[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 25, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-53
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
For the Record
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana:
Slides......................................................... 36
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama:
Letter to Honorable Janet Napolitano, February 12, 2010........ 42
Letter to Honorable Nancy Pelosi, February 16, 2010............ 45
Appendix
Questions Submitted by Chairman Bennie G. Thompson............... 77
Question Submitted by Honorable Henry Cuellar.................... 88
Questions Submitted by Honorable Christopher P. Carney........... 89
Questions Submitted by Honorable Laura Richardson................ 90
Questions Submitted by Honorable Bill L. Owens................... 92
Questions Submitted by Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr............... 93
Questions Submitted by Honorable Daniel E. Lungren............... 95
Questions Submitted by Honorable Mike Rogers..................... 96
Questions Submitted by Honorable Michael T. McCaul............... 99
THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
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Thursday, February 25, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Lofgren, Jackson
Lee, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Kirkpatrick, Lujan,
Owens, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green, Titus, King, Smith, Souder,
McCaul, Dent, Bilirakis, Broun, Miller, Olson, Cao, and
Austria.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to
receive testimony from Secretary Janet Napolitano on the
President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department
of Homeland Security.
I want to thank Secretary Napolitano for being flexible
about testifying in support of the President's fiscal year 2011
budget request for the Department of Homeland Security after
back-to-back snowstorms forced us to postpone this hearing.
On February 1 President Obama requested just over $56
billion for the Department of Homeland Security as part of his
fiscal year 2011 budget request. Overall, under the President's
proposal, the Department's budget is slated to increase by
about 3 percent over last year's funding level. Given the
current fiscal environment, the President is to be commended
for showing an on-going commitment to enhancing our Nation's
preparedness response and recovery capabilities.
The Department's mission, both homeland security and non-
homeland security, requires a budget request that is far-
reaching and impacts the security of Americans who travel by
air, rail, and sea; the capacity of communities to be prepared
for and respond to terrorism and other hazards, including the
threat posed by dangerous criminal aliens; and the ability of
our Nation and operators of critical infrastructure to find
innovative approaches to foster resiliency in the face of an
ever-evolving terrorist threats.
In reviewing this budget request, I am pleased to see that
you tackle the issue of over-reliance on contractors and
presenting a balanced workforce strategy. Since its inception
in 2003, contractor dependence has stood in the way of DHS
becoming the Federal agency that Congress envisioned and the
American people deserve.
Madame Secretary, you are to be commended for taking on
this challenge that for so many years went unaddressed by your
predecessors and for setting a goal of converting 3,300
contractor positions to DHS positions by the end of the year.
This is a step in the right direction. However, given that that
the Department relies on more than 200,000 contractors to
operate, a great deal more work will need to be done to ensure
that DHS moves away from an over-reliance on contractors.
While I support the substance of most of this budget
request, I do have some concerns. While I understand that
reducing personnel at the U.S. Border Patrol and U.S. Coast
Guard will bring short-term savings to the Department, I am
concerned that years of knowledge and experience will be lost
and that there may be a resulting reduction in DHS' resource
and capabilities to fulfill all its missions.
I am also greatly concerned the budget seeks to consolidate
a number of important free-standing grant programs into the
State Homeland Security Grant Program. I worry that this
consolidation will make it more difficult for local communities
to receive much-needed funding. It also troubles me that for
the second year in a row, the budget decreases funding for
vital first responder grant programs just as State and local
communities are struggling to maintain the capability gains
that have been achieved in recent years.
I am particularly disappointed that Centers of Excellence
and other university programs, including the Minority Serving
Institutions Program that DHS has supported since DHS was
established would be cut by nearly 20 percent under this
budget.
One last area that I strongly believe was not well-served
by this budget is maritime cargo screening. I find it
incredulous that this budget decreases funding for
international cargo screening programs by almost 48 percent. It
is hard to believe that these programs, which got short-shifted
by previous administrations, are being further downscaled under
this budget when there has not been a single legislative
proposal submitted to alter the statutory mandate on
international cargo screening.
As you know, under the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act, DHS is responsible for ensuring that 100
percent of the cargo that enters into the United States is
scanned. I just do not see how moving the few DHS personnel
that you have in the field, targeting cargo for screening, back
to the United States gets you any closer to meeting the
mandate.
That said, I look forward to working with you, Madame
Secretary, to ensure that the Department has the resources it
needs to execute all its missions, including to prevent and
respond to the threat of terrorism.
Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much, Madame Secretary. We welcome you here
this morning. I hope your ankle or your leg is doing better. It
was not caused by any Republican, was it--the injury?
[Laughter.]
No? Okay.
But on a--seriously now, let me thank you for offering to
meet with Republican Members of the committee on a regular
basis. I think it will go a long way to resolving some issues
that we have before they become major issues and also let us
get the benefit of your thinking before we just read about it
in the newspaper and draw wrong conclusions. So I thank you for
it.
I think it is going to be very, very helpful to both sides.
Also I think it will go a long way to continuing the bipartisan
cooperation we have tried to have on this committee since the
inception under both parties.
Madame Secretary, much has happened since you last
testified before the committee last May. We had the Vinas case,
which actually involved someone from Long Island, who was--his
indictment and conviction were announced. He was captured in
Afghanistan-Pakistan.
We had the Headley case involving Mumbai. We had the Zazi
case in New York. We have had the Major Hasan case in Fort
Hood. We had the Christmas Day bombing. We have the whole issue
involving the trial of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and where that is
going to be held and under the conditions where it will be
held.
So a lot has happened. Obviously, it shows that the threat
is as real as it ever was--maybe worse in that it is morphing,
or it is almost like mercury. As we go after it in one place,
it moved somewhere else and adopts a different form.
So, obviously, your job is more significant and more
important than ever, and the world is probably as dangerous, if
not more dangerous--certainly, different types of danger from
the same enemy, but different types of dangers, which is why
there are several points I want to mention about your budget. I
will follow up in questions. Other Members have various issues.
I know Congressman Olson has a specific issue he is going to
raise with you later.
But on the issue, for instance, as the threat is getting
larger and changing more, I am very concerned that Secure the
Cities has been zeroed out. While this primarily benefits New
York, it also involved other cities. It could be a prototype
for other cities, as money is going to be shared with other
cities.
Just last month, I believe, on the House floor we adopted
an authorization calling for continued funding of Secure the
Cities, and on last year's budget there was nothing in there.
The House passed legislation for $40 million, came back from
conference with $20 million, but this year there is nothing in
there, which to me it is wrong.
It is a mistake that is being made, and it involves not
just New York, the entire tri-State region, and also, as I
said, the money is available for other cities around the
country. The system itself can be a prototype. Basically, this
is to protect urban areas from attacks launched from suburban
areas.
Also, the issue which Chairman Thompson raised about the
Coast Guard maritime safety and security teams. I believe five
of the 12 are being decommissioned. Again, just speaking for
the New York area, I realize how valuable these teams are--how
invaluable they are, actually.
We have to have them, and how well-coordinated they are
with the FBI and with local law enforcement. Again, whatever
short-term savings there might be, to be eliminating five of
these 12 teams I think is really going to be very, very
counterproductive, and it is going to increase, you know, the
danger level.
Also, with the whole issue of the trials in New York City,
we have the Federal Protective Service that was in here
testifying, saying they do not have the funding or the
personnel to adequately safeguard the Federal courts in New
York in the event that a trial was held, and yet there is no
increase in the budget at all for the Federal Protective
Service.
With UASI, while that has gone up $213 million, $200
million of that is allocated for court security in the event
that the trials are held here in the United States. So in
effect, there was no increase in the UASI funding, even though
I believe the threats have increased.
As far as the $200 million or whatever the final number
ends up being, I do know that the Department of Homeland
Security and other law enforcement agencies did do an analysis
as to what the course could be, and to the extent you can
discuss that with us and how that approximates the $200 million
and without trying to sound overly partisan here, I know the
Vice President said he thought the $200 million that Mayor
Bloomberg spoke about was an exaggerated number, and yet that
turns out to be the number that is in the President's budget or
in your budget, so I would just see if you can perhaps explain
the Vice President to us.
The issue of Guantanamo. Obviously, Members of this
committee have different concerns and different beliefs as to
what should be done with Guantanamo. I personally believe it
should be open. I know others feel strongly it should be
closed. But also, you are on the board, I believe, or the panel
which is to decide the fate of Guantanamo or the prisoners at
Guantanamo. I was wondering if any progress has been made on
that at all?
Similarly, the issue that really caused a lot of debate
after the Christmas bombing is the whole issue of Miranda
warnings and who should give them, when they should be given. I
would like to hear from you or discuss with you during the
question period as to who should be making that decision.
Since obviously there was much more involved here than just
an individual being apprehended on the ground and since the
intelligence community is so far-reaching, it appears the
attorney general was making that decision, but in making that,
does he discuss that with the Director of National
Intelligence?
Does he discuss that decision with you? Does he discuss it
with the CIA? Does he discuss it with any of the other
counterterrorism or terrorism agencies and departments we have?
Or does he just make that on his own without realizing the full
consequences of what could happen?
So in any event, these are all issues I would like to
discuss with you, hear your thoughts on them. I am sure as the
year goes on and we have our regular meetings, a lot more of
these will be discussed.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time and look
forward to your testimony.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under committee rules, opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Honorable Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
February 25, 2010
Mister Chairman, thank you for convening this very important
hearing today on the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for
the Department of Homeland Security. Thank you to Secretary Napolitano
for being here as well.
It is an important duty of Congress to work with the President and
the various agencies to come up with an appropriate budget, especially
in these economic hard times. But it is equally important that we know
exactly where these funds are going so the American public knows that
taxpayer dollars are spent efficiently and effectively.
The 37th Congressional District of California, which I am
privileged to represent, has a vital interest in ensuring our homeland
security needs are adequately funded. My district is located in
Southern California, which is no stranger to natural disasters ranging
from earthquakes to mudslides to wildfires. The 37th district is also
home to many high-value terrorist targets, such as the Port of Long
Beach.
Therefore, I share the committee's concern about the decrease in
funding for international cargo screening. The proposal is $84.45
million, a decrease of $77.56 million below the fiscal year 2010
enacted amount of $162 million. This decrease is part of a shift
towards remote targeting and examinations of freight instead of a
physical presence of personnel at the ports. The 9/11 Act set forth a
goal of working towards 100 percent cargo screening, and this budget
decrease indicates a movement away, instead of towards, that goal.
While I recognize the fiscal constraints facing the President and the
Department, I question the decision to deemphasize cargo screening at
the expense of the safety of our ports.
In addition, as chair of the Subcommittee on Emergency,
Communications, Preparedness, and Response, I am pleased to see a 2.31
percent increase in FEMA's budget. However, I notice that there is a
cut of $200 million to the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency
Response (SAFER) Program and the Assistance to Firefighter Grants
(AFG). I believe these cuts will severely limit the ability of local
fire departments to meet community needs and maintain the readiness of
local first responders during all types of emergencies.
I agree with the committee that overall, we are pleased with the
President's budget request. However, I look forward to hearing
Secretary Napolitano's insight on the questions and concerns we have
raised.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield
back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Again, I welcome our witness today,
Janet Napolitano. She was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in
on January 21, 2009, as the third Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security. In her first year as the Secretary, she
has conducted a Department-wide efficiency review, released the
first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and submitted her
first budget request to Congress.
Madame Secretary, I thank you for your service and for
appearing before this committee today.
Without objection, the witness' full statement will be
inserted in the record.
Secretary Napolitano, I now recognize you to summarize your
statement as close to 5 minutes as possible.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Representative King and Members of the committee. It is a
pleasure to be before you today to discuss the President's 2011
budget request for the Department of Homeland Security.
I want to thank the committee for the strong support it has
shown the Department during my tenure as Secretary. I am glad
to work with you as we work to secure the American homeland and
also to ensure that we have the resources we need and that they
are put to use effectively and efficiently.
As noted, President Obama's budget for the Department
focuses our resources where they can be put to best use. The
2011 budget request is $56.3 billion. It equates to more than a
2 percent increase over last year's funding. While we are
always focused on securing and protecting the American people,
we are also committed to exercising strong fiscal discipline,
making sure that we are investing in what works.
While this budget will not go into effect until next
October, I think the events of the past months underscore the
importance of the investment to our mission and to our on-going
activities. The attempted attack on Flight 253 on Christmas was
a powerful illustration that terrorists, especially al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, will go to great lengths to try to defeat
the security measures that have been put in place since
September 11, 2001.
This administration is determined to thwart those plans, to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks by employing
multiple layers of defense, working in concert with one another
to secure the country. This effort involves not just the
Department of Homeland Security, but many other Federal
agencies with responsibilities related to the safety of the
homeland.
As President Obama made clear, the administration is also
determined to find and fix the vulnerabilities in our systems
that have allowed not just the Christmas day breach to occur,
but as we think forward proactively what could the next attempt
be? What needs to be done in advance of that?
We are working hand-in-hand across the Federal Government
also on a number of other areas. A more recent example would be
the response to the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti.
As the Chairman noted, this year we submitted our first
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. This gives us a long-
distance vision and template for the homeland security
enterprise and identifies five major mission areas for us.
The first is preventing terrorism and enhancing security.
The second is securing and managing our borders. The third is
smart and effective enforcement of our Nation's immigration
laws. The fourth, and a new one, is safeguarding and securing
cyberspace. The fifth is ensuring resiliency to disasters. Let
me briefly go through those with budget highlights related to
each one.
Preventing terrorism and enhancing security, the
President's budget request enhances multiple layers of aviation
security, a critical investment. We want to accelerate the
placement of advanced imaging technology machines, that kind of
machines that will increase our ability to detect nonmetallic
explosives.
We also want to add to the Federal Air Marshal Service to
train K-9 teams and the behavior detection officers in our
domestic airports while we work internationally across the
globe on increasing worldwide aviation security.
To secure and manage the borders, the budget request
strengthens initiatives that have already resulted in concrete
border security successes this past year. We want to expand the
border enforcement security task force teams, the best teams.
They have helped increase seizures of contraband across the
border.
We want to continue to increase the use of intelligence for
battling the drug cartels that are housed in Mexico, so the
budget contains additional monies for intelligence analysts
that will be focused on those efforts.
We also have in the budget the money that is necessary to
protect the Customs and Border Protection staffing levels, and
I want to pause they are a moment. There has been some
confusion. We have delivered a clarifying document. There was
no cut to Border Patrol staffing contemplated in this budget. I
think that needs to be made very, very clear.
In addition, we want to continue our efforts with respect
to Mexico. Just south of our border, the city of Juarez is one,
quite frankly, where the rule of law has been lost. The fact
that it is a bridge away from the United States should give us
all pause. We are working very closely with the federal
government of Mexico, just met last week with the president of
Mexico, the Mexican federal police and others to make sure
border-wide that we make sure that border is secure as
possible.
Additionally, in terms of enforcement and administration of
the Nation's immigration laws, the President's budget request
bolsters critical initiatives, such as our efforts to
strengthen E-Verify, which is the tool we use to ensure that
employers verify the legal presence of the workforce.
We also want to expand Secure Communities. This is a
program where we put access to immigration databases rights in
local jails and State prisons so that we proceed with
immigration removal and deportation while someone is still
incarcerated.
To safeguard and secure cyberspace, the budget request
includes a total funding level of $379 million for our
cybersecurity division in addition to the monies for the Secret
Service for their investigation of cyber-related crimes.
Under this, Mr. Chairman, we have already been granted by
the Office of Personnel Management the ability to hire up to
1,000 cyber experts by direct hiring authority over the next 3
years. This is an effort that we need to proceed on with due
haste so that we have on the civilian side of cyber command
just as we are developing on the military side.
To ensure resilience to disasters, the President's budget
request includes an increase in support of the disaster relief
fund and $100 million in pre-disaster mitigation grants in
support of State, local, and Tribal governments to reduce the
risks associated with disasters.
Finally, the budget includes increases that are
attributable to our efforts to mature and strengthen the unity
of the Department. Continuing to build out St. Elizabeths as a
consolidated headquarters, continuing to consolidate leases so
that we are not in more than four dozen locations around the
District, continuing to integrate various legacy data systems
and IT systems that came into the Department when it was
created that now need to be unified into one IT system are just
several of the administrative functions here.
They are put in headquarters, but they are designed to
provide support and operational efficiency throughout all of
the operating components.
Mr. Chairman, I have more detail. It is contained in my
complete statement, which I ask be included in the record. But
I look forward to addressing the questions that you have posed,
that Representative King has posed, and that the other Members
might have. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Secretary Napolitano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janet Napolitano
Mr. Chairman, Representative King, and Members of the committee:
Let me begin by saying thank you for the strong support you have
provided me and the Department this past year. I look forward to
another year working with you to make certain that we have the right
resources to protect the homeland and the American people and that we
make the most effective and efficient use of those resources.
I am pleased to appear before the committee today to present
President Obama's fiscal year 2011 Budget Request for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
As you know, the attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253 on
December 25 was a powerful illustration that terrorists will go to
great lengths to try to defeat the security measures that have been put
in place since September 11, 2001. This administration is determined to
thwart those plans and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist
networks by employing multiple layers of defense that work in concert
with one another to secure our country. This effort involves not just
DHS, but also many other Federal agencies as well as State, local,
Tribal, territorial, private sector and international partners. As
President Obama has made clear, this administration is determined to
find and fix the vulnerabilities in our systems that allowed this
breach to occur--and the fiscal year 2011 Budget Request prioritizes
these security enhancements.
The Department is also working hand-in-hand with our Federal
partners to respond to the devastation and loss of life in Haiti
following the January 12 earthquake. Collaboration within DHS among our
many components has allowed us to leverage unprecedented resources and
personnel to assist with the humanitarian efforts in Haiti, once again
demonstrating what these offices can accomplish together. The fiscal
year 2011 Budget Request strengthens the on-going work in each of our
Department's offices to fulfill our unified mission.
I will now summarize the fiscal year 2011 budget request along with
some of our key accomplishments from last year.
fiscal year 2011 budget request
The fiscal year 2011 DHS budget will strengthen efforts that are
critical to the Nation's security, bolster the Department's ability to
combat terrorism and respond to emergencies and potential threats, and
allow DHS to tackle its responsibilities to protect the Nation and keep
Americans safe.
DHS executes a wide array of responsibilities in its unified
security mission. To bolster these efforts, DHS collaborates and
coordinates with many partners--State, local, and Tribal governments
and law enforcement agencies, international allies, the private sector,
and other Federal departments. These partnerships are essential to DHS'
ability to fulfill its security mission.
The fiscal year 2011 budget continues efforts to use our resources
as efficiently and effectively as possible. We must exercise strong
fiscal discipline, making sure that we are investing our resources in
what works, cutting down on redundancy, eliminating ineffective
programs and making improvements across the board.
To institutionalize a culture of efficiency across the Department,
DHS launched the Department-wide Efficiency Review Initiative in March
2009. One major element of the Efficiency Review is the Balanced
Workforce Strategy, a three-pronged approach to ensuring that the right
workforce balance is achieved. First, we are taking steps to ensure
that no inherently Governmental functions are performed by contractors.
Second, we put in place rigorous review procedures to ensure that
future activities do not increase our reliance on contractors. Third,
we are coordinating workforce assessments across the Department to seek
economies and service improvements and reduce our reliance on
contractors. In fiscal year 2011, the Department will continue
executing the Balanced Workforce Strategy by converting contractor
positions to Federal jobs.
DHS secures the United States against all threats through five main
missions, each of which is strengthened by this budget:
Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security.--Guarding
against terrorism was the founding mission of DHS and remains
our top priority today. A key element of preventing terrorism
is recognizing the evolving threats posed by violent extremists
and taking action to ensure our defenses continue to evolve to
deter and defeat them.
Securing and Managing Our Borders.--DHS monitors our air,
land, and sea borders to prevent illegal trafficking that
threatens our country, while facilitating lawful travel and
trade. We will continue to strengthen security efforts on the
Southwest border to combat and disrupt cartel violence and
provide critical security upgrades--through infrastructure and
technology--along the Northern border.
Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws.--DHS is
responsible for enforcing the Nation's immigration laws while
streamlining and facilitating the legal immigration process. In
fiscal year 2011, we will continue to strengthen enforcement
activities while targeting criminal aliens who pose a threat to
public safety and employers who knowingly violate the law.
Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace.--The Department
defends against and responds to attacks on the cyber networks
through which Americans communicate with each other, conduct
business, and manage infrastructure. DHS analyzes and reduces
cyber threats and vulnerabilities, distributes threat warnings,
coordinates the response to cyber incidents and works with the
private sector and our State, local, international, and private
sector partners to ensure that our computers, networks, and
cyber systems remain safe.
Ensuring Resilience to Disasters.--The Department provides
the coordinated, comprehensive Federal response in the event of
a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other large-scale
emergencies while working with Federal, State, local, and
private sector partners to ensure a swift and effective
recovery effort. DHS will continue its increased efforts to
build a ready and resilient Nation by bolstering information
sharing, providing grants and training to our homeland security
and law enforcement partners and further streamlining
rebuilding and recovery along the Gulf Coast.
Ensuring shared awareness of risks and threats, increasing
resilience in communities and enhancing the use of science and
technology underpin these National efforts to prevent terrorism, secure
and manage our borders, enforce and administer our immigration laws,
safeguard and secure cyberspace, and ensure resilience to disasters.
The total fiscal year 2011 budget request for DHS is $56.3 billion
in total funding; a 2 percent increase over the fiscal year 2010
enacted level. The Department's fiscal year 2011 gross discretionary
budget request \1\ is $47.1 billion, an increase of 2 percent over the
fiscal year 2010 enacted level. The Department's fiscal year 2011 net
discretionary budget request is $43.6 billion,\2\ an increase of 3
percent over the fiscal year 2010 enacted level. For purposes of
comparison the Overseas Contingency Operation funding and transfer from
the National Science Foundation are not included in the fiscal year
2010 enacted level.
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\1\ Gross Discretionary funding does not include funding such as
Coast Guard's retirement pay account and fees paid for immigration
benefits.
\2\ This does not include fee collections such as funding for the
Federal Protective Service (NPPD), aviation security passenger and
carrier fees (TSA), credentialing fees (such as TWIC--TSA), and
administrative costs of the National Flood Insurance Fund (FEMA).
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The following are highlights of the fiscal year 2011 budget
request:
preventing terrorism and enhancing security
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT).--An increase of $214.7
million is requested to procure and install 500 advanced
imaging technology machines at airport checkpoints to detect
dangerous materials, including non-metallic materials. This
request, combined with units the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) plans to install in 2010, will mean that
1,000 AIT scanners, will total AIT coverage at 75 percent of
Category X airports and 60 percent of the total lanes at
Category X through II airports.
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to Staff AITs.--An
increase of $218.9 million is requested for additional
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), managers, and
associated support costs to operate additional AITs at airport
checkpoints. Passenger screening is critical to detecting and
preventing individuals carrying dangerous or deadly objects and
materials from boarding planes.
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs).--An increase of $85 million is
requested for additional FAMs to increase international flight
coverage. FAMs help detect, deter, and defeat terrorist and
other criminal hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers,
airports, passengers, and crew.
Portable Explosive Trace Detection (ETD).--An increase of
$60 million is requested to purchase approximately 800 portable
ETD machines ($39 million) and associated checkpoint
consumables ($21 million).
Canine Teams.--An increase of $71 million and 523 positions
(262 Full-Time Equivalents, or FTE) is requested to fund an
additional 275 proprietary explosives detection canine teams,
112 teams at 28 Category X airports and 163 teams at 56
Category I airports.
Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs).--An increase of $20
million and 350 BDOs (210 FTE) is requested to further enhance
TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program.
The fiscal year 2011 request includes a total of 3,350 officers
to enhance coverage at lanes and shifts at high-risk Category X
and I airports and expand coverage to smaller airports.
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Systems Engineering and
Architecture.--An increase of $13.4 million is requested to
fund systems engineering efforts to address vulnerabilities in
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, the multi-layered
system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines
designed to enhance the Nation's ability to detect and prevent
a radiological or nuclear attack.
Radiological/Nuclear Detection Systems.--An increase of $41
million is requested for the procurement and deployment of
radiological and nuclear detection systems and equipment to
support efforts across the Department.
Law Enforcement Detachment Teams.--An increase of $3.6
million is requested to bring deployable U.S. Coast Guard Law
Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) teams to full capacity. LEDETs
help prevent terrorism, secure U.S. borders, disrupt criminal
organizations and support counter drug missions overseas. In
fiscal year 2009, for example, LEDETs aboard U.S. naval and
partner nation assets accounted for more than 50 percent of
total maritime cocaine removals.
2012 Presidential Campaign.--Total funding of $14 million is
requested for start-up costs associated with the 2012
Presidential Campaign including training for candidate/nominee
protective detail personnel. The Secret Service will also begin
to procure and pre-position equipment, services, and supplies
to support candidate/nominee protective operations throughout
the country.
Secret Service Information Technology.--Total funding of $36
million is requested for the Information Integration and
Transformation program. This funding will allow the Secret
Service to successfully continue its comprehensive Information
Technology (IT) transformation and provide a multi-year,
mission-integrated program to engineer a modernized, agile, and
strengthened IT infrastructure to support all aspects of the
Secret Service's mission.
securing and managing our borders
Journeyman Pay Increase.--In the spring of 2010, DHS will
implement the journeyman pay increase, raising the journeyman
grade level for frontline Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Officers (including Border Patrol agents and Agricultural
Specialists) from GS-11 level to the GS-12 level. An adjustment
to the base of $310.4 million will fund the full-year impact of
the salary and benefit requirements associated with this
implementation.
CBP Officers.--An increase of $44.8 million is requested to
fund 318 CBP Officer FTEs within the Office of Field Operations
and 71 support FTEs for CBP. The decline in the number of
passengers and conveyances entering the United States in fiscal
year 2009 resulted in an almost 8 percent decrease in revenues
from inspection user fees. CBP, therefore, has fewer resources
to maintain critical staffing levels for CBP officers. The
proposed funding will allow CBP to maintain staffing for
critical positions to protect the United States at its ports of
entry.
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs).--An
additional $10 million is requested to establish BESTs in three
additional locations: Massena, NY; San Francisco, CA and
Honolulu, HI. These multi-agency teams work to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing
significant threats to border security, including terrorist
groups, gang members, and criminal aliens.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Enforcement.--An increase
of $30 million is requested to support CBP and ICE IPR
enforcement efforts. This includes information technology
systems that support IPR activities and implementation of the
5-year IPR Plan. An increase of $5 million is also requested
for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)-led National
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center).
The IPR Center brings key U.S. Government agencies together to
combat IPR violations that threaten our economic stability,
restrict the competitiveness of U.S. industry and endanger the
public's health and safety. ICE will also use these funds to
focus on disrupting criminal organizations through the internet
and support for anti-counterfeiting efforts.
Intelligence Analysts.--An increase of $10 million is
requested to fund 103 Intelligence Analysts for CBP. This
staffing increase will support 24/7 operations of CBP
Intelligence Watch, Operations Coordination, and the
Commissioner's Situation Room.
Coast Guard Asset Recapitalization.--A total of $1.4 billion
is requested to continue recapitalization of aging Coast Guard
surface and air assets. Included in this request is $538
million for production of the Coast Guard's fifth National
Security Cutter to continue replacement of the 378-foot High
Endurance Cutters fleet. Also included is $240 million for
production of four Fast Response Cutters to continue
replacement of the 110-foot Class Patrol Boat fleet. The Fast
Response Cutters have enhanced capability, high readiness,
speed, and endurance, which will allow them to quickly and
effectively respond to emerging threats. Additionally, $40
million is requested to purchase one Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA) HC-144A. The HC-144A will address the Coast Guard's MPA
flight hour gap by providing 1,200 hours every year per
aircraft. Finally, $13.9 million is requested for improvement
and acquisition of housing to support military families.
enforcing and administering our immigration laws
E-Verify.--A total of $103.4 million and 338 FTEs is
requested for the E-Verify Program. In fiscal year 2011, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will develop and
implement an E-Verify portal that will provide a single-user
interface for the program's products and services. In addition,
USCIS will enhance E-Verify's monitoring and compliance
activities through analytical capabilities that will support
more robust fraud detection and improved analytic processes and
will continue developing system enhancements in response to
customer feedback, surveys, mission requirements, and capacity
needs.
Secure Communities.--Total funding of $146.9 million is
requested to continue fiscal year 2010 progress toward Nation-
wide implementation of ICE's Secure Communities program--which
involves the identification, apprehension, and removal of all
Level 1 criminal aliens in State prisons and local jails
through criminal alien biometric identification capabilities.
Secure Communities, in cooperation with Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies, will provide a safeguard to
American communities by removing those criminal aliens from the
United States who represent the greatest threats to public
safety and by deterring their re-entry through aggressive
prosecution.
Immigrant Integration.--A total of $18 million is requested
to fund USCIS Office of Citizenship initiatives, including
expansion of the competitive Citizenship Grant Program to
support National and community-based organizations preparing
immigrants for citizenship, promoting, and raising awareness of
citizenship rights and responsibilities, and enhancing English
language education and other tools for legal permanent
residents. The Office of Citizenship will support the
implementation of the Immigration Integration program and lead
initiatives to educate aspiring citizens about the
naturalization process, monitor, and evaluate the
administration and content of the new naturalization test, and
develop educational materials and resources for immigrants and
the organizations that serve them.
safeguarding and securing cyberspace
National Cyber Security Division (NCSD).--Total funding of
$379 million is requested for the NCSD to support the
development of capabilities to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to incidents that could degrade or overwhelm the
Nation's critical information technology infrastructure and key
cyber networks. These funds will identify and reduce
vulnerabilities, mitigate threats, and ensure that cyber
intrusions and disruptions cause minimal damage to public and
private sector networks.
National Cyber Security Center (NCSC).--A total of $10
million is requested for the NCSC to enhance cyber security
coordination capabilities across the Federal Government
including mission integration, collaboration and coordination,
situational awareness and cyber incident response, analysis and
reporting, knowledge management, and technology development and
management.
ensuring resilience to disasters
Disaster Relief Fund (DRF).--The budget seeks funding of
$1.95 billion, an increase of $350 million for the DRF. The DRF
provides a significant portion of the total Federal response to
victims in declared major disasters and emergencies.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Facilities.--An
additional $23.3 million is requested to address critical FEMA
real estate needs. By fiscal year 2011, the capacity of FEMA
facilities will be unable to accommodate key mission
responsibilities and staff. FEMA also faces a critical need to
maintain and repair aging and deteriorating National
facilities. To address these needs, FEMA has developed a 5-year
capital plan to begin critical regional facility acquisitions
and repairs.
Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grants.--Total funding of $100
million is requested to provide program support and technical
assistance to State, local, and Tribal governments to reduce
the risks associated with disasters, support the National grant
competition and provide the required $500,000 per State
allocation. Resources will support the development and
enhancement of hazard mitigation plans, as well as the
implementation of pre-disaster mitigation projects.
