[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
VISA SECURITY AND PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING
EFFORTS IN THE WAKE OF FLIGHT 253
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER,
MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-55
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
Henry Cuellar, Texas, Chairwoman
Loretta Sanchez, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Jane Harman, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Al Green, Texas Officio)
Vacancy
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Alison Northrop, Staff Director
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.......................... 1
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
Witnesses
Mr. Raymond R. Parmer, Jr., Director, Office of International
Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Thomas S. Winkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. David T. Donahue, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa
Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
VISA SECURITY AND PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING EFFORTS IN THE WAKE OF FLIGHT
253
----------
Thursday, March 11, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:32 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson, Pascrell, and
Souder.
Mr. Cuellar [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order. The Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Terrorism--Counterterrorism is meeting today to receive
testimony on visa security, passenger pre-screening efforts in
the wake of Flight 253.
Today the subcommittee is meeting to examine the visa
security and passenger pre-screening efforts in the wake of the
Flight 253 incidence--you know, happened around Christmas day
of last year.
It is my hope that we build--we will be using this hearing
to build on the hearing that the Chairman of the full committee
had in January. We will be taking his foundation and work from
there.
Mr. Chairman, we want to thank you, of course, for that.
Now that we have an understanding of the failures that left
us vulnerable to attack, the subcommittee is examining as to
what steps DHS, the State Department and the Federal and
international partners are taking to address those
vulnerabilities.
Along with other Members of this committee I recently had
the opportunity to view some of those efforts first-hand. Last
week I visited--we visited the Customs Border Protection
National Targeting Center and was briefed by immigration and
customs enforcement about the Visa Security Program.
I am encouraged by much of what has happened since that
and, of course, what we have learned. Security in our skies
starts with what we do on the ground.
I am glad that CBP is doing more than just screening
passengers prior to departure for the United States, even
though they have a limited number of physical presence at a
number of the airports. They are making the most of existing
technology and utilizing relationships with regional carrier
liaisons, which makes good sense.
We must not forget that our airports are also the border
ports of entry. That is why ICE is deploying additional units
under its Visa Security Program, or VSP, as it is known, to
strategic, high-risk visa issuing posts around the world.
However, more remains to be done. We need to look how CBP
can further improve its pre-screening process to target those
who seek to do us harm, without unduly delaying the legitimate
travel. That balance is so important between security and, of
course, commerce.
We also must explore whether we are making the most of the
ICE Visa Security Program, and if it should be deployed to
additional high-risk embassies and consulates.
Furthermore, we should examine how the State Department and
the Department of Homeland can improve their coordination and
their cooperation. The coordination, the cooperation, and
communication is what we call the Three C's.
I have always advocated that as Government agencies, we
should share more information. The more we can do together, the
better it is for the people that we serve, our customers, our
taxpayers, the people of America.
I know that ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton has been
visiting our embassies to conduct outreach and discuss the
program.
However, I do have to say that I was troubled that the
State Department's recent denial of the VSP application for a
post in the Middle East. My understanding that there is a sign
of commitment to the interagency cooperation post-Flight 253,
and clearly we have a ways to go on this.
But I was pleased to hear that since that, the State
Department has reversed its decision, and hopefully that will
set the tone for the future, and the cooperation between ICE
and Homeland and the State Department is so important for us as
the committee.
Of course, ICE and CBP are only part of the equation. Many
of the problems that contributed to the Christmas day incident
were intelligence and information-sharing failures. As
Secretary Napolitano has stated, DHS is largely a consumer of
the watch list.
We need to make sure we get ICE and CBP, as our frontline
officers and agents at the--at America's land, sea, and
airports the information they need so they can do their job in
a proper way. Pre-screening passengers is one of our last lines
of defense in securing our skies.
Also, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I want to thank you. This
is my first hearing as Chairman of this subcommittee, and I
certainly want to say thank you very much for that opportunity,
Mr. Chairman.
Of course I will look forward to working with my Ranking
Member, Mr. Souder, who has been very interested and very
cooperative as we work in a bipartisan way.
Certainly, we want to do everything we can to address the
border and maritime security matters that come before this
subcommittee.
My approach as Chairman is going to be very simple. We want
to work together. It is not us versus you. We are all on the
same team. You might be the Executive branch. We might be the
Legislative branch. But we should work together. There will be
no surprises.
We are hoping, Mr. Chairman, that we get no surprises from
our agencies also. If there is a problem, we would like to know
before we read about it in the newspaper, as it happened in the
past. I think it is a very simple request that we are making.
I think if we do that, Mr. Chairman, I think we can have a
dialogue that will be for the betterment of the folks that we
serve.
So I want to thank the witnesses for joining us here and
for the courageous work that you all do every day and for
keeping us safe. We want to say thank you. I look forward to
your testimony and continuing our dialogue about how we can
work together to make our Nation more secure.
I know our Ranking Member is not here. I know there are--
they have a big meeting. But certainly, I would like to
recognize the Chairman of the full committee, the gentleman
from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
associate myself with your earlier statement.
Logistically, they have just called six votes. That is the
bad news. The good news--those are the only votes for the day,
so hopefully we can, Mr. Chairman, adjourn and come right back.
We can beg the indulgence of our witnesses.
You have made your statement quite clear. Cooperation and
coordination is absolutely important in this process. The
public expects no less. The assumption is that the right hand
really ought to know what the left hand is doing.
In the spirit of cooperation and coordination, Congress has
put the necessary tools in place with the professional help to
make that happen. The missteps in Jerusalem you just talked
about is unfortunate. Hopefully it won't happen again.
We have been assured, I think, at the staff level that that
has been corrected and hopefully the State Department will work
a little closer with us in the future.
I will, in the interest of time, Mr. Chair, include my
formal statement for the record, and I will yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Without objection. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
March 11, 2010
In January, the Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing to
examine the circumstances surrounding the attempted bombing of
Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas day.
From our examination of the chain of events leading up to the
incident, it is clear there were several failures that allowed the
alleged perpetrator to board the U.S.-bound flight.
I am pleased that today's hearing will build on what we have
learned by focusing on what we are doing, both now and over the long
term, to eliminate the security gaps revealed by Flight 253.
As I stated earlier this year, we will not eradicate all terrorist
threats overnight nor with a single technology.
Instead, we must develop a layered security approach that pushes
borders out and begins far in advance of a passenger boarding a U.S.-
bound flight.
With respect to the Department of Homeland Security, that will
require a number of initiatives, including enhancing ICE's Visa
Security Program (or ``VSP'') and strengthening CBP's passenger pre-
screening activities.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Congress recognized
the importance of securing the visa process and required it to be used
as a counterterrorism tool.
Mandating the Visa Security Program was one of these efforts.
By deploying experienced ICE agents at overseas posts, the program
attempts to identify potential threats before they reach our borders.
Despite the legislative mandate to deploy Visa Security Units to
high-risk posts, VSP expansion has been slow.
The current process can be cumbersome, and there appears to be some
resistance to expanding the program.
I was troubled by the State Department's denial last month of ICE's
application for a new VSP unit at a very strategic post--even in the
wake of Flight 253.
At the same time, it is DHS' responsibility to ensure that
applications are submitted in a timely way and that it makes the most
of the positions granted.
In short, improved coordination and cooperation between DHS and the
State Department are essential to the success of the program.
With respect to passenger pre-screening efforts, CBP has recently
strengthened some of their processes to ensure greater scrutiny of
certain passengers prior to departure, rather than waiting until they
arrive at U.S. airports.
I want to hear more about those enhancements and what else we can
do without unduly delaying legitimate travelers.
Those who would do us harm do not stick to the status quo, and we
cannot either.
In closing, I would like to congratulate Representative Cuellar on
his chairmanship. I look forward to continued good work from this
subcommittee under his leadership.
I thank the witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Cuellar. I guess at this time what we are going to do
is we are going to excuse ourselves so we can go vote.
How much time do we actually have? About 10 minutes. Well,
why don't we at least get the preliminary work out of the way?
Let me do the introductions, so when we come back we can go
ahead and get started.
So, Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me, first--our first
witness, so we can do the introductions--our first witness is
Mr. Raymond Parmer, Jr., who is the director of ICE Office of
International Affairs, the largest international component
within the Department of Homeland Security.
He has served in a variety of key ICE management positions,
including as the deputy director of ICE Office of
Investigations--again, the largest investigative arm of DHS.
With over 20 years of law enforcement experience, Mr.
Parmer has served as the special agent in supervisory--special
agent in a number of U.S. Customs Services Office of
Investigation field and headquarters offices.
Again, Mr. Parmer, thank you very much for being here with
us.
Again, our second witness, Thomas Winkowski, was first
appointed assistant commissioner for the Office of Field
Operations at Customs and Border Protection in August 2007.
In that position he manages an operating budget approaching
$2.5 billion, directs the activities of 24,000 employees and
oversees programs and operations of 20 major field offices, 326
ports of entry, 58 operational Container Security Initiative
ports and 15 pre-clearance stations.
Mr. Winkowski, again, we want to thank you. We got that
tour of the center last week, and we want to thank you for your
hospitality and the information that you provided us last week.
Our third witness is Mr. David Donahue, who has been the
deputy assistant secretary for visa services in September 2008.
Mr. Donahue, thank you very much for being here with us.
Prior to that, he was the director of the Office of Policy
Coordination and Public Affairs in the Bureau of Consular
Affairs. He was a minister counselor for the consular affairs
in Mexico City from 2005 and 2007. I guess you served there
with my friend Tony Garza from South Texas, also, Brownsville,
Texas.
Previous to that, he served at posts in the Philippines,
Pakistan, Singapore, Trinidad, and Washington, DC. Mr. Donahue
joined the Foreign Service in 1983.
Again, I want to thank all of you all for being here.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record, and we will ask you to hold at ease for
a while, and we will be back right after the votes. Thank you
very much for being here.
Committee recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Cuellar. All right. The subcommittee will resume again.
I believe Mr. Souder has a statement, and you want--you
just want to go ahead and submit that for the record? Okay.
Without objection, the record will be--the statement will be
part of the record.
[The statement of Mr. Souder follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Mark E. Souder
March 11, 2010
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to congratulate you on
the new subcommittee chairmanship. I know that we have had some
briefings prior to this but this is your first official hearing as the
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Chair. I look forward to
working with you over the rest of the Congress to examine issues under
the subcommittee's purview.
I am pleased that we are here to examine visa security and
passenger prescreening efforts in the wake of Flight 253. I also want
to thank our witnesses for appearing before our subcommittee today to
discuss this very important topic.
I want to say at the outset that, in my view, the Department needs
to more aggressively strengthen its capabilities to improve visa
security, bolster passenger prescreening, and expand border security
efforts overseas to prevent potential terrorists from boarding
airplanes bound for the United States.
The events of this past Christmas day show that terrorists remain
committed to exploiting weaknesses in our homeland security and
carrying out horrendous acts of violence against American citizens in a
very coordinated and methodical manner.
I am quite concerned that our visa security and passenger
prescreening efforts are not nearly as comprehensive and robust as they
need to be to prevent someone like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab from
slipping through cracks in our defenses.
Unfortunately, we need only look at the Department's budget request
for terrorist travel programs related to visa security and passenger
prescreening to see those cracks. The Department's fiscal year 2011
budget request fails to sufficiently fund key programs and initiatives
that can help identify terrorists seeking to travel to the United
States. It represents a missed opportunity to expand border security
efforts overseas and move toward a more coordinated strategy for
expanding our Nation's security perimeter.
For instance, funding for the Visa Security Program, which places
ICE personnel in high-risk locations overseas to more carefully
scrutinize visa applicants, will not allow for expansion of this
critical terrorist detection program in needed areas. ICE has
identified several dozen locations in which Visa Security Units should
be located, but insufficient funding and diplomatic resistance from the
State Department has slowed its expansion, so much so that it would
take many years to put units where ICE has identified that they are
needed.
The budget for CBP eliminates funding for advanced passenger
screening and targeting to help determine whether passengers should be
prevented from boarding flights prior to their departure for the United
States. These programs help assess potential passenger risk and
determine whether heightened scrutiny of those passengers is necessary.
CBP has acknowledged that this reduction will have an operational
impact, but insists that the funds used for these programs are needed
for other priorities. I understand that there is intention to continue
to fund this mission from within the base CBP budget, while a good step
raises transparency issues and begs the question of what else is being
cut.
The budget also fails to provide additional funding for tracking
foreign students in the United States and would eliminate funding for
the US-VISIT air exit, which is a key program necessary to identify
visa overstays. It is extremely disconcerting that DHS would present a
budget to Congress without funding or a plan to address this
vulnerability.
These programs, and other existing capabilities to detect and
disrupt terrorist travel, should be guided by a strategic plan designed
to maximize our ability to connect-the-dots given appropriate
information and further enhance the layered security necessary to stop
future attacks. Congress has given the Department the tools its needs
to push our border perimeter far beyond our physical shore so that
terrorists are not able to get into the country to commit their
despicable acts like they did on 9/11.
