[Senate Hearing 111-406]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-406
EXAMINING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PRIORITIES AND STRATEGY ACROSS AFRICA'S
SAHEL REGION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 17, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware BOB CORKER, Tennessee
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Benjamin, Hon. Daniel, Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 47
Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 45
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Gast, Earl, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC...... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 50
Gutelius, Dr. David, founder and partner, Ishtirak, consulting
senior fellow, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory, San Francisco, CA.................................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Huddleston, Hon. Vicki, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC.......................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell D. Feingold........................................ 48
Kennedy-Boudali, Lianne, senior project associate, RAND
Corporation, Arlington, VA..................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
(iii)
EXAMINING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PRIORITIES AND STRATEGY ACROSS AFRICA'S
SAHEL REGION
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D.
Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. This hearing will come to order.
Good morning everybody. I apologize in advance; it looks
like we're going to have three votes or so, starting at about
11:15, maybe a little earlier. We'll see if we can get through
the first panel by then, but I do appreciate everybody's
patience if we have to take a break in the hearing.
On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing entitled
``Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy
Across Africa's Sahel Region.'' I'm honored to be joined later
by the ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator Isakson.
When he arrives, I'll ask him to deliver some opening remarks,
as well.
Let me first clarify what constitutes the Sahel region.
This region covers those territories on the southern border and
directly to the south of the Sahara Desert. For our discussion
today, it includes parts or all of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. The Sahel is a region
on the front lines of climate change, facing the challenges of
soil erosion, deforestation, and desertification. It also is a
vast land-area home to nomadic communities, many of them
minority ethnic groups, which have long been in conflict with
some of the centralized state authorities in those regions.
Over the years, this region's long porous borders and
ungoverned spaces have been exploited by criminal groups,
particularly for the trafficking of drugs, weapons, illicit
goods, and people. And over the last decade, there's been
increasing concern about the potential for violent extremist
groups to do so, as well.
Counterterrorism officials have particularly focused on an
al-Qaeda affiliate, a group known as ``al-Qaeda in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghreb.'' AQIM, as it's known, emerged in Algeria
and has primarily operated in North Africa, but it has extended
its region to parts of the Sahel, and could expand farther.
Some U.S. intelligence officials have expressed concern at
AQIM's increasing capabilities and more sophisticated attacks.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to assess the threat
posed by AQIM amidst other transnational threats in the Sahel
region. This is yet another reminder that al-Qaeda is operating
in countries around the globe, and our fight against them,
therefore, must be global, too.
The administration is right to focus attention on the
Pakistan/Afghanistan region, but we cannot lose sight of other
places where al-Qaeda is seeking to gain ground. As we have
seen in Somalia and Yemen, weak states, chronic instability,
ungoverned spaces, and unresolved local tensions can create
almost ideal safe havens in which terrorists can recruit and
operate. Several parts of the Sahel region include that same
mix of ingredients, and the danger they pose, not just to
regional security, but to our own national security, is real.
At the same time, crafting an effective counterterrorism
strategy toward the Sahel requires an appreciation of the
unique local conditions that al-Qaeda seeks to exploit and the
factors that could motivate individuals to join their struggle.
We need to understand ongoing changes in conflicts--political,
economic, and social--that are shaping this region. Without an
appreciation of these local dynamics, injecting new U.S.
resources into the region could actually end up complicating or
even exacerbating the threat, rather than mitigating it. We
need to seriously consider how short-term activities relate to
our long-term goals of promoting good governance and the rule
of law.
In 2005, the Bush administration launched the Tran-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership to enhance the capabilities of
governments across the Sahel, as well as in Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia, for counterterrorism and to help confront the
spread of extremist ideology. Nearly $500 million has been
allocated for this program since fiscal year 2005, yet nearly 5
years later it remains unclear to what extent these efforts
have been successful.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to review our approach to
counterterrorism in the Sahel, the continuing challenges, and
what progress has been made. Because this is not in a
classified setting, I realize we are limited in how much we can
get into specific activities. But, we can discuss the overall
strategy and priorities of our counterterrorism efforts in the
Sahel and the roles played by different implementing agencies.
I believe it's important that we can explain to the American
people, at least generally, what we're doing and why they
should be confident that our efforts are making progress.
Let me just briefly introduce our witnesses this morning.
I'm very pleased that we have such great interagency lineup for
our first panel: the Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Africa, Vicki Huddleston; from USAID, Senior
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast; and from
the State Department, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Johnnie Carson.
In addition, State is also represented by its coordinator
for counterterrorism, Daniel Benjamin. Ambassador Benjamin's
presence here is particularly important because, while this
subcommittee approaches issues from the lens of sub-Saharan
Africa, the threat from AQIM cuts across regions and the
traditional boundaries of State Department's regional bureaus.
So, I thank all of you for being here, and I ask that each
of you keep your remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we have
enough time for questions and discussion. And, of course, we
will submit your longer written statements for the record.
Our second panel, we'll hear from Dr. David Gutelius, who
brings together a unique mix of expertise on this region and
technological innovation and media strategies. Dr. Gutelius was
a visiting professor at Stanford University. He founded and is
currently a partner of Ishtirak, a Middle East and Islamic
Africa-focused consultancy. He's also a consulting senior
fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory's National Security Analysis Department.
We also hear from Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, who has done
research and written about the history and evolution of armed
groups in Maghreb up in Sahel regions. Ms. Kennedy-Boudali was
a senior associate and assistant professor at the Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point and now works as a senior
project associate at the RAND Corporation.
So, again, I thank all of our witnesses for being here. And
now I will--unless the ranking member shows up in the next
couple of seconds. So, I'll turn to Ms. Huddleston--nope, he
came just as I was about to turn to the witnesses.
I'm pleased to recognize, for his opening statement,
Senator Johnny Isakson, the ranking member.
Senator Isakson. I will waive my opening statement, except
to say welcome to Secretary Carson--it's good to see you
again--and all of our witnesses. Counterterrorism is of
particular interest. In my travels to Africa, I've been very
interested in seeing our engagement on that continent, because
the potential for some very dangerous things to happen very
well could take place.
So, I welcome you all here. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for
being late, and it's good to be with you.
Senator Feingold. I thank you, Senator Isakson, and we'll
begin with Honorable Johnnie Carson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Carson. Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member
Isakson, other members of the committee, I welcome the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our support
to the countries of Africa's Sahel region to approve their
long-term security and to constrict the ability of al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb.
