[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FLIGHT 253: LEARNING LESSONS FROM AN AVERTED TRAGEDY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 27, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-51
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
William L. Owens, New York
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Witnesses
Ms. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
Mr. Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary, Management, Department
of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Mr. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Statement Submitted by Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland
Security and Justice Issues, and Stephen M. Lord, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government
Accountability Office........................................ 6
Statement Submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union...... 17
Appendix
Questions Submitted by Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Jane Holl
Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security........ 81
Questions Submitted by Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Michael E.
Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center............. 84
Questions Submitted by Honorable Christopher P. Carney for
Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center.. 84
FLIGHT 253: LEARNING LESSONS FROM AN AVERTED TRAGEDY
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Wednesday, January 27, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, DeFazio, Jackson
Lee, Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Kirkpatrick, Lujan, Owens,
Pascrell, Cleaver, Green, Himes, Kilroy, Titus, King, Souder,
Lungren, Rogers, McCaul, Dent, Bilirakis, Broun, Miller, Olson,
and Austria.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to
receive testimony on ``Flight 253: Learning Lessons from an
Averted Tragedy.''
Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for being
here today. Today's hearing will examine the circumstances
surrounding the attempted Christmas day bombing of Northwest
Flight 253. This committee will examine what happened, why it
happened, and what this Nation can do to make sure it does not
happen again.
We all know the facts. Abdulmutallab boarded Northwest
Flight 253 in Amsterdam bound for Detroit. As the plane entered
Detroit's airspace, he removed chemicals concealed in his
clothing and mixed them together with the intention of causing
an explosion. Thankfully, he failed. Courageous passengers and
crew subdued and restrained him until the plane landed, and he
was taken into custody.
Since September 11, this Nation has spent billions of
dollars to fix the aviation security system, yet 9 years later
it is clear that the safeguards put in place during the last
administration did not prevent another terrorist from boarding
a plane and trying to do harm to Americans.
This single failed terrorist act has brought those unsolved
security vulnerabilities into sharp focus. Security weaknesses
in the process of gaining legal admission to this country, gaps
in the collection and dissemination of information, a confusing
plethora of lists used to identify dangerous individuals,
stovepipes that impede the progress of information analysis and
sharing, and inconsistencies in the use of screening technology
all combine to create the situation faced by the passengers on
Flight 253.
The 9/11 Commission identified many of these problems, and
while the previous administration engaged in much movement to
solve these problems, it appears that movement and progress are
not the same. Within 2 weeks of this incident, President Obama
issued his preliminary report. The President's report found
incoherent, systematic weaknesses, and human errors were the
root cause of the intelligence failures that led to this
incident.
To any reasonable observer, one fact was certain. The
system did not work. In fact, the President ordered a series of
corrective actions, a clear and unflinching assessment followed
by quick action designed to address this long-known
vulnerability must be commended.
But it is important for all of us to realize that we will
not address our problems with terrorism in a blink of an eye
with a single technology. This Nation must begin to adopt a
layered approach to achieve a secure environment. We must not
begin our security assessment at the airport gate.
I want to thank our witnesses, and I look forward to their
testimony.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like you, I want to
thank the witnesses for their testimony here today.
I think this is an especially critical hearing. Everyone
knows mistakes are made. Mistakes do happen. I think what
concerns us and what should concern us as we go forward is how
those mistakes are addressed and what is being done to protect
our Nation in the future and to protect those types of mistakes
from happening again.
Mr. Chairman, one of the concerns I have is what appears to
me an uncoordinated response from the intelligence community. I
say that not just based on what we have learned over the past
month, but also from watching the Senate hearings last week,
from looking at the testimony, listening to what former
Congressman Hamilton had to say yesterday.
I say that is I still can't determine who is in charge, who
makes the decisions. If we go back to the 2006 event, the
liquid explosives from London, clearly, the Department of
Homeland Security was in charge. It was Secretary Chertoff who
was out front. It was Kip Hawley, head of TSA, who was out in
front.
This time there was really no one in front. Secretary
Napolitano made several appearances. Mr. Brennan made several
appearances. But it appears that there was no one who was
coordinating this from beginning to end. There was no one who
was going to be out in front.
I am concerned what the role--I asked Deputy Secretary Lute
just during her testimony what DHS sees as its role as being,
and I know in your statement, I have heard Secretary Napolitano
say this, that the Department is a consumer of intelligence. I
thought when the Department was created, we expected more of an
affirmative role by the Department, again, as what did occur, I
thought, in the last several years of the previous
administration.
I am not making this a political issue, but if this
administration is deciding to change emphasis, then I think we
should know that, as to who is going to be the main coordinator
here.
Also, I think it is important for the President to come
forward and to establish some order in the intelligence
community. I saw Lee Hamilton said yesterday, ``I do not
believe the President yet has a firm grasp of the intelligence
community.''
All of us are aware that in the past 6 or 8 months, there
has been an open dispute between Admiral Blair and Director
Panetta. That has not been resolved, and if it is resolved, it
is resolved at the margins. That feud, if you will, is still
there.
We find out that the main decisions, some of the key
decisions that were made on December 25 were not made by anyone
in the intelligence community, but apparently by the Justice
Department, and then after that it appears the main player was
the White House itself, John Brennan, neither of whom is part
of the intelligence community.
If we are going to have an effective response and effective
defense set up, I believe that the professionals in the
intelligence field should have more to say. The departments and
agencies that have been created for that purpose should be in
the forefront.
So the whole issue of the Miranda warning--currently, no
one--no one here today, nor Director Blair nor Director Panetta
were consulted when that decision was made. It was made by the
Justice Department, apparently.
Similarly, let me add on that, when it comes to the Justice
Department being involved, it was the attorney general, who we
have learned, and some of us have known it for a while, but it
has now become public, when he made the decision to bring the
9/11 trials to New York, he never consulted with one person,
not one person in New York--police commissioner, anyone of the
State police, anyone of the U.S. Marshals.
No one was consulted about the security implications of
that, which appears to be what was repeated on Christmas day
when the Justice Department made this decision without getting
any input from anyone else in the intelligence community.
Let me also make a point here, and I want to make this very
clearly. I hope this will be a bipartisan point. I am outraged
by the lack of information we have gotten from this
administration since Christmas day. The previous
administration--I will ask the Chairman to vouch for me on
this--again, using the liquid explosive incident in London,
from the night before and for every day and every hour after
that, we received any information we asked for, that we
requested. It was given to us. We were told what was
classified, what was not to be made public.
In this case on Christmas night, the White House--and I
have heard this from a number of people--told other agencies
and departments not to give information out. We could not get
anything. Whatever we got was on our own. We were not given any
information. I believe John Brennan has set up an iron curtain
of secrecy in the White House and wants to control the
intelligence community. He wants to control the information.
I ask the Chairman, again, to back me on this, and he can
disagree if he wishes. I don't know one item in the last--when
I was Chairman or he was Chairman or either of us was Ranking
Member, one bit of information that was given to us that was
ever leaked out if it was classified. We never got one
complaint from the Department of Homeland Security or from NCTC
or CIA or anyone.
But now going back to September, but especially this
Christmas day, I believe that the White House is trying to
control intelligence, is trying to control counterterrorism,
and it is doing it in a way which is highly restricting the
powers of the departments here involved and is cutting off the
Congress from the information we have to have.
We have constituents, we have responsibilities. This cannot
be something where the White House gets all the information,
massages it, manages it, and then puts out the facts later on.
So I am putting that at the foot of John Brennan.
I am putting it also at the foot of Attorney General Holder
the fact that decisions are being made by him almost
unilaterally that should be made by the professionals in the
field, certainly in consultation with people who can agree or
disagree on these decisions. But to have them unilaterally made
by someone who is outside what I believe is the intelligence
world is wrong. I think the President should address that.
I also believe that as far as Congress, we have a different
role of that information. We have time and time again have had
to bring resolutions frequently to get information. On this in
particular, I know that an iron curtain came down on Christmas
night. That was wrong.
It doesn't matter who is in power, whether Republican or
Democrat, we need information as Members of Congress to get the
job done. We are not getting it done, and I fault this
administration. It is disgraceful and outrageous, and I put
that at John Brennan.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Ranking Member King is partially correct in terms of the
committee's need to know with respect to any of this. I
absolutely support his premise that this committee has a
function. It cannot function without information in real time.
That information should not be gleaned from the news media, but
it should be gleaned from the proper source. It should not be
screened.
But I would also say that the Secretary Lute, Deputy
Secretary Lute, did contact me the night of Christmas on this
event, and I think she probably reached out to you. But now, I
am not aware of anybody else who tried to get in touch with us.
Mr. King. Deputy Secretary Lute reached out to me,
discussed what was going to be done as far as the future, as
far as airline precautions, but nothing about the facts of this
case.
Chairman Thompson. Okay, well----
Mr. King. We were told by other agencies they could not
give us any information.
Chairman Thompson. Well, no question the committee has the
right to know, and others have a responsibility to provide it,
and we will pursue that also.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
January 27, 2010
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this very important hearing
today focusing on the circumstances surrounding the attempted terrorist
bombing of Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, 2009. It is important
for the House to get answers regarding the events of that day. I thank
our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before us today to
share with us the lessons learned from this averted tragedy.
Like millions of Americans, I am a frequent air traveler, which
makes the events of December 25 particularly personal to us all. While
air travel still ranks as one of the safest ways to travel, this is an
industry where a single incident can become an enormous tragedy. Beyond
the lives lost and the damage to our economy, both the air travel
industry and the Nation suffers as the public loses confidence in the
integrity of our homeland security system.
It is disturbing to think what could have happened without the
brave actions of the passengers aboard Flight 253. Those passengers are
heroes and we cannot thank them enough for what they did. But what the
committee is focusing on today is what should have happened, what
systems should have worked, before we reached that point.
There are several questions to be explored today: (1) Why our
intelligence agencies did not connect the dots regarding the suspect,
(2) the efficiency of our visa and watch lists systems, (3) the
expanding nature of al-Quaeda, and (4) what technology we use, or
should be using, that would have prevented the events of December 25.
Also, I think we need to address why all the Members of this
committee were not notified and briefed in a timely fashion.
In the days and hours immediately after Christmas day, Members of
this committee were not briefed by the administration or TSA. As
Members of the committee tasked with jurisdiction over the agencies
responsible for security, that cannot be allowed to happen again. I
look forward to working with the Chairman, my colleagues, and the
administration to ensure that timely and meaningful consultation and
information sharing takes place.
I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished panel of
witnesses. We need to know exactly what went wrong and what we can do
to prevent these repeated mistakes from happening again.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield
back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Before I welcome our witnesses, I want
to indicate that Secretary Napolitano was invited to this
hearing. We were told that she would be out of the country. I
now understand she is no longer out of the country, but she is
not here, so maybe Deputy Secretary Lute, you can pull us in on
where the Secretary is.
Our first witness is Dr. Jane Holl Lute, the Deputy
Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Lute has
been before the committee a number of times and has been very
straightforward in her presentations, and we appreciate that.
Our second witness is Mr. Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary
of Management at the Department of State. Our final witness is
Mr. Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement and a
statement provided by GAO and a statement by the ACLU will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
their statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Deputy Secretary
Lute.
[The statements of the Government Accountability Office and
the American Civil Liberties Union follow:]
Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, and Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office
January 27, 2010
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-10-401T, a statement for the record to the
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Flight 253 raised
questions about the Federal Government's ability to protect the
homeland and secure the commercial aviation system. This statement
focuses on the Government's efforts to use the terrorist watch list to
screen individuals and determine if they pose a threat, and how
failures in this process contributed to the December 25 attempted
attack. This statement also addresses the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) planned deployment of technologies for enhanced
explosive detection and the challenges associated with this deployment.
GAO's comments are based on products issued from September 2006 through
October 2009 and selected updates in January 2010. For these updates,
GAO reviewed Government reports related to the December 25 attempted
attack and obtained information from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and TSA on use of the watch list and new technologies
for screening airline passengers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations, but has made recommendations
in prior reports to DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
the White House Homeland Security Council to enhance the use of the
watch list and to TSA related to checkpoint technologies. The agencies
generally agreed and are making some progress, but full implementation
is needed.
homeland security.--better use of terrorist watch list information and
improvements in deployment of passenger checkpoint technologies could
further strengthen security
What GAO Found
The intelligence community uses standards of reasonableness to
evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist watch
list. In making these determinations, agencies are to consider
information from all available sources. However, for the December 25
subject, the intelligence community did not effectively complete these
steps and link available information to the subject before the
incident. Therefore, agencies did not nominate the individual to the
watch list or any of the subset lists that are used during agency
screening processes, such as the ``No-Fly'' list. Weighing and
responding to the potential impacts that changes to the nomination
criteria would have on the traveling public will be an important
consideration in determining what changes may be needed. Also,
screening agencies stated that they do not check against all records in
the watch list, partly because screening against certain records may
not be needed to support a respective agency's mission or may not be
possible because of the requirements of computer programs used to check
individuals against watch list records. In October 2007, GAO reported
that not checking against all records may pose a security risk and
recommended that DHS and the FBI assess potential vulnerabilities, but
they have not completed these assessments. TSA is implementing an
advanced airline passenger prescreening program--known as Secure
Flight--that could potentially result in the Federal Government
checking passengers against the entire watch list under certain
security conditions. Further, the Government lacks an up-to-date
strategy and implementation plan--supported by a clearly defined
leadership or governance structure--which are needed to enhance the
effectiveness of terrorist-related screening and ensure accountability
for the process. In the 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Homeland
Security Council ensure that a governance structure exists that has the
requisite authority over the watch list process. The council did not
comment on this recommendation.
As GAO reported in October 2009, since TSA's creation, 10 passenger
screening technologies have been in various phases of research,
development, procurement, and deployment, including the Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT)--formerly known as the Whole Body Imager. TSA
expects to have installed almost 200 AITs in airports by the end of
calendar year 2010 and plans to install a total of 878 units by the end
of fiscal year 2014. In October 2009, GAO reported that TSA had not yet
conducted an assessment of the technology's vulnerabilities to
determine the extent to which a terrorist could employ tactics that
would evade detection by the AIT. Thus, it is unclear whether the AIT
or other technologies would have detected the weapon used in the
December 25 attempted attack. GAO's report also noted the problems TSA
experienced in deploying another checkpoint technology that had not
been tested in the operational environment. Since GAO's October report,
TSA stated that it has completed the testing as of the end of 2009. We
are currently verifying that all functional requirements of the AIT
were tested in an operational environment. Completing these steps
should better position TSA to ensure that moving ahead with a costly
deployment of AIT machines will enhance passenger checkpoint security.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: We are pleased to submit
this statement on the progress Federal agencies have made and the
challenges they face in key areas of terrorism information sharing and
the deployment of checkpoint technologies. The December 25, 2009,
attempted bombing of Flight 253 has led to increased scrutiny of how
the Government creates and uses the consolidated terrorist screening
database (the watch list) to screen individuals and determine if they
pose a security threat, and highlighted the importance of detecting
improvised explosive devices and other prohibited items on passengers
before they board a commercial aircraft. The White House's initial
review of these events exposed gaps in how intelligence agencies
collected, shared, and analyzed terrorism-related information to
determine if the subject--Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab--posed enough of a
threat to warrant placing him on the watch list, which could have
altered the course of events that day. To enhance its ability to detect
explosive devices and other prohibited items on passengers, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is evaluating the use of
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)--formerly called the Whole Body
Imager--as an improvement over current screening capabilities.
In October 2007, we released a report on the results of our
review--conducted at your request--of how the watch list is created and
maintained, and how Federal, State, and local security partners use the
list to screen individuals for potential threats to the homeland.\1\ As
a result of that review, we identified potential vulnerabilities,
including ones created because agencies were not screening against all
records in the watch list. We made a number of recommendations aimed at
addressing these potential vulnerabilities and helping to enhance the
effectiveness of the watch list process, which the agencies have not
yet fully addressed. These recommendations--which we discuss later in
this statement--are still important to address and can inform on-going
reviews of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack.
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\1\ GAO, Terrorist Watchlist Screening: Opportunities Exist to
Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency
Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List, GAO-08-110
(Washington, DC: Oct. 11, 2007).
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Also, in January 2005, we designated information sharing for
homeland security a high-risk area because the Government faced
formidable challenges in analyzing and disseminating this information
in a timely, accurate, and useful manner.\2\ Since then, we have been
monitoring and making recommendations to improve the Government's
efforts to share terrorism-related information, not only among Federal
agencies but also with their State, local, Tribal, and private sector
security partners.\3\ Addressing this high-risk area is important to
help remove barriers that lead to agencies maintaining information in
stove-piped systems, and to hold them accountable to the Congress and
the public for ensuring terrorism information is shared, is used, and
makes a difference. We are continuing to review Federal agencies'
efforts to share terrorism-related information and expect to report the
results of this work later this year.\4\
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\2\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington,
DC: January 2009), for our most recent update.
\3\ See, for example, GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal
Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing
Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, GAO-06-
385 (Washington, DC: Mar. 17, 2006); Information Sharing Environment:
Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related
Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess
Progress, GAO-08-492 (Washington, DC: June 25, 2008); and Information
Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information
with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts
Are Needed, GAO-10-41 (Washington, DC: Dec. 18, 2009).
\4\ We have three on-going reviews of terrorism-related information
sharing that are being conducted based on separate requests from your
committee, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
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In addition, in October 2009, we released a report on TSA's efforts
to deploy checkpoint technologies and the challenges the agency faces
in these efforts.\5\ We made eight recommendations related to the
research, development, and deployment of these technologies. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agreed with our recommendations
and identified actions planned or under way to implement them. While
DHS is taking steps to address our recommendations related to
conducting risk assessments, the actions DHS reported that TSA had
taken or plans to take do not fully address the intent of the majority
of our recommendations.
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\5\ GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed,
and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but
Continue to Face Challenges, GAO-10-128 (Washington, DC: Oct. 7, 2009).
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This statement for the record discusses: (1) The Government's
efforts to use the terrorist watch list to screen individuals and
determine if they pose a threat, as well as how aspects of this process
contributed to the December 25 attempted terrorist attack and (2) TSA's
planned deployment of the AIT for enhanced explosive detection and the
challenges associated with this deployment.
This statement is based on products GAO issued from September 2006
through October 2009.\6\ In conducting our prior work, we reviewed
documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at the various
departments and agencies with responsibilities for compiling and using
watch list records. We also reviewed documentation and obtained
information on current checkpoint screening technologies being
researched, developed, and deployed. Our previously published reports
contain additional details on the scope and methodology for those
reviews. In addition, this statement contains selected updates
conducted in December 2009 and January 2010. For the updates, GAO
reviewed Government reports and other information related to the
December 25 attempted attack, obtained information from DHS and TSA on
the use of watch list records and new technologies for screening
airline passengers, and interviewed a senior TSA official. We conducted
our updated work in December 2009 and January 2010 in accordance with
generally accepted Government auditing standards.
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\6\ See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce
Adverse Effects on the Public, GAO-06-1031 (Washington, DC: Sept. 29,
2006); GAO-08-110; Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are
Needed to Mitigate Risks, GAO-09-292 (Washington, DC: May 13, 2009);
and GAO-10-128.
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in summary
Because the subject of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack
was not nominated for inclusion on the Government's consolidated
terrorist screening database, Federal agencies responsible for
screening activities missed several opportunities to identify him and
possibly take action. We have previously reported on a number of issues
related to the compilation and use of watch list records, such as the
potential security risk posed by not checking against all records on
the watch list. We also identified the need for an up-to-date strategy
and implementation plan--one that describes the scope, governance,
outcomes, milestones, and metrics, among other things--for managing the
watch list process across the Federal Government. Such a strategy and
plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance
structure, can be helpful in removing cultural, technological, and
other barriers--such as those problems that the December 25 attempted
terrorist attack exposed--that inhibit the effective use of watch list
information.
With regard to the deployment of technology to detect explosives on
passengers, TSA expects to have installed almost 200 AITs in airports
by the end of calendar year 2010, and plans to procure and install a
total of 878 units by the end of fiscal year 2014. While recently
providing GAO with updated information to our October 2009 report, TSA
stated that operational testing for the AIT was completed as of the end
of calendar year 2009. We are in the process of verifying that TSA
tested all of the AIT functional requirements in an operational
environment. Moreover, we previously reported that TSA had not yet
conducted an assessment of the technology's vulnerabilities to
determine the extent to which a terrorist could employ tactics that
would evade detection by the AIT. While we recognize that the AIT could
provide an enhanced detection capability, completing these steps should
better position TSA to have the information necessary to ensure that
moving ahead with a costly deployment of AIT machines will enhance
passenger checkpoint security.
background
Terrorist Watch List Process
The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)--administered by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--is responsible for maintaining the U.S.
Government's consolidated watch list and providing it to Federal
agencies as well as State, local, and selected foreign partners for
their use in screening individuals. TSC receives the vast majority of
its watch list nominations and information from the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which compiles information on known or
suspected international terrorists from Executive branch departments
and agencies.\7\ In addition, the FBI provides TSC with information on
known or suspected domestic terrorists who operate primarily within the
United States. To support agency screening processes, TSC first
determines if each nomination contains specific minimum derogatory
information for inclusion in its terrorist screening database. TSC then
sends applicable records from the terrorist watch list to screening
agency systems for use in efforts to deter or detect the movements of
known or suspected terrorists. For instance, applicable TSC records are
provided to TSA for use in prescreening airline passengers; to a U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) system for use in screening
travelers entering the United States; to a Department of State system
for use in screening visa applicants; and to an FBI system for use by
State and local law enforcement agencies pursuant to arrests,
detentions, and other criminal justice purposes.\8\
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\7\ By law, NCTC, which is within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, serves as the primary organization in the U.S.
Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence pertaining to
terrorism and counterterrorism, except for intelligence pertaining
exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism. See
50 U.S.C. 404o(d)(1).
\8\ See GAO-08-110 for additional details on the compilation and
use of terrorist watch list records.
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Airline Passenger Screening Using Checkpoint Screening Technology
Passenger screening is a process by which screeners inspect
individuals and their property to deter and prevent an act of violence
or air piracy, such as the carrying of any unauthorized explosive,
incendiary, weapon, or other prohibited item on board an aircraft or
into a sterile area.\9\ Screeners inspect individuals for prohibited
items at designated screening locations. TSA developed standard
operating procedures for screening passengers at airport checkpoints.
Primary screening is conducted on all airline passengers before they
enter the sterile area of an airport and involves passengers walking
through a metal detector and carry-on items being subjected to X-ray
screening. Passengers who alarm the walkthrough metal detector or are
designated as selectees--that is, passengers selected for additional
screening--must then undergo secondary screening, as well as passengers
whose carry-on items have been identified by the X-ray machine as
potentially containing prohibited items.\10\ Secondary screening
involves additional means for screening passengers, such as by hand-
wand; physical pat-down; or, at certain airport locations, an
explosives trace portal (ETP), which is used to detect traces of
explosives on passengers by using puffs of air to dislodge particles
from their bodies and clothing into an analyzer. Selectees' carry-on
items are also physically searched or screened for explosives, such as
by using explosives trace detection machines.
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\9\ Sterile areas are generally located within the terminal where
passengers are provided access to boarding aircraft, and access is
controlled in accordance with TSA requirements.
\10\ A nonselectee passenger who alarms the walk-through metal
detector on the first pass is offered a second pass. If the passenger
declines the second pass, the passenger must proceed to additional
screening. If the nonselectee passenger accepts the second pass and the
machine does not alarm, the passenger may generally proceed without
further screening.
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assessing potential vulnerabilities related to not screening against
all watch list records and ensuring clear lines of authority over the
watch list process would provide for its more effective use
Agencies Rely Upon Standards of Reasonableness in Assessing Individuals
for Nomination to TSC's Watch List, but Did Not Connect
Available Information on Mr. Abdulmutallab to Determine Whether
a Reasonable Suspicion Existed
Federal agencies--particularly NCTC and the FBI--submit to TSC
nominations of individuals to be included on the consolidated watch
list. For example, NCTC receives terrorist-related information from
Executive branch departments and agencies, such as the Department of
State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the FBI, and catalogs this
information in its Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment database,
commonly known as the TIDE database. This database serves as the U.S.
Government's central classified database with information on known or
suspected international terrorists. According to NCTC, agencies submit
watch list nomination reports to the center, but are not required to
specify individual screening systems that they believe should receive
the watch list record, such as the No-Fly list of individuals who are
to be denied boarding an aircraft.\11\ NCTC is to presume that agency
nominations are valid unless it has other information in its possession
to rebut that position.
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\11\ As discussed later in this statement, agencies generally do
not use the full terrorist watch list to screen individuals. Rather,
they generally use subsets of the full list based on each agency's
mission and other factors.
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To decide if a person poses enough of a threat to be placed on the
watch list, agencies are to follow Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 6, which states that the watch list is to contain
information about individuals ``known or appropriately suspected to be
or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in
aid of, or related to terrorism.''\12\ HSPD-24 definitively established
the ``reasonable suspicion'' standard for watchlisting by providing
that agencies are to make available to other agencies all biometric
information associated with ``persons for whom there is an articulable
and reasonable basis for suspicion that they pose a threat to national
security.''\13\ NCTC is to consider information from all available
sources and databases to determine if there is a reasonable suspicion
of links to terrorism that warrants a nomination, which can involve
some level of subjectivity. The guidance on determining reasonable
suspicion, which TSC most recently updated in February 2009, contains
specific examples of the types of terrorism-related conduct that may
make an individual appropriate for inclusion on the watch list.
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\12\ The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD-6, Subject: Integration and Use of Screening Information
(Washington, DC, Sept. 16, 2003).
\13\ The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD-24, Subject: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to
Enhance National Security (Washington, DC, June 5, 2008).
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The White House's review of the December 25 attempted terrorist
attack noted that Mr. Abdulmutallab's father met with U.S. Embassy
officers in Abuja, Nigeria, to discuss his concerns that his son may
have come under the influence of unidentified extremists and had
planned to travel to Yemen.\14\ However, according to NCTC, the
information in the State Department's nomination report did not meet
the criteria for watchlisting in TSC's consolidated terrorist screening
database per the Government's established and approved nomination
standards. NCTC also noted that the State Department cable nominating
Mr. Abdulmutallab had no indication that the father was the source of
the information. According to the White House review of the December 25
attempted attack, the U.S. Government had sufficient information to
have uncovered and potentially disrupted the attack--including by
placing Mr. Abdulmutallab on the No-Fly list--but analysts within the
intelligence community failed to connect the dots that could have
identified and warned of the specific threat.
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\14\ The White House, Summary of the White House Review of the
December 25, 2009, Attempted Terrorist Attack (Washington, DC, Jan. 7,
2010).
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After receiving the results of the White House's review of the
December 25 attempted attack, the President called for members of the
intelligence community to undertake a number of corrective actions--
such as clarifying intelligence agency roles, responsibilities, and
accountabilities to document, share, and analyze all sources of
intelligence and threat threads related to terrorism, and accelerating
information technology enhancements that will help with information
correlation and analysis. The House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform has asked us, among other things, to assess
Government efforts to revise the watch list process, including actions
taken related to the December 25 attempted attack.
As part of our monitoring of high-risk issues, we also have on-
going work--at the request of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs--that is assessing agency efforts to create
the Information Sharing Environment, which is intended to break down
barriers to sharing terrorism-related information, especially across
Federal agencies.\15\ Our work is designed to help ensure that Federal
agencies have a road map that defines roles, responsibilities, actions,
and time frames for removing barriers, as well as a system to hold
agencies accountable to the Congress and the public for making progress
on these efforts. Among other things, this road map can be helpful in
removing cultural, technological, and other barriers that lead to
agencies maintaining information in stove-piped systems so that it is
not easily accessible, similar to those problems that the December 25
attempted attack exposed. We expect to issue the results of this work
later this year.
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\15\ The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
as amended, defines the Information Sharing Environment as ``an
approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland
security information, which may include any method determined necessary
and appropriate for carrying out [section 1016].'' See Pub. L. No. 108-
458, 1016(a)(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3665 (codified as amended at 6
U.S.C. 485(a)(3)). See also Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.
482 (requiring the establishment of procedures for the sharing of
homeland security information, as defined by this section).
