[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-119]
AL QA'IDA IN 2010: HOW SHOULD THE U.S. RESPOND?
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 27, 2010
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Tim McClees, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, January 27, 2010, Al Qa'ida in 2010: How Should the
U.S. Respond?.................................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, January 27, 2010...................................... 35
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2010
AL QA'IDA IN 2010: HOW SHOULD THE U.S. RESPOND?
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Clarke, Hon. Richard A., Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University............... 5
Coll, Steve, President, New America Foundation................... 10
Zarate, Hon. Juan Carlos, Senior Adviser, Transnational Threats
Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies........ 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Clarke, Hon. Richard A....................................... 44
Coll, Steve.................................................. 66
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 41
Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................ 39
Zarate, Hon. Juan Carlos..................................... 48
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 79
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers........................................ 89
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 85
Mr. Skelton.................................................. 83
Mr. Smith.................................................... 85
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 85
Mr. Wilson................................................... 87
AL QA'IDA IN 2010: HOW SHOULD THE U.S. RESPOND?
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 27, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room
HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services
Committee meets to receive testimony on ``Al Qa'ida in 2010:
How Should the U.S. Respond?''
Our witnesses today: Richard Clarke, currently an adjunct
lecturer at Harvard University and previously the national
coordinator for security and counterterrorism; Juan Zarate,
senior advisor with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the former deputy national security advisor for
combatting terrorism; Steve Coll, president of the New America
Foundation and the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of ``Ghost
Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin
Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.''
We welcome you, and we thank our witnesses for being with
us.
Since the attacks on September the 11th, 2001, the United
States has acted forcefully to disrupt and defeat al Qa'ida
[AQ] and to eliminate their safe havens in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. I firmly support our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan.
I believe it is vital that we succeed there. And I commend the
President on his recent decision to increase our force levels
in that conflict.
But as the attempted bombing of an airliner over Detroit on
Christmas Day by an al Qa'ida affiliate reminds us, even as we
pursue bin Laden and his allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al
Qa'ida has continued to evolve as an organization and
inspiration to terrorist groups around the world.
In order for us to combat this evolving threat, I believe
we must understand the state of al Qa'ida and how it has
changed over the years. In this effort, the committee's hearing
today with outside experts builds on the classified briefing we
held recently in past full committee hearings. The Terrorism
and Unconventional Threats Subcommittee, led by Adam Smith and
Jeff Miller, have done great work in this area over the years
and, I am sure, will continue to do so under the leadership of
Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez.
The title of this hearing, ``Al Qa'ida in 2010: How Should
the U.S. Respond?'', poses a deceptively simple question that I
hope our witnesses can help us with. But the real questions are
harder: What is al Qa'ida today, and how has that organization
evolved? How can the United States Government, in particular
the Department of Defense, take effective action to end the
threat posed by al Qa'ida, its allies, and its affiliates
around the globe? What tools do we have, and how should we
employ them? How can we undermine their media campaign and
attempt to provide an ideology justifying attacks against the
United States?
In short, what actions can we and should we take to
minimize the chances that we are faced with future attacks like
the attempted attack on Christmas? I hope our witnesses can
help us with these questions.
By the way, this is a reminder. Today, a Members-only
meeting, a China briefing, at 2:30 this afternoon in Room 2118,
our new old committee room. And you will be pleased when you
come back and see the work that has been done there.
I turn to our friend, the ranking gentleman from
California, Buck McKeon, for his comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
you for holding today's hearing on al Qa'ida and the continuing
threat that it poses.
For nearly two decades, al Qa'ida had waged war against the
U.S., its citizens, and the modern world. We may not have fully
realized the destructive nature of al Qa'ida until the tragic
events of 9/11, but we must not allow our determination and
vigilance to wane. We can be assured that al Qa'ida remains as
relentless and as violent as ever, and today's hearing allows
us to better understand al Qa'ida and what must be done to
protect our Nation and its citizens.
I would also like to welcome our witnesses. Your insights
today are extremely important given the influx of additional
troops to Afghanistan in support of General McChrystal's
strategy and given recent events such as the Christmas Day
airline bombing attempt and the Fort Hood shootings. We look
forward to your testimony.
We cannot forget that we are a nation at war. Al Qa'ida
stormed into the public view with the horrific acts of 9/11 but
well before that time had been plotting and acting against us.
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings
in Kenya, the failed attack against the USS The Sullivans, and
the successful attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all presaged what
was to come in 2001. Al Qa'ida had already declared war on us.
Only after the World Trade Center bombings, the Pentagon, and a
Pennsylvania field were burning did we fully appreciate that
fact.
I was heartened when, on December 1st, 2009, President
Obama officially took ownership of the war in Afghanistan and
the broader war on terrorism during his speech at West Point.
He is our Nation's Commander in Chief and plays the critical
role of guiding the United States during wartime.
Al Qa'ida, operating from safe havens in Afghanistan,
brought war upon our Nation, and our message must be clear: We
will not back down from those who seek to do us harm. We have
denied al Qa'ida operating space in Afghanistan but must ensure
our efforts to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven
once again do not waver.
The administration's decision to support General
McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy is an important step
toward stabilizing the country and, importantly, in degrading
al Qa'ida's operational capability. I am gravely concerned,
however, about the announcement of a timeline in conjunction
with the decision. We must allow events and conditions on the
ground to be the basis for any decisions on our Afghanistan
strategy, not Washington politics.
And I have to wonder, has President Obama emboldened our
adversaries by revealing a lack of commitment on our part? Or,
like his proclamation that Guantanamo Bay would close by
January 2010, does this hint to an administration that does not
fully understand the ramifications of its actions and
statements?
We must remember, however, that Afghanistan is not the sole
focus in this struggle. Pakistan is a key partner for us, as al
Qa'ida has been forced to seek refuge in tribal areas
controlled by the extremist Taliban. Pakistani forces have
gained important victories in their attempt to root out al
Qa'ida and its hosts from Waziristan and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, but much more needs to be done. We
must continue to support Pakistani efforts through intelligence
sharing, operational support and security assistance with
vehicles like the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund. And we also
need to support the Defense Department's 1206 train and equip
authority [National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206
``Global Train and Equip'' Program], which it uses elsewhere,
to ensure our partners in this struggle have improved
capabilities to meet threats to security and stability.
Al Qa'ida does not act alone and is a highly adaptable
organization. It has leveraged a franchise system to bring
like-minded groups around the world under its operational
umbrella. Al Qa'ida in Iraq, al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb,
and al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP] have all sought
to further al Qa'ida Central's goals.
What al Qa'ida seeks is the time and space to allow its
affiliates to rise. As in Iraq in 2006-2007 when al Qa'ida took
advantage of ungoverned space to train, plan, and attack the
vulnerable Iraqi Government as well as U.S. interests, al
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula seeks to gain ground in Yemen,
where the government forces are fighting not only al Qa'ida but
also an extremist Shiite insurgency for control of large areas
of its country.
Further, al Qa'ida is more and more willing to step out of
the spotlight and allow other groups to act as its proxies.
Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir and al Shabaab in Somalia have
helped al Qa'ida gain a broader audience and extend its
operational reach. Al Qa'ida very quickly capitalizes on these
groups' actions in the name of its grand strategy. Even in
failed or thwarted attacks, al Qa'ida adjusts its message for
greatest effect, always seeking to gain new recruits and
enhance its brand image as effective and successful.
Therefore, we must be very aware that a reduction in al
Qa'ida's fingerprints on terrorist operations does not
necessarily mean that the threat of al Qa'ida is diminished.
Ideology, radicalization, and the media that are available in
today's world provide a volatile mix for al Qa'ida to exploit,
while complicating our attempts to identify and focus on al
Qa'ida as an organization. The Little Rock, Arkansas, and Fort
Hood shootings and Christmas Day bombing attempt all represent
an increasing threat: that of radicalized individuals who
attack either on their own or with minimal operational
coordination with an al Qa'ida handler. The hand of al Qa'ida
may not be nearly visible, but the threat remains.
The challenges we face are many, but we absolutely must not
fail to recognize that we are at war, and our enemy will seek
any and all means to advance its cause. We are not facing
common criminals. And this fact was reaffirmed on January 5th
when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the right of the U.S. Government to detain
combatants. This decision reaffirms the belief that the laws of
war are the appropriate foundation for, and are needed in, our
efforts against terrorists who may not wear uniforms, but who
are waging war against us.
I believe the administration would be making a very
dangerous mistake were it to treat terrorists as common
criminals. While al Qa'ida operatives may not wear uniforms or
follow the Geneva Convention, we cannot ignore the fact that al
Qa'ida is waging war against us and that terrorists are al
Qa'ida's foot soldiers. They do not merely break civil laws but
advance a strategy that seeks to topple governments through
terrorism and other means. They cannot be viewed as anything
less than prisoners of war.
One would think that the President's policy toward
Guantanamo Bay's detention facility would reflect the fact that
we are at war. Yet he seeks to close the facility without a
clear plan and return many detainees to countries rife with
ungoverned spaces and al Qa'ida cells.
The remaining population at Guantanamo Bay does not
represent chance battlefield detainees or mere supporters, but
hardcore operatives. Given recidivism rates that are 20 percent
or higher, the President's position on detention and
prosecution of these wartime detainees held there is especially
alarming in its incoherence.
In response to the administration's irresponsible handling
of the detainee issue, we have introduced the ``Detainee
Transfer and Release Security Act of 2010.'' This legislation
will block transfers from Guantanamo to countries with
ungoverned spaces, active al Qa'ida cells or networks, or
confirmed cases of a former Guantanamo detainee who has
returned to the fight. Our efforts would have blocked the
December transfer of seven detainees to Yemen and last week's
transfer of two detainees to Algeria.
America cannot be complicit in allowing former detainees to
return to the fight against the United States. Our policies and
strategies must reflect the fact that we are at war. We should
not simply close Guantanamo, and we cannot allow enemy
combatants to return to the battlefield.
In al Qa'ida's world view, the U.S. should not exist.
Therefore, in this war, we must seek to defeat our enemy.
Measures that fall short of that goal, denying al Qa'ida
operating space and disrupting al Qa'ida operations, must not
enter our lexicon or our thought process. I take it as a
personal responsibility to remind my fellow Members, my
constituents, and my colleagues throughout the government of
what is called for in this great struggle.
With the fact that we are at war clear, I look forward to
our witnesses' input today. We are faced with an enemy that is
adaptable, that leverages media extremely well, that promotes a
twisted version of one of the world's major religions, and that
ultimately is willing to outlast us if that is what is required
of it. Your testimony will help us gain greater understanding
of how to face those challenges and how we can best shape our
strategy, policy, and actions to ensure that we defeat al
Qa'ida in what can only be viewed as a war of survival.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
The Chairman. I certainly thank the gentleman.
Again, we appreciate the witnesses testifying today.
And we will start with Richard Clarke. Thank you again for
being with us.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. RICHARD A. CLARKE, ADJUNCT LECTURER IN
PUBLIC POLICY, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a
pleasure to respond to your request for testimony or other
assistance.
You asked, What is the status of al Qa'ida, and what should
we be doing in the way of response to it? These questions have
been asked a lot since Christmas. I think we need to pause for
a minute and ask ourselves, What would have happened in this
country if that detonator onboard that Northwest/Delta flight
had worked? Because that is really the only difference between
a successful attack and the failure that occurred, is whether
or not that detonator worked.
And I am afraid that if it had worked, a lot of people
would have jumped to, perhaps, the wrong conclusion. They would
have thought that, because one single terrorist was able to
penetrate our defenses and cause the deaths, perhaps, of 200
Americans in the United States, that necessarily would have
meant that al Qa'ida was resurgent or that there was some
failure in the policies of the last administration or some
failure in the policies of this administration. And the
American people would ask themselves why it was the case that,
over a decade after al Qa'ida became a major issue for the
United States, that we had not been able to eradicate it.
I think it is important that we ask ourselves these
questions now publicly, because the difference between one
detonator working and one detonator not working suggests to me
that we could very well have a successful attack. And when we
do, if we do, we shouldn't panic and we shouldn't necessarily
jump to the wrong conclusions.
So, in trying to answer your questions at a very high
level, I have structured my response in the form of seven
propositions. And I will try to go through them quickly, but
they are available in the written testimony.
The first proposition is that if al Qa'ida does stage a
successful attack, it doesn't, in and of itself, indicate
whether or not they are getting stronger or not; that lone
operators will always be a threat, whether they are from al
Qa'ida or from another organization. Modern societies are
inherently fragile to lone-operator attacks. We saw that with
Oklahoma City, where there were just two or three people
involved. We saw it in the Washington area with the Washington
sniper. We are always going to face a threat of lone operators.
Secondly, many of the groups that we hear about, many of
the attacks that we see that are labeled as ``al Qa'ida''
really are not al Qa'ida Central. They are groups that had
existed for years, in some cases for a century, and have been
relabeled or have relabeled themselves as al Qa'ida. And two of
them, for example, al Qa'ida in the Maghreb and al Qa'ida in
Mesopotamia, have actually imploded in recent years. They lost
popular support because of their excesses, and they were also
successfully suppressed by security forces.
So I think we need to ask ourselves really, What is al
Qa'ida? And perhaps the best way of looking at it is to focus
on al Qa'ida Central, the organization that attacked us on 9/
11, the organization that, unlike the affiliates, has targeted
the far enemy, which is the United States.