Flood Map Modernization.--A total of $194 million is
requested to analyze and produce flood hazard data and map
products and communicate flood hazard risk. The funding will
support the review and update of flood hazard data and maps to
accurately reflect flood hazards and monitor the validity of
published flood hazard information.
Rescue 21.--A total of $36 million is requested for the
Rescue 21 system, enabling the U.S. Coast Guard to enhance
preparedness, ensure efficient emergency response, and rapidly
recover from disasters. The Rescue 21 system replaces the U.S.
Coast Guard's legacy National Distress and Response System and
improves communications and command and control capabilities in
the coastal zone. The system is the foundation for coastal
Search and Rescue and enhances maritime situational awareness
through increased communications ability with mariners and
other responders.
maturing and strengthening the homeland security enterprise
St. Elizabeths Headquarters Consolidation.--To streamline
the Department's core operations, $287.8 million is requested
to consolidate executive leadership, operations coordination,
and policy and program management functions in a secure setting
at St. Elizabeths. The Department's facilities are currently
dispersed over more than 40 locations throughout the National
Capital Region (NCR). This consolidation at St. Elizabeths will
reduce the fragmentation of components and will improve
communications, coordination, and cooperation across all DHS
headquarters organizations.
Lease Consolidation--Mission Support.--A total of $75
million is requested to align the Department's real estate
portfolio in the NCR to enhance mission performance and
increase management efficiency in conjunction with St.
Elizabeths Headquarters Consolidation.
Data Center Migration.--A total of $192.2 million is
requested for the continuation of system and application
migration of legacy data centers to two enterprise-wide DHS
Data Centers to meet current and anticipated data service
requirements. Funding will also be utilized for upgrading
infrastructure requirements.
Acquisition Workforce.--The fiscal year 2011 request
includes an increase of $24.2 million to strengthen the
Department's acquisition workforce capacity and capabilities.
The increase is requested to mitigate the risks associated with
skill gaps of the acquisition workforce, ensure that the
Department achieves the best terms possible in major
acquisitions and improve the effectiveness of the workforce.
Science and Technology (S&T) Safe Container (SAFECON)/Time
Recorded Ubiquitous Sensor Technology (TRUST) R&D.--A total of
$8 million is requested for the S&T SAFECON and TRUST programs.
These initiatives develop high reliability, high-throughput
detection technologies to scan cargo containers entering the
country for weapons of mass destruction, explosives,
contraband, and human cargo.
Grants.--A total of $4 billion is requested for grant
programs to support our Nation's first responders. This funding
assists State and local governments in the prevention of,
protection against, response to, and recovery from incidents of
terrorism and other events.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TOTAL BUDGET AUTHORITY BY ORGANIZATION
Gross Discretionary & Mandatory, Fees, Trust Funds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2009 Revised 2010 Revised 2011 2011 +/- Fiscal 2011 +/-
Enacted \1\ Enacted \2\ President's Year 2010 Fiscal Year
---------------------------------- Budget Enacted 2010 Enacted
-------------------------------------------------
[Thousands] [Thousands] [Thousands] [Thousands] [Percent]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Departmental Operations \3\. $659,109 $802,931 $1,270,821 $467,890 58
Analysis and Operations..... 327,373 335,030 347,930 12,900 4
Office of the Inspector 114,513 113,874 129,806 15,932 14
General....................
U.S. Customs & Border 11,250,652 11,449,283 11,180,018 (269,265) -2
Protection.................
U.S. Immigration & Customs 5,968,015 5,741,752 5,835,187 93,435 2
Enforcement................
Transportation Security 6,992,778 7,656,066 8,164,780 508,714 7
Administration.............
U.S. Coast Guard............ 9,624,179 10,122,963 10,078,317 (44,646) 0
U.S. Secret Service......... 1,640,444 1,702,644 1,811,617 108,973 6
National Protection and 1,188,263 2,432,755 2,361,715 (71,040) -3
Programs Directorate.......
Office of Health Affairs.... 157,621 139,250 212,734 73,484 53
Federal Emergency Management 5,971,159 6,194,268 6,527,406 333,138 5
Agency.....................
FEMA: Grant Programs........ 4,220,858 4,165,200 4,000,590 (164,610) -4
U.S. Citizenship & 2,876,348 2,859,997 2,812,357 (47,640) -2
Immigration Services.......
Federal Law Enforcement 332,986 282,812 278,375 (4,437) -2
Training Center............
S&T Directorate............. 932,587 1,006,471 1,018,264 11,793 1
Domestic Nuclear Detection 514,191 383,037 305,820 (77,217) -20
Office.....................
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................. 52,771,076 55,388,333 56,335,737 947,404 1.71
Less Rescission of Prior (61,373) (40,474) ............... 40,474 -100
Year Carryover Funds \4\...
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADJUSTED TOTAL BUDGET 52,709,703 55,347,859 56,335,737 987,878 2
AUTHORITY............
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUPPLEMENTAL \5\............ 3,354,503 295,503 ............... (295,503) ..............
Less Rescission of Prior (100,000) ............... ............... ............... ..............
Year Carryover Funds \5\...
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal Year 2009 revised enacted reflects: (1) Net reprogramming/transfer adjustments for OSEM ($17.4
million); OIG ($16.0 million); CBP (-$24.1 million); ICE ($16.4 million); TSA ($14.4 million); USCG ($.400
million); USSS ($2.5 million); NPPD ($30 million); OHA ($.430 million); FEMA (-$39.5 million). (2) Technical
adjustments to revise fee/trust fund estimates for ICE--Immigration Inspection User Fee ($7.0 million); ICE--
Detention and Removal Examination Fee ($1.4 million); ICE--Breached Bond/Detention Fund ($15.0 million); TSA--
Transportation Threat and Credentialing--Registered Traveler (-$10.0 million), TSA--Transportation Threat and
Credentialing--Transportation Worker Identification Credentials ($22.7 million); TSA--Transportation Threat
and Credentialing--HAZMAT (-$3.0 million); TSA--Transportation Threat and Credentialing--Alien Flight School
($1.0 million); CIS ($185.4 million); USCG ($7.9 million). (3) Realignment of USCG Operating Expenses funding
and Pursuant to Pub. L. 110-53 reflects TSA realignment of funds for 9/11 Commission Act implementation
($3.675 million--Aviation Security, $13.825 million--Surface, $2.5 million--Support). (4) Scorekeeping
adjustment for a rescission of prior year unobligated balances from USCG--AC&I (-$20.0 million).
\2\ Fiscal year 2010 revised enacted reflects: (1) Technical adjustments for TSA Aviation Security Fees of
($128.9 million); USCG Health Care Fund ($5.0 million). (2) Scorekeeping adjustment for a rescission of prior
year unobligated balances from USCG--AC&I (-$.800 million). (3) For comparability purposes, excludes USCG
Overseas Contingency Operations ($241.5 million) and National Science Foundation transfer to USCG of $54.0
million.
\3\ Departmental Operations is comprised of the Office of the Secretary & Executive Management, the Office of
the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, the
Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, and the National Special
Security Events Fund (NSSE).
\4\ Pursuant to Pub. L. 110-329, reflects fiscal year 2009 rescissions of prior year unobligated balances:
Analysis and Operations (-$21.373 million); TSA (-$31.0 million); FEMA--Cerro Grande (-$9.0 million). Pursuant
to Pub. L. 111-83, reflects fiscal year 2010 rescissions of prior year unobligated balances: Analysis and
Operations (-$2.4 million); TSA (-$4.0 million); Counter-Terrorism Fund (-$5.6 million); FEMA (-$5.6 million);
S&T (-$6.9 million); DNDO (-$8.0 million).
\5\ In order to obtain comparable figures, Net Discretionary, Gross Discretionary, and Total Budget Authority
excludes: (1) Fiscal year 2009 supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 110-252: USCG ($112 million). (2)
Fiscal year 2009 supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 111-5 (ARRA): USM ($200 million); OIG ($5 million);
CBP ($680 million); ICE ($20 million); TSA ($1.0 billion); USCG ($240 million); FEMA ($610 million). (3)
Fiscal year 2009 supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 111-8: USSS ($100 million). (4) Fiscal year 2009
supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 111-32: CBP ($51.2 million); ICE ($66.8 million); USCG ($139.5
million); FEMA ($130.0 million). (5) Pursuant to Pub. L. 111-32 reflects fiscal year 2009 rescissions of prior
year unobligated balances: FEMA (-$100.0 million). (6) Fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations
funding provided in Pub. L. 111-83: USCG ($241.5 million). (7) Fiscal year 2010 Supplemental funding pursuant
to Pub. L. 111-117: USCG ($54.0 million).
NET DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY BY ORGANIZATION
Excludes Discretionary Offsetting Fees & Mandatory, Non-Offsetting Fees, & Trust Funds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2009 Revised 2010 Revised 2011 2011 +/- Fiscal 2011 +/-
Enacted \1\ Enacted \2\ President's Year 2010 Fiscal Year
---------------------------------- Budget Enacted 2010 Enacted
-------------------------------------------------
[Thousands] [Thousands] [Thousands] [Thousands] [Percent]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Departmental Operations \3\. $659,109 $802,931 $1,270,821 $467,890 58
Analysis and Operations..... 327,373 335,030 347,930 12,900 4
Office of the Inspector 114,513 113,874 129,806 15,932 14
General....................
U.S. Customs & Border 9,803,667 10,134,554 9,817,117 (317,437) -3
Protection.................
U.S. Immigration & Customs 5,005,615 5,436,952 5,523,800 86,848 2
Enforcement................
Transportation Security 4,369,358 5,129,505 5,724,000 594,495 12
Administration.............
U.S. Coast Guard............ 8,104,707 8,541,749 8,466,537 (75,212) -1
U.S. Secret Service......... 1,415,444 1,482,644 1,571,617 88,973 6
National Protection and 1,188,263 1,317,755 1,246,715 (71,040) -5
Programs Directorate.......
Office of Health Affairs.... 157,621 139,250 212,734 73,484 53
Federal Emergency Management 2,777,560 2,963,268 3,292,860 329,592 11
Agency.....................
FEMA: Grant Programs........ 4,220,858 4,165,200 4,000,590 (164,610) -4
U.S. Citizenship & 152,490 224,000 385,800 161,800 72
Immigration Services.......
Federal Law Enforcement 332,986 282,812 278,375 (4,437) -2
Training Center............
S&T Directorate............. 932,587 1,006,471 1,018,264 11,793 1
Domestic Nuclear Detection 514,191 383,037 305,820 (77,217) -20
Office.....................
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................. 40,076,342 42,459,032 43,592,786 1,133,754 2.67
Less Rescission of Prior (61,373) (40,474) ............... -40,474 -100
Year Carryover Funds \4\...
Mandatory, Fees, and Trusts. 12,694,734 12,929,301 12,742,951 ............... ..............
ADJUSTED TOTAL BUDGET 52,709,703 55,347,859 56,335,737 987,878 2
AUTHORITY..................
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUPPLEMENTAL \5\............ 3,354,503 295,503 ............... (295,503) ..............
Less Rescission of Prior (100,000) ............... ............... ............... ..............
Year Carryover Funds \5\...
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2009 revised enacted reflects: (1) Net reprogramming/transfer adjustments for OSEM ($17.4
million); OIG ($16.0 million); CBP (-$24.1 million); ICE ($16.4 million); TSA ($14.4 million); USCG ($.400
million); USSS ($2.5 million); NPPD ($30 million); OHA ($.430 million); FEMA (-$39.5 million). (2) Technical
adjustments to revise fee/trust fund estimates for ICE--Immigration Inspection User Fee ($7.0 million); ICE--
Detention and Removal Examination Fee ($1.4 million); ICE--Breached Bond/Detention Fund ($15.0 million); TSA--
Transportation Threat and Credentialing--Registered Traveler (-$10.0 million), TSA--Transportation Threat and
Credentialing--Transportation Worker Identification Credentials ($22.7 million); TSA--Transportation Threat
and Credentialing--HAZMAT (-$3.0 million); TSA--Transportation Threat and Credentialing--Alien Flight School
($1.0 million); CIS ($185.4 million); USCG ($7.9 million). (3) Realignment of USCG Operating Expenses funding
and Pursuant to Pub. L. 110-53 reflects TSA realignment of funds for 9/11 Commission Act implementation
($3.675 million--Aviation Security, $13.825 million--Surface, $2.5 million--Support). (4) Scorekeeping
adjustment for a rescission of prior year unobligated balances from USCG--AC&I (-$20.0 million).
\2\ Fiscal year 2010 revised enacted reflects: (1) Technical adjustments for TSA Aviation Security Fees of
($128.9 million); USCG Health Care Fund ($5.0 million). (2) Scorekeeping adjustment for a rescission of prior
year unobligated balances from USCG--AC&I (-$.800 million). (3) For comparability purposes, excludes USCG
Overseas Contingency Operations ($241.5 million) and National Science Foundation transfer to USCG of $54.0
million.
\3\ Departmental Operations is comprised of the Office of the Secretary & Executive Management, the Office of
the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, the
Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, and the National Special
Security Events Fund (NSSE).
\4\ Pursuant to Pub. L. 110-329, reflects fiscal year 2009 rescissions of prior year unobligated balances:
Analysis and Operations (-$21.373 million); TSA (-$31.0 million); FEMA--Cerro Grande (-$9.0 million). Pursuant
to Pub. L. 111-83, reflects fiscal year 2010 rescissions of prior year unobligated balances: Analysis and
Operations (-$2.4 million); TSA (-$4.0 million); Counter-Terrorism Fund (-$5.6 million); FEMA (-$5.6 million);
S&T (-$6.9 million); DNDO (-$8.0 million).
\5\ In order to obtain comparable figures, Net Discretionary, Gross Discretionary, and Total Budget Authority
excludes: (1) Fiscal year 2009 supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 110-252: USCG ($112 million). (2)
Fiscal year 2009 supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 111-5 (ARRA): USM ($200 million); OIG ($5 million);
CBP ($680 million); ICE ($20 million); TSA ($1.0 billion); USCG ($240 million); FEMA ($610 million). (3)
Fiscal year 2009 supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 111-8: USSS ($100 million). (4) Fiscal year 2009
supplemental funding pursuant to Pub. L. 111-32: CBP ($51.2 million); ICE ($66.8 million); USCG ($139.5
million); FEMA ($130.0 million). (5) Pursuant to Pub. L. 111-32 reflects fiscal year 2009 rescissions of prior
year unobligated balances: FEMA (-$100.0 million). (6) Fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations
funding provided in Pub. L. 111-83: USCG ($241.5 million). (7) Fiscal year 2010 Supplemental funding pursuant
to Pub. L. 111-117: USCG ($54.0 million).
key fiscal year 2009 accomplishments & reforms
In 2009, our 230,000 employees strengthened existing efforts and
launched new initiatives to meet our five key responsibilities:
Guarding against terrorism; securing our borders; engaging in smart,
effective enforcement of immigration laws; preparing for, responding
to, and recovering from disasters of all kinds; and building a mature
and unified Department.
DHS has emphasized three cross-cutting approaches to achieve these
aims--increasing cooperation with Federal, State, Tribal, local,
private sector, and international partners; deploying the latest
science and technology to support our mission; and maximizing
efficiency and streamlining operations across the Department.
As a result, we have made major advances in addressing new and
emerging threats to keep our homeland safe, fostering lawful trade and
travel and continuing to build a ready and resilient Nation able to
meet the challenges of the 21st century. The following are some key
initiatives accomplished this past year.
Guarding Against Terrorism and Threats to Cyber Networks and Critical
Infrastructure
Protecting the American people from terrorist threats is the
founding purpose of the Department and a top priority. Over the past
year, DHS has continued to guard against terrorism by enhancing
explosives detection and other protective measures in public spaces and
transportation networks, working with the private sector to protect
critical infrastructure and cyber networks from attack, improving
detection of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials,
and building information-sharing partnerships with State and local law
enforcement that enable law enforcement to better mitigate threats.
Fulfilling a key 9/11 Commission recommendation, TSA began
implementing Secure Flight, which prescreens passenger name,
date of birth, and gender against Government watch lists for
domestic and international flights.
TSA achieved the 9/11 Act requirement of screening 50
percent of air cargo transported on domestic passenger
aircrafts by February 3, 2009. Currently, 100 percent of cargo
is screened on more than 95 percent of flights originating in
the United States and 100 percent of all baggage is screened
for explosives.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office directly trained more
than 3,600 Federal, State, and local officers and first
responders in radiological and nuclear detection and began
demonstrating the first-of-its-kind Cargo Advanced Automated
Radiography System, which aims to detect special nuclear
materials and shielding material in cargo at ports of entry.
DHS opened the new National Cyber Security and
Communications Integration Center--a 24-hour, DHS-led
coordinated watch and warning center that will improve National
efforts to address threats and incidents affecting the Nation's
critical IT and cyber infrastructure.
DHS worked with the Office of Personnel Management to attain
new authority to recruit and hire up to 1,000 cyber security
professionals across the Department over the next 3 years to
help fulfill DHS' broad mission to protect the Nation's cyber
infrastructure, systems, and networks.
S&T partnered with the U.S. Secret Service, industry, and
academia to digitize more than 9,000 ink samples to expedite
the investigation of criminal and terrorist activities by
reducing matching times from days to minutes.
DHS held the 5-day National Level Exercise 2009--the first
National-level exercise to focus on terrorism prevention--in
conjunction with Federal, State, local, Tribal, private sector,
and international partners.
In accordance with the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism
Standards Act (CFATS), which allows DHS to regulate the
security measures at high-risk chemical facilities, DHS is
working with 2,300 facilities on strengthening security
measures. In 2009, DHS received Site Security Plans from over
900 regulated facilities.
DHS signed agreements to prevent and combat crime with
Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. These agreements allow for
the exchange of biometric and biographic data to bolster
counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts while emphasizing
privacy protections.
DHS and Spanish Interior Minister Perez Rubalcaba signed a
Declaration of Principles formalizing the Immigration Advisory
Program--which identifies high-risk travelers at foreign
airports before they board aircraft bound for the United
States.
DHS forged partnerships with Germany and Spain to facilitate
scientific research and collaboration to combat transnational
threats.
DHS and Canadian Public Safety Minister Peter Van Loan
announced a series of cooperative initiatives between the
United States and Canada to address terrorism and organized
crime while expediting the lawful flow of travel and trade--
including a biometric data sharing initiative also involving
Australia, the United Kingdom and, eventually, New Zealand.
Securing Our Borders While Facilitating Lawful Travel and Trade
In 2009, DHS continued to strengthen security on the Southwest
border through additional manpower and new technology to disrupt the
flow of illegal drug, cash, and weapon smuggling that fuels cartel
violence in Mexico. The Department also reinforced security on the
Northern border while facilitating lawful travel and trade.
The Obama administration announced the Southwest Border
Security Initiative, a joint effort of the Departments of
Homeland Security, Justice, and State to crack down on Mexican
drug cartels by enhancing border security through additional
personnel, increased intelligence capability, and better
coordination with State, local, and Mexican law enforcement
authorities. As of December 8, 2009, CBP has seized more than
$38.3 million in southbound currency--an increase of more than
$29.3 million compared to the same period in 2008. In total
thus far in 2009, CBP and ICE have seized more than $101.7
million and nearly 1.59 million kilograms of drugs--an increase
of more than $48.2 million and more than 423,167 kilograms of
drugs compared to the same period in 2008.
DHS implemented the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for
land and sea travel to the United States, increasing border
security while facilitating lawful travel and trade by
requiring U.S. and Canadian citizens to present a passport or
other approved secure document that denotes identity and
citizenship when crossing the border.
DHS and the Department of Justice joined with the Office of
National Drug Control Policy to release the National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the Obama administration's
strategy to stem the flow of illegal drugs and their illicit
proceeds across the Southwest border and reduce associated
crime and violence.
The Department announced the expansion of Global Entry--a
CBP pilot program that streamlines the screening process at
airports for trusted travelers through biometric
identification--as a permanent voluntary program at airports
across the United States. Global Entry reduces average wait
times by more than 70 percent and more than 75 percent of
travelers using Global Entry are admitted in less than 5
minutes.
DHS launched a joint Coast Guard-CBP effort to use Predator
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to provide improved surveillance
of the United States' maritime borders. DHS will conduct the
first UAS operations along maritime borders in 2010.
DHS, the Department of Justice, and the Government of Mexico
signed a Letter of Intent to develop a coordinated and
intelligence-driven response to the threat of cross-border
smuggling and trafficking of weapons and ammunition. This
first-of-its-kind arrangement leverages the combined
investigative capabilities of ICE, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Attorney General of
Mexico to combat violence and criminal activity along the U.S.-
Mexico border.
Through Global Entry, DHS launched a first-of-its-kind
initiative with the Netherlands to open membership in U.S. and
Dutch expedited air travel programs to citizens of both
countries in an effort to streamline entry processes for pre-
screened fliers.
Engaging in Smart, Effective Immigration Law Enforcement
Over the past year, DHS has strengthened its immigration
enforcement activities, targeting criminal aliens and employers who
violate the Nation's immigration laws, while making improvements to the
legal immigration system.
DHS implemented a new, comprehensive strategy to reduce the
demand for illegal employment and protect employment
opportunities for the Nation's lawful workforce by targeting
employers who knowingly hire illegal workers through
investigations, prosecution, and civil and criminal penalties.
Since January 2009, DHS' new worksite enforcement policies have
led to 1,897 cases and 2,069 Form I-9 inspections targeting
employers, 58 companies and 62 individuals debarred, and 142
Notices of Intent to Fine totaling $15,865,181 issued.
DHS is reforming the immigration detention system, enhancing
security and efficiency Nation-wide while prioritizing the
health and safety of detainees. New initiatives include
creating an Office of Detention Policy and Planning to ensure
uniform conditions of confinement, medical care, and design;
implementing a medical classification system; centralizing all
detention facility contracts under ICE headquarters'
supervision; developing a plan for alternatives to detention;
more than doubling the number of Federal personnel providing
on-site oversight at the facilities where the majority of
detainees are housed; creating two advisory boards comprised of
community and immigration advocacy groups; and establishing an
independent Office of Detention Oversight reporting directly to
the ICE Assistant Secretary.
DHS expanded the Secure Communities initiative--which uses
biometric information to target criminal aliens in U.S.
correctional facilities--from 14 to 107 locations in 2009,
reflecting an increased emphasis on identifying and removing
criminal aliens who pose the greatest threat to public safety.
To date, the program has identified more than 111,000 aliens in
jails and prisons who have been charged with or convicted of
criminal offenses.
USCIS and the FBI cleared the backlog of a year or more for
background checks on people seeking to work and live in the
United States or become citizens--reflecting DHS' commitment to
quick, thorough, and fair adjudication of immigration
applications. The vast majority of these checks are now
answered within 30 days. At the end of fiscal year 2009, USCIS
also reduced the backlog of pending immigration applications
and petitions by more than 90 percent and reduced average
processing times for naturalization applicants by nearly 5
months as compared to fiscal year 2008.
USCIS launched a redesigned website--available in English
and Spanish--which provides a one-stop location for immigration
services and information, including real-time alerts on the
status of immigration applications via text message and e-mail.
USCIS increased employer participation in E-Verify, the
Nation's preeminent employment eligibility verification system,
from 88,000 companies at the end of fiscal year 2008 to more
than 177,000 employers today.
Preparing for, Responding to, and Recovering From Disasters
In the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other
large-scale emergency, the Department provides a coordinated,
comprehensive Federal response and works with Federal, State, local,
and private sector partners to ensure a swift and effective recovery
effort. This year, DHS increased efforts to build a ready and resilient
Nation by providing grants and training to our homeland security and
law enforcement partners, coordinating the Federal Government's
response to H1N1, and streamlining rebuilding and recovery along the
Gulf Coast.
DHS led the Federal response to the H1N1 outbreak, creating
regional coordination teams comprised of representatives from
DHS and the Departments of Defense and Health and Human
Services to oversee, coordinate, and execute National incident
management responsibilities. DHS also coordinated outreach
efforts to Congressional, State, local, Tribal, private sector,
and international officials regarding the H1N1 outbreak.
Since January 20, 2009, Louisiana and Mississippi have
received more than $2.1 billion in public assistance from DHS,
including $125 million for debris removal and emergency
protective measures, $935.5 million in public works and
infrastructure projects, $258 million for mitigation activities
to increase resilience and more than $542 million for K-12
education. In addition, more than 6,000 displaced households in
Louisiana and Mississippi have been transitioned to permanent
housing.
To cut through red tape and streamline and expedite the
decision-making process for public assistance for recovery
efforts in the Gulf Coast, DHS established two joint public
assistance teams and a new arbitration process to resolve long-
standing issues over public assistance funding. Over the past
10 months, the Joint Expediting Team and the Unified Public
Assistance Project Decision Team have resolved 156 projects,
distributing more than $100 million dollars to support the
repair and replacement of fire and police stations, schools
like the Southern University of New Orleans and Holy Cross
School, libraries, and other infrastructure critical to the
recovery of Gulf Coast communities.
FEMA has responded to 47 declared disasters since January
21, 2009, including the Red River flooding in North Dakota and
Minnesota, the September flooding in Georgia, and the
earthquake and tsunami that struck American Samoa.
Unifying and Maturing DHS
Six years since the Department's creation, DHS' goal remains the
same: One enterprise dedicated to a shared vision for homeland
security. Over the past year, DHS implemented a series of wide-ranging
efficiency initiatives that leverage the economies of scale in DHS in
order to recover millions of dollars and create a culture of
responsibility and fiscal discipline. At the same time, the Department
leveraged new technology to improve DHS operations, coordination, and
outreach.
DHS broke ground on its new headquarters at the St.
Elizabeths Campus. While DHS currently operates in more than 40
offices around the National Capitol Region, the consolidated
headquarters will unify DHS' many components into one cohesive
department and is expected to save taxpayers $163 million over
the next 30 years.
DHS launched the Efficiency Review Initiative to improve
efficiency, streamline operations, and promote greater
accountability, transparency, and customer satisfaction through
a series of initiatives--including eliminating non-mission
critical travel, renegotiating contracts, utilizing Government
facilities instead of private rentals, reducing printing and
postal mail and maximizing the use of web-based communication,
training and meetings, implementing energy efficiencies in DHS
facilities and maximizing DHS' buying power to receive the
lowest price possible when acquiring office supplies and
software licenses. These initiatives collectively are expected
to lead to hundreds of millions of dollars in cost avoidances.
This past year, DHS identified more than $100 million in cost
savings including $22 million by eliminating non-mission
critical travel; $16 by utilizing software licensing agreements
DHS-wide; $7 million through the mandatory review of contracts;
$9 million by eliminating redundancy in processing mariner
credentials; $8 million by consolidating the DHS sensitive-but-
unclassified portal system; almost $4 million by posting
documents on-line or using e-mail in lieu of printing and
postal mail; $2 million by streamlining boat maintenance and
support schedules; $2 million by utilizing Government
facilities instead of private rentals; almost $2 million by
increasing energy efficiencies at facilities and many more
examples across the Department.
S&T launched the Virtual USA initiative, an innovative,
information-sharing initiative that helps Federal, State,
local, and Tribal first responders communicate during
emergencies by linking disparate tools and technologies in
order to share the location and status of critical assets and
information--such as power and water lines, flood detectors,
helicopter-capable landing sites, emergency vehicle and
ambulance locations, weather and traffic conditions, evacuation
routes and school and Government building floor plans--across
Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments.
selected dhs high-priority performance goals
Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security
Improve security screening of passengers, baggage, and
employees while expediting the movement of the traveling public
(aviation and surface transportation security).--Fiscal year
2011 initiatives include deploying new technology, law
enforcement, and canine assets at domestic airports, enhancing
checkpoint technology, implementing the Transportation Workers
Identification Credential (TWIC) program--which requires
transportations workers to obtain a biometric identification
card to gain access to secure areas of transportation
facilities, and strengthening our Visible Intermodal Prevention
and Response (VIPR) teams-- which use unpredictability to
deter, detect, and disrupt potential terrorist activities, will
help us to achieve these goals.
Securing and Managing Our Borders
Prevent terrorist movement at land ports of entry and
maritime borders through enhanced screening while expediting
the flow of legitimate travel.--Fiscal year 2011 initiatives
include implementing the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
by deploying new technology, upgrading our processing
capabilities at border checkpoints, and enhancing information
sharing among law enforcement, as well as continuing
recapitalization of aging Coast Guard surface and air assets to
quickly and effectively respond to emerging threats.
Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws
Improve the efficiency of the process to detain and remove
illegal immigrants from the United States.
Improve the delivery of immigration services.--Fiscal year
2011 initiatives include increasing our targets for detaining
and removing dangerous criminal aliens from the United States
through our Secure Communities program--which uses biometrics
to identify and remove criminal aliens incarcerated in State
and local jails--by 4 percent per year. Additionally, we will
improve the delivery of immigration services by modernizing our
adjudication process for new immigrants and potential citizens.
Ensuring Resilience to Disasters
Strengthen disaster preparedness and response by improving
FEMA's operational capabilities and enhancing State, local, and
private citizen preparedness.--In fiscal year 2011, FEMA will
continue to enhance its training programs to help State and
local entities prepare for all types of disasters. FEMA is also
developing a National strategy to house up to half a million
households within 60 days of a disaster--increasing current
capacity by 200 percent.
Maturing and Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise
Mature and unify the Homeland Security Enterprise through
effective information sharing.
Improve acquisition execution across the DHS acquisition
portfolio, by ensuring key acquisition expertise resides in
major program office and acquisition oversight staffs
throughout the Department.--In fiscal year 2011, our efforts
will focus on information sharing across all departmental
components. Additionally, the Department is undertaking an
initiative to enhance the capability and capacity of its
acquisition workforce to ensure that major acquisition projects
do not exceed cost, schedule, and performance objectives.
We will focus on these goals over the next 2 years and continue to
work closely with the Office of Management and Budget in the monitoring
and reporting of milestones and performance measures associated with
them. As we continue the Bottom-Up Review associated with the QHSR, we
may update these goals and associated measures.
conclusion
The fiscal year 2011 budget proposal reflects this administration's
continued commitment to protecting the homeland and the American people
through the effective and efficient use of DHS resources. As outlined
in my testimony today, the Department will build on past successes in
several areas including information sharing with our partners, aviation
and port security measures, and immigration reform efforts.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions and to working with you on the
fiscal year 2011 budget request and other issues.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the Secretary. I will now recognize myself
for the first question.
Madame Secretary, it goes to the issue of maritime cargo
screening. Congress thought, along with leadership, Ms. Harman
and some other folks, that our ports and the whole issue of
screening and the vulnerabilities associated with not knowing
what is coming into the country was a real issue. We passed
legislation mandating 100 percent scanning by 2012.
Since that time the Secretary before you and now you have
taken the position that it can't be done. This budget reflects
a 48 percent decrease in resources to do that. Explain that to
the committee, please.