I am greatly troubled then that nearly 8\1/2\ years after the
September 11 attacks, the Department either plans to scale back or
fails to aggressively move forward on initiatives and programs that can
help prevent a repeat of such terrible events.
I hope that we are going to hear from today's witnesses about how
visa security has been improved and passenger prescreening has and can
be further strengthened in the aftermath of the attempted bombing of
Flight 253. I certainly have my doubts based on the Department's budget
request for these areas for the coming fiscal year.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you are as committed as I am to ensuring
that we are doing everything within our power to expand our border
security efforts overseas to protect American citizens and prevent
terrorists from entering our country. I hope today's hearing will
provide insights to help us do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Cuellar. At this time, as you recall--and again, we
apologize. As you know, we have had different votes. We just
finished, I believe, for the day, so what we will do now is
that we will go ahead and start off with the witnesses.
Mr. Parmer, as you know, we just introduced everybody right
before we left, so we will start off with Mr. Parmer. I would
ask you to summarize your statement for 5 minutes, and then we
will go on with Tom, and then other folks here will go ahead
and ask the questions.
So, Mr. Parmer.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND R. PARMER, JR., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Parmer. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, thank
you on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary
Morton for the opportunity to discuss the international efforts
of ICE to protect National security and prevent terrorist
attacks.
Today, I would like to discuss the Visa Security Program in
the context of the 9/11 Commission's findings, which emphasized
the importance of our immigration system more thoroughly
vetting individuals entering our country and developing
functional counterterrorism measures.
Within the Department of Homeland Security, ICE's Visa
Security Program is one of a number of programs designed to
protect the homeland and identify individuals who present a
risk before they can harm the United States.
The Visa Security Program places ICE special agents in a
U.S. embassies to work collaboratively with Department of State
consular officers and diplomatic security agents to secure the
visa adjudication process.
Before describing the Visa Security Program, the plans for
expansion and challenges of expanding, let me describe ICE's
international efforts more generally.
As the second-largest Federal investigative agency, ICE has
a significant international footprint. Through our Office of
International Affairs, ICE has 63 offices in 44 countries that
are staffed by over 300 personnel.
ICE personnel in these offices collaborate with foreign
counterparts to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal
organizations engaged in money laundering, contraband
smuggling, weapons proliferation, forced child labor, human
rights violations, intellectual property rights violations,
child exploitation, human smuggling and trafficking, as well as
facilitate repatriation of individuals with final orders of
removal.
ICE's Office of International Affairs is also responsible
for administering and staffing the Visa Security Program. The
visa adjudication process is often the first opportunity our
Government has to assess whether a potential visitor or
immigrant presents a threat to the United States.
The U.S. Government has long recognized the importance of
this function to National security. DHS regards the visa
process as an important part of the border security strategy,
and the Visa Security Program is one of several programs
focused on minimizing global risks.
The Visa Security Program relies on trained, experienced
investigators to look at an applicant in greater depth and
examine their social networks and business relationships with a
goal of developing information previously unknown to the U.S.
Government to assess whether individual applicants pose
security threats to the United States.
To conduct a thorough investigation, an ICE agent assigned
to a Visa Security Unit must have the ability to interview the
applicant of concern and must be exposed to local information
to understand whether the applicant's affiliations raise any
particular flags.
Each individual security--Visa Security Unit, with input
from the State Department, develops a targeting plan based on
assessed conditions and threats. Depending on the nature of the
concern that an applicant poses a threat, the ICE agent's
investigation may be complex and in depth, and in some cases
taking months to complete.
Of course, not every investigation lasts months. ICE agents
assigned to the Visa Security Program are experienced law
enforcement agents who have spent years developing interview,
interrogation, and other skills while investigating crimes in
the United States.
Visa Security Program efforts complement the consular
officers' responsibility for interviewing the applicant,
reviewing the application and supporting documentation, and
conducting automated screening of criminal and terrorist
databases, with proactive law enforcement vetting and
investigation.
ICE now has Visa Security Units at 14 high-risk visa
adjudication posts in 12 countries. At these 14 posts, in
fiscal year 2009, ICE agents screened approximately 905,000
visa applicants and, with their State Department colleagues,
determined that about 302,000 required further review.
Following investigation, in collaboration with State
Department, ICE recommended refusal of over 1,000 applicants.
In every instance, State Department followed the Visa Security
Unit recommendation and ultimately refused to issue the visa.
Visa Security Program recommendations have also resulted in
State Department visa revocations.
Under the direction of the Homeland Security Council,
beginning in May 2008, ICE and the State Department
collaborated on the development of the Visa Security Program
site selection methodology. The process for selecting a
particular site for a Visa Security Unit begins with a site
evaluation, which involves a quantitative analysis of threats
posed and site assessment visits.
The DHS formal nomination process follows, which involves
an analysis of ICE's proposal by DHS. Then, the National
Security Decision Directive--38 process, which is a mechanism
that gives the chief of mission in a particular post control
over the size, composition, and mandate of full-time staffing
for the post, commences within the State Department. Only once
the chief of mission has approved an NSDD-38 request can ICE
begin deployment.
ICE continues to look for opportunities to establish new
offices overseas to screen and vet additional visa applicants
at high-risk visa-issuing posts.
Based on collaborative site selection methodology with the
State Department, ICE has conducted additional classified
threat assessments in preparation for joint ICE-State
Department site visits to embassies and consulates abroad.
Assistant Secretary Morton and his counterpart at the State
Department are engaged now in a process of determining a common
strategic approach to the broader question of how to
collectively secure the visa issuance process.
I would now like to briefly discuss the security advisory
opinion process, which is administered by the State Department
and supported by other Government agencies to provide consular
officers advice and background information to adjudicate visa
applications abroad in cases of security or foreign policy
interest.
In May 2007, Congress mandated the creation of a Security
Advisory Opinion Unit within the Visa Security Program. The
Visa Security Program now supports the SAO process and the
Security Advisory Opinion Unit's findings are incorporated into
the overall SAO recommendation used by consular officers to
adjudicate visa applications.
The Security Advisory Opinion currently has co-located
personnel at the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center and
CBP's National Targeting Center for Passengers and also has
personnel assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center.
The integration of the Security Advisory Opinion Unit into
these centers allows for real-time dissemination of
intelligence between the various stakeholders in the visa
adjudication process.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for the subcommittee's continued support of ICE and
our law enforcement mission.
Assistant Secretary Morton and I, in partnership with State
Department, CBP and other vital partners, will continue
collaborating to ensure the security of the visa while
maintaining a fair and efficient process for legitimate
visitors and immigrants to enter the United States.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you would have
at this time.
[The statement of Mr. Parmer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond R. Parmer, Jr.
March 11, 2010
introduction
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant
Secretary Morton, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
international efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
to protect National security and prevent terrorist attacks. Today, I
plan to discuss the Visa Security Program (VSP) in the context of the
9/11 Commission's findings, which emphasized the importance of our
immigration system more thoroughly vetting individuals entering our
country and developing functional counterterrorism measures. Within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE's VSP is one of a number of
programs designed to protect the homeland and identify individuals who
present a risk before they can harm the United States. The VSP places a
DHS law enforcement officer (i.e., an ICE special agent) in a U.S.
embassy to work collaboratively with Department of State (DOS) consular
officers and Diplomatic Security Agents to secure the visa adjudication
process. Before describing the VSP, our budget, the plans for
expansion, and challenges of expanding, let me describe ICE's
international efforts more generally.
ICE's Presence Overseas
ICE, as the second-largest Federal investigative agency, has a
significant international footprint. ICE, through our Office of
International Affairs (OIA), has 63 offices in 44 countries, staffed by
more than 300 personnel. ICE personnel in these offices collaborate
with foreign counterparts in joint efforts to disrupt and dismantle
transnational criminal organizations engaged in money laundering,
contraband smuggling, weapons proliferation, forced child labor, human
rights violations, intellectual property rights violations, child
exploitation, and human smuggling and trafficking, and facilitate
repatriation of individuals with final orders of deportation. In fiscal
year 2009, ICE opened offices in: Amman, Jordan; Brussels, Belgium;
Cartagena, Colombia; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Jakarta, Indonesia and
continued to expand its coordination with U.S. military commands,
specifically United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), United States
African Command (AFRICOM), and United States European Command (EUCOM).
In fiscal year 2010, to increase our overseas presence and advance the
efforts to investigate crimes that reach beyond our borders, ICE is
proposing to open offices in Afghanistan, Israel, Vietnam, and Yemen.
ICE's OIA is responsible for administering and staffing the VSP.
The Visa Security Program
During the creation of DHS, Congress gave DHS some oversight
responsibilities for the visa process. Specifically, Section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 authorized the Secretary of
Homeland Security to: Administer and enforce the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and other laws relating to visas; refuse visas
for individual applicants in accordance with law; assign DHS officers
to diplomatic posts to perform visa security activities; initiate
investigations of visa security-related matters; and provide advice and
training to consular officers. In short, the HSA directed DHS to assist
in the identification of National security threats to the visa security
process.
The visa adjudication process is often the first opportunity our
Government has to assess whether a potential visitor or immigrant
presents a threat to the United States. The U.S. Government has long
recognized the importance of this function to National security. DHS
regards the visa process as an important part of the border security
strategy, and VSP is one of several programs focused on minimizing
global risks. The VSP relies on trained law enforcement agents to look
at an applicant in greater depth and examine their social networks and
business relationships with a goal of developing information previously
unknown to the U.S. Government to assess whether individual applicants
pose security threats to the United States. ICE agents assigned to Visa
Security Units (VSU) are professional law enforcement agents who focus
on selected applicants and any connection the applicants may have to
terrorism. In the context of the visa security process, they begin by
reviewing documents submitted by applicants, and reviewing the results
of automated checks (from the Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS), and others). To conduct a thorough investigation, an ICE agent
assigned to a VSU must have the ability to interview the applicant of
concern and must be exposed to local information to understand whether
the applicant's affiliations raise any particular flags. Each
individual VSU, with input from DOS, develops a targeting plan, based
on assessed conditions and threats. Depending on the nature of the
concern that an applicant poses a threat, the ICE agent's investigation
may be complex and in-depth, in some cases taking months to complete.
Of course, not every investigation lasts months. ICE agents assigned to
the VSP are experienced law enforcement agents who have spent years
developing interview, interrogation, and other skills while
investigating crimes in the United States.
DHS does not participate in all visa adjudication procedures;
rather, DHS becomes a part of the process following initial screening
of an applicant. As such, where VSUs are present, DOS consular officers
and ICE agents must establish effective and productive partnerships in
order to enhance the security of the visa process.
VSP efforts complement the consular officers' responsibility for
interviewing the applicant, reviewing the application, and supporting
documentation and conducting automated screening of criminal and
terrorist databases, with proactive law enforcement vetting and
investigation. In carrying out this mission, ICE special agents conduct
targeted, in-depth law enforcement-focused reviews of individual visa
applications and applicants prior to issuance, as well as recommend
refusal or revocation of applications when warranted.
ICE now has VSUs at 14 high-risk visa adjudication posts in 12
countries. While I can not identify the specific posts in this forum, I
will gladly brief the Members and staff of this subcommittee in a
classified or law enforcement-sensitive setting at a later date. At
these 14 posts, in fiscal year 2009, ICE agents screened 904,620 visa
applicants and with their DOS colleagues determined that 301,700
required further review. Following investigation, in collaboration with
their DOS colleagues, ICE recommended refusal of over 1,000 applicants.
In every instance, DOS followed the VSU recommendation and ultimately
refused to issue the visa. VSP recommendations have also resulted in
DOS visa revocations.
Expansion of the Visa Security Program
Under the direction of the Homeland Security Council, beginning in
May 2008, ICE and DOS collaborated on the development of the VSP Site
Selection Methodology. In brief, the process for selecting a particular
site for a VSU begins with an ICE site evaluation, which involves a
quantitative analysis of threats posed and site assessment visits. The
DHS formal nomination process follows, involving an analysis of ICE's
proposals by DHS. Then, the National Security Decision Directive--38
(NSDD-38) process, a mechanism that gives the Chief of Mission in a
particular post control over the size, composition, and mandate of
full-time staffing for the post, commences within DOS. Only once the
Chief of Mission has approved an NSDD-38 request can ICE begin
deployment.
ICE continues to look for opportunities to establish offices
overseas to screen and vet additional visa applicants at high-risk visa
issuing posts beyond the 14 posts at which we are currently operating.
The fiscal year 2010 budget designated $7.3 million for VSP expansion.
With this funding level, ICE estimates that it can deploy to four
additional posts. ICE has been conducting site visits and facilitating
the NSDD-38 process in an effort to determine whether it would be
beneficial to expand VSP operations to additional high-risk visa
adjudicating posts. Based on collaborative site selection methodology
with DOS, ICE conducted additional classified threat assessments on
four posts in preparation for joint VSP-DOS site visits to embassies/
consulates abroad. The VSP program has continued to grow since its
inception. While ICE is continuing to expand the program, further
expansion is contingent on ICE's dedicating existing overseas funding
to these efforts and approval of NSDD-38 requests at the posts in
question.