I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for
the record, if I may.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Ambassador Carson. Terrorism in the Sahel has become an
issue of increasing concern. Over the past 5 years, AQIM and
its predecessor organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat, GSPC, have stepped up their activities across the
Sahel. In the past 6 months alone, AQIM has been implicated in
the killing of an American nongovernmental organization--NGO--
worker in Nouakchott, Mauritania; the execution of a British
hostage in Mali; the assassination of a senior Malian military
officer; and an attempted suicide bombing against the French
Embassy in Nouakchott.
The countries in the region have recognized the problem and
have intensified their efforts against AQIM. Algeria recently
hosted regional chiefs of defense to promote improved
cooperation, and we understand that Mali will organize a heads-
of-state meeting in Bamako to address the situation soon.
However, all the countries in the Sahel face daunting
challenges. They are among the poorest countries in the world
and lack the resources to develop effective antiterrorism
programs on their own. They are also vast countries, stretching
over thousands of miles, where government services and
authority are weak or nonexistent. They are preoccupied with
critical humanitarian and development issues, and, in some
cases, terrorism is not their most pressing challenge.
The United States is committed to helping these countries
address the counterterrorism problems that these states face in
the Sahel. However, we believe that this is best done in a
supporting role rather than a leading role. We want to avoid
undertaking actions that could make the situation worse. We
must consult with the governments of the region to assess their
needs. We must encourage regional collaboration and cooperation
across borders. We must consult with our European partners and
urge them to be helpful. We have emphasized to those partners
that, while the United States will do its part, the burden must
be shared by us all. We have also stressed that we must make
sure that the assistance we in the United States provide does
not aggravate longstanding historical and cultural problems
that exist in some of the states in the region.
Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and others in the region can
manage and contain this issue if they work together and receive
appropriate encouragement and support from countries like the
United States. We should not seek to take this issue over. It
is not ours and doing so might have negative consequences for
U.S. interests over the long term.
We must also recognize that the governments in the region
have explicitly stated that the Sahel's security is the
responsibility of the countries in the region. They have not
asked the United States to take on a leadership role in the
counterterrorism efforts. In fact, they have clearly signaled
that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the
United States might, in some instances, be counterproductive.
The focal point of our effort has been the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership. Created in 2005, TSCTP allocates
between $120 and $150 million per year for programs in 10
countries. TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad, Mali,
Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
Burkina Faso was added in 2009.
The TSCTP program reflects our recognition that sporadic
engagements without adequate followup or sustainment would fail
to achieve the meaningful, long-lasting results that we seek in
the region. The emphasis, therefore, has been placed on
addressing key capacity shortfalls that could be addressed over
a period of years in these countries. The program draws
resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S.
Government, including the State Department, the Department of
Defense, and USAID.
TSCTP does not provide a one-size-fits-all assistance
package. As the current threat levels prevail in the region, we
look at the states on a case-by-case basis and adjust the
program to meet the needs of the countries.
We will continue to work with the countries in the region
to identify capacity, weaknesses, and to ensure that TSCTP
programs are adequately funded.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to make this
brief statement, and I will be happy to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the
committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss our counterterrorism approach in Africa's Sahel region. I look
forward to working with the Congress, and especially with this
committee, to identify appropriate tools to support the efforts of the
countries in the region to improve their long-term security and
constrict the ability of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a
variety of criminal networks to exploit the area's vast territory.
This hearing is very timely. While the security challenges in the
Sahel are not new, several attacks in recent months against African and
Western targets have drawn additional focus to the situation. Key
countries in the area, including Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania, have
intensified efforts to coordinate their activities against AQIM and
address the region's short, medium, and long-term vulnerabilities. At
the same time, we have consulted with African and European partners to
identify areas where we can more effectively support regional efforts
to improve the security environment in the Sahel over the long term.
The United States can play a helpful supporting role in the
regional effort, but we must avoid taking actions that could
unintentionally increase local tensions or lend credibility to AQIM's
claims of legitimacy. First and foremost, we must be sensitive to local
political dynamics and avoid precipitous actions which exacerbate
longstanding and often bloody conflicts.
AQIM's ideology and violent tactics are antithetical to the vast
majority of people in the region and the group's ability to mobilize
significant popular support for its objectives has been largely
frustrated. It has failed to build and sustain meaningful alliances
with insurgencies and criminal networks operating in the region. In
fact, AQIM's murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the
unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and the murder of an
American citizen in Mauritania may have caused some groups in Northern
Mali to sever opportunistic economic arrangements occasionally
established to supplement local groups' efforts to survive in the
region's austere environment. By contrast, the perceptions of the
United States have been generally favorable throughout the Sahel, even
during periods when our popularity around the world declined. It is
instructive that a 2008 poll involving 18 Muslim countries revealed
that Mauritanians had the highest opinion of the United States.
The countries in the region continue to demonstrate the political
will to combat terrorism and transnational crime. They have explicitly
stated that the Sahel's security is the responsibility of the countries
in the region. They have not asked the United States to take on a
leadership role in counterterrorism efforts and have, in fact, clearly
signaled that a more visible or militarily proactive posture by the
United States would be counterproductive. We fully concur that the
appropriate roles for the United States and other third countries with
even more significant interests in the region must be to support
regional security efforts while continuing to provide meaningful
development assistance to the more remote areas. Moreover, we have
emphasized that while the United States will do its part, the burden
must be shared.
We recognize, however, that the security environment in the Sahel
requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities
and capacity deficits. There is insufficient capacity to monitor and
protect immense swaths of largely ungoverned or poorly governed
territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers an area larger
than Texas. Niger is the poorest country in the world according to the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali rank
near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale.
The vulnerability of the northern Sahel has not only led AQIM to
seek out safe havens in the region, but has also enabled the operations
of a range of transnational criminal networks. Criminal traffickers in
human beings, weapons, and narcotics also exploit parts of the region.
West Africa has emerged as a major transshipment area for cocaine
flowing from South America to Europe. Narcotrafficking poses a direct
threat to U.S. interests since the proceeds of cocaine trafficked
through the region generally flow back to Latin American organizations
moving drugs to the United States.
The committee has asked how our counterterrorism efforts in the
Sahel relate to our long-term goals of good governance, civilian
control over security forces, and respect for human rights. The first
priority President Obama has identified for our Africa policy is
helping to build strong and stable democracies on the continent. This
is essential in West Africa. In recent years, the region has witnessed
two military coups in Mauritania, deeply flawed elections in Nigeria,
and an undemocratic seizure of power in Niger. Our experience in the
region has underscored the urgency of improving governance, strongly
promoting the rule of law, developing durable political and economic
institutions at all levels of society, and maintaining professional
security forces under civilian control.