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By Not Placing Mr. Abdulmutallab on the Consolidated Watch List or Its
Subsets, the Government Missed Opportunities to Use These
Counterterrorism Tools
Following the December 25 attempted terrorist attack, questions
were raised as to what could have happened if Mr. Abdulmutallab had
been on TSC's consolidated terrorist screening database. We created
several scenarios to help explain how the watch list process is
intended to work and what opportunities agencies could have had to
identify him if he was on the watch list. For example, according to
TSC, if a record from the terrorist screening database is sent to the
State Department's system and the individual in that record holds a
valid visa, TSC would compare the identifying information in the watch
list record against identifying information in the visa and forward
positive matches to the State Department for possible visa revocation.
If an individual's visa is revoked, under existing procedures, this
information is to be entered into the database CBP uses to screen
airline passengers prior to their boarding, which we describe below.
According to CBP, when the individual checks in for a flight, the on-
site CBP Immigration Advisory Program officers already would have been
apprised of the visa revocation by CBP and they would have checked the
person's travel documents to verify that the individual was a match to
the visa revocation record. Once the positive match was established,
the officers would have recommended that he not be allowed to board the
flight.
Under another scenario, if an individual is on TSC's terrorist
screening database, existing processes provide CBP with the opportunity
to identify the subject of a watch list record as part of the checks
CBP is to conduct to see if airline passengers are eligible to be
admitted into the country. Specifically, for international flights
departing to or from the United States (but not for domestic flights),
CBP is to receive information on passengers obtained, for example, when
their travel document is swiped. CBP is to check this passenger
information against a number of databases to see if there are any
persons who have immigration violations, criminal histories, or any
other reason for being denied entry to the country, in accordance with
the agency's mission. According to CBP, when it identifies a U.S.-bound
passenger who is on the watch list, it coordinates with other Federal
agencies to evaluate the totality of available information to see what
action is appropriate. In foreign airports where there is a CBP
Immigration Advisory Program presence, the information on a watchlisted
subject is forwarded by CBP to program officers on-site. The officers
would then intercept the subject prior to boarding the aircraft and
confirm that the individual is watchlisted, and when appropriate based
on the derogatory information, request that the passenger be denied
boarding.
In a third scenario, if an individual is on the watch list and is
also placed on the No-Fly or Selectee list, when the person checks in
for a flight, the individual's identifying information is to be checked
against these lists. Individuals matched to the No-Fly list are to be
denied boarding. If the individual is matched to the Selectee list, the
person is to be subject to further screening, which could include
physical screening, such as a pat-down. The criteria in general that
are used to place someone on either of these two lists include the
following:
Persons who are deemed to be a threat to civil aviation or
National security and should be precluded from boarding an
aircraft are put on the No-Fly list.
Persons who are deemed to be a threat to civil aviation or
National security but do not meet the criteria of the No-Fly
list are placed on the Selectee list and are to receive
additional security screening prior to being permitted to board
an aircraft.\16\
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\16\ Of all of the screening databases that accept watch list
records, only the No-Fly and Selectee lists require certain nomination
criteria or inclusion standards that are narrower than the ``known or
appropriately suspected'' standard of HSPD-6. The most recent guidance
related to the No-Fly and Selectee list criteria was issued in February
2009.
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The White House Homeland Security Council devised these more
stringent sets of criteria for the No-Fly and Selectee lists in part
because these lists are not intended as investigative or information-
gathering tools or tracking mechanisms, and TSA is a screening but not
an intelligence agency.\17\ Rather, the lists are intended to help
ensure the safe transport of passengers and facilitate the flow of
commerce. However, the White House's review of the December 25
attempted terrorist attack raised questions about the effectiveness of
the criteria, and the President tasked the FBI and TSC with developing
recommendations for any needed changes to the nominations guidance and
criteria.
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\17\ The Homeland Security Council originally was established in
2001 by Executive Order and subsequently codified into law by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the purpose of more effectively
coordinating the policies and functions of the Federal Government
relating to homeland security. See Exec. Order No. 13,228; Pub. L. No.
107-296, tit. IX, 116 Stat. 2135, 2258-59 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 491-
496). On May 26, 2009, the President announced the full integration of
White House staff supporting National security and homeland security
into a new ``National Security Staff'' supporting all White House
policy-making activities relating to international, transnational, and
homeland security matters. The Homeland Security Council was maintained
as the principle venue for interagency deliberations on issues that
affect the security of the homeland, such as terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, natural disasters, and pandemic influenza.
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Weighing and responding to the potential impacts that changes to
the nominations guidance and criteria could have on the traveling
public and the airlines will be important considerations in developing
such recommendations. In September 2006, we reported that tens of
thousands of individuals who had similar names to persons on the watch
list were being misidentified and subjected to additional screening,
and in some cases delayed so long as to miss their flights.\18\ We also
reported that resolving these misidentifications can take time and,
therefore, affect air carriers and commerce. If changes in criteria
result in more individuals being added to the lists, this could also
increase the number of individuals who are misidentified, exacerbating
these negative effects. In addition, we explained that individuals who
believe that they have been inappropriately matched to the watch list
can petition the Government for action and the relevant agencies must
conduct research and work to resolve these issues. If more people are
misidentified, more people may trigger this redress process, increasing
the need for resources. Finally, any changes to the criteria or process
would have to ensure that watch list records are used in a manner that
safeguards legal rights, including freedoms, civil liberties, and
information privacy guaranteed by Federal law.
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\18\ GAO-06-1031.
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Agencies Do Not Screen Individuals Against All Records in the Watch
List, Which Creates Potential Security Vulnerabilities; GAO
Continues to Recommend That Agencies Assess and Address These
Gaps
In reacting to the December 25 attempted terrorist attack,
determining whether there were potential vulnerabilities related to the
use of watch list records when screening--not only individuals who fly
into the country but also, for example, those who cross land borders--
are important considerations. Screening agencies whose missions most
frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers generally
do not check against all records in the consolidated terrorist watch
list. In our October 2007 report, we noted that this is because
screening against certain records may not be needed to support a
respective agency's mission or may not be possible because of computer
system limitations, among other things.\19\
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\19\ GAO-08-110.
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For example, CBP's mission is to determine if any traveler is
eligible to enter the country or is to be denied entry because of
immigration or criminal violations. As such, CBP's computer system
accepts all records from the consolidated watch list database that have
either a first name or a last name and one other identifier, such as a
date of birth. Therefore, TSC sends CBP the greatest number of records
from the consolidated watch list database for its screening. In
contrast, one of the State Department's missions is to approve requests
for visas. Since only non-U.S. citizens and nonlawful permanent
residents apply for visas, TSC does not send the department records on
citizens or lawful permanent residents for screening visa applicants.
Also, the FBI database that State and local law enforcement
agencies use for their missions in checking individuals for criminal
histories, for example, also receives a smaller portion of the watch
list. According to the FBI, its computer system requires a full first
name, last name, and other identifier, typically a date of birth. The
FBI noted that this is because having these identifiers helps to reduce
the number of times an individual is misidentified as being someone on
the list, and the computer system would not be effective in making
matches without this information. Finally, the No-Fly and Selectee
lists collectively contain the lowest percentage of watch list records
because the remaining ones either do not meet the nominating criteria,
as described above, or do not meet system requirements--that is,
include full names and dates of birth, which TSA stated are required to
minimize misidentifications.
TSA is implementing a new screening program that the agency states
will have the capability to screen an individual against the entire
watch list.\20\ Under this program, called Secure Flight, TSA will
assume from air carriers the responsibility of comparing passenger
information against the No-Fly and Selectee lists.\21\ According to the
program's final rule, in general, Secure Flight is to compare passenger
information only to the No-Fly and Selectee lists.\22\ The
supplementary information accompanying the rule notes that this will be
satisfactory to counter the security threat during normal security
circumstances. However, the rule provides that TSA may use the larger
set of watch list records when warranted by security considerations,
such as if TSA learns that flights on a particular route may pose
increased risks. TSA emphasized that use of the full terrorist
screening database is not routine. Rather, TSA noted that its use is
limited to circumstances in which there is information concerning an
increased risk to transportation security, and the decision to use the
full watch list database will be based on circumstances at the time.
According to TSA, as of January 2010, the agency was developing
administrative procedures for utilizing the full watch list when
warranted.
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\20\ GAO-09-292.
\21\ Pub. L. No. 108-458, 4012(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-15
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(C)).
\22\ See 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R.
pt. 1560).
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In late January 2009, TSA began to assume from airlines the watch
list matching function for a limited number of domestic flights, and
has since phased in additional flights and airlines. TSA expects to
assume the watch list matching function for all domestic and
international flights departing to and from the United States by
December 2010. It is important to note that under the Secure Flight
program, TSA requires airlines to provide the agency with each
passenger's full name and date of birth to facilitate the watch list
matching process, which should reduce the number of individuals who are
misidentified as the subject of a watch list record. We continue to
monitor the Secure Flight program at the Congress's request.
In our October 2007 watch list report, we recommended that the FBI
and DHS assess the extent to which security risks exist by not
screening against certain watch list records and what actions, if any,
should be taken in response.\23\ The agencies generally agreed with our
recommendations but noted that the risks related to not screening
against all watch list records needs to be balanced with the impact of
screening against all records, especially those records without a full
name and other identifiers. For example, more individuals could be
misidentified, law enforcement would be put in the position of
detaining more individuals until their identities could be resolved,
and administrative costs could increase, without knowing what
measurable increase in security is achieved. While we acknowledge these
tradeoffs and potential impacts, we maintain that assessing whether
vulnerabilities exist by not screening against all watch list records--
and if there are ways to limit impacts--is critical and could be a
relevant component of the Government's on-going review of the watch
list process. Therefore, we believe that our recommendation continues
to have merit.
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\23\ GAO-08-110.
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Identifying Additional Screening Opportunities and Determining Whether
There Are Clear Lines of Authority for and Accountability Over
the Watch List Process Would Help Ensure Its Effective Use
As we reported in October 2007, the Federal Government has made
progress in using the consolidated terrorist watch list for screening
purposes, but has additional opportunities to use the list. For
example, DHS uses the list to screen employees in some critical
infrastructure components of the private sector, including certain
individuals who have access to vital areas of nuclear power plants or
transport hazardous materials. However, many critical infrastructure
components are not using watch list records, and DHS has not finalized
guidelines to support such private sector screening, as HSPD-6 mandated
and we previously recommended.\24\
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\24\ The identification of critical infrastructure components that
are not using watch list records for screening is considered Sensitive
Security Information that cannot be disclosed in a public statement.
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In that same report, we noted that HSPD-11 tasked the Secretary of
Homeland Security with coordinating across other Federal departments to
develop: (1) A strategy for a comprehensive and coordinated
watchlisting and screening approach and (2) a prioritized
implementation and investment plan that describes the scope,
governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives,
metrics, costs, and schedule of necessary activities.\25\ We reported
that without such a strategy, the Government could not provide
accountability and a basis for monitoring to ensure that: (1) The
intended goals for, and expected results of, terrorist screening are
being achieved and (2) use of the watch list is consistent with privacy
and civil liberties. We recommended that DHS develop a current
interagency strategy and related plans.
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\25\ The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD-11, Subject: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures
(Washington, DC, Aug. 27, 2004).
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According to DHS's Screening Coordination Office, during the fall
of 2007, the office led an interagency effort to provide the President
with an updated report, entitled, HSPD-11, An Updated Strategy for
Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures.\26\ The office
noted that the report was formally submitted to the Executive Office of
the President through the Homeland Security Council and reviewed by the
President on January 25, 2008. Further, the office noted that it also
provided a sensitive version of the report to the Congress in October
2008. DHS provided us an excerpt of that report to review, stating that
it did not have the authority to share excerpts provided by other
agencies, and we were unable to obtain a copy of the full report. The
information we reviewed only discussed DHS's own efforts for
coordinating watch list screening across the Department. Therefore, we
were not able to determine whether the HSPD-11 report submitted to the
President addressed all of the components called for in the directive
or what action, if any, was taken as a result. We maintain that a
comprehensive strategy, as well as related implementation and
investment plans, as called for by HSPD-11, continue to be important to
ensure effective Government-wide use of the watch list process.
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\26\ DHS established the Screening Coordination Office in July 2006
to enhance security measures by integrating the Department's terrorist-
and immigration-related screening efforts, creating unified screening
standards and policies, and developing a single redress process for
travelers.
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In addition, in our October 2007 report, we noted that establishing
an effective governance structure as part of this strategic approach is
particularly vital since numerous agencies and components are involved
in the development, maintenance, and use of the watch list process,
both within and outside of the Federal Government. Also, establishing a
governance structure with clearly-defined responsibility and authority
would help to ensure that agency efforts are coordinated, and that the
Federal Government has the means to monitor and analyze the outcomes of
such efforts and to address common problems efficiently and
effectively. We determined at the time that no such structure was in
place and that no existing entity clearly had the requisite authority
for addressing interagency issues. We recommended that the Homeland
Security Council ensure that a governance structure was in place, but
the council did not comment on our recommendation.
At the time of our report, TSC stated that it had a governance
board in place, comprised of senior-level agency representatives from
numerous departments and agencies. However, we also noted that the
board provided guidance concerning issues within TSC's mission and
authority. We also stated that while this governance board could be
suited to assume more of a leadership role, its authority at that time
was limited to TSC-specific issues, and it would need additional
authority to provide effective coordination of terrorist-related
screening activities and interagency issues Government-wide. In January
2010, the FBI stated that TSC has a Policy Board in place, with
representatives from relevant departments and agencies, that reviews
and provides input to the Government's watch list policy. The FBI also
stated that the policies developed are then sent to the National
Security Council Deputies Committee (formerly the Homeland Security
Council) for ratification. The FBI noted that this process was used for
making the most recent additions and changes to watch list standards
and criteria. We have not yet been able to determine, however, whether
the Policy Board has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve issues
beyond TSC's purview, such as issues within the intelligence community
and in regard to the nominations process, similar to the types of
interagency issues the December 25 attempted attack identified. We
maintain that a governance structure with the authority for and
accountability over the entire watch list process, from nominations
through screening, and across the Government is important.
On January 7, 2010, the President tasked the National Security
Staff with initiating an interagency review of the watch list process--
including the business processes, procedures, and criteria--and the
interoperability and sufficiency of supporting information technology
systems. This review offers the Government an opportunity to develop an
updated strategy, related plans, and governance structure that would
provide accountability to the administration, the Congress, and the
American public that the watch list process is effective at helping to
secure the homeland.
recent work highlights the importance of conducting vulnerability
assessments and operational testing prior to deployment of new
checkpoint technologies
While TSA Has Not Yet Deployed Any New Checkpoint Technologies
Nationwide, It Plans to Have Installed Almost 200 AITs by the
End of 2010
As we reported in October 2009, in an effort to improve the
capability to detect explosives at aviation passenger checkpoints, TSA
has 10 passenger screening technologies in various phases of research,
development, procurement, and deployment, including the AIT (formerly
Whole Body Imager).\27\ TSA is evaluating the AIT as an improvement
over current screening capabilities of the metal detector and pat-downs
specifically to identify nonmetallic threat objects and liquids. The
AITs produce an image of a passenger's body that a screener interprets.
The image identifies objects, or anomalies, on the outside of the
physical body but does not reveal items beneath the surface of the
skin, such as implants. TSA plans to procure two types of AIT units:
One type uses millimeter wave and the other type uses backscatter X-ray
technology. Millimeter wave technology beams millimeter wave radio
frequency energy over the body's surface at high speed from two
antennas simultaneously as they rotate around the body.\28\ The energy
reflected back from the body or other objects on the body is used to
construct a three-dimensional image. Millimeter wave technology
produces an image that resembles a fuzzy photo negative. Backscatter X-
ray technology uses a low-level X-ray to create a two-sided image of
the person. Backscatter technology produces an image that resembles a
chalk etching.\29\
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\27\ GAO-10-128.
\28\ According to TSA, this description of the millimeter wave
technology applies only to the machine manufactured by L3 and does not
apply to other millimeter wave technologies that TSA is evaluating,
such as the Smiths millimeter wave AIT.
\29\ Research and development of the AIT technology is continuing,
specifically, to develop passive terahertz (THz) and active gigahertz
(GHz) technologies to improve detection performance and reduce
operational costs of commercially available systems.
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As we reported in October 2009, TSA has not yet deployed any new
technologies Nation-wide. However, as of December 31, 2009, according
to a senior TSA official, the agency has deployed 40 of the millimeter
wave AITs, and has procured 150 backscatter X-ray units in fiscal year
2009 and estimates that these units will be installed at airports by
the end of calendar year 2010. In addition, TSA plans to procure an
additional 300 AIT units in fiscal year 2010, some of which will be
purchased with funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009.\30\ TSA plans to procure and deploy a total of 878 units at all
category X through category IV airports.\31\ Full operating capability
is expected in fiscal year 2014. TSA officials stated that the cost of
the AIT is about $130,000 to $170,000 per unit, excluding installation
costs. In addition, the estimated training costs are $50,000 per unit.
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\30\ According to TSA, some of the 300 AIT units to be procured in
fiscal year 2010 will begin to be deployed to airports in the latter
half of fiscal year 2010.
\31\ TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States
into one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In
general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. Categories X, I,
II, and III airports account for more than 90 percent of the Nation's
air traffic.
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While TSA stated that the AIT will enhance its explosives detection
capability, because the AIT presents a full body image of a person
during the screening process, concerns have been expressed that the
image is an invasion of privacy. According to TSA, to protect passenger
privacy and ensure anonymity, strict privacy safeguards are built into
the procedures for use of the AIT. For example, the officer who assists
the passenger never sees the image that the technology produces, and
the officer who views the image is remotely located in a secure
resolution room and never sees the passenger. Officers evaluating
images are not permitted to take cameras, cell phones, or photo-enabled
devices into the resolution room. To further protect passengers'
privacy, ways have been introduced to blur the passengers' images. The
millimeter wave technology blurs all facial features, and the
backscatter X-ray technology has an algorithm applied to the entire
image to protect privacy. Further, TSA has stated that the AIT's
capability to store, print, transmit, or save the image will be
disabled at the factory before the machines are delivered to airports,
and each image is automatically deleted from the system after it is
cleared by the remotely located security officer. Once the remotely
located officer determines that threat items are not present, that
officer communicates wirelessly to the officer assisting the passenger.
The passenger may then continue through the security process. Potential
threat items are resolved through a direct physical pat-down before the
passenger is cleared to enter the sterile area.\32\ In addition to
privacy concerns, the AITs are large machines, and adding them to the
checkpoint areas will require additional space, especially since the
operators are segregated from the checkpoint to help ensure passenger
privacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ TSA stated that it continues to evaluate possible display
options that include a ``stick figure'' or ``cartoonlike'' form to
provide greater privacy protection to the individual being screened
while still allowing the unit operator or automated detection
algorithms to detect possible threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA Reports That It Is Taking Steps to Operationally Test AITs but Has
Not Conducted Vulnerability Assessments
We previously reported on several challenges TSA faces related to
the research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint
screening technologies and made a number of recommendations to improve
this process.\33\ Two of these recommendations are particularly
relevant today, as TSA moves forward with plans to install a total of
878 additional AITs--completing operational testing of technologies in
airports prior to using them in day-to-day operations and assessing
whether technologies such as the AIT are vulnerable to terrorist
countermeasures, such as hiding threat items on various parts of the
body to evade detection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ GAO-10-128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, in October 2009, we reported that TSA had relied on
technologies in day-to-day airport operations that had not been proven
to meet their functional requirements through operational testing and
evaluation, contrary to TSA's acquisition guidance and a knowledge-
based acquisition approach. We also reported that TSA had not
operationally tested the AITs at the time of our review, and we
recommended that TSA operationally test and evaluate technologies prior
to deploying them.\34\ In commenting on our report, TSA agreed with
this recommendation. A senior TSA official stated that although TSA
does not yet have a written policy requiring operational testing prior
to deployment, TSA is now including in its contracts with vendors that
checkpoint screening machines are required to successfully complete
laboratory tests as well as operational tests. The test results are
then incorporated in the source selection plan. The official also
stated that the test results are now required at key decision points by
DHS's Investment Review Board. While recently providing GAO with
updated information to our October 2009 report, TSA stated that
operational testing for the AIT was completed as of the end of calendar
year 2009. We are in the process of verifying that TSA has tested all
of the AIT's functional requirements in an operational environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Operational testing refers to testing in an operational
environment in order to verify that new systems are operationally
effective, supportable, and suitable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deploying technologies that have not successfully completed
operational testing and evaluation can lead to cost overruns and
underperformance. TSA's procurement guidance provides that testing
should be conducted in an operational environment to validate that the
system meets all functional requirements before deployment. In
addition, our reviews have shown that leading commercial firms follow a
knowledge-based approach to major acquisitions and do not proceed with
large investments unless the product's design demonstrates its ability
to meet functional requirements and be stable.\35\ The developer must
show that the product can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and
quality targets and is reliable before production begins and the system
is used in day-to-day operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ GAO, Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to
Improve Weapon Acquisition, GAO-04-386SP (Washington, DC: January
2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA's experience with the ETPs, which the agency uses for secondary
screening, demonstrates the importance of testing and evaluation in an
operational environment. The ETP detects traces of explosives on a
passenger by using puffs of air to dislodge particles from the
passenger's body and clothing that the machine analyzes for traces of
explosives. TSA procured 207 ETPs and in 2006 deployed 101 ETPs to 36
airports, the first deployment of a checkpoint technology initiated by
the agency.\36\ TSA deployed the ETPs even though agency officials were
aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier ETP models
suggested that they did not demonstrate reliable performance.
Furthermore, the ETP models that were subsequently deployed were not
first tested to prove their effective performance in an operational
environment, contrary to TSA's acquisition guidance, which recommends
such testing. As a result, TSA procured and deployed ETPs without
assurance that they would perform as intended in an operational
environment. TSA officials stated that they deployed the machines
without resolving these issues to respond quickly to the threat of
suicide bombers. In June 2006, TSA halted further deployment of the ETP
because of performance, maintenance, and installation issues. According
to a senior TSA official, as of December 31, 2009, all but 9 ETPs have
been withdrawn from airports and 18 ETPs remain in inventory. TSA
estimates that the 9 remaining ETPs will be removed from airports by
the end of calendar year 2010. In the future, using validated
technologies would enhance TSA's efforts to improve checkpoint
security. Furthermore, retaining existing screening procedures until
the effectiveness of future technologies has been validated could
provide assurances that use of checkpoint technologies improves
aviation security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ TSA deployed the ETPs from January to June 2006. Since June
2006, TSA removed all but 9 ETPs from airports because of maintenance
issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, as we reported in October 2009, TSA does not know whether
its explosives detection technologies, such as the AITs, are
susceptible to terrorist tactics. Although TSA has obtained information
on vulnerabilities at the screening checkpoint, the agency has not
assessed vulnerabilities--that is, weaknesses in the system that
terrorists could exploit in order to carry out an attack--related to
passenger screening technologies, such as AITs, that are currently
deployed. According to TSA's threat assessment, terrorists have various
techniques for concealing explosives on their persons, as was evident
in Mr. Abdulmutallab's attempted attack on December 25, where he
concealed an explosive in his underwear. However, TSA has not assessed
whether these and other tactics that terrorists could use to evade
detection by screening technologies, such as AIT, increase the
likelihood that the screening equipment would not detect the hidden
weapons or explosives. Thus, without an assessment of the
vulnerabilities of checkpoint technologies, it is unclear whether the
AIT or other technologies would have been able to detect the weapon Mr.
Abdulmutallab used in his attempted attack. TSA is in the process of
developing a risk assessment for the airport checkpoints, but the
agency has not yet completed this effort or clarified the extent to
which this effort addresses any specific vulnerabilities in checkpoint
technology.
TSA officials stated that to identify vulnerabilities at airport
checkpoints, the agency analyzes information such as the results from
its covert testing program. TSA conducts National and local covert
tests, whereby individuals attempt to enter the secure area of an
airport through the passenger checkpoint with prohibited items in their
carry-on bags or hidden on their persons. However, TSA's covert testing
programs do not systematically test passenger and baggage screening
technologies Nation-wide to ensure that they identify the threat
objects and materials the technologies are designed to detect, nor do
the covert testing programs identify vulnerabilities related to these
technologies. We reported in August 2008 that while TSA's local covert
testing program attempts to identify test failures that may be caused
by screening equipment not working properly or caused by screeners and
the screening procedures they follow, the agency's National testing
program does not attribute a specific cause of a test failure.\37\ We
recommended, among other things, that TSA require the documentation of
specific causes of all National covert testing failures, including
documenting failures related to equipment, in the covert testing
database to help TSA better identify areas for improvement. TSA
concurred with this recommendation and stated that the agency will
expand the covert testing database to document test failures related to
screening equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See GAO, Transportation Security: TSA Has Developed a Risk-
Based Covert Testing Program, but Could Better Mitigate Aviation
Security Vulnerabilities Identified Through Covert Tests, GAO-08-958
(Washington, DC: Aug. 8, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our 2009 report, we also recommended that the Assistant
Secretary for TSA, among other actions, conduct a complete risk
assessment--including threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessment--for the passenger screening program and incorporate the
results into TSA's program strategy, as appropriate. TSA and DHS
concurred with our recommendation, but have not completed these risk
assessments or provided documentation to show how they have addressed
the concerns raised in our 2009 report regarding the susceptibility of
the technology to terrorist tactics.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement for the record.
______
Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union
January 27, 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee: The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has more than half
a million members, countless additional activists and supporters, and
53 affiliates Nation-wide. We are one of the Nation's oldest and
largest organizations advocating in support of individual rights in the
courts and before the Executive and Legislative branches of Government.
In particular, throughout our history, we have been one of the Nation's
pre-eminent advocates in support of privacy and equality. We write
today to express our strong concern over the three substantive policy
changes that are being considered in the wake of the attempted terror
attack on Christmas day: the wider deployment of whole body imaging
(WBI) devices, the expanded use of terror watch lists and increased
screening of individuals from fourteen so-called nations of interest.
The ACLU believes that each of these changes greatly infringe on civil
liberties and face serious questions regarding their efficacy in
protecting airline travelers.
The President has already identified a failure of intelligence as
the chief cause of the inability to detect the attempted terror attack
on Christmas day. As such, the Government's response must be directed
to that end. These invasive and unjust airline security techniques
represent a dangerous diversion of resources from the real problem.
This diversion of resources promises serious harm to American's privacy
and civil liberties while failing to deliver significant safety
improvements.
i. introduction
WBI uses millimeter wave or X-ray technology to produce graphic
images of passengers' bodies, essentially taking a naked picture of air
passengers as they pass through security checkpoints. This technology
is currently deployed at 19 airports and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) recently announced the roll-out of 300 more machines by
year end.\1\ While initially described as a secondary screening
mechanism, DHS is now stating that WBI will be used for primary
screening of passengers.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Harriet Baskas, Air security: Protection at privacy's expense?
Msnbc.com, January 14, 2010. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34846903/ns/
travel-tips/.
\2\ Paul Giblin and Eric Lipton, New Airport X-Rays Scan Bodies,
Not Just Bags, New York Times, February 24, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another way of screening passengers is through terror watch lists.
The terror watch lists are a series of lists of names of individuals
suspected of planning or executing terrorist attacks. The master list
is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and contains more
than one million names.\3\ Subsets of this list include the No-Fly list
(barring individuals from air travel) and the Automatic Selectee list
(requiring a secondary screening). The names on this list and the
criteria for placement on these lists are secret.\4\ There is no
process allowing individuals to challenge their placement on a list or
seek removal from a list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Watchlist
Nomination Practices, Justice Department, Office of the Inspector
General, Audit Report 09-25, May 2009, pg 3. http://www.justice.gov/
oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf.
\4\ Id at 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, individuals who were born in, are citizens of, or are
traveling from fourteen nations will receive additional scrutiny under
a policy announced by the U.S. Government after the attempted terror
attack. As of January 19, 2010 these nations are Afghanistan, Algeria,
Cuba, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.
The ACLU believes that Congress should apply the following two
principles in evaluating any airline security measure:
Efficacy. New security technologies must be genuinely
effective, rather than creating a false sense of security. The
wisdom supporting this principle is obvious: Funds to increase
aviation security are limited, and any technique or technology
must work and be substantially better than other alternatives
to deserve some of the limited funds available. It therefore
follows that before Congress invests in technologies or employs
new screening methods, it must demand evidence and testing from
neutral parties that these techniques have a likelihood of
success.