ICE will continue moving forward to deploy new offices to the
highest risk visa adjudicating posts worldwide as resources allow, and
will continue to conduct joint site visits with DOS to create
opportunities for deployment. Moreover, ICE recognizes that the VSP is
but one relatively small component in the Nation's counterterrorism
strategy. Assistant Secretary Morton and his counterparts at DOS are
engaged now in a process of determining a common strategic approach to
the broader question of how best to collectively secure the visa
issuance process. We look forward to continuing to report back to you
with updates on this process.
Recent Successes
To put the VSP discussion in perspective, I offer two brief
examples of the results of including ICE in the visa process. In
September 2008, DOS raised concerns about visa applicants sponsored by
an international non-governmental sports group. ICE investigated and
determined that the majority of past applicants sponsored by the group
remained in the United States beyond their period of admission and that
the sport group's president had three previous visa denials, with one
on National security grounds. ICE disseminated information about
potential future applicants throughout DHS and to DOS visa-issuing
posts. This equipped CBP inspectors stationed at airports and the
border and DOS consular officers with detailed information about the
sports group to prevent future use of the club as a mechanism to gain
entry into the United States, and to prevent National security threats
from exploiting the scheme to gain entry.
Second, in July 2009, again while examining visa applications, ICE
agents identified an Iranian national who applied for a visitor's visa
to come to the United States to attend an information technology (IT)
conference on behalf of his employer. Although the Security Advisory
Opinion (SAO) process did not reveal a basis to find the Iranian
national ineligible, ICE's review revealed that the Iranian national's
employer--on whose behalf he was attending the IT conference--is an
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-designated organization
allegedly used by the government of Iran to transfer money to terrorist
organizations, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine--General Command and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
The visa applicant himself stated that he planned to attend the IT
conference to explore the purchase of technology for his employer.
While attending the conference alone did not render the Iranian
national inadmissible, the combination of attending on behalf of his
employer (an OFAC-designated entity) and the stated purpose to
``explore purchasing options'' for IT equipment constituted reasonable
grounds for denial of the visa. Therefore, ICE recommended that DOS
deny the visa on National security grounds, in accordance with the INA,
as his purpose for coming to the United States was to possibly procure
IT equipment for a designated OFAC organization. DOS concurred with
ICE's recommendation and denied the visa.
I offer these examples to illustrate in real terms the benefit of a
strong working relationship with DOS, and how the partnership advances
the goal of preventing those who may intend to harm the United States
from using a visa to enter our Nation.
The Visa Security Program's Security Advisory Opinion Unit (SAOU)
The Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process is the mechanism
administered by DOS, supported by other Government agencies, to provide
consular officers advice and background information to adjudicate visa
applications abroad in cases of security or foreign policy interest. In
May 2007, Congress mandated the creation of a Security Advisory Opinion
Unit (SAOU) within the VSP. VSP now supports the SAO process and the
SAOU's findings are incorporated into the overall SAO recommendation
used by consular officers to adjudicate targeted visa applications of
National security or foreign policy interest.
The SAOU is currently operating a pilot program that screens visa
applicants and communicates any potential admissibility concerns to
DOS. The SAOU currently has co-located personnel at the Human Smuggling
and Trafficking Center (HSTC), the National Targeting Center-Passenger
(NTC-P), both located in the National Capital Region, and also has
personnel assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The
integration of the SAOU into these centers allows for real-time
dissemination of intelligence between the various stakeholders in the
visa adjudication process.
conclusion
I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
testify today and for its continued support of ICE and our law
enforcement mission. Assistant Secretary Morton and I, in partnership
with the State Department and other vital partners, will continue
collaborating to ensure the security of the visa while maintaining a
fair and efficient process for legitimate visitors and immigrants to
enter the United States.
I would be pleased to answer questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Parmer, for your testimony.
At this time I will recognize Mr. Winkowski for 5 minutes
for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Winkowski. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member
Souder, and thank you for the opportunity to appear today to
discuss the steps U.S. Customs and Border Protection takes to
pre-screen travelers bound for the United States.
I appreciate the committee's leadership and your steadfast
efforts to ensure security of the American people.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to thank you for
taking the time from your busy schedule to visit us at the NTC
a few weeks ago.
Today I want to describe the role that CBP currently
performs in aviation security and the enhanced security
measures implemented in the aftermath of the attempted
Christmas day attack.
As part of our efforts to screen passengers bound for the
United States, CBP is an end-user of the U.S. Government's
consolidated terrorist watch list, which we use to help keep
potential terrorists off flights bound for the United States
and identify travelers that require additional screening.
The majority of travelers bound for the United States are
required to either have a visa issued by the Department of
State or are traveling under the Visa Waiver Program, an
electronic travel authorization issued through the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization, most commonly referred to now
as ESTA.
ESTA enables CBP to conduct enhanced screening of VWP
applicants in advance of travel to the United States in order
to assess whether they could pose a risk to the Nation. When a
traveler purchases a ticket for the--for travel to the United
States, a passenger name record may be generated in the
airlines reservation system.
A PNR may contain various data elements such as itinerary,
co-travelers, changes to the reservation and payment
information. CBP receives PNR data from the airline at various
stages, beginning as early as 72 hours prior to departure and
concluding at the scheduled departure time of the flight.
CBP uses the Automated Targeting System to evaluate the PNR
data against targeting rules. It is important to note that PNR
data received by airlines varies and may be incomplete, thus
resulting--reflecting different information than the person's
actual travel documentation.
On the day of departure, when an individual checks in for
his intended flight, the basic biographic information from the
individual's passport is collected by the air carrier and
submitted to CBP's Advance Passenger Information System, APIS.
APIS data is far more complete and considered more accurate
than PNR data. DHS screens APIS information on international
flights to and from the United States against the Terrorist
Screening Database, TSDB, as well as against criminal history
information, records of lost or stolen passports and prior
immigration or customs violations.
At nine airports in seven countries, CBP officers are
stationed under the Immigration Advisory Program. Working with
CBP's National Targeting Center, IAP officers are provided
information on certain passengers who may constitute a security
risk.
These officers can then make no-board recommendations to
carriers and host governments but do not have the authority to
arrest, detain, or prevent passengers from boarding planes.
While flights are en route to the United States, CBP
continues to evaluate the APIS and PNR information submitted by
the airlines. At this point, a further assessment of
individuals' admissibility into the United States is conducted
and a determination is made as to whether an individual
requires additional screening prior to admission.
Upon arrival in the United States, travelers present
themselves to a CBP officer for inspection. Based on the
information gathered during the in-flight analysis as well as
the on-site CBP officers' inspection, which includes examining
travel documents, observing and interviewing the traveler, a
determination is made as to whether the traveler should be
referred for a secondary inspection or admitted to the United
States.
Since Christmas day, CBP has undertaken a number of steps
to enhance our current process. We have expanded the
information referred to IAP officers. We also began additional
pre-screening of passengers traveling from non-IAP locations.
Officers assigned to our Regional Carrier Liaison Group, of
which we have three around the country working for--working
with the NTC, makes recommendations to foreign carriers to deny
boarding to individuals traveling to the United States who have
been identified as being a National security risk, are
ineligible for admission, or are traveling on fraudulent or
fraudulently obtained documents.
Through intelligence-sharing agreements, CBP continues to
work with our foreign government counterparts as well as CBP
and ICE attaches in order to share information as necessary and
appropriate.
While we address the circumstances behind the specific
incident, we must also recognize the evolving threat posed by
terrorists and take action to ensure that our defenses continue
to evolve in order to defeat them.
We live in a world of ever-changing risk, and we must move
as aggressively as possible both to find and fix security flaws
and anticipate future vulnerabilities.
Chairman Cuellar, thank you very much for the opportunity
to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Winkowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas S. Winkowski
March 11, 2010
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to
discuss the steps U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) takes to
pre-screen travelers bound for the United States. I appreciate the
committee's leadership, and your steadfast efforts to ensure the
security of the American people.
The attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253 on December 25 was a
powerful reminder that terrorists will go to great lengths to defeat
the security measures that have been put in place since September 11,
2001. As Secretary Napolitano has testified at recent hearings
regarding the attempted attack, this administration is determined to
thwart terrorist plots and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist
networks by employing multiple layers of defense that work in concert
with one another to secure our country. This is an effort that involves
not just CBP, but components across the Department of Homeland Security
and many other Federal agencies as well as State, local, Tribal,
territorial, private sector, and international partners.
Today I want to describe the role that CBP currently performs in
aviation security and the enhanced security measures implemented in the
aftermath of the attempted Christmas day attack.
cbp's role in multiple layers of defense
Since 9/11, the U.S. Government has employed multiple layers of
defense across several departments and agencies to secure the aviation
sector and ensure the safety of the traveling public. Different Federal
agencies bear different responsibilities, while other countries and the
private sector--especially the air carriers themselves--also have
important roles to play.
CBP is responsible for securing our Nation's borders while
facilitating the movement of legitimate travel and trade vital to our
economy. Our purview spans more than 5,000 miles of border with Canada
and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico. CBP is the largest uniformed,
Federal law enforcement agency in the country, with over 20,000 Border
Patrol Agents operating between the ports of entry and more than 20,000
CBP officers stationed at air, land, and sea ports Nation-wide. These
forces are supplemented with more than 1,100 Air and Marine agents, and
2,300 agricultural specialists and other professionals. In fiscal year
2009 alone, CBP processed more than 360 million pedestrians and
passengers, 109 million conveyances, apprehended over 556,000 illegal
aliens between our ports of entry, encountered over 224,000
inadmissible aliens at the ports of entry, and seized more than 5.2
million pounds of illegal drugs. Every day, CBP processes over 1
million travelers seeking to enter the United States by land, air, or
sea.
In order to counter the threat of terrorism and secure our borders,
CBP relies on a balanced mix of professional law enforcement personnel,
advanced technologies, and fully modernized facilities and
infrastructure both at and between the ports of entry. We deploy a
cadre of highly trained agents and officers who utilize state-of-the-
art technologies to quickly detect, analyze, and respond to illegal
breaches across the borders. These personnel rely upon a solid backbone
of tactical infrastructure to facilitate their access to border areas
while impeding illegal entry by persons or vehicles into the United
States. CBP Officers utilize advanced targeting, screening, and
inspection technologies to quickly identify persons or cargo that
warrant additional scrutiny without unduly impeding the traveling
public or commerce.
CBP and Intelligence
In 2007, CBP created the Office of Intelligence and Operations
Coordination (OIOC), which serves as the situational awareness hub for
CBP, providing timely, relevant information, and actionable
intelligence to operators and decision-makers and improving
coordination of CBP-wide operations. Through prioritization and
mitigation of emerging threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, OIOC
enables CBP to better function as an intelligence-driven operational
organization. The OIOC serves as a single, central repository for
agency-wide intelligence, while exploring new ways to analyze and fuse
information.
As part of our efforts to screen passengers bound for the United
States, CBP is a consumer of the U.S. Government's consolidated
terrorist watch list, which we use to help keep potential terrorists
off flights bound for the United States and to identify travelers that
require additional screening. Specifically, DHS uses the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB), managed by the Terrorist Screening Center,
as well as other information provided through the intelligence
community, to determine who may board flights, who requires further
screening and investigation, who should not be admitted, or who should
be referred to appropriate law enforcement personnel.
National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P)
A key tool for DHS in analyzing, assessing, and making
determinations based on the TSDB and other intelligence information, is
the National Targeting Center (NTC). The NTC is a 24/7 operation,
established to provide tactical targeting information aimed at
interdicting terrorists, criminal actors, and prohibited items. Crucial
to the operation of the NTC is CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS),
a primary platform used by DHS to match travelers and goods against
screening information and known patterns of illicit activity. Since its
inception after 9/11, the NTC has evolved into two Centers: the
National Targeting Center Passenger (NTC-P) and the National Targeting
Center Cargo (NTC-C).
This year, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) began
deploying Visa Security Program (VSP) personnel to the NTC-P to augment
and expand current operations. Through the VSP, ICE stations agents at
embassies and consulates to assist the State Department in identifying
visa applicants who may present a security threat. The focus of the VSP
and NTC-P are complementary: The VSP is focused on identifying
terrorists and criminal suspects and preventing them from reaching the
United States, while the NTC-P provides tactical targeting and
analytical research in support of preventing terrorist and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. The co-location of VSP
personnel at the NTC-P has helped increase communication and
information sharing.
Safeguards for Visas and Travel
One of the first layers of defense in securing air travel involves
safeguards to prevent dangerous people from obtaining visas, travel
authorizations, and boarding passes. To apply for entry to the United
States prior to boarding flights bound for the United States or
arriving at a U.S. port of entry, most foreign nationals need visas--
issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate--or, if eligible to travel under
the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) country, travel authorizations issued
through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).\1\
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\1\ Exceptions would be citizens of countries under other visa
waiver authority such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative or
the separate visa waiver program for Guam and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, or those granted individual waivers of the
visa requirement under the immigration laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issuing visas is the responsibility of the Department of State
(DOS), which screens all visa applicants biographic data against the
TSDB for terrorism-related concerns and screens their biometric data
(fingerprints and facial recognition) against other U.S. Government
databases for security, criminal, and immigration violation concerns.