And al Qa'ida Central has had its ups and downs. It was
certainly very strong prior to 9/11. It was hit badly after our
invasion of Afghanistan. It had a bit of a resurgence in the
last several years, but in the last two years, with our
increased tempo of operations against their sanctuary in
Pakistan and with the Pakistani Government finally doing
something about that sanctuary, al Qa'ida Central is a somewhat
reduced threat than it was in the past.
Nonetheless, there are affiliate groups that are of
concern, and two of them in particular seem to have targeted
the far enemy, the United States. Al Qa'ida in the Arabian
Peninsula, based in Yemen, consisting largely of Yemenis and
Saudis, seems to now have its intent on going after the United
States, including here in the homeland. And certainly the
Taliban is engaged in daily combat with the United States. A
third group, al Shabaab in Somalia, may also be involved in
preparing people to attack the homeland.
Mr. Chairman, I will skip over the other propositions there
in the testimony, but I think the chief point here is that the
eradication of al Qa'ida is the work of a generation. It is not
something that the American people should believe that any
administration will be able to accomplish, nor should the
American people expect that any administration will be able to
prevent all successful attacks.
And when and if an attack does come in the United States,
despite all of our efforts and despite the fact that we are
winning this war, we need to be nonpartisan, we need to be
analytical, and we need not to panic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clarke can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Clarke.
Mr. Zarate.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JUAN CARLOS ZARATE, SENIOR ADVISER,
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Zarate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McKeon,
distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to be with
you today to testify, and I thank you for the invitation.
I think it is an important moment to look at the nature of
al Qa'ida, particularly given the past series of events over
the last year, plots uncovered, Christmas Day failed attack,
the growing role of al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and,
frankly, the continued allure of al Qa'ida's ideology,
including in the homeland.
Mr. Chairman, al Qa'ida is no longer the same organization
we faced on September 11, 2001. In many ways, it has been
decimated, with the core elements of the organization on the
ropes. Al Qa'ida's senior leadership is being methodically
destroyed, its primary physical safe haven is being undermined,
its ideology is being rejected within Muslim communities around
the world, and, frankly, its strategy has yet to produce the
results promised.
At the same time, al Qa'ida has attempted to spur an
ideological awakening among Muslims around the world to fight
the West. The allure of this ideology continues to draw
adherents and manifests itself in real threats. Some actually
argue that al Qa'ida is actually achieving its goal via the
establishment of a virtual caliphate.
Thus, I think there is a paradox in which al Qa'ida as an
organization remains in steady decline but the global terrorist
threat inspired by this ideology remains a central national
security concern for the United States.
This is why I think there has been so much debate, both
here in Congress and in academic circles, about the nature of
al Qa'ida. Is it a hierarchical organization, a loose
confederation of like-minded terrorists or groups, or simply a
metastasized idea with viral appeal?
Frankly, I think al Qa'ida is a hybrid of those three, a
three-headed beast, if you will, comprised of the al Qa'ida
core, as Mr. Clarke mentioned, the al Qa'ida regional
affiliates and like-minded groups, and the al Qa'ida-inspired
radicalization and threats that we face.
Al Qa'ida core leadership, largely contained in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region, has continued to set the strategic
direction for the movement and has directed attack plotting. At
the same time, al Qa'ida has aggressively and systematically
moved to establish, co-opt, and use regional affiliates like al
Qa'ida in Iraq, al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, and al Qa'ida
in the Arabian Peninsula as forward bases for terrorist
activity and strategic reach.
Until the Christmas Day attack, these regional groups
confined their activities largely to their respective regions.
The most troubling revelation on Christmas was that al Qa'ida
was trying to hit the United States directly from its outpost
in Yemen.
The constellation of terrorist groups that have direct
ties, associations, or parallel ideological agendas with al
Qa'ida is constantly shifting. This, I think, has been
facilitated by the safe haven and training grounds present in
western Pakistan and in other regions around the world, like
Somalia, Yemen, and the Maghreb.
Aside from the direct threat to the United States, there is
a danger that some subset of these regional organizations or
groups could evolve into a new global syndicate, even absent AQ
core involvement. In addition, one of the more sophisticated of
the like-minded groups, like Lashkar-e-Taiba, called ``LT'' by
some, could alter its regional focus and become a global leader
and successor to al Qa'ida, taking up the mantle to defend all
Muslims. We have seen glimpses of this in the Mumbai attacks
and with the uncovered plotting against the Danish newspaper
that published the Muhammad cartoons. The mere existence of
these groups is dangerous and needs to be viewed as a potential
next phase in the war on terror.
In addition, al Qa'ida has identified and nurtured pockets
of radicalized cells and individuals in western Europe and
around the world with the capability to carry out deadly
attacks under al Qa'ida direction under its banner. The long-
term threat from al Qa'ida comes in the allure of its ideology
to individuals who may decide to commit acts of terror. Through
its propaganda, bin Laden and al Qa'ida have created a symbolic
brand that identifies al Qa'ida as a leader of this movement.
This has been amplified by the radicalization of individuals
via the Internet and via ideologues. This ideology, as you all
know, preys on discontent and alienation while providing a
simple narrative that pretends to grant meaning and a heroic
outlet for the young.
As you know, the al Qa'ida narrative is simple: The West is
at war with Islam. Muslims have a religious obligation to
engage in Jihad to defend fellow Muslims. The U.S. is the head
of the snake, the far enemy that must be fought along with
apostate allies. And al Qa'ida is the ultimate vanguard of this
movement for all Muslims. To disaffected or troubled
individuals, this narrative explains in a simple framework the
ills around them and the geopolitical discord they see on their
television sets and on the Internet.
There are some concerning elements to these recent cases of
radicalization within the U.S. which I think are important to
note. Unlike in past cases, some of the individuals involved
appear to be second- or third-generation Americans who were
born into Islam as opposed to being converts to the faith. They
appear to have acted in clusters, as with the American Somalis
and Northern Virginia Five. And they attempted to join or
succeeded in connecting with a known terrorist organization
abroad. These factors are troubling, especially given the
effectiveness of al Qa'ida and extremists like Anwar al-Awlaki
to use the Internet to draw new adherents, including from the
West.
This environment then I think suggests that more
individuals will be radicalized over time and could take on the
global terrorist mantle. And the metastasized dimension of the
terrorist problem is perhaps the most bedeviling since it is
diffuse, local, or even personal in nature, and hard to
counter. And I think this ideological battlefield is where the
long war, the generational battle, will be fought.
Mr. Chairman, if I could just quickly lay out what I
think--which is presented in my written testimony--should be
the U.S. response to al Qa'ida.
We should pressure al Qa'ida on all fronts, without a
doubt. It is essential that AQ core be dismantled. The core of
al Qa'ida is the heart of the global Sunni terrorist movement.
And though its destruction ultimately will not end terrorism or
the allure of its ideology, it is a key and important step to
disabling the global terrorist network.
The U.S. and the international community has to deny
physical safe haven to terrorist groups. We need to shift the
momentum against the Taliban in Afghanistan. We need to enable
the Pakistanis to continue their fight against the Pakistan
Taliban and al Qa'ida in the tribal regions. We must continue
our support to Yemen to root out al Qa'ida elements. Along with
regional partners, we should help defend the fledgling
transitional federal government in Somalia. And we must ensure
that the Iraqi Government is able to solidify security against
AQI [al Qa'ida in Iraq] and other violent extremist groups.
We also need an all-out offensive in the ideological
battle, with a concentration on networking and empowering
grassroots countermovements against al Qa'ida. Importantly, all
quarters in Muslim communities are now openly challenging al
Qa'ida.
And although the United States is not a central protagonist
in this battle within Islam, it has a key role to play. Aside
from promoting democracy, defending our policies and values,
and demonstrating that the West is not at war with Islam, the
United States should be actively countering this narrative and
the violent extremist ideology. The goal should be to help
foment and network a global grassroots countermovement through
the credible voices emerging to counter al Qa'ida in both the
physical and virtual worlds.
At the end of the day, this opposition must be organic and
come from within Muslim communities. And I think Muslim
Americans then have a special responsibility to stand up
against this ideology.
We need to continue to build a layered defense against
strategically significant terrorist attacks. This requires a
continual renewal of our commitment to intelligence gathering
and prevention as the primary principles guiding our homeland
defense. We should redouble our efforts to improve identity
management, to include integration of biometric-based
technologies. In addition, we should continue to extend our
borders with initiatives like the Container Security Initiative
that should expand the notion of expanding our borders beyond
our shores.
And importantly--and this is something my colleagues have
argued for--we must push government agencies to imagine the
unimaginable, by continuing to invest resources and energy to
prevent terrorist groups from developing, acquiring, or using
weapons of mass destruction [WMD]. This, then, also extends to
investment of resources and creating resiliency in our critical
infrastructure, to include our cyber infrastructure.
Lastly, our efforts to defeat al Qa'ida, I believe, require
a long-term legal framework to address the 21st-century threat.
There is still no established consensus about how to hold
suspect terrorists and insurgents in a seemingly endless global
conflict in which the theaters of conflict range from
recognized war zones in ungoverned havens to city centers and
suburban neighborhoods.
Whatever form this takes, I think the United States needs
to establish transparent rules for justifying continued
detention while protecting basic individual rights, and it will
need to gain some degree of international legitimacy. I think
this can only be achieved if the President and Congress commit
the capital and credibility to establishing such a system that
can then be defended in the U.S. courts and in the court of
public opinion.
Mr. Chairman, al Qa'ida and the movement it represents is
an enemy that is morphing in structure and adapting to changing
geopolitical landscapes, but one that retains the same radical
vision and ideology and devotion to the use of terrorism. We
must hasten the demise of al Qa'ida while containing the post-
al Qa'ida terrorist threat and the violent ideology that it has
spawned.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zarate can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Coll.
STATEMENT OF STEVE COLL, PRESIDENT, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
Mr. Coll. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
McKeon, members of the committee, for this opportunity to
testify.
I agree with the previous speakers about virtually
everything they had to say. I will try to briefly offer a few
complementary angles of vision.
I agree also with my predecessor that al Qa'ida presents a
paradox today. Its political and ideological support in the
Muslim world has been declining, and yet it remains resilient
as a source of disruptive terrorist violence.
And part of the explanation lies in the complexity of what
we mean by ``al Qa'ida.'' It has evolved to a point where it is
really several things at once. It is a specific organization
with 21 years of history in the same emir and deputy emir who
were appointed at the first meetings in Peshawar in the summer
of 1988. That organization remains intact, and it manages
through the same shura committees that it began with. It is
also a network of like-minded groups, a network that was really
formally organized in the 1990s. It has evolved and changed
shape, but it is still around as originally conceived. And al
Qa'ida is also a movement, an ideology, a brand.
As a political movement, I think al Qa'ida is failing.
Multiple polls have described the decline in public support for
its tactics throughout the Islamic world since about 2005. One
recent, particularly rigorous poll found that support for al
Qa'ida-directed attacks against American civilians in the U.S.
homeland is virtually negligible across a diverse array of
heavily populated Muslim-majority countries. In Pakistan, for
example, where anti-American feeling has reached a fever pitch,
only nine percent supported such attacks against U.S.
civilians. In Indonesia, the number was about five percent.
It is common to observe that bin Laden's poll ratings have
fallen because al Qa'ida-inspired violence has taken so many
Muslim civilian lives since 2001. But the data actually
suggests that citizens in Islamic countries, as elsewhere,
overwhelmingly disapprove of all indiscriminate violence
against civilians, no matter who carries it out and no matter
what the cause.
Despite its growing isolation, however, al Qa'ida remains
resilient and dangerous, in large part because its central and
original organization and its leadership remains in the field.
And I think we should be cautious about declaring that central
organization disabled.
My colleague Peter Bergen has documented that one easily
observed measure of the degree of activity of central al Qa'ida
is available in its media operations through As-Sahab, the
number of releases it puts out from year to year. In 2008,
those operations seem to have come under severe pressure and
have been reduced, but this year they have bounced back again,
despite the pressure that U.S. military activity and drone
attacks have obviously placed on the leadership and the impact
that has had.
And this succession of small- to modest-sized plots--many
of them, fortunately, unsuccessful--have produced a pattern of
open-source evidence that clearly implicates support from al
Qa'ida technicians or leaders in Pakistan or elsewhere along
the border. All of these plots make clear that the group
retains enough breathing space to launch operations that could,
as Mr. Clarke pointed out, but for the operation of a single
detonator, claim hundreds of lives in an instance.
I think the Flight 253 plot did bring to the floor a
pattern of evidence about al Qa'ida's specific resilience in
Yemen that has been accumulating for some time. The group's
presence and connections there, of course, date back two
decades. The resilience that presented itself on Christmas is
probably traceable to the period immediately after Saudi
Arabia's crackdown on al Qa'ida in 2003, when Yemen started to
reemerge as a refuge and a regional haven.
In the Pakistan and Afghanistan region, al Qa'ida's like-
minded allies, I think, are far more robust than they are in
Yemen. The number of sworn al Qa'ida members operating along
the Afghan-Pakistan border probably is only a few hundred, but
the Afghan Taliban's allied fighting forces, though largely
regional, are not exclusively regional in their focus, and
number, of course, in the many thousands. And the Pakistani
Taliban are equally estimated to number in the thousands.
Perhaps the most potent of these groups in the Pakistan-
Afghan region is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has been mentioned a
couple of times before. It is an India-focused group, but along
with splinters like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and
various cells that spin off from those, they have been able to
recruit very talented operatives from educated classes and
urban centers. I think this makes them distinctive in
comparison to the Afghan Taliban, for example. Lashkar's ranks
include scores of volunteer doctors and postgraduate
professionals.