Meaningful progress in these areas is crucial to the success of
ongoing efforts against AQIM and other criminal networks. The groups
are drawn to areas where they can take advantage of political and
economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their operating spaces and
lifelines, cross borders with impunity, and attract recruits. They
benefit when security forces and border guards lack the necessary
training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their
activities. Their cause is advanced when human rights abuses undermine
the credibility of security forces. Terrorists and criminal
organizations also take advantage of weak or corrupt criminal justice
systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute and incarcerate
all forms of criminals.
Underdevelopment in key areas represents a critical security
challenge in the Sahel. The region is extremely diverse and the sources
of insecurity in the region vary. In Northern Mali, for example,
insecurity in isolated border areas and along traditional smuggling
routes is perpetuated by unmet economic expectations and the lack of
legitimate alternatives to smuggling or opportunistic commerce with
criminal networks. Mali is one of Africa's most stable democracies, but
its efforts to address insecurity in the northern part of the country
are severely hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability to
provide adequate service delivery and educational and vocational
opportunities to isolated areas. This dynamic can become particularly
problematic in cases where AQIM has provided small amounts of food and
other consumables to generate good will or at least tolerance from
groups living in their vicinity.
Although AQIM's attempts to recruit in Mali and elsewhere in the
Sahel have been largely unsuccessful, its limited successes in
countries such as Mauritania can largely be traced to its ability to
capitalize on the frustration among the young over insufficient
educational or vocational opportunities. AQIM has also attracted
recruits and material support from isolated communities or
neighborhoods in Mauritania and elsewhere that lack alternatives to
schools, media, or networking centers that promote violent extremism.
The United States primary instrument to advance counterterrorism
objectives in the Sahel and the Maghreb is the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP is a multiyear commitment
designed to support partner country efforts in the Sahel and the
Maghreb to constrict and ultimately eliminate the ability of terrorist
organization to exploit the region. The rationale and overarching
strategy for TSCTP was approved by a National Security Council (NSC)
Deputies Committee in 2005. TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad,
Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia;
Burkina Faso was added in 2009.
TSCTP serves two primary purposes. The program identifies and
mobilizes resources from throughout the interagency to support
sustained efforts to address violent extremism in the region. It was
understood when TSCTP was created that sporadic engagements without
adequate followup or sustainment would fail to achieve meaningful long-
term results in a region with a multitude of basic needs. The emphasis
was therefore placed on key capacity deficits that could be addressed
over a period of years. The program draws resources and expertise from
multiple agencies in the U.S. Government including the State
Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID. As the threat levels,
political environments, and material needs differ substantially among
the partner countries, most engagements and assistance packages under
TSCTP are tailored to fit the priorities of the individual countries.
TSCTP was also designed to coordinate the activities of the various
implementing agencies. The coordination takes place at several levels.
Action Officers representing the various agencies meet periodically in
Washington to coordinate activities and share information.
Representatives from Washington and AFRICOM also meet regularly with
our Embassies in TSCTP countries. The first line of coordination and
oversight takes place at our Embassies. While various assessments and
inputs from throughout the interagency inform decisions regarding TSCTP
programming, Chiefs of Mission must concur with all proposed
activities. They are best placed to understand the immediate and long-
term implications of various activities and are ultimately the primary
interlocutors with the host countries.
Forming a definitive conclusion at this relatively early stage
regarding whether our counterterrorism approach in the Sahel is working
is difficult, but we believe that we are making important progress. For
example, TSCTP resources contributed to training and equipping more
capable and professional security forces in Mauritania. We believe that
our work with Mali to support more professional units capable of
improving the security environment in the country will have future
benefits if they are sustained. Our public affairs teams and USAID are
implementing a range of beneficial exchanges and projects in Mali and
promoting outreach to communities potentially vulnerable to extremism
in Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, and elsewhere.
The decision in 2005 to focus on long-term capacity-building rather
than search for quick fixes was clearly correct, even more so given the
limited absorptive capacity of these countries. Clear victories against
the underlying security and developmental challenges in the region are
unlikely to clearly announce themselves in the near term, but I am
confident that a steady and patient approach provides the best
opportunity for success.
The recognition that we must take a holistic approach involving
multiple agencies was also correct. Efforts to improve interagency
coordination and the vital coordination between our missions and
program managers in Washington and Stuttgart have been crucial. We
continue to seek a balance between the financial resources for the
development and diplomatic pieces of TSCTP and funding devoted to
military-to-military activities. We will continue to work toward a
balanced approach envisioned when the program was created.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer
any questions you have.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Carson.
Mr. Benjamin.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Benjamin. Senator Feingold, Ranking Member
Senator Isakson, thank you very much for the opportunity to
speak to you today about the Department's role in countering
terrorism in the Sahel region.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb continues to menace parts
of the Maghreb and the Sahel. In the north, it is frustrated by
Algeria's effective counterterrorism operations, but in parts
of the Sahel, it continues to operate with considerable
impunity.
We are working bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally
to develop the capacity of countries in the region to control
their sovereign territory, disrupt terrorist conspiracies, and
counter those who advocate violence. A well-thought-out, long-
term approach provides the best opportunity to ensure our
security and that of our friends and allies against the
terrorist threats from this region.
AQIM has failed to meet its key objectives and, under
pressure from Algerian security forces, is on the defensive in
Algeria. AQIM is financially strapped; indeed, it appears that
the Algerians have AQIM in the northeastern part of the country
increasingly contained and marginalized. The group has largely
worn out its welcome in the Kabylie region, where residents
have become increasingly resentful of its presence.
One of the central questions about AQIM has long been
whether it would be able to establish itself in Europe and
carry out attacks there. Some of our closest counterterrorism
partners in Europe have identified this possibility of
infiltration as one of their foremost concerns. That said, we
currently view the near-term possibility of such an expansion
of operations as less likely than it was just a few years ago.
In the Sahel, however, the picture is different. AQIM
maintains two separate groups of fighters in northern Mali and
has recently increased attacks and kidnappings, including
against Western targets.
The group relies, to a considerable extent, on hostage-
taking for ransom while carrying out murders and low-level
attacks to garner media attention. In the last 2 years, AQIM in
the Sahel has stepped up the pace. It has kidnapped two
Austrian tourists along the Tunisian/Algerian border in early
2008; two Canadian diplomats in Niger in December 2008; four
European tourists near the Mali/Niger border in January of this
year.