For individuals traveling under the VWP, DHS operates ESTA, a web-based
system through which individuals must apply for travel authorization
prior to traveling to the United States. ESTA enables CBP to conduct
enhanced screening of VWP applicants in advance of travel to the United
States in order to assess whether they could pose a risk to the United
States, including possible links to terrorism. On January 20, 2010, CBP
began its transition to enforce ESTA compliance for air carriers,
requiring all foreign nationals to present a valid authorization to
travel to the United States at the airport of departure.
Pre-departure Screening
When a traveler purchases a ticket for travel to the United States,
a Passenger Name Record (PNR) may be generated in the airline's
reservation system. PNR data contains various elements, which may
include optional information on itinerary, co-travelers, changes to the
reservation, and payment information. CBP receives PNR data from the
airline at various intervals beginning 72 hours prior to departure and
concluding at the scheduled departure time. CBP officers utilize the
Automated Targeting System--Passenger (ATS-P) to evaluate the PNR data
against ``targeting rules'' that are based on law enforcement data,
intelligence, and past case experience.
On the day of departure, when an individual checks-in for their
intended flight, the basic biographic information from the individual's
passport is collected by the air carrier and submitted to CBP's Advance
Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS data, which carriers are
required to provide to DHS at least 30 minutes before a flight for all
passengers and crew on-board, contains important identifying
information that may not be included in PNR data, including verified
identity and travel document information such as a traveler's date of
birth, citizenship, and travel document number. Carriers are required
to verify the APIS information against the travel document prior to
transmitting it to CBP. DHS screens APIS information on international
flights to or from the United States against the TSDB, as well as
against criminal history information, records of lost or stolen
passports, and prior immigration or customs violations and visa
refusals. APIS is also connected to Interpol's lost and stolen passport
database for routine queries on all inbound international travelers.
Another layer in the screening process is the Immigration Advisory
Program (IAP), which stations CBP officers at nine airports in seven
countries in coordination with the host foreign governments. CBP's
National Targeting Center provides the IAP officers with non-U.S.
Citizen and non-Legal Permanent Resident matches to the TSDB, of which
the No-Fly list is a subset. CBP also flags anyone whose U.S. visa has
been revoked, whose Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA)
has been denied, who is using a foreign lost or stolen passport, or who
is included on a Public Health Record provided by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. IAP officers can make ``no board''
recommendations to carriers and host governments regarding passengers
bound for the United States who may constitute security risks, but do
not have the authority to arrest, detain, or prevent passengers from
boarding planes.
Screening While En-Route to the United States and Upon Arrival
While flights are en route to the United States, CBP continues to
evaluate the APIS and PNR information submitted by the airlines. At
this point, a further assessment of an individual's admissibility into
the United States is conducted, and a determination is made as to
whether an individual requires additional screening prior to admission.
Upon arrival in the United States, travelers present themselves to
a CBP officer for inspection. Based on the information garnered during
the in-flight analysis, as well as the CBP officer's observations at
the port of entry, a determination is made as to whether the traveler
should be referred for a secondary inspection or admitted to the United
States.
enhanced security measures implemented since the christmas day attack
Following the first reports of an attempted terrorist attack on
Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, DHS immediately put in place
additional security measures. Since then, CBP has undertaken a number
of initiatives to enhance our security posture.
IAP Referrals
As explained above, CBP officers stationed abroad under the IAP
receive referrals from the NTC-P based on matches against the TSDB.
Following the attempted attack in December, the NTC-P, in coordination
with the OIOC, has expanded the information referred to IAP's to
include all aliens that the State Department has identified as
actually, or likely, having engaged in terrorist activity as well, as
existed in that case. NTC-P and OIOC continue to work with the
intelligence community to develop new rules to address the ever-
changing threat, while implementing specific operations to address
these threats.
Referrals for non-IAP Airports
On January 10, 2010, CBP also began pre-screening passengers
traveling from non-IAP locations through the ATS-P framework. To
accomplish this goal, the NTC-P works in coordination with officers
assigned to the Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG). The RCLG are
established in Honolulu, Miami, and New York and provide regional
points of contact and coordination between international carriers,
foreign immigration authorities, and other DHS entities. The RCLG
respond to carrier inquiries concerning the validity of travel
documents presented or admissibility of travelers. Additionally, CBP
officers at the NTC-P work with the RCLG officers to make
recommendations to foreign carriers that boarding be denied (off-loads)
to individuals traveling to the United States who have been identified
as being National security related threats, ineligible for admission or
who are traveling on fraudulent or fraudulently obtained documents
prior to boarding a flight to the United States. However, the final
decision to board or not board remains with the carrier. This pre-
departure initiative mirrors our IAP efforts for flights originating
from airports that do not currently have an IAP presence.
Enhanced Operational Protocols
At home and abroad, CBP officers have been briefed on the current
threat stream and continue to work with our international partners, air
carriers, local police, border control, and counterterrorism
authorities to recommend passengers traveling to and entering the
United States for additional screening as needed. CBP has implemented
enhanced operational protocols at 15 preclearance locations and all
300-plus ports of entry in the United States. At airports, CBP has
enhanced reviews of all incoming advanced passenger manifests based on
current threats and have increased pre- and post-primary operations. At
U.S. ports of entry, Passenger Analysis Units (PAU), and Counter
Terrorism Response (CTR) teams continue carrying out targeted
enforcement inspections, and have increased reviews of cargo manifest
systems/databases by our Advance Targeting Unit (ATU) teams, and
vehicle trunk inspections and truck cab checks. At POEs, the CTR team
will normally be formed from CBP Officers assigned to special teams, or
who possess prior counter-terrorism, antiterrorism, or intelligence-
related training or experience. These officers are then provided
additional training in order to target persons or cargo that may
warrant additional scrutiny. PAU and ATU are specifically designed to
target passengers or cargo that may require CTR examination before they
arrive at the POE. At seaports, CBP has heightened screening with Non
Intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment of all cargo from countries of
interest, and increased cargo and port perimeter sweeps.
Through intelligence-sharing agreements, CBP continues to work with
our counterparts in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico, as well as
CBP Attaches and representatives around the world, to share information
as necessary and appropriate.
conclusion
The attempted attack on Christmas day serves as a stark reminder
that terrorists motivated by violent extremist beliefs are determined
to attack the United States. President Obama and Secretary Napolitano
have made clear that we will be unrelenting in using every element of
our National power in our efforts around the world to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and other violent extremists.
While we address the circumstances behind this specific incident,
we must also recognize the evolving threats posed by terrorists, and
take action to ensure that our defenses continue to evolve in order to
defeat them. We live in a world of ever-changing risks, and we must
move as aggressively as possible both to find and fix security flaws
and anticipate future vulnerabilities. CBP will continue to work with
our colleagues in DHS and the intelligence community to address this
ever-changing threat.
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, and Members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Winkowski, for your time.
Again, thank you for that visit to allow us to be there at the
center. It was very informative.
At this time, our last witness is Mr. Donahue.
Mr. Donahue, if you can summarize your testimony in 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID T. DONAHUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
VISA SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Donahue. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder and--I
want to thank you for another opportunity to share with you how
the State Department is making the visa process more secure,
the revocation process more expeditious, and how we are
enhancing interagency information sharing.
The failed terrorist attack on Flight 253 revealed systemic
failures in the U.S. Government's efforts to protect the people
of the United States. The Department of State has been
vigorously reviewing visa issuance and revocation criteria and
determining how technological and procedural improvements can
strengthen border protection.
Our immediate response to the Detroit incident was to
direct our overseas missions to include complete information
about any previous and current U.S. visas in all Visa Viper
cables. That is happening now.
We also provided guidance on conducting a wide perimeter
fuzzy search of our visa records.
We reviewed our visa revocation procedures. The State
Department uses its broad and flexible authority to revoke visa
to protect our borders. Since 2001 we have revoked more than
57,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 2,800 for
suspected links to terrorism.
We are using this revocation authority as we review our
visa records against records in our CLASS lookout database, our
Visa Viper reporting, TSA's No-Fly and Selectee lists, as well
as other sources. We confirmed that most individuals in these
databases hold no visas. Of those few who did, a great many
were revoked prior to the current review. We also revoked a
number of visas in consultation with our partners.
We recognize the gravity of the threat we face and are
working intensely with our colleagues from other agencies and
our embassies and consulates overseas with the goal that no
person who is known to pose a threat to our security holds a
valid visa.
We have visa offices present in virtually every country of
the world, staffed by consular officers drawn from the
Department's professional and mobile multilingual foreign
service officer workforce, trained in analytic interview
techniques.
Our officers know that they are the first line of defense
in border security. Our global presence, foreign policy
mission, and personnel structure give us singular advantages in
executing the visa function throughout the world.
Our officers know that U.S. security is paramount. Each
consular officer is required to complete the Department's basic
consular course at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center
prior to performing consular duties.
The course in continuing education places strong emphasis
on border security and training in counterterrorism, fraud
prevention, name checking, and other techniques.
Visa applicants are screened against DHS and FBI name-based
and biometric databases as well as the 27 million names in our
own CLASS database. Visas cannot be issued without further
review for any applicant in the Terrorist Screening Database.
Applicants are also screened against our large and ever-
growing facial recognition database. Our Security Advisory
Opinion mechanism provides officers with the necessary advice
and background information to adjudicate the cases of visa
applicants with possible terrorist ineligibilities.
We are not afraid to say no. In fact, we denied more than 2
million visas in fiscal year 2009.
We also want to encourage legitimate travel to the United
States. Tourism creates jobs for Americans and encourages
understanding and appreciation of our values.
Within the Department we have a dynamic partnership between
the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that add valuable
law enforcement, investigative, and intelligence components to
our capabilities.
We have 145 officers devoted to fraud prevention and
document security world-wide. Seventy-three consular sections
overseas have diplomatic security--assistant regional security
officer investigator positions devoted to maintaining the
integrity of the visa and passport process.
We are deploying an electronic visa application form which
will provide more information to adjudicating officers and our
partner agencies and facilities--and facilitate our ability to
detect terrorism and fraud.
We are working with our interagency partners on the
development and pilot testing of a new intelligence-based SAO
system that will make full use of the additional application
data.
We give other agencies immediate access to 13 years of visa
data containing 136 million immigrant and non-immigrant visa
records, and they use this effectively. In February 2010 alone,
more than 18,000 employees of the Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Defense, FBI, and Commerce made just
over 1 million queries on our records.
We embrace a layered approach to border security screening
and are fully supportive of DHS Visa Security Program. We have
a particularly close and productive partnership with our DHS
colleagues here.
DHS US-VISIT receives all the information we collect from
visa applicants, including fingerprint data or use of ports of
entry to confirm the identity of travelers.
Visa Security Units of the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE, currently operate 14 visa adjudicating posts
in 12 countries.
Since January 2010 chiefs of mission have received requests
from ICE to open four VSUs and to augment staff at two existing
VSUs. Using their authority, chiefs of mission have approved
all four of the new VSUs and one request for expansion has been
approved. The other is under review.
In closing, the Department of State is at the forefront of
interagency cooperation and data sharing to improve border
security. We understand the critical importance of our work. We
have talented personnel and necessary tools to maintain safe
borders that welcome the vast majority of legitimate travelers.
I am pleased to take your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Donahue follows:]
Prepared Statement of David T. Donahue
March 11, 2010
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you
today. As a result of the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253, the
President ordered corrective steps to address systemic failures in
procedures we use to protect the people of the United States.
Therefore, the Department of State now is working on reviewing visa
issuance and revocation criteria and determining how technological and
other enhancements can facilitate and strengthen visa-related business
processes.
As I have briefed the Members of the full committee on January 13,
2010, and as Under Secretary for Management Kennedy testified before
the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 27, 2010, our immediate
attention is focused on remedying shortcomings identified following the
attempted attack on Flight 253. Planning for the future, incorporating
new technology, increasing data sharing, and enhancing operational
cooperation with partner agencies all contribute to a dynamic and
robust visa adjudication process. We constantly review our IT systems
and our procedures to adapt and improve our processes to respond to
changing times, security threats and to incorporate new tools available
to us. We have a highly trained global team working daily to protect
our borders and fulfill the overseas border security mission and other
critical tasks ranging from crisis management to protection of American
interests abroad. Within the Department, we have a dynamic partnership
between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security that adds a valuable law enforcement and investigative
component to our capabilities. We use these strengths to address the
continuing and evolving security threats.
In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on the day following his
father's November 19, 2009 visit to the Embassy, we sent a cable to the
Washington intelligence and law enforcement community through the Visas
Viper system that ``Information at post suggests [that Abdulmutallab]
may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.'' At the same time, the
Consular Section entered Abdulmutallab into the Consular Lookout and
Support System database known as CLASS, against which all visa
applications are screened. In sending the Visas Viper cable and
checking State Department records to determine whether Abdulmutallab
had a visa, Embassy officials misspelled his name, but entered it
correctly into CLASS. As a result of the misspelling in the cable,
information about previous visas issued to him and the fact that he
held a valid U.S. visa at that time, was not included in the cable. The
CLASS entry using the correct spelling resulted in a lookout that was
shared automatically with the primary lookout system used by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and accessible to other partner
agencies. DHS has noted that, as a result of that record, they planned
to meet Abdulmutallab and question him upon arrival.