Impact on Civil Liberties. The degree to which a proposed
measure invades privacy should be weighed in the evaluation of
any technology. If there are multiple effective techniques for
safeguarding air travel, the least intrusive technology or
technique should always trump the more invasive technology.
ii. screening techniques and technologies must be effective, or they
should not be utilized or funded
The wider deployment of whole body imaging (WBI) devices, expanded
use of terror watch lists and increased screening of individuals from
fourteen so-called nations of interest each face significant questions
regarding their efficacy in protecting air travelers and combating
terrorism.
Whole Body Imaging
There are no magic solutions or technologies for protecting air
travelers. Ben Wallace, a current member of the British parliament who
advised a research team at QinetiQ, a manufacturer of body screening
devices, has stated that their testing demonstrated that these
screening devices would not have discovered a bomb of the type used on
Christmas day, as they failed to detect low density materials like
powders, liquids and thin plastics.\5\ A current QinetiQ product
manager admitted that even their newest body scan technology probably
would not have detected the underwear bomb.\6\ The British press has
also reported that the British Department for Transport (DfT) and the
British Home Office have already tested the scanners and were not
convinced they would work comprehensively against terrorist threats to
aviation.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Jane Merrick, Are planned airport scanners just a scam? The
Independent, January 3, 2010.
\6\ Id.
\7\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition we know that al-Qaeda has already discovered a way to
work around this technology. In September a suicide bomber stowed a
full pound of high explosives and a detonator inside his rectum, and
attempted to assassinate a Saudi prince by blowing himself up.\8\ While
the attack only slightly wounded the prince, it fully defeated an array
of security measures including metal detectors and palace security. The
bomber spent 30 hours in the close company of the prince's own secret
service agents--all without anyone suspecting a thing. WBI devices--
which do not penetrate the body--would not have detected this device.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Sheila MacVicar, Al Qaeda Bombers Learn from Drug Smugglers,
CBSnews.com, September 28, 2009
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The practical obstacles to effective deployment of body scanners
are also considerable. In the United States alone, 43,000 TSA officers
staff numerous security gates at over 450 airports and over 2 million
passengers a day.\9\ To avoid being an ineffective ``Maginot line,''
these $170,000 machines will need to be put in place at all gates in
all airports; otherwise a terrorist could just use an airport gate that
does not have them. Scanner operators struggle constantly with boredom
and inattention when tasked with the monotonous job of scanning
thousands of harmless individuals when day after day, year after year,
no terrorists come through their gate. In addition to the expense of
buying, installing, and maintaining these machines, additional
personnel will have to be hired to run them (unless they are shifted
from other security functions, which will degrade those functions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/
security_checkpoints.shtm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The efficacy of WBI devices must be weighed against not only their
impact on civil liberties (discussed further below) but also their
impact on the U.S. ability to implement other security measures. Every
dollar spent on these technologies is a dollar that is not spent on
intelligence analysis or other law enforcement activity. The President
has already acknowledged that it was deficiencies in those areas--not
aviation screening--that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board an
airplane.
Watch Lists
The events leading up to the attempted Christmas attack are a
telling indictment of the entire watch list system. In spite of damning
information, including the direct plea of Abdulmutallab's father, and
other intelligence gathered about terrorist activity in Yemen,
Abdulmutallab was not placed into the main Terrorist Screening
Database. We believe that fact can be directly attributed to the
bloated and overbroad nature of the list--now at more than a million
names.\10\ The size of the list creates numerous false positives,
wastes resources, and hides the real threats to aviation security. As
we discuss below it also sweeps up many innocent Americans--falsely
labeling them terrorists and providing them with no mechanism for
removing themselves from the list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ DOJ OIG Audit Report 09-25, pg 3. http://www.justice.gov/oig/
reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These problems are not hypothetical. They have real consequences
for law enforcement and safety. An April 2009 report from the Virginia
Fusion Center states
``According to 2008 Terrorism Screening Center ground encounter data,
al-Qa'ida was one of the three most frequently encountered groups in
Virginia. In 2007, at least 414 encounters between suspected al-Qa'ida
members and law enforcement or government officials were documented in
the Commonwealth. Although the vast majority of encounters involved
automatic database checks for air travel, a number of subjects were
encountered by law enforcement officers.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Virginia Fusion Center, 2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat
Assessment, March 2009, pg 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every time a law enforcement officer encounters someone on the
terrorist watch list (as determined by a check of the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) database) they contact the TSC. So in essence
Virginia law enforcement is reporting that there are more than 400 al-
Qaeda terrorists in Virginia in a given year. This is difficult to
believe.\12\ In reality most, if not all, of these stops are false
positives, mistakes regarding individuals who should not be on the
list. These false positives can only distract law enforcement from real
dangers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The report does not state that any of these individuals were
arrested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 2009 report by the Department of Justice Inspector General found
similarly troubling results. From the summary:
``We found that the FBI failed to nominate many subjects in the
terrorism investigations that we sampled, did not nominate many others
in a timely fashion, and did not update or remove watch list records as
required. Specifically, in 32 of the 216 (15 percent) terrorism
investigations we reviewed, 35 subjects of these investigations were
not nominated to the consolidated terrorist watch list, contrary to FBI
policy. We also found that 78 percent of the initial watch list
nominations we reviewed were not processed in established FBI
timeframes.
``Additionally, in 67 percent of the cases that we reviewed in which a
watch list record modification was necessary, we determined that the
FBI case agent primarily assigned to the case failed to modify the
watch list record when new identifying information was obtained during
the course of the investigation, as required by FBI policy. Further, in
8 percent of the closed cases we reviewed, we found that the FBI failed
to remove subjects from the watch list as required by FBI policy.
Finally, in 72 percent of the closed cases reviewed, the FBI failed to
remove the subject in a timely manner.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ DOJ OIG Audit Report 09-25, pg iv-v. http://www.justice.gov/
oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf.
This is only the latest in a long string of Government reports
describing the failure of the terror watch lists.\14\ In order to be an
effective tool against terrorism these lists must shrink dramatically
with names limited to only those for whom there is credible evidence of
terrorist ties or activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Review of the Terrorist Screening Center (Redacted for Public
Release), Justice Department, Office of the Inspector General, Audit
Report 05-27, June 2005; Review of the Terrorist Screening Center's
Efforts to Support the Secure Flight Program (Redacted for Public
Release), Justice Department, Office of the Inspector General, Audit
Report 05-34, August 2005; Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening
Center (Redacted for Public Release), Justice Department, Office of the
Inspector General, Audit Report 07-41, September 2007; The Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices,
Justice Department, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report 09-
25, May 2009; DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List
Information, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector
General, OIG-04-31, August 2004; Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be
Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO Report to
Congressional Requesters, GAO-03-322, April 2003; Congressional Memo
Regarding Technical Flaws in the Terrorist Watch List, House Committee
on Science and Technology, August 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation Screening on the Basis of Nationality
Numerous security experts have already decried the use of race and
national origin as an aviation screening technique.
Noted security expert Bruce Schneier stated recently:
``[A]utomatic profiling based on name, nationality, method of ticket
purchase, and so on . . . makes us all less safe. The problem with
automatic profiling is that it doesn't work.
``Terrorists can figure out how to beat any profiling system.
``Terrorists don't fit a profile and cannot be plucked out of crowds by
computers. They're European, Asian, African, Hispanic, and Middle
Eastern, male and female, young and old. Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab was
Nigerian. Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, was British with a Jamaican
father. Germaine Lindsay, one of the 7/7 London bombers, was Afro-
Caribbean. Dirty bomb suspect Jose Padilla was Hispanic-American. The
2002 Bali terrorists were Indonesian. Timothy McVeigh was a white
American. So was the Unabomber. The Chechen terrorists who blew up two
Russian planes in 2004 were female. Palestinian terrorists routinely
recruit ``clean'' suicide bombers, and have used unsuspecting
Westerners as bomb carriers.
``Without an accurate profile, the system can be statistically
demonstrated to be no more effective than random screening.
``And, even worse, profiling creates two paths through security: one
with less scrutiny and one with more. And once you do that, you invite
the terrorists to take the path with less scrutiny. That is, a
terrorist group can safely probe any profiling system and figure out
how to beat the profile. And once they do, they're going to get through
airport security with the minimum level of screening every time.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/will-
profiling-make-a-difference/.
Schneier is not alone in this assessment. Philip Baum is the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
managing director of an aviation security company:
``Effective profiling is based on the analysis of the appearance and
behavior of a passenger and an inspection of the traveler's itinerary
and passport; it does not and should not be based on race, religion,
nationality or color of skin . . .
``Equally, the decision to focus on nationals of certain countries is
flawed and backward. Perhaps I, as a British citizen, should be
screened more intensely given that Richard Reid (a.k.a. ``the
Shoebomber'') was a U.K. passport holder and my guess is there are
plenty more radicalized Muslims carrying similar passports. Has America
forgotten the likes of Timothy McVeigh? It only takes one bad egg and
they exist in every country of the world.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Former Israeli airport security director Rafi Ron:
``My experience at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv has led me to the
conclusion that racial profiling is not effective. The major attacks at
Ben Gurion Airport were carried out by Japanese terrorists in 1972 and
Germans in the 1980s. [They] did not belong to any expected ethnic
group. Richard Reid [known as the shoe bomber] did not fit a racial
profile. Professionally as well as legally, I oppose the idea of racial
profiling.''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Katherine Walsh, Behavior Pattern Recognition and Why Racial
Profiling Doesn't Work, CSO Online, (Feb. 1, 2006), at http://
www.csoonline.com/article/220787/
Behavior_Pattern_Recognition_and_Why_Racial_Profiling_Doesn_t_Work.
This should be the end of the discussions. Policies that don't work
have no place in aviation security. When they are actively harmful--
wasting resources and making us less safe--they should be stopped as
quickly as possible.
iii. the impact on privacy and civil liberties must be weighed in any
assessment of aviation security techniques
Each of the three aviation security provisions discussed in these
remarks represents a direct attack on fundamental American values. As
such they raise serious civil liberties concerns.
Whole Body Imaging
WBI technology involves a striking and direct invasion of privacy.
It produces strikingly graphic images of passengers' bodies,
essentially taking a naked picture of air passengers as they pass
through security checkpoints. It is a virtual strip search that reveals
not only our private body parts, but also intimate medical details like
colostomy bags. Many people who wear adult diapers feel they will be
humiliated. That degree of examination amounts to a significant assault
on the essential dignity of passengers. Some people do not mind being
viewed naked but many do and they have a right to have their integrity
honored.
This technology should not be used as part of a routine screening
procedure, but only when the facts and circumstances suggest that it is
the most effective method for a particular individual. And such
technology may be used in place of an intrusive search, such as a strip
search--when there is reasonable suspicion sufficient to support such a
search.
TSA is also touting privacy safeguards including blurring of faces,
the non-retention of images, and the viewing of images only by
screeners in a separate room. Scanners with such protections are
certainly better than those without; however, we are still skeptical of
their suggested safeguards such as obscuring faces and not retaining
images.
Obscuring faces is just a software fix that can be undone as easily
as it is applied. And obscuring faces does not hide the fact that rest
of the body will be vividly displayed. A policy of not retaining images
is a protection that would certainly be a vital step for such a
potentially invasive system, but it is hard to see how this would be
achieved in practice. TSA would almost certainly have to create
exceptions--for collecting evidence of a crime or for evaluation of the
system (such as in the event of another attack) for example--and it is
a short step from there to these images appearing on the internet.
Intrusive technologies are often introduced very gingerly with all
manner of safeguards and protections, but once the technology is
accepted the protections are stripped away. There are substantial
reasons for skepticism regarding TSA promised protections for WBI
devices. In order for these protections to be credible Congress must
enshrine them in law.
Finally, the TSA should invest in developing other detection
systems that are less invasive, less costly, and less damaging to
privacy. For example, ``trace portal detection'' particle detectors
hold the promise of detecting explosives while posing little challenge
to flyers' privacy. A 2002 Homeland Security report urged the
``immediate deployment'' of relatively inexpensive explosive trace
detectors in European airports, as did a 2005 report to Congress, yet
according to a 2006 Associated Press article, these efforts ``were
frustrated inside Homeland Security by `bureaucratic games', a lack of
strategic goals and months-long delays in distributing money Congress
had already approved.''\18\ Bureaucratic delay and mismanagement should
not be allowed to thwart the development of more effective explosive
detection technologies that do not have the negative privacy impact of
WBI devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ John Solomon, Bureaucracy Impedes Bomb Detection Work,
Washington Post, Aug. 12, 2006, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/12/AR2006081200269.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Watch Lists
The creation of terrorist watch lists--literally labeling
individuals as a terrorist--has enormous civil liberties impact. It
means on-going and repetitive harassment at all airports--foreign and
domestic, constant extra screening, searches and invasive questions.
For the many innocent individuals on the lists this is humiliating and
infuriating.
For some it is worse. Individuals on the No-Fly list are denied a
fundamental right, the right to travel and move about the country
freely. Others are threatened with the loss of their job. Erich
Sherfen, commercial airline pilot and Gulf War veteran, has been
threatened with termination from his job as a pilot because his name
appears on a Government watch list, which prevents him from entering
the cockpit.\19\ Sherfen is not the only innocent person placed on a
terror watch list. Other individuals who are either on a list or
mistaken for those on the list include a former Assistant Attorney
General, many individuals with the name Robert Johnson, the late
Senator Edward Kennedy and even Nelson Mandela.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Jeanne Meserve, Name on government watch list threatens
pilot's career, CNN.com, August 22, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/
08/22/pilot.watch.list/index.html?iref=newssearch.
\20\ For details on these individuals and many other please see:
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/unlikelysuspects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most recent case--revealed just last week--is that of Mikey
Hicks, an 8-year-old boy who has been on the Selectee list seemingly
since birth. According to Hicks' family their travel tribulations that
began when Mikey was an infant. When he was 2 years old, the kid was
patted down at airport security. He's now, by all accounts, an
unassuming bespectacled Boy Scout who has been stopped every time he
flies with his family.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Lizette Alvarez, Meet Mikey, 8: U.S. Has Him on Watch List,
New York Times, January 13, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, to stops at the airport watch list information is also
placed in the National Criminal Information Center database. That means
law enforcement routinely run names against the watch lists for matters
as mundane as traffic stops. It's clear that innocent individuals may
be harassed even if they don't attempt to fly.
Nor is there any due process for removing individuals from the
list--there is simply no process for challenging the Government's
contention that you are a terrorist. Even people who are mistaken for
those on the list face challenges. A September 2009 report by the
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security found that the
process for clearing innocent travelers from the list is a complete
mess.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler
Redress Inquiry Program, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the
Inspector General OIG 09-10, September 2009. http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/
assets/mgmtrpts/OIG-09-103r_Sep09.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the significant and on-going harm to innocent Americans
as well as the harm to our National security caused by the diversion of
security resources these watch lists must be substantial reduced in
size and fundamental due process protections imposed. Innocent
travelers must be able to remove themselves from the list both for
their sake and the sake of National security.
Aviation Screening on the Basis of Nationality
This history of the civil rights movement in the 20th and 21st
Century is a long, compelling rejection of the idea that individuals
should be treated differently on the basis of their race or nation of
origin. Because of that, the administration's decision to subject the
citizens of fourteen nations flying to the United States to intensified
screening is deeply troubling. Long-standing constitutional principles
require that no administrative searches, either by technique or
technology, be applied in a discriminatory matter. The ACLU opposes the
categorical use of profiles based on race, religion, ethnicity, or
country of origin. This practice is nothing less than racial profiling.
Such profiling is ineffective and counter to American values.
But the harm that profiling on the basis of national origin does to
civil liberties is not an abstraction--it also has direct impact on
American security interests. These harmful policies have a direct
impact on the Muslim and Arab communities. The Senate Homeland Security
and Government Affairs committee has heard testimony from several
witnesses who cited the growth of Islamophobia and the polarization of
the Muslim community as risk factors that could raise the potential for
extremist violence.\23\ Unfairly focusing suspicion on a vulnerable
community tends to create the very alienation and danger that we need
to avoid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See for example, Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, Violent Islamist Extremism: The
European Experience, (June 27, 2007), particularly the testimony of
Lidewijde Ongering and Marc Sageman, available at: http://
hsgac.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=9c8ef805-75c8-48c2-
810dd778af31cca6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed a recent United Kingdom analysis based on hundreds of case
studies of individuals involved in terrorism reportedly identified
``facing marginalization and racism'' as a key vulnerability that could
tend to make an individual receptive to extremist ideology.\24\ The
conclusion supporting tolerance of diversity and protection of civil
liberties was echoed in a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) paper
published in August 2008. In exploring why there was less violent
homegrown extremism in the United States than the United Kingdom, the
authors cited the diversity of American communities and the greater
protection of civil rights as key factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ National Counterterrorism Center Conference Report, Towards a
Domestic Counterradicalization Strategy, (August 2008)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the January 7, 2009 White House briefing regarding the security
failures surrounding the Christmas attack, DHS Secretary Janet
Napolitano raised a question about ``counterradicalization.''\25\ She
asked, ``How do we communicate better American values and so forth, in
this country but also around the globe?'' Of course the Secretary
should know American values are communicated through U.S. Government
policies, which is why adopting openly discriminatory policies can be
so damaging and counterproductive to our National interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Briefing by Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano, Assistant
to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Brennan,
and Press Secretary Gibbs, 1/7/10, at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
pressoffice/briefing-homeland-security-secretary-napolitano-assistant-
president-counterterroris[sic].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. conclusion
Ultimately security is never absolute and never will be. It is not
wise security policy to spend heavily to protect against one particular
type of plot, when the number of terrorist ideas that can be hatched--
not only against airlines, but also against other targets--is
limitless. The President has identified a failure ``connect the dots''
by intelligence analysts as the main reason that Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab was able to board a flight to the United States.\26\ We
must not lose sight of that reality. Limited security dollars should be
invested where they will do the most good and have the best chance of
thwarting attacks. That means investing them in developing competent
intelligence and law enforcement agencies that will identify specific
individuals who represent a danger to air travel and arrest them or
deny them a visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Jake Tapper and Sunlen Miller, Obama: Intelligence Community
Failed to ``Connect the Dots'' in a ``Potentially Disastrous Way'',
ABCNews.com, January 05, 2010. http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/
2010/01/obamaintelligence-community-failed-to-connect-the-dots-in-a-
potentially-disastrous-way.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Invasive screening mechanisms, enlarging already bloated watch
lists, targeting on the basis of national origin--none of these
approaches go to the heart of what went wrong on Christmas day. Instead
they are a dangerous sideshow--one that harms our civil liberties and
ultimately makes us less safe.
STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Lute. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King,
Members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to
testify on the attempted attack on December 25.
Secretary Napolitano, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, was
scheduled to be out of the country. In view of that, although
her plans have changed, we have been in touch with your staff
that I would be here to testify for the Department.
As President Obama made clear immediately following the
attack, at the Department of Homeland Security and across the
Federal Government, we are determined to find and fix the
vulnerabilities that led to this breach.
Protecting the United States against terrorism calls upon
the expertise and authority of multiple agencies and many
partners. In addition to the men and women of the Department of
Homeland Security, this includes the efforts of the departments
of State, Defense, Justice, FBI, NCTC, and the broader
intelligence community. It also importantly includes our State
and local law enforcement agencies and our international
partners and allies around the world.
I am very pleased this morning to be joined by my
colleagues from the Department of State and the National
Counterterrorism Center.
As this committee is well aware of, Mr. Chairman, boarding
the plane means fulfilling three basic requirements. The
individual must retain proper documentation, including a
passport, visa, or other travel authorization, a ticket, and
boarding pass. He or she must pass through the checkpoint
screening to ensure that they are not concealing a dangerous
weapon or other dangerous material on their person or in their
baggage.
Finally, the individual must be cleared through a pre-
flight screening process that seeks to determine if that
individual poses a threat to the homeland security and thus
should be denied permission to fly.
Within this set of requirements, let me briefly describe
the specific role the Department of Homeland Security plays.
First, to conduct pre-flight screening, the Department is one
of the principal consumers of intelligence gathered by other
agencies, including the terrorist watch list, which includes
the No-Fly list. DHS checks passengers against these lists to
keep potential terrorists from boarding flights and to identify
travelers who should undergo additional screening.
Second, within the United States, DHS performs the physical
screening at domestic airport checkpoints and provides further
in-flight security measures in order to prevent smuggling of
weapons or other dangerous materials on airplanes.
Third, outside of the United States, the Department works
with foreign governments and airlines to advise them on the
required security measures for flights bound for the United
States and on which passengers may prove a threat. TSA nor any
other part of the Department, however, does not screen people
or baggage at international airports.
Let me say emphatically, as the President of the United
States has said and as the Secretary of Homeland Security has
said, that with regard to the attempted attack on December 25,
Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab should never have been allowed to
board a U.S.-bound airplane with explosives. As Secretary
Napolitano has detailed in recent weeks, DHS has implemented
numerous steps and is working closely with our Federal partners
to fix the vulnerabilities that led to the attempted attack.
As a consumer or a terrorist watch list information, the
Department works closely with the FBI, with the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and NCTC to improve our
ability to connect and assimilate intelligence. We are also
taking steps to strengthen standards for international aviation
screening and bolstering international partnerships to guard
against a similar type of attack.
But to be clear, Abdulmutallab was not on the No-Fly list
and hence, did not come to our attention prior to his boarding
the flight in Amsterdam. His presence on this list would have
flagged him to be prevented from boarding. He was not either on
the Selectee list, which would have flagged him for secondary
screening. Furthermore, the physical screenings that were
performed by foreign authorities at the airports in Nigeria and
the Netherlands failed to detect the explosive on his person.
Immediately following the attempted attack, the Department
took steps to secure incoming and future flights. We directed
the FAA to alert all 128 flights inbound to the United States
from Europe of the situation. We increased security measures at
domestic airports. We implemented an enhanced screening for all
international flights coming into the United States, and we
reached out to State and local law enforcement, air carriers,
international partners, and relevant agencies to provide
information they needed on the ground to take appropriate
measures.
In January 3, Secretary Napolitano dispatched me and my
colleagues in the Department to meet with international
leadership on the crisis in aviation security that was
illustrated through the events of 12/25. We met with senior
officials from 11 countries, plus the European Union, to
discuss ways to strengthen aviation security, and we are
determined to follow through on these contacts. I can report,
as questioned, Mr. Chairman, on the results of those
discussions.
The Secretary has herself been in touch with international
colleagues to identify ways to strengthen the international
aviation security standards and procedures.
As the Secretary said last week, and as the President has
said, there are no 100 percent guarantees against another
terrorist attempt to take down a plane or attack us in some
other fashion. But what we can give you, Mr. Chairman, is the
100 percent commitment of the Secretary, myself, Department
leadership, and the hundreds of thousands of men and women who
work in homeland security to do everything we can to minimize
the risk of terrorist attack.
Thank you again for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to
appear before this committee. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Lute follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jane Holl Lute
January 27, 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee: Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the attempted
terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253.
The attempted attack on December 25 was a powerful illustration
that terrorists will go to great lengths to defeat the security
measures that have been put in place since September 11, 2001. This
administration is determined to thwart those plans and disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks by employing multiple layers
of defense that work in concert with one another to secure our country.
This is an effort that involves not just DHS, but many other Federal
agencies and the international community as well.
As our part in this effort, DHS is a consumer of the U.S.
Government's consolidated terrorist watch list, which we use to help
keep potential terrorists off flights within, over, or bound for the
United States, and to identify travelers that require additional
screening. We work with foreign governments, Interpol, and air carriers
to strengthen global air travel security by advising them on security
measures, and on which passengers may prove a threat. We also work with
air carriers and airport authorities to perform physical screening at
TSA checkpoints and to provide security measures in flight.
Immediately following the December 25 attack, DHS took swift action
at airports across the country and around the world. These steps
included enhancing screening for individuals flying to the United
States; increasing the presence of law enforcement and explosives
detection canine teams at airports, and of air marshals in flight; and
directing the FAA to notify the 128 flights already in-bound from
Europe about the situation. Nonetheless, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
should never have been able to board a U.S.-bound plane with the
explosive PETN on his person. As President Obama has made clear, this
administration is determined to find and fix the vulnerabilities in our
systems that allowed this breach to occur.
Agencies across the Federal Government have worked quickly to
address what went wrong in the Abdulmutallab case. The effort to solve
these problems is well underway, with cooperation among DHS, the
Department of State, the Department of Justice, the intelligence
community, and our international allies, among others. As a consumer of
terrorist watch list information, the Department of Homeland Security
welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the dialogue on improving the
Federal Government's ability to connect and assimilate intelligence. We
are also focused on improving aviation screening and expanding our
international partnerships to guard against a similar type of attack
occurring again. To those ends, today I want to describe the role that
DHS currently performs in aviation security, how DHS responded in the
immediate aftermath of the attempted attack on December 25, and how we
are moving forward to further bolster aviation security.
dhs' role in multiple layers of defense
Since 9/11, the U.S. Government has employed multiple layers of
defense across several departments to secure the aviation sector and
ensure the safety of the traveling public. Different Federal agencies
bear different responsibilities, while other countries and the private
sector--especially the air carriers themselves--also have important
roles to play.
DHS oversees several programs to prevent individuals with terrorist
ties from boarding flights that are headed to, within, or traveling
over the United States or, in appropriate cases, to identify them for
additional screening. Specifically, DHS uses information held in the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), a resource managed by the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as well as other information provided
through the intelligence community, to screen individuals; operates the
travel authorization program for people who are traveling to the United
States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP);\1\ and works with foreign
governments, international, and regional organizations, and airlines to
design and implement improved security standards worldwide. This
includes routine checks against Interpol databases on wanted persons
and lost or stolen passports on all international travelers arriving in
the United States. The Department also performs checkpoint screenings
at airports in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 35 countries in the Visa Waiver Program are: Andorra,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom (for the United Kingdom, only citizens with an
unrestricted right of permanent abode in the United Kingdom are
eligible for VWP travel authorizations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To provide a sense of the scale of our operations, every day, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes 1.2 million travelers
seeking to enter the United States by land, air, or sea; the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screens 1.8 million
travelers at domestic airports; and DHS receives advanced passenger
information from carriers operating in 245 international airports that
are the last point of departure for flights to the United States,
accounting for about 1,600 to 1,800 flights per day. Ensuring that DHS
employees and all relevant Federal officials are armed with
intelligence and information is critical to the success of these
efforts.
Safeguards for Visas and Travel
One of the first layers of defense in securing air travel consists
of safeguards to prevent dangerous people from obtaining visas, travel
authorizations, and boarding passes. To apply for entry to the United
States prior to boarding flights bound for the United States or
arriving at a U.S. port of entry, most foreign nationals need visas--
issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate--or, if traveling under a Visa
Waiver Program country, travel authorizations issued through the
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Exceptions would be citizens of countries under other visa
waiver authority such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative or
the separate visa waiver program for Guam and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, or those granted individual waivers of the
visa requirement under the immigration laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issuing visas is the responsibility of the Department of State. At
embassies and consulates where it is operational, the Visa Security
Program positions personnel of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) to assist State Department personnel in identifying visa
applicants who may present a security threat. For individuals traveling
under the VWP, DHS operates ESTA, a web-based system through which
individuals must apply for travel authorization prior to traveling to
the United States. These systems examine an individual's information to
assess whether he or she could pose a risk to the United States or its
citizens, including possible links to terrorism. Without presenting a
valid authorization to travel to the United States at the airport of
departure, a foreign national is not able to board a U.S.-bound flight.
The Department also works with other Federal agencies and our
foreign partners to try to prevent possible terrorists from obtaining
boarding passes. These include the application of the No-Fly List and
the implementation of Secure Flight program, which I explain below.
Pre-departure screening
As another layer of defense, DHS conducts pre-departure passenger
screening in partnership with the airline industry and foreign
governments in order to prevent known or suspected terrorists from
boarding a plane bound for the United States or, as appropriate, to
identify them for additional screening. DHS uses TSDB data, managed by
the Terrorist Screening Center that is administered by the FBI, to
determine who may board, who requires further screening and
investigation, who should not be admitted, or who should be referred to
appropriate law enforcement personnel.
Specifically, to help make these determinations, DHS uses the No-
Fly List and the Selectee List, two important subsets within the TSDB.
Individuals on the No-Fly List should not receive a boarding pass for a
flight to, from, over, or within the United States. Individuals on the
Selectee List must go through additional security measures, including a
full-body pat-down and a full physical examination of personal effects.