One of the Europeans, a British hostage, was subsequently
murdered by AQIM, as you all know.
AQIM has also increased other kinds of attacks in the
Sahel. This year the group killed a Malian official in northern
Mali; an American NGO worker in nearby Mauritania; and
attempted a suicide bombing outside the French Embassy in
Mauritania.
Despite the uptick in violence, hostage-taking, and the
murder of individual Western citizens, we believe that these
operations reveal some AQIM weaknesses. AQIM has failed to
conduct attacks or operations in Morocco, Tunisia, or Libya.
The Muslim population in the Sahel and the Maghreb, as a whole,
still reject AQIM's extremism. There are exceptions, however,
and the increase in AQIM recruitment in Mauritania is
troubling.
That said, if we play our cards right, we can further
contain and marginalize AQIM's threat to U.S. interests, and we
can make investments that will be productive and reasonable.
We're striving to build countries' capacity through long-
term programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership. We're also working closely with other key
international partners to ensure that our collective efforts in
the region are well targeted, well coordinated, and effective.
Our quiet, but solid support for their counterterrorism--
that is, those in the region--has emboldened our partners to
stand up to extremism. We have been, if you will, leading from
the side. These partners have shown the will to take on
terrorists in the past, and we expect that that will continue.
Our support to military and law enforcement capacity-
building has led to stronger controlled borders and remote
spaces, and that continues to improve. Our programs for
countering violent extremism--such as radio programming,
messaging from moderate leaders, and prison reform--have
bolstered the region's traditionally moderate inclinations.
We believe that our relatively modest efforts in the region
are paying off and are worthy of continuation. A steady, long-
term commitment to building effective security in the region
will benefit the United States by enabling others to take the
lead in stopping terrorists in their own countries before those
threats reach our borders.
These countries have made it clear that they do not want
the United States to take a more direct or visible operational
role, but welcome assistance from the United States and other
third countries.
We are particularly pleased that our regional partners are
working together to weaken AQIM, motivated in part by the
group's recent atrocities. In August, Algeria hosted a
conference for high-level defense ministry representatives from
Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria to coordinate AQIM
efforts, and we expect Mali to follow that up with a regional
heads-of-state summit before the end of the year.
We're also working with our European partners, with whom we
met in Paris last month, on this issue, specifically to
coordinate assistance to our partners in the Sahel and the
Maghreb. Additionally, we have met with Canadian officials to
discuss cooperation in the wake of the hostage-taking of one of
their diplomats.
I should add that capacity-building is not the only
contribution the Western partners can make to defeating
terrorism in the region. It is also imperative that we do what
we can to remove incentives for kidnapping. This administration
plans to make a broader acceptance of the no-concessions
approach an important initiative.
In closing, let me reiterate. We welcome the readiness of
our partners in the region to take the lead in confronting
AQIM, and we are pleased about the cooperation among our
Western allies as we take effective steps to help build
security in the Sahel. This cooperation, I strongly believe,
will help fulfill the vision of working in partnership with
other nations in troubled areas that has been a hallmark of
President Obama's foreign policy. I believe, also, that as we
continue to provide support using the TSCTP as our primary
tool, we will achieve our goal of reducing the danger AQIM
possess to the region and to American interests.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Department of State, Washington, DC
Senator Feingold, Ranking Member Senator Isakson, members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to speak to you today about the
Department's role in countering terrorism in the Sahel region. Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to menace parts of the Maghreb
and the Sahel. In the north, it is frustrated by Algeria's effective
counterterrorism operations, but in parts of the Sahel, it continues to
operate with significant impunity. We are working bilaterally,
regionally, and multilaterally, to develop their capacity to control
their sovereign territory, effectively disrupt terrorist attacks, and
counter those who advocate violence. A well-thought-out, long-term
approach provides the best opportunity to ensure our security and that
of our friends and allies against the terrorist threats from this
region.
AQIM has failed to meet its key objectives and, under pressure from
Algerian security forces, is on the defensive in Algeria. AQIM is
financially strapped, particularly in Algeria, and unable to reach its
recruiting goals. In the Sahel, they are also having difficulties
recruiting although the influx of Mauritanian recruits has meant that
their manpower situation is not as critical as in the north.
AQIM has historically focused on Algerian targets in the
northeastern portion of Algeria. After AQIM's 2006 merger with al-
Qaeda, the group has continued to attack the Algerian Government and
military, while expanding its targeting of Western interests in the
region. In December 2007, the group conducted sophisticated dual
suicide bombings of both the Algerian Constitutional Council and U.N.
office buildings in Algiers.
Since then, however, the group's fortunes have been ebbing. AQIM
has been unable to conduct large-scale attacks since summer of 2008, in
part due to pressure from Algerian forces, which have achieved
important successes in breaking up extremist cells and disrupting
operations. Increasingly, it appears that the Algerians have AQIM in
northeastern part of the country increasingly contained and
marginalized. Nonetheless, AQIM has continued to conduct low-level
attacks in northeastern Algeria by carrying out ambushes, laying mines,
and using small explosives, primarily against military checkpoints,
gendarmes, police, and army vehicles. AQIM has also largely worn out
its welcome in the Kabylie region, where residents have become
increasingly resentful of the group's presence. Although AQIM has never
conducted attacks on U.S. diplomatic targets in Algeria, U.S. and
Western business interests, particularly those linked to oil companies
have been targeted in the past, and remain at risk.
One of the central questions about AQIM has long been whether it
would be able to establish itself in Europe and carry out attacks
there. There is no question but that we need to take this possibility
very seriously, especially in light of past attacks carried out by
predecessors to AQIM such as Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in France. Some
of our closest counterterrorism partners in Europe have identified this
possibility of infiltration as one of their foremost concerns. That
said, we view the near-term likelihood of such an expansion of
operations as less likely than it was just a few years ago. This, in
large measure, is because of the pressure on the group in Algeria.
In the Sahel, the picture is different. AQIM maintains two separate
groups of fighters in Northern Mali, and has recently increased attacks
and kidnappings, including against Western targets. They rely to a
considerable extent on hostage-taking for ransom while carrying out
murders, and low-level attacks to garner media attention. In the last 2
years, AQIM in the Sahel has stepped up the pace: Kidnapped two
Austrian tourists along the Tunis-Algerian border in early 2008; two
Canadian diplomats in Niger in December 2008; and four European
tourists near the Mali/Niger border in January 2009. One of the
Europeans, a British hostage, was subsequently murdered by AQIM.