Secretary Napolitano. The monies requested for the
Container Security Initiative reflects the fact that with
increasing technology and increasing implementation of
initiatives that were begun under my predecessor, that we can
achieve the screening necessary of containers and cargo with
the 10+2 rule, which is now in effect with electronic records
of what is in cargo, which is now in effect with 24-hour notice
of what is in cargo, which is now in effect, all things that
didn't exist, really, at the time that the 100 percent
requirement was contemplated. So we have been addressing this
from a risk-based and a technology-based approach to get to
where we need to be.
Chairman Thompson. Are you going to propose to change the
law that Congress established, saying 2012 is the date that the
100 percent has to be maintained?
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, I think I have been
pretty--my assessment, and I looked at it independently of my
predecessor, but my assessment has turned out to be the same as
his, which is that the 100 percent requirement is not
achievable by 2012. So we will need to work with the committee
this year on what we are asking for, how it will secure our
ports, and what statutory changes may need to be made.
Chairman Thompson. So based on what you just said, what is
your best guess as to when 100 percent cargo screening will be
attained?
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, I would like the
opportunity to address with the committee, if not today, at
some other time, whether the 100 percent screening is really
the way to go, now that we know more than we did when the 100
percent screening requirement was imposed.
Chairman Thompson. Let me say it would benefit the
relationship if that request would come before we read it in
the paper that you can't do it. Our expectations, Madame
Secretary, is that if there is a law with deadlines on it and
there are problems, please come talk to us. But when we read
about it in the newspaper that you are not going to do it, it
is a problem.
I say to you if you can't do it, we hear the part, but the
public expects some direction toward satisfying the 100 percent
mandate. Congress expects it.
The other issue is last year you talked about the issue of
collective bargaining rights for TSOs. Can you tell me, based
on last year you told us that you were checking with general
counsel and general counsel would tell you whether you could do
it, do you have the authority to act administratively on
collective bargaining rights?
Secretary Napolitano. Let me take two points, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I am sorry if you read about the 100 percent in
the paper. I have testified on that before, before in the
Senate, and I think I also submitted some statements in that
regard.
But I think we need to further that dialogue, because we
need to look at what is the best way to secure our ports, the
cargo that comes into the ports, and the myriad ways that cargo
comes into our ports. The plain fact of the matter is I think
we just plain know more now than we did when the 100 percent
requirement was developed.
So I look forward to testifying or bringing information
before this committee, because we have--I know I have, at
least--testified at least once on this.
Moving forward on the collective bargaining issue, my
understanding is that we do have the authority to collective
bargaining under the current law.
Chairman Thompson. Do you plan to exercise this authority?
Secretary Napolitano. We are working with our TSOs, but we
are not collectively bargaining with them right now.
Chairman Thompson. You are aware that we have had a vote in
the House on this issue in the past----
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. And that the House said it
is fine to do it.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I will yield to the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, on the issue of Secure the Cities, you
and I have been through this before, but the House has in a
number of times in separate votes overwhelmingly indicated
support for this program. I believe it is absolutely essential.
If we look at Madrid, if we look at London, it is very likely
the next attack against a major urban area is going to come
from outside.
The ultimate nightmare would be a dirty bomb coming in. New
York City has set up a Secure the Cities nuclear detection
system, basically, which forms a guard around the city, the
highways, the bridges, tunnels leading into the city from the
suburbs. It involves, I believe, 70 different law enforcement
agencies from throughout New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and
yet it has been zeroed out in this year's budget.
We seem to go through the same argument. The money hasn't
been spent. Actually, as far as I know--I have been going
through it--all the money has either been spent or obligated or
is awaiting approval.
For instance, on the 2009 funding, even though the budget
was adopted, you know, long ago, it was not awarded to New York
until October 2009. Still, applications are in, and so there is
really no money to be accounted for. It is either spent,
obligated, or awaiting approval from the Department, from DNDO.
I just think a serious mistake is being made here. It puts
the city at risk, and not just New York City, but the way the
legislation is drafted, money will also be spent in other
cities around the country.
Secretary Napolitano. Congressman, first of all, I
recognize that New York City and the area around it is a
target, as far--and we know that. It receives literally
hundreds of millions in various programs because of that.
Securing the Cities, however, was one small program
relative to the denominator. It was designed to be a 3-year
grant program, after which if New York City wished to pursue
it, they could use UASI or other grant monies.
We do have one of these budgeteer issues going on. Has New
York City actually even obligated the money they have already
received that is in the pipeline or not? Our budgeteers say
they haven't. I am given to understand that New York City
believes it has. Somewhere there ought to be an agreement
there, but there is that.
But the more important point, I think, is that as a pilot
program, which it was, a 3-year, it has not yet now--it is now
time for be--to be really assessed independently as to whether
it is effective or not, given and comparing it to other types
of protective technologies and programs that are available
there.
I think that that audit--or it is not an audit; it is
really an assessment--will be happening this year, but we need
to proceed forward and really make sure that if we are going to
continue funding Securing the Cities, if the Congress wants to,
it really is value added to the other millions of dollars that
we are putting into the greater New York area.
Mr. King. Again, there is, then, I would say a basic
misunderstanding. I don't believe it was ever believed by New
York that this was just going to end after 3 years as far as
the funding----
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
Mr. King [continuing]. Just by the nature of the program. I
think it is not just New York. It is New York, New Jersey,
Connecticut, over 70 police departments and law enforcement
agencies. I will let my friend, Mr. Pascrell, discuss it later.
But it was never my understanding or anyone in the city, I
don't believe, that this was to end after 3 years. It just
wouldn't make sense. But in any event, I would like to follow
this through with you and perhaps set up meetings with
Commissioner Kelly on that.
On the issue of the 9/11 trial in New York, were you ever
consulted prior to the announcement by the Attorney General
that it was going to be held in New York?
Secretary Napolitano. I was not.
Mr. King. Okay. My understanding is you have been
appointed--you were, or the DHS was, part of a task force after
the fact to determine the security course of the trial in Lower
Manhattan. I had sent a letter to you and to the attorney
general and to Director Leiter on January 29 requesting a copy
of the classified threat assessment. I have not heard from you.
I realize you have many letters on your desk and you have a
broken leg, but if you could get that to us, because that to
me, I would like to see how that threat assessment is being
analyzed, what was taken into account, even if it was after the
fact, especially in view of the Vice President's statement that
he thinks that the number of $200 million or $230 million is an
exaggeration. So if you can make that classified report
available to us on the committee, it would be very, very
helpful.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I will follow up on that. I
believe the budget request is for up to $200 million for
terrorism trials per se. I think that contemplates that there
could be other trials as well during fiscal year 2011. I know,
Representative, you are focused on the KSM announcement, the
KSM trial, but I believe the actual budget request was a little
broader than that.
Mr. King. I see my time is running out. Let me just ask one
quick question for yes or no. Are you aware of any of the
cities that are being considered for a Guantanamo detainee
trial? You said the money could go places other than New York.
Are you aware of any other city?
Secretary Napolitano. It is my understanding that those
assessments are being done by the Department of Justice.
Mr. King. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Now I recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes. Mr.
Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman----
Madame Secretary, good seeing you again--just to note
procedural issue that I think was raised by the Chairman, one
of the questions that we had asked was what was it, the 181
Border Patrol. I think at one time you all had said we are
going to cut them by attrition, and then it came back and said
we are not going to cut them.
Alison, our staff, got the e-mail from you all today
saying, ``Let Mr. Cuellar know we are not cutting 181 Border
Patrol as originally proposed. We are taking this money
elsewhere out from CBP to cover the $50 million comp.''
The problem is we get this around 12:30 today, and we read
it before that time in the--what was it--in the newspaper
today. It is one of the issues that we have been asking, Madame
Chair--I mean, Madame Secretary, that, you know, we are the
oversight committee. We would like to get this before the media
does, because when the media gets this--and nothing against the
media--but when they get it before we do as oversighters, it
just puts us in a very uncomfortable situation.
So I would ask you again, you know, if you can just have
your staff trust us and provide us the information before the
media does. I mean, I have the memo here from Alison. I asked
her, ``When did you exactly get it,'' and then the newspapers.
So I would ask you as a procedural question to do that.
The second thing is is the Coast Guard, the memo about them
reducing the global terrorism missions. I am looking at it
right now, and I am not going to go into detail, but if there
is going to be a change in the mission, the mission of the
Coast Guard, and you are taking the global terrorism mission to
do more search or rescue, again, like the Chairman said, let us
know before. At least give us a little heads-up on some of the
matters again.
We want to work with you. We want to be your friend and
supporter on this. We want to just ask you to work with us on
this. Do you want to address this? I want to talk about the
good work you do with Mexico, which is what I want to conclude
with.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, if I might, that clarification
on the CBP budget request was that is an exchange that has been
going on with the appropriators, and I will let staff work with
your staff on it. Do you want that? But if the press picked up
something that was going on back and forth with the
appropriators, I think that explains that. That is
traditionally how that has been done.
I think the Coast Guard memo to which you refer is a
internal draft option paper that goes all the way back to last
November and before the President's budget was even finalized.
It is not something that is operative, nor is it where the
President nor I believe the Coast Guard should go.
So, unfortunately, it is one of those things in this town.
Paper leaks out like water through a sieve, and that should--
but that is an internal pre-decisional paper.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Thank you. So it is not--okay, good.
On the story that came out also today, and the Washington
Post apparently picked up a lot of things today, the question
is about contractors outnumbering Federal workers. I saw your
response to Senator Lieberman. My thing is I can understand the
usage of some contractors. I don't have a problem against
contractors, but, you know, you got to have some sort of
balance.
My only thing is that if you provide performance and
oversight and performance measures to make sure that we are
measuring that is that I am hoping that that is applying to
those individuals, because if this story, and it is probably
wrong, says that contractors employed by Homeland outnumber the
number of Homeland Security people, I think that is going to
raise some issues to a lot of Members on that.
Secretary Napolitano. Right.
Mr. Cuellar. Does it outnumber? Do contractors outnumber?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, it doesn't outnumber,
but it is too high a number. There are reasons for that. When
the Department was put together so quickly, given all the
missions that it had and that were added to it, in order to
move quickly enough, the use of contractors was required.
What the Department has not had is a plan in place to
convert those positions into Federal employees. That is what we
are now pursuing through the Balanced Workforce Initiative. A
problem we have in speeding that up--and I would like to speed
it up, Mr. Chairman--is the pure length of time that it takes
to on-board a Federal employee under the current statute rules
and regs that govern civilian employment.
It is something that at Senate Homeland Security yesterday,
I said it is a problem Government-wide. But certainly for DHS
as the newest department, it has slowed down, a conversion that
we would like to do as rapidly as possible.
Mr. Cuellar. My time is up, but just whatever you do
working with Mexico--I know you were over there, and I want to
congratulate you--keep up the good work, because I think we
need to do a little bit more. We might have to look at, my
opinion, maybe at 2.0, because they are in serious situations
in what is happening.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madame Secretary, for the work that you do.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Madame Secretary, if you could provide the committee with
some outline of who these 200,000 people are. I know you can
categorize them, you can do whatever you want, but based on
what Mr. Cuellar is saying, we need to know are these
professional people? Are these clerical people, or just what
they are? So you don't have to give the title position, but----
Secretary Napolitano. Kind of categories?
Chairman Thompson. Absolutely. That would help.
Secretary Napolitano. I think we already have that, but we
will get that to you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to recognize Mr. Dent
out of order. He has a family emergency he is going to have to
attend.
Without objection. Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the Members for your accommodation.
Madame Secretary, thank you for being here, and
particularly under your situation with your ankle. I just have
a few questions for you today, but first just let me discuss an
issue near and dear to the hearts of my fellow Pennsylvanians.
Madame Secretary, I cannot support and in fact, I will
vehemently oppose any attempt by the administration to relocate
Guantanamo terror detainees to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, whether for detention or for prosecution,
especially given the Flight 93 crash in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, on 9/11.
Having recently visited the Gitmo facilities, I see
absolutely no reason why these trials must be held in this
country in the United States, let alone in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and I will do everything within my power to
prevent detainee trials from being held within the
Commonwealth. Please, please encourage the Justice Department
to look elsewhere. Certainly, I know that--I believe that is in
their court. Please convey that message.
That being said, I have some issues regarding the
Department's budget request that I would like to discuss with
you. In 2008 the Department promulgated the Larger Aircraft
Security Program, known as the LASP program, the proposed
rulemaking regarding general aviation security. John Sammon
from TSA was working with industry to redefine those
requirements to ensure that they were smart, sensible, and most
importantly, enforceable.
In light of the Austin, Texas, incident, can you please
tell me where we are in the issuance of either an amended
rulemaking or a completely new rulemaking for general aviation
security?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Representative. We are,
obviously, taking a fresh look. We had done a proposed rule. We
have been working with the general aviation community. We have
the comments back. We had been prepared to issue a revised
rule, but I have asked that we take another look at the rules
in light of what happened to just to make sure that we are
making the right judgments in terms of what kinds of security
measures should be in place for what size of aircraft.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Thank you. I have long been a proponent of
using this advanced imaging technology or whole body imaging,
and I know that you have been supportive as well, for improving
our passenger security screening capabilities. I appreciate the
investment that this budget proposes in these new state-of-the-
art technologies.
However, even if we had these 500 new AIT machines in
place, they wouldn't have stopped Abdulmutallab from killing
300 people on Christmas day. He was--from almost killing 300
people--he was screened overseas.
While I understand you have been working with the
International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen these
international security standards, are you willing to go it
alone and require tougher security standards for flights
entering the United States if the ICAO proves unhelpful?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, the international aviation
security work that we are doing right now is going very, very
well. We have had meetings in Spain with my colleagues from the
European Union. We just came back from Mexico City, where we
had a Western Hemispheric meeting.
Everybody realized that they all had citizenry on Flight
253--or could have--and that there was a necessity to raise
world aviation standards in terms of information collection, in
terms of sharing information about passengers, passenger
vetting, and in terms of airport screening and security itself.
So that is going very well. We will be in Tokyo next week to
meet with the aviation community in Asia.
We always have the option, Representative, of refusing an
airport to have a last point of embarkation to the United
States. I don't know that that option has ever been employed,
but we always retain it. But I think it better, given the fact
that people need to be able to travel and commerce needs to be
able to move and as well as meeting our security demands, to
see if we can in this global world raise the overall level of
aviation security.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Well, thank you for that update.
In August of this year, the 9/11 Act passed by Congress 3
years ago would require all foreign in-bound passenger aircraft
to screen its cargo prior to the aircraft's entry into the
United States. The Department and TSA made it quite clear that
they will not be able to meet the statutory requirement.
Since the law requires you to ensure that 100 percent of
all air cargo is screened, how are you going to handle those
foreign in-bound aircraft who on August 4 had not screened
their cargo? Will you prohibit their entry into the United
States?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I would prefer to
brief you a little bit individually on that, but let me just
say by the end of the year we should meet that 100 percent
requirement on the air-bound cargo.
Mr. Dent. Foreign air-bound cargo?
Secretary Napolitano. Foreign. We will by early this year
we will be all domestic, but my understanding is by the end of
the year we will get to 100 percent on air-bound cargo from
international.
Mr. Dent. Okay. I was under the impression that we were not
going to meet that foreign standard by August 4, so I would be
curious----
Secretary Napolitano. Not by August 4, but by a few months
after that. I think we are on track to meet that standard. I
will have that double-checked.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Thank you.
I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
accommodation.
Chairman Thompson. The Chairman now recognizes the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, thank you for coming in today. It is good to see
you.
To start, I am going to start talking to you about the
QHSRs. As you know, as the Chairman of the Management,
Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, we are pretty
concerned about it. We have held a number of hearings and a
number of briefings. I was really pleased to see the final
product come out, although I think that there is probably some
detail that is missing.
Now, I know that you are going to issue fairly soon the
Bottom-Up Review, the BUR.
Secretary Napolitano. The BUR, yes.
Mr. Carney. Yes. I am very interested to know a number of
things. First of all, what is the date we are going to have
that?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, the BUR process is
well under way. Sometime between the end of March and the
beginning of April or the middle of April you should have the
BUR.
Mr. Carney. Okay. That is pushed a bit from what I was told
earlier, but make it closer to the end of March, please. When
will the Department start working on the next QHSR?
Secretary Napolitano. I have kind of been focused with
getting that BUR done. Let me get back to you on that.
Mr. Carney. Okay. When do you begin--when do you think you
are going to start requesting funds for the next QHSR, though?
Secretary Napolitano. I am not sure I understand the
question, Representative. You mean to do the QHSR?
Mr. Carney. If you do the next one, exactly, yes.
Secretary Napolitano. Okay. I apologize. I didn't
understand the question. I think it may be something that we
look at in the 2012 budget.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Going forward, will the QHSR and the BUR
be one document, then?
Secretary Napolitano. I think that is ideally yes, for
obvious reasons. But I think that in our desire and yours to
move the QHSR through and given that when I began as Secretary,
it really was not----
Mr. Carney. Ready for prime time.
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. Had not been moved
along, we wanted to move very, very rapidly and really
establish the vision for the Department, matched by the BUR,
which you will have very shortly. By the time we get to our
second QHSR, we should be through that kind of disconnect.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Good.
I want to switch gears here slightly. As you know, at
yesterday's budget hearing in the Senate Homeland Security
Committee, the Ranking Member stated that the inspector general
was unable to make comments on time to OMB regarding the OIG
budget request. The Ranking Member also stated that the IG told
her that the budget requested for the OIG would ``significantly
inhibit his ability to carry out the responsibilities of his
office.''
Like many other offices, the OIG's budget was flatlined.
For fiscal year 2011 you are requesting $129 million, and
according to the IG Reform Act, your budget request must
include comments from the IG's office about the resource needs,
and no such comments were furnished for the 2011 budget. Do you
know why that happened? Can you explain that?
Secretary Napolitano. Again, I can explain because the IG's
budget has been increased the last few years, it was flatlined
this year in light of the fiscal discipline that we were all
undertaking. As I understand it, the IG put the comments in the
Congressional justification, but again, you know, the IG is
kind of a semi-independent wing, and they don't go through us
in that regard.
Mr. Carney. Are they supposed to go through you in that
regard?
Secretary Napolitano. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Carney. Okay. I want to read you an e-mail that we
received this morning in my district office, and they forwarded
to me before I came on.
It said, ``Dear Congressman Carney, I am very happy to know
that you support the work of the Border Patrol in curtailing
illegal immigration. For this reason I feel compelled to write
you about a matter that my son recently spoke to my husband and
I about. My son is a Border Patrol agent stationed in Tucson,
Arizona. He has told us that funding for the Border Patrol has
been cut and as a result, vehicles and equipment are not being
maintained, overtime is being cut, and adequate manpower to
provide backup and cover the vast terrain is not available. As
parents, our concern for his safety while on the job is
paramount. As an agent who loves his job, however, my son's
concern is that areas are being left unpatrolled and will allow
free passage of drugs and illegals into the U.S.''
How can we respond to this person's mom? Is this true?
Secretary Napolitano. I would say, ``Dear Mom, your son is
highly misinformed.''
[Laughter.]
I know that Tucson sector like the back of my hand. I
worked that Tucson sector since 1993. We have increased every
possible resource there--manpower, equipment. We have built a
new Border Patrol station. It is a key area for us, because the
Arizona Sonora quarter is a lead quarter for illegal
immigration and drug trafficking. I would be happy to give you
some direct numbers just on the Tucson sector, but I would be
happy to write the mom myself, if you would like me to.
Mr. Carney. Well, I may take you up on that offer. Thanks.
[Laughter.]
But I am fairly familiar with the sector as well, and we
have some issues, of course, with P-28 and the fencing and
things like that, and we can address that perhaps in the next
round of questions.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, let us go to the subject of worksite
enforcement. Today in the United States there are 15 million
people who are out of work. They and their families are hurting
greatly, yet at the same time we have about 7 million people in
the country who are working here illegally. If we were to just
enforce the current immigration laws on the books, we might cut
unemployment in half.
When I think about the impact that could have on our
country if we did enforce laws and cut that unemployment rate
in half, you have the opportunity to be a National heroine by
enforcing the laws.
Let me give you some facts about what I perceive as a lack
of enforcement. In the area of administrative arrests are down
68 percent, criminal arrests down 60 percent, criminal
indictments down 58 percent, and criminal convictions down 63
percent. In all those categories--arrests, indictments,
convictions--they are all down 58 to 68 percent, all in 1 year.
That is quite a record.
My question is why don't we enforce immigration laws and
create more jobs for unemployed Americans?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Representative Smith, let me
just say that I believe that enforcement of our Nation's
immigration laws is not only important, but particularly when
we have an unemployment rate in the country the way we do, to
make sure that we have effective worksite enforcement. So let
me describe how we have gone about it.
Mr. Smith. Well, if you would answer my questions first
about why these statistics are down so much. The arrests, the
indictments, the convictions are all down.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed. So let me, if you might--let
me answer that directly. First of all, I-9 audits of companies
are up substantially--record numbers.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Secretary Napolitano. We can bring more----
Mr. Smith. Let me concede that. Audits are up, notices of
intent to fine. By the way, notice of intent. Even when they
are fined, the companies consider it just the cost of doing
business. If you want to reduce the number of illegal workers,
these statistics should have gone the opposite direction. Why
don't you let your ICE agents arrest more people, detain more
people, and free up those jobs for unemployed Americans?
Secretary Napolitano. Can I speak?
Mr. Smith. Please. I hope you will answer the question.
Secretary Napolitano. All right. Let me describe what we
are doing. We have substantially increased I-9 audits. More
employers are being subject to fines. We have more employers
than ever signed up on E-Verify to verify legal residency
before you even begin employment. We have record numbers of
criminal alien removals from this country, record numbers of
criminal alien arrests in this country, more than any other
year prior to this. We have had more I-9 audits this year----
Mr. Smith. Right. But we are talking about worksite
enforcement--worksite enforcement.
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. And worksite enforcement
is all part of that.
So I think if you spoke with members of the business
community, they would say, ``Get ICE off our backs, because
they are all over the place, making sure that we comply with
the immigration laws.'' We will continue to do that.
Mr. Smith. Well, I am not hearing that. I don't think many
of those criminal aliens were worksite enforcement cases. I am
talking about individuals who are working illegally in the
country, and if we were to enforce immigration laws, we could
free up those positions for a lot of unemployed Americans.
Let me go to US-VISIT. As you know, we have a budget this
year proposed by the administration that did not request a
single dollar for the US-VISIT exit side of the program. US-
VISIT was implemented. It was a bill that I introduced in 1996
that became law.
As you know better than I, 40 percent of all the people in
the country illegally are visa over-stayers. If you want to
know who they are, if you want to know whether they have left
this country or not, you have to have an exit system.
The administration does not have any money for that
biometric exit system. Why aren't they interested in reducing
the 40 percent number of the people who are in the country
illegally? You can't do it unless you know who they are.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I don't think--Representative,
your question presumes that there is no money for US-VISIT. The
fact of the matter is that----
Mr. Smith. No, I just asked you why there wasn't an
increase, if you are going to increase the money for US-EXIT.
Secretary Napolitano. Please, there is $50 million that it
has been unallocated that we are carrying forward for US-VISIT.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Let us hope you implement the program, if
you are serious about addressing that problem.
My last question is a follow-up to the Ranking Member's
question a while ago when he asked you what other cities were
being considered as locations to try the Gitmo detainees. You
responded by saying that DOJ was assessing it. But his
questioning was what other cities are being considered, not who
was assessing it. Let us stipulate that no decision has been
made as to which city, but surely you know what cities are
being considered. On behalf of the American people, I would
like to ask you what are those cities.
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I am not privy to
that information right now.
Mr. Smith. You do not know what cities are being
considered, and you are Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security?
Secretary Napolitano. Sir, I personally am not part of
those discussions.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madame Secretary. I want to talk--let us talk
technologies. Last October GAO submitted a report to us that
identified underlying weaknesses in TSA's decision-making with
respect to acquiring new screening technologies.
If we are going to assess intelligently your proposal that
TSA receive $700 million to purchase and deploy these new
technologies, it would be important, at least for me, to know
whether TSA plans to or has prepared risk assessments and cost
benefit analysis with performance measures to support the
decision to deploy these technologies.
Does the Science and Technology Directorate have--what role
does science play in these technologies?
Secretary Napolitano. Right. It is in two ways. First of
all, yes, we are using risk assessment. Yes, we are employing
performance metrics. As part of our efforts now, actually the
S&T Directorate of the Department has entered into MOUs with
two of the National labs to work on a screening technology and
how we continue to improve the airport and security screening
environment.
Mr. Cleaver. Let us move to the WBIs. I am in the process
of writing an op-ed piece for my hometown newspaper, and I have
struggled with this whole issue, as I am sure all of the
Members of this committee. But the administration has decided
that they are going to support this. We are talking about 100--
1,000, I guess, whole body imaging machines.
Secretary Napolitano. Scanners, right.
Mr. Cleaver. Scanners, equipment. There is always paranoia
by travelers, and I think that this, while it may maybe end
up--I may end up being one of the strongest supporters of it.
But is there any kind of way that we can convince the public
with factual information that the machines are not storing
images and that we won't see them on somebody's Facebook----
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
Mr. Cleaver [continuing]. Or on the internet or on the
Salahi's program?
[Laughter.]
Secretary Napolitano. First of all, the current iteration
of the technology doesn't really even show a face at all. It
really is designed to ascertain anomalies that can be further
looked at through secondary inspection. Second, the reader
isn't even where the person is, so there is no association
there.
Third, the image is not stored. That is part of the--how
can I say it--it is part of the contract, the technology,
everything else, that there is no storage of the image itself.
It is merely designed to ping upstairs to an examiner
downstairs if there is an anomaly that shows.
I have seen some of the newspaper pictures of the image.
They used a very old first-generation version of what actually
shows up. The technology now has really mitigated the privacy
concerns, so hopefully we can work with you, but also with the
committee, too, because I do think it is a very important
investment for the country to make, to satisfy people that this
is not designed to be anything other than an objectively better
way to protect people on aircraft.
Mr. Cleaver. My final question, and I agree with you, but,
you know, people are concerned nonetheless. Then we have a
religious group that is also concerned about it because of
their own religious beliefs, which I respect.
But I wonder if we reduce the paranoia, the skepticism, if
we have same-gender scanners like we do presently when we go
through the screening. I mean, you know, the men are going to
be dealt with by men, and women by women. So I am wondering can
we do that with screening? Or does that generate a cost factor
that causes it to be cost-prohibitive?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, a couple of things. One is,
remember, the person who is reading the screen is not down
there----
Mr. Cleaver. Yes, I understand that.
Secretary Napolitano. All right.
Mr. Cleaver. But what I am saying, Madame Secretary, I
mean, to somebody sitting at home, who flies three or four
times a year, and they are scared that, you know, that their
beauty will be seen, I mean, it seems to me we need to do
everything we can to create comfort.
Secretary Napolitano. Right. We are working through that
particular issue, but remember the passenger always has the
alternative of going through the standard way, the magnetometer
with the possibility of a patdown. They would have to do that
anyway, if they were trying to get on the plane. So that option
is retained.
What we have seen in the pilot projects in the airports
where the scanners have been deployed is that 98 percent of the
passengers prefer just to go through the scanner. So but again,
airports are retaining an optional avenue as well.
Mr. Cleaver. If the Members of our committee could go
through and then we come to have a committee hearing and see if
we could find that--see if we can figure out who is who. I
think if we can't figure out who is who, then I think it ought
to run. Makes it a good deal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, you said that securing the border is one
of the most important missions in the Department, and I have
several slides I would like to show.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Souder. The first slide, if you could put that up on
the screen, basically just states the fundamental problem we
have. We have 6,000 miles of border. The Border Patrol says we
have 936 under control, meaning we have 5,064 that isn't under
control. Basically, we have less than 15 percent under control.
This 15 percent safety standard--I mean, it is something I am
sure the car companies would like, and I am not sure why car
company safety standards should be different than our standards
on terrorism.
If we could put our second slide up--I believe that you
were provided with copies of those as well--this is extremely
troubling. Discuss the Border Patrol agents in a minute, but no
increase for CBP officers, a reduction in air and marine
interdiction pilots, no new hard fencing, no expansion of the
virtual fence, no additional detention bed space. It seems like
you are going backwards rather than forwards, even though we
are less than 15 percent.
Now, I heard you say and explain earlier. The minority has
not received any confirmation that you changed your budget.
Perhaps we should read the Washington Post more closely, but we
didn't receive any e-mails that at least that would mean if you
are reversing yourself on the cuts, that you have a freeze. But
when you only have less than 15 percent covered, it is not
clear why we would even be having a freeze.
I think the American people would say if we are going to
spend money, this is one of the places we want the money spent,
that you really can't control our borders State-by-State. If we
could go to the last slide, I think it is extremely telling
that the figures in this draft, which came--the line is hard to
see there----
Secretary Napolitano. I can't quite see it.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. Basically at--and I think you have
a copy--basically, after 2008 it stops. According to the Border
Patrol, once we received the hard fence and the electronic
fence, in 2010 there was nothing, in 2011 nothing to expand it,
and you have no future plans that show you intend to expand it,
no vision that is stated for how you are going to do it.
You are doing BEST teams, and that is good, and ICE teams,
and we have a few things in the air, but as far as functional
control of the border, which leads to contraband and people--
and contraband and people can be terrorists, it can be
narcotics, it can be illegal immigration, but it is basically
contraband and people, effective control, not just seeing them,
but effective control.
So is your testimony that this budget is sufficient and
will increase control of the borders and move us towards
control? Are you saying that having 4,300 miles not under
control is acceptable? Do you think that our border is still
vulnerable? Do you believe that terrorists will exploit this
weakness and smugglers such as what we have seen recently with
Somalia and how they came across? It was a bunch of Somalians,
and we can't find them.
Secretary Napolitano. Can you go back to slide No. 2?
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Secretary Napolitano. Let us each take one by, if I might
just go through, Representative. First of all, again, as I
explained, those positions are not being eliminated. The Border
Patrol will have the same, and sustain the same number on the
Southern border, and meet the Congressional mandate on the
Northern border. In terms of no increase in CBP officers, I
think that is related to No. 1.
Reduction for air and marine interdiction pilots. Really
what we are talking about there is some consolidation and some
elimination of one-time equipment purchases.
No new fencing and SBInet. Let me pause a moment there.
First of all, we will complete and virtually--virtually--have
completed what Congress appropriated the money for in terms of
tactical fence, SBInet. My understanding is--from this Congress
and from this committee--is you want to make sure that I spend
money smartly and efficiently.
SBInet, a contract and a concept that was entered into
years ago, has been plagued with troubles from Day 1. It has
never met a deadline. It hasn't met its operational capacities,
and it doesn't give us what we need to have. We will complete
the first phase of that, but I don't think it would be
responsible of me to come to this committee and say based on
the performance and the difficulties we have had standing up
the first phase, that we should do it all around the border.
The monies of the budget for technology that are border-
related are things like mobile imaging technology and the like,
which are more facile, which are easily maintained, which are
more operable by an actual Border Patrol agent. We want to re-
look at SBInet. We will share that with the committee. We
intend to do that, but the technology dollars that need to
match up with the boots on the ground may be better spent in
another fashion.