Through the Secure Flight Program, the Department is making an
important change to the process of matching passenger identities
against the No-Fly List and Selectee List, and fulfilling an important
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Previously, responsibility for
checking passenger manifests against these lists rested with the air
carriers themselves. Under the Secure Flight program, DHS began to
transfer this responsibility to TSA in 2009, and the transition is
targeted for completion by the end of this year. In addition to
creating a more consistent matching process for all domestic and
international travel to the United States and strengthening the
effectiveness of redress in preventing misidentifications, Secure
Flight will flag potential watch list matches and immediately trigger
law enforcement notification and coordination.
As an additional layer of security, DHS also uses the Passenger
Name Record (PNR), the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS),
and the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) to assess a passenger's
level of risk and, when necessary, flag them for further inspection.
PNR data, obtained from the airline reservations systems, contains
various elements, which may include optional information on itinerary,
co-travelers, changes to the reservation, and payment information. PNR
data is evaluated against ``targeting rules'' that are based on law
enforcement data, intelligence and past case experience. APIS data,
which carriers are required to provide to DHS at least 30 minutes
before a flight, contains important identifying information that may
not be included in PNR data, including verified identity and travel
document information such as a traveler's date of birth, citizenship,
and travel document number. DHS screens APIS information on
international flights to or from the United States against the TSDB, as
well as against criminal history information, records of lost or stolen
passports, and prior immigration or customs violations. APIS is also
connected to Interpol's lost and stolen passport database for routine
queries on all inbound international travelers.
Another layer in the screening process is the Immigration Advisory
Program (IAP). The CBP officers stationed overseas under the IAP
program at nine airports in seven countries receive referrals from CBP
screening against the TSDB, of which the No-Fly list is a subset. IAP
officers can make ``no board'' recommendations to carriers and host
governments regarding passengers bound for the United States who may
constitute security risks, but do not have the authority to arrest,
detain, or prevent passengers from boarding planes.
Checkpoint Screenings and In-Flight Security
The third layer of defense for air travel in which DHS plays a role
is the screening of passengers and their baggage. TSA screens
passengers and baggage at airports in the United States, but not in
other countries. When a traveler at a foreign airport is physically
screened, that screening is conducted by the foreign government, air
carriers, or the respective airport authority.
Domestically, TSA employs a layered approach to security, which
includes measures both seen and unseen by travelers. The 48,000
Transportation Security Officers at hundreds of airports across the
country screen passengers and their baggage using advanced technology
X-ray systems, walk-through metal detectors, explosive trace detection
equipment, trained canines, vapor trace machines that detect liquid
explosives, Advanced Imaging Technology, full-body pat-downs,
explosives detection systems, Bomb Appraisal Officers, and Behavior
Detection Officers--both at the checkpoint and throughout the airport.
Through programs such as the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program,
TSA also uses random and unpredictable measures to enhance security
throughout the airport perimeter and in limited access areas of
airports. The $1 billion in Recovery Act funds provided to TSA for
checkpoint and checked baggage screening technology have enabled TSA to
greatly accelerate deployment of these critical tools to keep
passengers safe.
In an effort to enhance international screening standards, TSA
conducts security assessments in accordance with security standards
established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at
more than 300 foreign airports, which include foreign airports from
which flights operate directly to the United States and all airports
from which U.S. air carriers operate. If an airport does not meet these
standards, TSA works with the host government to rectify the
deficiencies and raise airport security to an acceptable level.
Ultimately, it is the foreign government that must work to address
these security issues.
In long-term circumstances of non-compliance with international
standards, TSA may recommend suspension of flight service from these
airports to the United States. In addition, TSA inspects all U.S. and
foreign air carriers that fly to the United States from each airport to
ensure compliance with TSA standards and directives. Should air carrier
security deficiencies exist, TSA works with the air carrier to raise
compliance to an acceptable level. If an airport is located within one
of the 35 VWP countries, DHS conducts additional audits and inspections
as part of the statutorily mandated VWP designation and review process.
In terms of in-flight security, Federal Air Marshals (FAM) are
deployed on high-risk domestic and international flights where
international partners allow FAMs to enter their country on U.S.-
flagged carriers. Thousands more volunteer pilots serve as armed,
deputized Federal Flight Deck Officers. Additionally, armed law
enforcement officers from Federal, State, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies that have a need to fly armed provide a force
multiplier on many flights.
dhs response to the attempted december 25 attack
The facts of the December 25 attempted bombing are well established
and were relayed in the report on the incident that the President
released on January 7, 2010. On December 16, 2009, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national, purchased a round-trip ticket from
Lagos, Nigeria to Detroit. Abdulmutallab went through physical security
screening conducted by foreign airport personnel at Murtala Muhammed
International Airport in Lagos on December 24 prior to boarding a
flight to Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. This physical screening included
an X-ray of his carry-on luggage and his passing through a walk-through
metal detector. Abdulmutallab went through additional physical
screening, conducted by Dutch authorities, when transiting through
Amsterdam to Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit, and presented a valid
U.S. visa. Abdulmutallab was not on the No-Fly or Selectee Lists.
Accordingly, the carrier was not alerted to prevent him from boarding
the flight or additional physical screening, nor did the IAP officer
advise Dutch authorities of any concerns.
As with all passengers traveling on that flight, and similar to all
other international flights arriving in the United States, CBP
evaluated Abdulmutallab's information while the flight was en route to
conduct a preliminary assessment of his admissibility and to determine
whether there were requirements for additional inspection. During this
assessment, CBP noted that there was a record that had been received
from the Department of State, which indicated possible extremist ties.
It did not indicate that he had been found to be a threat, or that his
visa had been revoked. CBP officers in Detroit were prepared to meet
Abdulmutallab upon his arrival for further interview and inspection.
The attack on board the flight failed in no small part due to the brave
actions of the crew and passengers aboard the plane.
Immediate DHS Response
Following the first reports of an attempted terrorist attack on
Northwest Flight 253 on December 25, DHS immediately put in place
additional security measures. TSA directed the Federal Aviation
Administration to apprise 128 U.S.-bound international flights from
Europe of the attempted attack and to ask them to maintain heightened
vigilance on their flights. Increased security measures were put in
place at domestic airports, including additional explosive detection
canine teams, State and local law enforcement, expanded presence of
Behavior Detection Officers, and enhanced screening. That evening, DHS
issued a security directive for all international flights to the United
States, which mandated enhanced screening prior to departure and
additional security measures during flight.
From the first hours following the attempted attack, Secretary
Napolitano worked closely with the President, senior Department
leadership, and agencies across the Federal Government. Secretary
Napolitano and I communicated with international partners and Members
of Congress. The Secretary also engaged in dialogue with State and
local leadership, the aviation industry, and with National security
experts on counterterrorism and aviation security. The results of these
communications culminated in two reports to the President: one on New
Year's Eve and the second on January 2, 2010.
One of our most important conclusions was that it is now clearer
than ever that air travel security is an international responsibility.
Indeed, passengers from 17 countries were aboard Flight 253.
Accordingly, DHS has embarked upon an aggressive international program
designed to raise international standards for airports and air safety.
On January 3, 2010, Secretary Napolitano dispatched me and Assistant
Secretary for Policy David Heyman to Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle
East, Australia, and South America to meet with international
leadership on aviation security. In total, we met with senior officials
from 11 countries, plus the European Union in order to discuss new ways
to bolster collective tactics for improving global aviation security.
Last week, Secretary Napolitano travelled to Spain to meet with her
European Union counterparts in the first of a series of global meetings
intended to bring about broad consensus on new, stronger, and more
consistent international aviation security standards and procedures.
In addition to these efforts, the Department has been in close
contact with Congress, our international partners, the aviation
industry and State and local officials across the country since the
afternoon of the attempted attack. On December 25, the Department
issued a joint bulletin with the FBI to State and local law enforcement
throughout the Nation; conducted calls with major airlines and the Air
Transport Association; distributed the FBI-DHS joint bulletin to all
Homeland Security Advisors, regional fusion center directors and Major
City Homeland Security Points of Contact in the country; and notified
foreign air carriers with flights to and from the United States of the
additional security requirements. DHS has maintained close contact with
all of these partners since the attempted attack, and will continue to
do so.
On January 3, TSA issued a new Security Directive, effective on
January 4, mandating enhanced passenger screening.
steps forward to improve aviation security
While these immediate steps helped strengthen our security posture
to face current threats to our country, as President Obama has made
clear, we need to take additional actions to address the systemic
vulnerabilities highlighted by this failed attack. On January 7,
Secretary Napolitano was joined by Assistant to the President for
Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan to announce five
recommendations DHS made to the President as a result of the security
reviews ordered by President Obama. At the President's direction, DHS
will pursue these five objectives to enhance the protection of air
travel from acts of terrorism.
First, DHS will work with our interagency partners to re-evaluate
and modify the criteria and process used to create terrorist watch
list, including adjusting the process by which names are added to the
No-Fly and Selectee Lists. The Department's ability to prevent
terrorists from boarding flights to the United States depends upon
these lists and the criteria used to create them. As an entity that is
primarily a consumer of this intelligence and the operator of programs
that rely on these lists, the Department will work closely with our
partners in the intelligence community to make clear the kind of
information DHS needs from the watch list system.
Second, DHS will establish a partnership on aviation security with
the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories in order to use
their expertise to bolster our security. This new partnership will work
to develop new and more effective technologies that deter and disrupt
known threats, as well as anticipate and protect against new ways that
terrorists could seek to board an aircraft with dangerous materials.
Third, DHS will accelerate deployment of Advanced Imaging
Technology to provide capabilities to identify materials such as those
used in the attempted December 25 attack, and we will encourage foreign
aviation security authorities to do the same. TSA currently has 40
machines deployed at nineteen airports throughout the United States,
and plans to deploy at least 450 additional units in 2010. DHS will
also seek to increase our assets in the area of explosives-trained
canines, explosives detection equipment, and other security personnel.
Fourth, DHS will strengthen the presence and capacity of aviation
law enforcement. As an interim measure, we will deploy law enforcement
officers from across DHS to serve as Federal Air Marshals to increase
security aboard U.S.-flag carriers' international flights. At the same
time, we will maintain the current tempo of operations to support high-
risk domestic flights, as we look to longer-term solutions to enhance
the training and workforce of the Federal Air Marshal Service.
Fifth, as mentioned earlier, DHS will work with international
partners to strengthen international security measures and standards
for aviation security. Much of our success in ensuring that terrorists
do not board flights to the United States is dependent on what happens
in foreign airports and the commitments of our foreign partners to
enhance security--not just for Americans, but also for their nationals
traveling to this country.
In all of these action areas to bolster aviation security, we are
moving forward with a dedication to safeguard the privacy and rights of
travelers.
conclusion
President Obama has made clear that we will be unrelenting in using
every element of our National power in our efforts around the world to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and other violent extremists.
While we address the circumstances behind this specific incident,
we must also recognize the evolving threats posed by terrorists, and
take action to ensure that our defenses continue to evolve in order to
defeat them. We live in a world of ever-changing risks, and we must
move as aggressively as possible both to find and fix security flaws
and anticipate future vulnerabilities in all sectors. President Obama
has clearly communicated the urgency of this task, and the American
people rightfully expect swift action. DHS and our Federal partners are
moving quickly to provide just that.
As Secretary Napolitano said last week, there is no 100 percent
guarantee that we can prevent a terrorist from trying to take down a
plane or attack us in some other fashion. That is not the nature of the
world we live in, nor of the threats that we face. What we can give
you, however, is the 100 percent commitment of the Secretary, myself,
DHS leadership, and the entire DHS enterprise to do everything we can
to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks.
Chairman Thompson, Representative King, and Members of the
committee: Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I am happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Lute.
I now recognize Under Secretary Kennedy to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY, UNDER SECRETARY, MANAGEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, sir. Chairman Thompson, Ranking
Member King, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
After the attempted bombing of Flight 253, Secretary
Clinton stated, ``We are all looking hard at what did happen in
order to improve our procedures, to avoid human errors,
mistakes, oversights of any kind, and we are going to be
working hard with the rest of the administration to improve
every aspect of our effort.''
This introspective review and the concurrent interagency
review are on-going. We appreciate this committee's interest
and support as we continue this review process, noting in
particular the recent committee staff visit to our consular
facility in London. We recognize the gravity of the threat we
face, and we consider ourselves the first line of defense in
our National security efforts. We acknowledge that processes
need to be improved, and here are the steps we have already
taken.
The State Department misspelled Umar Farouk Abdullah's name
in our Visas Viper report. As a result, we did not have that
information about his current U.S. visa in that report. To
prevent that from occurring again, we instituted new procedures
to ensure comprehensive visa information is included in all our
Visas Viper reporting. This will highlight the visa application
and issuance material also available already in the data that
we have shared with our National security partners.
We are also reevaluating the procedures and criteria used
to revoke visas. The State Department has broad and flexible
authority to revoke visas. Since 2001, we have revoked over
51,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 1,700
suspected links to terror.
New watchlisting information coming from the intelligence
and law enforcement community is continually checked every day
against the database of previously issued visas. We can and do
revoke visas and circumstances where an immediate threat is
recognized. We can and do revoke visas to the point of people
seeking to board aircraft, preventing their boarding in
coordination with the FBI's National Targeting Center. We
revoke visas under these circumstances almost daily. We are
standardizing procedures for triggering revocations from the
field and are adding revocation recommendations to the Visas
Viper report.
At the same time, expeditious coordination with our
National security partners is not to be underestimated. There
have been numerous cases where a State Department unilateral
and uncoordinated revocation would have disrupted important
investigations that were under way by one of our National
security partners.
The individual involved was under active investigation, and
our revocation action would have disclosed the United States
Government's interest in that individual and ended our National
security colleague's ability to pursue the case and identify
terrorist plans and co-conspirators.
We will continue to closely coordinate visa revocation
processes with our intelligence and law enforcement partners,
while also constantly making enhancements to the security and
integrity of the visa process. Information sharing and
coordinated action are foundations of the border security
systems put in place since 9/11, and they remain sound
principles.
The State Department has close and productive relationships
with our interagency partners, particularly with the Department
of Homeland Security, which has statutory authority for visa
policy. The State Department brings unique assets and
capabilities to this partnership. Our global presence,
international expertise, and highly trained personnel provide
us singular advantages in supporting the visa function
throughout the world.
We developed and implemented intensive screening processes
requiring personal interviews and supported by a sophisticated
global information network. This front line of border security
has visa offices in virtually every country of the world and
are staffed by highly trained, multilingual, culturally aware
personnel of the State Department.
We support them with the latest technology and access to
enhanced screening tools and information systems. We are
introducing a new generation of visa software to more
efficiently manage our growing mission and the increasing
amounts of data we handle. We are pioneers in the use of
biometrics, a leader in the field of facial recognition, and we
are expanding into the field of iris screening. We have and
will continue to automate processes to reduce the possibility
of human error.
The State Department makes all visa information available
to other agencies, giving them immediate access to over 13
years of data. We introduced on-line visa applications in 2009,
which expanded our data collection tenfold and provide new
information readily available for analysis by the State
Department and by other agencies. This system is being rolled
out worldwide in a few months.
We embrace a layered approach to border security screening,
which results in multiple agencies having an opportunity to
review information and requires separate reviews at both the
visa application and admission stage. No visa--no visa--is
issued without it being run through security checks against our
partners' databases. We screen applicants' fingerprints against
U.S. databases, and we run our facial recognition software
against the photo array provided by the intelligence community.
At the same time we believe that U.S. interests in
legitimate trade, travel, and educational exchanges are not in
opposition to border security. In fact, the United States must
strive to meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security.
Again, the multi-agency team effort to which each agency
brings its particular strengths and expertise results in a
robust and secure process, a process based on broadly shared
information. We remain fully committed to correcting mistakes
and remedying deficiencies that inhibit the full and timely
sharing of information.
We fully recognize that we are not perfect in our reporting
in connection with this case. However, we are working and will
continue to work not only to address shortcomings, but to
continually enhance our border security screening capabilities
and the contributions we make to this interagency effort.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patrick F. Kennedy
January 27, 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. As a
result of the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253, the President
ordered corrective steps to address systemic failures in procedures we
use to protect the people of the United States. Secretary Clinton
reiterated this direction when she stated, ``we all are looking hard at
what did happen in order to improve our procedures to avoid human
errors, mistakes, oversights of any kind. We in the State Department
are fully committed to accepting our responsibility for the mistakes
that were made, and we're going to be working hard with the rest of the
Administration to improve every aspect of our efforts.'' Therefore, the
Department of State now is working on reviewing visa issuance and
revocation criteria and determining how technological enhancements can
facilitate and strengthen visa-related business processes.
Our immediate attention is on addressing the deficiencies
identified following the attempted attack on Flight 253. At the same
time we continue to plan for the future, incorporating new technology,
increasing data sharing and enhancing operational cooperation with
partner agencies. We have a record of quickly adapting and improving
our procedures to respond to security imperatives. We have a highly
trained global team working daily to protect our borders and fulfill
the overseas border security mission and other critical tasks ranging
from crisis management to protection of American interests abroad.
Within the Department we have a dynamic partnership between the Bureau
of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that adds a
valuable law enforcement and investigative component to our
capabilities. We will use these strengths to address the continuing
security threats.
In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on the day following his
father's November 19 visit to the Embassy, we sent a cable to the
Washington intelligence and law enforcement community through proper
channels (the Visas Viper system) that ``Information at post suggests
[that Farouk] may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.'' At the same
time, the Consular Section entered Abdulmutallab into the Consular
Lookout and Support System database known as CLASS. In sending the
Visas Viper cable and checking State Department records to determine
whether Abdulmutallab had a visa, Embassy officials misspelled his
name, but entered it correctly into CLASS. As a result of the
misspelling in the cable, information about previous visas issued to
him and the fact that he currently held a valid U.S. visa was not
included in the cable. At the same time the CLASS entry resulted in a
lookout using the correct spelling that was shared automatically with
the primary lookout system used by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and accessible to other agencies.
We have taken immediate action to improve the procedures and
content requirements for Visas Viper cable reporting that will call
attention to the visa application and issuance material that is already
in the data that we share with our National security partners. All
officers have been instructed to include complete information about all
previous and current U.S. visa(s). This guidance includes specific
methods to comprehensively and intensively search the database of visa
records so that all pertinent information is obtained.
In addition to this change in current procedures to search visa
records, we immediately began working to refine the capability of our
current systems. When dealing with applications for visas, we employ
strong, sophisticated name searching algorithms to ensure matches
between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information
contained in the 27 million records found in CLASS. This strong
searching capability has been central to our procedures since automated
lookout system checks were mandated following the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing. We will use our significant experience with search
mechanisms for derogatory information to improve the systems for
checking our visa issuance records.
The Department of State has been matching new threat information
with our records of existing visas since 2002. We have long recognized
this function as critical to the way we manage our records and
processes. This system of continual vetting has evolved as post-9/11
reforms were instituted and is now performed by the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC). All records added to the Terrorist Screening Database are
checked against the Department's Consolidated Consular Database (CCD)
to determine if there are matching visa records. Matches are sent
electronically from the TSC to the Department of State to flag cases
for visa revocation. In almost all such cases, visas are revoked. In
addition, we have widely disseminated our data to other agencies that
may wish to learn whether a subject of interest has a U.S. visa. Cases
for revocation consideration are forwarded to us by DHS/Customs and
Border Protection's (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC) and other
entities. Almost every day, we receive requests to review and, if
warranted, revoke visas for potential travelers for whom new derogatory
information has been discovered since the visa was issued. Our
Operations Center is staffed 24 hours per day/7 days per week to work
these issues. Many of these requests are urgent because the person is
about to board a plane. The State Department then uses its authority to
prudentially revoke the visa.
Since the Presidentially-ordered Security Review, there have been
changes in the thresholds for adding individuals to the Terrorist
Screening Database, No-Fly, and Selectee lists. The number of
revocations has increased substantially as a result. This revocation
work is processed electronically in the Department. As soon as
information is established to support a revocation, an entry showing
the visa revocation is added electronically to the Department of
State's lookout system and shared in real time with the DHS lookout
systems used for border screening.
In addition to these changes, the Department is reviewing the
procedures and criteria used in the field to revoke visas and will
issue new instructions to our officers. Revocation recommendations will
be added as an element of reporting through the Visas Viper channel. We
will be reiterating our guidance on use of the broad discretionary
authority of visa officers to deny visas on security and other grounds.
Instruction in appropriate use of this authority has been a fundamental
part of officer training for several years.
The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke
visas and we use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since
2001, we have revoked 51,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including
over 1,700 for suspected links to terrorism. We have been actively
using this authority as we perform internal scrubs of our data with
watch list information provided by partner agencies. For example, we
are re-examining information in our CLASS database on individuals with
potential connections to terrorist activity or support for such
activity. We are reviewing all previous Visas Viper submissions as well
as cases that other agencies are bringing to our attention from the No-
Fly and Selectee lists, as well as other sources. In these reviews, we
have identified cases for revocation and we have also confirmed that
substantial numbers of individuals in these classes hold no visas and
of those few who did, many were revoked prior to the current review. We
recognize the gravity of the threat we face and are working intensely
with our colleagues from other agencies to ensure that when the U.S.
Government obtains information that a person may pose a threat to our
security, that person does not hold a visa.
We will use revocation authority prior to interagency consultation
in circumstances where we believe there is an immediate threat.
Revocation is an important tool in our border security arsenal. At the
same time, expeditious coordination with our National security partners
is not to be underestimated. There have been numerous cases where our
unilateral and uncoordinated revocation would have disrupted important
investigations that were underway by one of our National security
partners. They had the individual under investigation and our
revocation action would have disclosed the U.S. Government's interest
in the individual and ended our colleagues' ability to quietly pursue
the case and identify terrorists' plans and co-conspirators.
In addition to revocation efforts, consular officers refused
1,885,017 visas in fiscal year 2009. We now are renewing guidance to
our officers on their discretionary authority to refuse visas under
section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act with specific
reference to cases that raise security concerns. No visa is issued
without it being run through security checks against our partners'
data. And we screen applicants' fingerprints against U.S. databases as
well.
The Department has a close and productive partnership with DHS,
which has authority for visa policy. Over the past 7 years both
agencies significantly increased resources, improved procedures, and
upgraded systems devoted to supporting the visa function. DHS receives
all of the information collected by the Department of State during the
visa process. DHS has broad access to our entire CCD, containing 136
million records related to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and
covering visa actions of the last 13 years. Special extracts of data
are supplied to elements within DHS, including the Visa Security Units
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These extracts have been
tailored to the specific requirements of those units. We are working
closely with ICE Visa Security Units established abroad and with
domestic elements of DHS, such as CBP's National Targeting Center.
We gave DHS access to U.S. passport records, used by CBP to confirm
the identity of citizens returning to the United States. We developed
new card-type travel documents that work with the automated systems CBP
installed at the U.S. land borders. We are collecting more information
electronically and earlier in the process. Expanded data collection
done in advance of travel will give DHS and partner agencies richer
information and more time for analysis.
We make all of our visa information available to other involved
agencies, and we specifically designed our systems to facilitate
comprehensive data sharing. We give other agencies immediate access to
over 13 years of visa data, and they use this access extensively. In
November 2009, more than 16,000 employees of DHS, the Department of
Defense (DOD), the FBI and Commerce made 920,000 queries on visa
records. We embrace a layered approach to border security screening and
are fully supportive of the DHS Visa Security Program.
The Department of State is at the forefront of interagency
cooperation and data sharing to improve border security, and we
embarked on initiatives that will position us to meet future challenges
while taking into consideration our partner agencies and their specific
needs and requirements. We are implementing a new generation of visa
processing systems that will further integrate information gathered
from domestic and overseas activities. We are restructuring our
information technology architecture to accommodate the unprecedented
scale of information we collect and to keep us agile and adaptable in
an age of intensive and growing requirements for data and data sharing.
We proactively expanded biometric screening programs and spared no
effort to integrate this expansion into existing overseas facilities.
In partnership with DHS and the FBI, we established the largest
biometric screening process on the globe. We were a pioneer in the use
of facial recognition techniques and remain a leader in operational use
of this technology. In 2009 we expanded use of facial recognition from
a selected segment of visa applications to all visa applications. We
now are expanding our use of this technology beyond visa records. We
are testing use of iris recognition technology in visa screening,
making use of both identity and derogatory information collected by
DOD. These efforts require intense on-going cooperation from other
agencies. We successfully forged and continue to foster partnerships
that recognize the need to supply accurate and speedy screening in a
24/7 global environment. As we implement process and policy changes, we
are always striving to add value in both border security and in
operational results. Both dimensions are important in supporting the
visa process.
The Department of State is an integral player on the border
security team. We are the first line of defense. Our global presence,
foreign policy mission, and personnel structure give us singular
advantages in executing the visa function throughout the world. Our
authorities and responsibilities enable us to provide a global
perspective to the visa process and its impact on U.S. National
interests. The issuance and refusal of visas has a direct impact on
foreign relations. Visa policy quickly can become a significant
bilateral problem that harms U.S. interests if handled without
consideration of foreign policy impacts. The conduct of U.S. visa
policy has a direct and significant impact on the treatment of U.S.
citizens abroad. The Department of State is in a position to anticipate
and weigh those possibilities.
We developed and implemented intensive screening processes
requiring personal interviews, employing analytic interview techniques,
incorporating multiple biometric checks, all built around a
sophisticated global information technology network. This frontline of
border security has visa offices present in virtually every country of
the world. They are staffed by highly trained and multi-lingual
personnel of the Department of State. These officials are dedicated to
a career of worldwide service and provide the cultural awareness,
knowledge, and objectivity to ensure that the visa function remains the
frontline of border security.
In addition, we have 145 officers and 540 locally employed staff
devoted specifically to fraud prevention and document security,
including fraud prevention officers at overseas posts. We have a large
Fraud Prevention Programs office in Washington, DC that works very
closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and we have fraud
screening operations using sophisticated database checks at both the
Kentucky Consular Center and the National Visa Center in Portsmouth,
New Hampshire. Their role in flagging applications and applicants who
lack credibility, who present fraudulent documents, or who give us
false information adds a valuable dimension to our visa process.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security adds an important law enforcement
element to the Department's visa procedures. There are now 50 Assistant
Regional Security Officer Investigators abroad specifically devoted to
maintaining the integrity of the process. They are complemented by
officers working domestically on both visa and passport matters. These
Diplomatic Security officers staff a unit within the Bureau of Consular
Affairs that monitors overseas visa activities to detect risks and
vulnerabilities. These highly trained law enforcement professionals add
another dimension to our border security efforts.
The multi-agency team effort on border security, based upon broadly
shared information, provides a solid foundation. At the same time we
remain fully committed to correcting mistakes and remedying
deficiencies that inhibit the full and timely sharing of information.
We have and we will continue to automate processes to reduce the
possibility of human error. We fully recognize that we were not perfect
in our reporting in connection with the attempted terrorist attack on
Flight 253. We are working and will continue to work not only to
address that mistake but to continually enhance our border security
screening capabilities and the contributions we make to the interagency
effort.
We believe that U.S. interests in legitimate travel, trade
promotion, and educational exchange are not in conflict with our border
security agenda and, in fact, further that agenda in the long term. Our
long-term interests are served by continuing the flow of commerce and
ideas that are the foundations of prosperity and security. Acquainting
people with American culture and perspectives remains the surest way to
reduce misperceptions about the United States. Fostering academic and
professional exchange keeps our universities and research institutions
at the forefront of scientific and technological change. We believe the
United States must meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security.
We are facing an evolving threat. The tools we use to address this
threat must be sophisticated and agile. Information obtained from these
tools must be comprehensive and accurate. Our criteria for taking
action must be clear and coordinated. The team we use for this mission
must be the best. The Department of State has spent years developing
the tools and personnel needed to properly execute the visa function
overseas and remains fully committed to continuing to fulfill its
essential role on the border security team.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Director Leiter to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Leiter. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Members
of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing on the
events of Christmas day.
Let me start with the most crystal-clear assertion I can
make. Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab should not have boarded that
plane bound for the United States on Christmas day. The
counterterrorism system failed, and I along with other leaders
have told the President--I tell you, I am telling the American
people--we are determined to do better.
I have also pledged to the President, along with the DNI, a
fresh and penetrating look at the human and technical factors
that we think contributed to this failure and try to determine
ways that we can improve our performance. The President has
tasked me with two specific responsibilities--one, a
methodology of pursuing follow-up actions for all threats and
threads as we detect them, and second, a dedicated capability
at NCTC to enhance watch list records.