If one of these sub networks did find the time and space to
reform and plot an attempt of the Mumbai type, it could create
far more destructive effects than is typically available to
these single operators and small groups that al Qa'ida has been
organizing.
In my own judgment, I think Mumbai is actually the most
serious warning in the succession of plots, along with the 2006
attempted planes bombing conspiracy in Britain, simply because
of its scale and what it tells you about the geographical space
and the unmolested time that the Mumbai organizers had to carry
off a very creative and complicated attack. I think that is a
risk we should be mindful of, even though it doesn't
necessarily involve the direct targeting of the U.S. homeland.
Let me conclude by stepping back from that observation just
to say that I think, in a strategic or global sense, al Qa'ida
seems to be in the process of defeating and isolating itself.
Its political isolation in the Muslim world has set the stage
for the United States and allied governments, with persistence
and concentrated effort, to finally destroy central al Qa'ida's
leadership along the Afghan-Pakistan border.
That achievement, as the previous speakers have pointed
out, would not end terrorism or end the problem of radical
Islamist violence, but it would provide justice for the victims
of 9/11, and it would also contribute to freedom of maneuver
for the United States and its allies as they continue this
generation-long campaign. It would also end the debilitating
and destabilizing narrative of the hunt and escape that has
elevated the reputations of bin Laden and his deputy, al-
Zawahiri, for so long.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coll can be found in the
Appendix on page 66.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Coll.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. I will pass.
The Chairman. Who is next? Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing.
And I want to thank our witnesses.
Gentlemen, I have listened, hopefully very attentively, to
what each of you have said. What I think I find missing is, you
know, if you were given a free hand, if you were the Commander
in Chief and you had a Congress that would cooperate with you
unflinchingly, what would you do different than we are doing
right now?
Mr. Clarke. Congressman, I think implicit in your question
is that we should be doing something different. And what I am
trying to say is that you should not, just because there was an
almost successful attack over Detroit, conclude that we are not
being successful. I think we are being successful.
And I think the administration, long before the incident in
Detroit, the administration focused on the growing threat in
Yemen and was acting successfully against that threat in Yemen.
It wasn't getting a lot of press attention, but there was a
very effective U.S. Government activity for most of last year
in Yemen. And we were significantly destroying the leadership
of al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula long before the media
even learned what ``AQAP'' stood for.
So don't conclude automatically that we need to do
something different. And don't conclude that, if we were only
doing the right things, al Qa'ida will disappear overnight.
This is the work of a generation. We are well on track to
eliminating al Qa'ida Central as a significant threat. We have
greatly improved our homeland security. It will never be
perfect; don't expect it ever will be. Don't expect we will
ever be able to stop every attack.
I think if you were to look at all of the things that the
administration is doing and other allied governments are doing,
the area that probably needs the most reinforcement is the
ideological counterweight that my colleagues have talked about.
It is really not something the United States Government can do
overtly. It is best done by Muslim governments.
And Muslim governments have actually done a very good job.
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates
[UAE], other countries, have really done a very effective job
of creating an ideological counterweight domestically inside
their country. That wasn't always the case, but I think it is
now.
They are doing it without U.S. involvement, which is great
because U.S. involvement probably wouldn't help. But there are
things the United States can do. And if there were one area
where I would strengthen our efforts, it would be in the
somewhat fuzzy and hard-to-define area of creating an
ideological counterweight.
Mr. Taylor. Sir.
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, it is a great question. I agree
with Mr. Clarke, but I think there are three areas where we can
continue to improve, in particular to deal with the movement.
And I think Mr. Clarke is right to point out that we
shouldn't throw the baby out with the bath water, in terms of
assuming that we have failed because of what happened on
Christmas Day. I think people have short memories. And I think
we have, over the last eight years, disrupted numerous plots.
Mr. Coll mentioned the August 2006 Atlantic airline plot, which
would have been a devastating attack, which, with help from the
Pakistani Government and the U.K. Government, we were able to
disrupt with great effect. And so I would say we have done a
very good job.
And, as Mr. Coll indicated as well, al Qa'ida is self-
imploding. The very nature of its exclusionary ideology and its
violent tactics is not only an inherent part of their DNA in
terms of what they do and what they want to do as an
organization, but it is also inherently alienating to the very
constituencies that they are trying to attract.
And I think the grand lesson from Iraq with the Al Anbar
awakening is the fact that the Iraqis themselves, in the heart
of what is supposed to be al Qa'ida's core constituency, rose
up physically against al Qa'ida and have largely rejected al
Qa'ida, which I think to a certain extent was the beginning of
the end for al Qa'ida, an existential threat.
But three areas I would suggest some attention: dealing
with safe havens to avoid these regional groups or militant
insurgencies from becoming regional problems or even global
platforms. That entails not just dealing with the current
problems like Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, but
looking beyond the horizon to potential problems in places like
Bangladesh, northern Nigeria, and other parts where there is
already sectarian tension, where there are forces of
radicalization trying to act like leeches to exacerbate those
conflicts, and where you have the potential for al Qa'ida to
really make hay in places like that. So I think we need to be
forward-looking.
Countering the narrative is huge. And I think the U.S. does
have a role to play in terms of working with the private
sector, with credible voices. Groups like the Quilliam
Foundation in London, ex-extremists who have come out now
fighting against their former mates, who are literally
organizing against radicalization. These are the kinds of
groups we need to support, network without tainting.
And then, finally, the legal framework. I think we need to
end what has largely become a political football with respect
to how we treat this problem for the long term. Because it is a
long-term problem. This isn't just a problem of Guantanamo; it
is a problem with the legal framework long-term. And we need to
resolve that.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the gentlemen.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Perhaps because I am a scientist, but I think that numbers
really do have significance. In a recent briefing before this
committee, I asked the four experts their estimate of how many
radical Islamists they thought there were in the world that
disliked us and would hurt us if they could. Two of them said,
order of magnitude 10,000; a third one said 100,000; and the
fourth one said, in terms of our ability to count them,
essentially an infinite number.
We have about a bit less than 200 in Guantanamo Bay, with a
20 percent recidivism rate. That would mean that if those 20
percent return to the battlefield, that would increase the
number from 10,000, 100,000, or essentially an infinite number
to a number that really is lost in our estimate.
But I know we are not dealing with a practical reality
world here; we are dealing very largely with emotion and
political issues. And so I know that the importance of these 40
is hugely more than the infinitesimal number that they would
add to the international radical Islamists who hate us, would
wish us ill and would hurt us if they could.
I was impressed with a statement that Admiral Olson made
before this committee: ``Special operation forces must focus on
the environmental dynamics and root causes that create today's
and tomorrow's threats and adversaries. Furthermore, a solution
is often as diverse as the threat and requires an approach that
is integrated with the long-term work of civilian agencies,
especially the State Department and USAID [United States Agency
for International Development], to foster U.S. credibility and
influence among relevant populations.''
In this committee, we focus primarily on military. In terms
of a percentage of the effective weapons that we have to fight
against these international threats, how large do you think the
military is as compared with the others which Admiral Olson
mentioned before this committee?
Mr. Clarke. Congressman, I think, obviously, in
Afghanistan, the United States military is our principal weapon
in fighting against the Taliban. If you can put Afghanistan
aside--and that is asking a lot--but if you consider the rest
of the world where the threats exist, I think the military is a
valuable tool, probably of equal importance with the FBI
[Federal Bureau of Investigations] and law enforcement
cooperation, probably of equal importance with the State
Department and AID, but I don't think it is primarily a
military issue.
And I think the dialogue that has occurred over the last 10
years, at least, about whether it is a military issue or a law
enforcement issue misses the point. It is not a military or a
political issue or a sociological issue. It is all of the
above. And the only way for us to combat it effectively is to
use all the weapons available to the United States. And,
certainly, some of our military is a valuable weapon on some
occasions in some environments. But it is not an either/or
situation. Law enforcement plays a very, very critical role, as
does intelligence. And, as you suggest, going after the root
causes is also valuable in some countries.
So we need to tailor our response depending upon where we
are operating, and we need to use everything we've got.
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, I am a huge fan of Admiral Olson
and the special operations community. And I think, as we look
forward to the nature of asymmetric warfare, we are going to be
relying more and more on special forces in environments of
concern and interest, both in preparation of the battlefield
and in trying to determine what national resources we can bring
to bear.
I would just say we need to remember some important lessons
over the last eight years where we have been successful. If you
look at southeast Asia, where all of the experts in 2001 and
2002 were expecting the second front in the War on Terror to
emerge, given al Qa'ida's presence there, their deep ties to
local groups like Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf Group, there
has been incredible success, I think, in not only disrupting
those networks but disrupting their regional and global reach.
And part of that has been the work of the special ops
community; part of it has been the work of locals. And I think
that is a good formula to look at in the future.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Clarke, let me ask you, what would victory against al
Qa'ida look like?
Mr. Clarke. Mr. Chairman, I think if we look out maybe 20
years from now, if we are lucky, and there isn't an al Qa'ida,
there isn't a structured organization known as al Qa'ida, and,
more importantly, if the violent Islamic ideology represented
by al Qa'ida is significantly on the wane, then I think we
would be able to declare victory.
The ideology is never going to go away. It has been around
for a thousand years. It comes and goes. There are waves in
Islamic history of this sort of deviant, distorted strain of
Islam, just as there were in Christianity for hundreds of
years. So I think it is always going to be there. But if we can
make it a small minority view in the Islamic world and if we
can eliminate the structured organization, then I think we can
declare a success.
But we will never be in a situation where there are no
violent Islamic cells anywhere in the world. For us, we need to
determine success in part by eliminating organizations that
threaten the United States, that see as their primary purpose
going after what they call the ``far enemy.'' Those are the
ones that should be our highest priority.
The Chairman. How do you get at the Islamists who will
always have a violent streak in them?
Mr. Clarke. Well, I think what has proven so effective so
far is to have respected imams in the community explain in the
mosque on Fridays why the things that are being said by al
Qa'ida are lies, why they are distortions, to do that at the
community level throughout the Muslim world. That is being done
in a lot of countries, and it is being done quietly but, I
think, very effectively.
We now also, however, need to bring that message into the
Internet and into the cyberspace. Because we have seen all too
often that individuals have been recruited remotely. People who
have never been to an al Qa'ida meeting, never been to a rally,
never been to anyplace where a group assembled were nonetheless
converted.
And this is very frightening. It is very frightening to our
Muslim friends that really well-done Internet appeals have
touched a responsive chord in many Muslim youth. And then,
having been converted on the Internet, they then go out and try
to find organizations, try to find a way of affiliating and
actually plugging in to al Qa'ida.
We do not yet, as far as I know, have in any country an
effective cyberspace presence of the ideological effort that is
the counterweight to al Qa'ida.
The Chairman. Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this excellent hearing.
I applaud all three of you. You know, our etiquette here is
that two witnesses are chosen by the majority and one by the
minority, and it is always a good sign when we can't tell which
is which. And I applaud you for your analysis and your
thoughtful efforts to try to help your country.
I am reminded of Mr. Jim Saxton, former Member, who also
worked very hard in a nonpartisan manner, and he pushed for a
panel that was established on terrorism. We had a meeting in
July of 2000, and this is what he said in his opening
statement: ``As a further example, the relatively new terrorist
group, al Qa'ida, headed by Usama bin Laden, may foreshadow a
new trend toward relatively self-sufficient terrorist
organizations that sustain themselves and operate independently
of a state sponsor.'' That was a year and a half before the
2001 attacks. We are now a decade later, and I appreciate your
ongoing efforts here.
The second point I wanted to make was, I think you, Mr.
Coll, talked about we need to not make any provocative mistakes
or acts. And I think a couple of you referred to the Abu Ghraib
experience and the photographs. At that time, I had a couple of
Egyptian interns that were with me for a couple of weeks. And
one of them was a young woman who liked America a lot, liked
Americans, excellent English language skills. And I asked her
what she thought about those photographs that came out when
they were first released. She was very polite, she said, ``I
wasn't there. I don't know what happened. It may be able to be
explained.'' She said, ``But when I saw those photographs, I
felt like it was me on the floor of that prison cell.'' And
here, this was a young woman in America, likes America. So you
put yourself in the position of somebody who may not be very
pro-American and a young male, you can understand your
admonition, Mr. Coll, to avoid mistakes and provocative acts.
Mr. Zarate, I think you, in your statement, more completely
than the other two witnesses, talk about some of these other
areas around the world and make some, I think, very good
suggestions. You specifically mention Algeria and Morocco. And
it gives me a chance to say something about the good work that
Ambassador Christopher Ross is doing to try to resolve the
issues between the Polisario in Morocco, because until that
conflict gets resolved, it is going to be very, very difficult
for Morocco and Algeria to come together and that region to get
settled.
And, of course, our attention doesn't get on these
intractable conflicts that have been going on for several
decades. But I think your statement today as to why we need not
ignore these conflicts that, unfortunately, we sometimes get
used to when, in fact, the people in the area very much want to
resolve them and we need to help them. And I, again, applaud
Chris Ross' efforts.
The question I wanted to ask is--and maybe I will use
Flight 253 for the question. What is that group trying to
accomplish? I think you, Mr. Coll, said it has very little
strategic significance. Have their goals changed? What are they
trying to accomplish?
What we have said in the past is the goal of al Qa'ida is
to get the United States to remove its troops from Muslim lands
and stop supporting Israel. I would like to hear from the three
of you briefly, what do you think the goal was with that attack
and other attacks at this stage?
Mr. Coll. Well, I think al Qa'ida leaders explained their
reasoning repeatedly, and they want to hold the United States
directly to account for what they regard as its aggressive
policies in the Muslim world. Bin Laden always uses the phrase
``raid'' to describe what we would correctly see as mass
murder, but he sees it in this, sort of, narrative of both
political and millenarian violence that he imagines himself
leading.