AQIM has also increased other kinds of attacks in the Sahel,
although their capabilities still compare poorly with earlier AQIM
operations in Algeria. This year, AQIM killed a Malian official in
northern Mali, killed an American NGO worker in neighboring Mauritania,
and attempted a suicide bombing outside the French Embassy in
Mauritania. In 2007, AQIM fighters killed four French tourists in
Mauritania. AQIM in the recent past has attacked Mauritania and Malian
security units with some success as well, killing 12 Mauritanian
soldiers and beheading them in one instance and annihilating a Malian
unit searching for AQIM elements after the murder of the British
citizen.
Despite the uptick in violence, hostage-taking, and murder of
individual Western citizens, we believe that these operations reveal
some AQIM weaknesses. AQIM has failed to conduct attacks or operations
in Morocco, Tunisia, or Libya. The Muslim population in the Sahel and
Maghreb, as a whole, still rejects AQIM's extremism. There are
exceptions, however, such as the increase in AQIM recruitment of
Mauritanians, which is troubling.
In the future, we view AQIM as posing a persistent threat to
Western individuals in the Sahel, including our Embassies and
diplomats, as well as tourists, business-people, and humanitarian
workers. I would like to emphasize, however, that AQIM represents less
of a threat to stability in its region than do al-Qaeda in the
Federally Administered Territories in Pakistan or al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. The group cannot seriously threaten
governments or regional stability, nor is it poised to gain significant
support among the region's population. AQIM cannot drive a wedge
between the United States and its partners; it also cannot ignite an
ethnic-based civil war as al-Qaeda in Iraq nearly did.
If we play our cards right, we can further contain and marginalize
AQIM's threat to U.S. interests, and the investments required are
reasonable.
We are striving to build countries' capacity through long-term
programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
We are also working closely with other key international partners to
ensure that our collective efforts in the region are well targeted,
well coordinated, and effective.
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a
multiyear, multiagency commitment designed to support partner efforts
in the Sahel and the Maghreb to constrain and ultimately eliminate the
ability of terrorist organizations to exploit the region. The program
supports partner efforts to: Build long-term capacity to defeat
terrorist organizations and facilitation networks; disrupt efforts to
recruit, train, and provision terrorists and extremists; counter
efforts to establish safe havens for terrorist organizations; disrupt
foreign fighter networks that may attempt to operate outside the
region; address underlying causes of radicalization; and increase the
capacity of moderate leaders to positively influence vulnerable
populations. It also supports efforts to increase regional and
subregional cooperation and interoperability, in such areas as
communication and intelligence-sharing.
Our quiet but solid support for their counterterrorism efforts has
emboldened our partners in the region to stand up to extremism. We have
been ``leading from the side,'' if you will. These partners have shown
the will to take on terrorists in the past. In 2003, for example, Mali,
Niger, and Chad worked together to track down and arrest the extremist
leader al-Para, who was infamous for taking 32 European hostages for
ransom. In 2005, Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali conducted relatively
successful joint combat operations against the Salafist Group for Call
and Combat (GSPC), the precursor group to AQIM, in northwestern Mali.
The United States supported these operations from the background by
providing information and logistics support. Our capacity-building
assistance has enabled Niger and Chad to take on antiregime rebels
successfully. Our support to military and law enforcement capacity-
building has led to stronger control of borders and remote spaces, and
that continues to improve. Our programs for countering violent
extremism--such as radio programming, messaging from moderate leaders,
prison reform, and university linkages, such as connecting U.S.
universities to the Algerian university in Constantine--have bolstered
the region's traditionally moderate inclinations.
We believe that our relatively modest efforts in the region are
paying off and are therefore worthy of continuation. A steady, long-
term commitment to building effective security in the region will
benefit the United States by enabling others to take the lead in
stopping terrorists in their own countries--before they reach our
borders. These countries have made it clear that they do not want the
United States to take a more direct or visible operational role, but
welcome assistance from the United States and other third-party
countries.
The good news is that Algeria has been relatively successful
against AQIM in northeastern Algeria. Despite its political turmoil,
Mauritania has retained a strong interest in working with the United
States on counterterrorism issues. Malian Government efforts, including
a brief period of stepped-up military operations in mid-2009, have also
helped to disrupt AQIM operations in the Sahel. We hope that our recent
deliveries of trucks, communications gear, and nonlethal logistical
supplies will reinforce an effort that suffered from physical/logistic
incapacity issues. We are particularly pleased that our regional
partners are working together to weaken AQIM, motivated in part by
AQIM's most recent atrocities. In August, Algeria hosted a conference
for high-level Defense Ministry representatives from Mali, Niger,
Mauritania, and Algeria to coordinate anti-AQIM efforts. Mali plans to
host a followup regional heads of state summit before the end of the
year. That the region will to take on AQIM is clear; we should make
clear our commitment to enable them to succeed. We remain troubled by
the extra-constitutional actions taken by President Tandja in Niger to
stay in power and we have halted our assistance to that country for the
time being.
We are also working with our European partners, whom we met with in
Paris last month on this issue specifically, to coordinate assistance
offered to our partners in the Sahel and Maghreb. At the Paris meeting,
which included Stephane Gompertz and Olivier Chambard from the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Charlotte Montel from the Foreign
Minister's Cabinet, as well as officials from the European Union, Great
Britain, and Germany; discussions centered on cooperation in the
future. Additionally, we have met with Canadian officials to discuss
cooperation in the wake of the hostage taking of their diplomats. We
share the opinion that the best way to bolster the regional will to
defeat terrorism in the trans-Sahara will involve building the law
enforcement and military capacity of our regional partners.
I should add that building capacity is not the only contribution
that Western partners can make to defeating terrorism in the region. It
is also imperative that we do what we can to remove the incentives for
kidnapping for ransom. The key will be for other countries to embrace a
policy of no concessions to hostage takers. This administration plans
to make broader acceptance of the no-concessions approach an important
initiative. We have seen that, over time, kidnappers lose interest in
nationals of countries that adhere to such a policy.
In closing, let me reiterate: We welcome the readiness of our
partners in the region to take the lead in confronting AQIM, and we are
pleased about the cooperation among our Western allies as we take
effective steps to help build security in the Sahel. This cooperation,
I strongly believe, will help fulfill the vision of working in
partnership with other nations in troubled areas that has been a
hallmark of President Obama's foreign policy. I also believe that as we
continue to provide support, using the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership as our primary tool, we will achieve our goal of reducing
the danger AQIM poses to the region and U.S. interests.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Benjamin.