Mr. Souder. Ma'am, Secretary, that in your answer--and I
understand the SBInet is being used in the evening, the Border
Patrol is still going through the tests, and they are
relatively happy with the tests--you have outlined not a single
mile of additional control. You are basically saying, oh, well,
we are not cutting back. We are doing some consolidation, but
we are not cutting back.
Your vision was for partial tracking. Are you saying that
there will be additional miles under functional control
somewhere in this administration, since we have gone 2 years
without an additional mile being added?
What you are saying is you are finishing the Bush
proposals, which were 2 years old, but is there going to be
another mile done of this part that is it down? Are you saying
you are going to have functional control? Border Patrol says
there will be no additional miles of functional control. Do you
agree with that?
Secretary Napolitano. I don't know where that statement
came from, and I am not going to debate a statement I haven't
seen the source of or whatever, but let me tell you this. The
Southern border is important to us. It is important for any
number of reasons, as is the Northern border.
We keep expanding control. We have, for example, with the
funds of the Recovery Act, been able to add funding in
improvements and technology particularly at the Northern
border. A lot of that number you are talking to is really the
Northern border.
The Southern border, we are completing the tactical fence
you appropriated money for. The technology is going to be
there, the manpower. If you look at numbers--and if you want to
look at numbers, look at numbers in terms of illegal
immigrants, look at numbers of contraband seized--and you will
see that we are going----
Mr. Souder. I am sorry. Reclaiming my time, under----
Chairman Thompson. Excuse me, but you had----
Mr. Souder. Unemployment is not a way----
Chairman Thompson. Excuse me.
Mr. Souder. Unemployment rates are not a way to control
immigration.
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. Controlling immigration.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Secretary Napolitano. That is not correct.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady from Arizona. Mrs.
Kirkpatrick, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Madame Secretary, nice to have you here.
Thank you.
You know, I share your concern about SBInet, and I am glad
that you are reassessing the value of that. Does that signal a
lessening of commitment to use SBInet or any other kind of
technology along the border?
Secretary Napolitano. No. That is what I was trying to
clarify this with Representative Souder. Look, that is a big
investment. There is a lot of money. It is presumed to have
cell tower after cell tower after cell tower across some of the
most hostile aspects of the United States in terms of geography
and weather and the like.
It has been very difficult to deploy. It has been very
difficult to operate. We will finish the first phase, which is
actually the Arizona phase, but it has caused a lot of
frustration. Rather than be wasteful or unduly delay further
technology or other types of technology being used at the
border, we think it deserves and merits a fresh look.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you.
Now, I am going to switch direction here a little bit and
talk about your fifth mission, which is ensuring resilience to
disasters. We recently had a heavy winter storm in northern
Arizona, and about a week ago I visited with folks on the
Navajo Nation to talk with people--first responders--and we met
in an emergency command center that was set up in the community
to help folks through.
I wanted to hear from them first-hand what worked and what
didn't. It was very apparent that the grit and the guts of the
local people really pulled them through the disaster, and
thankfully, there were no casualties. But the concerns about
what didn't meet are in four areas.
The first one is communication. Communication just did not
work, did not work between the National Guard, FEMA, the local
first responders. It just fell apart in numerous ways. Maybe I
can get you more detail on that.
The second thing was that it is evident that there needs to
be more training in the rural areas regarding emergency relief
efforts. There was also a lack of collaboration between the
various units, so in other words it looked like FEMA didn't
know what the National Guard was doing. They didn't know what
local communities were doing, a real breakdown in
collaboration.
I will just give you one example. They were taking food out
eventually with our National Guard trucks to communities, but
they couldn't take hay for the livestock. So there was some
kind of regulation. They couldn't have hay and food on the same
truck. So that is just one example.
But the last thing about what was really interesting is
they brought up to me they think there needs to be training
regarding cultural sensitivity with the Federal agencies who
might be there responding, that there would seem to be a whole
lack of understanding of the local culture.
So is there any funding in this budget that you think could
be directed to address some of those needs?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, first of all, Representative,
what I would--first of all, I will take those suggestions back
to the director of FEMA and have them look at this situation
directly.
With respect to coordination with the National Guard, that
should be occurring, and there should be interoperability. I
have some familiarity with those individuals, so I don't know
what broke down, but there have been joint exercises, and
indeed, in responding to forest fires up in northern Arizona,
that that has happened almost without a hitch and very
smoothly.
So I think we need to troubleshoot this one in particular
and say, well, what happened here. That doesn't normally happen
during forest fire season in northern Arizona, where FEMA and
the National Guard work together hand-in-hand and have
interoperability and have things. For example, I know the
National Guard has the accessibility to patch trucks that can
be used to patch different types of radio systems with one
another. So we will have to troubleshoot this one in
particular.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. I will be happy to get you
more detailed information about that. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. I yield back my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Rogers, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here, Madame Secretary.
I hope that since the Christmas day bombing attempt, that
you have explained it to the attorney general that you are in a
very critical National security role and that from now on
before he decides to go off half-cocked, that he should consult
with you and your counterparts in the National intelligence
before making decisions. You don't have to answer that, but I
hope you have explained that to him and the President.
Secondly, right after that attempted attack, one of the co-
chairs of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, came out and
reminded us that it is time for the Congress and the
administration to use the political will to follow through on
the last major recommendation, which was consolidating
jurisdiction for homeland security in this committee.
It is going to be a tough political lift, but I hope you
will urge the Speaker and the Majority Leader in the Senate
that it is time to do it. You all having to come up here to 86
different committees and subcommittees is just absolutely
indefensible, and it is causing problems for the Department as
far as direction and goals and such.
To that end, I would like to offer for the record without
objection, Mr. Chairman, the two letters that we have sent to
the Secretary and the leader, Speaker Pelosi, urging that
consolidation.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
I want to talk to you about the budget. All in all, I am
pretty pleased. I want to thank you, CDP, Center for Domestic
Preparedness. You have adequately funded them and put some
money for maintenance in that was critically needed at that
facility and the Noble Hospital training facility there where
we train health care professionals to be prepared to respond
after a natural major disaster.
But one thing that I am concerned about was the
elimination, or what appears to be the elimination, of a chief
veterinary officer. Dr. McGinn has been sent out to North
Carolina, and I understand that position is not going to be
filled. They are just going to consolidate that with the
Director of Food Veterinarian Animal Defense.
The chief veterinary role is a very critical role. We need
to make sure that we are protecting our food safety and
preparing for ag terrorism. I am going to introduce a bill. I
talked yesterday to Dr. Garza, who assures me that position,
the role is going to continue to be fleshed out under that new
directorate.
I am going to introduce a bill, which has got broad
bipartisan support in the committee, to ensure that that
position continues to exist. He can call it director of food
veterinarian animals if he wants to and chief veterinary
officer, but we want to make sure that somebody has those
responsibilities going forward to make sure we are protected
against those threats.
Then the thing I want to talk to you most about, though, is
I want to applaud you. I have been for years advocating higher
use of canine assets for people screening. Your predecessors
have given it lip service, and you have put some real money in
there. You are to be commended for the $71 million you put into
the budget to expand the Lackland facility.
What I would urge you to do--I had your TSA officials come
in and brief me earlier this week about our capacity, what we
are going to be able to accomplish with this--this program, and
I am not going to go into detail here. I do want the Members to
get a briefing like I did, though, later about the coverage we
are going to have.
My request to you is that while you are doing this--this is
going to give us 275 additional teams a year out there--we need
to plus that up. I would urge you that while you are doing it
to do it right. Instead of making it $71 million, make it $100
million. Have a second location so we can get about 600 dogs a
year--teams a year out into the field.
That would get us in 5 or 6 years to where we have more
complete coverage of the 430 airports that we got to be
concerned about. At the level we are at now, it would be 10 or
12 years, and that is not acceptable. So I would urge you to
consider going into the line item that you have $360 million
for new equipment, scanning equipment. Pull that $30 million
off of that and add it to that canine item.
I think that would be a good, robust level for us to be
able to get to comprehensive coverage of these airports in a
reasonable amount of time. I will be happy to talk more with
you and your folks about that. There is just no way we can do
it just at Lackland is my point. We got to have at least a
second facility that is doing that.
But again, you are to be applauded. You put some muscle
behind what you said you were going to do after the Christmas
day bombing, and I appreciate that.
Last, the ICE budget. I am a little concerned that I didn't
see more money in there for ICE agents. We really have a
shortage of ICE agents, and there are only 52 positions that
are being added. Can you tell me why?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think the budget, I think,
adequately meets ICE's enforcement responsibilities. As I
suggested earlier, one of the things that we are increasing in
the budget is Secure Communities, which really is a force
multiplier. Where we have Secure Communities, we identify
criminal aliens and can do more deporting and removals more
effectively than ever before.
So I think while the number of agents is only up to 52, if
you look at that in conjunction with Secure Communities, you
see how we are using that as a force multiplier.
Mr. Rogers. This last one, going back to the canines, do
you think that it is reasonable to look at plussing that up by
$30 million to get a second location?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, as my staff will tell
you, I am a big believer in dogs and what dogs can do. So it is
a resource split and allocation issue, but my mind is very open
and I--dogs used properly with the properly trained handler can
really help improve safety.
Mr. Rogers. Well, the thing that I have told the other
Members, we are talking about a new technology, this vapor
weight technology, where the dog doesn't have to sniff the
person. You just walk by them. That would be very helpful at
our airports where people who, before they go through technical
screening, can just walk by these canines. The Christmas day
bomber would not have gotten on that plane if we had it.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey
for 5 minutes, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Where do we start here? First of all, I would like to
associate myself with the comments of the Ranking Member
concerning the categorical assistance to cities and regional
areas, areas around those cities which were expanded, if you
remember, 5 years ago. I think that is, hopefully, not just an
oversight here. I think it is critical to defending America.
Second, you testified last year after you raised your hand
that you were going to take a specific look at the bureaucracy
that you heard my good friend from Alabama talk about. I asked
you the questions then. You assured the committee that you are
going to address the issue of bureaucracy, because when you
have bureaucracy, you have less accountability.
You saw that in the December 25 episode where who pushed
Jake was the main question. We realize that DHS is the consumer
of intelligence and is not the vehicle. The fact of the matter
is, though, that we don't know who to hold accountable, because
this bureaucracy is growing and becoming worse--worse.
Tell me one instance that you have recommended to us in 1
year where you wanted us to be of assistance to you--and we
thank you for your service to your country; we want to be
helpful--I can't recall it, but that doesn't mean it hasn't
happened. Give me one instance.
Secretary Napolitano. I am not sure I----
Mr. Pascrell. Give me one instance where you recommended to
this committee that we assist you in breaking through the
bureaucracy of the Department that you head?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I don't know exactly where your
question is headed, but I will tell you----
Mr. Pascrell. You don't know where exactly--I mean, I can't
be more direct than that, Madame Secretary.
Secretary Napolitano. Well----
Mr. Pascrell. We want to be helpful. We are not asking the
questions and we are not making the comments here because we
want to give you more work. We want to give you less work. You
just testified this morning before Appropriations Committee. If
you want to continue to go crazy, continue. If you want to be
going to 86 committee meetings, continue.
You were asked a year ago. We wanted to be helpful. You
ignored us, because I haven't seen any recommendations on your
part. Now tell me where I am wrong, and I will apologize.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think you are wrong in a
number of ways, but----
Mr. Pascrell. Where am I wrong, Madame Secretary?
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. I don't think--I also--
well, let me finish my answer.
Mr. Pascrell. Sure.
Secretary Napolitano. I believe that the Department and
this committee need to have more, not less, communication. We
are endeavoring to do that both on the Democratic side and on
the Republican side. We have endeavored to provide you every
bit of information that you have asked for.
We have asked the Congress for the ability to get some
administrative resources, which are called bureaucracy but are
in essence the ability to have the infrastructure necessary to
run what is now the third largest department of the Government.
I would love to talk about that with you.
Mr. Pascrell. We have had a year. I am not incorrect. The
Department is incorrect. This committee stands to be helpful to
you, and it has not been given that opportunity.
The second issue. I appreciate the difficulty of your job--
anybody who sits in that position--and I think you appreciate
it, too. You have to create a budget that meets all the needs
of the Nation, this Nation, greatest nation in the world,
during this economic crisis, while at the same time you are
working our way out of this deficit hole.
We understand that. We deal with this every day and with
every department. I am satisfied with the budget, especially
the necessary increase in funding to boost aviation security.
You went into that, I believe, in your testimony.
However, I am greatly dismayed and indeed disturbed that
for the second year in a row this administration has decided to
cut critical Fire Grants program that provides equipment and
training to our firefighters. This year he has decided to cut
the SAFER program as well, which helps maintain staffing levels
in our Nation's firehouses.
Overall, these two programs have been cut by $200 million,
which is 25 percent less than we passed in fiscal year 2010. At
a time when we are still fighting our way out of that deep
recession, those towns can't afford to do it on their own, and
municipalities are being forced to slash public safety budgets
every day.
This is exactly the wrong time to cut vital grants
programs. They are necessary. They were necessary before 9/11--
before 9/11 is when we started the program--and they are
necessary today. In fact, there is $3 billion to $4 billion of
applications in those programs every year.
Second, I was extremely surprised to see that the budget
called for four stand-alone grant programs to just be folded
into the large State Homeland Security Grant Program. Look, I
know the game. I was the mayor of a city once. It is a very
interesting way to hide what you really want to do.
This includes the interoperable emergency communications. I
guess there is no word that has been used more in this
committee since 2001 than the word ``interoperable.'' But they
are gone. We worked to create in the 109th Congress in order to
support our first responders. This looks like a way to do a
backdoor cut of these programs. There will be no way to compare
it, if you fold that into the larger program.
I think that this is a wrong way to go. I understand it is
a great way to hide would you really want to do. I assume that
that is not what you want to do. What in God's name do you want
to do?
If I may ask that, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, listening to mayors and
Governors, one of the things they asked of me last year was to
reduce the amount of grant applications and grant reports that
they had to do. They wanted more flexibility. They wanted the
ability to use grant funding for things like sustaining and
maintaining equipment as compared to having to buy new
equipment all the time in order to achieve grant funding. The
proposal this year was designed to meet those requests.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, let me tell you something. That is not
acceptable. The mayors of this country feel that the program of
the Fire Act and the SAFER Act are the best-run bureaucratic
programs in the Federal Government, because there isn't any
bureaucracy.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from New Jersey has
expired.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, I have to respond to answers that don't
really go to the question.
Chairman Thompson. Well----
Mr. Pascrell. We are in the same place we were a year ago.
Chairman Thompson. I think you have made your point, Mr.
Pascrell.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, welcome. Last week a small aircraft
slammed into a Federal building in my district, reminding us
that we are still vulnerable. The devastation from what was a
very small plane was really highly destructive. I walked away
thinking how could such a small plane almost bring down an
entire Federal building?
It is a threat. I want to also commend the first
responders, because the loss of life could have been so much
more severe than it actually was. My thoughts and prayers go
out to the family of the one Federal employee who was injured
and killed.
I would just recommend, though, also as you look at--and
you mentioned General Aviation and I would recommend you
continue to work closely with them as you look at rulemaking. I
think, as I have met with them after this tragedy, I think they
have some very, very good ideas where we can work with
industry, not against industry, in making this situation and
helping the American people be safer.
Another incident, ironically, just north of my district not
too long ago--Fort Hood. I went to the memorial service. I
talked to the commander, General Cone. We found out since then
the Joint Terrorism Task Force had information about this
individual, that he had been contacting an al-Qaeda operative
in Yemen, a DOD representative on the JTTF, and yet that
information was not shared with the base.
I asked General Cone, ``Would you like to have had that
information?'' You had a major at your base, you know, who was
in contact with the top al-Qaeda leader, and yet they didn't
know about that. I find that to be really inexcusable. His
question to me was, ``How many more Hasans are out there?''
It is a DOD issue. It is a JTTF issue, but it is also, when
you talk about military bases in the United States, it is a
homeland security issue as well. I know you are smart enough to
recognize that.
I do have a few budget questions, but I want to ask you on
that, because we know al-Qaeda has targeted military
installations. Fort Dix is another good example. What are you
doing to ensure that the information-sharing process is
improved so we can prevent, in this case, 14 individuals from
being killed in the future?
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed, without going into the Fort
Hood situation specifically, but one of the things we have
really been working on this past year is the amount of sharing
of intelligence with State and local law enforcement about
threats and threat streams that are within their jurisdictions
so that they can be watching out for them.
Our first responders, in particular 800,000 or so police
officers, are a force multiplier way beyond whatever Federal
presence that we have. We have greatly bolstered the fusion
centers, and I think you will see a lot of activity in that
regard over this next year really strengthening the standards
there.
What really qualifies as a fusion center? What that is
designed to do, Representative, is have in one place State,
local, and Federal not only trained officers, but databases and
analysts. It is not just sharing data that is important. It is
the analysis that is important.
Mr. McCaul. I agree. It is also acting on information
coming in, because there was information on Fort Hood. There
was information on the Christmas bomber case. There were flags
being raised. There were dots not only not being connected, but
dots not being acted upon that I think, had they been acted
upon, we could have avoided the Fort Hood tragedy and also
could have revoked the visa of the Christmas bomber.
I know this is a budget hearing, so I want to ask you a
couple of questions. I would first like to--as Mr. Cuellar
mentioned, I really commend you for your efforts working with
Mexico that is so important with the violence in Juarez, as you
mentioned, is probably one of the most violent cities in the
world. Mexico has suffered more killings than the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars combined.
Three programs that I saw--one, the Operation Stone
Garden--I mean, you were in Arizona. It has been a very
successful program, and yet it is being cut from $60 million to
$50 million.
Second, that 287(g) program, which has also been very
successful, is just maintained at the current level. Then
finally, the ICE Detention and Removal Office, when I talk to
ICE officials particularly in the Houston area, they tell me
they don't have the resources they need to carry out their
mission. That is just coming from your people on the ground.
So if you could explain to me those three budgetary items,
because I think they would go a long way in helping us better
secure this border.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, No. 1 was--which was No. 1?
Mr. McCaul. Operation Stone Garden.
Secretary Napolitano. Stone Garden. What happened last year
was there was some extra money that we redeployed to Stone
Garden. $50 million is what we have had. That is a pretty
consistent budget request.
What we have done, however, is basically steer all of that
money to the Southwest border, whereas previously it could be
shared, and part of it was used on the Northern border. You
might imagine yesterday I heard from some Northern border
representatives that weren't happy about that decision. But my
decision was that that is where the money is best used right
now.
Mr. McCaul. I agree.
Secretary Napolitano. With respect to 287(g), the strategy
we are using as we are continuing to assign 287(g)s that we are
really plussing up Secured Communities. They are more effective
in terms of actual yielding criminal aliens that have entered
the United States, so we think that is a better strategy.
In terms of beds, detention and removal beds in the Houston
area, Representative, that is one we will get back to you
specifically on. The bed request, the head request is based on
our National estimate about what we need. Maybe there needs to
be adjustment within that National number.
Mr. McCaul. Because finally, as you mentioned, you said
when you were attorney general that the Federal Government
needs to pay its bills when it comes to the burden on State and
locals. My home State of Texas has a tremendous burden in that
regard.
I thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey--
New Mexico, Mr. Lujan?
[Laughter.]
I was trying to give him some more time.
Mr. Lujan. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I hope my
friend from New Jersey doesn't get any--just yet, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, thank you for being here as well. I want
to tell you how much I appreciate the fact that DHS and DOE are
working closely with one another now. After the failed attempt
on Christmas day, we did very clearly hear the directive from
the President, asking for DHS and DOE specifically in NSA
facilities to collaborate to try to solve some of these real
problems. I want to thank you for not wasting any time on doing
that.
A few things that I want to bring up, and some of the
testimony that we heard from Dr. Albright in our Science and
Tech Committee, who is from Lawrence Livermore, highlighted the
importance of the President's directive, but went on to say
this:
That explosives have long presented the most prevalent
threat to transportation security, to critical facilities and
to individuals. Current events show that explosives continue to
be the weapon of choice for terrorists worldwide. The threat is
evolving, and increased access worldwide to the internet has
provided the terrorists with information to manufacture
homemade explosives using readily available chemicals.
Explosives are very difficult to detect in some cases. Only
trace evidence is available for sampling, and bulk quantities
of explosive matter must be detected in the presence of other
potentially confusing or benign materials. TSA officers only
have a short time to detect explosives and assess the
situation, if they are to maintain the flow of people and
goods.
Continuous and concentrated research and development is
fundamental to understanding the threat and creating the tools
that will give our Nation the capability it needs to decrease
our vulnerability. We now know that there is progress being
made in bringing technologies forward that will strengthen our
capabilities and give our TSA agents the tools they need to
preventing materials from moving forward.
The one concern that I have, Madame Secretary, is the
commitment to the investment--substantial investment, up near
$700 million, if I have my numbers correct, with other
detectors to--really around metals.
I wanted to hear from you how we are going to move forward
so that we are able to bring these technologies forward, also
deploy and get your ideas on if you feel that it is important
that rather than a short-term relationship with the NSA DOE
facilities with Homeland Security, if that should turn into a
long-term relationship to make sure that we are working closer
in that regard, and also your thoughts on taking a whole system
systematic approach in trying to understand the threat that we
are going to see as opposed to reacting to what we know that
just happened.
Secretary Napolitano. Let me address the last first. We
need to react to things that happen--it would be foolish not
to--and to adjust in light of what we have already seen. But at
the same time we need to be thinking ahead. So there is a
reaction and a pro-action that need to be happening
simultaneously.
One of the ways this can occur is with greater use of
science and technology. That is why the President has directed
that we really tighten up the relationship with our National
labs so that their research is really designed, or at least
partly designed, to help us operationally to think through what
the next iteration of threat, the materiel used, et cetera.
So I hope that this relationship, which was really
catalyzed by the December 25 attempt, becomes part and parcel
of our National homeland security framework and that we use
that brain capacity we have in those National labs to greater
effect for homeland security purposes.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Chairman, this is just one area that I hope
that we can work on together with yourself, with Ranking
Member, and with all Members of the committee, because when we
look specifically at these relationships and what some of the
brightest minds--scientists, physicists--have to offer not only
with their capabilities with tech transfer and
commercialization, what that means to creating jobs, but also
looking at problems like this, where we have threats like this
every day.
They really wanted to highlight that, Mr. Chairman, as we
begin to look at this in a different way and think outside of
the box, where we can bring together the brightest minds that
we have that we have made investments in. The modeling
capabilities, the simulation capabilities that lead to
technologies that are going to make a difference and save
people's lives is somewhere that I hope that we turn.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Madame Secretary, I sent a letter to you on January 21
regarding the visa security program. When can I expect a
response?
Secretary Napolitano. Hopefully, very soon. We are trying
to, and greatly by and large are moved to the point where we
can respond to every Congressional inquiry within a month.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. I have a couple of questions
regarding that issue.
How many visa issuing posts are there overseas currently?
Secretary Napolitano. For the State Department?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, State Department.
Secretary Napolitano. I don't know the overall number.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. How many of these locations--can you
tell me how many locations have visa security units currently?
Secretary Napolitano. I am going to ask. A small
percentage.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Well, I think it is about 14, from my
estimations. How many have been identified as high-risk
locations?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, we just added two--I know of
that--the past week. I don't know--a number.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Okay, so my understanding is that
there are 40 high-risk locations, and the State Department has
220 locations and that we have units in 14 locations.
So the next question is on the current pace, how long would
it take to establish visa security units in locations the
Department has identified as high-risk? If you can't answer
that question, I would like to get a response as soon as
possible.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, that is reasonable.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Do you believe that it is--you know,
we want to make sure we beef up this program. An example of
this was the Christmas bomber. I think that could have been
prevented. So, you know, and I understand that the budget
recommendation is flat for this year, and that is unacceptable
to me. So if you could respond to me as quick as possible, I
would really appreciate it.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Representative. Part of that is
this is not just the Department of Homeland Security's
decision. This is really the Department of State where the
Department of Homeland Security will be allowed into an embassy
facility to work there. So that is something that we are having
to work through at the interagency level.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, that is what I am concerned about is
that there may be some resistance from the Department of State
in establishing these units. If so, I would like to know which
locations, where the resistance lies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, I apologize to you, but the intelligence
authorization bill is on the House floor this afternoon, and
that is why I was absent for much of this conversation. I did,
however, hear your testimony.
As you set out the five priorities for your agency, the
first one was counterterrorism. I want to applaud that and
recognize and, I think, agree with you that the Homeland
Security Department exists to protect the homeland, and there
is a large terrorist threat.
I have a question about that and one other. I want to put
them to you at the same time so that I observe my time limit.
On the subject of terrorism, I think probably, besides the
technological corrections that we have already made since the
Christmas bomber problem, the other problem was the absence of
sustained leadership focusing specifically on what could happen
both to aircraft and other things, but certainly, sustained
leadership at the top.
So one question I have is what are you personally doing,
given your busy, hugely busy life and professional obligations,
to sustain your leadership on the terror threat?
My second question is to pick up on some of the questions,
some of the issues Mr. Bilirakis was posing on visas. It is my
understanding that since the 1990s there has been a requirement
for a capable exit visa system. It is good to know and to have
a secure visa entry program, and we are doing better at that, I
believe, but we still have not implemented our visa exit
program up to any reasonable, by my lights, standards.
I was a member of the Congressional commission on terrorism
that existed between 1999 and 2000. We predicted a major terror
attack on the United States. Sadly, we were right. But one of
the gaps we found in U.S. security was a capable exit visa
system. If people can come here legally and then get lost here,
that is an enormous vulnerability.
So my two questions are what sustained leadership are you
personally giving to the terror, the huge terror threat against
us, and two, what can we do to expedite an effective and fully
developed exit visa system?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. I
think two things. One is that you are right. Sustained
leadership is important here. It takes a number of forms. One
is making sure that we have a clear vision for the Department.
That is reflected in the QHSR, which we really went from 0 to
60 on this year.
The second is to make sure that we have a better
integration of our intel analysis within the Department, with
other intelligence assets around the Beltway, and that we are
doing a better job of connecting our intel analysis with
information threat streams so that can be used by State and
local law enforcement, so very important around the country. I
think we have made great progress in that regard this year. We
are going to be continuing to push that issue.
The third is really focusing on the sustained effort, and I
think somewhat creatively, quite frankly--areas like aviation,
where we have instituted an international aviation initiative,
where we have entered into MOAs with the National labs that
didn't exist before.
So those are the kinds of things that we are working on in
all the iteration of the Department. But they all blend
together under the guise of guarding against terrorism and
ensuring the security of the United States.
With respect to exit and exit visas, we do have--as someone
noted before, we have not requested new money there. We have
$50 million we are going to pull forward into this year for
U.S. exit. That will be for the air environment.
The big problem, and one that I have asked the scientists
and others to look at it: How do we handle the fact that the
United States has such a huge land border with so many land
ports of entry and so many lanes? That is under the current
iteration of technologies a huge, huge budget number. It was
not one I was prepared to bring forward to the committee this
year.
Ms. Harman. Well, I thank you. I just in 12 seconds urge
you personally to keep asking about what your Department is
doing on a daily basis, or frequent basis, to focus on the
terror threat so that it is clear from the top how urgent that
is.
On the U.S. exit program, I think we are going to have to
step up and write the checks, because I think it is
unacceptable to have the ability for people to come here and
then get lost in our country and possibly cause harm against
us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Broun, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, I am very pleased to see you in
attendance today. I hope that you will agree with me that it is
critical for the Secretary of any Federal agency to be present
at important oversight hearings. I hope that we can be assured
that in the future you will be personally present at all these
extremely important oversight hearings. I hope you assure us of
that.
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I think improving
communication and being available to the committee is a very
important part of my responsibilities.
Mr. Broun. I certainly hope so, and I trust that you will
be.
I was also extremely pleased to see that just recently you
admitted that the Fort Hood massacre was a terrorist attack. I
think that admission is long overdue, and I am pleased to see
you finally go ahead and make that admission.
Madame Secretary, I have serious concerns about regarding
how your Department plans to use its resources, and I would
like some clarification on some issues that I feel that the
American people deserve to hear from you for the recent actions
of the Christmas day bomber and the open intelligence opinions
that al-Qaeda will most likely attempt to attack our homeland
within the next 6 months.
It is more apparent now than ever that our enemies will
stop at nothing to attack us. We must work even harder to stop
them. As I have said before in here in this committee, the
Marine Corps teaches that you must know your enemy to defeat
them.
Many brave Americans work hard to pinpoint and identify
those who wish us harm. It is foolish for this or other Federal
agencies tasked with protecting our homeland and our country to
ignore the hard work and waste of our resources.
What I would like to see from this Department is greater
effectiveness at collecting and sharing vital information on
those who are most likely to attack us, whether that
information comes from our intelligence agencies or our global
partners who serve as our first line of defense. Closing these
gaps in our human intelligence and informational networks is
absolutely essential.
One way for us to focus our attention on those people in
those countries that we know will try to attack us. Time wasted
screening a grandmother in her mid-80s or a 10-year-old on
vacation with his family could better be used in screening
individuals who are coming from somewhere who are more likely
to produce known enemies to our country and who want to harm us
and destroy this Nation and everything that we are founded
upon.
You stated in your testimony that you and this
administration are determined to find and fix our security
vulnerabilities, and I really trust that that is so. I look
forward to you going on to do so.
Do you believe, Madame Secretary, what I have suggested
could prove more effective than our current methods?
Secretary Napolitano. In what respect, sir?
Mr. Broun. In focusing upon the countries and the
individuals and groups of individuals who are most likely to be
those individuals who want to do us harm?
Secretary Napolitano. Doing things on a risk-based or
intel-based way, obviously, is something that we endeavor to do
across the Federal Government. When you are talking about the
travel environment, I think it is important to add to that a
certain amount of unpredictable randomness, which disables a
terrorist from being able to predict with certainty whether
they will be subject to secondary screening or the like.
So it is intel-based, but it is also the greater
utilization of algorithms of randomness, if I can use that
phrase, to add onto that to defeat predictability.
Mr. Broun. Well, I certainly agree with that. There is no
such thing as 100 percent safety, 100 percent certainty, but I
think, particularly with limited resources, that it is very
important to focus upon those nations and those people groups
who we know want to do us harm. There may be other individuals,
other people groups, and maybe even homegrown terrorists that
we have got to focus upon, but we do know without a question
that there are those.
I encourage you. I hope that you will utilize your very
limited resources, because we and the Federal Government are
out of money. We don't have the money. We are stealing our
grandchildren's future by creating huge amounts of debt.
But homeland security is one of the--and National security
is the primary focus of the Constitution for the Federal
Government. So focusing upon those individuals, those
countries, those groups of people that we know the greatest
preponderance of individuals who want to do us harm come from
those areas, I hope that you will really focus upon them with
random screening and other things. I understand the problems
that you face, but I just encourage you to consider that.
Are there other an additional methods that could be
deployed in defense of our homeland that would close those gaps
and vulnerabilities?