We took immediate action to improve the procedures and content
requirements for Visas Viper cable reporting that will call attention
to the visa application and issuance information that is already part
of the data that we share with our National security partners. All
officers have been instructed to include complete information about all
previous and current U.S. visa(s) when a Visas Viper cable is sent.
This instruction includes guidance on specific methods to
comprehensively and intensively search the database of visa records by
conducting a wide-parameter, ``fuzzy search,'' leveraging an existing
search capability called ``Person Finder,'' when searching our
comprehensive repository of visa records in the Consular Consolidated
Database (CCD). Searches conducted in this manner will identify visa
records despite variations in the spelling of names as well as in dates
of birth, places of birth, and nationality information.
In addition to this change in standard procedures on searching visa
records, we immediately began working to refine the capability of our
current systems. For visa applications, we employ strong, sophisticated
name searching algorithms to ensure matches between names of visa
applicants and any derogatory information contained in the 27 million
records found in CLASS. This strong searching capability has been
central to our procedures since automated lookout system checks were
mandated following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. We use our
significant and evolving experience with search mechanisms for
derogatory information to constantly improve the systems for checking
our visa issuance records.
The Department of State has been matching new threat information
with our records of existing visas since 2002. We have long recognized
this function as critical to the way we manage our records and
processes. This system of continual vetting has evolved as post-9/11
reforms were instituted and is now performed by the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC). All records added to the Terrorist Screening Database are
checked against the Department's Consolidated Consular Database (CCD)
to determine if there are matching visa records. Matches are sent
electronically from the TSC to the Department of State to flag cases
for possible visa revocation. In addition, we have widely disseminated
our data to other agencies that may wish to learn whether a subject of
interest has a U.S. visa. Cases for revocation consideration are
forwarded to us by our consular offices overseas, our domestic visa
office, DHS/Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) National Targeting
Center (NTC), and other entities. Almost every day, we receive requests
to review and, if warranted, revoke visas for potential travelers for
whom new derogatory information has been discovered since the visa was
issued. Our Operations Center is staffed 24 hours per day/7 days per
week to address urgent requests, such as when the person is about to
board a plane. I frequently use the State Department's authority to
prudentially revoke the visa and prevent boarding.
Since the Presidentially-ordered Security Review, there have been
exigent changes in the thresholds for adding individuals to the
Terrorist Screening Database, No-Fly, and Selectee lists. The number of
revocations has increased substantially as a result. As soon as
information is established to support a revocation, an entry showing
the visa revocation is added electronically to the Department of
State's CLASS lookout system and shared in real time with the DHS
lookout systems used for border screening.
The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke
visas and we use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since
2001, we have revoked more than 57,000 visas for a variety of reasons,
including over 2,800 for suspected links to terrorism.
We have been actively using this revocation authority as we perform
internal reviews of our data against watch list information provided by
partner agencies. For example, we are re-examining information in our
CLASS database regarding individuals with potential connections to
terrorist activity or support for such activity. We are reviewing all
previous Visas Viper submissions and cases that other agencies are
bringing to our attention from the No-Fly and Selectee lists, as well
as other sources. In these reviews, we identified cases for revocation
and we also confirmed that substantial numbers of individuals in these
classes hold no visas and of those few who did, a great many were
revoked prior to the current review. We recognize the gravity of the
threat we face and are working intensely with our colleagues from other
agencies with the desired goal that when the U.S. Government obtains
information, no person who may pose a threat to our security, holds a
valid visa.
Because individuals change over time and people who once posed no
threat to the United States can become threats, revocation is an
important tool in our border security arsenal; we use our authority to
immediately revoke a visa in circumstances where we believe there is an
immediate threat. At the same time, we believe consultation with
National security partners is critical. Expeditious coordination with
our National security partners is not to be underestimated. Unilateral
and uncoordinated revocation could disrupt important investigations
undertaken by one of our National security partners.
Finally, the Department is reviewing the procedures and criteria
used in the field to revoke visas and will issue new instructions to
our officers. Revocation recommendations will be added as an element of
reporting through the Visas Viper channel. We are in the process of
providing additional guidance to the field on use of the broad
authority of visa officers to deny visas on security and other grounds.
Instruction in appropriate use of this authority has already been a
fundamental part of officer training for years.
Beyond revocations, the Department of State is at the forefront of
interagency cooperation and data sharing to improve border security,
and we have embarked on initiatives that will position us to meet
future challenges while taking into consideration our partner agencies
and their specific needs and requirements. We are implementing a new
generation of visa processing systems that will further integrate
information gathered from domestic and overseas activities. We are
restructuring our information technology architecture to accommodate
the unprecedented scale of information we collect and to keep us agile
and adaptable in an age of intensive and growing requirements for data
collection, processing, and sharing.
We are the first line of defense in border security. Our global
presence, foreign policy mission, and personnel structure give us
singular advantages in executing the visa function throughout the
world. Our authorities and responsibilities enable us to provide a
global perspective to the visa process and its impact on U.S. National
interests. The issuance and refusal of visas has a direct impact on our
foreign relations. Visa policy quickly can become a significant
bilateral problem that harms broader U.S. interests if handled without
consideration for foreign policy impacts. The conduct of U.S. visa
policy has a direct and significant impact on the treatment of U.S.
citizens abroad. The Department of State is in a position to anticipate
and weigh all those factors. Remember, the vast majority of the more
than 2 million visas denied last year were denied for reasons unrelated
to terrorism. Let me reiterate, however, that the Department of State
is fully committed to protecting our borders and has no higher priority
than the safety of our fellow citizens and the legitimate foreign
visitors who contribute so much to our economy and society.
The State Department has developed and implemented intensive
screening processes requiring personal interviews, employing analytic
interview techniques, incorporating multiple biometric checks, all
built around a sophisticated global information technology network. We
have visa offices present in virtually every country of the world,
staffed by consular officers drawn from the Department's professional,
and mobile multilingual Foreign Service Officer workforce. These
officials are dedicated to a career of worldwide service, and they
provide the cultural awareness, knowledge, and objectivity to ensure
that the visa function remains the frontline of border security. Each
officer's experience and individual skill-set contribute to an overall
understanding of the political, legal, economic, and cultural
development of foreign countries in a way that gives the Department of
State a special expertise over matters directly relevant to the full
range of visa ineligibilities.
Consular officers are trained to take all necessary steps to
protect the United States and its citizens during the course of making
a decision on a visa application. Each consular officer is required to
complete the Department's Basic Consular Course at the National Foreign
Affairs Training Center prior to performing consular duties. The course
places strong emphasis on border security, featuring in-depth
interviewing and name-checking technique training, as well as fraud
prevention. Consular officers receive continuing education, including
courses in analytic interviewing, fraud prevention, and advanced
security name-checking.
Consular officers refused 2,181,986 nonimmigrant and immigrant
visas in fiscal year 2009 out of 8,454,936 applications. We now are
renewing guidance to our officers on their authority to refuse visas
with specific reference to cases that raise security concerns. No visa
is issued without it being run through security checks against our
interagency law enforcement and intelligence partners' data. And we
screen applicants' fingerprints against U.S. databases as well. The
results of these checks by consular officers and any fraud indicators
are brought to the attention of VSU officers wherever they are posted
abroad.
In addition, the Department of State's Security Advisory Opinion
(SAO) mechanism provides officers with the necessary advice and
background information to adjudicate these cases of visa applicants
with possible terrorism ineligibilities. Consular officers receive
extensive training on the SAO process, including namechecking courses
that assist in identifying applicants requiring additional Washington
vetting. The SAO process requires the consular officer to suspend visa
processing pending interagency review of the case and additional
guidance. Most SAOs are triggered by clear and objective circumstances,
such as nationality, place of birth, residence, or visa name check
results. In addition, in cases where reasonable grounds exist,
regardless of name check results, to suspect that an applicant may be
inadmissible under the security provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, consular officers suspend processing and institute SAO
procedures.
CLASS, our primary visa screening watch list, has grown more than
400 percent since 2001--largely the result of this improved exchange of
data among State, law enforcement, and intelligence communities. Almost
70 percent of CLASS records come from other agencies. We have enhanced
our automatic check of CLASS entries against the CCD as part of our on-
going process of technology enhancements aimed at optimizing the use of
our systems to detect and respond to derogatory information regarding
visa applicants and visa bearers. We are accelerating distribution to
posts of an upgraded version of the automated search algorithm that
runs the names of new visa applicants against the CCD to check for any
prior visa records. This enhanced capacity is available currently at 83
overseas posts, with the rest to follow soon.
We are deploying an enhanced and expanded electronic visa
application form, which will provide more information to adjudicating
officers and facilitate our ability to detect fraud. Officers have
access to more data and tools than ever before, and we are evaluating
cutting-edge technology to further improve our efficiencies and
safeguard the visa process from exploitation. We are working with our
interagency partners on the development and pilot-testing of a new,
intelligence-based SAO system that will make full use of the additional
application data.
The Department of State has a close and productive partnership with
DHS, which has authority for visa policy under Section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act. Over the past 7 years both agencies
significantly increased resources, improved procedures, and upgraded
systems devoted to supporting the visa function. DHS receives all of
the information collected by the Department of State during the visa
process. DHS's US-VISIT is often cited as a model in data-sharing
because the information we share on applicants, including fingerprint
data, is checked at ports of entry to confirm the identity of
travelers. DHS has broad access to our entire CCD, containing 136
million records related to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and
covering visa actions of the last 13 years. Special extracts of data
are supplied to elements within DHS, including the Visa Security Units
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These extracts have been
tailored to the specific requirements of those units.
We are working closely with ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs)
established abroad and with domestically-based operational units of
DHS, such as CBP's National Targeting Center. VSUs currently operate at
14 visa adjudicating posts in 12 countries. Since January 19, 2010, we
have received requests from DHS's component, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to open four additional VSUs and to augment staff at two
existing VSUs. The Chiefs of Mission have approved the four new VSUs
and one request for expansion; the other request for expansion is under
review.
We make all of our visa information available to other involved
agencies, and we specifically designed our systems to facilitate
comprehensive data sharing. We give other agencies immediate access to
over 13 years of visa data, and they use this access extensively. In
February 2010 alone, more than 18,000 employees of DHS, the Department
of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
Department of Commerce made just over 1 million queries on visa
records. We embrace a layered approach to security screening and are
fully supportive of the DHS Visa Security Program.
Working in concert with DHS, we proactively expanded biometric
screening programs and integrated this expansion into existing overseas
facilities. In partnership with DHS and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), we established the largest biometric screening
process on the globe. We were a pioneer in the use of facial
recognition techniques and remain a leader in operational use of this
technology. In 2009, we expanded use of facial recognition from a
selected segment of visa applications to all visa applications. We now
are expanding our use of this technology beyond visa records. We are
testing use of iris recognition technology in visa screening, making
use of both identity and derogatory information collected by DOD. These
efforts require intense on-going cooperation from other agencies. We
successfully forged and continue to foster partnerships that recognize
the need to supply accurate and speedy screening in a 24/7 global
environment. As we implement process and policy changes, we are always
striving to add value in both border security and in operational
results. Both dimensions are important in supporting the visa process.
In addition, we have 145 officers and 540 locally employed staff
devoted specifically to fraud prevention and document security,
including fraud prevention officers at overseas posts. We have a large
Fraud Prevention Programs office in Washington, DC, that works very
closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and we have fraud
screening operations using sophisticated database checks at both the
Kentucky Consular Center and the National Visa Center in Portsmouth,
New Hampshire. Their role in flagging applications and applicants who
lack credibility, who present fraudulent documents, or who give us
false information adds a valuable dimension to our visa process.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security adds an important law enforcement
element to the Department's visa procedures. There are currently 75
Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator (ARSOIs) positions
approved for 73 consular sections overseas specifically devoted to
maintaining the integrity of the process. This year, the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security has approved 48 additional ARSOI positions to work
in consular sections overseas. They are complemented by officers
working domestically on both visa and passport fraud criminal
investigations and analysis. These highly trained law enforcement
professionals add another dimension to our border security efforts.
The multi-agency team effort on border security, based upon broadly
shared information, provides a solid foundation. At the same time we
remain fully committed to correcting mistakes and remedying
deficiencies that inhibit the full and timely sharing of information.
We have and we will continue to automate processes to reduce the
possibility of human error. We fully recognize that we were not perfect
in our reporting in connection with the attempted terrorist attack on
Flight 253. We are working and will continue to work not only to
address that mistake but to continually enhance our border security
screening capabilities and the contributions we make to the interagency
effort.