Mr. Gast.
STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gast. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Isakson. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the role
USAID is playing in the fight against terrorism in Africa's
Sahel region.
Terrorism is a challenge that has plagued U.S. Government
work around the world. In Africa, our efforts to improve
governance and create opportunity are increasingly threatened
by the emerging forces of violent extremism.
To counter the forces that would derail our progress toward
development in this fragile region, USAID is working in concert
with the Departments of Defense and State in the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership to define how development
assistance can most effectively be used to contribute to long-
term peace and stability.
Because of the dearth of information about the drivers of
extremism in Africa that existed in 2005 when the program
started, USAID commissioned two studies: one to aggregate and
supplement what was known, and one to apply those findings to
programs that would address those drivers.
The studies highlighted the complex nature of extremism and
showed that an overarching root cause, such as poverty, is
often just one of many factors that contribute to
radicalization; rather, a number of factors often work
together. For instance, corruption undermines state capacity
and facilitates the emergence of ungoverned or poorly governed
spaces, which, in turn, may provide opportunities for extremist
groups and local conflicts to flourish.
These findings are critical to our decisionmaking and
inform what interventions will be the most effective toward
preventing drivers of extremism from spiraling out of control.
Youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance
are the four areas where we see the greatest opportunity for
local partnerships and progress. Unlike traditional development
programs, our counterextremism efforts often target narrow
populations, and we specifically reach out to young men, the
group most likely to be recruited by extremist groups.
While it can be different to measure success in countering
extremism, we have seen some progress in our efforts. As a
result of our outreach in Chad, the Association of Nomads and
Herders has created a youth branch of its organization. Youth
participation in organizations like this one helps to build
stronger ties with the community and provides youth with a
voice in society. This type of empowerment can greatly reduce
the feelings of marginalization that feeds into--recruitment
into extremist groups.
In the uranium mining areas of northern Niger, communities
have formed listening clubs to discuss USAID-funded radio
programs on good governance. One club even reports that they
are pooling funds together to purchase a phone card so that
they can call the radio station with feedback.
But, despite the promise of these community-based efforts,
national governance has seen a setback in Niger. The recent
referendum and sham elections have done more to empower the
current antidemocratic regime than to provide a voice for the
people, and we are concerned about the path that regime is
taking.
For our programs to be successful, we must invest in strong
local partnerships, and our methods of engagement must be
nimble and creative. Because trends in extremism are fluid, we
must constantly reassess our priorities, our progress, and our
policies to ensure that our work is based on the realities of
today.
Toward this end, we are pleased with our strong and
productive partnership in the interagency. Sustained engagement
within U.S. Government, with other donor governments, and with
our partners in the Trans-Sahara region will be the key to
combating extremism today and securing peace and stability for
years to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Isakson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Prepared Statement of Earl Gast, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the role
USAID is playing in the fight against terrorism in Africa's Sahel
region.
Terrorism is a challenge that has plagued U.S. Government work
around the world. In Africa, especially in the trans-Saharan region,
our efforts to improve governance and create economic opportunity are
increasingly threatened by the emerging forces of violent extremism. To
counter the forces that would derail our progress toward development in
this fragile region, USAID is working in concert with the Departments
of Defense and State in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP). USAID has been committed to TSCTP since its inception in 2005,
working to define how development assistance can most effectively be
used to contribute to long-term peace and stability.
Because of the dearth of information about extremism in Africa that
existed when the partnership began, USAID commissioned two studies: one
to aggregate and supplement what is known about the drivers of
extremism in Africa, and one to take those findings and apply them to
programs that could address those drivers. These exhaustive, peer-
reviewed studies have helped create the foundation on which we design
our development programs.
The studies highlighted the complex nature of drivers that lead to
extremism and showed that an overarching ``root cause,'' such as
poverty, is often just one of many factors that contribute indirectly
to radicalization in Africa. Socioeconomic drivers such as social
exclusion and unmet economic needs often contribute to the threat of
violent extremism. Politically, extremism can be driven by the denial
of political rights and civil liberties, or endemic corruption and
impunity for well-connected elites. And broader cultural threats--to
traditions, values or cultural space--also are drivers that may need to
be addressed. Our research shows that these drivers are neither static
nor globally consistent, and they evolve over time.
A number of factors often work together to contribute to
radicalization, and the full impact of one factor often depends on
whether other factors are present at the same time. For instance, as
noted in the study, someone who has been marginalized socially may only
be radicalized if he also has the opportunity to form personal
relationships and networks with violent extremists. A person who feels
thoroughly estranged from mainstream society may drift into violent
extremism groups, not primarily because of his anger at being excluded,
but because social alienation fuels the types of personal relationships
and group dynamics that, in turn, facilitate the turn to violent
extremism. Along similar lines, pervasive corruption undermines state
capacity, and facilitates the emergence of ``ungoverned,''
``undergoverned,'' ``misgoverned,'' or ``poorly governed'' spaces,
which, in turn, may provide opportunities for violent extremist groups.
In addition, failed or failing states are creating more space for local
conflicts to flourish, which may then be co-opted or hijacked by
transnational terrorist networks. These findings are critical to our
policy and programming decisions and will inform what interventions
will be the most effective toward preventing drivers from spiraling,
how to monitor our progress, and how to integrate counterterrorism
concerns into our future efforts.
Combined with country assessments, these findings have led us to
focus our work on maintaining low levels of violent extremist threat in
Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania by reducing the drivers we identified
through activities that strengthen resiliencies and communicate
messages among at-risk groups. USAID's TSCTP approach has concentrated
on youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance--the four
areas where we see the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and
progress. Each activity is tailored to meet the specific threat levels,
political environments, and material needs of each country. Unlike
traditional development programs, our counterextremism efforts, when
necessary, target narrow populations that generally aren't reached by
other programs. We also specifically reach out to young men--the group
most likely to be recruited by extremist groups.
In Niger, we have been building the capacity of local leaders to
launch and sustain community development projects. In Mali, the 11
community radio stations we're building will reach 385,000 people with
messages of peace-building, governance, and education. And in Chad, we
are developing conflict mitigation and community stabilization projects
that reach into the country's remote north.
