite, 100 percent effective. Do you have some
guesstimation, estimation, prognostication as to what
percentage of persons will be prevented from entering?
Mr. Hite. No, sir. I do not.
Mr. Green. Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher. Sir, I will tell this committee and quite
honestly that I cannot guarantee with any amount of technology,
personnel, or infrastructure that nobody will ever penetrate
the borders between the ports of entry either underneath, over,
or by the air.
What I can guarantee is our continuous efforts, again, in
working with that right combination, working with the
intelligence community and identifying that threat. In cases
where we do have somebody that comes across the border that we
will have the capacity and the capability to respond and
mitigate any potential impact against that threat.
Mr. Green. Well, the reason I ask is because it would seem
to me that if we are going to spend billions of dollars we
ought to have some goal, some idea as to what we will
ultimately accomplish after spending billions of dollars.
So let us give Mr. Borkowski a chance to--an opportunity.
Can you shed some light? Will we prevent 75 percent, 85
percent?
Mr. Borkowski. I can't----
Mr. Green. Ten percent? What percentage of persons will we
prevent from coming into the country if our plan is 100 percent
effective?
Mr. Borkowski. A couple things, Congressman. By the way, I
can't give you a specific number. I can say this. Border
enforcement at the border is not enough in and of itself, okay?
So we are talking about securing the borders themselves, but
there are other factors that impact preventing people from
coming across there, which is why there is an--and I am not
commenting on the policy, but I have to emphasize there is
interior enforcement. There are immigration reform issues with
this.
So we are talking about border security. The goal of border
security at the border is to know what is going on to some high
level of confidence across that whole border, and to have the
opportunity to respond to that knowledge as we see fit when we
see fit. So that is what our technology is designed to give us,
knowledge of what is going on.
Mr. Green. Sir, may I just indulge for one additional
person, please? Mr. Hite, did you respond?
Mr. Hite. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Your opinion is again?
Mr. Hite. That I didn't have the answer to your question.
Mr. Green. Do you as a person who works with this closely,
do you believe that we should have an answer to that question?
That we should have some goal?
Mr. Hite. Well, I believe that we should have a goal. I
think a goal in the terms that you were asking about with that
level of precision is--would be very, very difficult if not
impossible to have. It is a very complicated equation.
Mr. Green. All right, thank you very much. Thank you for
your indulgence, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes my friend from Alabama, Mr. Rogers
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief, back in 2005 when we--or 2006, when we authorized
the ramping up of your forces from 12,000 to 18-3 or -5, I
can't remember what it was, I said then I didn't believe that
was enough. That I believed that we needed to be in the--below
the mid-20s? Do you believe you are adequately staffed for the
mission?
Mr. Fisher. Given where we are now with about 20,000 Border
Patrol agents, at this point with the increase of the
technology as we are seeing over time and the right
deployments, currently that is what we are assessing as well.
I can also tell you, sir, and this is a point that is worth
mentioning is of those additional 6,000 Border Patrol agents
back then, or 6,000 Border Patrol agents, a lot of those agents
now are having levels of maturity----
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Fisher [continuing]. Post-training so their value in
the force-multiplying capability is going to be enhanced over
the next few years. So that is why I am measured because it is
not just the numbers. It is what we are seeing as it relates to
the training, the maturity level, the additional technology,
and then what we are seeing as those benefits.
So for right now as we look at, you know, personnel,
technology, and infrastructure, as everybody has mentioned
here, you know, the other critical piece for our organization
is a new way of thinking which suggests that not just those
three things are going to get us operational control, however
that is defined.
It is that we look at our strategy. We take a look at the
difference between gaining that control as well as sustaining
that. Where is the emphasis with the personnel and technology
within a sustainment strategy in comparison to the way we have
applied it over the years to be able to gain control in some of
these areas, so----
Mr. Rogers. Well, I want to talk about strategy in a
minute. In answering the question from Mr. McCaul a few minutes
ago about UAVs, I am curious, do you all use air ships at all
along the border that could meander and loiter for weeks at a
time?
I am not talking about the aerostats that are tethered. I
am talking about what I call a blimp but the military uses them
like in Afghanistan, eyes in the sky? Do you all use that
platform?
Mr. Fisher. I don't believe we do, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Borkowski.