We believe that U.S. interests in legitimate travel, trade
promotion, and educational exchange are not in conflict with our border
security agenda and, in fact, further that agenda in the long term. Our
long-term interests are served by continuing the flow of commerce and
ideas that are the foundations of prosperity and security. Acquainting
people with American culture and perspectives remains the surest way to
reduce misperceptions about the United States. Fostering academic and
professional exchange keeps our universities and research institutions
at the forefront of scientific and technological change. We believe the
United States must meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security.
We are facing an evolving threat. The people and the tools we use
to address this threat must be sophisticated and agile and must take
into account the cultural and political environment in which threats
arise. The people must be well-trained, motivated, and knowledgeable.
Information obtained from these tools must be comprehensive and
accurate. Our criteria for taking action must be clear and coordinated.
The team we use for this mission must be the best. The Department of
State has spent years developing the tools and personnel needed to
properly execute the visa function overseas and remains fully committed
to continuing to fulfill its essential role on the border security
team.
Mr. Cuellar. I want to thank you very much.
Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for being here
with us.
I remind Members that we have 5 minutes of questions per
witness--for the witnesses, should I say, and I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
Since it is only you and I, Mr. Souder, we are going to
probably stretch that a little bit and be a little bit more
flexible.
But let me first--let me just start off with some procedure
work first. Deadlines. The only thing is, as I mentioned, I
would ask you all and your Congressional liaison folks that
when we ask for testimony there are certain time tables. I
understand you all were looking at each other's testimony and
got a little delayed.
But I would ask you to just make sure that if you are going
to be late, I would just ask, please, you know, talk to our
committee. Just give us a little advance notice that it is
going to be late, and would ask you to just do that just as a
housecleaning procedure.
For the State Department, how would you rate your
Department's ability to communicate with ICE?
Then, ICE, I will ask you the same thing.
I know that there was--a particular situation got denied,
and then of course, now they got approved. But how would you
rate your ability to work together, Mr. Donahue?
Mr. Donahue. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. I
can't imagine that there are two U.S. Government agencies that
work more closely than the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of State, particularly in border issues.
We were just talking during the recess that if we put
together the number of times that we have been together and
that different people in my office have been with people in the
other offices, both in ICE and the Department of Homeland
Security, just in the last couple months it would probably be
in the hundreds, if not more.
In addition, on the ICE VSU program, we have assigned
senior officers to that program since the beginning who travel
with the members of the ICE team in site review. We do the same
on visa waiver expansion.
So we have a very close relationship, meeting many times
during the week, usually.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Mr. Parmer.
Mr. Parmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would characterize
it similarly as my colleague from State Department. I think
when the Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated the creation of
the Visa Security Units, there was some skepticism, perhaps, at
various levels in the State Department.
But in every location where--and I visited several of these
locations--where we have the Visa Security Units, without
exception, the naysayers have been overcome and feel that our
programs are complementary and serve as force multipliers.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Now, let me ask you--using the example of the Flight 253,
I--and I listened to the three witnesses give us the
testimony--can you just give me a little checklist of what we
did and what we are doing now that is different, improved?
If you can break down into different steps, using the
example of 253, what we are doing now that is different, that
has improved, so we can provide better security?
Let's start with the State Department, because remember,
where the individual started off, and there were calls to the
embassy--let's go step by step as to--and then any time, Mr.
Parmer, you want to come in, or somebody wants to come in--this
is something that we are doing differently, because I am--we
got lucky.
You know, we will--you know, we say we got lucky. I am now
interested in looking forward. What are we doing to provide
better security?
Mr. Donahue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the first
thing is that we have sent out to our posts--and we know that
there was a problem with the spelling and the search engine
that was used by the officer to check to see whether the
traveler had prior visas.
We have sent out new information about a much more robust
search engine and instructions on the importance of getting
that information into the Visa Viper cable and other
information that they should put in the Visa Viper cable, so
that when that arrives at the interagency community people have
a little--a lot more to go on to determine whether they need to
do more investigation on that.
We are going out to our posts--we have already had a good
response to this on the Visa Viper reporting, where posts are
coming in, they are telling us a lot.
We start right away, as soon as we receive that Visa Viper
cable, discussing that traveler with our partners, particularly
with the TSC, the Terrorist Screening Center, to determine that
we are--to deconflict any possible conflicts with people they
are watching. Then we revoke very quickly.
I think those are the--probably the two most important
things in--and the other part is we have been spending a lot of
time with our interagency partners in ensuring that the watch
lists are as effective as they can be.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. All right.
Mr. Parmer.
Mr. Parmer. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Cuellar. Again, just like Mr. Donahue, just give us the
checklist as to what we are doing now differently.
Mr. Parmer. That is a difficult question to answer, because
the Visa Security Units have always maintained a high level of
scrutiny for the--working in concert with the----
Mr. Cuellar. But let's use----
Mr. Parmer [continuing]. State Department.
Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. Let's lose--I am sorry, let's use
the 253 as an example.
Mr. Parmer. What we have done since then is re-prioritize,
that we have a list of high-profile posts at which we would
like to open Visa Security Units. We have re-prioritized that
list in light of some of the intelligence that has come out of
the Christmas day incident.
Assistant Secretary Morton and others are having high-level
discussions with the State Department about things that we can
do differently in the future toward not only the screening
process but also a more rapid deployment for the Visa Security
Units.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Winkowski.
Mr. Winkowski. Mr. Chairman, at CBP we have done several
major issues that I think are very, very significant, and let
me kind of take this in bites as you asked.
At our IAP locations, the nine IAP locations, prior to 12/
25, our 29 officers out there were getting--from a terrorist-
related standpoint were getting notification on their hot list
that we showed you down at the NTC. They were getting
individuals from the no-fly and the terrorist screening
database on the terrorist-related side.
Then on the admissibility-related side, the ESTA denials,
the visa revocation, lost or stolen passports, and the public
health notifications, so that was prior to the Christmas
incident.
Since then, we have grown the hot list--continue, of
course, to get the no-fly. But we have also included the
selectees, those individuals that are selected for enhanced
inspection as part of the TSA program.
I wanted to make sure that as those individuals went
through the selectee process that is conducted by security
overseas that our IAP officers know that we have an individual
going on that flight that was a selectee, so we can focus in
and ask perhaps additional questions.
The other thing that we did was the SO-7 report that we
referred to----
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Mr. Winkowski [continuing]. A few weeks ago. That
particular report was only sent to the port of entry
domestically. It was not sent to the IAP locations.
A decision had been made early on in the program back in
2004, 2005 when we stood up the Immigration Advisory Program
that we were very concerned that we could overwhelm the small
number of officers that we have over in those locations.
So we wanted to make sure they got--you know, that the hot
issues from the standpoint of the no-flys and the TSDB hits and
the public health alerts--and the decision was made not to give
them those particular reports.
I have changed that. All IAP locations now get that report.
In this particular case, it was sent from State Department. Of
course, we continue to have the ESTA denials, the visa
revocations, the loss or stolen passports, and the public
health. So that is the IAP piece.
The other major change that we made was as I was looking at
the gaps and as you--as we talked--opportunities like this, you
look at gaps. You look at, you know: What went wrong, what do
we need to do better, where else are we vulnerable?
We have in those non-IAP locations we don't have any
offices there, so you have individuals that perhaps had a visa
that was revoked, would still get on that airplane and fly
domestically--fly to the United States, and we would deal with
that admissibility issue in the States.
What we have done is we had a unit called the Regional
Carrier Liaison Group that you referred to in your opening
comments and that I have referred to here, located in Miami,
New York, and in Honolulu. That unit was stood up a number of
years ago to really reach out to the airlines and work with the
airlines on individuals with fraudulent documentation.
Recently down in Miami we have that group well entrenched
for a number of years, and what we did was we took what were
concerned with the IAP locations and overlaid it over into the
Regional Carrier Liaison Group, so what we have is virtually a
virtual net over the entire world from a standpoint of the
Regional Carrier Liaison Group.
So what happens is when these--when an individual hits
against our PNR or our APIS, and they are not at an IAP
location, what happens is the National Targeting Center gets it
on their hot list, calls the applicable Regional Carrier
Liaison Group, who then notifies the airline overseas and tells
the airlines that we have an individual, give them the name,
that their visa had been revoked or there is an issue with
them, and that we are recommending a no board.
We have 100 percent cooperation from all of the airlines on
that. We are very, very good partners with them. So as a result
of
12/25, not only did we enhance what we were doing at the IAP
locations, we took it a step further and addressed the non-IAP
locations as well.
The other thing that we have done is the hot list. It
became apparent to me that, you know, we put the hot list out,
and we really haven't--we really were not out there challenging
that hot list. Do we have everything on that list that those
officers need? I have implemented that procedure.
The other thing that we have done is all of these
individuals that are on the hot list, referred over on the hot
list, whether it is the IAP locations or the non-IAP locations,
we have a FAM that is assigned to the National Targeting
Center, and they are given that information on every single
flight of individuals that are on our hot list.
So there is awareness if a FAM is going to be boarding that
particular aircraft so he or she knows who is on that aircraft
from a standpoint of any type of security issues.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Mr. Winkowski. That is what we have done.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Winkowski, let me just--I don't want to
complicate this, because we have been talking about airports,
and some of those lists are for the airlines, but as you know,
88 percent of the goods and services come through land ports,
roughly.
Are we doing any additional screening for our land ports?
That is where--I mean, that is basically where most of our
people will be coming in. I know some of those lists are--I
understand that. But anything else extra that we are doing?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, on the land border side, of course, we
have implemented the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, with
standardized documents, which as--you know, as you mentioned,
you know, we have job and field operations of balancing
preventing dangerous people and dangerous things from coming
into the country, but at the same time expediting legitimate
trade and travel.
So certainly, I think the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative has helped us standardize documents, and what we are
seeing over time here is we have a very, very high compliance
rate down on the southwest border, for example. We are about 92
percent compliant.
We have moving much quicker towards getting the RFID
readable documents that the individuals can have--for example,
State Department is reissuing the border crossing cards. There
is 10 million border crossing cards. They are coming up. They
are expiring. The State Department is reissuing them with the
RFID chip.
So you have got that piece. We have a targeting piece. We
have an automated targeting system for land. It is a robust
system, but you don't get that pre-departure information on the
vehicle side, that we deal--we don't have advance information
on who is coming into the United States on the land border
side.
We have it on the cargo side, but we don't have it on the--
on the people side, and I think that is something that we need
to work towards, and I will make a suggestion on that in a
moment.
So you know, we have got targeting units. Our query rates
are much higher than they have ever been. Not so many years
ago, because of infrastructure problems and because of a lack
of the right technology, i.e. the WHTI solution, we had a
relatively low query rate.
We have grown that tremendously. On the southwest border we
are over 70 percent query rates, and our goal is to be at 100
by the end of this fiscal year. So we have that layered
approach in there. WHTI has been extremely helpful to us and
certainly appreciate what Congress has done to give us a steady
stream of funding for WHTI.
But I do think it is time from a standpoint of looking at
kind of an all modes APIS, advanced information all modes,
because we do have ferries out there that don't have any
advance information. Trains are voluntary. Buses--and----
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Mr. Winkowski [continuing]. Certainly, I don't need to
explain to you buses coming into Laredo. It is the busiest bus
location. We need to work towards a solution of getting advance
information for those bus travelers.
Mr. Cuellar. Right, and I think working with Mr. Souder and
Mr. Thompson and the other Members and our staff, that is an
issue that we want to talk about at a later time, because, like
you mentioned, there are other modes of transportation in the
United States that have no advance notice.
Mr. Winkowski. Right.
Mr. Cuellar. If somebody gets smart out there, all they
have to do is look at the other modes of transportation and
again, keeping in mind, 88 percent of all the goods--people
coming into the United States are coming through land ports,
and I know the focus--because of Flight 253 and this is why we
are here.
Let me just finish one thought, and I am--if the Ranking
Member will indulge me on this, and then I will give him all
the flexibility he needs to get.
So we talked about the protocols were in place for Flight
253. We talked about that you just gave me a little summary of
the new protocols that you all added.
Using the new protocols, the new changes, using the
individual from Flight 253 that happened last year, under the
new protocols, where would you have picked up this individual?
Mr. Winkowski. What would have happened with the new
protocols--he would have hit against the SO-7 report, the State
Department report, and the quasi visa refusal.
That report would have been--that record would have been
placed on the hot list for the IAP in Amsterdam. What would
have happened is the IAP officer would have taken the
individual and begun the process of questioning him.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. Now, what I understand--he was only
interviewed by CBP when he landed in Detroit.
Mr. Winkowski. That is correct.
Mr. Cuellar. How would this have changed under the new
protocols?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, it would have been placed on his hot
list. Prior to 12/25, the SO-7 report was not put on the hot
list. It was viewed as an admissibility issue that--which we
could handle State-side, because there is a series of Q&As that
you have to do with the individual and IAP is not designed for
that.
What we have done is for those terrorist exclusion codes
for the SO-7--they are on the--now the hot list, so that would
have come up through ether the PNR or the APIS.
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Mr. Winkowski. Our officers in Amsterdam would have
notified. We would have gotten the passenger and questioned him
in Amsterdam.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay, good.