While it can be difficult to measure success in countering
extremism, we have seen some progress in our efforts. As a result of
our outreach in Chad, the Association of Nomads and Herders has created
a youth branch of its organization, which has given those young men who
participate greater stature in their community. The promotion of youth
participation in organizations such as this one helps to build stronger
ties between youth and their communities, and provides them with a
voice in society. Empowering youth in this way can greatly reduce the
feeling of marginalization that feeds recruitment into extremist
groups.
In northern Mali, where one of the underlying drivers of extremism
is the lack of educational opportunity, a USAID radio-based program has
trained more than 1,400 teachers in 217 schools.
And in Niger, our early partnership with a local imam has directly
resulted in more than a dozen madrassas adding a course on peace and
tolerance to their curricula.
In the uranium-mining areas of northern Niger communities have
formed listening clubs to discuss USAID-funded radio programs on good
governance. One listening club even reports that they are pooling funds
to purchase a phone card so that they can call the radio station with
their feedback.
But despite the promise of these community-based efforts, national
governance has seen a major setback in Niger. The recent referendum and
sham elections have done more to empower the current antidemocratic
regime than to provide a voice for the people, and we are concerned
about the path the regime is taking. As a result, most development
assistance has been frozen, and programs that work with local officials
and provide skills training to young people are now on hold, though our
work in media is ongoing.
Similarly, in Mauritania, our work was curtailed by the August 2008
coup d'etat. However, with Mauritania's return to constitutional order
following the signing of the Dakar Accord and July 2009 elections, we
are again focusing on strengthening democracy and human rights.
The FY 2010 request for $32 million in development assistance and
economic support funds for TSCTP seeks to build on these programs
through more robust programming reaching a greater number of people,
particularly youth, and a possible scaling-up of activities to
additional countries such as Burkina Faso, where we plan to conduct an
assessment in the near future. This continued funding in the base
budget will allow USAID to develop long-term staffing and procurement
plans to ensure we continue to make progress countering extremism
through strategic development programming.
For our programs to be successful, we must invest in strong local
partnerships and our methods of engagement must be nimble and creative.
Because trends in extremism are fluid, we must constantly reassess our
priorities, our progress, and our policies to ensure that our work is
based on the realities of today.
Toward this end, we are pleased with our strong and productive
partnership with the Departments of Defense and State on the planning
and implementation of TSCTP, as well as our work with other donors on
coordinating efforts to counter extremism. Sustained engagement--within
the U.S. Government, with other donor governments, and with our
partners in the trans-Sahara region--will be the key to combating
extremism today and securing peace and stability for years to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Senator Isakson, and members of
the subcommittee for your continued support for USAID and our programs.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Gast.
Ms. Huddleston.
STATEMENT OF HON. VICKI HUDDLESTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR AFRICA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Huddleston. Chairman Feingold and Ranking Member
Isakson, thank you for the invitation to testify today about
the Department of Defense's role in the Sahel region.
DOD is the third pillar of the 3-D approach--diplomacy,
development, and defense--in the Sahel and Maghreb region to
address the challenges posed by al-Qaeda in the land of the
Islamic Maghreb known, as you said, Mr. Chairman, as AQIM.
Under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, we
have a comprehensive approach that addresses political,
developmental, and defense issues. Assistant Secretary Johnnie
Carson, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dan Benjamin, and
USAID Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Earl
Gast have all addressed the underlying political, ethnic, and
geographic challenges. So, I will focus my remarks principally
on the military dimension.
The Department of Defense, through primarily the U.S.
Africa Command, is supporting an overarching U.S. Government
strategy to counter AQIM in the Sahel and north Africa. The
principal DOD activity supporting the TSCTP effort is Operation
Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara, OEF-TS, which focuses on
building the capacity of regional militaries, so that they can
counter the presence of AQIM and prevent terrorist operations
in those areas.
In addition, through our DOD military training, equipping,
and advising activities, we seek to foster greater coordination
and cooperation among the security institutions in the region.
We believe that the long-term solution must be that each
nation is capable of governing and controlling its territory
with professional militaries accountable to civilian
governments that have the support of local populations. If this
is not the case, then those who espouse violent extremism and
acts of terrorism, even if temporarily deterred, will return to
the ungoverned spaces.
DOD military cooperation programs and activities span a
broad spectrum, from relatively simple outreach and
humanitarian-related efforts through academic courses and
education programs, to tactical and operational-level training
and exercises, sharing military advise, information, and
equipment, to enable our partner nations to carry out military
operations.
The U.S. Africa Command train and liaison missions use our
special forces in support of the OEF-TS mission objectives
throughout the Sahel.
Algeria and Mali are critical to leading and resolving the
challenge posed by AQIM. The AQIM leadership is headquartered
in Algeria, the majority of its members are Algerian, and most
of its attacks, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, have been
against Algerian targets. AQIM's rear base, or safe haven, has
been in Mali since 2002. Near neighbors, namely Mauritania,
Niger, and Chad, have all been negatively impacted by AQIM
attacks over the past several years.
Our military relationship with Algeria is designed to
support our mutual security interests. Algeria is working with
Mali to bring the region together around a common solution
acceptable to the countries that are directly involved.
Algeria--indeed, the region and our allies, as Mr. Benjamin
pointed out--believe that a solution is only possible when the
response is coordinated and implemented through a regional
approach.
Mali is a major recipient of DOD military cooperation
efforts in the Sahel, receiving equipment in FY 2009, through
security assistance resources, as well as section 1206
authority. In addition, DOD has carried out over 10 training
events with the Malian military throughout the year, an
extremely high tempo for operations and tactical training.
President Amadou Toure and the chief of the Malian
military, General Poudiougou, have consistently expressed their
appreciation for our assistance in helping them address the
challenges posed by AQIM, and President Toure has said that he
is committed to a regional summit to coordinate efforts across
the board to counter AQIM.
DOD military cooperation activities with Mauritania were
suspended in August 2008, following the military coup there.
Military cooperation is now restarting, following this
country's return to a constitutional system in July 2009.
AFRICOM planning has already begun, with exercises and training
to start after January 2010, and possibly equipment enhancement
starting at the end of FY10. Unfortunately, our cooperation
with Niger is limited because of President Tandja's suspension
of the constitution. U.S. military cooperation with Niger prior
to January 2008 was good and similar in scope and effort to the
current activities in Mali. We hope that President Tandja will
return to a democratic and constitutional framework so that
AFRICOM can again work with Niger.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member----
Senator Feingold. Let me ask you to conclude, if I could.