In addition, I am, of course, working with the DNI, with
Leon Panetta, with Bob Mueller and other members of the IC to
work on intelligence community-specific improvements.
I would like to briefly summarize the events of Christmas
day from our perspective and what went wrong. I want to start
by debunking something that has become conventional wisdom,
that this is a failure just like 9/11. As the President has
said, this was not, like 2001, a failure to collect or share
intelligence. Rather, it was a failure to connect, integrate,
and understand the intelligence.
Now, one is not necessarily a lead to the more tragic
consequences than the other, but the differences in those
failures obviously lead to a different set of reforms that
might be necessary.
Although the National Counterterrorism Center and the
intelligence community have long warned, going back to 2008,
2009, about the threat posed by al-Qaeda in Yemen, we did not
correlate the specific information that would have kept
Abdulmutallab off that flight.
We did highlight the growing threat of al-Qaeda in Yemen.
We also focused on targets in Yemen, but in the fall of 2009 we
increased the need to talk about the possibility of al-Qaeda
from Yemen targeting the United States. We also in fact
analyzed the information that al-Qaeda was working with an
individual who, only again after the fact, did we know to be
Abdulmutallab.
Finally, the intelligence community also warned repeatedly
of the type of explosive device that was ultimately used by
Abdulmutallab and the ways in which that device could be used
to undermine U.S. aviation screening. But again, despite having
identified these overall streams, we failed to make the last
final connection, what I would refer to as the last tactical
mile here, linking Abdulmutallab's identity to the plot that
was in train.
We indeed had the information that came from his father
that he was concerned about his son going to Yemen, coming
under the influence of religious extremists, and that he was
not going to return home. We also had streams of information
from other intelligence channels that provide the pieces of the
story. We had a partial name, an indicator of a Nigerian, but
there was no single piece of intelligence that brought that
together, nor did we at NCTC or elsewhere in the intelligence
community do that in our analysis.
As a result, although Mr. Abdulmutallab was identified with
respect to terrorists and placed in the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment, he was not watchlisted based on the
information that was associated with him, nor was the placed on
the No-Fly or Selectee list.
Had all the information the United States had available at
the time that link together, his name would have been
watchlisted and thus on the visa screening list and the border
inspection list. Whether he would have been placed on the No-
Fly and Selectee list, based on the existing standards, would
have been determined by the strength of our analytic judgment.
As I have already said, I believe, one of the clear lessons we
have learned is a need to re-examine the standards for
inclusion on these various watch lists.
Finally, and I hope I have made clear I have no desire to
try to make excuses for what we did not do, because there are
things that we didn't do well and we didn't do right. I do want
to give you at least a bit of context about the context in
which this failure occurred.
Every day the National Counterterrorism Center receives
literally thousands of pieces of intelligence related to CT--
more than 5,000 a day; well over 5,000. We review well over
5,000 names each day. Each day more than 350 individuals are
actually placed on the watch list.
Now, in hindsight we can say with a high degree of
confidence that Abdulmutallab was plotting with AQAP. Although
we obviously have to do better, we have to recognize that in my
view there is no single silver bullet, and that is especially
true as this terror threat we face becomes more multi-
dimensional and more dispersed away from traditional areas of
promoting terrorism.
So while watchlisting and intelligence are critical tools
in this fight, I would echo the Chairman's statement of the
need for a layered approach to counterterrorism, which includes
technology, international screening and cooperation and the
like.
Now, very quickly, I would like to outline the ways in
which we are improving the system already. As I have noted, the
President has assigned to the interagency to review the
standards for inclusion on the watch lists, including the No-
Fly Selectee list. This has been done.
In addition, we have immediately moved additional resources
to focusing on Yemen and other al-Qaeda affiliates that we
believe pose a threat to U.S. homeland security.
Third, we are trying to move away from a names-based system
of pursuing these threats, ensuring that our analysts have the
time and resources to pursue the small tidbits of information
so they can in fact associate that with individuals and ensure
proper watchlisting.
Finally, as I also noted at the outset, under the
President's direction we are expanding and deepening our
allocation of responsibility for specific follow-up actions for
a wide range of threats, not just those that appear to be high-
priority threats in the beginning.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I very much look forward to
working with this committee and fielding your questions as we
work on this together.
[The statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael E. Leiter
27 January 2010
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
Committee on Homeland Security: Thank you for your invitation to appear
before the committee to discuss the events leading up to the attempted
terrorist attack on Christmas day and the improvements the National
Counterterrorism Center and the intelligence community have underway to
fix deficiencies.
It is my privilege to be accompanied by Jane Holl Lute, Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security and Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of
State for Management.
The attempted terrorist attack on Christmas day did not succeed,
but, as one of several recent attacks against the United States
inspired by jihadist ideology or directed by al-Qaeda and its
affiliates, it reminds us that our mission to protect Americans is
unending.
Let's start with this clear assertion: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
should not have stepped on that plane. The counterterrorism system
failed and we told the President we are determined to do better.
Within the intelligence community we had strategic intelligence
that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had the intention of
taking action against the United States prior to the failed attack on
December 25, but, we did not direct more resources against AQAP, nor
insist that the watchlisting criteria be adjusted prior to the event.
In addition, the intelligence community analysts who were working hard
on immediate threats to Americans in Yemen did not understand the
fragments of intelligence on what turned out later to be Mr.
Abdulmutallab, so they did not push him onto the terrorist watch list.
We are taking a fresh and penetrating look at strengthening both
human and technical performance and do what we have to do in all areas.
Director of National Intelligence Blair and I have specifically been
tasked by the President to improve and manage work in four areas:
Immediately reaffirm and clarify roles and responsibilities
of the counterterrorism analytic components of the IC in
synchronizing, correlating, and analyzing all sources of
intelligence related to terrorism.
Accelerate information technology enhancements, to include
knowledge discovery, database integration, cross-database
searches, and the ability to correlate biographic information
with terrorism-related intelligence.
Take further steps to enhance the rigor and raise the
standard of tradecraft of intelligence analysis, especially
analysis designed to uncover and prevent terrorist plots.
Ensure resources are properly aligned with issues
highlighted in strategic warning analysis.
Additionally, NCTC has been tasked by the President to do the
following:
Establish and resource appropriately a process to prioritize
and to pursue thoroughly and exhaustively terrorism threat
threads, to include the identification of appropriate follow-up
action by the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland
security communities.
Establish a dedicated capability responsible for enhancing
record information on possible terrorist in the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment for watchlisting purposes.
the events leading up to the christmas day attack
I will now briefly discuss some of the details of the bombing
attempt and what we missed. As the President has said, this was not--
like in 2001--a failure to collect or share intelligence; rather it was
a failure to connect, integrate, and understand the intelligence we
had.
Although NCTC and the intelligence community had long warned of the
threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, we did not correlate
the specific information that would have been required to help keep
Abdulmutallab off that Northwest Airlines flight.
More specifically, the intelligence community highlighted the
growing threat to U.S. and Western interests in the region posed by
AQAP, whose precursor elements attacked our embassy in Sana'a in 2008.
Our analysis focused on AQAP's plans to strike U.S. targets in Yemen,
but it also noted--increasingly in the fall of 2009--the possibility of
targeting the United States. We had analyzed the information that this
group was working with an individual who we now know was the individual
involved in the Christmas attack.
In addition, the intelligence community warned repeatedly of the
type of explosive device used by Abdulmutallab and the ways in which it
might prove a challenge to screening. Of course, at the Amsterdam
airport, Abdulmutallab was subjected to the same screening as other
passengers--he passed through a metal detector, which didn't detect the
explosives that were sewn into his clothes.
As I have noted, despite our successes in identifying the overall
themes that described the plot we failed to make the final
connections--the ``last tactical mile''--linking Abdulmutallab's
identity to the plot. We had the information that came from his father
that he was concerned about his son going to Yemen, coming under the
influence of unknown religious extremists, and that he was not going to
return home. We also had other streams of information coming from
intelligence channels that provided pieces of the story. We had a
partial name, an indication of a Nigerian, but there was nothing that
brought it all together--nor did we do so in our analysis.
As a result, although Mr. Abdulmutallab was identified as a known
or suspected terrorist and entered into the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment (TIDE)--and this information was in turn widely
available throughout the intelligence community--the derogatory
information associated with him did not meet the existing policy
standards--those first adopted in the summer of 2008 and ultimately
promulgated in February 2009--for him to be ``watchlisted,'' let alone
placed on the No-Fly List or Selectee lists.
Had all of the information the United States had available,
fragmentary and otherwise, been linked together, his name would have
undoubtedly been entered on the Terrorist Screening Database which is
exported to the Department of State and the Department of Homeland
Security. Whether he would have been placed on either the No-Fly or
Selectee list--again based on the existing standards--would have been
determined by the strength of the analytic judgment. One of the clear
lessons the U.S. Government has learned and which the intelligence
community will support is the need to modify the standards for
inclusion on such lists.
In hindsight, the intelligence we had can be assessed with a high
degree of confidence to describe Mr. Abdulmutallab as a likely
operative of AQAP. But without making excuses for what we did not do, I
think it critical that we at least note the context in which this
failure occurred: Each day NCTC receives literally thousands of pieces
of intelligence information from around the world, reviews literally
thousands of different names, and places more than 350 people a day on
the watch list--virtually all based on far more damning information
than that associated with Mr. Abdulutallab prior to Christmas day.
Although we must and will do better, we must also recognize that not
all of the pieces rise above the noise level.
The men and women of the National Counterterrorism Center and the
intelligence community are committed to fighting terrorism at home and
abroad and will seek every opportunity to better our analytical
tradecraft, more aggressively pursue those that plan and perpetrate
acts of terrorism, and effectively enhance the criteria used to keep
known or suspected terrorists out of the United States.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel. I will now recognize myself for questions.
To each one of the panelists, since this occurrence on
December 25, has any personnel action or disciplinary action
taken place in your Department relative to this incident?
Ms. Lute. In the Department of Homeland Security, Mr.
Chairman, the personnel actions that have been taken have
related to intensified training, intensified deployment, but
there have been no disciplinary actions that have taken place.
Chairman Thompson. So there are no disciplinary----
Mr. Kennedy. No disciplinary actions, sir.
Mr. Leiter. We are currently reviewing all the personnel.
We have made no final decisions.
Chairman Thompson. If you will, at whatever point you
complete that review, would you provide the committee that
which the law allows so we can review it?
Mr. Leiter. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. So my understanding is, even though this
was an unfortunate situation, nobody has been disciplined. We
understand the President took responsibility, and that is good,
but the question in the minds of a lot of us is, is that good
enough?
Now, my next question to each one of you is if that
situation occurred today, would it be any different?
Mr. Kennedy. On the State Department, it would be
different, Mr. Chairman. We had a process that had been worked
out with the interagency community, and we have discovered that
we did not have sufficient checkmarks in. There was no
requirement in our previous rule grid when we reported on the
Visas Viper, meaning somebody coming into an American embassy
and saying we have concerns about a third party.
We reported that immediately, but we did not have in that
process a checkmark that this individual had a U.S. visa. I
cannot tell you why that wasn't included. I can tell you
probably because we had already passed to the law enforcement
intelligence community the list of everyone who gets a visa on
a daily basis.
We have now added that to our process, so any person who
comes in the embassy and makes a report of terrorist concern,
not only to report that individual in our Visas Viper message
to the community, but we add then this person has a United
States visa, and we have also enhanced the name-checking
capability in that system to make sure that if there is a
misspelling----
Chairman Thompson. Okay. So, all right, so he has a visa.
So what does that do?
Mr. Kennedy. What?
Chairman Thompson. In the process. Does it revoke the visa?
Does it----
Mr. Kennedy. As I mentioned in my statement, Mr. Chairman,
if we unilaterally revoked a visa, and there was the case
recently up, we have a request from a law enforcement agency to
not revoke the visa. We came across information. We said,
``This is a dangerous person.'' We were ready to revoke the
visa. We then went to the community and said, ``Should we
revoke this visa?''
One of the members--and we would be glad to give you that
in private--said, ``Please, do not revoke this visa. We have
eyes on this person. We are following this person who has the
visa for the purpose of trying to roll up an entire network,
not just stop one person.''
So we will revoke the visa of any individual who is a
threat to the United States, but we do take one preliminary
step. We ask our law enforcement and intelligence community
partners, ``Do you have eyes on this person and do you want us
to let this person proceed under your surveillance so that you
may potentially break a larger plot?''
Chairman Thompson. I think that the point that I am trying
to get at is is this just another box you are checking, or is
there some security value to adding that box to the list?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. The intelligence and law enforcement
community tell us that they believe in certain cases that there
is a higher value of them following this person so they can
find his or her co-conspirators and roll up an entire plot
against the United States, rather than simply knock out one
soldier in that effort.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Leiter.
Mr. Leiter. I would offer four ways in which I think the
process would work differently today, Mr. Chairman. First,
actually beginning in July 2008, right after Mr. Abdulmutallab
obtained his visa, NCTC began working with State Department in
reviewing visa applications in a new and more advanced way.
The way in which we now review that visa, and I can't go
into it in the open session, would have detected a connection
with Mr. Abdulmutallab, which would have stamped an automatic
warning to State Department, DHS, FBI and other intelligence
community components. So first of all, he might not have even
gotten the visa in the first place.
Second, anyone who has a visa that goes on the watch list,
the default is if that visa is revoked, they also become a no-
fly to ensure that if someone shows up with the visa, if there
is some confusion there, they are also a no-fly. That is the
second step.
Third, we have dedicated teams that don't have any
responsibility for producing intelligence, but simply for
following up on these small leads. I believe those teams would
increase the likelihood we would tap.
Fourth, we have, as an interagency way, reviewed already
the standards for placement on No-Fly. Although those standards
have not yet been formally adjusted, they are being interpreted
in a manner which allows us to more broadly apply those
practically.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I yield to the Ranking Member for questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess this would go to Mr. Leiter and Deputy Secretary
Lute. The President first spoke to the Nation on this on
Monday, December 28, I believe. It was 3 days after the event.
During that time I assume most of this information was
available to the intelligence community, whoever was briefing
the President. Yet when he spoke that day, 3 days after, he
referred to Abdulmutallab as an isolated extremist.
Do you know who was responsible for clearing that
statement, when obviously he was not an isolated extremist? He
was part of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We had this
series of information on him. Now, the President seemed to
correct that the next day. Why did the President go forward and
use that term? Who is responsible for briefing him? Who is
responsible for clearing that statement?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I frankly can't speak to the White
House interactions and who prepared that for the President and
who briefed him on that. I simply don't know. I would say that
on the night, on Christmas night, we advised the White House. I
think the White House, we said that we believe this was an
attempted terrorist attack.
I will also add that during this entire look back, an on-
going investigation, as you know, different pieces of
information have come forward, which have made it more and more
clear, I think, each day of his connections to al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula.
Mr. King. Secretary Lute.
Ms. Lute. Congressman, I would echo what Director Leiter
has said. I was equally not involved in the deliberations
within the White House to inform the President.
I can also say, as Director Leiter has said, that from the
moment we became aware of this incident, there was an extremely
intensive effort to identify as many facts about this
individual as we possibly could, including reaching out to
international partners who held some elements of information.
That work was intensive over those several----
Mr. King. Because this interrupts my time, I want to
interrupt. Again, I am just concerned why 3 days later, with
all this information available, the President said ``isolated
extremist.'' Was it John Brennan who briefed him? Was it Leon
Panetta?
I mean it would seem to me that in a situation like this,
there should be one point person, who goes in and tells the
President, who coordinates everything. Who is that coordinator?
Do you know? Who would have allowed him to say ``isolated
extremist'' when he was not isolated?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I know that the National
Counterterrorism Center and others were providing intelligence
to the White House on an on-going basis. I simply don't know
how those statements were produced.
Mr. King. Okay.
Secretary Lute and Mr. Leiter, would, you know, either
yourselves or anyone in the intelligence community who would
now say that Abdulmutallab should be un-Mirandized at this
stage? Because, obviously, Director Blair seems to believe it
was a mistake to have him put into the criminal justice system.
At this stage, is anyone willing to recommend he be taken out
of the criminal justice system and put into the military
tribunal system?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, what I can say from the Department
of Homeland Security's perspective and in hindsight--there is a
lot of hindsight going on--we are focused on those aspects of
this for which the Department had key responsibility. The
decisions regarding the Mirandizing of Abdulmutallab are
appropriately directed to the Justice Department.
Mr. King. Okay. My understanding was the Secretary of
Homeland Security is a member of the President's task force on
interrogation, and that supported the creation of the HIG. I am
wondering does the Department have a position of whether or not
at this stage, not doing Monday morning quarterbacking, right
now as of Wednesday, January 27, do you believe that you should
be taken out of the criminal justice system and put into the
military tribunal system?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, I am not party of all of the
conversations that have gone in this individual. I am not
prepared----
Mr. King. Director Leiter.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I think it is critically important
that we try to get in as much information from him as we can. I
think now, several weeks after the arrest and Mirandizing, it
is not at all clear to me, and I am not close enough to know
whether or not it would be productive or counterproductive,
given the current FBI investigation, to do that.
Mr. King. Secretary Lute, it has been reported in the press
that CBP was waiting in Detroit to question the terrorist when
he came off the plane. If that is true, wouldn't that have been
sufficient information to contact the Netherlands and at least
ask them to do a secondary inspection?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, what CBP had was consistent with our
long-standing practice of examining issues related to
admissibility, and----
Mr. King. Okay, but looking at it now--we are going toward
the future again--I am not trying to Monday morning
quarterback, but looking toward the future, having that
information, if there is enough information to question a
person coming off, is it that difficult to ask another
government to give him a secondary inspection?
Ms. Lute. We in fact have changed our practice.
Mr. King. We have. Okay.
Ms. Lute. That kind of information will be pushed forward.
Mr. King. Let me ask Director Leiter and Secretary Lute:
People have said the system failed, but what really was the
system failure? Wasn't it judgments that failed? Obviously, we
always have to adapt the system. But it seems to me the system
provided enough information that, if it were properly
interpreted, this would not have happened. Did the system
actually fail, or are we talking about judgment mistakes?
Again, I am not trying to Monday morning quarterback. But I
think rather than just say the system failed, one person
accepts the responsibility, shouldn't we be--as the Chairman
seemed to be indicating, and I agree--looking for individuals
who did make judgment mistakes?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I think there are potentially some
instances where there was a protocol to be followed, and
someone didn't follow the protocol. That is one category of
failure.
The second category of failing is did you connect these two
pieces of data? I frankly think that that second category is a
lot harder to identify and clearly say you made a mistake. We
want analysts to do that. But whether or not they actually
could, and piece that all together, given the resources, the
workload they are facing, I think it is much more difficult to
say that that was a clear failure.
I believe the phrase ``systemic failure'' was meant to
suggest that there are a series of failings in different pieces
of the system, not that the entire system itself is broken.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California for
5 minutes. Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome our witnesses, but comment on the
absence of Secretary Napolitano. This is the committee with
primary jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security.
She is the Secretary of Homeland Security. She is in
Washington, DC.
She was invited to testify at this very important hearing,
and she should have been here, Deputy Secretary Lute. I
understand that you were prepared and you had accepted our
invitation, but I am very personally disappointed that she
isn't here.
I also want to note for the record that I was briefed
following the Christmas bomb plot within a few days. I was
first in my district, and then I was on a family vacation, but
Secretary Napolitano did call me after she spoke to the
Chairman. I am quite aware that she had first spoken to him. I
also exchanged e-mails and had numerous calls with Mr. Leiter,
who was first in Washington, DC, during the event and then
subsequently on a short family vacation himself. I know he was
hard at work.
Mr. King. Would you just yield for 2 seconds? Just to say
nobody on this side received those briefings, which I think is
wrong. It has always been bipartisan.
Ms. Harman. I agree with you, Mr. King, that there should
be bipartisan briefings. You know that I agree with that.
I also want to note that in recent years there have been
many intelligence community successes. The Zazi plot, the
Headley plot and others are examples of success, and there had
been many intelligence community sacrifices, particularly the
loss recently of seven CIA personnel at the Forward Operating
Base Chapman in Afghanistan. Obviously, all of us know this and
want to salute again today the hard-working women and men of
the intelligence community.
But despite all those successes and the risks that they
take, the Christmas day problem does represent a failure. Two
of you, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Leiter, have stepped up and taken
responsibility, as has Mr. Brennan, and I applaud you for doing
that. I applaud the fact that you have all pledged that you
would do better.
Doing better is not optional. A hundred percent security
can never be achieved, but surely we can do better. At least to
me, listening to all of this and based on my long experience
with the Intelligence Reform Act and other efforts to try to
better, I think that doing better is not about laundry lists.
It is about leadership.
Only through leadership will our system of layered security
become more agile and responsive. Let us understand that the
enemy that is seeking to harm us is agile and responsive.
Whatever it is that we now decide to do, they will try to
figure out a way to get around it. So our system of collection,
analysis, visa approval, watchlisting and other things should
get better. But only through strong leadership will that better
system stay agile and responsive.
Let me just add one thing as the tag end. This I commend
the Department of Homeland Security for doing very well, and
that is preparing, not scaring the public. There is a new tone.
I applaud that. Let us remember that the successful layer of
security on Christmas day was a prepared public on that
airplane.
So, finally, let me make one other point. There is
testimony submitted for the record of this hearing by the ACLU,
and I have read that testimony, and I think it is extremely
thoughtful. It reminds me that one piece of unfinished business
since the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 is the formation of a
privacy and civil liberties commission that was supposed to
oversee new practices to keep our country safer.
I wrote a letter to the President in October with Senator
Susan Collins of Maine, and the White House has never responded
to our letter. Insofar as I know, nothing has been done. I
think that this is unfortunate and will prevent us from
assuring the public that we are enacting better practices
consistent with our Constitution.
But my one question, because time is running out, is to
each of you. What are you personally going to do to assert
leadership in the near- and medium-term to make certain that
the people under your supervision remain agile and responsive
against an evolving threat by a learning organization?
Ms. Lute. Congresswoman, perhaps I will begin. You and I
know each other well. I take very seriously the
responsibilities of leadership, and I underscore
responsibility. I personally traveled to 12 countries in 12
days with colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security
to bring a message of leadership from the United States to our
international partners with whom we have to work very closely
to raise the standard of aviation security.
I personally spoke with the IAB officer on the ground in
Amsterdam to understand from his perspective what more can we
do to change the system and to improve our ability to prevent a
future event as occurred on Christmas day.
The Secretary equally has personally made aviation security
a cornerstone event of our efforts going forward in this, along
with other parts of the Department, who take very seriously its
leadership role to help create a homeland where the American
way of life can thrive. This is something we take extremely
seriously.
Mr. Kennedy. Ma'am, the Secretary of State is incredibly
involved in this, and she has charged me, and I think that I
would offer in the brief time I have two points, but there are
others.
The first, we need to continually increase our software
capability to take disjointed pieces of material and bring them
to get together. The second thing we need to do is and I have
to make sure that is happening, and I think that we also have
to make sure that we remain and improve our lash-up with the
National security and the law enforcement community, because we
are on the frontline.
But while we are on the frontlines, if we don't have the
backstopping that is the best that we can lash up, then we
would fail again. That is my pledge to make sure those happen.
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, I have spent a tremendous amount
of time since December 25 with my workforce, my analysts, my
watch listers, my watch standards, and made clear to them many
things. One, I have to enable them to be able to do the job. If
they need something, they have to come to me, so I am making
sure that lines of communication are more open than ever.
So one of the things I first said to them is I want to know
from every one of them how do we do our job better. I did an
open e-mail to my entire organization. I probably got 200
responses of what they think needs to be done.
The second thing I said to them in a way relates back to
what the Chairman asked. I told all of them you have to ask
yourself whether or not you can keep doing it, because this is
high pressure. It is high stakes. You are going to get beat up
in the public realm. You have to make sure that you can commit
yourself 100 percent to this every single day. There is no
embarrassment if they can't. We have to make sure that we have
a well-honed team that really stays on this.
Finally, the last thing I would say I am doing--I am not
generally noted to be an especially patient person, but
whatever patience I have shown in the past in terms of trying
to negotiate or massage interagency agreement to obtain data or
to provide cooperation, frankly, I am done with it. I am going
to ask once politely, and after that I am bringing to the White
House and Director Blair and saying this has to be done. If it
can't be done, I can't guarantee you the security that I think
you and the American people deserve.
Could I add one thing, Mr. Chairman? I just want to note on
the record I endorse wholeheartedly the information that this
committee needs to make a decision. You have my commitment from
NCTC--I hope we have illustrated that in the past--to provide
you that completely and on a nonpartisan basis the information
you need to do your oversight correctly.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentleman from Indiana for 5 minutes, Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Kennedy, I would appreciate for the record if
you would--you said since 2001 you revoked 51,000 visas and
1,700 for suspected links to terrorism--could you give us a by-
year number of visas revoked and number for suspected
terrorism?
But, secondly, I know my friend from New York kept making a
point about Monday morning quarterbacking. As a Hoosier, when
you have Peyton Manning as your quarterback, you don't have to
do Monday morning quarterbacking. That is important here,
because it is the person in charge, and the people in charge.
When they fail is when we do Monday morning quarterbacking.
It is not the agent who didn't have the information who
messed up here, that as you see these people at the airports as
you go around the world, there were signals from the top to
back off of profiling, don't focus as much, agents not focusing
as much on capturing people as moving them through, not putting
things together.
I have some basic questions that we learned before, and I
was very disturbed at some of the briefing. My understanding is
in public record that we didn't know he paid cash, because we
don't collect the information on cash, because 20 percent or
some percentage of people who do foreign travel pay by cash and
that that wasn't in his--we didn't know he paid cash. That is
public record. Is that true?
Mr. Leiter. I think it is true that we did not know he paid
cash. One note, I would say, Mr. Souder. I think you are right.
Roughly 20 percent of global passengers pay cash. That
proportion, from the region he came from in Africa, is vastly
higher, so frankly, a cash payment for a ticket from where he
bought his ticket really would not raise any suspicion.
Mr. Souder. We also didn't know that the British had him on
a no-fly list. Is that correct? That is publicly reported.
Mr. Leiter. The British did not have him on a
counterterrorism no-fly list. The British had----
Mr. Souder. But they had him on a no-fly list.
Mr. Leiter. He did not have a visa----
Mr. Souder. He didn't have a visa, so he couldn't fly.
Mr. Leiter [continuing]. For criminal purposes.
Mr. Souder. So the question is, and this is what I would
ask you, in any type of basic tracking or intelligence, in
narcotics and that type of thing, you build a system. When a
business is trying to figure out risk of something, they build
a system.
The cash would not be relevant in normal, but the cash
becomes relevant if the father said this, and you knew you were
watching something from there, and you are tracking a ticket.
Then all of a sudden the cash is relevant. The fact that he
didn't have a visa was not relevant, because it wasn't relevant
to terrorism. But the fact that he was a liar on his visa form
suddenly becomes relevant, once you know that the father
called, and he bought cash in that.
In other words there is a point system. My understanding is
you don't have a point system. Is that true?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman----
Mr. Souder. In other words there is no way to pyramid the
information.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I don't think that is quite true,
but I don't want to quibble with your point, because I think
you are exactly right. Those individually----
Mr. Souder. Irrelevant things, yes.
Mr. Leiter [continuing]. Inoffensive bits of data add up to
a larger picture. I will say that over the past several years,
as we have tried to ``accumulate data'' so all of that data can
be shared and analyzed together, one of the consistent
challenges we have faced at the National Counterterrorism
Center is these bits of data that aren't terrorism information,
but could add to that picture.
That has been one of the most significant obstacles we have
faced in making sure all that information can be effectively
analyzed.
Mr. Souder. But would you not agree that there are things
where you are building a broad picture, and there are things
that are specifically relevant to getting on an airplane? In
other words I know early on until they somewhat improved the
system, that one time going through the Washington airport, six
of the seven people in secondary where members of Congress.
Why? We got out early. We bought e-tickets. We paid cash.
That those are logical things you watch for in an airplane,
and they build that, but you might not need them in your full
terrorism bank. Do you have any ability to separate when you
are getting on an airplane, when you are getting at something
else from kind of this general pool? Otherwise, you will have
so much information that will be indecipherable.