Mr. Borkowski. We don't, although we have spoken to folks
representing that to kind of put into our menu of options. But
we don't currently use them.
Mr. Rogers. Yes, you know, early on we saw the inherent
problems with the cameras on poles. I know you all have a
fancier name for them, but that is what they are. It just seems
like that this is an asset that we ought to be incorporating
because it does allow you to see over into Mexico and see what
is gathering and have a pretty good view from our side as well.
So I would be interested in your thoughts about that at
some other time. I may have you come by and visit with me.
I also heard Mr. McCaul talk about the fact that the 700
miles of fencing that was authorized and appropriated, which
only half of it is pedestrian fencing, has been pretty much
completed. Is that accurate?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. How much more do you need of pedestrian
fencing? How much more fencing do you need now that you--now
that we have used up what we have appropriated and authorized?
What would be the next ask?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, Congressman, we are in the process of
assessing that right now, matter of fact. Going back to some of
the evaluations and what my staff is currently doing at my
request is taking a look at requirements based on what we know
with the projections for SBI.
Going back and revisiting the personnel, technology, and
infrastructure piece because one of the things I want to be
able to do is we have basically one operational, almost two
operational cycles, if you were, 2 years to see what that
pedestrian fence, what that vehicle barrier has done with
respect to our ability to achieve those levels of operational
control.
Where have the traffic gone, and in some of those areas----
Mr. Rogers. When do you expect to have that assessment?
Mr. Borkowski. Probably within the next few months, sir.
Mr. Rogers. By the end of this calendar year?
Mr. Borkowski. By the end of the calendar year into the
next year when we are talking about our operational planning
cycle, yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. You will be able to talk about not only what
you need as far as fencing but staffing?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. I wanted to visit strategy before my
time is up. I noticed in January Secretary Napolitano announced
a DHS-wide review of SBInet and its alternatives. In February
of this year the budget request, it included a $225 million cut
for border technology.
Then the following month, in March, Secretary Napolitano
froze SBInet funds and transferred $50 million to other
technology. In May, President Obama announced a request of $500
million in emergency funds to boost the border security and
deployment of National Guard.
This is for Chief Fisher. Did they talk with you about any
of these before they made these decisions? Was this part of a
strategy is what I am after?
Mr. Fisher. I have been in discussions with both the CBP
leadership and the Department leadership about requirements,
about, you know, strategy and what we are doing with respect to
the threat. I don't know how much of that was part of those
specific items that you had mentioned, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Well, and I understand the idea of a strategy--
--
Mr. Fisher. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. A little while ago my colleague from Texas
asked Mr. Borkowski a question about, you know, best-case
scenario, and you said you didn't have one. It just really
seems to me that as a part of your plan that you kind of ought
to have an idea of when you are going to achieve certain
milestones and objectives, best-case and worst-case.
I mean, I just think it is fundamental. So I was kind of
maybe uncomfortable to hear you don't have a best-case
scenario. For what that is worth I hope that you all will work
toward that goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I yield back.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
Interesting testimony so far, but I am not surprised by
anything I don't think, but Mr. Borkowski, what is going to
happen to equipment that has already deployed if the Secretary
finds we are not going to continue with SBInet? What is the
plan for that?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, under the nature of a contract like
this the hardware that is already built because it is a cost-
reimbursable contract, if we shut everything down we own it.
Then the question for us is do we continue to operate it or
not?
Now, in Tucson-1 where we have turned this over since
February to the Border Patrol while we are waiting to do the
testing, we are getting value out of it. So my anticipation
would be we would operate it to whatever level it is effective.
The question, as I suggested earlier is how effective is
it? But it is somewhat effective. So I don't think, although we
haven't concluded, I don't think it is likely we just rip it
all apart and not use it. I suspect we would use what we have
got but we wouldn't build any more. That would be the issue.
Mr. Carney. Would you then integrate it with other
technologies that you are assessing now or what are you
assessing now actually?
Mr. Borkowski. All right. The immediate question for the
assessment is do we need to rethink the basic technology
strategy, which was let us deploy SBInet in some incarnation
along the whole border? That will be the meat of our technology
investment.
The question is, is that really the right technology in the
right places? Or are there better mixes and matches, including
things like UAVs, which really weren't in that trade. So the
assessment is do--should we rethink that baseline?