Secretary Napolitano. Let me ask you to say that again,
please?
Mr. Broun. Are there other additional methods, besides
focusing on those things that we have already talked about,
that could be deployed in defense of our homeland and that
would close those gaps and vulnerabilities?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think several. One, as I
already mentioned, you have got to add a random aspect to all
of this. In other words we are not doing the same thing at
every airport across the country. Why? Because we don't want
there to be predictability.
I think there is a huge untapped role for science and
technology here that we should pursue, and I already mentioned
with Representative Lujan working with, in particular, the
National labs. I think there we can do more.
Then third, making sure that across the global environment
we have increased information collection and sharing to the
maximum extent that we can. Working with our allies and others,
I think, really helps provide us with a greater security
network.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
I appreciate the extra time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from Alabama.
Mr. Rogers. Just I wanted to inquire, do you expect to have
a second round of questions or----
Chairman Thompson. We will probably finish just about the
time for votes. We had thought we could do it, but it looks
like, because I have been generous with my time on the
questions, we might not be able to do it.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, it is great to have you here and really
providing us with some insight into this year's budget.
I just wanted to sort of add my voice to that of Ranking
Member King with regard to the Securing the Cities grant. I
understand the dilemma of the funding, which we tend to always
in some fashion come up with, whether it is through
appropriations.
But when you talk about looking at some of the work that
the labs have done, there are also other ways of looking at how
we can address the threat of radiological, biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons, and I hope that we will get some
finding from the Securing the Cities model that could hopefully
be something that can be helpful for the rest of the Nation.
We are all very used to the explosive--unfortunately,
become used to the explosive event that we witnessed in 1993 in
New York and again in 2000. But there are other very, just as
meaningful threats to us that we are not conscious of, and it
is, I think, tools that we develop along the way in
anticipation of someone utilizing one of these types of
weaponry that will bode well for the Department and for our
Nation, so I hope you will give that your highest
consideration.
I also wanted to just let you know how pleased I am that
the budget acknowledges the on-going real possibility of a
cyber attack. This budget requests $379 million for a National
Cyber Security Division and $10 million for the National
Security Cyber Center. I know that you touch on this in your
testimony, but can you elaborate a little bit more on how this
funding would be used to buttress your cybersecurity
capability?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, it is a number of ways, and
perhaps one of the things to suggest to this committee is a
classified briefing on all of the efforts on cyber at a certain
point in time.
But it is deployment of prevention and detection
technology. It is working to secure the .gov domains. It is
working with the private sector on the .org and .com domains.
We have opened up this year the NCIC, which is a consolidated
cybersecurity facility in Virginia, which has allowed us to do
some things we could not before.
But I will share with you, Congresswoman, one of our
greatest challenges--if this committee would ask me what are
some of the greatest challenges, I would say one of them is
getting enough cyber experts into Federal service to really
work on the civilian side of cybersecurity.
We have direct hiring authority, but I think, as we can all
appreciate, the length of time it takes to on-board a Federal
employee takes too long, and for those youngsters that are
young scientists who really know the cyber world, they get
impatient. So that is something that we are really going to
have to work together on.
Ms. Clarke. I look forward to that, Madame Secretary. You
are absolutely correct. I think that we have to come up to
speed, those of us who are of a certain age, about the
realities of the technology around us and the young people, who
are very agile with it, and their attention span.
I think that it will bode us well if we can demonstrate how
important it is to get young people with that expertise, that
talent, and maybe not-so-young people, but people who are
seasoned enough in the technology used, on-board with us before
the private sector snatches them out.
Another area that I am concerned about and wanted to just
raise with you is the area of ASP. We have supported pursuit of
the laudable goal of improving detection performance, but have
been concerned with the performance of the system, as well as
some of the testing over the years. Can you give me a sense of
the analysis that you and DNDO did to determine the ASP? If you
can't finish right now, can you get us something in writing?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, and indeed we actually took some
action within the last week. So we will get back to you on
that.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan,
Mrs. Miller.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, we are delighted to have you here today and
appreciate your testimony.
One of the issues that--really, a principal advocacy for me
is Northern border security, as you know. You and I have had
some conversations about that. You have been very gracious with
your time, as has your Deputy Lute. She has been great as well.
But I just say that because, coming from Michigan, Northern
border, it is so important to my reason, and I have been fully
appreciative of what is going on in the Southern border and the
measures that have been necessary to address the drug cartels
coming across the border, et cetera, et cetera.
But I have to go back--circle around here a bit to the
Stone Garden grant and make my pitch for that. Our area, just
my immediate region, since everyone's being somewhat parochial
talking about their region, we have the Ambassador Bridge,
which is the busiest commercial artery in the Northern tier of
our Nation. We have the Windsor Tunnel under that.
We have the Bluewater Bridge, which is the second-busiest
commercial artery on the Northern tier and the only one that
you can transit hazardous materials there. We have the CN rail
tunnel, which is the largest rail entry incarnation, there.
Immediately across the St. Clair River in Sarnia, we have
the largest concentration of petrochemical plants, I think, in
the hemisphere, maybe next to New Jersey, but it is enormous,
along with the Great Lakes--a number of unique dynamics is what
I am saying.
One of my counties was able to get a Stone Garden grant
several years ago. Now, of course, with the experience, Stone
Garden at the Southern border got 59 percent in 2008. In 2009
it was 84 percent. In 2010 it is 100 percent. Now, according to
the budget here, they are not even eligible. Northern border
can't even apply for these.
I am appreciative, as I say, you have to ship the resources
where you think are necessary. But to go to zero seems rather
extreme to me, and we need some resources as well. What do you
think?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I appreciate that, and I have
heard that from others. I will say that Stone Garden shouldn't
be looked at in isolation from other grant monies that have
been available and made available up in the Northern region.
The bulk of the ARA money that was appropriated for ports
went to the Northern border ports and technology at the ports
and improvement at those ports, which go to some of the
structures that you alluded to. So in a tough budget year with
some decisions to be made, that is where we were. But I think
that that is something that will continue to be worked on
throughout the process.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that, and I hope you do revisit
that, because it really is a policy question. One thing with a
Stone Garden grant, it is a force--and I am appreciative of
what you are saying to go to the infrastructure of the grants
for that, but Stone Garden really has been a force multiplier
for the locals, which has really been such a fantastic assist
to whether it is the Coast Guard or the CBP or what have you.
So that is my pitch on the Stone Garden.
In regards to the SBInet, and there has been a lot of talk
about this today, and I am not sure what all has happened on
the Southern border with the SBInet, but, you know, on the
Northern border sometimes maybe we even do things--I won't say
better, but different.
Secretary Napolitano. Right.
Mrs. Miller. We actually have the SBInet, as you know, in
my district, where you are standing up currently. There are 11
towers that are being constructed. We actually had an ice jam
in my area, and I took an air boat out to see the last tower
being constructed on Sunday afternoon, and our experience, I
think, with SBInet is we are looking forward to this.
We haven't had much problems, and I think it is going to be
completely turned over to the CBP in March. So we are looking
forward to a good experience there--just my pitch on that.
Since I have limited amount of time, there has been a lot
of talk about the Christmas day bomber. As the representative
from Michigan, where this airplane was coming down, you might
imagine it has been on the front page. It has never fallen off
the front page of our newspapers.
Everybody is totally engaged in the debate about whether or
not the Christmas day bomber should have gotten court-
appointed, taxpayer-funded attorneys--not one, but three in
this case. I do know there is money put in here for the KSM,
perhaps, trial in New York or wherever it is going to go.
I don't think there is any money that has been budgeted for
the Christmas day bomber, who has already been arraigned in the
Federal building in downtown Detroit. I guess I am just looking
for a little guidance on that. What does that mean there?
You cannot imagine how bad the economy is in Michigan and
in Detroit and with the resources that we are now faced with on
something that we are not too happy about to begin with, but
just from a budgetary standpoint. Do you have any comment on
that, Secretary?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I was just with
Governor Granholm and know that the situation in Michigan is so
serious. I think the actual budget request was not for KSM-
specific. It was for terrorism-related trials. Right now
sitting here with you, I don't know how that is to be
apportioned or utilized, but there was a recognition by the
administration that there would be terrorism-related trials in
the United States in 2011, and they require additional
security----
Mrs. Miller. Well, even in 2010 that is happening, so
perhaps you could get back to me on if you find out any
information about any budgetary relief for Michigan for the
Detroit area for that.
Since you have been good with your time, I will just very
quickly also say the Air and Marine Wing of the Great Lakes
Northern Border Wing that is being set up at Selfridge Air
National Guard Base in my district currently as we speak as
well, we are looking forward to a UAV mission this year. I know
you have spoken about that.
We are never going to put SBInet all the way around the
Northern or Southern border or a fence, nor do we want to. But
I do think that this is a critical component of utilizing off-
the-shelf hardware that has been so effective in theater and
utilizing with CBP. We are looking forward to that mission as
well.
Secretary Napolitano. Very good.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms.
Titus, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, nice to see you again. Before I ask my
question, I would just make two comments. I would like to also
have the record show that I share the concerns of the gentleman
from New Jersey about cutting the Fire Grants, because Nevada
is in special session right now, looking at ways to cut, as
other cities in Nevada. We really need that money.
Second, if I could just go back to Mr. Broun's comment
about looking for alternative ways to make us more secure,
Creech Air Force Base is in my district, and I visited them and
witnessed some of the flying of the remotely piloted aircraft.
I think that is a possibility for use in border control and
pirates and other things. I would be interested in kind-of how
you see that as future technology.
But my question is in the wake of Mumbai in 2008, there was
a real focus on the problem with a soft target. I think that
was critical, and I think the Department increased its emphasis
there. Over time, though, that seems to have diminished. But
the threat has not diminished.
Representing a community like Las Vegas, where this is a
real possibility, I would ask you to show me where in the
budget or explain what parts of the budget have some commitment
to going back to that emphasis on the soft target.
I would also remind you that I sent a letter a couple of
weeks ago, inviting you to come to Las Vegas and see that
unique community--we have got a transient population, we have
got thousands of visitors on any given day, a host of potential
targets in the area--just so you could see how the public and
private sectors are working together and see how we might
incorporate some more of that as part of our National policy.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed, I think that, if we can, we
have got to get up there.
On the soft target issue, you will find most of that under
the NPPD directorate and also in the private sector office. We
have had a lot of outreach. We have had outreach with the hotel
associations and the hotel operators in the past months.
Over the holiday season we met with the representatives of
the 700 largest shopping malls in the country, and we also
prepared and had on-line training for shopping mall employees
on what to watch out for, what to look for, and the like.
That is the kind of thing that provides direct assistance
in the soft target environment that I think is very, very
useful.
Ms. Titus. We look forward to seeing you, and I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Olson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olson. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, welcome.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Mr. Olson. Good to see you again.
I am going to talk about issues concerning the budget in
the United States Coast Guard. Madame Secretary, I understand
in a tight fiscal environment sacrifices have to be made, but
some of the Coast Guard budget cuts seem penny-wise and pound-
foolish.
We have invested over $100 million in maritime safety and
security teams, yet your budget proposes to cut that capacity
by 42 percent to save $18.2 million. You propose to move to a
``regional concept'' with the Maritime Safety and Security Team
program, yet you terminate 395 active-duty military personnel
instead of transferring them to other MSST units.
You cut the aviation support to the Maritime Security
Response Team, the Coast Guard elite counterterrorism team,
thus eliminating the Coast Guard's tactical ability to board a
vessel that is actively opposing being boarded by a law
enforcement agency.
What is even more disconcerting is that as the Secretary of
Homeland Security, you are supporting a potential successor to
the current commandant who wants to further degrade both the
homeland security and search and rescue functions of the Coast
Guard.
I have here a memo from Vice Admiral Papp, recommended by
you and nominated by the President to be the next Commandant of
the United States Coast Guard. In this memo Admiral Papp
indicates a willingness to ``incur additional risk in order to
inform the fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2016 budget
bills.''
Madame Secretary, when Admiral Papp talks about incurring
additional risk, he is not talking about risk to the Coast
Guard. He is talking about risk to the American public. Given
that risk continues to threaten our Nation--terrorism, the drug
trade, human trafficking--why is it sound to put greater risk
on the American people?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, as I said earlier--I don't know
whether you heard me; there was a question raised about that--
that was an early interagency memo that was leaked based on
earlier budget assumptions that are not in fact the out-year
budget assumptions for the Coast Guard.
That is not the policy of the Coast Guard, nor the
Department of DHS, and so it is difficult to respond to a
leaked pre-decisional draft document in a public hearing of
this nature. But Admiral Papp is highly, highly qualified to be
the next Commandant of the Coast Guard, and I think the Senate
and the people of America will agree. He has a very, very
distinguished service record in the Coast Guard and has served
the people of this country very, very well. So let us just go
there.
Now, with respect to the MSSTs, you are right. We have
consolidated and regionalized them. It was the combined
judgment with the Commandant of the Coast Guard that we could
have the same reach in terms of response to possible terrorism
activities at the regional level as opposed to having so many
different places with their own MSST. There I understand there
can be disagreement about that. I am sure those will be
discussed throughout the appropriations process.
Mr. Olson [continuing]. I know you don't agree with me,
because you are rolling your eyes there, but, you know, the
Coast Guard's--to have an asset on the scene within 2 hours.
When your life is on the line, 2 hours is it might be an
eternity--is an eternity if you are in the water. But again,
Admiral Papp in his memo seems to be willing to modify those
standards. I don't want to go further, but do you support his
assertion that more risk is acceptable, loosening the standard
for on-scene response time?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, with all respect, I
am just not going to get into a dialogue about a draft leaked
memo. That is not the policy of the Coast Guard, nor the policy
of the Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Olson. Again, I understand that. But the nominee--this
is his memo.
Secretary Napolitano. Well----
Mr. Olson. He wrote it.
A couple of more questions, then. Admiral Papp seems also
to reduce the security patrols by 10 to 15 percent, reducing
the number of Coast Guard response boats in both groups by
cutting drug enforcement efforts by 25 percent.
Finally, he will end the Coast Guard's Maritime Security
Response Team and has said that these reductions are ``just a
fraction of what is needed, and I am prepared to go further.''
In my humble opinion, he has gone too far. In conclusion,
again, I know you responded to my fellow Texan about his
questions, and I appreciate your position, but if these radical
proposals that this nominee--if these are things that he is
actually thinking about that are good for the Coast Guard that
he will enact when he gets into office, I think he is
unqualified, and I ask that you reconsider supporting his
nomination.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent that
the memo be added to the record.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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Mr. Olson. With that, I yield back my time. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chairman now will recognize the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you, Madame Secretary, for appearing today. Just as
an aside, I maintain a prayer list, and I assure you that I am
adding you to my prayer list. God bless you.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, thank you very much.
Mr. Green. Madame Secretary, quickly, would the imaging--we
seem to be getting some feedback--would the imaging equipment
that we have, the full body scan equipment at AIG, would that
equipment have detected the bomb that was to be employed on
Christmas day?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I don't want to go
into detail in an unclassified setting. Let me just articulate
it this way. There is no doubt in my mind----
Mr. Green. Let me if I may, I will take it--I am going to
retract that. I will retract that and just ask you this.
Secretary Napolitano. All right.
Mr. Green. Is it perhaps among the best equipment that we
have to do it?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
Mr. Green. Okay.
Secretary Napolitano. It is objectively better than the
current iteration of technology.
Mr. Green. Exactly. I listened to your testimony, and here
is where I am going. I thought you had good retorts for privacy
concerns. It is unfortunate that we don't have that message
pervasive to the extent that privacy advocates across the
length and breadth of the country would at least give
consideration to it, if they haven't already--ACLU, for
example.
My question is to what extent have we had an opportunity to
sit, dialogue, and try to work out these concerns with
organizations like the ACLU?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, the chief privacy
officer of the Department has been meeting with a number of
members of the privacy advocacy community, for lack of a better
word. Whether she has met directly with the ACLU I do not know,
but we have been trying to educate that community on the fact
that the earlier technology and how it works is just not the
same as it is right now. So we continue that.
Privacy is a very important value for us. Civil liberties
are important values for us. If we are going to continue to use
different types of technology, we need to take those accounts
into consideration at the front end.
Mr. Green. At the risk of being rude, crude, and unrefined,
I have to go on quickly.
I think, Madame Secretary, that the logic we employ today
will not be the logic that we will employ the day after--God
forbid--a plane traveling at 500 miles per hour has its
structural integrity compromise at 35,000 feet. Many of the
folks who would say today, ``I have a problem,'' the day after
that occurs--and God forbid that it will--they won't use that
same logic.
The beautiful thing about being a member of the public is
you can be here today and there tomorrow and there are no
consequences. We have the challenge of dealing with the
consequences of our actions or our inactions, which is why I am
just encouraging you to do as much as you can as fast as you
can to get the answers that you have to the public, because I
think you do a good job at responding to the privacy concerns.
I really do. I think we need to get that message out.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Mr. Green. I want to encourage you to do what the President
is doing, but I will tell you today with the health care issue
and C-SPAN live, but I would tell you that it wouldn't hurt to
have some of those people who have some of the sharp questions
in the same room with you, televised so that people can hear
you respond and know that this has been addressed, that it is
of importance to you.
Now, quickly, there is about $21 million that has been
estimated to be the cost to transition from the Federal
Protective Service, FPS, to the National Protection and
Programs Directorate. Apparently, there is not a request for
this $21 million in the budget. Can you tell me quickly does
this mean that we are now abandoning this program? Or does it
mean that you have some other plans that we are not privy to?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, we have a spend plan,
and that transition has basically occurred from ICE to the
NPPD. The budget accordingly reflects that that transfer has
basically occurred.
Mr. Green. Okay. Let me move----
Secretary Napolitano. In addition, there was in the FPS
account--my understanding is there was approximately $200
million that had been unspent so that there are unspent monies
as well to be deployed for FPS. So those two things go
together.
Mr. Green. Thank you. Quickly now, the TWIC card. Some
ports, as I understand it, are employing a card that is local
along with the TWIC card, which is mandatory. Is there a need
for multiple cards at these ports, or is the TWIC card one that
should suffice for all ports?
Secretary Napolitano. You know, I would have to know more
about the local port setting and which workers are being used
for it. But the TWIC card is designed to be a National--you
know, it is a National check, a National card.
Mr. Green. The reason I ask is because there are the
workers--I have had some to complain to me about having to have
multiple cards. Apparently, there may be multiple costs
associated with it. Just when you make wages, every dollar
counts, and I want to represent them well.
Final question on TWIC is this. Do we have the scanners for
all of the TWIC cards now? Are scanners in place across the
country for the cards? We deployed the cards before we deployed
the scanners, so have we deployed the scanners?
Secretary Napolitano. We have a schedule to deploy the
scanners beginning at the larger ports, but they are not all in
place right now.
Mr. Green. There is a concern about fraudulent cards being
developed. I am sure you are aware of it. There is even some
question as to what crime is committed when that card is used.
We know crimes are committed, but there is some debate about
whether we go Federal, whether you are going to go local in
terms of the crime. Perhaps some directive to some of the ports
may be helpful.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, we will take a look at that.
Mr. Green. Okay. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from New Orleans, Mr. Cao.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Five minutes.
Mr. Cao. Madame Secretary, I just want to say that I have
been one of your biggest fans, and I continue to be one of your
biggest fans of the Congress, because I feel that you have done
a tremendous job, given the complex environment in which we
live. I would also like to thank your staff, who have worked
very closely with us to promulgate rules in connection with
CDLs that are very, very favorable to recovery.
But with that being said, I just wanted to reiterate the
issues that we discussed prior to the hearing. In connection
with the rules that are being promulgated, a problem might
arise in connection with adjacent parishes to Orleans, who
right after Katrina experienced a short period of increase in
income, and it might present a problem for them in getting the
CDL loans forgiven. So I would ask that you and your staff
look, revisit the rules in connection with those parishes.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, sir. We would do that.
Mr. Cao. The second issue that I would like to address is
the special CDL to private entities with service agreements
with local governments. We have also discussed this prior to
the hearing. I just want to give you the background of it.
Ochsner and Jefferson Parish have been working
unsuccessfully since 2007 to obtain funding under this special
CDL program enacted following Hurricane Katrina. This special
CDL program assists local governments in providing essential
services to their communities, and under the implementing
regulations promulgated by DHS, private nonprofit hospitals
such as Ochsner are eligible to use these special CDL proceeds.
I just want to point your attention to the preamble to the
regulations, which basically states to that fact. Because of
this regulation, Jefferson Parish has deemed it appropriate to
provide special CDL loan proceeds to Ochsner, because they
provided Jefferson Parish with the essential health care
services after Katrina when Charity Hospital was destroyed.
Based on my understanding, Jefferson Parish and Ochsner
have corresponded and met with FEMA officials numerous times
and as of February 2010, FEMA has yet to approve Jefferson
Parish's application for this special CDL for Ochsner. So if
you can look into that issue I would really appreciate it.
Secretary Napolitano. I will ask FEMA to do that. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much.
My last question that I would like to ask you concerns the
Maritime Safety and Security Team. Based on what I have heard
so far, I guess, based on your budget, the team will be
eliminated. The team in New Orleans serves a special role in
security post-Katrina, and I wonder whether or not there is a
way that this team can be pared down instead of fully
eliminated.
Secretary Napolitano. I think the theory of the Coast Guard
there, Representative, was that particularly in places where we
have also another, a large Coast Guard footprint, that simply
paring down didn't make as much sense as simply consolidating
to another nearby area.
Of course, New Orleans has a huge Coast Guard footprint. It
is the same with New York. With the consolidation of the MSST
team, they still have one of the largest Coast Guard
deployments in the United States, so kind of the theory in
terms of making smart and effective use of the dollars that we
do get appropriated was that it was better to handle it this
way rather than simply reduce the size of teams.
Mr. Cao. Thank you. That is all the questions I have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Lofgren, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madame Secretary, for your presence here today.
I want to talk a little bit about how we approach some of
these complicated technological questions. I will tell you that
I was frustrated for a number of years on not only the results,
but the process of how we were mapping vulnerabilities for
infrastructure in the United States, most of it held in the
public sector.
At one point I suggested that we outsource, for lack of a
better word, the mapping to the National labs, who actually
have some of the expertise available that we really didn't
have, and I think still do not have, in the Department. That
also relates to cybersecurity.
I know it is important that the cybersecurity function be
in the Department. I don't quarrel with that. But I do think
that there is an expertise that could be brought in from the
National labs that is really hard to hire. I am wondering if
you have thought about that. That is question No. 1.
Question No. 2, I will never forget in this room the
testimony we received from the inspector general. I asked the
question whether there had been the US-VISIT. US-VISIT had been
hacked, and he said, ``Who would know?'' They didn't even
deploy detection intrusion security. So I think from that, we
need to do an assessment, a cyber assessment of our own
Department. It is always better to have somebody from outside--
that than to do it yourself.
Finally, I am interested--I know that your ICE director is
a career prosecutor from DOJ. The responsibilities are split
between departments, and I am wondering what kind of mechanisms
have been put into place for the ICE director to share with the
DOJ the need for additional immigration judges.
We are so short on immigration judges, and I remember when
I was in local government, we had, I think, the second-largest
county jail in the State of California. We had an overcrowding
problem, but the answer was, in large measure, judges. It
wasn't the need for more space. It was a need to process cases.
I think if you look at the amount of delay and the--not in
every case, but when you have somebody who stays for a very
long time, they are eating up a big budget at $90 a day. It
really makes more sense for the Government overall in some
cases to hire, but it is different departments. I am wondering
what kind of mechanisms to share that mechanism exist, if there
is anything we can do to assist in that.
The final question is--it is kind of a little one, but I
promised I would ask--customs and border security at Dulles
Airport. They are not highly paid. They have got, you know,
crummy hours and a hard job. I was shocked to find out that
they have to pay for their parking on top of everything else
out at Dulles. Is there any way to do something about that? So
those are my three questions for you.
Secretary Napolitano. On parking, I don't know. I will find
out.
On the judges and the relationship between what we are
doing on the enforcement side, we have the impact on the
justice system. There were at least two joint meetings between
DHS and DOJ at OMB when the President's budget for 2011 was
being prepared to look at precisely that intersection. That is
having been a prosecutor and a practitioner in the Ninth
Circuit, I really appreciate that particular issue in a
fundamental way.
With respect to cyber and use of the National labs and red-
teaming ourselves, as I suggested earlier, it might be time for
this committee to have a cyber hearing of some sort, perhaps in
a classified setting, to get--excuse me, to get a better sense
of where it is that we are heading. I think we have made great
strides this year, but there is no doubt that we have much work
to do.
Ms. Lofgren. Can I follow up on the infrastructure
vulnerability, because it is not just cyber? I mean, it is
cyber, but they are--you know, we had, harking back to some of
the lists we had, we had, I mean, the Santa Cruz Boardwalk
placed in Santa Clara County and miniature golf courses on the
list. I mean, it was an embarrassment to everyone.
I spent a lot of time on it, and the real problem was that
we were asking people who really didn't know in local
governments and in law enforcement to do something that was
outside their field of expertise.
When you look at the entire system--and I don't think we
have accomplished it yet--you know, you can't protect unless
you know the critical vulnerabilities. Have you given a thought
on how we might team that, how to swarm that effort?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, we have done a lot in the sense
of really looking at where are the Nation's critical and what--
first of all, what is a critical infrastructure?
Ms. Lofgren. Right.
Secretary Napolitano. How do you define it? Where is it?
How is it protected? What private sector section does it belong
in that we need to interact with? Then how do we--to the extent
that is a cyber network, how do we deal with that? To the
extent it could be a possible target, how do we deal with that?
Also the relevant consequence management, should there be a
successful attack.
I would just suggest that I think that there again, there
has been a lot of good work done in the last 7 years. There is
more work to be done, and the National labs can be very helpful
there as well.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder--certainly, we don't want to discuss
here publicly what we know has not been attended to in our
various jurisdictions, but maybe we can look to have a more
confidential session with the Secretary to explore that, and I
think that----
Chairman Thompson. We had already taken note based on an
earlier conversation.
Ms. Lofgren. Oh, very good.
Chairman Thompson. We will coordinate their schedules for
that to occur.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Whew! I don't know about you, but I am glad
we are getting down the line here. Madame Secretary, it is
great to see you as always, and thank you for your attendance
and your frankness regarding this serious issue. I have got
four key questions, so I am going to ask them quick, and if I
can get your indulgence, I would appreciate it.
No. 1, your fiscal year 2009 budget was 52.7. How much of
that did you actually spend--was expended?
Secretary Napolitano. I will have to get back to you on
that.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. My second question. Madame Secretary,
we on the committee are very much aware of the administration's
supplemental budget request to provide an additional $5.1
billion to the disaster relief fund. Of these funds, $1.5
billion is to be used to pay for arbitration judgments in favor
of the entities affected by Hurricane Katrina, such as Charity
Hospital in New Orleans.
Looking past the significant amount of money that is
needed, I am troubled that the Civilian Board of Contract
Appeals found in at least two cases that the experts
representing FEMA were less experienced and less credible and
have spent less time in the building than the entities'
representatives, and were also unlicensed.
In other words the officials chosen by FEMA to make the
judgments related to public assistance decisions were not the
type of individuals who should have been making the decisions
in the first place. I realize that initial part was done prior
to you coming; however, what are you intending to do to ensure
that we have the right people making the decisions on public
assistance?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, we have done a lot of work in
FEMA, as I think Representative Cao acknowledged. Part of that
is making sure we do have the right people making the right
judgments.
One of the really reforms that happened this last year was
the Congress passing the ability to arbitrate some of these
claims so that we could get them resolved, decisions made, and
people could get on with their lives.
The supplemental that the President has submitted will
cover those arbitrations. It will also cover, I think, $1.1
billion that will be necessary for the schools and their
reconstruction, the ones that are still left. And so with that,
we think we will really end the year with the Katrina-Rita
arbitrations done.
Ms. Richardson. According to my notes, $1.5 billion, which
is quite a lot of money. I think what this committee is looking
for are: Have specific standards been put in place to ensure
that the new people who are coming in or the people who are
there at a minimum are licensed? As this report said, less
experienced, less credible and all those things--do we have
some sort of standards in place to ensure that that has been
corrected?
Secretary Napolitano. Congresswoman, I have asked the
general counsel to make sure that we have the right people in
place to do that.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. My third point--and I am now down to
2 minutes--looking at the budget, and what I really have spent
a lot of my time working on, I want to associate myself with
all of my colleagues, their concerns with the SAFER and
firefighter grants.
I am going to have a--I don't see myself supporting the
budget as it is with that decrease. Also, the Emergency
Operation Centers, I just find something that I personally
worked on for about 10 years from the local government to
today, seeing it evaporate before our very eyes is disturbing.
Then finally, looking at the Coast Guard as well, you know,
it just makes us wonder. We understand the size of your
Department and all the areas, but these suggested decreases are
very concerning to us as the committee and to me personally.
But finally, the cargo security, which you know I have a
great interest in, and we have had a couple of discussions, and
I think your first time here I mentioned to you the 9/11
requirements that were coming forward, and it is my
understanding the Chairman mentioned it to you as well, and I
am very concerned with the potential, from what I see here, of
47.87 percent. In my business here, what I know about money,
once you cut that much, you probably never get it back.
When I look at on the flip side more money being spent for
Secret Service--now, in this very committee we had the head of
the Secret Service say that the complaints or the threats that
have come through have not been any greater than any other
President, which I found surprising, but that is what he said--
candidate protection and all that.
You know, I am concerned that the pendulum is not swinging
too far one way and we are missing the foxes, literally, in our
bedroom. So for me, because this happens to be my bedroom
community that I live in, I would just have serious issues with
the decisions made regarding cargo security and wanted to hear
your thoughts.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think I have already shared
those. We will be happy to provide you with further.
But we think with the 10+2 rule, with 24-hour notification,
with the transformation to electronic record collection as
opposed to having to move paper, that that combined with the
fact that you can't just look at cargo coming in one way--that
is just one way; if you were to view the United States as a
house, it is only one way to the house--there are a lot of
things, other things that need to be covered.
But that, the methodology that we are using, will yield the
greatest security and that the margin added for the 100 percent
requirement doesn't give you that additional amount of security
where we would be better off doing some other things.
Ms. Richardson. Well, Madame Secretary, and as I close,
your predecessor was not particularly supportive of the reality
of achieving the 9/11 time frames. I believe when you came, you
were equally not as committed of meeting those time frames. So
I hope to work with the Chairman and this committee. I view it
as a serious issue.
We went on a Congressional delegation, and when I asked at
that port, and it was a foreign port, how many of the cargo are
you inspecting other than what is required of being pulled
aside, and the answer was none.
I believe, just as we saw, you know, we can all panic and
respond and knee-jerk with the Christmas day bomber, but I
believe it is not a question of if. It is when eventually this
will come back to bite us.
So I look forward to working with you. I know you believe
in security, and that is why you are serving, and we are
grateful for it. But it is a No. 1 priority for me. Thank you
very much for your time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and
sorry for my delay managing bills on the floor.