Mr. Leiter. On that, Congressman, I would really defer to
Deputy Secretary Lute on their screening----
Mr. Souder. Then let me tie a question with that, that we
worked hard in the very original bill to make sure that
Homeland Security was going to be at as many posts where they
were doing visas and as many posts at airports. You had 50
deployments. Are you asking for more?
In other words the whole point of port security in airports
is not to kind of arrest them after they have blown everything
up. It is to get it before it gets here. Are you asking and
requesting more overseas deployments? Are you going to get this
kind of information where they can say, okay, this is airplane
specific, this is harbor specific, as opposed to just general?
There may be something--for example, somebody's shipping
orders. That may be relevant in a port, but not relevant to the
total counterterrorism center.
Ms. Lute. Congressman, on each of these lines we are doing
more. As you know, the Department of Homeland Security has no
authority abroad. But we do have programs where we have people
deployed for precisely this purpose. These are limited
programs. We have expanded them as Congress has given us the
resources to do so. We will expand them again. We have expanded
them in the wake of this episode.
Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one thing very clear
about the Secretary's leadership and your presence today, as
you know, she had planned--there was international travel that
conflicted with this hearing today. I was offered in part
because I went abroad immediately at her direction with my
colleagues to raise some of the issues that you are raising
about the kind of information that we are collecting, about the
kind of technology that we can deploy, about the weaknesses
that exist in the system and how we can work collectively to
raise that bar.
Mr. Chairman, with your staff it was coordinated and agreed
that that I would appear for that reason.
Mr. Souder. With all due respect, it isn't true that you
have no authority abroad. You have the right to reject their
entry into the United States.
Ms. Lute. Absolutely right, Congressman. There is no
question. We do--we can----
Mr. Souder. A container doesn't have to come in. A person
doesn't have to come in. We have that authority.
Ms. Lute. That is correct. But to your point about
additional information, we have made that change in Homeland
Security, taking information that previously under our pre-
existing protocols was related to admissibility and not putting
it in the service of making flying determinations.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. DiFazio for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Lute, you know, we wouldn't have any imaging technology
capability today if it hadn't been for Kip Hawley. You know, I
have been a fan of this since I was first exposed to it about 8
years ago. I kept bumping up against that ``Oh, my God, we are
going to see people's skin or bodies or images'' or whatever.
Kip Hawley, you know, after a number of failed
administrators, really focused on this. He pushed it through. I
kept saying, ``Isn't it just the way you get software? It
doesn't have to be your body. It can--'' and Kip finally got
that done.
So the point I am making here is we need a TSA
administrator. I am going to ask this question, which I asked
Ms. Napolitano last spring. Can't you just get it out of the
way and allow the people in the TSA to unionize? It will not
impinge, unlike some wacko Republicans think, on National
security. Just get that out of the way so that won't be the
thing that stalls the new TSA administrator.
She said she wanted to wait for an administrator to get it
done. You can't wait. She needs to make the decision, get it
done, give them those rights and get that off the table, and
then the next administrator can just deal with security issues
and their history and background, and not this specious issue.
That is just a message I wish you would deliver to her, because
she said here, you know, to me quite some time ago she was
wanting to move this forward, but she wanted to wait for the
administrator. Can't wait. Get it done.
Point No. 2, you know, the imaging technology is good. It
may or may not have worked in this case, but it has to be mated
with something that does vapor detection. Are we full out there
working on vapor detection or trace detection? You know, I mean
dogs are great, but, you know, we need, you know, maybe, you
know, either we need a heck of a lot of dogs or, you know, we
need some technology that is more dependable than those puffer
machines.
Ms. Lute. You are absolutely right, Congressman. This
technology does represent an improvement in our overall
capabilities, but it is only one part of a layered system.
Other technology has to be brought to bear as well, as well as
improved processes, improved information gathering across the
board.
We are working very closely and have established a high-
level working group with the Department of Energy and the
National labs to look precisely not only at are we using
existing technology to best effect, but what are the promising
new technologies that we can then add to these multiple layers
to ensure the best safety and defense possible?
Mr. DeFazio. Okay.
To anybody, are all--I hate these stupid names; I don't
know, the Terrorist Identities Datamart entire and, you know,
whatever, TIDE? Are all the people on the TIDE list now
selectees? I don't see why they wouldn't be. It is an
insignificant number of daily passengers compared to the number
of people who fly daily. It would not be in an imposition. Are
they now also selectees?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, they are not, although I must say
I very much appreciate your sentiment. Frankly, from my
perspective as the director of NCTC, it is no skin off of my
back if they all were.
Mr. DeFazio. There are 500,000 of them. They are worldwide.
There are 3 million-something people fly a day. You know, I
mean it would add significantly to the burden. Does Homeland
Security object to this?
Ms. Lute. Homeland Security has no objection to that, to
any measures that enhance the security of the traveling public.
Mr. DeFazio. Do you think that would enhance security, that
anybody who is on the TIDE list is a selectee?
Ms. Lute. Rather than going----
Mr. DeFazio. Yes or no. I am running out of time.
Ms. Lute. If any--it takes----
Mr. DeFazio. You don't know.
Ms. Lute [continuing]. It takes layers of defenses--
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. All right. So you are sort of no.
Mr. Leiter[continuing]. Respectfully.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, yes.
Mr. Leiter. Again, I respect your views, and I am happy to
do it, but the pressure on NCTC, on DHS over the past 8 years
has never been in that direction.
Mr. DeFazio. All right.
Mr. Leiter. It has always been in the exact opposite
direction. So I just want to recognize this is a very changed--
--
Mr. DeFazio. I understand, but, you know, Congress acted,
and we pushed, and we have in place now an appeal system. So if
somebody is on that list, like John Lewis from Georgia, our
colleague, or, you know, former Senator Kennedy, others who get
on the list, you know, there is an appeals process. You can get
off the list.
But why not err on the side of caution? Anybody on that
list becomes a selectee. They at least get that slightly higher
level of screening. They have some interaction with a, you
know, with an officer, you know. I just think that to me, and
again, it would be a very, very, very infinitesimal percentage
addition to the daily workload.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I agree in many ways----
Mr. DeFazio. Okay.
Mr. Leiter [continuing]. But would note it would be about a
40 or 50 times increase in the number of selectees we have
today.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, but I don't think so on a daily basis. It
is 500,000 people on the list. How many of them fly on a daily
basis, you know, when there are 3 million people a day flying?
I mean I just don't think it would be.
Mr. Leiter. But we currently have 14,000 on the Selectee
that would increase them 40 to 50----
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, but I know it would increase the list
that much, but in terms of daily workload, it would be nowhere
near that.
One other quick question to State. You talked about you
have the authority to immediately revoke a visa. You know, but
you want to communicate. Then you said, but if it was urgent,
you would act.
Have you ever had a recommendation the other way to you,
that you revoke a visa that you didn't revoke?
Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Thank you very much. We have been told that some votes will
happen, and I have been fairly lenient with time. But in the
interest of giving every Member an opportunity to ask
questions, we will strictly adhere to the time.
The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As everybody on this committee knows, for many years I have
been a vigorous advocate of canines' use and remain that way,
and I want to talk mostly about that.
Before I do, I want to visit the subject that my colleague
from Oregon brought up about the administrator who was
proposed. The administration didn't propose him until
September. I mean they had been in office 8 months, so if this
was such a priority with the administration, he should have
been proposed earlier.
Secondly, you did raise the issue that I care about. That
is canine use. Right after this Christmas day bombing,
Secretary Napolitano in her remarks--White House press
conference--listed three or four items that the Department was
going to turn to to enhance our security layer system, and one
of them was enhanced canine use.
I sent her a letter since then, expressing again, as I have
in this hearing and in other venues, my concern that we aren't
utilizing that asset enough. I know for a fact that TSA only
uses 750 canines. These are very inexpensive, very effective
means of technology.
You have stated in your statement, the written statement,
in two different places that you have increased your use of
canine detection dogs, explosive dogs, in our transportation
hubs. Can you tell me where and how many and what your plan is
on that asset?
Ms. Lute. In this open setting, Congressman, I am not going
to detail any of the specific security measures that we have
taken, but we believe that canines are an important part of the
multi-layered defenses that we have been talking about. We look
to use them to the greatest extent possible. We know their
value. We are convinced of it, and we are going to expand our
use.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. But you haven't significantly expanded
them since the Christmas day bombing.
Ms. Lute. But we have in fact expanded them. But the
details of that in this setting I am not prepared to explain.
Mr. Rogers. That is fine. I do want to get back with you in
a more private setting, but I want to address a new technology.
Currently, the Amtrak, the Capitol Police and the Federal
Protective Service all use a new type of canine explosive
detection dog called a vapor wake dog. What it is is when
somebody walks by, the dog detects the vapors in their wake. We
all leave a wake when we walk by. Explosives in particular
leave the smell, the odor, there for 15 minutes in that wake.
So when it comes to transportation hubs like airports, bus
stations, subways, whatever, the dog doesn't have to smell the
person directly. It can just step by when the person walks by.
All these entities use it, but TSA does not use it. The
Capitol Police, as I said, uses it. The Secret Service is now
looking at it. They are going to probably start using it. Why
has TSA been so reluctant to use that technology?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, we focus on layered defense, as we
have been discussing here this morning, and we are examining
all aspects of layers, including the increased use of canines.
As I mentioned, the Secretary has made very clear her
determination that we look at promising new technologies,
techniques, canines, leave no stone unturned to increase the
security of the traveling public.
Mr. Rogers. Well, they are used extensively in Europe. One
of the things I was hoping that Secretary Napolitano would do
during her trip to Europe--and I thought about it when she
announced it--was I am hoping that as a part of the agreements
that we worked out with our allies around the world, that for
planes that are destined to the United States, that we can at a
minimum deploy dogs, canines to those airports to be at the
gate of any plane that is leaving for the United States to make
sure that at least those passengers are screened with that
layer of security that we have some control over.
If they want to let people get on the planes going
elsewhere, that is their business, but if it is coming to this
country, I want to make sure they are screened with every tool
that we have got in our toolbox. A frustration that I have got
is we are spending billions a year on bells and whistles, and
we have a very simple technology that works, and we aren't
using it anywhere close to the level that we should be using
it. So I would ask you if you are going to make this a priority
is to go forward and in the near future.
Ms. Lute. Yes, sir. As the Secretary did make clear to her
European colleagues when they met together on this issue at her
request, there are number of measures that need to be taken.
This is not a business-as-usual environment that we are in, and
it takes the collaboration of all of us to be able to assure
the traveling public that we are doing ever we can to keep them
safe, including measures such as you have outlined.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes Representative Cleaver for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Lute, you addressed this already to some degree, and I
am not sure how much you can discuss this issue here publicly,
but you had mentioned that you and the Secretary had traveled
abroad in hopes of working out some cooperative agreements with
our allies in this fight against terror.
One of the questions that maybe you can answer here, and I
would be interested in hearing, you know, some of the more
detailed information in the right setting, proper setting, but
is there any willingness abroad to support what we are trying
to do in terms of aviation safety for other countries to
contribute financially to enhance technological measures, I
mean? Or are we the only Western nation that is engaged in
spending a lot of money in trying to increase the technology or
create more sophisticated technology?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, this was an extremely intensive
trip. My many years in the Army prepared me well for the
conditions under which we were traveling.
The dialogue with our international partners could not have
been more supportive. They recognize almost universally that
this is not a U.S. problem. This is not a Dutch problem. This
is not a Nigerian problem. This is an international problem
that the responsible governments of the world must come
together to address. Again, they all agree that in the area of
information gathering and sharing, we need to do better, and we
can.
In the area of technology, we are not deploying existing
technologies to best effect, and there are new and promising
technologies. We are not the only ones with an investment in
technology and reliance. It is one of the multiple layers of
defense that we have in place.
Equally, there is a recognition that this global system, as
we saw on Christmas day, with an access to any part of this
system, you potentially have access to the entire system, so we
all need to come together, and they recognize those
responsibilities. The Secretary is leading a series of regional
dialogues leading to a major conference on this issue so that
concrete actions can be taken in the information sharing,
technology, and system strengthening.
Mr. Cleaver. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This was clearly a failure in intelligence. I think all the
witnesses have agreed to that. The President of the United
States has as well. It is more than a failure to connect the
dots, as we talk about so much. It is a failure to identify
dots or specific threat information coming in and acting upon
it appropriately.
We had the Christmas bomber's father going to the embassy,
warning us about his son. The State Department issued a cable
that basically stated that and sent it to law enforcement, and
I assume to the NCTC, stating that information had posted just
that Farouk may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.
I think Members of Congress and the American people don't
understand why with that type of information and Director
Leiter with specific intelligence coming in through the IC, the
intelligence community, why that wasn't linked together, No. 1,
and why it wasn't acted upon to ensure that this man never got
on this airplane in the first place.
I think we agree that this visa should have been revoked
immediately, given the information. I can't get into the
classified information that you are privy to, but it was
specific. What happened here?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, some action was taken, but as you
have identified, as I have talked, we would say it was
obviously not sufficient, which was his name was entered into
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, but that didn't
have automatic repercussions in terms of screening, visa
revocation, or stopping him from boarding the plane.
The other intelligence simply wasn't identified and
associated with this individual. I can tell you that there was
concern on the intelligence community's part about potential
attack by al-Qaeda in Yemen, and we were concerned even about
the timing of that. What we didn't connect was the individual's
name or where that attack would occur. That was our failure.
Mr. McCaul. Was that because it was misspelled--the name
was misspelled? I mean to me, you know, if you type my name
into Google, for instance, M-C-C-A-U-L, they will say, did you
mean M-C-C-A-L-L. and so do you not have a similar type of
capability?
Mr. Leiter. Actually, the misspelling did not affect NCTC
in any way. It did affect, as I understand it, and I will defer
to Under Secretary Kennedy on this, from our perspective when
his name was sent in, we actually put the spelling in both
ways. The technology we use, it wouldn't have made a
difference.
Mr. McCaul. Did you not have the cable that the State
Department sent?
Mr. Leiter. We did, and we inserted the spelling based on a
number of things.
Mr. McCaul. Yet you made the decision not to revoke the
visa, given that information?
Mr. Leiter. I don't have the authority to revoke a visa.
That is an authority----
Mr. McCaul. Right. Can't you call Secretary Kennedy and
say, ``You know, I think we have got a problem here. We ought
to think about revoking this visa.''
Mr. Leiter. The intelligence community can, frankly. That
normally doesn't occur, if the nomination itself comes from the
State Department, because----
Mr. McCaul. Well, I think there needs to be a lot better
coordination going on here between these two entities.
Mr. Kennedy, why, given the information that you had, why
wasn't the visa revoked?
Mr. Kennedy. Sir, as I mentioned earlier, when we get any
information, when anyone appears at an American embassy and say
that they have doubts about someone, we immediately generate
what is called a Visas Viper message. We send that to the
entire law enforcement and intelligence----
Mr. McCaul. My time is running out. I understand the
process, but you had this information, and you didn't revoke
the visa.
Mr. Kennedy. Because----
Mr. McCaul. I mean the cable I just read----
Mr. Kennedy. Right.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. Makes it pretty clear that this
man is associated with extremists in Yemen. You didn't revoke
his visa.
Mr. Kennedy. What it was, sir, his father said he was
associated with this, and so we then asked the intelligence and
law enforcement community if they had any other information. I
don't want to take much of your time. I would be glad to visit
with you afterwards.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I think the father is a very credible
source. This isn't some anonymous person coming in saying this.
Mr. Kennedy. We have people coming in, sir, to American
embassies every day, attacking their relatives.
Mr. McCaul. Well, let me just--my time--this was a failure
extraordinaire, and I sure hope it never happens again.
Deputy Secretary Lute, the last of my remaining time, they
have identified a vulnerability in our system. I am very
concerned about future flights now. The system didn't work. The
screening--you know, they are always a simple genius, you know.
They use chemical explosives, which would be detected through
X-ray, but not through the magnetometer.
I know we are focusing on the 16 countries of interest in
terms of pat-downs and more enhanced screening, but I am
concerned about still the majority of the airports out there
where we are still vulnerable. They could still use this
technique and get chemical explosives through the magnetometer.
What is the Department of Homeland Security doing about that?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, we are not just focused on those 16
places that you have identified. We are focused on aviation
security globally and the traveling public, to ensure their
safety.
People have talked about silver bullets. We don't look for
silver bullets in Homeland Security. We know it takes a layer,
multiple measures of layers, not just by us, but by our
international partners, and it takes constant vigilance.
We have made some adjustments internally now to take the
information that we get, push it forward where we have teams on
the ground or to authorities in airlines where we don't have
specific teams. We are looking to expand our teams as well.
This is not a business-as-usual response. No one will be
satisfied----
Mr. McCaul. But my point is there are still many airports
vulnerable to the same technique deployed by this terrorist.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have to echo the sentiments of a number of our colleagues
today, who I am very dismayed that the Secretary herself is in
here. I mean it is probably fair to ask where the hell is
Secretary Napolitano for this hearing, to be quite honest.
I understand, Deputy Secretary Lute, that you are prepared
and that is great, but she was invited. She needs to be here to
address something of this magnitude. My first question is why
was her first response to the public that the system worked?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, if I could, and I clarified before,
the Secretary had international travel that was originally
conflicted. We coordinated with the Chairman's office. She has
been in regular talks with the Chairman, other Members of this
committee. She dispatched me with my colleagues around the
world to work aggressively with international partners, part of
the reason my appearance here was coordinated and agreed.
What the Secretary has made clear in her initial response,
she was responding to in the environment of what are we doing
to address this concern now? How are responding to the
information that we would have to ensure that there are no
other flights that are subjected to any danger or that pose any
threat to the American public?
Mr. Carney. I want to shift gears slightly here. You and I,
last time we spoke, I believe, was New Year's Eve. That is
right. How is the QHSR coming? Are we further down the road?
Are we going to see it soon? Frankly, does the QHSR lay out a
sort of chain of command that would obviate some of the issues
we are talking about today?
Ms. Lute. We did speak late New Year's Eve, in fact. The
QHSR from our perspective is concluded. It is with the White
House right now, ensuring final interagency coordination prior
to release. As I mentioned to you, we are on schedule that I
discussed with you.
We look for the QHSR, together with the bottom-up review of
the Department and a number of other measures that we are
taking internally to clarify roles and responsibilities in what
is a significant enterprise for this country--that is, homeland
security.
We believe that the QHSR lays this out in a clear fashion,
the roles and responsibilities of other Members, other parts of
the Federal Government, State, local, law enforcement. It is an
enterprise to ensure that this homeland is a place where the
American values, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Thanks. Just one more question, and you
didn't answer my second question, my first comment. Do you know
why the Secretary said the system worked in her first reaction?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, as she has made clear, she was
responding to a series of questions that were also related to
what are you doing in response to this information? What are we
doing now to ensure that the traveling public is safe--planes
in the air, airlines? What information are we pushing out?
Mr. Carney. Thank you.
Mr. Leiter, I just have a couple of moments left. By the
way, sir, I respect you enormously and what you bring to the
table, and I really want to know from your perspective, was
there a single point of failure, a double point of failure,
multiple points of failure in the Christmas day attack?
Mr. Leiter. Multiple.
Mr. Carney. Multiple.
Mr. Leiter. Yes.
I am trying to save you time, Congressman.
Mr. Carney. We will have a chance at some more questions,
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Thompson. Well, we can, or we can submit them for
the record and get a response.
Mr. Carney. Okay.
Chairman Thompson. Multiple probably could go a long time.
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, if you would like me to expand, I
always can, but I was----
Mr. Carney. Well, no, no, as the Chairman of the Oversight
Investigation Subcommittee, I think maybe we will have you come
in and chat with us a little bit. I will appreciate that.
No more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I don't want the committee to be misled. I have talked with
the Secretary 2 days ago. We did not talk about her non-
attendance or attendance at this hearing. Staff did communicate
based on a directive we received that the Secretary would not
be here, and we worked on Deputy Secretary Lute's presence.
That changed. At a minimum, based on that change, somebody
could have communicated back to the committee one way or the
other that we told you we weren't going to be here, we are here
now, but we still can't come because of some other things. That
is the courtesy I think the committee still deserves, and it
does not require comment.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Leiter, based on your testimony, your written testimony
and also your testimony that you gave last week before the
Senate, it appears you believe that the Federal Government did
in fact collect the dots, but did not recognize the linkages
between those pieces of information. Is that a fair assessment
of your statement, your position?
Mr. Leiter. Yes, definitely.
Mr. Dent. Isn't it true that the NCTC is designed to be a
major, if not the premier intelligence fusion and analysis
center?
Mr. Leiter. We have the statutory responsibility to be the
primary analytic center for counterterrorism, and we along with
the CIA have primary responsibility on it.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I also understand that the Intel Authorization Act of 2010
that passed the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, but was not considered on the House floor,
included sharp decreases in staffing levels for the Office of
Director of National Intelligence. Isn't it true that your
staffing at the National Counterterrorism Center is included in
those DNI staffing levels and could have been very negatively
impacted?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, that is correct. As Director Blair
noted, I believe, last week, my discussions with him in
December were about how I was going to absorb cuts of up to 20
percent of my personnel areas to include analytic and
watchlisting personnel.
Mr. Dent. So then do you have enough analysts to connect
these dots?
Mr. Leiter. Well, believe me, it is a very, very small
silver lining and not a silver lining I really wanted, but
those initial cuts have now been canceled for us. We have been
working with the DNI and the----
Mr. Dent. So you do have enough analysts?
Mr. Leiter. No. I have already discussed with the DNI, and
he has discussed with the Office of Management and Budget the
need for additional analysts and individuals to work on
watchlisting. So we enhanced those watchlisting records, so the
right people are on the No-Fly list, the Selectee list. Right
now I don't have enough people to do that.
Mr. Dent. So you are saying, then, additional analysts, and
not fewer analysts, as HPSI proposed, that would help you
accomplish your intelligence fusion mission?
Mr. Leiter. Yes, but I do want to make clear I don't look
at this as this great opportunity to grow.
Mr. Dent. I understand.
Mr. Leiter. I look at it as the realization that we can't
do the mission as expected, and we weren't doing as well as we
did because of the assets we didn't have and the assets we were
potentially losing.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, sir.
To Deputy Secretary Lute, I understand that while at the
Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, they have these full body
imagers, as you know. They were not used at the checkpoints for
the flights bound for the United States on Christmas day. In
fact, within the United States we have only 40 of these
machines at about 19 airports.
While I know that you can not guarantee protection,
particularly when you are relying on human interpretation of an
image, do you believe that the whole body imager would have had
a better chance of detecting or identifying Abdulmutallab's
explosive device than the current technologies employed at
airports?
Ms. Lute. Congressman, we believe it represents an
improvement over our current capabilities, but again, it is
only part of a layered system.
Mr. Dent. Understood. In order to address privacy concerns,
some of the local vendors have developed these so-called auto
detection software for their whole body imaging equipment with
the goal of getting the TSA image observer out of the process.
This auto detection technology, I am told, is currently being
tested over in Schiphol and in Amsterdam.
Is the TSA, the Transportation Security Lab, or the S&T
director examining this auto detection technology? If so, when
can we expect to see some preliminary results?
Ms. Lute. We are examining all aspects of advanced imaging
technology, whole body imaging. We are aware of some of the
technologies that exist out there, and we are also engaging in
dialogue with our international partners like the Dutch to see
what they have, what they are using. We believe this is an
enhancement.
We take the privacy concerns very seriously. There are a
number of measures in place with respect to whole body imaging
now, the dislocation of the observer, the non-retention of
image. But we believe that this is an area where we don't want
to settle for just existing technology, but also want to
explore most promising new.
But we also don't want this to take forever. We want to put
tools in the hands of screeners now to enhance security.
Mr. Dent. Good. Then I hope you will certainly communicate
with our friends in the Senate that stripped the amendment that
was placed in the TSA authorization by the House that would
restrict the use of these whole body imagers.
Finally, there appears to be a debate on which advanced
technology system is better--backscatter radiation or the
millimeter wave technology. Have you done an analysis on the
health and safety of both of those types of systems? Did you
identify any risks in multiple daily exposures?
Ms. Lute. So, Congressman, I am aware that there are
differences. I am not a scientist. Our science and technology
folks, together with the Department of Energy and the National
labs, are working with TSA on this and other technologies as
part of a layered defense.
Mr. Dent. Could somebody report back to us? Could somebody
send a report back to us, which is the better technology?
Ms. Lute. Yes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We will get the gentleman's question answered by the
Department. Be happy to.
The gentlelady from Ohio for 5 minutes, Ms. Kilroy.
Turn your microphone on.
Ms. Kilroy [continuing]. The responsibility for failing
within their respective organization. I think coming before
this committee is part of that acknowledgment of responsibility
and the oversight that it ruled as given to this body and to
the United States Congress.
I think it is critically important that once we acknowledge
the errors, that we also provide a plan or hear from you your
plan to fix, to correct the problem, to make sure that people
aren't becoming complacent in the years since 9/11 and protect
the flying public. I thank those of you who made very clear
statements in your testimony, as you did, Director Leiter,
about that level of responsibility.
The more I hear about the Christmas bomber, the more I am
amazed at how he got on the plane. That continues today to
really stun me, that given the level of information, granted in
different parts of the system, that there was sufficient
information that, at least to me, it seems that he should not
have been allowed onto that plane.
I keep learning things through hearings, through briefings,
and through public news reports, that news reporters managed to
get some information that had not been shared with the
committee in prior briefings. But there was sufficient
information, apparently, for him to be tagged for questioning
when he got off the plane. I don't understand, I guess, why the
Customs and Border Protection was the agency that was charged
with questioning him when he got off the plane.
Ms. Lute. Congresswoman, that is we have standing protocols
that have been in place in this case since 2006 related to
admissibility issue questions. The Customs and Border
Protection persons were prepared on the basis of that
information to question him when he arrived.
We have changed that process. We now take that kind of
information and push it forward to a pre-boarding opportunity
that individuals be questioned before they get on planes,
precisely because we recognize now that there is important
information that can help us understand whether or not an
individual poses a threat to aviation security, and so we have
changed that process.
Ms. Kilroy. Well, I appreciate that things have moved
forward and people will be getting questioned ahead of the
process.
But when you have this incident that has occurred--and
thank God that actions were taken that all passengers and crew
were able to get off that plane safely--but once you have this
person, who has attempted this atrocious act, when and who,
what agency should be involved in taking custody of that
person? Who is trained to interrogate a terrorist? Who has
ultimate authority in the chain of command in this type of
situation?
Ms. Lute. I can only speak to the part about the
information that we had regarding admissibility. No one is
satisfied that this individual got on this plane with this
material. It should never have happened, and we have to do
everything we can so it doesn't happen again.
We are taking the information we have about admissibility.
He was at no time identified as a No-Fly or Selectee, which
would have triggered certain actions prior to his boarding.
Ms. Kilroy. I understand that, but he took actions on the
plane. Everybody on the plane was aware of that. People on the
ground were aware of that. So are Customs and Border Patrol
agents trained in the science of interrogating a terrorist that
has been taken into custody?
Ms. Lute. He was handed over to the Department of Justice
and the FBI.
Ms. Kilroy. So the reports that I read that Customs and
Border Protection interrogated him for an hour before he was
turned over to the FBI--you are saying that would be incorrect,
then?
Ms. Lute. No. Customs and Border Protection had him upon
presentation for entry, and he was handed over to law
enforcement officials.
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, if I--I got it.
Ms. Kilroy. Yes.
Mr. Leiter. He was initially arrested by the Customs and
Border Protection officers, who were there at the airport.
Immediately upon being removed from the aircraft, he was
immediately turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Ms. Kilroy. I also want to endorse the line of questioning
that Congressman Rogers led with respect to the use of canines,
because I think that they have amazing abilities to detect, and
they are very observant of body language as well as their use
of different senses.
With respect to the changes in the visa process, have there
been any changes in the length of visas that are going to be
offered, allowed to people so they could come to this country?
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, should I answer the question?
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman will answer the question.
Mr. Kennedy. I will be glad to see the Congresswoman and
come visit with her and discuss that or submit an answer for
the record, whichever you prefer, sir. I am prepared now.
Chairman Thompson. You can answer the question now.
Mr. Kennedy. Ma'am, it really doesn't matter whether a visa
has a validity of 1 day or 1 year. If information comes to us
on the day after a visa issue or 30 days after or 90 days
after, if the intelligence or law enforcement community comes
to us and said, ``You cleared this person, because there was no
record when you cleared them. We now have something new on this
person. That is, he or she is a danger to National security,''
we revoke the visa that day.