Mr. Donahue and then Mr. Parmer, same question. Under your
new protocols, new changes, using the example of the individual
on Flight 253, where would you have stopped this individual
from your perspective?
Mr. Parmer, same question.
Mr. Donahue. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think
today two things would have happened. First of all, the officer
in Nigeria would have known that the traveler had a visa
because they would have been using a more robust search engine.
They would have reported that in the Visa Viper cable, and
also we would have their entry in a--as a P3B with the entry
that my colleague just referred to.
Both of those--we are doing constant review of our lists.
Any time we get a Visa Viper in, we look at that case very
seriously.
A case like this I think we would have--you know, it is
hard to predict, but I think we would have decided to revoke
the visa, ask him to come back in to interview, so he wouldn't
have had a visa and wouldn't have--wouldn't have traveled at
all.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. So you feel under the new protocols you
would have--using that as an example, you would have stopped
him before he boarded.
Mr. Donahue. For example, there are no--no one with this
code, this P3B code--there is no one in our records with a P3B
code right now who has a visa.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Mr. Parmer, same question. New protocols, how would this
have been different for that individual?
Mr. Parmer. Chairman, it would purely be speculative on my
part to----
Mr. Cuellar. We understand. But under the new protocols----
Mr. Parmer. Well, there are no--from the perspective of the
Visa Security Units, there are no different protocols. We were
not in the post where the visa was issued, so it would be,
again, purely speculative for me to comment on that.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay, fair enough.
All right, Mr. Souder, thank you for your indulgence, and
you have got 15 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Souder. Basically, it is the same thrust continued.
So, Mr. Parmer, are you in Nigeria now?
Mr. Parmer. No, sir.
Mr. Souder. Did you apply to go to Nigeria now? It is one
of the more risky countries we have been seeing a lot in the
news.
Mr. Parmer. Yes, sir, it is on the list of countries that
we would like to establish a post in. I referenced earlier re-
prioritization of the--of our high-risk list that we have
worked on collaboratively with the State Department, and it
is----
Mr. Souder. Is it a funding question?
Mr. Parmer [continuing]. Higher on the list. No, sir, it is
not.
Mr. Souder. If it gets re-prioritized to go up, does one
get bumped off where you had requested?
Mr. Parmer. Not of those currently pending, or the--of the
NSDD-38s that were just approved, no, sir.
Mr. Souder. So you can add--there is no problem with adding
countries? I am trying to figure out why it isn't there. You
said that it--you are re-prioritizing to move it up higher.
Does that mean you didn't request it before, or it was
below the funding cut for it before? I am trying to figure out
what is the problem here. Is it a funding question?
Is it a staffing question, which when--then would probably
be a funding question? Is it an embassy personnel? Is the State
Department saying, ``We can only absorb so many in a given
year?''
Mr. Parmer. No, sir. No, sir. Before the Detroit incident,
it was not ranked as highly on the list. We have been working
under a 5-year expansion plan that was approved by the Homeland
Security Council, and it is--with the infrastructure and the
budget that we have in place, we have been seeking expansion
that we were able to support.
So it hasn't been a funding issue or a State Department
issue. It was just not as high on the list.
Mr. Souder. So Congress mandated that you go to 50, and how
many are you now, 10, adding four?
Mr. Parmer. We are in 12 countries at 14 locations.
Mr. Souder. So since it is a mandate, why haven't you
requested to move faster? I am trying to figure out what is the
holdup.
Mr. Parmer. The best way to put that, again, is I will
refer back to the expansion plan that was approved by the
Homeland Security Council that--where we were moving forward at
a rate that our infrastructure could support and as well as the
budget----
Mr. Souder. By the infrastructure, you mean number of
agents? Is this a computer question? It is not a computer
question.
Mr. Parmer. No, sir.
Mr. Souder. It is not infrastructure that way. It is
personnel?
Mr. Parmer. Our headquarters component, our administrative
function, as well as the--what we could support through
deployment of personnel.
It is too cumbersome to try to deploy that many people in a
short period of time, and it was something that we could--our
agency could comfortably----
Mr. Souder. Could you----
Mr. Parmer [continuing]. Move forward with and responsibly
move forward with.
Mr. Souder. Could you get back to me with the particulars
of what is so cumbersome about this? I am trying to--is it that
you have to divert so many agents from other tasks to go there?
Is it that, quite frankly, it takes a long time to do the
research, you don't have enough research personnel? I am trying
to figure out what it is, because we said 50.
The irony here is--in this discussion is that I remember
when I was over at the Government Reform Committee, and we
first debated whether homeland security was going to go in
there.
Initially, we were going to take the entire--and I worked
with Chairman Ben Gilman at the time--take the entire security
process away from the State Department. We worked out a
compromise because you were supposed to be in all high-risk
countries immediately after 9/11. This was a negotiated deal.
Because partly, visa clearance and that process is a key
part of the State Department entry level training program. They
had language background. When you actually got into it, it was
better to work a cooperative process.
Now what I am finding--it has been a little while since 9/
11, and we are in 2012, and you are resource-challenged, and I
am just trying to figure out where it is. Did Congress turn it
down? Did you not make a request? Are you being blocked from
the request from OMB, which would be typical in many agencies?
We understand that.
But the bottom line is that--and also I am a little
perplexed why Nigeria wasn't there, but that is another
question.
Now let me move to another aspect of the--kind of the same
line of questioning. I was listening with interest as to what
is changed, because that is one of the fundamentals, and first,
if I could start with Mr. Donahue--well, let me ask Mr.
Winkowski--good to see you.
One of the challenges here of anybody watching is that they
think there is just like all these initials wandering around at
every airport and port of entry. That was one of the most
amazing performances of numbers of--it would have taken your
testimony twice as long as if you would have spelled out all
what those initials were of the different programs.
But in the challenge of--my understanding is CBP had the
name right. It wasn't a spelling question for CBP and ICE,
correct?
Mr. Winkowski. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Souder. But you felt that the information wasn't
actionable enough prior to getting on the plane, that it had to
be done in Detroit.
Mr. Winkowski. Yeah, a decision had been made when we stood
up the IAPs back in 2004 that those kinds of reports, the quasi
visa refusals--his visa was not canceled--could be handled
State-side rather than at the IAP location, okay, because what
we are concerned with is the program is very small, and we
wanted the individuals assigned to the IAP locations to be
focusing in what was on the hot list, and at that time these
reports were not on there.
So Detroit got the report, and that was what was supposed
to happen. The IAP location did not get that report.
Mr. Souder. Okay. Now, one of the confusing things for me,
just trying to sort through--Mr. Donahue, you have suggested
that probably, had you spelled it right and had this
information, that now this person wouldn't be allowed a visa.
I am trying to figure out why would it be actionable for
you to deny an interview and not for CBP, because they
determined that information--is there a change in what is now
actionable?
Mr. Donahue. Thank you for the question. There is. We
certainly have looked at everything we do, and one thing that I
think that we did before this incident was we sent in reports.
I don't know that all of us--I certainly didn't have as
full an understanding of the entire interagency process for
determining when a name gets promoted to watch listing.
We sent in the reports. We waited to see how that name
would come out. Would it come out as a watch listing name?
Would it be something that would go into a TIDE file and not be
promoted?
We did not review all of the Visa Viper cables for a
determination of revocation then, although the consular officer
has the authority to make a recommendation to do an SAO, for
instance.
So I think the real change here is that we--as soon as we
get a Visa Viper cable in now, we are reviewing it ourselves
also, and if there is information that makes us concerned that
this person may have connections to terrorism, we are going to
the interagency, we are saying we would think that we may be--
want to revoke this visa, to have the person come in for an
interview.
If there is no objection, we revoke.
Mr. Souder. One of the somewhat disturbing things that we
heard--because one of the initial defenses was, ``Well, we get
family members and people coming in all the time who--who say
things,'' which is certainly true. There is all kinds of
quarrels all over the world where people make cases.
But this person had been a fairly credible source before.
Are you making those kind of--in our system, do we have some of
those kind of cuts that we are becoming a little more aware of?
Mr. Donahue. Well, certainly, everyone is very sensitive to
this type of reporting now. I also think that the information
was very thin. It was that he had--as you know, the only
information the consular officer had was that the son had come
under the influence of extremists in Yemen.
That rings lots of bells today and certainly would, I
think, any of us would revoke at that point.
Mr. Souder. I mean, did that not suggest something might be
imminent?
Mr. Donahue. It is hard to say. It is hard to be in someone
else's mind. But it could be that something is imminent or that
the father would like us to use whatever assets we might have
had in another country to find his son. Looking back, we could
look at it that way.
But I think it is hard to reconstruct. I think today we
certainly see--we have had a lot of threat reporting since
then. I think that is another item that--to answer the
Chairman's question, it is another item of things that we are
doing--is that there is a much more robust review of threat
assessments and review of this kind of information against
threat assessments.
Mr. Souder. Basically, meaning that when we get scared, we
tilt towards caution and re-interviewing? I mean, that is kind
of what it sounds like here, because--that we relax. I mean, it
is not just any individual. I mean, the whole system seems to
relax, including Congress--relaxes, and then we get scared, and
then we tilt it.
It just seems to me we ought to have a pattern that when
there is doubt you take extra caution.
Mr. Donahue. That is why we have put in--I think all of us
have put in new systems. But for ourselves, we get a Visa Viper
in, we will review that immediately, we will discuss it with
the interagency and revoke. When we receive a request from NTC
to revoke, we will review that case and revoke quickly. We
understand the critical nature of this.
Mr. Souder. The January 27 hearing, I ask for the number of
visa revocations per year and the number revoked based on
terrorism concerns. Do you have that at this point, or what is
the status of that request?
Mr. Donahue. Yes, it was in my statement. It was----
Mr. Souder. Okay. So you have it in the statement with the
numbers?
Mr. Donahue. It is in the statement and in the--also the--
yeah, the----
Mr. Souder. We may have some additional breakdown
questions, and be interested--because I think it would be
useful just for the Department and assuming that our regular
oversight is going to see how that changes.
Now, obviously, if it changes over time, they are going to
change their systems, too, so to a degree you are effective,
you know, that doesn't--just because it goes up or down doesn't
necessarily prove anything.
But initially, it will be interesting to see whether, in
fact, more are revoked or less, or what the patterns are.
Mr. Donahue. You mean how many we have revoked since----
Mr. Souder. No, the original January 27 question and then,
say, if you can continue to track that data----
Mr. Donahue. Okay.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. It is likely to----
Mr. Donahue. We will do that. We----
Mr. Souder [continuing]. Question.
Mr. Donahue [continuing]. The number is that we have
revoked 57,000 since 2001 and 2,800 of those are terrorist-
related. But we will continue to track that number. I think it
is an important number, too.
Mr. Souder. Then for Mr. Wiskowski, that--you said--or
Winkowski. I said ``Wis,'' sorry. Winkowski. In the last part
you were--in response to his question, you talked about the--
for example, the Staten Island and the Washington ferry systems
and coming across from Canada where we caught the Millennium
bomber--the trains and so on--that all challenges--any of those
come through in a budget request to address it?
Mr. Winkowski. No. What we are doing is we are beginning
the process of studying how we ought to go about this. Now, for
example, buses--I think it is going to be very, very
challenging, and we have got to find the right solution for us
as well as the industry.
So I do not believe any requests came up for budget. We do
have our WHTI office looking at these different modes and how
we are going to accomplish that. We just recently, over the
last year or so, put in eAPIS for general aviation, and it has
worked out very, very well.
We have got very, very high compliance. But I think those
four areas--and I didn't get to say small boats. I think the
small boats also coming back and forth--getting some type of
advance information with the technology that is out there
today--we have done it with general aviation.
I think we have now got to lean forward here and really--
again, to drill down on what would it take to get advance
information on those modes.
Mr. Souder. A problem I have--because I believe that was a
very sincere answer, but having worked narcotics prior to 9/11
and continuing to work the border questions, and having been in
San Diego looking at the small boat question, looking at the
aircraft question, north and south border, looking at Lake
Champlain, we knew this was a problem before, like, the last 24
months.
Why are we just starting to develop the solutions now?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, we have put in different boating--for
example, small----
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. Winkowski [continuing]. Boats--and I think we both
would agree it is a--it is a----
Mr. Souder. Incredibly challenging.
Mr. Winkowski. Incredibly challenging, and----
Mr. Souder. The Great Lakes, with all the islands.
Mr. Winkowski [continuing]. And we have got small boat
strategies in there, and we have got the Air Marine working
at--looking at northern border strategies from a standpoint of
how to handle it with the Coast Guard and really, the Coast
Guard is the lead on--in a lot of this area.
But you know, quite frankly, you know, we spend a lot of
our time on containers, dealing with containerized cargo,
whether it is the challenges we have there, with 100 percent
scanning. A lot of intellectual capital goes into those program
areas.
We are now beginning to really get--drill down on this
area--ferries, and trains, and buses and small boats, and I--
and there is also--there is a legislative fix.
As I understand it, sir, we need legislation in order to
mandate that, or the legislation that you all gave us for the
cruise ship industry and the airlines and the other modes that
we have out there requires a legislative vehicle, as I
understand it.