Was that really the right way to define the technology
contribution to border security? Or can we come up with
something that is a little bit more rational that is tailored
to each area of the border?
Some of those might be things like SBInet, but some of them
might be a couple of mobile surveillance systems, a camera
tower, a UAV, you know, a blimp. Okay? So that is the plan.
Now, that is going to take a little while to frame that for
the whole border, which is why I think we are all frustrated
because you would like me to have that today and, frankly, I
can't tell you I do. So that is what we are talking about
assessing.
My expectation is that we would not end up with SBInet all
along the border. Already that doesn't look like a wise thing
to do. It may make some sense. We don't know yet. It may make
some sense in some places. So that is the plan.
In terms of integrating, that is a longer-term question
because if I have UAVs and mobile surveillance systems and so
forth, the question would be is there utility in taking all of
that information, sending it to one place and doing something
called--like data fusing it? It is very expensive, but it has
benefit.
So that would be a vision for the future. The first
question is get technology there in the first place. The second
question is can I do something to enhance the utility of that
technology through things like integration and fusion?
Mr. Carney. Well, the future is now. I think we understand
that.
Chief Fisher, you know, you are supposed to have about 655
miles or so under surveillance with this technology by now, and
it is--we are down to 53--or we are at 53 miles roughly. That
leaves a big gap. I mean, some of that the technology was
supposed to account for fewer Border Patrol agents, right?
I mean they were supposed to do the work that more agents
on the ground should do. What have you done to fill in that gap
to compensate for that shortage of folks on the ground?
Mr. Fisher. Well, we would deploy Border Patrol agents in
there to do the detection capability and/or mobile surveillance
systems, mobile war scopes. We would commonly deploy and
redeploy those resources within an area of operation on a daily
basis anyway.
So the fact that a particular SBInet system isn't doing
that, we are compensating because a threat may still be there
and we have to reduce that vulnerability in other ways.
Mr. Carney. No, I understand that you are compensating, but
do you have adequate forces? I mean--I am kind of re-asking Mr.
Rogers' question here. Do you have enough folks on the ground
to fill the gap that should have been filled by SBInet?
Mr. Fisher. We are currently assessing that as well, Mr.
Chairman, matter of fact, and one of the things we are looking
at as part of the strategy is defining corridors of operation.
Then identifying and prioritizing those corridors to be able to
match the adequate resources against a particular threat in a
prioritized fashion.
So to suggest that we have that all across my answer would
be no, we don't. But then again, going back with what Chairman
Cuellar had mentioned is we have the finite resources and with
respect to the taxpayers' dollars.
How do we then deploy those resources in the appropriate
way to be able to achieve the stated objectives at the most
cost-effective way of doing that? That is what I am charged
with, sir, and that is what we are assessing right now.
Mr. Carney. We cannot wait for your answer, frankly. How
much input do you have as Border Patrol into what Boeing is
doing now?
Mr. Fisher. I don't work directly with Boeing personally
myself. I do----
Mr. Carney. But the CBP does?
Mr. Fisher. Oh, absolutely. Matter of fact, I meet
frequently with Mr. Borkowski. There are Border Patrol agents
assigned to his staff. He is clear as far as what my
operational requirements are as it has being communicated to me
from our field leadership. He constantly checks my thinking
just to make sure that what he is hearing is consistent with
what the discussions that he and I have had.
Mr. Carney. Okay, thank you.
I will recognize Mr. Cuellar for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, just a quick
observation, if we want to do something--I think that if the
private sector wanted to do something or Government wanted to
do something, I think the first thing we would do looking at
the big picture is do the assessment as to what we want to do,
what we want to cover, what technology will be used in
different areas, and then you get to work.
In this case, and I know you are new, Mr. Borkowski. I
appreciate it. I really--because like I said I really like your
attitude. I really do--is it looked like we got into the
project and started working on it and then when Mr. Rogers or
myself or other folks ask you well, you know, what do we need
for the rest? Oh, we haven't gotten to that assessment yet
because we are trying to work on this.
Quite honestly I don't think we gave Boeing the right
directions, you know? You know, I want Boeing to succeed on
this, and I know there have been some issues, but did we do the
assessment for the whole border and following Ms. Miller it is
not only the southern border but the northern border, but right
now we are focusing on the priority which the southern border
is.