I thank you, Madame Secretary, for being here. Let me start
out by acknowledging all the men and women that work for the
Department of Homeland Security. I am still trying to calculate
whether it is the largest or next-to-largest of our
departments, but certainly it has had some steep mountains to
climb in terms of the many district groups that have come
together. I want to thank them very much for their service and
thank you.
As was indicated when we conversed, I do understand that
the Christmas day bomber had origins beyond some of the
boundaries and responsibilities of TSA, in particular the TSO
officers, and I think that should be noted. But we know that we
want to be perfect. We have to, because we are in the business
that we are in.
So I have a series of quick questions, and since this is a
budget hearing, I would like to mention some policy issues that
you might not have time to talk about, but I would suggest
starting out with.
I do think we need a time frame for discussions on
comprehensive immigration reform. Of course, there are
overlapping jurisdictions, and that might be a policy question
that one might want to have in our budget writing to at least
set us on track for something that I think is enormously
important.
My committee has held several hearings on encouraging
private sector entities to secure themselves against a
potential attack. As you know, this is generally not done by
regulation, but through DHS voluntary partnership with the
private sector.
We had a hearing on the Mumbai attack so that we would
understand what could happen in the United States and what is
being done in the United States. The PS-Prep program, a part of
the
9/11 Act, was discussed. It is clear that this program could be
leveraged to assure that our private sector partners are taking
tangible steps to secure facilities that have been targeted by
terrorists.
Please discuss the status of this program, when it will
begin to certify businesses and the amount of money dedicated
to it in the budget both at FEMA and the Office of
Infrastructure. That is the PS-Prep program--I don't know if
you heard me. Then I will just leave you.
I would appreciate whether or not we are funding Science
and Technology more or staffing it up, because the complaint is
that we cannot get needed security inventions or technology
confirmed quick enough.
I understand the air cargo question was asked, but if you
have a better answer as to when you might think we would
complete that requirement. I would like to find out whether or
not the Gallatin match, where they don't have to match, has
been added.
Then the Citizen Corps--I understand we are not funding it,
and we were just making progress. Administrator Fugate was in
Houston talking about the value of the Citizen Corps. We were
working to get the Corps--this is the response teams citizens
in minority neighborhoods, which we had really not reached. I
just want to know are we lowering the funding, or do we have
funding that we can utilize? I would like to see it bumped up.
I yield to the Secretary.
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, on several of these,
why don't I ask your indulgence and just get back to you with
specifics on those?
I do want to pause a moment on S&T, however.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just let me know the ones you are going to
get back to me on.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, the rest of them. I have got
them here. We are taking notes.
But we now have an Under Secretary for Science and
Technology in place. She was confirmed not too long ago, but we
have been working really vigorously to make sure that Science
and Technology is really incorporated throughout the
Department, not just in that directorate.
But we are using that in terms of helping set standards,
set requirements for the contracting that we do moving forward.
That, we think, will help drive innovation on the vendor side,
which is very important.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But it is the speed as well. It is too
slow, and you are hurting small businesses. We really want to
work with you on that.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. We would be happy to work with
you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Unanimous consent to recognize Mr. Rogers for a follow-up
question.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, earlier our colorful good friend from New
Jersey was trying to get you to name one thing in the last year
you had asked us to do. What he was after was a follow-up to my
questioning about jurisdictional consolidation. We need you to
urge the President and Speaker Pelosi and Leader Reid to make
this political lift.
As you had mentioned early, the size of your Department is
substantial. This Congress had the same difficulty when it
established the Pentagon and put everything under HASC in the
House and SASC in the Senate for the Armed Services, the
various branches.
We need you to exercise what Lee Hamilton called for, and
that is the call for the political will to consolidate
jurisdiction in this committee. That is what he was trying to
get you to say. What have you done? Have you asked for it?
We have had so many of your people in leadership positions
testify before this committee about their frustration of having
86 different committees and subcommittees they have to answer
to. I heard Ms. Richardson make a reference to our joint
concern about the Fire Grants and the SAFER grants. Those come
out of the Science Committee. Transportation has Coast Guard as
well as on and on and on, Judiciary, Oversight.
It is a political lift, because they are going to aggravate
a lot of Chairmen when they start trying to take jurisdiction
away from them and consolidate it here, but it needs to be done
to make sure your Department has uniform and consolidated
leadership in the Congress, know what the Congress is expecting
for you, and take a lot of burden off of you all.
So I would like to ask are you willing to do that? Are you
committed to trying to see that the Congress pursue that
remaining
9/11 Commission recommendation that has not been satisfied?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Representative, it is something
we have discussed with Congressional leadership. We have raised
not just the number of committees, but the amount of work
attendant upon that.
Just this morning in our Appropriations Subcommittee, the
Chairman was making some very legitimate complaints, really,
about the delay in getting some reports. But I think he was
surprised when I pointed out that just in that subcommittee we
had 300 mandatory reports. That doesn't even include this
committee or the volume of correspondence and hearings that
this committee generates.
So the answer is that that is one recommendation of the 9/
11 Commission we would like to see pursued. It is something
that we have spoken with Congressional leadership about.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Have you spoken about it with the
President as well?
Secretary Napolitano. I have.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Texas had a follow-up.
Mr. Green. Yes. You indicated, Madame Secretary, that you
were going to deploy the TWIC card readers, but you did not
give me the date. I would like to have the date of deployment
for those readers, please.
Secretary Napolitano. I think some have been deployed.
There is a schedule by which they are rolling out. We will get
that schedule to you. I don't have it at my fingertips.
Mr. Green. All right. I would like to get the schedule.
Finally, I would like to associate myself with the comments
of the Chairman with reference to the 9/11 Commission
recommendation of 100 percent cargo screening. It is important
to us. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Madame Secretary. I
have one question before we close the hearing. I understand
that the President has established a long-term natural disaster
recovery working group. Can you just kind of give the
committee: If you are involved in that at all, and just how is
it coming?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I co-chair it with the Secretary
of HUD. It is designed to--we have a National Response
Framework, which is what you do in the immediacy of a disaster
and the immediate aftermath, but what you do long-term to
restore housing, small business, neighborhoods, communities.
At what point does HUD take over the housing? At what point
is SBA brought in? Do you waive certain requirements for loans
and CDBG grants and the rest if it is part of a long-term
recovery from a natural disaster that you otherwise wouldn't
have?
I believe we are scheduled to give our recommendations to
the President in early April, and we are on schedule to do
that. We would be happy to conduct a briefing for the committee
after the President has a chance to look at them.
Chairman Thompson. Right. One of the issues I want you to
look at is to what extent does pre-disaster mitigation come
into being. We are still, as you know, paying a tremendous tab
for Katrina and some other natural disasters.
But if we have in place some pre-disaster mitigation
program, even though hurricanes and other things would come, to
the extent that we could fortify areas with significant
construction requirements and some other things, the cost over
time would be less than what we are faced with right now. So I
would hope that you would look at it.
We have been working with a number of groups around the
country, trying to see whether or not there are some
opportunities. There are some real smart people who have looked
at cost-effective mitigation efforts, especially for homeowners
and other people who live in some of those impacted areas.
With a little help from HUD and DHS, I think we could push
the concept that would drive down insurance rates and a number
of other things so that the dollar figure for the cost would
not be less. Let me suggest that there is a group called the
smartersafer.org.
Secretary Napolitano. I am sorry--the Smarter Safer----
Chairman Thompson. Smarter Safer Coalition. They have been
corresponding with your office. We will provide to you some
information on it. These are people who come up with bright
ideas. I would think that some of those vetting of those ideas
would bear fruit for what you are looking at, and I would
suggest that after we provide it, if you would do it, we would
appreciate it.
Secretary Napolitano. Be happy to look at those.
Absolutely.
Chairman Thompson. I thank you for your time. You have been
most gracious. Four hearings in 2 days is probably a record,
but if this one was any indication of those, you have done all
right, and I want to thank you for that. The Members of the
committee might have additional questions for you, and we will
ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions Submitted by Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. I am pleased that you are taking on this major
challenge to the institutional stability of your agency by proposing a
``Balanced Workforce'' program in your fiscal year 2011 budget request.
The ratio of contractors to Federal employees at the Department is an
issue that the committee has repeatedly identified. This new initiative
to address this over-reliance is certainly encouraging; however, I do
have some questions.
What is the Department's strategy to determine what positions will
be changed over from contract to Federal? Will you simply stop renewing
large contracts that are slated to expire or will there be a position-
by-position analysis?
Answer. We will use workforce planning efforts to identify the
proper balance of Federal employees and contractor resources to achieve
the Department's mission. To this end, under direction of the Under
Secretary for Management, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer
(OCHCO) has established a Balanced Workforce Program office. The
executive for this office will work closely with key stakeholders in
developing a long-term comprehensive strategy for the Department.
Contracts will be reviewed to ensure that the work is not inherently
Governmental, unauthorized personal services, or core/critical
competency.
Question 1b. I agree with the statements by contractor industry
groups that ``in-sourcing solely for the sake of in-sourcing or on the
basis of arbitrary quotas'' would be a detriment to the Department as
it fulfills its missions. How are you avoiding arbitrary quotas and
ensuring that there is a systematic approach in identify positions for
conversions?
Answer. We are not setting quotas, but under the leadership of the
Balanced Workforce Program office, assessing the unique workforce need
of each Component. Our approach is to ensure that functions that are
identified as inherently Governmental, unauthorized personal services,
or core/critical competency are performed by Federal employees.
Approximately 3,500 positions have been identified as such and will be
in-sourced. Thereafter, the Balance Workforce Program office will
provide the oversight necessary to ensure the Department develops a
systematic approach to determine the appropriate ratio of Federal
employees to contractors.
Question 1c. Please provide a breakdown of how many positions you
expect to transition in fiscal year 2011, Department-wide and by
agency, and the anticipated cost savings or avoidance for such position
conversion.
Answer. Please refer to the chart below.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WORKFORCE BALANCING FISCAL YEAR 2011
[Dollars in Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
2011 Total Fiscal
Fiscal Cost Year 2011
Component Contractor FTEs Year 2011 Reduction Increase
Positions Cost to in Federal
Savings Contractual Personnel
Services Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP................................................. 950 475 $40.6 $140.6 $100.00
OHA................................................. 20 16 2.30 4.20 1.90
S&T................................................. 35 35 0.42 7.12 7.12
USCG................................................ 300 300 2.70 41.33 26.83
NPPD................................................ 306 360 13.20 56.90 43.70
ICE................................................. 47 47 2.35 9.40 7.05
20 ......... 2.50 2.50 ..........
OSEM--Executive Secretary........................... 1 1 0.23 0.11 0.87
FEMA................................................ 28 14 1.46 3.03 1.56
A&O................................................. 138 125 17.77 36.89 19.11
USM--Office of Human Capital........................ 15 15 0.00 6.10 2.30
USM--HRIT........................................... 25 25 0.00 5.40 3.87
USM--Office of Procurement.......................... 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
USM--Office of Security............................. 72 72 0.00 6.08 2.85
CFO................................................. 38 19 0.00 1.85 1.85
OCIO................................................ 27 106 0.00 12.41 12.41
WCF................................................. 0 34 0.00 6.48 5.27
-----------------------------------------------------------
Total DHS..................................... 1,322 1,419 $72.75 $329.61 $236.69
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. As you know, this committee has raised many concerns
with the development of the Transformation and Systems Consolidation
(TASC). We have determined that the previous administration failed to
conduct the proper due diligence prior to issuing a ``Request for
Proposal.'' Keeping that in mind, and seeing that there are funds
within the fiscal year 2011 budget to fund TASC, what steps are you
taking to make sure that the Department will get a system that will
resolve DHS' well-documented financial management issues?
Answer. The Department has taken a top-down approach in guiding the
consolidation of financial, acquisition, and asset management systems.
DHS is in the process of establishing an Executive Steering Committee
(ESC), which will provide strategic leadership and direct the
Department's vision for TASC. It is anticipated that the ESC will be
headed by the Under Secretary for Management and membership will be
derived from the Department's CXOs and Components.
A departmental Integrated Management Team (IMT), consisting of the
Offices of the Chief Financial Officer (OFCO), the Chief Procurement
Officer (OCPO) and the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) are performing
a thorough review of the TASC initiative. DHS has developed program
management planning documents, processes, and plans in accordance with
DHS Acquisition Directive 102-01 (AD 102-01) and insights gained from
the IMT. DHS is also taking steps to ensure adequate staffing for the
TASC program management office (PMO) that continues to build a robust
team of full-time Federal employees with expertise in project
management, systems accounting, change management, acquisition
management, business intelligence, accounting services and systems to
successfully manage TASC. TASC leadership has a risk management plan
which was presented to Congress in the fiscal year 2010 TASC Report to
Congress.
Based on recommendations contained in the December 2009 GAO report
titled, ``Financial Management Systems: DHS Faces Challenges to
Successfully Consolidating its Existing Disparate Systems, GAO-10-76,''
the oversight of the Independent Verification and Validation (IV & V)
team is now performed by the Department's OCIO.
Independent verification and validation (IV & V) contractors
continue to support the Department's CFO, providing comprehensive and
mature oversight throughout the program life cycle. Specifically, IV &
V reviews documents and processes for completeness and correctness;
quality assurance over project deliverables and cost; and compliance
assessments against enterprise architecture, security, performance
requirements, and organizational standards.
Question 3. Like you, I am concerned about the human resources
challenges that DHS faces. Accordingly, I want to make certain that the
Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer has an adequate budget to
address the Department's long-standing problems with morale and
diversity and to promote a common culture among all DHS employees. The
budget request for this office is $24.9 million; a slight decrease from
fiscal year 2010 enacted levels.
Please outline what portion of the Department's $24.9 million
request will be allocated to meet your goals for: (1) Hiring reform;
(2) workforce diversity and outreach; and (3) leadership development?
Answer.
The Department expects to allocate a portion of its $24.9 million
as follows:
Hiring Reform.--$7.6 million (to include policy development,
workforce engagement, human capital planning, and human
resources program accountability, but not information
technology-related investments.)
Workforce Diversity and Outreach.--$2.7 million.
Leadership Development.--$6.3 million (not including the
operational component of SES candidate development programs,
which is within the working capital fund).
Question 4a. Having the appropriate personnel to carry out the
important mission at the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is
essential. However, in previous years, I&A has been unable to hire and
sustain the number of FTEs requested.
What steps are you taking to improve the process by which you
recruit, clear, and hire personnel to meet your FTE request for this
year? What improvements do you expect to have in place to fill the FTE
request for fiscal year 2011?
Answer. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) senior
leadership has made hiring up to full strength as rapidly as possible a
top priority. Internal improvements include:
Weekly senior leadership meetings chaired by the Under
Secretary to focus on the hiring effort;
Working with the Department's Office of the Chief Human
Capital Officer (OCHCO) to establish open continuous
announcements, whereby the best qualified group of candidates
is referred for selections to multiple similar positions. This
significantly improves the overall efficiency of our hiring
process;
Drastically decreasing the time it takes to process hiring
packages--from crafting position descriptions to selecting
candidates, to staffing hiring packages, managers are held
accountable for making hiring a top priority; and
I&A has a full-time trained Recruitment and Outreach
Coordinator focused on a targeted college and university
recruitment program. Recently, I&A participated in a virtual
career fair with other Intelligence Community (IC)
organizations, where over 8,000 applicants registered for I&A's
virtual booth.
I&A is also working with relevant stakeholders to improve the
efficiency of the external processes that affect hiring time frames.
I&A is working with OCHCO on regaining some form of Direct
Hire Authority.
To reduce the amount of time it takes for a selected
candidate to clear the investigation process, I&A has increased
coordination efforts with the Office of Personnel Management by
assigning a Security Specialist from I&A to the Department's
Office of Security to facilitate rapid processing of I&A
applicants through the DHS security clearance process.
Question 4b. Are there additional authorities you need in order to
better execute the hiring and/or retention of qualified personnel?
Answer. Direct Hire Authority would increase I&A's ability to
compete for talent with the IC and the private sector and I&A is
working with OCHCO and OPM on regaining some form of Direct Hire
Authority.
Question 4c. What steps have you taken to ensure you are hiring,
retaining, and developing a diverse workforce?
Answer. I&A is committed to actively seeking a diverse and
competent workforce. In the first two quarters of fiscal year 2010, the
I&A Recruitment and Outreach Coordinator and I&A managers participated
in numerous college and university career fairs and job fairs likely to
provide candidates to help I&A increase its diversity numbers with
regard to African Americans and Hispanics. Examples include
participation in the Norfolk State University Career Fair and
University of Texas-Pan American Career Fair. I&A also has participated
in events sponsored by U.S. Military affiliates and veterans groups and
plans to participate in upcoming events with groups such as the League
of United Latin American Citizens, Asian Pacific American Association,
Blacks In Government, Society of American Indian Government Employees,
and Federally Employed Women, as well as the Federal Hiring Event for
People with Disabilities.
Question 5a. In June 2009, Mr. Bart Johnson, the then-Acting Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, testified before our
Subcommittee on Intelligence that contractors made up 60 percent of
I&A's workforce. He acknowledged that this was a problem and that I&A
was working to shift the balance between contractors and Federal
employees.
How does your budget request support a contractor-to-Federal
employee conversion?
Answer. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes conversion of
87 contractors to permanent Government employees. This is in addition
to the conversion of 110 contractors appropriated to I&A in fiscal year
2010.
Question 5b. What percentage of I&A's workforce is currently made
up by contractors?
Answer. I&A's workforce is currently made up of 55 percent
contractors.
Question 5c. By the end of fiscal year 2010, what will the
percentage be?
Answer. I&A's goal for the end of fiscal year 2010 is to have the
percentage of contractors at no greater than 47 percent.
Question 5d. By the end of fiscal year 2011?
Answer. I&A's goal for the end of fiscal year 2011 is to have the
percentage of contractors at no greater than 38 percent.
Question 6a. In light of the attempted terrorist attack on Flight
253 on Christmas day 2009, I am surprised that the budget does not
request greater investment in CBP's passenger prescreening programs and
technology, such as CBP's National Targeting Center and Advance
Passenger Information System. That said, how does CBP plan to change or
improve its passenger prescreening processes in the upcoming fiscal
year?
Answer. The administration had to weigh a number of competing and
worthy priorities while it was formulating the fiscal year 2011 budget.
However, after careful consideration of its priorities, the needs of
the American public and all the available options, the administration
decided to focus its resources on the priorities contained in the
President's budget.
CBP carefully examined its passenger screening processes and
procedures and has already implemented or planned a number of
initiatives that will improve its capabilities. The most significant of
these include the Pre-Departure Program, exploring expansion of the
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), and the CBP partnership with TSA.
The Pre-Departure program was created to identify and prevent the
boarding of high-risk travelers who seek to travel on a commercial air
carrier destined for the United States. The Pre-Departure Program
mirrors the IAP vetting procedures; the NTC-Passenger works with the
CBP Regional Carrier Liaison Group, which then reaches out to the local
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attache, CBP Attache, Air
Carrier Security Office, etc to assist with contacting the specific
airlines to recommend that these identified travelers not be permitted
to board an aircraft destined to the United States.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request maintains IAP operations at its
current level and allows for evaluation of expansion to various other
sites. Expansion criteria is based on several factors, including but
not limited to, the amount of passenger traffic from the airport to the
United States; the number of high-risk passengers traveling from the
airport to the United States; and the conclusion of successful
negotiations between the United States and the respective foreign
government.
Question 6b. The budget requests an additional 103 intelligence
analysts for CBP's Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination
(OIOC). According to the budget, these analysts are to support CBP
Intelligence Watch, Operations Coordination, and the Commissioner's
Situation Room.
Please elaborate on the kind of work that these analysts will
perform, and how their activities will fit into the mission of CBP and
DHS. Also, please describe the OIOC's relationship with I&A.
Answer. The CBP Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination
(OIOC) is responsible for providing intelligence support to decision-
makers from the policy level to the action level--officer and agents
responsible for securing the U.S. border. OIOC is CBP's representative
in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, led by the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). The relationship between the
Components is collaborative and mutually supporting.
The additional 103 intelligence analysts will enable OIOC to
enhance current programs, including:
24x7 National Intelligence Watch that provides watch and
warning to the entirety of CBP;
24x7 Tactical Intelligence Cell that provides direct support
to the CBP National Targeting Center-Passenger;
Management of CBP intelligence collection and requirements
processes;
Short-term analytic efforts focused on immediate and near-
term threats;
Begin development of a CBP-wide common intelligence picture
(CIP) providing real-time intelligence and basic war-gaming
capability throughout this agency.
Question 7a. On the morning of February 18, a dog involved in a CBP
training exercise at Dulles International Airport bit a 4-year old
girl. This was an unusual incident in the otherwise impressive record
of the program's 40-year history. However, I am aware that there have
been changes to the curriculum and training and a discontinuation of
the Labrador breeding program. Please provide answers to the following
items:
What actions has CBP taken since February's attack to reassess its
program?
Answer. On the advice of Counsel, we are declining to respond, as
we anticipate that this matter will soon be in litigation.
Question 7b. Describe changes made to the training prior to
February's incident.
Answer. No changes were made in the training of the passenger
processing sub-discipline prior to the February incident.
Question 7c. Explain the rationale used in discontinuing the
Labrador breeding program.
Answer. The breeding program has not been discontinued; however, it
has been temporarily suspended pending a reassessment, due to the
numerous discrepancies found during an initial evaluation. This
evaluation consisted of reviewing all the administrative functions of
the breeding program, as well as selection testing of the canines in
the rearing program at the time. The decision was made to temporarily
suspend the breeding program due to the fact that all the canines in
the program failed to demonstrate that they possessed the necessary
genetic drives to perform detection work at the required level.
Question 7d. Have there been any studies to compare breed
characteristics in the various CBP work environments such as airports,
land ports of entry, border checkpoints to verify how breeds respond in
those locations?
Answer. No conclusive studies comparing breed characteristics in
the various CBP work environments have been conducted.
Question 7e. Has there been any discussion within CBP of how
different breeds are perceived by the public and how the public
responds to them?
Answer. No, the CBP Canine Program is focused on procuring canines
that possess the necessary genetic drives to fulfill its mission.
Question 8a. Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act authorized
the creation of the Visa Security Program, which deploys ICE agents to
high-risk areas worldwide to conduct security reviews of visa
applications. According to a 2008 DHS Office of Inspector General
report, ICE's Visa Security Units offer valuable resources to consular
officers in support of visa operations. However, I understand that DHS
has run into resistance establishing these units at certain embassies
and consulates.
Have there been delays in the establishment of visa security units
in new locations? If so, please identify the source(s) of the delays.
Answer. In 2008, ICE and the State Department collaborated on VSP's
site selection methodology and presented the joint findings to the HSC.
Additionally, DOS and ICE VSP released a 2008 cable to all posts
highlighting the joint accomplishments of the State Department and ICE
VSP efforts overseas. At posts where ICE VSP operations have been
established, DHS and State Department personnel have established strong
and productive partnerships that enhance the security of the visa
process.
While ICE VSP's cooperation with the State Department has been
largely successful, ICE VSP has occasionally faced concerns from
individual Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs of Mission towards the establishment
of new VSUs in certain locations. The process for evaluating an
agency's request for locating a position in a Mission overseas is set
forth in NSDD-38. Under NSDD-38 procedures, a Chief of Mission must
determine whether to accommodate additions to Mission personnel. The
Chief of Mission will consider available space, resources, support
capabilities, the threat level at post, and existing presence at post
of the agency requesting new positions when making a determination on
an NSDD-38 request.
Question 8b. Have these delays contributed to the fact that there
is no additional request of funds for the program for the next fiscal
year?
Answer. Based on the funding provided in each year, ICE has been
able to deploy to approximately 3-4 posts per year. ICE presently has
fiscal year 2010 funds available to open new Visa Security Units (VSUs)
in Sana'a, Yemen; Tel Aviv, Israel; Jerusalem, Israel; and London,
United Kingdom, and to expand ICE's existing presence in Amman, Jordan;
Saudi Arabia; and Frankfurt, Germany. ICE is currently moving forward
with deployment to these posts. ICE currently has funds to sustain
operations at the new posts, but will require additional funds for
future expansion.
Question 8c. What effect has the Flight 253 incident had on
prospects for expansion of the Visa Security Program?
Answer. The determination of high-risk locations is a fluid and
dynamic process that changes as new threats are identified. Since
Flight 253, ICE is updating the list of high-risk posts. Based on this
new analysis, ICE will continue to aggressively expand the VSP within
its allotted resources.
Question 9a. Our current immigration detention system is comprised
of a patchwork of ICE-owned facilities, private detention centers, and
hundreds of State and local facilities.
How will ICE use the funding proposals in this budget request to
accomplish the ambitious detention reform goals ICE announced last
year?
What role do you see the Alternatives to Detention programs playing
in ICE's detention management strategy in the future?
Answer. ICE will use the funding proposals in the fiscal year 2011
budget request to accomplish detention reform goals by:
Monitoring and adjusting, as needed, the implementation of a
medical classification system to support immigration detainees
with unique medical or mental health needs.
Minimizing transfers, thus decreasing costs associated with
transportation and delays in proceedings.
Creating a library of contracts for all facilities with
which ICE has active agreements, and centralizing all contracts
under ICE headquarters' supervision. At present, the Office of
Acquisitions at ICE headquarters negotiates and manages only 80
of the approximately 270 contracts for detention facilities.
The remaining contracts are overseen by several ICE field
offices and the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. ICE
will aggressively monitor and enforce contract performance in
order to ensure contractors comply with terms and conditions--
especially those related to conditions of confinement. When
confronted with repeated contractual deficiencies, ICE will
pursue all available avenues for remedying poor performance,
including termination of contracts. In the long term, this
effort is expected to yield cost savings and a better managed
and more efficient contracting process, though these
initiatives may require additional resources at headquarters.
Completing the hiring of 39 Federal employees to provide on-
site oversight at ICE's largest detention facilities, where
more than 80 percent of immigration detainees are housed, and
strengthening the day-to-day oversight at these facilities. ICE
is developing training courses, policies, and procedures to
ensure this cadre of personnel is well-trained and managed.
These 39 Federal employees will replace ICE employees who were
given temporary duty assignments in fiscal year 2010 to perform
this mission.
Continuing to house non-criminal, non-violent populations
based on a risk assessment and custody classification in the
appropriate facilities. ICE is planning to pilot this risk
assessment tool beginning in May 2010. These populations
include arriving asylum seekers, who are generally housed at
facilities such as the Broward Transitional Center, in Florida.
ICE will also complete two residential facilities as
immigration detention facilities for non-criminal, non-violent
populations. In fiscal year 2010, DRO transitioned the T. Don
Hutto Residential Center in Taylor, Texas, from holding
families, to holding 512 single adult females in a residential
custody environment.
Updating the Performance-Based National Detention Standards
(PBNDS), which are currently with the publisher and
implementing new Family Residential Standards.
Continuing our efforts to consolidate existing detention
facilities into fewer facilities that are more in line with the
administration's detention reform initiatives.
Continuing the recently established Detention Monitoring
Council reviews of detention facility inspection reports,
assessments of corrective action plans, ensuring remedial plans
are implemented, and determinations of whether the use of a
facility should continue.
The Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program has a critical role in
ICE's detention management strategy, by providing ICE with the option
to release individuals that are considered to be low-risk. Each
potential participant will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by
trained ICE officers using a refined risk assessment tool created by
the Office of Detention Policy and Planning. This tool will assist the
officers in making a determination on an appropriate level of reporting
and technology, based upon multiple factors that include, but are not
limited to, ties with the community, family obligations, criminal
history, and their stage in the immigration court proceedings. With the
assistance of the ATD program, ICE will be able to release low-risk
individuals and families from detention and free up bed space for
higher-risk aliens, criminals, and others who could be a danger to the
community.
On January 25, 2010, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
and ICE began a fast-tracking pilot for participants on ATD in
Baltimore and Miami. The goal of the pilot program is to reduce the
average length of time that participants remain on ATD, pending a
hearing, from 310 days to 180 days. As of April 13, 2010, 213
participants have been placed into the pilot program.
Question 10. The committee is pleased to see that the TSA budget
provides resources to address the video surveillance gap that was
identified earlier this year, when a security breach shut down the
Continental Airlines terminal at Newark International Airport.
Certainly, we could have seen a better response from TSA and local law
enforcement authorities if the Port Authority's video surveillance
system had been fully operational at the terminal exit lane.
What steps is TSA taking, in conjunction with its local law
enforcement and aviation partners, to ensure that surveillance programs
are operational and effective at all times?
Answer. Following the security breach at Newark International
Airport on January 3, 2010, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) immediately deployed a team of security experts to visit numerous
airports to review breach compliance plans, discuss and observe breach
drills, share best practices, review and observe Closed Circuit
Television systems (CCTV), and conduct training as required.
Additionally, the TSA directed a Nation-wide data call of all airport-
owned CCTV systems to ensure proper operational capabilities are
maintained.
Question 11. The budget requests approximately 4,000 new personnel
for TSA, with the majority of them providing checkpoint support at the
Nation's airports, including administering AIT systems.
How do the additional 4,000 positions fit in the checkpoint support
model?
By the end of fiscal year 2011, how will the addition of 1,000 new
AIT machines affect TSA's workforce overall? What percentage of the TSO
workforce do you project will be working on AIT systems in fiscal year
2011?
Answer. The additional 1,000 Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)
machines will require 3,550 more Full-Time Equivalent (FTE), which will
be distributed to the receiving airports based on the Transportation
Security Administration's Staffing Allocation Model. Also included in
the fiscal year 2011 request are 210 FTE for Behavior Detection
Officers (BDOs) to enable expansion of the Screening of Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT) program at additional airports.
As Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are cross-utilized for
multiple screening functions, the majority of new TSO positions
requested in fiscal year 2011 will operate the AIT machines on a
rotational basis.
Question 12a. Please provide an update for when TSA will complete
the implementation of its Secure Flight passenger pre-flight watch list
matching program for all carriers operating domestic flights, and what
the schedule is for implementing Secure Flight for foreign and domestic
air carriers operating in-bound flights to the United States.
Answer. Secure Flight will ultimately conduct watch list matching
for approximately 68 covered domestic airlines and 148 foreign
airlines. The Secure Flight program began operational cutover to
airlines on January 27, 2009. To date, 41 airlines have successfully
cutover to Secure Flight, including four foreign airlines. Eleven
airlines are partially cutover. Testing is underway with 29 airlines.
Secure Flight is deploying to domestic and foreign airlines in a phased
process. Each airline will integrate the capability to submit Secure
Flight Passenger Data over the coming months. Secure Flight deployments
for domestic airlines began in early 2009. Testing and deployment with
foreign airlines began later that year. The anticipated cutover for
both domestic and foreign airlines is the end of calendar year 2010.
Question 12b. What type of coordination efforts are occurring
between TSA and Customs and Border Protection now, what will those
efforts look like with the implementation of Secure Flight?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration and the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection jointly operate the Secure Flight
International Capabilities Project. This project, which began in
January 2009, identifies and coordinates the capabilities and
activities required to align CBP and TSA with respect to policy,
process, and technology for handling foreign airlines. To date, this
project has been successful in putting in place the policy, process,
and technology required for a seamless transition from CBP-performed
watch list matching to Secure Flight.