The group in Yemen is a little bit more muted about their
own particular ideology. But when you read into the preachers
around what we understand to be the group that recruited and
equipped the Flight 253 attacker, it is the same narrative of
direct violence against the United States that is associated
both with political but also millenarian narratives.
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, in terms of the actual attack,
this is the manifestation of al Qa'ida's strategy to try to use
the regional outpost. And the outpost in Yemen is the most
dangerous because you have seasoned al Qa'ida members, long
ties to bin Laden and the core group, directing their attention
to the West.
This has been the intention of al Qa'ida for some time, but
they pressed this in 2005, 2006. And, if you recall, the
Zawahiri-Zarqawi letter from 2005 that laid this strategy out
in the context of al Qa'ida in Iraq. But that is precisely what
they have been trying to do in the Maghreb and in Yemen. And,
unfortunately, this is a manifestation of that very strategy.
But I would say, in terms of long term, what al Qa'ida has
in mind is long-term conflict with the U.S. They have in mind
the notion of bankrupting us, bleeding us of blood and
treasure, thinking of the model of the Soviets in Afghanistan.
And I think that is really driving bin Laden and al Qa'ida's
thinking these days. And any kind of attack that disrupts us,
that forces us to, you know, fight amongst ourselves and to
spend resources is a victory for them, in their minds.
Mr. Coll. If I could just add very briefly, I do think they
want us to overreact. They have talked about that a fair
amount, and that is part of the way they get us toward this
strategy of what they imagine are leading us to bankruptcy.
Mr. Clarke. Sir, I think their ultimate goal, as they have
declared it, is to replace the governments in the Islamic
countries, to overthrow the Government of Saudi Arabia,
overthrow the Government of Egypt. That is their ultimate goal.
And they seek to get us out of the region by increasing the
pain upon us, because they believe we are propping up those
governments.
What is interesting is that their long-term goal,
overthrowing the Government of Saudi Arabia and Egypt,
replacing those governments with al Qa'ida governments, is as
far away from ever happening as it could possibly be. The
chances of them ever achieving their ultimate goal are close to
zero.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for your work.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, given the high recidivism rates that we have
observed, is transferring detainees to other countries an
acceptable risk when they can easily return to al Qa'ida's
ranks, either because of a lack of effective monitoring or
because of inadequate legal and prison systems?
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, I think it is something we have to
be worried about, and worried about even more so with the
present population of Guantanamo, which represents a more
hardened group of terrorists and folk connected to al Qa'ida.
We have seen in the past the numbers vary from, you know,
anywhere from 7 percent to 20 percent. But I think recidivism
rates would likely go much higher if some of these individuals
are released without the proper security constraints on the
back end.
And I think that is critical. We have got to be sure if we
are transferring individuals. The Bush administration did so,
as I was a part of, over 530 such individuals transferred out
of Guantanamo. You have got to be sure that you have the right
security measures on the back end. And, unfortunately, what we
have seen in the past is those security measures aren't
foolproof, and we have seen members return to the battlefield.
So we have to be very cautious about this.
Mr. Coll. If I could just add, I think it is important to
manage these risks with eyes on the strategic context.
There have been two administrations, on a bipartisan basis,
that have come to the view that the provocation that Guantanamo
represents outstrips the benefits of its specific location as a
detention center. President Bush announced his desire to close
the facility for that reason, and President Obama has followed.
Both Presidents and their staffs have wrestled with the
extraordinary complexity of the case files and the risks
associated with those case files. But I do think it is
important to understand that the strategic goal here is to
create a context in which al Qa'ida continues to isolate itself
in the Muslim world. Guantanamo is a factor in the provocative
narrative that al Qa'ida has sought to exploit.
Mr. Clarke. Congressman, I think there are two separate
issues here. One is, should we be releasing these people at all
and, if so, with what criteria; and, two, if we keep them,
where do we keep them. I think they are very separate issues.
And, obviously, I think the first question answers itself,
as Juan suggested, we have been releasing them for several
years now. We have learned something in the process. I think
some of the initial prisoners that were released in the Bush
administration turned out they shouldn't have been released. I
think we have learned that there are countries, such as Yemen,
that probably can't handle it right now, and, therefore, we
have to be very careful. But there have been other cases that
have been quite successful. So it has been, in both of the last
two administrations, something that was considered on a case-
by-case basis. I think we have to continue to do that, learning
from our past mistakes.
The second issue of, if we are going to keep some number of
them, is it important that they be kept in Cuba. I have never
understood the logic that says there is some value of having
them in Cuba as opposed to someplace else. I do think that
having them in Cuba has become a tool that the al Qa'ida
propaganda machine uses against us. Is it going to solve the
world's problems to take that one talking point away from al
Qa'ida? No, it is not. But I don't see why we should continue
to hand them a propaganda point by continuing to keep
Guantanamo open. I think moving them to someplace else would
probably have some minor value that is probably worth doing.
Mr. McKeon. I think, you know, there have been references
to the past administration, this administration. I am not
trying to make this a political issue at all. To me, it is just
a rational issue or a economic issue. Because when we had
briefings here before the holidays, in three briefings we were
told how much it was going to cost to move the detainees to
Illinois and to New York, and we were talking over a half-
billion dollars. Given our economic situation, it is hard for
me to see how that could possibly be justified.
But back to the point of where we transfer them, if they
are going to be transferred, is it unreasonable to require that
a receiving country not be a state sponsor of terrorism, that
it be able to secure and exercise control over its territory,
such that terrorist groups do not enjoy a safe haven and that
confirmed cases of Guantanamo detainees released to its
custodies are being returned to terrorism? That is my concern.
Mr. Clarke. Well, sir, I think we need to develop criteria.
And I think probably both the last two administrations had
criteria; we need to keep adjusting them.
As to whether or not the country receiving them is on the
state sponsor list or not, there are probably some countries on
the state sponsor list that would probably be pretty good
places to send them. I think certainly the Government of Syria,
which has been on the state-sponsored list, the Government of
Syria is about as opposed to al Qa'ida as we are and has proven
that over and over again. They are unlikely to release al
Qa'ida people.
But, the other criteria you have mentioned, whether or not
they are able to hold them, would suggest that places like
Yemen, which is not on the state sponsor list, probably
shouldn't be receiving them right now.
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, I think we need to learn lessons
and adjust our criteria accordingly. I think we have learned
some lessons from those we have already released. And I think
the criteria needs to take into account the shifting
international security context. I think the Obama
administration was wise to withhold transferring further
Yemenis, given the situation in that country. So I think that
is very important.
If I could just mention very quickly on the Guantanamo
question again, I think the underlying issue with Guantanamo,
for which it is a symbol, is the question of how we hold
individuals in this long-term battle. And if we are going to
have a preventive detention model, in many ways the locale, the
venue doesn't matter. The issue is whether or not we can
legitimately defend the system by which we hold such
individuals, especially if they are not going to be held to
account in a recognizable court of law.
And so I think one of the things this administration really
needs to grapple with, and it is part of my testimony, is how
do you frame that legal framework and how do you defend it. And
part of that defense may be going back and looking at the
fact--and I have heard this from my friends at Amnesty
International--that Guantanamo is actually a fairly good place
to be held as a detainee, with the facilities that have been
built, with Attorney General Holder going down and saying it is
a prison that is being well run.
And so this may be a time to reflect on whether or not we
defend the very notion of Guantanamo as part of a preventive
detention model that we have to defend for the long term.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, let me start out by saying--and I am hearing
just a little bit of a thread here in most of the testimony
that talks about taking away talking points from al Qa'ida.
And I think, Mr. Clarke, in your written testimony, your
six points said that completing the withdrawal of U.S. combat
forces from Iraq is an important component on the ideological
front. And I understand that. I just would remind all of us, in
2001, there were no U.S. combat forces in Iraq or Afghanistan.
There was no Gitmo. And yet the U.S. was brutally and viciously
attacked by al Qa'ida Central, I believe as you referred to it.
And it occurs to me that one of the reasons that we are
having this discussion about al Qa'ida is not because they are
so powerful; it is because they have demonstrated an intensity
of ideology that overwhelms us just by their commitment to do
us harm. And it occurs to me that there are two primary
components to the threat that they compose. Number one is that
intent, and number two would be their capacity to carry it out.
And I feel like this notion that we better take away their
talking points is kind of dangerous because it belies what we
already know about their intractable intent.
So let me start there, but my question is that we have to
focus on this thing called capacity. And nothing, of course, I
don't think, concerns any of us more than al Qa'ida or groups
with that mindset gaining access to weapons of mass
destruction, especially nuclear-yield weapons.
So what can we do today--and I am hoping the entire panel
will discuss this. I understand we are not in a closed session,
so you will have to adjust accordingly. But what can we do
today to prevent the proliferation of WMD in places like
Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea to eliminate the possibility of
a nuclear-armed al Qa'ida?
I just am so convinced that that wipes all other issues off
the table if terrorists gain access to even one nuclear weapon,
because then the response of the free world that follows,
everything is a completely new world.
So what are we doing to focus on preventing the capacity of
al Qa'ida to do us harm, especially them gaining access to
nuclear capability?
And I will start with you, Mr. Coll.
Mr. Coll. I think the single most important goal in that
respect ought to be to create conditions in which Pakistan
stabilizes and is able and increasingly is willing to take the
steps necessary to eliminate extremist ideology from Pakistani
soil and to stop using extremist groups as a proxy for
Pakistani regional foreign policy goals.
And in order to create conditions for Pakistan to stabilize
in that way, it is going to be necessary, at least in the
medium run, to create conditions for normalization between
India and Pakistan so that they don't embark on a nuclear arms
race that only exacerbates the dangers to the entire world of a
nuclear arsenal in Pakistan that is vulnerable to an insider
threat over time.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, on your first point, I couldn't
agree more. I think we have to be careful not to give al Qa'ida
hecklers veto over our policies, because I think they do have a
centuries-long view of their grievances that shift with the
political winds. And I think we see that time and again with
the statements coming out of bin Laden and al Qa'ida, now
focused on our support for Israel; in the past, our military
presence in other conflicts. And so, if it is not one excuse,
it is going to be another, and I think we need to be careful.
Although, we shouldn't be handing them free gifts, from a
propaganda perspective.
On the WMD front, I am actually quite proud of the work we
did on this. I think we laid out a very powerful six-part
strategy. It is laid out in the 2006 national strategy for
combatting terrorism.
But two quick points. I agree with Mr. Coll that, on the
nuclear front, the center of gravity is Pakistan, where we have
seen Pakistani scientists in the past associated in helping al
Qa'ida. And I think we have to be very careful with the
dimensions of capacity and expertise that al Qa'ida could gain
from the Pakistani nuclear complex.
On the bio side, I think we have to worry very diligently
about the expansion of biolabs around the world, in some places
in ungoverned or undergoverned parts of the world. That is
dangerous as we look at, potentially, toxins and pathogens used
by terrorist groups.
Mr. Clarke. Congressman, the WMD issue is the classic low-
probability, high-impact analytical problem. And it raises the
question, as all of those kinds of problems do, how do you
spend your dollar, how do you spend your time? Because you
could spend the whole gross national product dealing with this
issue.
The place that I think deserves more attention on the
nuclear issue, putting aside biological and chemical, on the
nuclear issue the place that I think deserves more attention is
not the security of weapons, because that has attention, but
the security of nuclear material. There are hundreds of tons of
enriched uranium around the world that are not properly
audited, accounted for, and secured. We haven't done a good job
on that issue, and that is where I would put that attention.
Mr. Franks. Thank you. I would agree with that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Three quick points and then one question.
First of all, definitely, I want to thank Mr. Zarate and
Mr. Clarke for making a couple points that I think are very
critical that we ought to move past. I mean, first of all, Mr.
Clarke's point about the choice between this being a law
enforcement issue and a military issue. It is no choice at all;
it is both, and a lot of other things in between. And we
shouldn't waste too much time debating that. We should debate
how do to each piece of it best and making sure that we don't
miss any of them.
And then, also, both of you made the point, on the issue of
the detainee policy, we have been, you know, obsessed with
where we hold them, when, in fact, I think the larger and more
difficult issues is how do we hold them and who do we hold and
who don't we hold and what are the criteria. And we have the
issue of the people who we are not going to try in any court
but we have to hold. How do we justify that policy and defend
it? And I think that should be the focus of that debate. And I
hope, from your mouths to God's ears, if you will, that
hopefully we will continue to move in that direction.
And then on the propaganda point, I agree with Mr. Franks
that we should not be at all concerned with how al Qa'ida is
going to react to whether or not Guantanamo is open, where we
try people, what our policies are in Afghanistan. There are,
however, other voices in the Muslim world that we better pay
attention to. Jordan, you know, a strong ally, our policies
will impact their ability to continue to have their citizens
agree with us. Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan--many places look
at our policies, whether it is Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, what
goes on in Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And
these are allies that we should care about, and I hope we don't
forget about that point.
My question has to do with the Taliban and al Qa'ida and
how close they are. There are many different, you know,
varieties of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It seems
to me critical to success there would be separating them off
from al Qa'ida. We are not going to eliminate the Taliban in
Afghanistan or in Pakistan.
What do you think about the relationship right now between
the Taliban and al Qa'ida in both Afghanistan and Pakistan? I
understand that we are talking about a complex set of groups
here, but what can we do to separate them so that if the
Taliban has some degree of influence anywhere that doesn't
automatically mean that al Qa'ida does? Is that have even
possible?