Did we do the overall assessment because everything I have
been hearing so far is well, I can't give you a short-term. I
can give you the worst-case scenario but I can't give you the
best-case scenario. We haven't gotten to the assessment. We are
still looking at that.
I mean I would ask you all to really step back, do the
long-term assessment, see what works in south Texas, what works
in California, what works in New Mexico, what works in that
area?
Work with our new chief and do that. I know you all have
been doing that, but we have been asking you, and the responses
we have been getting back is well, we haven't gotten to that
assessment on that.
I think that would be more fair to Boeing or any other
company that you are working with to say this is the overall
assessment. This is what we need. Go ahead and give us the best
product or service in this case.
I would ask you all to really work together on that
assessment because otherwise Mr. Rogers and myself, Mr.
Chairman and other folks, we ask you for that assessment but
you are telling us well, we haven't got to that.
I know you are new. But I would ask you to look at that and
work with us on the committee so we can help you do that
overall assessment. That is it. No answer requirements, just
hopefully saying, ``Yes, I will. We will work on it.'' Thank
you.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Chief, I want to follow up on that a little
bit. I serve on the Armed Services Committee as well, and one
of the things I found in the years I have been there is you are
never going to get a general to tell you he needs something
separate from what the President's budget says or what the
Secretary of Defense is saying.
I don't appreciate that. It is unfair to the Congress to
not be able to get a fair answer from a commanding general as
to what they need in wartime so that we can provide it.
I offer that back up to say this. We need to know if you
need more agents. No matter what the Secretary wants or what
the President wants, if you feel like you need more agents, you
need to tell the people on this committee so we can get them
for you.
So I ask, when you say you haven't got your assessments
yet, do you just not want to tell us? Or do you really not know
if you need more people or not?
Mr. Fisher. I can tell you, sir, my response to your
earlier question about identifying the requirements to--under
our operational definition is to achieve effective operational
control. It is not a numerical equivalent of 19,000 or 25,000.
Not--and even if the threat remained the same, which it
doesn't by the way, and all things were being equal with
respect to the terrain along the southwest border, which it
isn't, and the northern border, is trying to figure out what is
that right combination?
I mean and sometimes I even get frustrated with my staff
when they say well, chief, it depends. It depends, you know,
that right combination of personnel----
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Fisher [continuing]. Technology and infrastructure.
What is interesting is now that we started over the last few
years receiving that, we are starting to see the benefits of
that. So I think we are in a better position over this next
year and the following year to assess what that combination is.
That is why I was mentioning earlier in some of those areas
where we have achieved by our tactical definition effective
operational control. Now the question is: Okay, what is it
going to take to sustain that? Because the thought is within
our strategy, it is going to take more resources in that
combination to gain control than it is to sustain it.
So when we look at those areas and we start developing a
sustainment strategy and what that entails, what I am expecting
is that we will be able to redeploy some of those resources
into other areas where we are gaining control.
So that is why the number may at some point be okay, but we
are using it in a lot more flexible manner. We are being a lot
more mobile with our response capabilities because now we do
have the situational awareness and the detection with the
technology piece.
We have the persistent impedance that the infrastructure
gives us. So now we are using our personnel smarter. We are
using our air assets smarter. So we are coming up with a force
that we are a lot more flexible against those threats.
Mr. Rogers. Well, you know that on its face what is
happening right now with the National Guard being sent back
down there it gives us the impression that you need more
staffing, maybe in support capacities. May not have to be
agents, but you see my point?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I would like to know do you have a problem
after you complete your assessment giving us your unvarnished
opinion notwithstanding how the President or the Secretary
would feel about it?
Mr. Fisher. No, Congressman, I wouldn't have any--I told
this committee in my first testimony that any questions that
you pose to me I will give my honest answer and assessment to
that. I mean, if there are certain circumstances in my tenure
as the chief that I can't answer a question I will tell you
that as well, sir.
Mr. Rogers. But you do understand how we would have
concerns when we see the National Guard having to be mobilized
to come out and help you all, that maybe you need more of your
own people and not having to have the National Guard?