Question 13. Given the delays in issuing regulations, the prolonged
grant application processing time, and the relative shortage of
expertise in surface transportation modes generally, why is there a
decrease in funding requested for TSA for ``Surface Transportation
Security Operations and Staffing?''
Answer. The development of various regulations directed by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
continues to advance and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) believes that these are critical regulations that need to be
implemented. TSA has streamlined its grants processes to ensure that
its responsibilities in this area are completed well in advance of the
onset of the grant period of performance. TSA has identified
efficiencies to support critical operations in fiscal year 2011. To do
this, TSA looked across all of its programs and identified reductions
that could be made without degradation to the existing level of
service.
Question 14. Throughout the budget request, Coast Guard listed that
it is responsible for the inspection of over 48,000 Transportation
Worker Identification Credentials but there were no funding requests
tied to TWIC inspections. Additionally, the Coast Guard has the lead
role in overseeing security for the MTSA facilities.
For fiscal year 2011, what resources are allocated for the Coast
Guard to conduct TWIC inspection? Similarly, what resources are
allocated for MTSA enforcement?
Answer. Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
inspections are carried out as part of the Coast Guard's Marine
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) enforcement program. Funding
and personnel associated with MTSA implementation for vessel and
facility security in fiscal year 2010 is $44.7 million and 372
positions. These resources are part of the existing base of Coast Guard
resources that support the Ports Waterways and Coastal Security and
Marine Safety missions.
Question 15. I understand that recapitalization is a necessary task
since many of the Coast Guard's surface and air assets are aging and
need to be replaced. To that end, Coast Guard has requested funding for
several replacement surface and air assets including the purchase of
the fifth National Security Cutter, Fast & Medium Response Cutters, and
a Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
How will these new assets affect Coast Guard's ability to carry out
its homeland security missions?
Answer. Recapitalizing aging assets is necessary to sustain mission
performance. The Coast Guard's effort to replace high and medium
endurance cutters (HEC and MEC), patrol boats (WPBs) and medium-range
surveillance fixed-wing aircraft at, near, or beyond their service life
is an on-going, sustained initiative to provide capable and cost-
effective assets for our personnel to execute Coast Guard missions.
These assets directly contribute and enhance the Coast Guard's missions
(e.g., ports, waterways, and coastal security, drug and migrant
interdiction, defense readiness, search and rescue and other law
enforcement, etc.). New assets will expand maritime domain awareness,
enhance end game capabilities through advanced flight decks and small
boats, and improve C4ISR capabilities to enhance interoperability with
partner agencies.
Question 16. The 2012 Presidential campaign preparations include a
temporary shift of 22 special agents from investigative units to the
program in order to support future staffing requirements.
How will the transfer of these agents from the investigative unit
to the Candidate Nominee Protection program affect the Service's on-
going criminal investigative mission?
Answer. The administration's fiscal year 2011 budget request seeks
to reallocate FTE from the Investigations and Field Operations account
to the Protection, Administration, and Training account to cover the
specialized training requirements in advance of the 2012 Presidential
campaign.
While agents assigned to Investigations are routinely used to staff
temporary protective details and other protective support functions,
the Secret Service will continue to sustain a robust and viable
investigative agenda. As in previous campaign periods, the Secret
Service will prioritize our investigative initiatives as necessary to
efficiently manage the investigative case load during this challenging
period. The Secret Service will focus on crimes involving organized
criminal groups, large financial losses, and those investigations with
significant community impact.
The Secret Service continues to build unique partnerships with
other agencies which aid our investigative mission during campaign
years. The Secret Service has established a National network of
Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTF) to leverage the resources of
academia; the private sector; and local, State, and Federal law
enforcement agencies in an organized effort to combat threats to our
financial payment systems and critical infrastructures. The Secret
Service currently maintains 29 ECTFs, to include the first
international ECTF located in Rome, Italy.
Additionally, the Secret Service has established a network of
Financial Crimes Task Forces (FCTF). These FCTFs, located in 38 cities
across the United States, combine the resources and manpower of
multiple local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies to combat
organized criminal groups.
Through the use of the ECTFs and FCTFs, the Secret Service
leverages law enforcement resources from other agencies and departments
to sustain on-going investigations. The task force model allows us to
maintain continuity of investigative operations while Secret Service
agent personnel are assigned to temporary protective assignments.
To further manage increased investigative demands, the Secret
Service, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security,
developed the National Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI) in Hoover,
Alabama, a cyber crimes training facility designed to provide State and
local law enforcement officers with training, equipment, and expertise
in computer forensics and digital evidence analysis. To date, roughly
420 State and local police officers have completed training at the
NCFI. These officers are now available to assist with Secret Service
investigations as necessary.
The Secret Service has also positioned Criminal Research
Specialists (CRS) in major field offices throughout the United States.
CRS personnel assist special agents with criminal investigations, but
they do not participate in protective duties. Therefore, CRS personnel
can further sustain continuity of investigative operations while agents
are performing protective duties.
Question 17. Madame Secretary, Congress in the SAFE Port Act
authorized $400 million for port security grants for fiscal year 2011.
However, the President's fiscal year 2011 budget only requested $300
million. Please explain why the Department will only request $300
million to help localities protect their ports, especially in light of
an anticipated reduced U.S. Coast Guard presence at a number of ports?
Answer. Section 112 of the Security and Accountability for Every
Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) amended 46 USC 70107 and authorizes
$400 million for the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) for fiscal
years 2007 through 2011.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes the same amount of
funding that was appropriated in fiscal year 2010: $300 million. In
fiscal year 2009, the PSGP received its full authorized amount of
funding ($400 million) and received an additional appropriation of $150
million through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
providing a total of $550 million for the program.
Question 18. It has been the committee's longstanding conviction
that the Office of Risk Management and Analysis needs to take on a more
prominent role within DHS and work in a consistent manner with DHS
components on how to establish and follow risk-management protocols.
Please explain why you are seeking a $152,000 decrease in Risk
Management and Analysis' budget for technical assistance to other DHS
components?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to
risk management as a means to achieve homeland security. As stated in
the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, homeland security is
ultimately about effectively managing risks to the Nation's security.
The Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA), in conjunction with
partners from across DHS and the homeland security enterprise--
including Federal, State, local, Tribal and territorial government
organizations, the private sector, and our international partners--is
working to achieve a consistent and integrated approach to risk
management that will increase the effectiveness of homeland security
risk management. RMA has taken several critical first steps for
building and institutionalizing integrated risk management. The office
established a risk governance process with the DHS Risk Steering
Committee (RSC). The RSC ensures that there is collaboration,
information-sharing, and consensus-building across the Department as we
identify and integrate best practices for risk management and analysis.
In September 2008, the RSC published a DHS Risk Lexicon that
establishes a common language for discussing risk-related concepts and
techniques, and then in January 2009 released an Interim Integrated
Risk Management Framework that sets the foundation for a common
approach to homeland security risk management.
The projected decrement in program funds will not significantly
impact RMA's capability to provide technical assistance. In fiscal year
2010, RMA converted program dollars for contract support into salaries
and benefits for an additional 13 Federal employees. By establishing an
``in-house'' technical assistance capability, RMA is able to more
effectively and efficiently meet the needs of the Department's
components. For example, RMA is currently providing risk management
technical assistance to the Office of Policy, the Science and
Technology Directorate, the Transportation Security Administration, the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. In addition, for longer-term projects, RMA has
established the business protocols for having DHS components provide
the funding to RMA for their specific technical assistance requirement.
Question 19a. As you know, the committee has been very concerned
about the cost overruns and development missteps associated with the
SBInet program. The budget request goes as far as to defer a funding
request for the next fiscal year due to SBInet's delays in deployment.
How is S&T's Testing/Evaluation Division working with SBInet
program officials to establish operational testing requirements?
Answer. The S&T Director, Test and Evaluation and Standards, and
the S&T Director, Operational Test are the final approval authority for
the SBInet TEMP. S&T is also a member of the SBInet Test & Evaluation
(T&E) Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT). While the Office of the
Border Patrol will serve as the Operational Test Director, S&T is
providing oversight and guidance for the test process and procedures
and will participate in the actual conduct of the test.
Question 19b. What responsibility does this division have to
establish testing requirements for other operational components?
Answer. Paragraph (12) of Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 charges the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for
S&T with the responsibility for ``coordinating and integrating all
research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation
activities of the Department.'' To carry out these and other test and
evaluation (T&E) related legislative mandates, S&T established the Test
and Evaluation and Standards Division (TSD) in 2006 and created the
position of Director of Operational Test & Evaluation in 2008.
To fulfill its mission, TSD develops and implements robust
Department-wide T&E policies and procedures. Working with the DHS Under
Secretary for Management, TSD approves Test and Evaluation Master Plans
(TEMP) that describe the necessary Developmental Test and Evaluation
(DT&E) and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) tasks that must be
conducted in order to determine system technical performance and
operational effectiveness based upon vetted Operational Requirements
Documents. In addition, the Director of OT&E approves the operational
test plan for oversight programs, to ensure adequacy of the T&E
activity in support of Acquisition Decision Event 3 program reviews.
Question 20. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request calls
for a nearly 20 percent cut in the University Programs portfolio. This
is the largest single cut to the S&T budget. Even in this tight fiscal
climate, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and other agencies
throughout the Government have found a way to continue supporting
science research. Yet, S&T plans to eviscerate the Centers of
Excellence, Minority Serving Institutions Program, and University
Scholars--programs that enjoy strong Congressional support. What is the
reason for the decrease?
Answer. There were many competing priorities facing the Department
as the fiscal year 2011 budget was being built. Many hard decisions and
trade-offs had to be made in order to provide funding for the highest
priority needs across a vast and diverse mission space. The Department
still feels that the long-term development of basic research
capabilities is the future of DHS and is supportive of the Science and
Technology Directorate's University Programs. The Department maintained
University Programs at the level possible, but delivery of near-term
operational technologies was a higher priority.
The reduction to the University Programs budget, specifically
Minority Serving Institutions and Educational Programs, will not impact
any students who have already been awarded scholarships or fellowships.
All scholarships and fellowships are fully funded for the length of the
award when the candidate is selected.
Question 21. The committee has repeatedly voiced concerns with the
large number of inaccuracies that have been discovered within the E-
Verify program.
Question 21a. How is DHS working to improve the accuracy of the
data contained in the system in order to provide timely verifications?
Question 21b. What resources do you need in fiscal year 2011 to
improve the program?
Answer. The 2009 Westat report of the E-Verify program used a model
to estimate the program's total accuracy rate for the first time,
finding that 96 percent of all E-Verify initial responses was
consistent with the person's work authorization status, and finding the
remaining 4 percent of queries was inconsistent with an individual's
work authorization status, which the study found was primarily due to
identity fraud. The report evaluated the program covering the time
period of September 2007 to June 2008 and provided recommendations for
system improvements.
USCIS has already implemented or is planning to implement over two-
thirds of the primary recommendations that relate to program
improvements. Several of the remaining recommendations are aimed at
informing future policy-making and require legislative changes. The
recommendations that we have addressed since June 2008 are part of our
work to continuously improve E-Verify. USCIS has several initiatives
planned that will continue to improve E-Verify accuracy by expanding
the Photo Tool, enhancing monitoring and compliance activities,
improving data matching and providing an avenue for employees to check
themselves in E-Verify prior to employment to combat employment-related
discrimination. These initiatives include:
Expanding the E-Verify Photo Tool by September 2010 by
adding Department of State U.S. passport photos to the E-Verify
system. Adding U.S. passport photos would assist employers in
authenticating the validity of a U.S. passport presented by an
employee during the Form I-9 process. Currently, the Photo Tool
only checks against DHS-issued documents (any permanent
resident card or employment authorization document presented by
the employee).
Exploring the feasibility of adding driver's license data to
E-Verify. E-Verify is examining the possibility of a pilot
program with one State. If deployed, E-Verify will match
presented driver's license data with the data on record with
the issuing State, thereby reducing the possibility of
fraudulent driver's licenses being used to gain employment
authorization.
Expanding current monitoring and compliance efforts by
revising existing algorithms to better detect misuse and
identity fraud in the system, as well as expanding the number
of employer behaviors monitored to better detect employer
misuse, abuse, and discrimination.
Developing a Fraud Alert tool which will further identify
Social Security Numbers potentially used fraudulently in E-
Verify and lock them to prevent further use.
Working to deploy E-Verify Self Check, which will allow
individuals to verify the accuracy of their Government records
outside of the employment process. Self Check will allow
workers to update their records before being hired while
protecting the privacy and security of personal information and
ensuring the system is not used to pre-screen applicants or
discriminate in the hiring process. We anticipate Self Check
will result in fewer adverse actions against authorized
workers.
Improving helper text to decrease typos and strengthening
data-matching algorithms.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request for E-Verify is $103.4 million.
In addition, the fiscal year 2010 appropriation included $30 million of
2-year funding for E-Verify. Of the $30 million, USCIS expects to carry
over approximately $15 million into fiscal year 2011. The 2-year
funding was specified by the Congress for continued improvement of the
E-Verify system including:
an identity assurance tool, which will be deployed with the
Self Check feature and expanded at later phases to include
users of the system;
additional capacity to investigate fraudulent use of the
system, which is reflected in the expansion of our monitoring
and compliance program; and
development of a Self Check tool to allow authorized workers
to validate the accuracy of their records on file with Federal
Government agencies.
Question 22. Various outbreaks--including H1N1--have tested the
ability of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center to obtain
and integrate biosurveillance data from throughout the Government. To
date, NBIC has struggled to stand up operations. Secretary Napolitano,
having just gone through the H1N1 crisis, can you speak to the value of
the NBIC and its future given the meager budget request--just $7
million for fiscal year 2011?
Answer. The $7 million requested in fiscal year 2011 to support
NBIC is sufficient to maintain current operations. Funding will support
development of analytical biological surveillance and impact reports--
similar to the reports completed during the 2009-H1N1 pandemic. These
reports are collaboratively developed among interagency partners and
will be made available for interagency use.
The $1 million reduction from fiscal year 2010 funding reduces the
amount available to reimburse detailees or liaison officers from
partner agencies to serve at NBIC to provide analytic and collaborative
capabilities. The reduction in funding could affect up to six detailees
depending on grade. While the lack of reimbursements may be interpreted
as a disincentive to interagency participation in NBIC, as highlighted
in the Government Accountability Office's report, ``Biosurveillance:
Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering
Interagency Data and Resource Sharing,'' Federal agencies are not
actively participating in NBIC. To foster collaboration and information
sharing between agencies, we must reevaluate NBIC's structure to ensure
its mission is transparent and participating agencies understand its
value-add during biological incidents.
To further information flow into NBIC and strengthen collaboration
with State and local partners, the DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
is working to enhance partnerships with specific States, the private
sector, non-governmental agencies, and the international community.
Beginning with the $5 million provided to NBIC in fiscal year 2010 to
support a demonstration project with the North Carolina Collaboratory
for Bio-Preparedness, we aim to validate integrated information sharing
of public health, animal surveillance information, environmental
monitoring, and other biosurveillance information. We continue to work
with our Federal partners.
In addition to North Carolina, NBIC is engaging with other States
to establish biosurveillance data-sharing pilot outreach programs.
These States include: New Jersey--a State with a very mature DHS-State
fusion center relationship and a robust information sharing tool;
Minnesota--a State nationally known for their superior food defense
capabilities through information analysis; and, Washington State--a
State that has demonstrated advanced capability to integrate critical
infrastructure analysis into decision-making schemes. As we work with
State and local partners and follow GAO's recommendations, we hope to
demonstrate the value of situational awareness to respond to biological
incidents.
Question 23. For the 476 new BioWatch detectors that OHA seeks to
purchase with the increase requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget,
will any or all be deployed to any new locations or will they all be
used to replace and add to existing BioWatch detection systems in the
29 host cities where BioWatch systems are currently located?
Answer. DHS agrees that the BioWatch program is a much-needed
system that provides early detection of a biological attack and the
Department remains focused on supporting this program. In fiscal year
2011, $173.5 million is requested to support the BioWatch program.
Approximately $84 million will be used to procure and potentially
deploy units for a four-city operational field test of the Generation-3
system. The four-city operational testing will include inserting
Generation-3 detectors alongside existing Generation-1 and Generation-2
detectors in each of the four areas. The specific locations within each
jurisdiction will include existing sites, and will consider new
locations to improve the networks (i.e., additional sites both indoors
and outdoors.)
The Generation-3 program consists of a multi-year deployment
strategy over a 4-year period. The Generation-3 revised baseline
schedule is reflected by the major milestones below:
Field Test Program Contract Award (Phase I)--November 12,
2009;
Field Test Program Task Order 1 Award--February 2, 2010;
Field Test Program Task Order 2 Award--3rd Quarter fiscal
year 2010;
Completion of Field Testing--2nd Quarter fiscal year 2011;
Technology Readiness Review--2nd Quarter fiscal year 2011;
Phase II Contract Award for Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) and Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E)--4th Quarter
fiscal year 2011 or 1st Quarter fiscal year 2012;
Conduct OT&E: Start--4th Quarter fiscal year 2012, Finish--
3rd Quarter fiscal year 2013;
Initial Operational Capability (IOC)--3rd Quarter fiscal
year 2013;
Deployment of Gen-3 detectors Nation-wide, fiscal year 2013-
fiscal year 2016;
Completed network fiscal year 2017.
Question Submitted by Honorable Henry Cuellar of Texas for Janet
Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. Since its implementation in 1997, the Foreign Language
Awards Program (FLAP) has been instrumental in identifying and
utilizing Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees who are
proficient in a foreign language, a skill especially important in their
role of dealing directly with foreign travelers and trade. Under the
program, which incorporates more than two dozen languages, CBP Officers
and Agriculture Specialists who qualify after language proficiency
testing can earn awards of between 1 and 5 percent of their pay if they
use a language other than English for more than 10 percent of the time
during their daily duties. Thousands of frontline CBP employees use
their language skills in this way every day.
CBP employees' foreign language skills enhance the agency's
important homeland security and trade-related missions. Rewarding
employees for using their language skills to protect our country,
facilitate the lawful movement of people and cargo across our borders,
and collect revenue that our Government needs makes sense. Congress
agreed that employees should be encouraged to develop their language
skills by authoring FLAP. Not only does it improve efficiency of
operations, it makes the United States a more welcoming place when
foreign travelers find CBP Officers can communicate in their language.
At CBP, this program has been an unqualified success, and not just
for employees but for the travelers who are aided by having someone at
a port of entry who speaks their language, for the smooth functioning
of the agency's security mission. For these reasons I am quite
concerned that the fiscal year 2011 DHS budget proposed to eliminate
this Congressionally-authorized program, and was further surprised to
learn that, on February 4, 2010, CBP notified its employees that it was
immediately suspending this program citing lack of fiscal year 2010
funding.
Why was this program immediately suspended?
What budget planning went into this decision to immediately suspend
and eliminate FLAP at CBP?
Question 1b. How will the suspension of this program impact
recruitment and retention of employees who are proficient in a foreign
language?
Answer. CBP Officers and Agriculture Specialists hired since June
2004 and initially assigned to the Southern border, Puerto Rico, and
Miami have a minimum Spanish proficiency requirement as a condition of
employment. Officers and Agriculture Specialists lacking sufficient
proficiency in Spanish receive five additional weeks of language
training. Notwithstanding the suspension of the FLAP, managers will
continue to encourage all employees to utilize their enhanced foreign
language proficiency to accomplish the agency's mission. Managers also
have the option to use other traditional awards (e.g., ``on the spot''
and ``time-off'') to recognize employees who utilize their superior
foreign language proficiencies and significantly contribute to the
accomplishment of the mission.
CBP believes there will be a minor impact on the agency's ability
to retain employees. FLAP was originally implemented as an incentive
for CBP Officers and Agriculture Specialists to learn foreign languages
to complement duties at the ports of entry. However, since the
initiation of FLAP there have been some changes to benefits available
to CBP Officers and Agriculture Specialists:
These personnel now receive enhanced retirement benefits
similar to other law enforcement officers; and
Journeyman-level increases are being pursued to address the
heightened responsibility due to the increased scope and
complexity of these core positions since 9/11.
Question 1c. FLAP has a dedicated funding source--customs user fees
collected from the traveling public and the trade community. How will
customs user fees that formerly funded FLAP now be distributed?
For what programs will these user fees be used? And is this customs
user fee diversion supported by statute?
Answer. Currently, FLAP awards are funded through customs,
immigration, and agriculture user fees. Due to a substantial reduction
of airline travel and commercial conveyances entering the United States
in recent years, there has been a substantial decline in fee revenues.
The customs user fee currently supports approximately $10.2 million of
the FLAP program. This funding will be redirected towards other
requirements that are eligible under the fee legislation. The savings
in customs user fees from the FLAP reduction will allow CBP to more
fully fund overtime and premium pay.
Questions Submitted by Honorable Christopher P. Carney of Pennsylvania
for Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Madame Secretary, in 2008, the TSA issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking for the Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP)
which would create a set of security standards for large general
aviation aircraft. My understanding is that the initial proposed rule
did not address security and operational issues sufficiently and is now
being revised with appropriate technical input from stakeholders. I
know that you've testified before about this issue and have expressed
your desire to work with stakeholders to get this and other rules
completed cooperatively.
Since it decided to revise the LASP, the TSA has taken this
approach and is now nearing completion on a supplemental rulemaking.
However, I understand that the agency missed a self-imposed deadline to
get this rulemaking out before the end of last year and that it does
not expect to issue it until later this year. Although I understand
that the TSA still does not have an administrator, I worry that this
rule is being delayed too long.
When do you expect to issue the supplemental rulemaking for the
LASP?
Does the Department have adequate resources to complete this rule?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) is
currently developing a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(SNPRM) for the Large Aircraft Security Program, taking into
consideration more than 7,000 public comments received from the
original Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and input from the use of open
public forums, workshops, and stakeholder meetings. TSA expects to
issue the SNPRM later this calendar year.
Question 2. When will the Department start work on the next QHSR?
When do you expect to request funding to begin the work on the next
QHSR?
Answer. Focused efforts on the next QHSR, due to Congress on
December 31, 2013, are anticipated to begin sometime in early 2012. The
Department is currently focused on completing the Bottom-Up Review
(BUR), which was initiated shortly before the completion of the 2009
QHSR and will inform the development of the fiscal year 2012-2016
budgets. Departmental initiatives and analytic efforts that flow from
the BUR and budget build, as well as development of the next DHS
Strategic Plan, will be principal focus areas through calendar year
2011; all of which are necessary antecedents to the next QHSR.
The Department will request funding for the next QHSR as part of
the fiscal year 2012-2016 budget request.
Questions Submitted by Honorable Laura Richardson of California for
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. A number of steel pipe and tube producers are located
in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area, including Western Tube & Conduit
located in Long Beach in the 37th Congressional District. Western Tube
along with others in the domestic industry have joined together and
filed cases on imports of circular welded steel pipe and light walled
rectangular tubing from China. The industry obtained relief from these
unfairly traded imports in 2008 and antidumping and countervailing
duties were put into place ranging from 100 percent to 300 percent.
In mid-2009, industry officials began to monitor imports of light-
walled rectangular (LWR) tubing into the West Coast sea ports of Long
Beach and Los Angeles. Their research uncovered anomalies with many
shipments of LWR products that indicated that some of these entries
were being misclassified as another product, i.e. ``used books'' or
violating country of origin rules by having incorrect labeling. In some
instances the industry tracked the shipping records and noted that
while the product may have been listed as made in Vietnam the contents
of the shipment never originated from that country, but instead came
from China. The domestic industry documented this information beginning
in September 2009 and presented the data to officials at Customs
Headquarters in Washington, DC.
In an effort to elevate this issue of customs fraud and
circumvention the industry obtained support from members of the
California delegation and a letter was sent in late December 2009 by
Representative Richardson and Representatives Farr, Napolitano, Roybal-
Allard and Rohrabacher to Customs. The Acting Deputy Commissioner for
Customs provided a response to Members in mid-January 2010 and
indicated that the agency was reviewing the information.
Secretary Napolitano, over the past 5 months I have been working
with officials at steel pipe and tube companies located in my district
and others located nearby on issues related to circumvention of duties
specifically of entries arriving at the Long Beach and Los Angeles
seaports. The industry has taken great steps to provide my office with
documentation of entries of steel tubing entering at these ports
without correct classification. This has resulted in a loss of
collection of duties on these imports from China which were found to be
traded unfairly in 2008. The duties range from 100 percent to 300
percent and were put into place to provide relief for the industry. As
each day passes, the industry who makes these products in the region
and who employs approximately 2,000 workers in the area are losing the
opportunity to compete in their own market because these unfairly
traded imports are entering duty-free.
I believe that the Department should communicate throughout the
agency that commercial enforcement is critical to the economic security
of the company. I also believe that it is equally important that the
Secretary send a strong message to everyone in the agency and
especially to those at Customs that any type of fraud will not be
tolerated and if anomalies are reported that the agency take swift and
appropriate actions to ensure that these practices end. What can we do
to ensure that this issue is resolved as quickly as possible to help
protect the companies and jobs in my district and around the country?
Answer. CBP is aware that U.S. industry is highly concerned with
the evasion of Antidumping/Countervailing Duties (AD/CVD) that includes
not only steel tubing but all products, and how this evasion erodes the
ability for U.S. industry to successfully compete. Please know that CBP
takes all matters of evasion of duty very seriously, and in
coordination with ICE, the investigative arm of DHS, employs every
available method in accordance with law to address these matters.
CBP is not permitted to disclose the details of an on-going
investigation and or trade enforcement action (including CBP fines,
penalties, or forfeitures cases) or any significant action taken by CBP
to enforce the customs and related laws--including but not limited to
seizures, exclusions, or collection of duty. If the investigation or
action results in judicial action, the conclusion of a commercial
allegation can and often does take years for completion. The effect of
this lengthy process is the assumption by U.S. industry that AD/CVD
cases are not being actively enforced.
CBP is currently monitoring 288 AD/CVD cases under order and 12 AD/
CVD cases in preliminary status that have been issued by the Department
of Commerce (DOC). The number of AD/CVD cases that enter the
preliminary stage of investigation continues to increase. In many of
these cases, CBP has encountered various types of circumvention schemes
such as the misuse of entry type, misdescription or misclassification,
false country of origin, smuggling, and transshipment.
To direct an effective trade facilitation and enforcement approach,
CBP focuses its actions and resources around priority trade issues
(PTIs) that pose a significant risk to the U.S. economy, consumers, and
stakeholders, such as AD/CVD. CBP's Office of International Trade (OT)
is responsible for the trade policy, program development, and
regulatory oversight functions of CBP.
Within OT, the Commercial Targeting and Enforcement Division is
charged with the development of operational plans to address non-
compliance; manage targeting criteria; develop audit and other post-
entry verification actions; and develop penalty and enforcement
procedures for all of the PTIs. This is done through a series of
offices located around the country, staffed by subject matter experts.
These offices are designated as National Targeting and Analysis Groups
(NTAGs).
The sole focus of the South Florida NTAG in Plantation, Florida is
AD/CVD enforcement. The South Florida NTAG is responsible for
monitoring and analyzing all newly instituted AD/CVD cases and
establishing criteria to ascertain whether applicable entries are being
entered as AD/CVD entries (type 03). The research conducted involves
analyzing the use of entry type codes and changes in import patterns,
importers, manufacturers, and changes in price/quantity.
On a local level, Import Specialists monitor their PTI areas and/or
commodity, and initiate trade enforcement actions. Those actions are
recorded in CBP systems and available at a National level for other
Import Specialist and NTAGS for review. NTAGs will review those results
and determine if National and/or further action is necessary.
CBP Service Ports are equipped with Commercial Enforcement Analysis
and Response (CEAR) Teams, comprised of subject matter experts from
local CBP and ICE commercial fraud enforcement operations. With the
combined expertise of the CEAR members, the group identifies viable
enforcement actions to take on violations presented to the group, which
may include the initiation of an investigation by ICE, a penalty
imposed by CBP, or a combination of both criminal and civil actions.
CBP has been successful in many instances in stopping evasion that
we have detected or when U.S. industry provides us with an allegation
of evasion. With every success, however, there are likely evasion
schemes that go undetected. ICE can only investigate so many importers,
and many cases cannot be proven, especially with transshipment issues.
Several nations do not allow CBP or ICE teams to investigate in their
respective countries. Additionally, some importers are foreign entities
and cannot be thoroughly investigated and pursued in the United States
as to their duty liability, and CBP is left with only the bond amount
for duty collection.
We understand that there is a monetary gain in not paying the AD/CV
duty on these subject products, and that certain foreign manufactures
and U.S. importers will attempt to circumvent AD/CVD cases. As such,
CBP will continue to target importers and manufactures for potential
evasion of AD/CVD cases and use all available means to enforce the
cases.
Question 2a. Madame Secretary, in 2008, the TSA issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for the Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP)
which would create a set of security standards for large general
aviation aircraft. My understanding is that the initial proposed rule
did not address security and operational issues sufficiently and is now
being revised with appropriate technical input from stakeholders. I
know that you've testified before about this issue and have expressed
your desire to work with stakeholders to get this and other rules
completed cooperatively. In my opinion, this is the best way to
approach the rule-making process because it ensures that policy-makers
have developed rules utilizing needed security and technical expertise
from the industry.
Since it decided to revise the LASP, the TSA has taken this
approach and is now nearing completion on a supplemental rulemaking.
However, I understand that the agency missed a self-imposed deadline to
get this rulemaking out before the end of last year and that it does
not expect to issue it until later this year. Although I understand
that the TSA still does not have an administrator, I worry that this
rule is being delayed too long.
When do you expect to issue the supplemental rulemaking for the
LASP?
Question 2b. Does the Department have adequate resources to
complete this rule?
Question 2c. Do you plan to make it a priority of yours to see that
the LASP rule is completed as soon as possible?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) views
strengthening general aviation security as one of its top priorities.
The TSA is currently developing a Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (SNPRM) for the Large Aircraft Security Program, taking into
consideration more than 7,000 public comments received from the
original Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and input from the use of open
public forums, workshops, and stakeholder meetings. TSA expects to
issue the SNPRM later this calendar year.
Questions Submitted by Honorable Bill L. Owens of New York for Janet
Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. I am pleased to see that ICE's budget request includes
the establishment of a Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST),
including one in Massena, New York.
What kind of results can the community expect to see from a BEST?
Answer. Establishing a BEST in Massena will allow ICE and its law
enforcement partners in the region to efficiently focus on
investigating cross-border criminal activity related to contraband
smuggling, human smuggling, money laundering, weapons trafficking, and
its associated violence on the Akwesasne Mohawk Indian Reservation.