Mr. Coll, if you will.
Mr. Coll. I think the relationship that is probably closest
between al Qa'ida and the Pakistani Taliban, particularly the
Mehsud nexus of the Pakistani Taliban. There are also long
historical ties that must be continuing between the Haqqani
network, which is sort of a semi-independent element of the
Afghan Taliban in al Qa'ida.
In a strategic sense, al Qa'ida is clearly enabling both
Taliban by distributing insight into tactics, bomb-making, and
media operations. Think of just the oxymoron of the phrase
``Taliban media operations.'' In the 1990s, that basically
involved covering up oil paintings in Kabul ministries, and
today they are putting out many more videos than even al Qa'ida
is. So al Qa'ida clearly has an effect on these groups.
How to separate them, ultimately it requires a strategy
that persuades many Taliban leaders that their interests are
regional and local and political, that they are territorial,
and that our ----
Mr. Smith. How are we doing on that front, and what can we
be doing better?
Mr. Coll. I think we are just beginning to construct a
strategy in Afghanistan, and we are way behind in building a
partnership with the Pakistani Government that would lead to an
effective approach to their western frontier and domestic
insurgency.
Mr. Zarate. I would agree with Mr. Coll's assessment. But I
would say that, in terms of Pakistan, the Pakistani Government
has to have a different view for the long-term commitment they
have to the tribal areas. We saw, for example, in 2006, the
peace deal with the tribes in North Waziristan and South
Waziristan which eliminated the pressure that al Qa'ida was
under at the time and the incentives that the tribes actually
had then to work with the central government in Pakistan. There
was a withdrawal of forces, a withdrawal of checks of
enforcement of that deal. And I think that is what gave al
Qa'ida some breathing space at the time and some other
terrorist groups some breathing space in western Pakistan.
We are now, as we see with Secretary Gates going to
Islamabad, pushing the Pakistanis to make their way back into
North Waziristan, which I think is the next important battle
space. And I think part of this is physical pressure; part of
it is negotiation with purse and other goodies that the tribals
like, including influence; and I think part of this is a
political solution on the other side of the border in Kabul.
Mr. Clarke. I would agree with all of that. But I think, in
answer to your question, what should we be doing, I think
General McChrystal probably is doing it on the Afghan side. And
that is to say that he understands the Taliban on the Afghan
side are not monolithic and bits of them can be broken off
through a combination of coercion and bribery, to be blunt
about it.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for testifying today and for your service
to our country in varying capacities.
It seems that we have a real concern with failed states who
are in governable areas that have a population of Sunni Muslims
and some of them having a view of life that is susceptible to
al Qa'ida. How do we deal with that effectively? Because it
seems to be that perhaps in Afghanistan we haven't dealt with
it. And some of you have said that it has kind of bled this
country dry.
But how do we--we have not simply Afghanistan, but we
have--and there are ungovernable areas of Pakistan, we have
Somalia as a failed state, and we have problems with Yemen in
some ungovernable areas there that have al Qa'ida elements now.
I mean, how can we best protect our national security
interests in those areas and not bleed this country
financially?
Yes?
Mr. Zarate. I think you have hit the nail on the head
because I think we can't be all things to all people and we
can't have boots on the ground, for both the symbolic reasons
that we have talked about here but also for resource reasons.
I think we need to devise strategies like we did in
southeast Asia, where you have the local authorities, with
capacity-building, taking on the fight themselves, both the
hard edges of the fight and the soft edges. And you look at
things that the Indonesians have done, the Malaysians, with
Australian help, with U.S. help, that has been incredibly
effective.
If you look at Yemen, I think there is a much greater role
for Saudi Arabia and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and Gulf
states that have in their interest not to have an al Qa'ida
safe haven in their backyard. I think there is a greater role
there. In the Maghreb, having Algeria and Morocco work more
closely together, that is something we tried to achieve over
many years. That is critical.
So I think the regional partners have to take the leading
role, with the U.S. and other capable western countries
providing support and capacity. That is the only way you are
going to contain these problems and then start to deal with
them in the long term, which involves development aid,
assistance, economic investment, all of which we can't do on
our own and all of which the local authorities and countries
and interested parties, whether they are tribal or otherwise,
have the most primary interest in affecting.
Mr. Coffman. Anyone else?
Mr. Clarke. I think that is right. I think we can do a lot
with a small footprint. I think we are demonstrating that now
in Yemen. We have tried in Somalia. Somalia is a difficult
problem. But I think there are ways to extend central
government into some of these ungoverned regions through a
combination of development aid and security aid. And we can use
U.S. special operations forces and others in small numbers to
help achieve that. I think it is a big mistake to think that we
only can help these people by putting in a large American aid
footprint or a large American military footprint. In fact, that
is probably counterproductive.
What is interesting is, in places like Yemen, it is not so
much a problem that there isn't enough money to do the
development aid. There is plenty of money pledged by the
Saudis, the United States, the UAE, and others. The problem has
been institution building in the central government so that it
can use the money that has been pledged. And that is something
where we ought to be able to do a better job.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Coll?
Mr. Coll. I think all of those approaches that Mr. Clarke
and Mr. Zarate have outlined are necessary. I think it is
important, though, to look at the record of where success has
really been achieved and taken hold.
And southeast Asia, I think, is the best example. I
traveled in Indonesia this summer, and I was struck by the
extent to which the capacity building and the extraordinary
success of the Government of Indonesia, the Government of
Malaysia, even the Government of Philippines to a degree has
had, is a product of regional economic integration. I mean,
these are middle-income countries that are moving ahead in such
a confident way that they are able to muster a national
capacity to defeat insurgent groups and to control ungoverned
spaces in a way that just wasn't imaginable 20 years ago.
So, ultimately, in the Arab world and in Africa, that kind
of momentum, as distant as it looks in a place like Somalia or
Yemen, is essential. American USAID or boots on the ground is
no substitute for national capacity that is built from regional
economic momentum.
Mr. Coffman. Let me be specific and say Somalia, I mean,
where we really are talking about a failed state that has no
capacity at this time, we have issues of piracy in terms of,
you know, pirates having safe harbor there because it is a
failed state. We have issues, certainly, of al Qa'ida having a
presence there. How do you deal with the situation where there
is no capacity?
Mr. Zarate. Somalia is perhaps the most bedeviling of the
safe haven problems, for all the reasons I think most folks
know well. I think part of it is doing precisely what we have
tried to do, which is to come up with a political solution
where fractious parties within Somalia have a vested interest
in building the power of a central government or some semblance
of a central government.
We are getting there, I think, with the Djibouti process
that has been supported by the U.S. and other partners. Part of
it is having the AU [African Union] and regional countries like
Kenya and Ethiopia, which are not well liked in some instances,
for obvious reasons, take greater ownership and, frankly, help
contain the problem while the political process develops and
where you have the capacity.
But that is a fractious society, a violent society, and one
where al Qa'ida has found allies like al Shabaab for some time.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Taylor. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes the
gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Davis, for five minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
As you know, we are about to start the discussions for the
defense budget for 2011. And I am wondering how you would
prioritize our defense spending in relation to al Qa'ida. Or
should we be looking away from more conventional forces? How do
we balance the threats that al Qa'ida poses as we look to those
issues?
Mr. Clarke. Well, again, putting aside Afghanistan, which
is where we are directly using our military to confront al
Qa'ida and its affiliates like the Taliban, putting aside that,
which I think needs to be fully and adequately funded, both on
the defense side and on the foreign ops side, probably at least
as important on the foreign ops side, I think we need to look
at whether or not the Special Forces Command is adequately
sized. It has been very strained over the last few years
because of, first, its successes in Iraq and now being used
extensively in Afghanistan, perhaps in Yemen and elsewhere.
That is probably the place where, on the military budget, the
greatest contribution can be made.
Mr. Zarate. I would agree with that. I think we need to
look to see where we have resources that apply to the
asymmetric threat. And I think SOCOM [Special Operations
Command] is one example where we have programs that can be
applied.
I think programs that allow us to build capacity with
foreign counterparts--I know the special operations community
has built a very important and good global and network of
special operation forces around the world, including with some
Arab allies. And so, building that capacity to deal with
problems as we have seen in Yemen or in Somalia or in the
Maghreb becomes very important so that we don't have to put
boots on the ground and we have good and capable allies that
are willing and able to do it. So I think that is important.
And, finally, I know this may be outside the purview of
this committee, but finding a way, perhaps through 1206
funding, to blend the funding that goes to State and DOD [the
Department of Defense] for these longer-term development aid
and assistance programs in environments where you have
incipient conflicts that need both a security component and a
development aid and assistance component. I think that is
critical. And I don't think, as a bureaucracy, we have really
figured that out as a U.S. Government. And we have struggled
with it. I am sure Dick did in his time in the White House. I
did, as well.
Mr. Coll. My colleagues know the programmatic pieces much
better than I, but I would step back and just make two quick
observations.
First, to reenforce the notion of SOCOM's enabling
capacity. When you look out over 20 years, one hopes that the
stress that special forces have been under in Iraq and
Afghanistan will ebb, but the challenge of enabling regional
and local capacity will persist.
And, secondly, if--I would scrutinize the strategic
communications efforts of the Defense Department in this
budgeting cycle, because I do think there is an opportunity and
a need to reset, on a nonpartisan, serious basis, American
thinking about strategic communication and where the dollars
are going and whether they are effective and how to leverage
them successfully. This, again, is a 20-year challenge that is
not going to go away, and it would be a good time to start
thinking about how to spend effectively to support that goal.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I think that one of the lessons that we have learned in the
last number of years is how to be more efficient, in some ways,
across agencies. But I also am wondering if you could, you
know, maybe just point out where are we the most inefficient in
trying to work better together to preserve our security in a
way that doesn't bankrupt us, bleed us the way that we are
seeing today.
Mr. Clarke. Where are we most inefficient? I would have to
say, if you look across in terms of the budget where are we
spending money probably least effectively, it is probably in
AID, in the foreign ops budget because they tend to go after
very large projects, which take a long time and aren't
immediately seen by the people in the recipient countries,
necessarily, as beneficial.
To the extent that AID has moved in the direction, which it
has, of smaller projects that deliver quick hits, quick
victories, the way the DOD money has done so well, I think that
is probably the place where we could be more efficient.
Mr. Zarate. I couldn't agree more. I think one of the
challenges for the U.S. Government is aligning our development
aid and assistance long-term with our short-term national
security needs without doing damage to those long-term goals.
So we haven't figured that out yet. And I think Dick is
absolutely right, in terms of the lack of efficiencies.
I would, for example, echo what Mr. Coll said in terms of
strategic communications. I think that was something that we
left unfinished in the prior administration, figuring out both
bureaucratically and programmatically how you deal with this
new war, this asymmetric, Internet-based war in terms of
STRATCOM [Strategic Communications] strategy and structure. So
that is important.
Finally, I would just say, Congresswoman, I think we, as a
government, need to start thinking more creatively about how we
engage, align, and work with private-sector actors. I think we
don't do it well enough. And what you have facing us is an
enemy made up of non-state actors, cells, networks. What we
haven't figured out is how to align those good guys on the good
side of the ledger to work against those very networks at the
local level. And I don't think we are very good at that yet.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor. Before the Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, we have been called for two votes, one 15-minute,
one 5-minute. It is Chairman Skelton's intention to recognize
Mr. Shuster, then break for the votes and come back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania
for five minutes.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Is it Mr. Zarate?
Mr. Zarate. Zarate.
Mr. Shuster. My Spanish is a little off.
You brought up the concern I have about how do we try these
terrorists, and it has become a political football. I believe
it has become a political football because, in my district in
rural Pennsylvania, the truck driver, the average American, the
average citizen in my district is asking me, why are we giving
these people the same rights that American citizens have when
they are not?
The underwear bomber, I understand after 50 minutes of
interrogation they read him his Miranda rights, and he took the
advice of the Miranda rights and shut up and waited for his
attorney to get there.
So that is the reason it is political football, I believe.
I think there is an accepted, credible system out there, and
that is the military tribunals. So I would like to hear your
comments on what you think the solution--do we have the
solution in place?
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, I agree with you. I think one of
the challenges that this administration faces--and it perhaps
is of their own making, and I think to a certain extent it is,
especially with the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed decision, to bring
him to New York and some of his compatriots to face trial in
New York--is the lack of clarity as to what exactly is the
legal structure and paradigm being applied.
Because what you will have in that context is, in essence,
a tiered legal system. For the worst of the worst, they are
getting the most protections under U.S. law, the same
protections you and I would get in a civilian court, while
there are lower-level al Qa'ida individuals who will not face
trial at all, will have no due process as we understand it in a
civilian court, with no explanation as to why that system makes
sense or is in concert with the rule of law.
So I think the first thing that needs to happen is a
framework that explains these tiers and explains exactly why
they are being the applied. I am not against fundamentally--I
was a former prosecutor, terrorism prosecutor--to using the
criminal legal system. But it is one tool of many and shouldn't
necessarily be the first point of entry for these individuals.
And I think it goes to the nature of what we are facing. I
think we have to make some choices. If we want intelligence
from terrorists we capture, like the Christmas Day bomber, then
you don't Mirandize him and you don't put him immediately into
the criminal legal system. But it doesn't mean you can't
prosecute him later, as we did, for example, with Jose Padilla.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Clarke, I wondered what your thoughts
were. What do you believe al Qa'ida's view is on the situation
where we are bringing him into our Federal courts and giving
him the rights of the American citizen? Do you think that is
something they are smiling about when they see that? Does that
help their cause?