Mr. Fisher. Oh, I understand those concerns----
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Fisher [continuing]. Sir, yes.
Mr. Rogers. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Krone, every deadline that has been set for SBInet has
been missed. What do you account for the failure of the system
to meet the deadlines and what methodologies do you use to
actually calculate those time frames that you are trying to do
something?
Mr. Krone. Thank you, Chairman. First, let me point out
that the schedule that we discussed 3 months ago relative to
completion of systems acceptance testing for both Tucson and
Ajo, we have held those schedules. Although we are not
celebrating, there actually have been some milestones over the
last 4 or 5 months that we have beat. Not by a lot but by some.
I think that is the cumulative result of applying sound
management practices to the program, some of which were pointed
out by the GAO and a lot of rigor that has been brought to the
program by Mr. Borkowski.
As I said before, I have been associated with the program
for about 3 years now. We went on this spiral development
journey to do something that had not been done before.
That is net together a series of sensor towers with a
common operating software and put Border Patrol agents in the
loop to work interactively with the system and fielded Border
Patrol agents, integrating commercial off-the-shelf into a
relatively harsh environment in the southwest border.
We learned a lot along the way about how individual
components, which were well-characterized in and of themselves,
when combined together in this operational scenario would
perform. In many areas we were disappointed--I know the
committee was--in the performance of this total end-to-end
system.
So collectively in partnership with our customer we made
decisions about do we deploy the system as is, if you will, out
of the box, strung together? Or do we spend some time to try to
improve the performance of the system and therefore delay its
systems acceptance testing and eventual hand-over?
So these were, if you will, deliberate decisions that we
made collectively with our customer to get the system right
before we turned it over to the Border Patrol for their use.
Mr. Carney. Understood. So we decided to take more time and
change the goals a little bit, or to a certain degree change
the parameters, which it was not how it was originally sold.
We, you know, we have had this discussion before----
Mr. Krone. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carney [continuing]. And which becomes an issue that we
are, you know, the guardians of the taxpayers' money and, you
know, we said yes to this. Somebody said yes to this and we
want it as sold.
Mr. Borkowski, going back to alternatives, how--are you
seriously considering expanding, say, the Predator fleet or
things like Shadows, you know, smaller UAVs, UAS' to get more--
you are not going to control ground with vision, but you can
certainly point folks in the direction to do that?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes. In fact, we are seriously considering
it, although those decisions are actually going to be made by
folks like Chief Fisher. Somebody asked earlier about, you
know, do we have a dialogue? He is actually the boss.
Mr. Carney. Right.
Mr. Borkowski. He sets what we need and how we use it. But
yes, we have had the small UAVs, certainly, and I know you have
probably talked with General Castellaw and you know his view
and the importance of UAS and UAVs. So yes, we are seriously
considering those.
Mr. Carney. Okay, very good. Now, a number of my colleagues
asked questions, and I will end with this because we have
actually got to go vote. On the time table for your
assessments, you know, we ask questions that have--you probably
should have anticipated a while ago actually. In the--you
haven't done the assessments for us.
So we would like, the next 30 days, assessments on, for
example, you know, best- and worst-case scenarios of
deployment. Because we, you know, we actually have--when are we
going to be able to control the border? Because coming up some
time in the foreseeable future we are going to have to vote on
things like immigration reform.
We can't do that until we have operational control of the
border, until we understand that. I know maybe they go hand-in-
hand. Maybe they are part and parcel of one another, but you
are in a position to provide us with information and we would
love that.
We would also love your schedule on your testing coming up.
You know, what is going to happen? When are the dates of the
testing? What are your parameters for testing? You know, so we
have something to also have a metric to assess by. Okay?
You know, hopefully this is as frustrating for you as it is
for us here. We have got to get this right. You know, we have a
long less-than-secured border, and I am not going to say
completely unsecured because I think what CBP is doing is
remarkable, to be honest. I mean, my hat is off to you guys all
the time.
But in the end we have to be the stewards of the taxpayers'
dollars, of the resources that we have available and protect
this Nation. The threats are increasing rather than decreasing.
Until we do that we cannot consider this homeland secure.
That ends this hearing for this morning. We will have other
questions and we will submit them in writing, and I am--please
encourage you to give us a prompt response. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned
and the hearings were concluded.]
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