Mr. Souder. My concern with this--and I encourage you to do
this. I encourage your agency to do this--is somebody has to be
working in a non-panic mode. When people say what do you do for
a living, I say I am a Congressman; we overreact for our
business. That is our duty, because we are like the
weathervanes of society. We run every 2 years, which means
constantly we blow with that.
But somebody has got to be saying what is comprehensive. We
just can't have, ``Oh, we are really fortunate this guy didn't
know how to do his bomb.'' We have to be anticipating. We have
to have you leading.
It is like, ``Oh, we are going to do 100 percent of cargo
here,'' without understanding kind of risk assessment--how are
you doing on the south and north border, how are you doing on
the ports, how are you doing on the containers.
Look, because as we learn in this case, they probe. They
test. They find out even where we are at at different parts of
the airports, that we take a--quite frankly, a retired senior
citizen in Sarasota and do 18 million searches on her, and we
are not doing anything on the buses. It is, like, come on.
We really depend on you all to drive us a little bit,
because--you are not running right now, and we kind of react
when a thing comes, and then we put all the funds in there. But
we need to have a balanced thing.
It has been a long time since 9/11 and we still don't have
these kind of core things that we know are high-risk even
though, in fact, the Millennium bomber, which would have been
the biggest one--if it hadn't been for an agent at the border
on a person who came over on a ferry more or less thinking that
the person looked nervous at the end of the day, we could have
had an incredible catastrophe.
Mr. Winkowski. I agree. I don't want to mislead you or the
Chairman. I mean, with ferries and trains and buses and small
boats, we still do our inspections. I mean, and we still run
them through systems.
What I am trying--what we need to do is we have got to, you
know, through the risk management models, get that advanced
information, make decisions, get rid of that clutter, that low-
risk group, spend little time with them and more time with the
high-risk.
One of the ways you do that--and we found in the--with
advance passenger information is that you are able to make
better decisions.
I think also, sir, that I think we have made tremendous
inroads since 9/11. I look back at that very unfortunate event
and look back at the fact that we never had a National
Targeting Center for passenger, and we never had a National
Targeting Center for cargo.
We were not advanced from the standpoint of PNR information
and APIS information and all the advanced information that we
get on the cargo side. We have made tremendous inroads, but I
think we have been spending so much time in those areas, on
cargo, at the expense of some of these other areas, such as
small boats.
I mean, we are spending a lot of intellectual capital here
looking at issues like 100 percent scanning when, in fact, we
have put in all these layers. I am not saying that it is
perfect, but we really need to focus in and I get your message
very clearly.
Mr. Souder. Let me make it clear. I believe we have made
tremendous progress--that we haven't been attacked. We have had
a couple that have misfired, but it is a classic law
enforcement--layered things--they make mistakes when they get
layered, they are more nervous, they get tipped off, and that
sometimes have been fortunate but most of the time we have
stopped them, and that we just cannot flatline here.
The danger is--and the good thing that happened here is it
has got everybody concerned again, because we were flatlining.
The budget can't flatline either. There are some things that
are the clear requirements of the United States Congress to do.
We cannot have county commissioners and State legislators
running around trying to figure out how border security is
going to work, how we are going to stop terrorists, that when
we are working our budget we have to understand which things
are clearly our responsibility and which things are shared
responsibilities.
We cannot flatline because the challenge is going to get
more sophisticated, so we have to keep doing it. But we have
made tremendous progress, and I didn't mean to imply that we
didn't.
Yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Souder, thank you again very much.
Let me ask you just--suggestions that have been thrown out
there that some have argued that visa issuance is no longer a
matter of foreign policy but more--primarily it has become a
security issue.
Any thoughts on that? I know that is a big change, but any
thoughts on that, Mr. Donahue?
Mr. Donahue. I think that visa issuance is both. I think
that there is a foreign policy aspect to it, but I think it is
a security aspect. I think our officers fully understand that
in the field. Their first thought in every visa adjudication,
No. 1 thought, is how am I protecting my country.
I mentioned that we turned down 2 million visas. We don't
know how many of those people were either criminals or
terrorists, but in the interview the officer got a funny
feeling in his stomach, and--just as the officer did in
stopping the Millennium bomber, and said, ``This story is not
right.''
Part of that is being culturally aware. Part of that is
speaking in the language of the applicant. Part of that is
living in the country, traveling around, knowing--you know
yourself. It is hard for people to understand the border
situation unless you have lived in the border. I was told that
a million times when I served in Mexico.
It is the same thing overseas. We believe that we have an
advantage that when we are interviewing, we are--we have this
mix of, No. 1, let's keep our country safe, but let's be sure
that the vast majority of people who are legitimate travelers,
people who are coming here to study in our great universities,
people who are coming here to spend their money, people who are
investing, that they can get in.
Making that decision takes critical thinking, takes lots of
training, and takes a great eye for security.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Parmer, let's talk about these additional Visa Security
Units that ICE plans to stand up this year. What are we doing
in the meanwhile while we are waiting to stand those up?
Mr. Parmer. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I don't understand
your question.
Mr. Cuellar. In other words, we are planning to put those
units in different places across the world. What are we doing
in the meanwhile to address that? Because we are saying that
there is a priority to put them in certain places.
What are we doing in the mean time? Do we hope that we get
lucky, or what are we doing during that time?
Mr. Parmer. What are we doing toward establishing those
offices?
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Mr. Parmer. Well, we are selecting the personnel. We are
going through the personnel process. We are getting the--
looking for housing at post, working with the embassy----
Mr. Cuellar. While we are going through that process, that
absence from that place that you want to set up the unit--
nothing--I guess nothing can be done during that time except
work through your office.
Mr. Donahue. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I was in Mexico last.
I had a very close relationship with our ICE colleagues. We
stopped people. We revoked visas of people at the advice of
ICE. We also depend on the ICE units here in the States that
review it. We have other--Department of Homeland Security.
It is a layered approach, and so even in putting this out,
we don't know where the next terrorist is going to come from.
We have to use smart deployment of all of our skills. They
won't be everywhere. But through layered approaches we have a
way to cover that.
Mr. Cuellar. For these units that we want to set up, I know
the best thing to do is to have ICE individuals there, because
you have got the individuals. What about using some sort of
virtual office? Because I am sure there is some resource
limitation.
I know that the best thing is to have somebody there. I
understand that argument. But in medicine, for example, in
Texas we have used telemedicine, where you can have a doctor
and, through the telemedicine system, you can see, you can
hear, you can talk, you can show him the documentation, you can
do everything.
Have you all thought about using that technology to help
you expand on a faster basis where you can be domestic but
still be able to connect to certain other areas? I know the
argument, Mr. Parmer. I know that it is better to have
individual. I know that.
But if doctors can do it, there is no reason why law
enforcement individuals can't also do that. Any thoughts of
using that to at least supplement or at least temporarily use
those systems, the technology?
Mr. Parmer. You knew exactly what I was going to say, so I
won't belabor that point about the value of having people in
country, and it is a similar concept as to why visas aren't
issued remotely.
But I think that topic is among those being considered by
Assistant Secretary Morton, or some exploration of that topic
by Assistant Secretary Morton and his counterpart at State,
Assistant Secretary Jacobs.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. I would ask you to--and I was just with
Secretary Morton last night. I think I am supposed to see him
next week again. But I would ask you--and I will tell him, too,
but I would ask you all to consider this.
To have somebody there, I understand, it is the best
person. But you know, is it better to have somebody or not have
anybody at all? At least there is some sort of intermediate
system on the technology. The new world that we are in, you
know, the systems that we have--I think I would highly, highly
encourage you all to at least explore and research this.
You might not be there, but you might have somebody in one
of your offices here in the United States be able to work with
one of your officers there, one of your employees there, and at
least do that.
I mean, I will go back. If doctors can do it through
telemedicine, there is no reason why law enforcement--and I
know they are different. I understand. I got three brothers who
are peace officers, so I understand that.
But I would ask you at least to explore that, so I would
ask you to please ask Secretary Morton--I think he is a very
innovative, bright individual--that I think you all should at
least explore this possibility.
Mr. Parmer. Pardon me, Mr. Donahue.
I just wanted to add that we do have a remote capability
that we do work in collaboration with State on, and it is the
security advisory opinion process. That does work remotely. You
know, again, going back to the----
Mr. Cuellar. Well, then you got the first step there.
Mr. Parmer. That is right. And----
Mr. Cuellar. Okay? Okay?
Mr. Parmer. But the value of being able to interact with
the applicant, work alongside the consular officers, interact
with--liaise with local law enforcement, follow up with family
members, business associates, that sort of thing--there is just
no replacement for having the ability to do that in country.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. Well, again, I would highly, highly
encourage you to do that.
You know, one of the things that we have seen--and I will
use medicine as an example--you might have a doctor there,
general practitioner, but then he is able to connect to certain
specialist, and that doctor can talk to those specialists who
are somewhere else.
If you have certain experts in your office that might not
be able to go to some remote part of the world, at least they
will be able to connect and talk to--and use the expertise.
Nowadays, with this technology, it is like if you are there.
Use that. So again, I would strongly ask you to consider that.
I would ask one more thing. What else can we do as Members
of Congress, as Congress, to help you all? I will go--Mr.
Parmer--and I know you can't go into the budget and ask,
because I know you can't lobby us, but--well, what are the more
generic things that we can do to help you? I will go one by
one.
Mr. Parmer. I am not prepared to answer more of a policy-
type question, but I do--I will reiterate our appreciation for
the support that you do currently give us. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
I know you are not shy.
Mr. Winkowski. Yeah, Mr. Chairman. We already talked about
one. I think we have got to really drill down here on the all
modes APIS. I think it is time, and we have done some
preliminary work, and we will certainly work with the staff on
that.
Mr. Cuellar. We were just talking right now, as we talked--
what was it, last week, I believe----
Mr. Winkowski. Yes.
Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. I think we are at that time to
start looking at--doing that type of work, so we are going to
set up a meeting, a hearing on this particular issue to talk
about it, because I still go back--I am a border guy, and I
still go back to my numbers.
Eighty-eight percent of the goods or the people coming into
United States are coming from land ports. If that is where the
majority of the folks coming in, and if I was somebody with bad
intentions, I would look at those other areas, whether they are
buses--for example, in Laredo, Texas we get about 100 buses a
day times, what, 40 individuals.
Just one port, doesn't include California and the other
places, just one port in Laredo, 100 buses, 40 individuals, and
that gives you an idea. If you do some of that work before they
get there, then you can work on the high-risk individuals
instead of--everybody across the border on that.
But that doesn't cover ferries and other----
Mr. Winkowski. Not only do you work on the high-risk
individuals, of course, with APIS you would set up a system
where the--those that need I-94s--they are all printed by the
time these individuals come off the bus, or maybe get to a
point where they don't even need to come off the bus.
Been down there many times, as you know, and see all these
people going into the office, waiting for I-94s to be done. So
I think we have got some opportunity there.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. I want to thank you, because I want you
all to continue being forward-thinking. I am glad that the
Department is looking at those issues I had. So I appreciate
that.
Mr. Donahue, any thoughts?
Mr. Donahue. Well, we are extremely grateful for the
information-sharing that Congress has encouraged among the
agencies. It has changed the way we do business.
We are getting things like the ADIS information, the
Arrival and Departure Information System, other systems that
are being shared across the Government, and they help our
officers in the field.
The one request I would make, partially because we are
self-funded, is that we really do encourage you and your
Members and your staff members to visit our consular sections.
I think a few minutes--just as you enjoyed at the National
Targeting Center, I think a visit to some of our busy visa
sections when you are visiting for other business in a capital
city or a consular city is a real eye-opening experience to see
our officers using the language, protecting our borders, on a
daily basis.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, sir, and I think that is a very good
suggestion.
I want to say thank you to all three of you. Again, I
apologize. sometimes our schedules are beyond our control.
Sorry about the delay that we had there. But I really want to
thank you all.
I know that your men and women that you all supervise, that
you all work with, do a great service to our country, so again,
for the State Department, and for ICE and CBP, we really
appreciate the good work that you have been doing.
Personally, I feel very--I feel good as to the different
improvements that you all have made, because I always look at--
we saw what happened, but I am interested in looking forward--
what are the lessons learned, what are we learning?--so this
doesn't happen again.
Also keep one thing in mind. Mr. Winkowski, we talked about
this. We have to be careful about not just relying on the
systems themselves. As we mentioned, there is still this sixth
sense or this intuition that our men and women have to use,
because you just can't look at everything that is on a computer
screen.
The more we can encourage this--and I know we talked about
that for all the Department. Of course, for ICE and CBP I would
ask you to just make sure you tell your folks, you know, to use
that sixth sense, if I can use that--as my brothers in law
enforcement told me that little sixth sense on that, so I
appreciate that.
Again, I would ask you, again, to say--you know, I want to
say thank you very much, and I appreciate you all being here.
At this time, I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony, Members for their questions.
Again, if there is any additional questions that Members
might want to submit, I would ask you to go ahead and submit
that to the committee.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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