Mr. Clarke. I don't think they give it two seconds'
thought, and, frankly, I am not sure we should either. You
know, the difference between the military tribunals, which you
suggest wouldn't have Mirandized the prisoner, and the civil
criminal process has been exaggerated. It is really not that
different, in terms of their rights.
I think we have successfully prosecuted a very large number
of terrorists under the Bush administration and under the
Clinton administration in the Federal civil system with very,
very high success rates. And I just don't understand why people
are afraid of using the Federal civil system, civil court
system, the criminal court system, which has proven to be so
effective.
Mr. Shuster. I would submit, I think the folks in my
district are saying because it will take months and months, if
not years, and millions of dollars of money that need to go out
to fight terrorism.
Mr. Clarke. So will the military system, sir.
Mr. Shuster. What is that?
Mr. Clarke. So will the military tribunal system, sir. It
will take just as long and cost just as much.
Mr. Shuster. Well, I guess time will show us what the facts
are on that.
Mr. Clarke. We already have historical data that would
suggest that.
Mr. Shuster. Right.
The next question I have is--and I see my time is running
short, so if you don't have an opportunity to answer, if you
could give us something in writing. It is something concerning
Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi--I keep hearing his name--who I have
heard him called ``bin Laden, Jr.,'' and the most effective
propagandist they have in getting these young people to come to
their cause.
So I wondered if all three of you might--again, he is going
to gavel me down here in 40 seconds. So I will start with you,
Mr. Coll, and if you have any views on him and what your
thoughts are, if you could comment.
Mr. Coll. I would be happy to come back in writing on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 79.]
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Abu Yahya al-Libi is one of the most prominent
clerics that al Qa'ida has. He has become prominent in terms of
his sermons and his Internet presence. He has gained fame
because he escaped from Bagram, and that has created more to
his mythos as a leader in al Qa'ida. And I think he is an
important figure that needs to be killed or captured.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Clarke, any thoughts on that?
Mr. Clarke. Yes, I would agree with Juan on that.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman from
Pennsylvania.
I would remind Members that we have approximately six
minutes to make the vote, but it is very much Chairman
Skelton's intention to return after those votes.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Our hearing will resume with Mr.
Heinrich, please.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our guests for being here today.
I have one question I want to direct first at Mr. Coll, and
then feel free, the rest of you, to chime in as well.
But I wanted to ask you, Mr. Coll, one of the fundamental
limiting factors to our success in Afghanistan, which is
obviously related to this whole issue in a deep way, is just
the willingness of the Afghan Government to do some of the
fundamental reforms, the anticorruption measures and other
things that are necessary.
And I wanted to get your--as somebody who has written about
many of these players in Afghanistan for a long time, I wanted
to get your take on how you would characterize the willingness
of the Karzai government today to make some of the changes that
we need to see to realize our goals in Afghanistan.
Mr. Coll. Well, all the evidence is that it is inadequate,
and it is certainly one of the major strategic risks facing
U.S. policy in Afghanistan.
Having said that, the better news is that the Afghan
Government is larger than President Karzai. I have long worried
about the extent to which, out of necessity and expediency
both, we have tended to make him an indispensable figure and
run everything through his office. You see now in the
relationship between parliament and the President the potential
for a sounder, more broadly based approach to the limited role
that the Kabul government actually has to play. But it is
important because of the credibility that it provides for
international policy in Afghanistan.
And I recognize, as well, that General McChrystal and
Ambassador Eikenberry and others have a vision that is based on
the idea that there are many more actors in Afghanistan who can
turn things around than those just in the Kabul ministries. So,
working through effective governors at the provincial and even
sub-provincial level will be critical to achieving the, sort
of, stability that will allow Afghanistan security forces to
deploy and U.S. forces to pull back.
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, just to piggyback, I think it is a
very good point. With relation to that, I think a big question
that the Afghan Government has and that our policy confronts is
the question of the center versus the locality, how much we
rely on local and tribal partners in the first instance versus
the focus on Kabul and the central government and, in
particular, from a security perspective, whether or not we
begin to rely more heavily on local security militias.
I think that becomes a very important policy question for
not only folks here in Washington but also in Kabul. You have
had experiments that have worked well in Wardak province and
other places, but it is not clear that that model will work
everywhere in Afghanistan. And we have to be careful about
diffusing the security of the country.
And so I think there are some very important inflection
points here with respect to Kabul's ability to control its own
security.
Mr. Heinrich. As a follow-up question, are there
opportunities that we are missing to engage the wider
government, the broader government, that we should be taking
advantage of to make sure that all our eggs aren't in that
Kabul basket?
Mr. Coll. I think it is critical that U.S. policy in
Afghanistan approach these political equations with as much
energy and creativity and resources as it is approaching the
military equation. And I think you have described it, framed it
correctly, which is that a successful policy of national
reconciliation and political reintegration that complements the
security piece in Afghanistan over the next three to five years
has to be more broadly based than the presidential palace.
Now, you can achieve that broader base through lots of
different mechanisms. You can turn to parliament, you can use
loya jirgas and other institutions, traditional institutions.
You can do it regionally, as well as nationally. But you have
to do it. And it also has to be reinforced by regional
diplomacy that brings to bear pressure on these factions in
Afghanistan that are otherwise not likely to participate in
such a reconciliation program.
And I think there has always been an articulation of this
vision in U.S. policy, but now bringing it to bear
successfully, it is hard, it is going to be a zig-zag, it is
always going to be incomplete. But if it is not made a
priority, then it won't succeed.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Kratovil.
Mr. Kratovil. Mr. Chairman, first, let me thank you for
allowing folks to come back so we had an opportunity to ask a
few questions.
Let me just follow up on Mr. Heinrich's question. His
question sort of went to the issue of, how do we make that
policy in Afghanistan better? My question is a little bit
different.
Given the facts related to this Christmas Day incident and
given what we know is going on in Yemen and the problems there,
what impact does that have on your view of the strategy at all
in Afghanistan, in terms of putting more troops on the ground?
Any of you or all of you.
Mr. Coll. It has no impact on my view, in the sense that I
think that, as I believe it was Mr. Clarke pointed out,
understanding that there were problems outside of the Pakistan-
Afghan region predated the Christmas attack and robust activity
was under way, it just wasn't publicized.
I think that the reason the President made the right
decision in Afghanistan has to do with core al Qa'ida, which,
as we talk about earlier, remains resilient and, while under
pressure and diminished, still able to facilitate the transfer
of bomb-making techniques, still able to participate in robust
media operations, and still able to assist the destabilization
of both the Pakistan and Afghan Governments.
Mr. Coll. So it is a resilient danger that needs to be
addressed directly. And I think that that is the rationale,
ultimately, for the policy in Afghanistan.
Mr. Clarke. I think Steve is right. They are very different
situations, and they call for very different kinds of
responses. In Afghanistan, things obviously got out of control.
And we, therefore, now need a very large military force there,
at least for the short term. In Yemen, we are able to work
through an existing government, give it military support, give
it intelligence support, and hopefully give it development,
economic support.
There will be other places around the world where al Qa'ida
will pop its head up or affiliated groups will pop their heads
up. And, at least initially, these small footprint solutions,
like what we are doing in Yemen, are the appropriate response.
Mr. Zarate. Congressman, the only thing I would add--and I
agree with both my colleagues here--is that there is a
demonstration effect to our policy. And so, shifting the
momentum of the Taliban in Afghanistan becomes important, in
terms of the global posture that the U.S. has, in part, for our
friends and allies, as they understand we are resolute and are
willing to fight for what we believe in and to work with them.
That becomes very important with Pakistan, I think, in the long
term.
And I also think in terms of the enemy, it becomes
important. We don't want to play into their hands, and we don't
want to needlessly spend blood or treasure, but, at the same
time, we need to be resolute. And I think one of the lessons of
Iraq is that it was one of the first times that we had, when
bloodied, stood up to al Qa'ida and surged. And I think that
was a devastating lesson to our enemies, and I think that is
something we should keep in mind in Afghanistan.
Mr. Kratovil. We had testimony several months ago--and I am
trying to remember the gentleman's name--in talking about
Afghanistan, what we are going to do in Afghanistan. And his
point was, of course if we are squeezing in one place, it would
bleed out into another.
One of you mentioned what has happened in Yemen as a result
of the crackdown in Saudi Arabia. Can't we simply expect that
to happen, based on the crackdown in Afghanistan?
Mr. Coll. Well, the Government of Pakistan is certainly
concerned about spillover effects. Their version of what has
happened after 9/11 emphasizes the consequences to Pakistan of
the migration of al Qa'ida from Afghanistan into Pakistan as a
result of U.S. military action there.
But I think my response to that argument that you referred
to, which has been part of a very healthy American discourse
about U.S. policy choices in Afghanistan, this notion that you
squeeze the balloon and Yemen pops up and Somalia pops up, is
that there is no territory that means to al Qa'ida what the
Afghan-Pakistan border means to al Qa'ida. And the role of the
core leadership and networks that are located there is distinct
from any other expression. That doesn't mean these other
expressions aren't dangerous. But in order to achieve any
definition of success against al Qa'ida, that core organization
needs to be disabled and destroyed. And I do think it is a
distinct problem.
Mr. Kratovil. Okay.
Mr. Zarate. I would just agree. I would say that al Qa'ida
core will make their last stand in the Afghan-Pak border
region. You are not likely to see a grand al Qa'ida caravan to
some other locale, the way we saw, for example, the move from
Sudan to Afghanistan in the past.
That doesn't mean the regional affiliates or radicalized
cells and individuals won't be a problem in the future. They
will. But it doesn't mean that there is the balloon effect that
people talk about.
Mr. Kratovil. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Let me ask Mr. Clarke, we have had some homegrown, domestic
radicalization from Zazi, the Major Hasan, David Headley, and
the Northern Virginia Five. What do you make of this?
Mr. Clarke. I think it is remarkable we don't have more.
When you think of it, you know, we are a nation of 300 million
people.
And there have clearly been attempts by al Qa'ida and
similar groups to radicalize populations in the United States,
including prison populations. And, so far, I think we have done
a fairly good job in the United States on both the ideological
front and the intelligence front. What I mean by that is, I
think the American-Muslim community--or communities, I should
say--have been very good in waging the ideological war within
their own communities against al Qa'ida and against what it
believes in. And we have been very successful.
And it has been remarkably different in Europe. If you look
at England, you look at Germany, you look at France, those
Islamic communities have been more successfully radicalized
than those in the United States.
I think it is logical to expect that this is going to
happen; we are going to have these onesies and twosies of
people, individuals who are radicalized in part through
Internet outreach, radicalization on the Web, at least
initially, and in part through the occasional radical imam like
al-Awlaki, who has now moved to Yemen but was in northern
Virginia and elsewhere.
I think it is largely, though, sir, Mr. Chairman, I think
it is a good-news story that so little of it has happened and
that the FBI has done a relatively good job in tracking what
problems there have been here.
The Chairman. I thank you.
Any comments from the other two gentlemen?
Mr. Zarate. Mr. Chairman, I would just repeat what I said
in my testimony, which is I don't think we should overreact in
terms of the number of cases we have seen over the past year. I
think we have seen a fairly consistent element of a domestic
radicalization problem that hasn't reached a crisis or tipping
point, as Dick mentions. You know, you have had Derrick
Shareef, Sadiqi, the Fort Dix plot, the Torrance cell. You
know, over the last eight years, we have had numerous cases
where the FBI and others have done very good work in
disrupting. So I don't think we should make any grand
conclusions.
Two things we should watch, though, is the clustering, the
fact that you have groups of individuals within communities,
like the American Somalis, that are drawn to the ideology; and,
secondly, the continued attempts to reach the foreign terrorist
organizations themselves. And I think that is a bit different,
and it is the kind of thing that we need to watch very
carefully. Because that presents a very different kind of
danger than the onesies and twosies that Mr. Clarke talked
about.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Coll?
Well, gentlemen, this has been an excellent hearing, and we
certainly appreciate your being with us. And we feel that we
have learned a great deal. And we look forward to seeing you
again.
[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
January 27, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
January 27, 2010
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
January 27, 2010
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Coll. Abu Yahya Al-Libi is the nom de guerre of a Libyan-born
jihadi who has fought in and around Afghanistan since at least the
early 1990s. He became a celebrity after his escape from Bagram Prison
outside of Kabul in 2005. Some analysts have praised his communication
skills; he has some education and has been able to exploit in
propaganda stories about chatting with American prison guards at Bagram
as well as his daring escape. It is doubtful that any al Qa'ida leader
will ever gain the global reputation that Osama Bin Laden enjoyed at
the height of his popularity, but Libi does represent a charismatic
example of the generation of jihadis shaped by the battlefield and
prison narratives that followed the September 11 attacks and the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq. [See page 29.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
January 27, 2010
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON
Mr. Skelton. Should the United States engage countries such as
Yemen using security cooperation alone or should U.S. policy be broader
and focus on development and reform irrespective of the host-nation
commitment to U.S. policy and cooperation on counterterrorism issues?
Mr. Clarke. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
Mr. Skelton. You have been working counterterrorism issues for
decades, and serving at very senior levels of the U.S. government has
given you perhaps a unique vantage point in terms of organizational
changes in the federal government that have occurred since 9/11. Can
you provide us with an overview of how our government--and in
particular the Department of Defense--has been working together in
light of the continually evolving threat posed by al Qa'ida? Where and
what do we need to improve? What types of inefficiencies still exist
that could potentially be exploited by our enemies?
Mr. Clarke. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
Mr. Skelton. How do you assess the risk that Americans fighting
alongside groups like al Shabaab in Somalia will return to the United
States intent on attacking the homeland?