Since 2005, the BESTs have been extremely successful in addressing the
threats of cross-border crime. The BESTs are flexible platforms from
which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) investigates and
targets transnational criminal organizations and emerging threats that
exploit vulnerabilities along the Nation's borders. The Massena BEST,
through its partnership with local, county, State, Tribal, Federal, and
international partners in the region, will address transnational
criminal organizations operating and living in the shared communities
of New York State and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec. In
addition, the Massena BEST will complement and enhance already
established BESTs in Detroit and Buffalo to effectively target and
dismantle major criminal organizations based in the greater Toronto
area that use smuggling routes through all three locations.
Question 1b. What other steps is DHS taking to improve the security
of tribal lands along our borders?
Answer. ICE is addressing the security of tribal lands along our
borders primarily through the Shadow Wolves. The Shadow Wolves are
Native American trackers that patrol the Tohono O'odham Indian Nation,
a 2.8 million-acre reservation in Arizona with a 75-mile-long border
with Mexico. The Shadow Wolves were established by Congressional
mandate in the early 1970s in response to the rampant smuggling
occurring through the Tohono O'odham Indian Nation. The Shadow Wolves'
primary mission is to interdict smuggled narcotics using both modern
technology and the ancient art of tracking.
In fiscal year 2007, several Shadow Wolves were detailed to the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation (Montana) and the Bay Mills Chippewa
Indian Reservation (Michigan) to assess the viability of establishing
similar units along the Northern border. Although the details did not
produce any enforcement results, they were successful in creating
points of contact and opening dialogue between the Tribal governments
and the local ICE Resident Agent in Charge offices. The Shadow Wolves
details were coordinated with Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Office of Border Patrol, along
with Tribal and local law enforcement agencies.
DHS is also addressing the security of our Tribal lands along the
border through its Southwest border efforts. Personnel from ICE's
Office of Investigation (OI), Detention and Removal Operations (DRO),
and Office of Intelligence (INTEL) as well as myriad Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies are currently partnering in BEST and
the Southwest border surge; efforts that will improve security along
the Southwest border. ICE has also increased participation with
government of Mexico agencies to assist in providing additional
security to border communities at large. Furthermore, other DHS
initiatives undertaken by CBP, particularly OBP, will also impact the
security of these communities.
Question 2. Northern border communities have historically
benefitted from Operation Stonegarden, a program that provides grants
to local law enforcement on the border to increase their operation
readiness. Northern border States have always been eligible for these
grants and received funding in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009.
Yet the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011, which includes
$50 million for Operation Stonegarden, proposes limiting eligibility to
the Southern border only. What is the rationale for excluding Northern
border communities from applying for this funding?
Answer. The fiscal year 2011 request for Stonegarden is only for
the SW border because of DHS concern about the continuing threats on
this border.
Question 3. I would like to know if the Department of Homeland
Security has considered streamlining the Trusted Traveler Program so
that participants can use a single card at international points of
entry along the U.S.-Canadian border. Further, has TSA considered
creating dedicated security screening lanes at airports for
participants in one of CBP's Trusted Traveler Programs?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) operates four Trusted Traveler Programs:
NEXUS, Free and Secure Trade (FAST), Secure Electronic Network for
Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and Global Entry. There are over
730,000 approved, low-risk travelers enrolled in these programs, which
offer secure and expedited immigration, customs, and agriculture
processing on arrival into the United States.
Over the last 2 years, CBP has taken steps to streamline all of its
Trusted Traveler Programs so that they are easily accessible and
convenient for international travelers. For example, all of the Trusted
Traveler Programs are served by a single on-line application system
called the Global Online Enrollment System (GOES). The integration of
all the programs into a single database and on-line application is key
part of a unified trusted traveler program.
Whereas Global Entry does not have a separate credential, CBP
redesigned the credentials for NEXUS, SENTRI, and FAST to make them
more secure and have the same look and feel. All three credentials
comply with requirements of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
(WHTI); members holding a credential receive facilitated processing
when entering at the land border through trusted traveler dedicated
lanes but can be used by U.S. and Canadian citizens to enter the United
States through any lane at any land or sea port of entry. NEXUS,
SENTRI, and FAST cards can be verified at the border electronically
through CBP's databases. All three documents are accepted by the
Transportation Security Administration as identity documents for the
purposes of entering the sterile area of an airport.
Although virtually harmonized, it is unlikely that CBP will change
the names of the respective programs due to bi-national agreements and
brand recognition. The NEXUS program is jointly managed by the United
States and Canadian governments. NEXUS allows entry from Canada into
the United States at land, and designated air, and small boat arrival
locations. SENTRI is managed solely by the United States.
Global Entry is a CBP Trusted Traveler pilot program that provides
expedited clearance of pre-approved, low-risk air travelers into the
United States. Global Entry allows approved members to use an automated
kiosk at designated airports to bypass the regular CBP Passport Control
queues so that customs, agriculture, and immigration processing is
expedited. Membership is currently limited to U.S. citizens, U.S.
nationals, and U.S. lawful permanent residents, as well as to citizens
of the Netherlands via a joint arrangement. Unlike the other programs,
Global Entry does not require the use of a separate credential; the
traveler presents his or her passport or lawful permanent resident
card, which is linked to Global Entry membership.
TSA piloted the Registered Traveler program, which provided a
service similar to your proposal to dedicate security screening lanes
at U.S. airports for members of CBP's Trusted Traveler Programs. At the
conclusion of the pilot, Registered Traveler transitioned to a private
sector-run, market-driven program. Three Registered Traveler vendors
provided operations at participating airports, but have since ceased
operations due to financial reasons. TSA has encouraged interested
vendors to work directly with airports and air carriers if they wish to
develop similar Registered Traveler programs. DHS will evaluate future
private sector proposals to include consideration of possible benefits
to members of CBP's Trusted Traveler Programs.
Questions Submitted by Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr. of New Jersey for
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. I was extremely surprised to see that the budget called
for four stand-alone grants programs to just be folded into the larger
State Homeland Security Grant Program. This includes the Interoperable
Emergency Communications Grants that Mr. Reichert and I worked to
create in the 109th Congress in order to support our first responders
in the wake of the lessons we learned on 9/11. If these critical grant
programs are folded in we have no way to track their funding from year
to year--to me this looks like a way to do a back-door cut of these
programs. Will the Department commit to the committee that if these
grant programs remain folded into the State Homeland Security grants
that in next year's budget you will ensure that there is a breakdown of
how much funding went directly for these priorities including
interoperability grants? Without that information this committee is
blind to understanding if key priorities are being properly addressed.
Answer. FEMA's Grants Reporting Tool (GRT) is built to track both
sub-program spending as well as National priority data. As such, if the
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP) is
consolidated as a stand-alone program into the larger State Homeland
Security Program (SHSP), the GRT would be configured to capture the
IECGP spending data independently. The GRT would also continue to be
configured to track overall National spending activities relative to
interoperable communications; this data would be construed across a
plethora of grant programs for which interoperable communications is an
allowable spending area, including IECGP. If the IECGP is subsumed into
the overall State Homeland Security Program (i.e. it would not continue
to be stood up as a separate grant program, even if consolidated into
SHSP), the GRT would still be configured to track spending activities--
including planning, training, exercises, equipment, and personnel--
relative to the Interoperable Communications National priority.
Question 2. In recent years we've seen CBP try to focus its limited
resources by creating new programs that grant significant benefits to
companies that can demonstrate strong internal controls. An example of
this is the Importer Self-Assessment Program. This permits importers to
self-assess their customs compliance to avoid official CBP audits and
reduce the threat of delays for Government inspections. The new Broker
Self-Assessment pilot program follows a similar model, and allows
customs brokers to police themselves if they agree to follow approved
security plans. These programs are designed, in large part, to help
alleviate CBP's audit burden and facilitate trade in a speedier
fashion. Of concern, however, is the lack of a specified standard for
measuring HS classification accuracy.
After all, how effective is it to have participants in such
programs audit themselves without any CBP-provided objective standards
for measurement?
Do you believe that such programs would have greater success if CBP
established objective, standardized controls for measuring HS
classification accuracy?
Answer. The annual compliance measurement of the Importer Self-
Assessment participants has been 99.5 percent overall and slightly over
99 percent in classification (major transactional discrepancies) over
the last 4 years. CBP will explore ways to enhance the self-testing
conducted by participants, which may include establishing measurement
standards for particular risk areas.
Honing measurements and standards can be effective in sustaining
and possibly surpassing the overall compliance goals of the ISA
program, which would include HS classification accuracy.
Question 3. According to CBP, commodity reporting errors contribute
significantly to the estimated $1 billion in duty revenue losses to the
U.S. Treasury per year. What's more, substandard commodity reporting
plays a significant negative role in Customs targeting efforts.
Presumably, CBP is trying to address these shortcomings through the
Importer Security Filing (also known as ``10+2''). However, 10+2
remains critically dependent on timely and accurate commodity
classification, and there has been no evidence to suggest that
commodity classification accuracy has improved.
What are some of the major reasons why classification errors are so
pronounced?
What will you do to help remedy the problem?
Answer. CBP uses an annual statistical audit to measure revenue
loss due to non-compliance. Our measurements of this revenue loss over
the last 5 years have declined from $470 million in fiscal year 2005 to
$285 million dollars in fiscal year 2009. As a percentage of all
duties, fees, and taxes that CBP does collect, these statistical
estimates represent about 1 percent on average of the roughly $30
billion that the agency collects within a given year. Misclassification
of goods is a primary cause of this revenue loss, mainly because the
complexity of the tariff allows for even the most common of mistakes to
cause a wide percentage shift in the rate of duty applied to imported
goods.
However, classification is an area that we directly address through
targeting, operations, and other enforcement activities. These
activities provide a benefit in both reinforcing compliant behavior
from importers 99 percent of the time as the statistical audits show,
while allowing the agency to focus on the 1 percent of revenue that is
not paid to the agency when duties are due.
Regarding the Importer Secure Filing (ISF), the law requiring
importers to supply this information strictly prohibits CBP from using
it for purposes other than ensuring cargo safety and security and
preventing smuggling. As a recent source of data layered on top of
existing ones, CBP cannot use it to address revenue issues. However,
this does not impact the other existing and well-used data sources
available to the agency for cargo and post-release trade enforcement,
and CBP remains committed to measuring, targeting, and applying risk
management principles to revenue loss related to non-compliance and
fraud.
Questions Submitted by Honorable Daniel E. Lungren of California for
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. The request for the chemical and biological program at
the Science and Technology Directorate is slightly decreased from
fiscal year 2010 levels. The Congressional justification states that
the decrease reflects the ``funding of higher priority items within the
Department.'' It also states that as a result of the decrease, subject
matter expertise and support for the NBIC will be reduced.
Is it fair to assume, therefore, that the NBIC is not a terribly
high priority for the Department, at least not until its fate is
determined, and that Congress will continue to see budget requests for
this program decrease?
What is the plan for the NBIC? Are we wasting time and money by
continuing an endeavor that is not achieving its goals, or do those
goals need to be redefined? In what way will the Department engage the
Congress in its discussions surrounding the future of NBIC?
Answer. The $7 million requested in fiscal year 2011 to support
NBIC is sufficient to maintain current operations. Funding will support
development of analytical biological surveillance and impact reports--
similar to the reports completed during the 2009-H1N1 pandemic. These
reports are collaboratively developed among interagency partners and
will be made available for interagency use.
The $1 million reduction from fiscal year 2010 funding reduces the
amount available to reimburse detailees or liaison officers from
partner agencies to serve at NBIC to provide analytic and collaborative
capabilities. The reduction in funding could affect up to six detailees
depending on grade. While the lack of reimbursements may be interpreted
as a disincentive to interagency participation in NBIC, as highlighted
in the Government Accountability Office's report, ``Biosurveillance:
Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering
Interagency Data and Resource Sharing,'' Federal agencies are not
actively participating in NBIC. To foster collaboration and information
sharing between agencies, we must reevaluate NBIC's structure to ensure
its mission is transparent and participating agencies understand its
value add during biological incidents.
To further information flow into NBIC and strengthen collaboration
with State and local partners, the DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
is working to enhance partnerships with specific States, the private
sector, non-governmental agencies, and the international community.
Beginning with the $5 million provided to NBIC in fiscal year 2010 to
support a demonstration project with the North Carolina Collaboratory
for Bio-Preparedness, we aim to validate integrated information sharing
of public health, animal surveillance information, environmental
monitoring, and other biosurveillance information. We continue to work
with our Federal partners.
In addition to North Carolina, NBIC is engaging with other States
to establish biosurveillance data-sharing pilot outreach programs.
These States include: New Jersey--a State with a very mature DHS-State
fusion center relationship and a robust information-sharing tool;
Minnesota--a State nationally known for their superior food defense
capabilities through information analysis; and, Washington State--a
State that has demonstrated advanced capability to integrate critical
infrastructure analysis into decision-making schemes. As we work with
State and local partners and follow GAO's recommendations, we hope to
demonstrate the value of situational awareness to respond to biological
incidents.
DHS has and will continue to make every effort to engage
interagency participants as well as promote outreach and data sharing
with appropriate State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies. NBIC
and the biosurveillance Federal agency participants are now engaged in
a formal review of the biosurveillance mission-space, interagency value
of data-sharing and data integration, methodology to enhance
collaboration and the development of metrics to monitor and evaluate
mission success.
As we work to refine NBIC by engaging State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners, we will update Congress on the status of NBIC and
associated challenges that arise.
Question 2. Some have argued that despite improvements in the
interagency process and the issuance of several important reports and
other strategy-type documents, the Nation does not have a truly
National biodefense strategy. And that, more specifically, DHS does not
have its own Department-wide biodefense strategy. When can we expect a
biodefense strategy and implementation plan from DHS?
Answer. The recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on BioWatch
and Public Health Surveillance recommended that ``DHS enhance efforts
to develop a mechanism for providing a national situational awareness
of biological threats and significant disease outbreaks, to better
inform rapid decision-making and response through cross-jurisdictional
data sharing and analysis of data.'' OHA takes this report seriously
and sees great value in the Commission's work. The Obama administration
has taken steps to enhance the Nation's capabilities. After this Report
was published, Assistant Secretary Dr. Garza met with the Executive
Director of the WMD Commission to discuss OHA's related efforts and to
build a relationship that will allow DHS to use the report card as a
catalyst for continuing to improve National capabilities.
A National Biodefense strategy to detect and protect the Nation
against biological threats requires coordination among Federal
agencies, State, local, Tribal, and territorial officials, and
representatives from the private sector. DHS is working internally and
in coordination with key stakeholders to develop an approach that can
effectively and systematically address detection, preparedness, and
response to biological threats.
Questions Submitted by Honorable Mike Rogers of Alabama for Janet
Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Strategic planning is key when proposing any budget. We
must be certain that our homeland security dollars are being spent
wisely, with adequate attention not only to the Office of Health
Affairs immediate goals, but to those of the entire Department and the
Nation. With that in mind:
When can we expect a strategic plan from the Office of Health
Affairs?
What are the specific goals of that strategic plan?
How do these goals reflect the work currently on-going within the
three OHA divisions (Weapons of Mass Destruction & Biodefense, Medical
Readiness, and Component Services)?
What are the primary tasks each of your employees will deliver on
in the coming year?
How do these break down into monthly deliverables and 90-day
deliverables?
I would like a list of the deliverables for each main division and
each office within each division for these time periods.
Has the Science and Technology Directorate reviewed the draft
strategic plan, and what were their comments?
Have OHA staff been afforded the opportunity to provide anonymous
input and feedback on the plan? Please provide a written copy of this
feedback.
Answer. I agree that strategic planning is essential when
developing a budget request. It is for this reason that I directed the
Deputy Secretary to conduct a bottom-up review of the Department's
activities, to ensure that future budget requests align to National
priorities.
The Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is finalizing a Strategic
Framework the week of April 5, 2010. The Framework will outline goals
and strategic objectives for fulfilling OHA's responsibilities in
support of my priorities, the DHS mission, and in alignment of the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). We will provide you will a
copy of the framework when it is complete. On April 6, 2010 all the
employees of OHA will gather for an ``All Hands'' meeting to discuss
the new Framework and their path forward.
OHA's updated milestones and measures will be included in the
Fiscal Year 2011-2015 Future Years Homeland Security Program report to
Congress.
Question 2. As important as the strategic plan itself are the
people who draft and carry out that plan.
What are the qualifications of senior leadership within OHA? Please
demonstrate that your top-level management meets these qualifications.
What is the position description and qualifications required for
the Director of the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense Division?
Answer. OHA senior leadership consists of a Chief Medical Officer
(CMO) and Assistant Secretary, Deputy CMO/Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, an Associate Chief Medical Officer for Medical Readiness, an
Associate Chief Medical Officer for Component Services and a Deputy
Assistant Secretary for WMD Biodefense. The qualifications of the
individuals holding those positions are listed below.
CMO/Asst Sec.--Senate-confirmed position, qualifications
public record. MD, MPH, 13 years as a practicing physician and
medical educator.
DCMO/PDAS.--Vacant.
ACMO Medical Readiness.--MD, 17 years experience in
emergency medicine.
ACMO Component Services.--MD, MPH, EMS Fellowship, 18 years
emergency medical experience.
DAS WMD-Biodefense.--Career SES, 20 years military
experience in operational, finance, and policy-making roles; 7
years at DHS in Executive positions.
The qualifications required of the Director of the Food,
Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense Division include, but are not
limited to:
Doctor of Veterinary Medicine required; a Master of Public
Health or Master of Science in Epidemiology, or similar
Master's degree in a relevant health sciences discipline is
preferred.
Demonstrated ability to serve as an expert and advisor on
incidences of animal and food-borne disease conditions, as well
as the public health impacts of zoonotic and infectious
diseases.
Knowledge of veterinary and/or public health emergency
management and operations.
Ability to lead and manage the agricultural security and
food defense activities within the division, OHA, and DHS.
Demonstrated skill to plan, organize, and recommend
implementation of a National level animal disease program and
food defense program which results in substantial favorable
consequences.
Ability to lead the development of strategies and
recommendation and the implementation of operational plans that
will promote improvement in safety of animal agriculture,
reduction in animal disease risk, and prevention of food-borne
illnesses.
Demonstrated skill in effective and clear communications to
senior-level Government and private sector officials on a
variety of policy, programmatic, and scientific information.
Skill in building consensus among internal and external
stakeholders and in obtaining and maintaining cooperation and
support to resolve policy and program issues.
Ability to communicate technical information in a non-
technical environment.
Question 3. I understand that Dr. Jon Krohmer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary (PDAS) and Deputy Chief Medical Officer (CMO), has
been detailed to work on health matters for Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. I would like to request the document showing the line of
succession for the position of Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs/
CMO. My understanding is that it is the PDAS who is in charge in the
absence of the Assistant Secretary/CMO. Statutorily, the Chief Medical
Officer is required to be a medical doctor, and it would therefore
follow that the PDAS/CMO would also be. In Dr. Krohmer's absence, then,
do you have a medical doctor as the Acting PDAS/CMO?
Answer. Per the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of
2006, the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) ``shall possess a demonstrated
ability in and knowledge of medicine and public health.'' The statute
does not require the individual appointed as Chief Medical Officer to
be a medical doctor. Any individual that meets the qualification
standard set forth in 6 U.S.C. 321e(b) would be qualified to be
appointed by the President to the position of CMO, subject to the
advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
Dr. Garza, as CMO and Assistant Secretary of Health Affairs,
possesses both an M.D. and a Masters in Public Health (M.P.H). The
position of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) and Deputy
Chief Medical Officer (DCMO) is vacant at this time. At this time,
there is no Acting PDAS/DCMO. The duties of this position are currently
being fulfilled by others in senior OHA management.
The line of succession for the Office of Health Affairs is depicted
in the table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Health Affairs Career Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Presidential Appointee with
Officer. Senate Confirmation.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Career.
Deputy Chief Medical Officer.
Director of Operations.................. Career.
Chief of Staff.......................... Non-Career SES or Schedule C.
Associate Chief Medical Officer, Medical Scientific Professional.
Readiness.
Associate Chief Medical Officer, Career.
Component Services.
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Weapons Career.
of Mass Destruction and Biodefense.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4. Last fall, DHS published proposed guidance for first
responder preparedness and response to a widespread anthrax attack. I
submitted public comments at that time, and I again commend OHA for
taking this important step and for giving State and local officials
needed guidance.
When do you plan to publish the final guidance?
What will your guidance recommend with regard to the anthrax
vaccine in the Strategic National Stockpile--in terms of placement on
an approved equipment list to facilitate State access, and in terms of
dealing with expiring vaccine?
Answer. Representative Rogers, thank you for your commendation. An
interagency working group produced the guidance for first responder
preparedness and response to a widespread anthrax attack. During the
public comment period, approximately 300 comments were received. The
DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is leading the adjudication process
and the guidance document is currently under review by our Federal
interagency partners.
The guidance recommends pre-event vaccination for high-risk
responder groups. However, the guidance does not make any
recommendations regarding expiring vaccines contained in the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS). Though the guidance does not address expiring
vaccine, there are on-going discussions as to how to best manage the
expiring vaccine in the SNS, including the option of making expiring
vaccine available to responder organizations considered to be in the
high-risk categories on a volunteer basis.
Facilitating State access to Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) vaccine
by including it on FEMA's Approved Equipment List (AEL) has been a
priority for OHA. We have been working closely with the Interagency
Board (IAB), an organization sponsored by the Federal Government that
serves as an independent and unbiased expert panel to make
recommendations related to standardization and appropriate deployment
of technologies to first responders. We hope to gain the support of the
IAB to include AVA on the Standardized Equipment List (SEL), from which
FEMA bases the AEL. OHA will continue to work with the IAB and FEMA to
ensure our Nation's first responders are protected from and prepared to
respond to biological threats.
Question 5a. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission just
released a report card that flunked the administration in several areas
of WMD preparedness.
How is your budget reflective of the WMD Commission's
recommendations to enhance laboratory biosecurity and other
biopreparedness needs, in particular those areas deemed insufficient by
the latest report card?
Answer. DHS takes the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
Report Card produced by the Graham-Talent Commission on the Prevention
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism seriously
and sees great value in the Commission's work. The Obama administration
has taken steps to enhance the Nation's capabilities. After this Report
was published, Assistant Secretary of the Office of Health Affairs
(OHA) Dr. Garza met with the Executive Director of the WMD Commission
to discuss OHA's related efforts and to build a relationship that will
allow DHS to use the report card as a catalyst for continuing to
improve National capabilities.
The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) was
authorized in 2007 to enhance the capacity of the Federal Government to
rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track biological events
of National concern through integration and analysis of data relating
to human health, as well as animal, plant, food, and environmental
monitoring systems (both National and international). Since it was
initiated, NBIC has provided critical biosurveillance information on a
number of incidents including the 2009 Salmonella St. Paul event and
the 2009-H1N1 pandemic.
NBIC works to identify biological incidents early and alerts senior
leaders of emerging threats against the population. It is critical that
the Nation has the ability to recognize and track biological events
early to prevent or mitigate associated consequences.
Question 5b. In what ways does your budget support the need for
enhanced guidance for emergency planning and citizen engagement,
specifically in terms of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's
request?
Answer. The report card recommends that we ``work with a consortium
of State and local governments to improve preparedness in the event of
a WMD attack'' and highlights our efforts relating to Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101. It goes on to recommend working with citizens,
private sector, and non-governmental organizations to improve guidance
and preparedness.
While a number of the items in the fiscal year 2011 budget will
advance this effort, two in particular will make targeted advances to
address this recommendation. The Technical Assistance Program provides
needed support to State and local governments to implement a variety of
preparedness programs across the continuum of homeland security. The
lessons learned from the program, along with the materials developed in
support of the program, serve as the foundational materials for the
enhancement of the Comprehensive Preparedness Guides as well as public
education materials in support of Community Preparedness. This will
include a joint effort with the private sector community to update the
existing planning recommendations issued in 1993, as well as guides
addressing the variety of hazards faced by a community.
Questions Submitted by Honorable Michael T. McCaul of Texas for Janet
Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. For fiscal year 2011, Congress provided $20 million
for the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-12 program for
fiscal year 2010 to issue new, secure identity cards to Department of
Homeland Security employees and contractors to access secure
facilities, communications, and data. With the increasing prevalence of
our Government computers being infiltrated the HSPD-12 program needs to
be deployed as quickly as possible to lock down our computer networks
from hackers.
Congress has also directed the Department of Homeland Security,
Office of Security, to provide a report on your progress in issuing new
identity cards and remaining needs for additional infrastructure and
materials needed to complete the project.
Please give us an update on the issuance of the HSPD-12 cards
including a timeline on the obligation of the funds and progress on
deployment of these secure cards for this fiscal year.
Answer. The Department has made the issuance of the DHS PIV card to
DHS employees and contractors a top priority. At the beginning of the
DHS PIV card surge deployment, DHS had issued 21,372 as of January 22,
2010. At the end of second quarter of fiscal year 2010 (March 31,
2010), DHS issued an additional 16,738 cards for a cumulative total of
38,110 PIV cards issued. The Office of the Chief Security Officer is
working closely with DHS Components to ensure that DHS will have issued
100,000 PIV cards across the components in fiscal year 2010. The
Department will issue 250,000 PIV cards by the end of fiscal year 2011
utilizing existing resources.
The following table provides the projected timeline for obligating
funds for HSPD-12 cards:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HSPD-12 Card Issuance Procurement Amount
Plan ($000) Contract Awarded
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Treasury Certificate Authority $267 Fiscal year 2010 Q 2
Services.
DHS HSPD-12 Core Infrastructure $159 Fiscal year 2010 Q 2
(operations/network costs).
DHS PIV Card Stock.................. $245 Fiscal year 2010 Q 2
NCR Card Issuance, Installation $1,330 Fiscal year 2010 Q 2
Support, & Enterprise Training.
GPO Security Printing of DHS PIV $1,770 Fiscal year 2010 Q 3
Cards.
Enrollment/Card Issuance $3,765 Fiscal year 2010 Q 3
Workstations and Consumables.
Card Issuance Contract Labor and $10,385 Fiscal year 2010 Q 3
Deployment Support.
Internet-based Appointment $145 Fiscal year 2010 Q 4
Scheduling Tool.
PKI Certificates and CIWS Interfaces $1,909 Fiscal year 2010 Q 4
Reserved for contract overages or $25 .......................
miscellaneous expenses.
-----------------------------------
Total IMD Costs............... $20,000 .......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 1b. What are you requesting for fiscal year 2011 for HSPD-
12 deployment?
Answer. The Office of Security fiscal year 2011 budget request does
not include funding for HSPD-12 Deployment. The Department expects to
obligate fiscal year 2010 funds for contracts in the third quarter that
will carry the Department's efforts into fiscal year 2011. The
Department is working with components to identify funding, such as
component base funding for legacy badging systems, to meet any other
fiscal year 2011 and the out-year requirements. The Department is
committed to fulfilling its requirements under HSPD-12 utilizing base
resources in fiscal year 2011.
Question 2. During the President's State of the Union message he
highlighted ``bio-terrorism.'' But when I read through the supporting
document the next day I noticed he was referring to a plan to stockpile
medications for a possible bio-attack. There is a Bio-Watch program
underway. Are we keeping our focus on this most needed detection
system?
Answer. DHS agrees that the BioWatch program is a much-needed
system that provides early detection of a biological attack and the
Department remains focused on supporting this program. The fiscal year
2011 budget request maintains current biodetection capabilities,
referred to as the Generation-1 and Generation-2 program, and moves
forward with the major acquisition to upgrade systems with autonomous
biodetection capabilities, referred to as Generation-3. Significant
testing and evaluation is required of all potential autonomous
biodetection capabilities to ensure the technology is capable of
meeting end user requirements prior to DHS committing to a procurement
decision. The updated timeline for the Generation-3 program is
reflected by the major milestones below:
Field Test Program Contract Award (Phase I)--November 12,
2009;
Field Test Program Task Order 1 Award--February 2, 2010;
Field Test Program Task Order 2 Award--3rd Quarter fiscal
year 2010;
Completion of Field Testing--2nd Quarter fiscal year 2011;
Technology Readiness Review--2nd Quarter fiscal year 2011;
Phase II Contract Award for Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) and Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E)--4th Quarter
fiscal year 2011 or 1st Quarter fiscal year 2012;
Conduct OT&E: Start--4th Quarter fiscal year 2012, Finish--
3rd Quarter fiscal year 2013;
Initial Operational Capability (IOC)--3rd Quarter fiscal
year 2013;
Deployment of Gen-3 detectors Nation-wide, fiscal year 2013-
fiscal year 2016;
Completed network fiscal year 2017.
The deployment of an automated biodetection capability may
facilitate expanding biomonitoring efforts to indoor locations that are
not well-supported by the current technology as well as shortening the
detection time following an attack. The Nation's detection capability
through the BioWatch program is augmented by coordination of State and
local assets through local BioWatch Advisory Committees and
Jurisdictional Coordination programs, organization of interagency
support on the Federal level and a robust exercise program directed
towards notification through response. DHS also leads an interagency
effort that produces guidance documents to support State and local
responses.
Question 3. It seems to me we need the earliest possible detection
system to alert emergency rooms and citizens, and properly deploy
countermeasures and vaccines. Is the $89 million in the proposed budget
enough for the full deployment of bio-watch units next year?
Answer. DHS agrees that the BioWatch program is a much-needed
system that provides early detection of a biological attack and the
Department remains focused on supporting this program. In fiscal year
2011, $173.5 million is requested to support the BioWatch program.
Approximately $89.5 million will be used to maintain the current
National network, establish a more comprehensive quality assurance
program, optimize the BioWatch network to maximize probability of
detection of an attack, expand the current BioWatch exercise program
that includes extensive interaction with Federal, State, and local
partners, provide State and local partners better situational awareness
with web-based modeling capabilities backed up by a robust reach-back
capability to the National laboratories, and work with the interagency
on technology evaluations.
Approximately $84 million will be used to procure and potentially
deploy units for a four-city operational field test of the Generation-3
system. If one or both candidates pass current testing, we plan to
procure units for deployment into other existing BioWatch
jurisdictions. The four-city operational testing phase will evaluate
BioWatch systems in a variety of outdoor and indoor environments to
ensure the systems operate properly before committing the Government to
a large-scale buy.
The final Generation-3 National network will be deployed over a
period of 3-4 years after the aforementioned operational test and
evaluation in four cities. The Generation-3 schedule is reflected by
the major milestones below:
Phase I Contract Award--November 12, 2009;
Task Order 1 Award--February 2, 2010;
Task Order 2 Award--3 Q fiscal year 2010;
Completion of Field Testing--2 Q fiscal year 2011;
Technology Readiness Review--2 Q fiscal year 2011;
Phase II Contract Award for Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP) and Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E)--1 Q fiscal
year 2012.
OT&E:
Start--4 Q fiscal year 2012;
Finish--3 Q fiscal year 2013;
Initial Operational Capability (IOC)--3 Q fiscal year 2013;
Approval for Full Rate Production (FRP)--3 Q fiscal year
2013;
Contract Award for FRP--4 Q fiscal year 2013;
Deployment of Gen-3 detectors Nation-wide, fiscal year 2013-
fiscal year 2016;
Completed network fiscal year 2017.
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