Ms. Kilroy. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia for 5 minutes, Mr. Broun.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, during
your opening statement you seemed to blame the Bush
administration on this instance on Christmas day. To me there
is a whole lot more going on here than just blaming President
Bush and his administration, because I think this
administration has a lot to blame, too.
Deputy Secretary Lute, I assume that you are just a good
soldier and carrying out the orders that you were given by your
chain of command. You mentioned attempted attack, and they have
actually--before your testimony, you just talked about that
during your discussion about the Secretary not being here.
I am incensed, frankly, that she is not here. Even the
foreign visit was to brief people in Europe, and she ought to
be here briefing these people in this committee who have
responsibility to ensure the safety of the American public.
Also, the Secretary said that the system worked, which is
hogwash. The Chairman asked if there was any disciplinary
action being taken, and all of you all said no. Frankly, I am
incensed by that, and I think the President of the United
States should ask for the resignation of Secretary Napolitano
and get somebody there who is not in la-la land. Frankly, I
think she is in la-la land.
I don't know who else in your Department is, but whoever he
is, they need to go, because the safety of the American people
absolutely is critical on having good leadership at the top. I
don't think we have that here in this country.
So I am incensed. I think other Members of this committee
are incensed that the Secretary won't take her time to come
here and face this committee. I hope the President will take
disciplinary action and get rid of her and get rid of anybody
else in your-all's Department who are in denial, frankly, about
the seriousness of this.
In the United States Marine Corps, I was taught to know
your enemy. I have heard testimony from some other of the
members of this panel. They seem to get it. But I don't think
the Department of Homeland Security, and I am not sure the
President and his administration, get it.
We are facing not a war on terror. We are facing a war
against a group of fascists in this country who hate this
Nation, hate everything we stand for, including the freedom,
including the freedom we give to women, and they want to
destroy this Nation. We must as a Nation start facing the fact
that these are Islamic fascist terrorists, who want to use that
tactic in a war. Terrorism is only a tactic. We are not
fighting terrorism. We need to stop talking about that.
To me the failure here is political correctness gone amok.
There are many Members of this committee, principally on the
other side, who don't want profiling. We just had a hearing
about the undocumented attendees to a State dinner. We have got
a lot of undocumented attendees in this Nation that the State
Department allows to come into this country, and some that are
documented.
We need to change the whole philosophy of how we are trying
to protect this Nation. I don't think we are doing a proper
job. Frankly, I am incensed. I hope the President will start
paying attention to what is going on here and will stop this
inane thought of not profiling people that are entities that we
know hate our Nation and will do what is necessary to protect
the American public and keep this Nation safe.
Mr. Pascrell. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Broun. No, I won't.
Mr. Pascrell. You won't yield?
Mr. Broun. No, I won't.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay.
Mr. Broun. Because I have got just a minute left, and so I
want----
Mr. Pascrell. I will just say it later, so it doesn't
matter.
Mr. Broun. But it is absolutely critical that this
administration take serious our enemy. America needs to know
its enemy. It is radical--it is a bunch of radical folks all
over the world, who want to destroy it. They are going to
continue to attack us.
Whole body imaging is not going to prevent, and even the
canines are not going to prevent, bombings. There is no way
unless we search every body cavity on every person who wants to
come into this Nation.
But we know one of the big, glaring, flashing dots is
radical Islam. We have got to start focusing upon that. There
is absolutely no question about that. Our people are going to
die. Those who are worshiping at the altar of political
correctness are going to--that worshiping at the altar of
political correctness and not profiling our enemies is going to
result in killing American citizens.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. My time is up.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman's time has expired.
We have two votes scheduled, and we expect to return in
about 25 minutes. The committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. We would like to reconvene the recessed
meeting.
We now will begin questioning with the gentlelady from
Nevada, Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have a
couple of questions. I would like to start with Mr. Leiter.
On several points in your written testimony, maybe not so
much in your oral testimony, you note that the intelligence
community possessed strategic intelligence regarding al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, and you note that they had--and I put
this in quotes--``had the intention of taking action against
the U.S. prior to the failed attack on December 25, but we did
not direct more resources against them nor insist that the
watch list criteria be adjusted prior to the event.''
You also note that the NCTC and intelligence community had
long warned of the threat posed by this group in the Arabian
Peninsula. But it appears that despite your intelligence on
this and your concern about it expressed here, that the
necessary steps weren't taken to prevent this.
So I want to ask you who was receiving your reports about
this intelligence? Why do you think they didn't respond to it
in the appropriate way?
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, I think everything you said is
correct in terms of encapsulating my statement. All of the
intelligence we write goes to a broad array of consumers
ranging from the President to the members of the Cabinet,
deputy secretaries and the like.
I wouldn't say, though, that nothing was done. It is that
the things that were done turned out not to have been ones that
stopped this threat. There was forceful action taken on a
number of fronts to try to disrupt various threats from al-
Qaeda in Yemen. What it didn't do is detect this thread or stop
this particular individual.
Now, steps were taken. Why do I think that we didn't shift
enough focus onto this individual? I do think that al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, although we saw a desire and a
possibility to strike the homeland, I don't think we fully
realized the speed with which they had moved and actually put
that desire into action.
Ms. Titus. Well, I would ask you going forward, which is
the important thing, do you think we are putting enough
resources and enough attention on this growing threat in the
Arabian Peninsula?
Mr. Leiter. I think we have begun to move those resources.
I still don't believe we have all the resources we need. I
would also add that I remain particularly concerned, as I have
testified before this committee and others previously, I remain
particularly concerned not just about Yemen, but also in
Somalia and the flow of Americans of largely Somali descent to
Somalia. I think that poses a similar threat. Although Yemen is
the subject of today's hearing, we have to remain very, very
focused again on Somalia and, of course, on Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Ms. Titus. Do you feel like the people who are higher up,
all this group that you report to, are taking your warnings
seriously?
Mr. Leiter. I think without a doubt. I believe the
President's immediate direction on shipping resources, Director
Blair's intervention here to make sure we have the resources,
and the rest of the intelligence community, I think we have.
Ms. Titus. Well, we need to. There is no question about
that.
Mr. Leiter. I agree with you wholeheartedly.
Ms. Titus. Just one other quick question for Ms. Lute. I
would ask you--now, we have put so much focus on the
international flights, because this incident was an
international flight, but we can't forget that 9/11 involved
domestic flight. We are not ignoring them or letting them go by
the wayside as we now suddenly focus on Schiphol, are we?
Ms. Lute. Absolutely right, Congresswoman. We are not
neglecting any part of the aviation security systems, nor are
we neglecting our land and sea borders, as we have this
particular focus on air. We have a number of measures in place
across the board to enhance our vigilance, increase our
information gathering and sharing, as we have been discussing,
working with technology in this multi-layer defense
domestically as well as internationally.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Miller, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You know, there have been lots of questions from my
colleagues about the process and the failures of our protocol,
et cetera. Many people have commented about the absence of
Secretary Napolitano, and I would associate myself with those
remarks.
However, I will also say that it is stunning to me that
Attorney General Holder or nobody from the Department of
Justice is here to talk to this committee and to testify to
this committee. I would respectfully request that at some point
he does testify before this committee.
Our responsibility is to have oversight, and I want to
focus, I think, on what has happened since the attempted act of
war, because that is what it was. It wasn't a criminal act. It
was an act of war by a terrorist, an enemy combatant. I was
stunned that this terrorist was not turned over to the
military.
Again, I am just incredibly dismayed no one from the DOJ is
here. Yet, it was they, under the direction of Attorney General
Holder, that made this decision to turn this terrorist over to
the FBI, and not as an enemy combatant. He made the decision. I
believe that the attorney general is creating a culture at the
Department of Justice that fosters an ideology of approaching
this war on terror like a simple police action.
I will cite a couple examples of why I say that, because I
do believe it is dangerous to our security, and I am very
concerned about it. We know, for instance, that before becoming
the attorney general, Eric Holder and his law firm represented
accused terrorists that were in the custody of the military,
and he urged their release to the civilian justice system. That
includes Jose Padilla. They were very proud about giving free
pro bono legal service to 17 Yemeni and one Pakistani, who
currently are at Gitmo.
We know that he and President Obama have placed many of
these attorneys in high-ranking positions at the Justice
Department--again, attorneys that provided free, top-flight
legal assistance to enemy detainees.
I mean my husband's an attorney. I know a lot of attorneys.
You might have pro bono work for a child abuse case, domestic
violence case. This is what they decided they wanted to give
free legal advice to: Enemy detainees.
We also know that the attorney general has stonewalled
Senator Grassley, who is attempting to discover who these high-
ranking Justice officials are and what their role is in making
these decisions.
We know that the attorney general has been a huge advocate
to close Gitmo and to bring these detainees to the United
States. We know that the attorney general has made the decision
to bring KSM and others implicated in the 9/11 conspiracy to
New York City for trial without consulting any security
officials in New York or other high-ranking officials in the
military or intelligence communities.
Our Ranking Member mentioned that he had not consulted
them--actually, I think it was on the Jim Lehrer Show, where he
said he consulted his wife and his brother before he made that
decision. So I have concern with that.
We also know that in this instance the attorney general did
not share, in the instance of the Christmas day bomber, that he
did not share the intelligence gleaned from the Christmas day
bomber with the military or intelligence officials before
giving the Miranda rights to this terrorist.
I know the President has said that no one is accountable,
or that no one will be held accountable, no single person, but
I believe that President Obama must hold Attorney General Eric
Holder responsible for the loss of additional intelligence that
would have been gained to protect our citizens from future
attack.
He has been rather flippant, I would say, in saying that he
is not afraid of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed being given a platform
to spout his anti-American rants in our justice system. He says
we have nothing to fear from giving terrorists constitutional
rights and access to our court. I disagree.
I am the only Member of this committee from the Detroit
area, and this incident may have faded in the front of many
papers, newspapers, and media across our Nation, but I will
tell you in Detroit we are looking every single day at this
terrorist, this enemy combatant, an act of war against America,
who was treated at the University of Michigan Burn Center,
which is probably the best burn center in the entire world, and
not only given one free court-appointed, taxpayer-funded
attorney, he has three--three--attorneys.
We are looking every day at what is happening at the
Federal building in the city of Detroit, all of the expense
that is being taken on by the Detroit Police Department at a
time they can't afford that kind of expense, and other security
officials, just to make sure that we have no incident there.
The first thing this guy hears when he gets off the
airplane is, ``You have the right to remain silent.'' Here is
your great justice system that we are having here in America.
It makes me crazy.
In the absence of anyone from the Department of Justice,
let me just ask Director Leiter. Do you think that Attorney
General Eric Holder's decision to Mirandize this guy denied us
the opportunity to garner very valuable information? Do you
think that if we got a terrorist in Afghanistan or Yemen or in
theater and we only interrogated him for 50 minutes, that that
would be adequate?
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, I will try to answer, of course.
I mean I am not from the Department of Justice. One thing I do
want to correct, though. I don't believe it is correct that the
information that was garnered during those initial 50 minutes
of interrogation was not shared with the intelligence community
or with the Department of Defense. I say that, because I was on
the video teleconference that evening, and----
Mrs. Miller. If you could, just a moment. I recognize he
did share the information, but he did not share the information
that he was going to Mirandize this, and that was my point.
Nobody was asked about that. That was Attorney General Eric
Holder's decision, apparently.
Mr. Leiter. I apologize, Congresswoman. I understood. I
just did want to make clear that the information that they
garnered was immediately shared with the intelligence
community. It was put to action. I think there was information
that was garnered from that initial 50 minutes of interrogation
that has been quite valuable.
Mrs. Miller. Well, my time has expired, so I would just
simply say that, Mr. Chairman, we are facing a new type of
enemy who doesn't consider the battlefield to be just in Yemen
or in theater. The battlefield that day was Seat 19A on that
Northwest flight, and these are enemy combatants. I think it is
dangerous for America to treat them as civil criminals. Thank
you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
For the record, as you know, the Minority has an
opportunity to request a witness, and it could have very well
been the Minority's option to request Attorney General Holder
for this hearing, and they did not.
The Chairman recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say that as a New Yorker, I know that it is
possible that we have under previous administrations tried
individuals who seek to do us harm--terrorists, if you will--in
civilian courts and been very successful there. So, you know, I
think that this is an issue we can go back and forth with.
But I think that we have to also make sure that in doing so
we don't manifest through our conversations just the outcomes
that we are seeking to prevent. That is encouraging others, by
labeling enemy combatants, to become enemy combatants.
I think that we have the power and an expertise in our
Nation to address all of these concerns, and that is why we are
here today to encourage one another to use those talents and
expertise to do what needs to be done to protect the American
people. Certainly, as we review our failures and our mistakes,
we learn from them to strengthen ourselves as a Nation, to do
what has to be done to protect the American people.
So having said that, my concern has to do with our ability
to manage these databases. I have felt all along since, really,
hearing from constituents in my constituency that they have had
a very hard time getting off these lists, that we were building
a quagmire. I say that, because at a certain point the list
becomes the proverbial trying to find the needle in a haystack,
when you are not purging it, when you are not moving people
through the cleared list.
So I am just concerned that as we build out this data
infrastructure to be able to find individuals, to communicate
in real-time about individuals that we may have on one list,
but may not be on another, that the time that it takes to scan,
to data input, because it is my understanding that particularly
in the TIDE database, that there are people with similar names
in addition to the actual name. I am sure once you sort of plug
in a name, you are going to get a list of names.
I want to raise the question with each of you about how we
refine our capacity through data maintenance and gathering to
be able to do that type of ID in real-time. The GAO has found
that agencies involved in screening international visitors to
the United States do not screen individuals against all records
in the watch list.
Can we say that the system has become too cumbersome for
accuracy of screening to become more difficult over time? I
would like to get that response from each of you.
Ms. Lute. Congresswoman, perhaps I will begin, and then
Director Leiter may want to add to it.
There is an enormous amount of data being gathered. It is
one of the tools that we use for aviation screening, and we use
it for other purposes as well. We are constantly refining our
processes to ensure that we have the accurate information of an
individual that is in these databases.
One of the issues that I raised in my conversations with
international colleagues, and the Secretary certainly
emphasized as well, is creating a standard for passenger name
records so that we have as much information as we possibly can
about individuals. Are they who they say they are, and are they
fulfilling the intent they declare?
We do and have created a sort of one-stop for de-
confliction when people find themselves on a database
erroneously. It is called the Travelers Redress Information
Program. It is not yet a perfect system, and we acknowledge
that, but we are working very hard to address it.
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, believe me, I am very
sympathetic to your concerns, because I have the responsibility
to get through all of this data and make sure it is clean. We
want it as clean a system as we could have. I will note a
couple of things.
First, I think it is important to note that United States
persons make up a very small percentage of our high database,
very small percentage. In fact, you can only be in our database
if you are the subject of an active FBI investigation. Within
24 hours of that investigation being closed, you are purged. I
think we have a very good record for meeting that standard. So
I think that is point No. 1.
Point No. 2, are there simply better ways of doing this?
There undoubtedly are. Any names-based screening system has
inherent weaknesses. It requires not just a name, but you also
want additional data about that person if you can, whether it
is a birth date or a passport number.
The next step, really, is moving towards greater
integration of biometrics. Under Secretary Kennedy has already
noted some of those advances that we have made. I think both at
the initial screening when someone is getting on an aircraft,
but certainly when they are getting a visa, when they arrive at
a port of entry, the integrated use of biometrics, which is
there already, is extremely helpful.
It has to be expanded. There is a significant resource
tail, and there is also a significant civil liberties concern
that have to be addressed as we do this. But we know that is
the right way to go.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes for 5 minutes, Mr. Olson.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Before I get started on my line of questioning, I would
like to identify myself with my colleague from Michigan's
remark on the decision to use the criminal justice system of
our country instead of the military justice system to prosecute
this individual.
Very briefly, what I have understood is when he was brought
off that aircraft after he had tried to kill all the people
aboard that plane, he was taken into custody, was taken to the
hospital for medical treatment.
Two FBI agents began asking questions. He was giving them
actionable intelligence for at least 50 minutes, intelligence
that saves lives. Those agents that were asking those
questions--there is an exception to the Miranda rights that if
you believe there is imminent information that is going to save
lives--there is another bomb on an aircraft or, as we saw
unfortunately on September 11, there are other aircraft in the
air with bombers like Mr. Abdulmutallab on it--then they have
discretion to ask questions. Again, for 50 minutes, by reports,
they got actionable intelligence information.
Five hours later, another group, a ``clean team,'' showed
up. The first thing they did was read him his Miranda rights.
No surprise, he hasn't talked since then. We will never know
what information we have lost and what risks and what damage we
may put to our country by not interrogating him fully and
getting all the information he had to learn about what al-
Qaeda's doing in Yemen.
I would like to change tactics here, change the tone of
my--I want to talk a little bit about--you know, one thing that
I believe is the most information we can have and the quicker
we get it, the earlier in the whole process, the better chance
we have to thwart it.
As we know Mr. Abdulmuttalab, it seems to be that he got,
at least from the information I have had, that his
radicalization, his radicalization happened while he was going
to school in Great Britain in England. The British intelligence
states he is--Islamic student organization in their fight
against extremism. Abdullahmatal--I am sorry--Abdulmutallab was
the fourth president of an organization like that in Great
Britain to be charged with a terrorism-related offense.
My question is is extremism on college campuses something
that the intelligence community is focused on, both abroad and
here at home?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I would be happy to talk about
this more in a closed hearing. I will say we have worked very
closely with the British as they look at their groups. We have
consistently seen connections between terrorists threatening
the United States and terrorist activity in the United Kingdom.
One of the things we have done as a response to this is
reinvigorate that information sharing to make sure that we have
full visibility into whether or not it is the schools or the
garage mosques or simply the splinter groups. I agree with you.
We have to make sure this information is shared very quickly.
Mr. Olson. Have we seen anything here domestically akin to
what is going on in Great Britain?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, we have never seen within the
United States nearly the scale, scope, depth of radicalization
that we have seen in the United Kingdom. We have pockets of it,
and we are concerned with it. I wouldn't associate it with any
single environment within the United States.
Mr. Olson. Thanks for that.
One more question. Maybe I appreciate if it is two
sentences across the line in the classification system. But one
individual I am concerned about, and I hope I pronounced this
right, is Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, who had contact, we know,
with Mr. Abdulmuttalab, probably in Yemen, probably as part of
the, you know, the organization that helped him get trained and
certainly can keep him indoctrinated.
Also concerned as a Member from Texas. Apparently, there
were e-mail contacts between him and Captain Hasan who, as you
know, killed 13 soldiers at Fort Hood. I am just concerned. Do
you know of any other? He is using 21st century technology--
videos, teleconferencing technology, particularly, you know, of
sending that signal to England and Great Britain again. I know
I am harping on them, but is there any evidence that he has
been doing that home here in our country?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I really can. I can't go into
great depth here. I will tell you that the intelligence
community has been concerned with the activities of Anwar al-
Awlaki for some time. He was initially investigated in
association with the events of 9/11, when he was an imam in San
Diego, later in Northern Virginia.
I can tell you that even well before Major Hasan, but
certainly after the events of Fort Hood, NCTC, the FBI and
other agencies have been very, very focused on Awlaki, but also
other individuals like Awlaki, who are savvy to Western ways,
Western technology, modern technology, and their ability to
reach into our border through this technology.
Mr. Olson. I see that I have run out of time. Thank you
very much. Stay on him. Thanks.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, many of us have stressed one thing as Members
of this committee. If there is one thing we have stressed, it
is that the bureaucracy itself is as great a threat to our
National security as anything else. You heard the bureaucracy
today, part of it.
Let me just point out that Congress is not exempt from this
criticism. Indeed, this is at least the fourth of different
full committees to hold a hearing on the attempted attack of
December 25. This strikes me as entirely counterproductive to
what we are trying to accomplish.
It seems crystal clear to me that the events of December 25
were allowed to occur, because once again we have failed to
connect things in the information that we already had, we
already knew about. Once again, our intelligence agencies
failed to communicate with each other. This is a human error,
not an electronic error.
We spend a lot of time talking about the state-of-the-art
of these machines that are in airports and aren't in airports.
We have not told the American people the truth. Many binary
explosives are not detectable at this point.
We established a Director of National Intelligence, the
DNI, to serve as the head of the intelligence community. It
consists of 16 different agencies spread throughout the Federal
Government--16. Each of these intelligence agencies have
different standards for their personnel--each of them. 9/11 9
years ago--they still have different standards.
I would conclude that you are not going to get the proper
relationship amongst these agencies until you have basic
standards. In fact, the agency within all of the 16 that has
the toughest standards is the CIA. I would begin there.
But we established that position of Director of National
Intelligence to finally provide some leadership and guidance
over the intelligence community so that we could finally close
the gaps in this information sharing. Clearly, we are not there
yet.
What troubles me most about this incident was that we
allowed this individual to receive a visa in the first place to
enter the United States. I think of all those families who have
tried to get united and were denied a visa, because they
thought if they came to the United States, that they wouldn't
go back. Many of those cases were adjudicated correctly. Many
of them were not.
We never took steps to revoke his visa before he entered a
foreign airport to travel. We already had negative information
on this individual. Not only had the State Department spoken to
his father, but we knew that he traveled to Yemen. For young
men to travel from Nigeria to Yemen with no known legitimate
purpose--that should raise a number of red flags.
Mr. Leiter, Director Leiter of the National
Counterterrorism Center, is often described as the arm of our
intelligence community that is responsible for--I hate the
phrase, and probably you do, too--connecting the dots on
intelligence gathering. Do you agree that is your primary role
and responsibility? If so, doesn't that hold you primarily
responsible for the failure to connect the dots on the
intelligence we already had on this individual?
Mr. Leiter. Absolutely. I said several times, Congressman,
NCTC is the primary analytic organization. It was our
responsibility to do this. We didn't do that. There was another
organization that also had responsibility under the DNI's
standards. That didn't occur there either.
Mr. Pascrell. Do you wonder why some of us have concluded
that maybe we have added an extra layer of bureaucracy to the
intelligence apparatus that is slowing us down to get to the
goal line? Do you wonder why we think that at times? Or do you
think that the DNI is absolutely necessary to stop those who
wish to bring harm to our families, to our neighborhoods, and
to our borders? What are your thoughts? I know you work for
them. What are your thoughts?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, I think the DNI is a useful
construct to advance intelligence reform. I do not think that
the DNI in this case, this construct or the layers, was the
problem. I mean I think many of the weaknesses you have
identified are fair weaknesses. I just don't think they were
the issue that caused this failure here today.
Mr. Pascrell. Do you have the authority you need to work
with intelligence across our Federal departments and agencies?
Do you have the authority to do that?
Mr. Leiter. Congressman, it is not easy for an----
Mr. Pascrell. I am not saying it is easy. Believe me, I am
not, Mr. Leiter. But my question is very specific.
Mr. Leiter. I do not, nor do I believe the DNI, as
currently constructed, has all of the authority necessary to
move all of the information in a way that will maximize the
likelihood of detecting these plots.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, I hope that--and I know you
were listening, and the Ranking Member, to the last answer. The
gentleman has been forthright. I thank him for his service to
his country. We have created--my conclusion, not their
conclusion--a monster. We will never get the safety of the
American citizens as we build these levels of bureaucracy that
do not get to the heart of the issue.
I would ask you to go back----
I would ask you to go back, Ms. Lute----
I would ask you to go back, Mr. Kennedy--to look at this
bureaucracy as being the systemic problem. This is human error,
but maybe it is human error precipitated by the fact that we
have created a bureaucratic nightmare so that no one is held
accountable. That is why you create bureaucracies, you know.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman's time has expired, but we always recognize
his leadership.
Mr. Leiter, In light of your question, we are going to ask
you to provide us what authority you think you need in order
for you to do your job in a manner you deem necessary.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to do that, and I
would work with the DNI. I would add that although I say that,
I don't have any particular authorities right now that would
quickly ensure that every bit of this data is shared with every
other component of the intelligence community.
Chairman Thompson. I understand, but you just said in
response to the gentleman from New Jersey's question that you
don't have it.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to go back, and we
will come back with recommendations to you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for appearing today.
I believe, as has been indicated, this was a failure of
intelligence, but I would like to make sure that I state that
it was not a failure of all intelligence personnel. I say this,
because we have many people who risk their lives on a daily
basis. Some, by the way, lose their lives, as was evidenced by
the recent event that we need not go into.
Their families--they see these hearings. I don't want their
families to assume that I have concluded that all intelligence
officers are failures, because I want them to have the morale
necessary to do a very difficult job under circumstances that
are extremely complicated, and sometimes almost impossible, if
not impossible.
I believe that the structural integrity of a plane at 3,000
feet traveling at 500 miles per hour is of paramount
importance. It is as important as anything that we deal with.
Because the structural integrity of that plane is so important,
I want a system that will reveal and allow us to capture the
Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab.
But I also want a system that will capture the
Abdulmutallab who doesn't pay cash, the Abdulmutallab who
doesn't ask for Seat 19A, the Abdulmutallab whose father
doesn't turn them in. I want a system that will capture the
Abdulmutallab whose religion I am not aware of.
If we focus only on connecting the dots that could have
been connected to the exclusion of designing a system that will
allow us to capture the Abdulmutallabs who are not obvious, who
are not intuitively obvious to the most casual observer, if you
will, it would be a mistake.
We must have a system that will reveal the Abdulmutallab
who is Anglo-Saxon and has blond hair, because this beast that
we have to deal with continually metamorphoses. It becomes
something else somewhere else. If we only assume that it will
be tomorrow what it is today, we will make today's mistake, and
it will impact tomorrow.
So the system that I am looking for is one that will allow
us to understand, in my opinion, that the last line of defense
is the airport. That is the last line of defense. The American
people don't ask us to do the impossible. They do demand,
however, that we do all that we can--that we do all that we
can.
At some point the excuse that we didn't do all that we
could is not going to be enough for the American people. So we
have got a duty at these airports to do all that we can. We owe
it to the intelligence officers who risk their lives every day
to make sure that we do all that we can at the airports, our
last line of defense.
A quick question, if I may. Did we know the religion of
Richard Reid prior to December 2001?
Mr. Leiter. I don't believe so. I don't think we knew
anything----
Mr. Green. I think that that answer suffices. The reason I
asked is because if we focus on religion and then some other
adjectives, we are missing a point here. I want to capture the
culprit whose religion may not be the religion du jour for our
purposes. This is serious business, and it goes beyond the
ability to simply identify that which is superficial, the
superficial social analyst who can come in after the fact and
connect all of the dots and see how clearly we could have saved
the day, had we connected the dots.
So I suppose I had more of a statement than questions for
you, because I just absolutely believe that we must not allow
ourselves to be trapped by religion and by ethnicity and place
of origin. It is bigger than that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California for 5 minutes, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the time. I am sorry I couldn't be here during all
of this, but I am divided between three different committees,
and we just voted to impeach a Federal judge. I think it is
only eight times in history we have done that, so I had to be
there for that vote.
Yes, I hope we are not prisoners of wrong impressions
either. But I also hope we are not prisoners of PC. We are in a
war declared on us by radical jihad, radical Islam. That
happens to be a fact. We didn't pick the war. They picked the
war. I haven't seen too many Irish Catholic nuns blow
themselves up.
Sometimes we do stupid things like having my 6-month-old
granddaughter a couple of years ago taken out for a secondary
search when they searched her diaper. That kind of stupidity
hurts us, I think, even though we do it to make sure that we
have some egalitarian approach to this.
Mr. Kennedy, let me ask you something. That is if the State
Department had the information about Abdulmutallab from his
father prior to issuing a visa, would we have issued a visa?
Mr. Kennedy. Sir, if we had the information the father had
presented before----
Mr. Lungren. Yes, that is my question.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir. What we would have done is we would
have not issued the visa. We would have sent in to the
intelligence and law enforcement communities a security and
advisory opinion, ask them what additional information they
had, and then made the decision on the basis of what additional
information they provided as well.
Mr. Lungren. So if that is the case, why wouldn't we move
to revoke the visa if we have that information?
Mr. Kennedy. Because we sent the request in to the Visas
Viper, sir, went into the intelligence and law enforcement
community and ask them if they had any additional information
on Mr. Mutallab.
Mr. Lungren. Does someone have a constitutional right to
come to the United States?