Mr. Zarate. The al Shabaab and the jihadi battlefield in Somalia
continue to attract radicalized recruits and support from around the
world, including individuals from the United States. Unfortunately, a
series of recent cases, including announcements on August 5, 2010, by
the Attorney General of new arrests in the United States for terrorist
support to al Shabaab, underscore this festering problem. The pipeline
of Americans, both non-African converts to Islam and American-Somalis,
to fight in Somalia with al Shabaab raises the direct concern that such
fighters and radicalized individuals will be trained and then
redeployed to commit attacks in the United States. This has been a
central concern of U.S. counterterrorism officials since 2005.
There are three key factors that raise concerns that the al Shabaab
will serve as a platform for deployment of Westerners to attack in the
homeland:
The al Shabaab's view that it forms part of al Qa'ida's
global network as well as continued interaction between al Qa'ida
elements in East Africa with the al Shabaab make it likely that al
Shabaab will try to project force and its influence beyond Somalia--
either on its own or at the prompting of al Qa'ida elements. The al
Shabaab's July 2010 suicide attacks in Kampala are troubling because
they demonstrate the group's willingness to attack beyond the borders
of Somalia against a perceived enemy. In addition, the al Shabaab seems
particularly willing to try to bait U.S. intervention and reaction,
which makes their potential actions against U.S. interests more
variable and less susceptible to deterrence.
With the presence of Americans and other Westerners in al
Shabaab training camps who could travel relatively easily back to the
United States, there is greater opportunity for the al Shabaab to
deploy an individual or group to the United States to commit an act of
terror. The reality that the first American suicide bomber in October
2008, Shirwa Ahmed, was an American-Somali who attacked a site in
Somalia serves as a clear warning that Americans can be radicalized and
deployed as suicide attackers. With others following in his footsteps
in Somalia and the failed Times Square car bomb, the concerns about a
possible American committing an act of terror in the Homeland have only
grown.
Events over the last 18 months have perhaps taught the al
Shabaab a lesson. To project force into the United States--even with a
failed attack (as seen vividly in the Detroit airline incident and the
bungled Times Square car bomb)--may be a success. With perceptions of
U.S. overreaction to the Detroit and Times Square events, groups like
al Shabaab may now believe that disruption vice destruction in the
United States is a worthy goal. They also may have learned the lesson
from regional groups and allies of al Qa'ida, like al Qa'ida in the
Arabian Penninsula and the Pakistan Taliban, that deployment of just
one operative for an attack can raise the group's profile and inject
fear into American society--and could perhaps lure the United States
into a direct military confrontation.
These factors combined with the continued allure of Somalia as a
perceived battlefield make it likely that the al Shabaab--on its own or
as a proxy for al Qa'ida--will attempt to deploy an operative into the
United States for an attack. Fortunately, there are counterweights to
this possibility. The al Shabaab is under increasing pressure within
Somalia, and its recruits--Westerners or otherwise--have been
concentrated on maintaining and expanding control of territory in
Somalia. In addition, within the United States there is intense focus
by law enforcement and the intelligence community on this potential--
since 2006--and the recent cases revealed publicly demonstrate law
enforcement's continued focus on any pipeline--human or financial--to
Somalia. Finally, the Somali-American community in urban areas like
Minneapolis have begun to recognize that they have a problem in their
midst and have cooperated with law enforcement to try to prevent the
radicalization of Somali-American youth.
Mr. Skelton. If we are seeing al Qa'ida-affiliate threats spread
from South Asia to the Arabian Peninsula, where do you believe is the
next potential region of instability and what specifically can we do to
address this evolving threat?
Mr. Zarate. I have described the evolving violent Sunni extremist
problem as a terrorist Hydra--with AQ Core (made up of the senior
leadership and cadre of historical al Qa'ida present largely in Western
Pakistan); AQ affiliates and allies (to include groups like al Qa'ida
in the Arabian Penninsula, al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qa'ida
in Iraq, al Shabaab, the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban, Islamic Jihad
Union); and AQ-inspired individuals and cells all operating in a global
battlefield. The most dangerous manifestations of regional expansion
for al Qa'ida lie in the relationships with regional organizations that
have ideological, historical, and logistical ties to AQ Core as well as
small groups of radicalized individuals who are committed to the
strategic goals and actions defined and prompted by al Qa'ida.
Aside from Afghanistan and Pakistan and all the groups operating in
those countries (including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Haraka ul Jihad I Islami
(HUJI), and HUJI-Bangladesh), the United States needs to worry about
physical safe haven in numerous parts of the world which provide the
opportunity for Sunni terrorist allies to recruit, train, mingle, and
strategize together. The arc from Yemen through Somalia and East Africa
to Southern Sudan and the Maghreb provides the most important and
dangerous arc of instability and opportunity for our terrorist enemies.
The growing radicalization in Central Asia--to include southern Russia
and western China--is of concern especially with organizations like the
Islamic Jihad Union and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
operating aggressively in the region and beyond. The problem of
extremism in the Gulf, Iraq, Egypt, and the Levant needs to be watched
carefully, though al Qa'ida has had difficulty in establishing bases in
the countries of this region after crackdowns in the post 9/11 period.
Finally, the problems of ``pocket havens''--small communities of
radicalized individuals who are susceptible to recruitment and
enlistment on their own or by organized terrorist groups--need to be
treated seriously. These pockets can be found in refugee camps (e.g.,
Palestinian camps in Lebanon), particular villages (e.g., Tetuan in
Morrocco), and in urban environments among disaffected minorities
(e.g., certain Muslim sub-communities in Europe and North America).
The most important thing that can be done is to empower and enlist
regional and local actors to take up the task of disrupting active al
Qa'ida and terrorist activity while also trying to prevent and
counteract the radicalization of susceptible populations. This model
will look different in each instance depending on the environment and
how the threat is materializing, but the key remains local engagement
and cooperation by security and law enforcement agencies, aid agencies,
and credible community voices. The United States can always be helpful
by providing information, capacity, and relevant enablers. The example
of Southeast Asia's success in addressing the terrorist threat is
informative, with capable and willing countries working together with
the assistance of Australia and the United States to disrupt terrorist
cells, prevent radicalization, build collective capabilities and
defenses, and to engage in counterinsurgency efforts where needed.
Mr. Skelton. In your written testimony, you talk about how al
Qa'ida's public support is declining and how they have essentially
politically isolated themselves since 2005. In addition to the policy
options you discuss, how specifically can the United States take
advantage of this downward trend in the popularity of al Qa'ida and
what strategies would you recommend?
Mr. Coll. The best strategy is to work through others in the
Islamic world--particularly to help highlight the narratives of Muslim
and other civilian victims of al Qa'ida's indiscriminate bombing, and
to publicize polling data that documents the abhorrence that most
Muslims feel toward suicide bombing. Directing financial support,
through proxies if possible, to civil society and human rights groups
in Muslim-majority countries who help victims of terrorist violence is
one specific idea that would push in this direction. Direct arguments
made by American officials are less likely to be effective.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. Should the United States engage countries such as Yemen
using security cooperation alone or should U.S. policy be broader and
focus on development and reform irrespective of the host-nation
commitment to U.S. policy and cooperation on counterterrorism issues?
Mr. Clarke. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. In your testimony you talked about the effective use
of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to build national capacity of
our foreign counterparts and partners. With this in mind, and
considering high-priority regions of concern, where should SOF
concentrate their efforts geographically to enhance partnerships and
limit or mitigate threats posed by AQ and AQ affiliates?
Mr. Zarate. The U.S. Special Forces (SOF) and the relationships and
capacities they have built and continue to build around the world are
critical to our long-term counterterrorism success. Counterterrorism
operations around the world will often depend directly on the
discipline and effectiveness of small units able to target and disrupt
terrorist activity surgically. SOF helps to build that worldwide
capacity and network that is advantageous to U.S. interests.
The SOF's resources are best spent with countries that are aligned
with U.S. interests, have the willingness to engage in the terrorism
fight, and will be important to local and regional disruption of
emerging terrorist threats. Those special forces from countries that
have been active with the United States in war zones like Afghanistan
and Iraq are prime candidates as force-multiplying partners in building
further global capabilities.
The most critical of the special forces engagements globally will
come with countries that can serve as regional enablers for their
neighbors to address existing and future threats. In East Africa, this
includes work with Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan forces. In the Middle
East, this means continuing to build the capabilities of strong
partners like Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Morocco,
and Iraq. In Southeast Asia, this means working collectively with
Australian special forces to build the capabilities of Singaporean,
Thai, and Indonesian forces. With our special forces and existing
capable allies, we need to be building credible partners in key parts
of the world where al Qa'ida and its allies have potential footholds to
ensure it cannot gain safe haven or expand its global reach.
Ms. Sanchez. In your testimony you talked about a need to reset
strategic communications on a nonpartisan basis. What specific
strategic communications strategies would you offer policy makers as we
consider the morphing AQ threat of 2010 and beyond?
Mr. Coll. The most important priority is to conceive of strategic
communications policy so that it fits with the media technologies of
our time. To date, American strategic communications thinking has
remained rooted in the ``broadcast tower'' or one-to-many paradigm of
the Cold War era. Anyone who keeps a Facebook or Twitter account will
recognize that many-to-many is the new paradigm. Innovators at the
State Department such as Alec Ross, Secretary of State Clinton's
adviser on how digital technology creates opportunities for diplomacy,
offers an example of the new thinking that the government requires. The
next step is to think about how models of many-to-many communication
can be distributed to reinforce Muslim public opinion that is already
hostile to al Qa'ida and its tactics. This will require some risk-
taking that public diplomacy thinkers have so far found difficult.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. One of the most disturbing aspects of al Qa'ida's
demonstrated elasticity and adaptability is its use of the Internet to
attract new followers and facilitate radicalization. The Internet has
allowed al Qa'ida to reach out beyond the constraints of regional
borders and the geographical locations of its training camps to spread
the extremist mindset and encourage newcomers to act on the ideology's
call to violence.
This ability to harness the Internet is especially concerning due
to the emerging threat of ``homegrown'' terrorist and domestic
radicalization. In fact, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies ``Transnational Threats Update'' that came out last month
(Volume 7, Number 9, Nov-Dec 2009), stated that the threat of
domestically radicalized recruits ``has manifested itself as a
possibility in more than 20 cases since 9/11, and at least a dozen in
the past year.''
And Mr. Coll wrote last week in a piece for the New American
Foundation titled ``Threats'' (January 18, 2009) that al Qa'ida ``has
evolved into a jihadi version of an Internet-enabled direct-marketing
corporation structured like Mary Kay, but with martyrdom in place of
pink Cadillacs.''
As the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
reported in its 2008 Staff Report on violent Islamist Extremism, the
Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat, one of the primary
drivers of the expanding al Qa'ida threat to our homeland is the use of
the Internet to enlist individuals to joint in violent extremism
without ever really affiliating with a terrorist organization.
So as we look forward and try to analyze what the U.S. should do to
better prevent future terrorist attacks and ultimately defeat and
eliminate al Qa'ida, understanding the emerging threat of the Internet
in radicalization is a critical aspect.
Mr. Zarate, given your extensive experience in providing and
advising strategic direction for combating terrorism, can you provide
your opinion as to the way forward to preventing al Qa'ida from
harnessing the power of the Internet to spread radical and violent
Islamic ideologies and recruit from inside the borders of the U.S.
Can you address both the technological and the communication
aspects of addressing this threat? Do we have the necessary cultural
understanding and communication skills to counteract the propaganda
produced by al Qa'ida and its affiliates? If not, how do we develop the
necessary skill sets?
Mr. Zarate. The Internet has become a global accelerant to al
Qa'ida's cause, giving it reach well beyond its geographic bounds and
creating the sense of a global, virtual caliphate that is attractive to
adherents around the world. The allure of the al Qa'ida-inspired
narrative and radicalization is growing stronger in Western countries
among disaffected individuals. The approach to the Internet is
complicated for the United States given our constitutional devotion to
First Amendment principles and the necessary openness of communication
via the Internet.
There are three key avenues of engagement on the Internet for the
United States:
The United States and allies should be monitoring closely
and exploiting the communications and virtual interactions of suspect
individuals and groups online. Intense monitoring and disruptive
actions that result should create a sense of mistrust among violent
Islamist extremists online that will help mute or restrict their use of
the Internet as an all-purpose recruitment, training, funding, and
deployment tool.
The United States should educate and leverage the private
sector, including the Internet Service Providers when appropriate, to
police the Internet and to filter Web sites that run counter to legal
and contractual obligations.
Most importantly, the United States should enlist,
encourage, and enable private sector actors and foreign counterparts to
counter the messages and presence of extremists online. There should be
a form of cyber-privateering that empowers certain groups and
individuals to counter the enemy's extremist ideologies, through direct
theological and moral challenge, satire and humor, and the availability
of alternate positive channels for those who may be searching for
meaning and identity online.
There are limitations to what the U.S. Government can do--based on
law and effectiveness. There is not enough expertise in the U.S.
Government to do this all; the U.S. Government is not a credible voice
in these online extremist venues and among susceptible populations; and
there are constitutional limits to what the U.S. Government can do if
its message could affect or be seen as directed toward U.S. citizens or
a U.S. audience. Importantly, these limitations point to the need for
others--foreign governments and non-state actors and networks--to be
engaged online to counter the violent Islamist extremist ideology and
related communities emerging. Fortunately, we are beginning to see just
this, with American Muslims beginning to counter extremist messages
online with videos, Web sites, and blogs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. The President has recently announced the suspension of
all Guantanamo Bay detainees being released to Yemen. However,
detainees are still being released to marginal countries, with two
being released to Algeria just last week. Historical data also points
to the fact that one in five released detainees returns to terrorist
activities. Algeria's neighbor, Libya, has been on the State
Department's list of nations which sponsor terrorism, and it is
arguable that conditions in the region are ripe for a resurgence of
terrorist activity. Given this, shouldn't we take a good hard look at
to which countries we allow detainees to return? Additionally, should
the list of nations with ``State Sponsored'' terrorism be updated and
expanded to include those nations which provide terrorists with a safe
haven?
Mr. Clarke. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. Much attention has been given, and rightfully so, to al
Qa'ida's growth in the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, and North
Africa. However, many countries in South America are exhibiting signs
of being ripe for the growth of terrorist movements: heavy narcotics
trades, governments largely seen as illegitimate and growing
unemployment. What are the opportunities to ensure we are not caught
blindsided by the growth of terrorism in this region?
Mr. Clarke. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. In recent years, separatist groups, such as Somalia's
al Shabaab, have pledged their support to al Qa'ida. Arguably, their
pledge comes from financial and armament motivation, as opposed to
aligned religious ideologies. With the increase in separatist movements
in Northern Africa, in places such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Algeria, and
domestic unrest with the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen, what measures
are, or may be taken, to prevent the spread of al Qa'ida's reach to
these movements?
Mr. Clarke. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
Mr. Wilson. The President has recently announced the suspension of
all Guantanamo Bay detainees being released to Yemen. However,
detainees are still being released to marginal countries, with two
being released to Algeria just last week. Historical data also points
to the fact that one in five released detainees returns to terrorist
activities. Algeria's neighbor, Libya, has been on the State
Department's list of nations which sponsor terrorism, and it is
arguable that conditions in the region are ripe for a resurgence of
terrorist activity. Given this, shouldn't we take a good hard look at
to which countries we allow detainees to return? Additionally, should
the list of nations with ``State Sponsored'' terrorism be updated and
expanded to include those nations which provide terrorists with a safe
haven?
Mr. Zarate. The problem of returning detainees held in Guantanamo
(GTMO) in a manner that both protects U.S. national security interests
and upholds our obligations to protect the individuals' human rights
has bedeviled both the Bush and Obama Administrations. The problem has
grown more acute with the remaining population in GTMO comprising a
more dangerous population of terrorist operatives than the original
collection of GTMO detainees. Because of the nature of the remaining
population, the recidivism rates are likely to be much higher than past
released detainees. In addition, from past transfers of GTMO detainees,
we know that security guarantees and rehabilitation programs are not
fool-proof and that some of the returned detainees will decide to
return to the battlefield.
This reality then puts a premium on the U.S. Government's risk
calculus tied to each release and the level of confidence we have in
the ability and willingness of a host government to constrain the
former detainees' ability to rejoin the fight or serve as an
inspirational recruiter for terrorist causes. The United States should
therefore review carefully the state of a recipient country's security,
the status of al Qa'ida-related groups or cells in that country, the
vulnerability of the community in which the detainee will be returned,
and the capability of that country to adhere to its security and human
rights agreements. This calculus, especially after the attempted attack
on December 25th, has forced the Obama Administration to halt all but
one of the GTMO transfers to Yemen.
The question of whether countries that provide terrorists safe
haven should be listed as state sponsors of terror is an important one.
Certainly, those countries that actively support or are willfully blind
to the use of their territory by known and recognizable terrorist
organizations should be candidates for listing as state sponsors of
terror. The level of knowledge and complicity of senior elements in the
government for such safe haven must play into that determination.
This, however, is different from the situation in which terrorists
are taking advantage of the weaknesses or geography of a country, whose
government attempts to control its territory or does not have the means
to do so effectively. If there is a willingness to control territory
and to deny safe haven, then that government should not be considered a
state sponsor of terrorism. Even so, there needs to be open recognition
of those parts of the world that present terrorist and transnational
illicit networks the physical space to organize and mingle, as well as
a recognition that sovereign states may not be able to police their
territory. Because of the importance of safe haven to international
security, there needs to be a renewed focus not just by host
governments but by regional actors and the international community to
help deny safe havens with capacity building, active measures to
quarantine or fill safe havens with government controls, and a new
international legal framework and understanding of the need to deny
safe haven.
Mr. Wilson. Much attention has been given, and rightfully so, to al
Qa'ida's growth in the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, and North
Africa. However, many countries in South America are exhibiting signs
of being ripe for the growth of terrorist movements: heavy narcotics
trades, governments largely seen as illegitimate and growing
unemployment. What are the opportunities to ensure we are not caught
blindsided by the growth of terrorism in this region?
Mr. Zarate. The problem of Sunni or Shia-based terrorism in South
America cannot be ignored. At a minimum, there is a potential that
human smuggling networks and transnational organized criminal networks
(to include drug cartels and gangs) could be used by terrorist
organizations, like al Qa'ida or Hizballah, to gain entry of operatives
undetected into the United States. There is also the potential that
diaspora communities in South America could serve as covers for
operatives to recruit, train, raise funds, and deploy against U.S.
interests. Tied to this problem is the reach of transnational criminal
networks--with the logistics and funding to help those willing to pay--
and the permissive environment created by regimes like Venezuela and
Nicaragua to allow nefarious actors to operate. These dangers are
exacerbated by an increasing Iranian presence in the region thanks to
commercial, financial, and governmental relationships with Venezuela.
These potential dangers require the United States to monitor
vigilantly the transnational networks that could be used to smuggle
terrorists, the suspect individuals who may be embedded in diaspora
communities, and any signal of growing radicalization of Latin American
populations. Most importantly, this requires building and maintaining
awareness, capacity, and cooperation with key governments and related
authorities in the region since most of the work of detecting suspect
terrorist and criminal activity will fall to local and national
authorities.
Mr. Wilson. In recent years, separatist groups, such as Somalia's
al Shabaab, have pledged their support to al Qa'ida. Arguably, their
pledge comes from financial and armament motivation, as opposed to
aligned religious ideologies. With the increase in separatist movements
in Northern Africa, in places such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Algeria, and
domestic unrest with the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen, what measures
are, or may be taken, to prevent the spread of al Qa'ida's reach to
these movements?
Mr. Zarate. It is critical to constrain the global reach of al
Qa'ida by preventing or breaking its connections with local and
regional groups that could be ideologically aligned and used as
strategic footholds globally. It is also important to distinguish
between groups like the al-Houthis in Yemen, who are Shia, from the
global Sunni extremist movement led by al Qa'ida, as well as
distinguishing local grievances with no violent Islamist extremist
connections from the broader global movement.
Constraining al Qa'ida's reach requires numerous steps, to include
the following:
Pressuring the AQ Core to the extent that they are not
able to provide strategic or tactical guidance or support to their
regional networks or potential allies;
Preventing the financial ties that often bind such
groups;
Decapitating the leadership of regional groups with the
deepest and historical ties to AQ Core, while preventing and
interdicting the injection of key leadership or guidance to the
regional affiliates;
Assisting regional governments to attack the
infrastructure of the local or regional affiliates (thereby forcing
them to focus on survival and local issues versus AQ's global agenda);
Messaging by credible voices about the foreign nature of
AQ, the antithetical and destructive agenda and interests of the AQ-led
movement, and the likely losing strategy of garnering more attention
from security authorities by associating with AQ; and
Through local authorities, identifying and pacifying
existing sectarian or local conflicts that could be exploited by al
Qa'ida to radicalize and recruit adherents and create a new battlefront
(e.g., the Christian/Muslim conflict in Nigeria; tensions in Southern
Thailand).
Mr. Wilson. The President has recently announced the suspension of
all Guantanamo Bay detainees being released to Yemen. However,
detainees are still being released to marginal countries, with two
being released to Algeria just last week. Historical data also points
to the fact that one in five released detainees returns to terrorist
activities. Algeria's neighbor, Libya, has been on the State
Department's list of nations which sponsor terrorism, and it is
arguable that conditions in the region are ripe for a resurgence of
terrorist activity. Given this, shouldn't we take a good hard look at
to which countries we allow detainees to return? Additionally, should
the list of nations with ``State Sponsored'' terrorism be updated and
expanded to include those nations which provide terrorists with a safe
haven?
Mr. Coll. The United States should not return prisoners to
countries with documented records of torture and prisoner abuse. As to
``state sponsors'' of terrorism, whether it is that legal mechanism or
another comparable one, it is important for the United States to make
transparent and reasonable judgments about what the capacity of weak
governments is to prevent their sovereign territory from becoming a
sanctuary, and to hold governments accountable to a reasonable standard
of action. It would be foolish to make policy on the basis of wishful
thinking about the capacity of weak governments; equally, it would be
foolish to appease or accommodate states that are doing less than they
can to prevent terrorists from operating on their territory.
Mr. Wilson. Much attention has been given, and rightfully so, to al
Qa'ida's growth in the Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, and North
Africa. However, many countries in South America are exhibiting signs
of being ripe for the growth of terrorist movements: heavy narcotics
trades, governments largely seen as illegitimate and growing
unemployment. What are the opportunities to ensure we are not caught
blindsided by the growth of terrorism in this region?
Mr. Coll. Mexico provides an example of how instability and
political violence caused by non-state actors can affect the interests
of the United States even where terrorism against American citizens or
interests is not at issue. Promoting the strength of democratic Latin
American governments and ensuring equitable economic growth through
trade, public investment, safety nets, and middle-class formation will
provide the best opportunities for sustainable stability in the region.
Mr. Wilson. In recent years, separatist groups, such as Somalia's
al Shabaab, have pledged their support to al Qa'ida. Arguably, their
pledge comes from financial and armament motivation, as opposed to
aligned religious ideologies. With the increase in separatist movements
in Northern Africa, in places such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Algeria, and
domestic unrest with the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen, what measures
are, or may be taken, to prevent the spread of al Qa'ida's reach to
these movements?
Mr. Coll. Each of the cases mentioned here is distinctive and
complex. Each must be examined in its specific setting. Promoting
democracy, human rights and the rule of law as core American principles
should be the bedrock foundation of fine-tuned regional strategies.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. In December 2009 President Obama spoke at
West Point and stated that ``our overarching goal remains . . . to
disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the
future. To meet that goal . . . we must deny al Qa'ida a safe haven. We
must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to
overthrow the government.'' If Guantanamo Bay detainees are brought
into the U.S. to stand trial, aren't we giving al Qa'ida a platform and
opening ourselves up to risk of al Qa'ida taking a deeper interest and
striking here in the United States?
Mr. Clarke. [The information referred to was not available at the
time of printing.]
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Last week in Afghanistan, a suicide bomber
attempted to gain access to the Afghan Central Bank, leaving half a
dozen Taliban members and 5 Afghanis dead, including 3 security guards.
From this attack on an Arab financial institution, can we surmise that
terrorist groups and the Taliban are fighting separately and each are
in need of financing? What steps does Afghanistan need to have in-place
to protect its financial interests against extremist groups?
Mr. Zarate. The attack on the Afghan Central Bank is less a
reflection of the need for financing by the Taliban and more a symbolic
attempt to hit one of the key institutions of the central government--
one that has garnered much support from the United States and the
international community. Criminal ventures play a part in filling the
Taliban's coffers, but the various factions of the Taliban and its
leadership have multiple sources of funding--from the narcotics trade
and hostage-taking to extortion and foreign donors. They will continue
to use all means to fund their activities and the insurgency.
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. What can the U.S. do to assist Afghanistan,
but especially Pakistan and Yemen, to improve their own efforts in
preventing or stemming the flow of illicit funds to the al Qa'ida
terrorist network?
Mr. Zarate. Disrupting the flow of terrorist funds in active war
zones or in less developed economies can often prove difficult, since
the most effective tools the U.S. Government has to affect the flows of
illicit funds through the international financial system are less
effective in these contexts. That said, there are a number of things
that can be done to help build the capacity of countries like
Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan to prevent the flows of funds to
terrorist groups and actors--and steps the U.S. Government can take on
its own.
In the first instance, the United States must work directly with
the host governments to apply financial regulatory scrutiny and
enforcement resources on those individuals and entities--including
charities--that have already been identified as serving as funding
conduits for al Qa'ida, the Taliban, and related terrorist groups.
Second, the United States can assist by creating targeted
information and analysis for action. Over the past few years, the
United States has done this well by creating field-based financial
intelligence analysis units (``threat finance cells'') in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Importantly, this also requires monitoring of cash flows into these
countries--via couriers--as well as value transfer via the hawala
system. This requires capable and willing customs officials and
regulators who understand how cash is moved and how the hawaladars
operate. These officials and their governments must then be willing to
enforce effectively (and without corruption) relevant reporting and
financial oversight laws.
Creating asset forfeiture laws that provide bonuses and asset
sharing for effective interdictions and application of the law can help
incentivize and decrease the risks of corruption, if the programs are
administered well. The United States and foreign entities, like the
World Bank and IMF, have helped establish the framework for these
efforts. In addition, the use of mobile banking and automatic deposits
increases the security and transparency of payments and undermines the
ability of corrupt or nefarious actors to use the flow of paper money
to fund their activities.
These efforts should dovetail with attempts to bring formal
financial services into developing and poor economies. The advent of
mobile banking technologies, as seen in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia,
will help communities and individuals who had previously relied on
informal methods of holding and moving money take an evolutionary leap
toward formal banking. This trend will give authorities a better chance
at monitoring, tracking, and disrupting the flow of some illicit
transfers while ensuring that individuals have access to necessary
banking services.
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