Mr. Kennedy. No, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Does someone have some sort of international
right to come to the United States?
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely not.
Mr. Lungren. A visa is a discretionary action by the United
States, right?
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Lungren. The granting of a visa. So why would you even
hesitate about not granting someone a visa if he had that
information from the father such as was given by Mr.
Abdulmutallab's father?
Mr. Kennedy. Two reasons, sir. First is context. We turn
down almost two million--1.9 million visas a year. So we do
not----
Mr. Lungren. Okay. I don't care about the other. I am
asking you about this specific case. That is why I am asking.
Mr. Kennedy. No, because, sir, there are people who come
into embassies every day, every month, family members,
disgruntled business partners, and others who say that so-and-
so might be a terrorist. So we have been very carefully
analyzing that. We consult with our partners.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. I understand that. Let me ask you this,
then. So do we have a lot of fathers who have experience such
as Mr. Abdulmutallab's father did, who turn their sons in with
that kind of information?
Mr. Kennedy. There have been family members.
Mr. Lungren. So there are a lot of them.
Mr. Kennedy. There have been family members who----
Mr. Lungren. You know, I appreciate it. I don't like people
getting cute with me. This is very serious business.
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely.
Mr. Lungren. The American people are asking us. I was just
home. People are saying, ``How in God's name can you screw up
like this?'' We have spent billions of dollars trying to do it,
and we say, ``Well, you know, a father comes in like this with
this guy's pedigree. He says that about it. Yes, we got a lot
of them.'' I would argue that you don't get a lot of them, and
I would argue that you ought to be a little more serious about
this then doing that.
Mr. Kennedy. Sir, I am----
Mr. Lungren. Now, you know, it is easy to be a second, you
know, on Monday morning quarterback, but when you tell me that,
it bothers me a great deal.
Mr. Kennedy. If I could just finish my sentence.
Mr. Lungren. You can finish your sentence, but we are in a
serious question here about people who want to kill us, and you
talk to me. It sounds like the State Department is doing things
the way they used to do it.
Mr. Kennedy. No, sir. The second part of my sentence, sir,
is that we are reviewing all of our procedures. We regard
ourselves as the first line of defense, and we have every
intention. We are committed to----
Mr. Lungren. Well, you weren't the first line of defense
here, were you?
Mr. Kennedy. I believe we were, sir.
Mr. Lungren. This is amazing. I am sorry. It is amazing to
me. So you don't--it didn't work the way it should, though, did
it?
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely not.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Mr. Kennedy. I said that in my testimony, sir.
Mr. Lungren. So you are reviewing the procedures and
criteria. So what would do differently now, if you got this
information? Or would you do anything differently, except make
sure it went up the line?
Mr. Kennedy. If he had been a visa applicant, we would have
coded that information. We would have sent the inquiry to
Washington. We would have asked other people in the
intelligence community what----
Mr. Lungren. Okay. So he wasn't a visa applicant. He
already had a visa.
Mr. Kennedy. Right.
Mr. Lungren. So what change would take place now, if you
are confronted with the same information, not applying for a
visa, but he has a visa. This information is brought to you at
one of the embassies.
Mr. Kennedy. I would think, as you suggested, sir, we would
do all more in-depth review to make sure that the information
being presented to us was valid. Then if it was valid, we would
move to revoke the visa immediately.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. I would just like you to bring one
little bit of information back to the State Department. I have
an adult daughter who was visiting Gambia the week after
Christmas. She thought it might be important for her to go to
the embassy to indicate that she was there--American citizen
there.
She was told the person that would take that information
was sick, and the person who was--or, excuse me, was on
vacation--and the person who was supposed to take that person's
place was sick. Therefore, she could come back in a week to
tell them that she was there. She was leaving in a week.
I just want to tell you she didn't pull anything about
being my daughter or anything else. I just happen to think that
kind of a response to a simple American citizen going to a
country saying, ``You know, you might want to know I am here in
case anything happens''--not that she thought anything was
going to happen in that country, but that was the response she
got.
Mr. Kennedy. That was totally inappropriate and wrong, and
I will look into that, sir. We encourage, we request, we have
web sites to encourage any American traveler to record their--
--
Mr. Lungren. That is what she did. She was told to come
back after she had left.
Mr. Kennedy. That was an error, and we will look into it.
Why? That is not our procedure.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
To the witnesses, let me thank you.
I think all of us echo the fact that we know that there are
men and women on the front line, and we appreciate their
service. We also appreciate the leadership of the President of
the United States as the Commander-in-Chief. He should be able
to expect the highest level of performance of his staff, of his
Executive staff, that he should also expect the Congress is a
collaborator with him in team homeland security.
Unfortunately, I think that there were enormous challenges
and missteps that did not equate to the team working together
and playing on the playing field together. I frankly believe
that part of it is, of course, some of the missteps of the
United States Congress, some of the inability of the executive
to listen to the Congress.
My subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Transportation
Security and Infrastructure Protection, looked into the
question of watch lists. We actually made comments about the
burdensome method of that watch list, of how heavy laden it
was, how inaccurate it was, to the extent that we had 8-year-
olds, so we had an 8-year-old as a witness. Another 8-year-old
had been interviewed. It is a simple task to look at that watch
list and provide the intelligence and the staffing to make it a
watch list that is credible of the name.
The other broken part of the system is the responsibility
still, as I understand it, on airline personnel as people come
to counters and their names--they go to the back and check
their names--civilians looking at issues that happen to deal
with homeland security issues.
We have a problem and a crisis that needs to be fixed. A
part of it is that we must acknowledge that we will not have
people bearing flags running down airports and saying, ``I am a
terrorist.'' Individual operators and actors, franchising of
terrorism, seems to be the call of the day, and then taking
credit for it one way or the other. We know now that Osama bin
Laden has taken credit for the December 25 action.
Many of us, who are not inside the Department, were aware
that there was activity going on around the holiday. We know
that that is the modus operandi of terrorists. Go when a
country is focusing on something else. So my questions go to
this whole question of interrelatedness.
Quickly to Secretary Kennedy, are your consul offices--do
they have a direct connection to the watch list effort of
Deputy Secretary Lute and the counterterrorism efforts of
Director Leiter so that the Nigerian consulate person would
have had that direct connection?
Chairman Thompson. Please use your microphone.
Mr. Kennedy. My apologies.
We get daily and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can they call back and contact a human
being?
Chairman Thompson. Madam, well, just, I don't think he
finished it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand, but my question is can
they--I hear what he is going to say. The question is----
Chairman Thompson. Now, I didn't hear what he was going to
say. Just let him answer. You have got plenty of time. I am
going to be very nice.
Go ahead, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. The law enforcement and Homeland Security and
intelligence communities provide us with information every day
on new threats. We load that into our database, and that
information is available to every embassy and consulate
throughout the world.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Does the consular general have the
authority or the ability, or the individual who dealt with the
father of the alleged perpetrator in the incident at December
25, to be able to call back on the telephone, on a cable, on an
e-mail, or whatever is secure, to ask questions out of the
Deputy Secretary Lute area or the counterterrorism area?
Mr. Kennedy. What they do is they call the visa office at
the State Department, which is our central repository and which
is in daily contact via all the secure means with both as the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center. Yes, ma'am. We
are in contact with daily. That is one of the major
improvements since 9/11. We are all lashed up as partners----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But if you are in contact, what does that
mean? Does that mean that the person who engaged with the
father of the alleged perpetrator had the ability to get on the
phone and call and get a quick answer of the person who
answered the phone in Washington, DC? I am suspicious. There is
an individual here talking about activity of an individual that
has a visa.
Was there a direct link for there to be a response by
checking live intelligence by way of a direct call to the
counterterrorism or direct call to the watch list? Those are in
two different areas.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir. He was not on the watch list. He was
not on the Selectee list. The State Department, when the father
came in, talked to an embassy officer, who then immediately
reported to the consular section that this is the information
that was received, and that information was immediately sent to
Washington.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Have you made changes to ensure that
information that would describe someone as suspicious can be
responded to quickly? Because frankly I believe that all that
the father said was enough information for a well-trained
official, whether they are State Department or not, that we are
living in a different climate and maybe I should do something
about it? Have you had a re-training of your staff around the
country--around the world, rather?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, ma'am. We have sent out revised and
updated instructions, and we emphasize that we have added
additional information to the immediate report that is sent
in--it is called Visas Viper--that notifies the Homeland
Security and intelligence and law enforcement communities that
the State Department has come into piece of information that
may well be important, and here it is.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Deputy Secretary Lute, if I might, on the
watch list, which has been one of the major complaints and a
burdensome list that is both, I believe, inaccurate. In many
instances it plays into my colleague's comments about profiling
for the basis of religion and otherwise, which does nothing to
fight the war on terror.
My question is the distinction between the watch list and
the No-Fly list. In this instance this person should have
definitely been on the No-Fly list, and so my question is what
is the strategy for a comprehensive and coordinated
watchlisting and screening approach into a prioritized
implementation and investment plan that describes the scope,
governance principles, outcomes, milestones, training
objectives, metrics, cost and schedule of necessary activities
as relates to the watch list to be able to move to the No-Fly
list?
If I may also raise to Director Leiter so I can have these
questions out, which I think is very important. I hope that
when we are on notice that an incident is occurring, all hands
will be on deck, similar to making sure that embassy personnel,
who we have great respect for, are at their desks at
appropriate times, because all times of the schedule, if you
will, the calendar, people are coming and going. I hope if
there is a terrorist act, we have all hands on deck on this
information.
Director Leiter, and I would say my question is there has
been a lot of discussion about the failure. This was not a
failure to connect the dots, but to analyze what we had. It has
been said that the intelligence community, to build a more
robust analytical capability, specifically what steps are being
taken to accommodate this goal in training, system design and
technological changes, but more importantly, on the human
intelligence and behavioral assessment, which, if you had done
that on the gentleman's actions, he would have been on the No-
Fly list.
Deputy Secretary Lute.
Ms. Lute. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. As you know, the
Department of Homeland Security does not own or control the
watchlisting. Abdulmutallab was neither No-Fly nor Selectee.
But we are working very closely with our colleagues
throughout the interagency to identify the kinds of information
that is necessary for us to take steps related to ensuring
aviation security.
In fact, in the wake of this incident, we will take
information such as Under Secretary Kennedy was talking about
and put that in the hand of our immigration advisory
professionals that are stationed abroad in nine locations so
that they can engage in additional questioning and examination
of persons who come on that list. That is an important step in
the direction of increased security, and we are looking at
others as well.
You also mentioned the frustration with the ensuring the
accuracy of the list. We share that frustration. It is
important that we do have lists on which we rely for ensuring
the safety of the traveling public, that these be accurate
lists. We are working very intensively to establish an easy way
for people to de-conflict information when it is erroneous and
to ensure that those lists are the accurate, important tool
that we need them to be.
But we also know that we are facing a determined adversary,
who is looking to use people who are unknown to any system. In
this regard we need to evaluate their activities, travel
patterns, and other activities which can tip us off that this
person may be dangerous, certainly is worth additional
screening and questioning, and working intensively with our
interagency colleagues to get better systems in place for those
contingencies.
Mr. Leiter. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I
think you are exactly right, that we have to improve the
ability of these analysts to understand the characteristics of
this information as they are coming in so they get a true feel
for when a father walks in, why is the father walking in? Why
this report?
We are doing a number of things on this front. Most
importantly, we are creating specific teams that are not bound
to writing daily intelligence. When they get that bit from the
father and dive into it and connect that intelligence in a way,
that you do have all the information necessary to make that
determination about whether someone should be or should not be
on the No-Fly list.
So you also do not get people on the No-Fly list that you
don't want on the No-Fly list, because the only way you are
going to get the bad guys off the plane is to also ensure that
the good guys can get on the plane. Otherwise, the system just
becomes unwieldy.
So we have already begun additional training. The Director
of National Intelligence is studying how we can advance that
training more. We are creating teams to pursue these to ensure
that they have the time and they have the resources to track
down these free pieces of information and put them together.
Mr. Kennedy. Congresswoman, you also asked is the State
Department on duty in addition to the embassy people you
mentioned. We have somebody responsible that is in our
operation centers 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year. If a question comes in from an embassy--it may be in a
different time zone--or comes in from our partners in the
National security community, that officer knows who to reach
out to to get the right information they need immediately.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, may I just say a point on
the record?
I thank the witnesses.
The one point that I heard Deputy Secretary Lute say is
that Homeland Security does not have ownership of the watch
list. I think it speaks to, again, the work we have to do and
have been doing to get the synergism so that we have some
mutually interrelatedness on trying to help all of these
persons and that we can get an understanding everybody has
ownership of the watch list, the No-Fly list.
We have got to find a way to weave in our security so that
there are no gaps, not putting the fault on these public
servants, but there has to be a cleaning up of the cracks in
the system that will allow this kind of breach to happen. It
has to be a combination, Mr. Chairman, of the Executive working
with us as team homeland security, and no distinction between
Republicans and Democrats, team homeland security.
I hope in that spirit that we will have the appointee
necessary for the running of the Homeland Security Department
to move as quickly as possible to be appointed and confirmed on
the behalf of the American people. I look forward to working
with them.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions.
Mr. Kennedy, if you would provide the committee with the
instructions you referenced Chairwoman Jackson Lee that have
been implemented since the December 25 incident with respect to
training and other information. Now, if that is classified,
just let us know, we will still govern ourselves accordingly.
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to get that to
you, sir. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Leiter, you said you want to make sure that good guys
get on the plane. There is a good guy here who is a Member of
Congress that has an awful difficult time getting on planes. He
is Congressman John Lewis in Georgia.
Deputy Secretary Lute, can you look into that and figure
out a way how he can not be flagged for secondary screening and
other things, because he is in fact John Lewis? Now, there is
another John Lewis out there. We still ought to have a system
to figure out how to handle this.
Ms. Lute. Yes, sir, we should. I am on it.
Chairman Thompson. Okay. Thank you very much. I am sure he
would appreciate it.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman. Can I make one note on that
front?
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Leiter. Not knowing the facts of Congressman Lewis'
case and certainly not accusing him of being a known or
suspected terrorist, I do want to flag for the committee--I
think it is important to understand--that a desire to have more
people on the watch list will inevitably lead to more false
positives. We have to accept that, I believe, as a cost.
There is nothing we can do technologically or with the
human to eliminate those false positives from occurring--again,
not speaking directly to the Congressman's case, but accepting
that this will be a byproduct of ensuring that some bad people
don't get on the plane.
Chairman Thompson. Well, and I understand, but that is
going forward. This has been from day 1. So we are not even to
the next generation. But, obviously, we assume the
inconvenience that adding to the list will bring, but these are
different times.
Mr. Kennedy, last question. Can you provide the committee
with either, if you know right now or at a later date, how many
people we actually have working in the visa office in your shop
here in Washington?
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, let me get that for the record.
I can get within a swag, but I will submit that for the record,
sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. King. Thank you for the testimony. Thank you for their
service. I yield back.
Thank you, Chairman, for the hearing.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Before concluding, I remind the witnesses that the Members
of the committee may have additional questions for you, and we
ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those
questions.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Jane Holl
Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. In response to a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission
about improving passenger pre-screening, the Secure Flight program is
being implemented so that TSA will be assuming the duty, which now
rests with the air carriers, of checking passengers against the No-Fly
and Selectee databases. I understand TSA is first implementing Secure
Flight domestically, but with there being a significant threat
concerning international in-bound flights, how will the Department
conduct watch list passenger pre-screening for in-bound flights to the
United States? How will this be incorporated with existing CBP programs
like the Advanced Passenger Information System?
Answer. DHS is implementing Secure Flight through a phased process.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) anticipates that
Secure Flight deployments for domestic aircraft operators will be
completed in spring 2010. TSA has also initiated Secure Flight
deployments for foreign aircraft operators and expects to assume watch
list matching for all flights, international and domestic, by the end
of calendar year 2010.
All aircraft operators, both foreign and domestic, who have not
transitioned to Secure Flight are responsible for conducting watch list
screening of their passengers against the No-Fly and Selectee lists.
Currently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens
travelers arriving into or departing from the United States against the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB, the U.S. Government's Terrorist
Watch List), including No-Fly and Selectee records. All commercial and
private aircraft operators with flights arriving into or departing from
the United States are required to transmit passenger manifest
information through the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). APIS is used for terrorist
watchlist screening, law enforcement analytical work, passenger
facilitation, and departure monitoring. As part of program alignment,
on February 19, 2008, CBP started screening all APIS manifest
submissions against the No-Fly and Selectee watch lists with the
screening results being provided to the TSA Office of Intelligence
(TSA-OI) for resolution. CBP has been working closely with TSA and the
airline industry to align the APIS program with TSA Secure Flight
watchlist screening. When TSA's Secure Flight Program is fully
implemented, the No-Fly and Selectee screening will transition from the
APIS system to Secure Flight. CBP will continue to process APIS
manifest information for its law enforcement and traveler facilitation
mission.
Question 2. Ms. Lute, It is my understanding that ``Puffer
Machines'' or Explosive Trace Portal Machines worked great when they
were tested in the lab testing but during field testing they had a high
breakdown rate caused by dust and dirt entering the machines. I have
been told by TSA that there are currently 9 machines currently in the
field, but TSA has no intention to field any more because of the
breakdown rate. Is any effort being made to revise or improve this
technology?
Answer. At this time there are only two deployed Explosive Trace
Portals (ETP), one at Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport and one at
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, and both are slotted for
removal this year. As we deploy Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) at an
airport we remove obsolete equipment at the same time. This minimizes
disruption of the airport operations and increases resource and cost
efficiencies.
While the ETP devices previously purchased by Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) experienced operational performance
issues that hindered their effectiveness in the field, TSA and the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate
continue to evaluate a variety of trace detection technologies.
Question 3. Ms. Lute, it is my understanding that every checkpoint
in the United States has portable Explosive Trace Technology devices. I
realize it is not practical to test every person in every airport with
this device because of time limitations, but can TSA increase the
amount of passengers randomly selected for the explosive trace
technology swab test? Has TSA taken any steps to increase their use?
Answer. To restate your question more accurately, every checkpoint
in the United States has tabletop Explosive Trace Technology devices.
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) technology is a critical tool in our
ability to stay ahead of evolving threats to aviation security. In
fact, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has recently
expanded the random use of ETD technology at airports Nation-wide as an
additional layer of security. Since it will be used on a random basis,
passengers should not expect to see the same thing at every airport or
each time they travel. TSA will continue to evaluate the numbers of
passengers screened and work to maximize the effectiveness of ETD
screening as commensurate with resource levels and airport operations.
Question 4. Ms. Lute, it is my understanding that a pilot program
that was recently completed by TSA called ``e-Logbook'' would allow TSA
to instantly be able to know if a FAM or LEO flying armed is on-board
an aircraft. I have been informed this pilot program was a success
however, it is my understanding that no funding has been requested yet
for this program to go up Nation-wide. I would like to know what the
current status is and what plan does TSA have to role out this program
Nation-wide?
Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has a dedicated
system in place to continually track, in real time, Federal Air Marshal
(FAM) presence on domestic and international flights.
With regard to the Electronic Logbook (e-Logbook) pilot program,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is seeking to
establish an automated process for providing situational awareness for
other armed law enforcement officers (LEOs) on-board any given
aircraft. The e-Logbook pilot program was tested in Washington (Reagan
National Airport, Dulles International) and San Francisco and TSA is
currently considering a Nation-wide implementation. In the interim,
TSA's Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) currently tracks
State and local armed LEOs on commercial aircraft through a National
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) solution implemented
last year. Although functional, the NLETS solution relies on manual
processes and is limited to State and local LEOs.
Also, on February 1, 2010, TSA began a pilot implementation of an
enhanced credential verification procedure for Federal Law Enforcement
personnel flying while armed.
The enhanced identification procedures require each Federal LEO
flying armed in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 1544.219 and respective
agency policy, to be in possession of a Unique Federal Agency Number
(UFAN). The UFAN is an agency-specific alpha-numeric number TSA issues
to Federal agencies/entities upon request. The UFAN is known only to
TSA and the respective agency/entity. Each agency/entity must ensure
its eligible law enforcement personnel are aware of this number to be
used in conjunction with the LEOs badge, credential, a secondary form
of Government-issued identification, and airline-issued LEO flying
armed paperwork. The UFAN number is an additional form of verification
and will be requested of the LEO at the LEO checkpoint prior to entry
into the boarding area.
Question 5. Ms. Lute, it has come to my intention that some flights
have both FAMS agents and LEO's flying armed, while other flights have
neither. Is the Department taking any steps to create a scheduling
system to maximize the use of FAMS with LEO's flying armed?
Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) provides mission
coverage to the Nation's civil aviation system using a concept of
operations (CONOPs) that is essentially a threat-based matrix
prioritizing scheduled flight coverage well in advance of the flight
date. FAMS, on the other hand, can be made available to cover emergent
threats when necessary. In order to perform the FAMS' mission, all
Federal Air Marshals (FAM) undergo intensive specialized training far
exceeding requirements for law enforcement officers (LEOs) flying
armed.
With regard to the matter of other armed LEOs, the FAMS has
determined that flight schedules from other agencies (Federal, State,
and local) are flexible by nature, often booked within days of the
flight date (allowing virtually no advance FAMS planning) and are not
sufficiently reliable to ensure daily coverage of flights.
Overburdening airlines and TSA's Mission Operation Center with
additional last moment cancellations/bookings to ensure proper coverage
of high priority flights presents operational and logistical challenges
best overcome by the FAMS making its own schedule independent of other
LEOs traveling on flights.
Question 6. Ms. Lute, does the Department plan to hire more FAMS
agents? If so, how many?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request does seek
to increase the Federal Air Marshal Service funded staffing level.
Specifically, the budget request seeks to hire 499 additional FAMS
personnel in fiscal year 2011.
Question 7. I have recently become aware of ``event-driven'' as
compared to ``person-driven'' software. As I understand it, ``event-
driven'' software is very efficient and can instantly capture and
process extremely large volumes of information. I understand that
electronic signals generated by events serve as input into specialized
event-driven software. I am told that based on its processing rules
with predetermined expectations and constraints, it can intelligently
process the information to constantly revaluate individuals' risk
profiles, connect the intelligence-revealing dots, and automatically
and immediately communicate the derived intelligence or alerts to all
the appropriate people that need to know, or need to take action.
I am told that this event-driven software has been successfully
used for years in extremely complex manufacturing environments such as
Aerospace and Defense, as well as many other challenging industries.
The processing of travel and security ``events'' is apparently no
different and I understand that the software can be deployed very
quickly. It appears there is a possibility that with this software the
``events'' leading up to the Christmas day bomber incident would have
set off the alarms for everyone, even if the bomber was not on any
watch list. How long do you estimate it will take before the American
people can be protected by comprehensive ``event-driven'' software?
Answer. DHS is aware that event-driven systems have proven useful
in such large-scale applications as manufacturing, financial and
investment management, aircraft and spaceflight, and project
management. Common to all these applications is some on-going process,
workflow, or lifecycle. For example, a production line; an investment
policy based on a series of price or monetary changes; a series of
engine thrust, altitude, heading, weather, and fuel (and many other)
measurements, which describe the health of an aircraft; or a
development cycle for a software design. The ``event'' refers to a
point along the process, workflow, or lifecycle, where an automated
decision is made by the system to proceed or to take one of several
alternatives. Using our manufacturing or aircraft and spaceflight
examples, this could be deciding to insert a new throttle assembly
because the old one was ineffective or setting a series of thrusters or
making altitude adjustments on the Space Shuttle to ensure a safe re-
entry trajectory. For event-driven systems to function, at least three
elements are necessary. These are: (1) A constrained set of rules that
determine how decisions are made, (2) access to all the data or
databases that are necessary to make a decision, and (3) sensors to
detect an event or measurements that are continuously made along the
process or lifecycle.
In the context of the attempted attack on December 25, 2009, for an
individual and an explosive material, a set of rules does exist for
deciding what happens if one or the other is detected, therefore the
first element for an event-driven system is present and functioning.
The second element, access to all data, was incomplete. In the case of
the individual, while he used his real identity (e.g., he did not try
to use a false passport or another name), DHS screening systems lacked
any data indicating that he presented an imminent threat. In
particular, he was not on the U.S. Government's terrorist watch list.
Similarly, while DHS had sufficient information to know that the
particular substance could be explosive, our foreign partners did not
have systems or processes in place to detect it.
In summary, an event-driven system applied to the attempted attack
on December 25 would not have functioned because the individual was not
watchlisted and because the screening equipment was not sensitive
enough to detect the explosive material. Had the individual been
watchlisted or had the equipment been sensitive enough to detect the
explosive materials, an event-driven system would not have been
necessary as the existing information-based and physical screening
processes would have prevented him from boarding the aircraft. DHS is
working with our counterparts within the U.S. Government and our
foreign partners to close these vulnerabilities.
Event-driven systems could prove useful for some homeland security
applications. However, should the Department identify event-driven
systems as a practical technology solution for air passenger screening,
it will take time to integrate into the existing enterprise.
Question 8. The findings of the administration's report released
Jan 7, 2010, included: ``The information that was available to
analysts, as is usually the case, was fragmented and embedded in a
large volume of other data'', and that ``NCTC and CIA personnel who are
responsible for watchlisting did not search all available databases to
uncover additional derogatory information that could have been
correlated with Mr. Abdulmutallab''.
My understanding is that most of the analysis is currently a
process of manual searches of the various databases.
Could this goal be achieved with automation, through the use of
clever technology that can process large volumes of information
efficiently and if so, are you currently looking at putting such
technology in place?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investigating
ways to improve searches across the large number of databases in the
Department. Even before 25 December, in response to terrorist activity,
the Department established a DHS Threat Task Force (DTTF) and provided
access to 47 databases to a single co-located team in order to conduct
name traces. While this is a step forward and has yielded actionable
insights, the greater need is the ability to search across databases at
the same time, combining search results. Rather than search each
database individually, a federated search would allow us to more
quickly make analytic connections.
A cross-database search capability could enable DHS to conduct
searches on individual names, submit lists of names for search, and set
up alerts which are tripped when new information on individuals of
interest arrives. Various statistical and probabilistic algorithms
could be used to prioritize the search results based on context and
frequency.
DHS is exploring options for a federated search capability. While
federating searches across multiple databases is technically feasible,
it is challenging when dealing with numerous datasets of different eras
and structures, and it must also be done in a manner consistent with
DHS information use policies including implementation of the Fair
Information Practice Principles. In advance of creating this
capability, moreover, the Department will also develop applicable
System of Records Notices (SORN) and Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA)
to ensure that we use the databases in a manner consistent with what we
have publicly stated about them. The Department will continue to work
through these issues to make available for search the kinds of
sensitive U.S. persons data that are currently not easily shared with
the intelligence community in a manner that protects privacy, civil
rights and civil liberties, and ensuring DHS can achieve its mission to
detect threats to the homeland.
Question 9. Does our technology today enable us to assess every
single passenger's risk profile, considering all contributing factors,
in order to determine his/her specific risk level at any given point in
time, and to immediately communicate an elevated risk to the security
agencies for extra screening or follow up? If not, are you aware of a
technology that could accomplish this?
Answer. For international flights, in addition to screening against
the No-Fly and Selectee lists that are part of the Terrorist Screening
Database, DHS uses a decisions support tool that compares traveler
information against intelligence and other enforcement data by
incorporating risk-based targeting scenarios and assessments. The
primary purpose is to target, identify, and prevent terrorists and
terrorists' weapons from entering the country. All individuals entering
the country by commercial air and sea carriers are run through this
system. Based on results of the targeting systems, DHS will determine
appropriate next steps, which include denying boarding, additional
screening before departure or upon arrival, denying admission to the
United States, or arrest upon arrival.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Michael
E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center
Question 1. What disciplinary or other personnel action has your
agency taken in response to the events leading up to the failed attack
on Flight 253?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Does NCTC have the authority it needs to fulfill its
mission to the American people? Specify any additional authorities
needed to operate effectively.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Under what circumstances are names removed from the
TIDE database? Describe relevant procedures and the time intervals
associated with these procedures.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Christopher P. Carney of Pennsylvania for
Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center
Question. Mr. Leiter, at the hearing when asked about how many
points of failure occurred within our intelligence and homeland
security systems, ``Was there a single point of failure, a double point
of failure or multiple points of failure?'', you answered ``Multiple''.
Please list these failures and rank them in terms of severity and what
needs to be done to fix them.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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