Ambassador Huddleston [continuing]. Oops--your invitation
letter asked me to address our interagency coordination related
to our Sahel programs. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership is a good example of bringing together State,
USAID, and DOD to address an issue that impacts the stability
and growth up the north and west Africa.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss DOD's efforts and
AFRICOM's role as part of the larger USG government effort in
addressing the challenges posed by AQIM in the Sahel and
Maghreb regions of Africa. My colleagues and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Huddleston follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Vicki Huddleston, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Africa, Department of State, Washington, DC
Senator Feingold, Senator Isakson, members of the committee, thank
you for the invitation to speak to you today about DOD's role in the
Sahel region. DOD is the third pillar of the ``3-D approach--Diplomacy,
Development, and Defense--in the Sahel and Maghreb region to address
the challenges posed by al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM).
The DOD through primarily U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is
supporting an overarching U.S. Government (USG) strategy to counter
terrorism--specifically al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM)--in the Sahel and North Africa. The principal tools for doing so
are the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Operation
Enduring Freedom--Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), which seek to build the
capacity of regional militaries so that they can counter the presence
of AQIM and prevent their operations within their countries. In
addition, through our military training, equipping, and advising
efforts, we seek to foster greater coordination and cooperation among
the security institutions in the region. We believe that the long-term
solution must be that each nation is capable of controlling its
territory because it has the support of it citizens while maintaining
the military capacity to ensure stability. If this is not the case,
then those who espouse violent extremism and acts of terrorism, even if
temporarily defeated, will return to the ungoverned spaces.
Under TSCTP we have a comprehensive approach that addresses
political, developmental, and defense issues. Assistant Secretary
Johnnie Carson, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dan Benjamin, and
USAID Acting Administrator for Africa Earl Gast, have addressed the
underlining political, ethnic, and geographic challenges, so I will
focus my remarks principally on the military dimension. However, the
military aspect of our combined strategy cannot effectively move
forward without the political will and buy-in by the regional partners
themselves.
Algeria and Mali are critical to leading and resolving the AQIM
challenge. The AQIM leadership is headquartered in Algeria and most of
its attacks have been against Algerian targets. The majority of its
members are Algerian; however, Mauritanians now make up a substantial
number of AQIM's foot soldiers. AQIM's rear base or safe haven has been
in Mali since 2002, when its predecessor organization, the Salafist
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), moved 15 European hostages into
the Malian Sahara Desert from Algeria. Near neighbors, namely
Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, have all been negatively impacted over the
past several years by the GSPC and its successor AQIM. Burkina Faso,
Nigeria, Libya, and Morocco, could also be future targets of
opportunity where AQIM could attempt to recruit, link up with like-
minded organizations, or carry out terrorists attacks.
I recently met with the Algerian leadership, including the Minister
of State for African and Maghreb Affairs, the Presidential Advisor on
Terrorism, and the Minister-Delegate for the Ministry of National
Defense, who all expressed their desire not only to cooperate with the
USG and our allies, but also to lead the region in facing this
challenge. To this end. Algeria has already moved forward by organizing
in August of this year a meeting of the military Chiefs of Defense
(CHODs) of Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in Tamanrraset, Algeria. The
CHODs agreed to establish a united command which will rotate among
these militaries. We believe that this initiative is critical to
dealing with the AQIM challenge.
The other side of regional military coordination is the political
commitment among the regional partners to a comprehensive strategy that
addresses the developmental and political issues as well as the
security and stability issues. During my visit to Mali in June,
President Toure informed U.S. Ambassador Milovanovic and me that he is
committed to hosting a Bamako summit that would address achieving a
regional agreement on the way forward against AQIM. We consider this
summit critical to the region's success. It would also provide a
framework in which the USG and our European partners could provide
assistance that would support regional development and security.
General Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, is also scheduled to travel to
both Mali and Algeria in the next few weeks to consult on the progress
in planning for the Bamako summit and other collaborative initiatives
for the region.
DOD military cooperation in the Sahel is conducted primarily
through the authorities and resources of OEF-TS. OEF-TS is the DOD
contribution to the larger counterterrorism effort of TSCTP, which I
mentioned earlier and of which you've heard from my colleagues here
today. Executed under the operational control of USAFRICOM, led by
General Ward, the objectives of OEF-TS flow from the TSCTP strategy,
using military cooperation programs and activities to build military
capacity in our African partners to reduce the availability of the
Sahel region as a safe haven and operational support, resupply, and
sustainment area for AQIM.
DOD military cooperation programs and activities span a broad
spectrum from relatively simple outreach and humanitarian-related
efforts, through academic courses and education programs, tactical and
operation-level training and exercises, up to sharing of military
information and providing equipment to enable partner nation military
operations.
DOD, through USAFRICOM training and liaison missions, has deployed
to several countries in the region to support achievement of OEF-TS
mission objectives. In this region, DOD has deployed teams including:
the Joint Planning Advisory Teams (or ``JPAT'') that work closely with
embassies to schedule, support, and synchronize the multiple training
events occurring across this region; Civil-Military Support Elements
(or ``CMSE'') that coordinate DOD humanitarian and other civic action
projects; and Military Information Support Teams (or ``MIST'' teams),
that work closely with Embassy Public Affairs officers to positively
counter the messages of violent extremism and proactively project U.S.
efforts, particularly those by the U.S. military.
When we look, at AQIM, Algeria is the focus and primary target of
their attacks. Our military relationship with Algeria is designed to
support our mutual security interests. Algeria is working to bring the
region together around a common solution acceptable to the countries
that are directly involved. Algeria believes--as we do--that a solution
is only possible when the response is coordinated and implemented
together. As I mentioned earlier, Algeria organized a meeting of CHODs
in August in Tamarraset to coordinate a military approach. This effort,
however, is dependent upon an endorsement by the political leadership
in the region. This endorsement could be possible through the long-
awaited Bamako summit that I mentioned earlier. Algerian officials told
me that they remain committed to a regional approach.
Mali is a critical player. It is a recipient of DOD military
cooperation efforts in the Sahel, receiving over $10M in equipment in
FY09 through security assistance resources as well as the section 1206
authority. In addition, DOD spent over $5M in FY09 through OEF-TS in
Mali conducting over 10 training events with the Malian military
throughout the year--an extremely high tempo for operations and
tactical training. I visited Mali in June of this year, meeting with
President Toure and General Pougiougou, the chief of the Malian
military. They expressed their appreciation for our assistance in
helping them address the challenges posed by AQIM. President Toure
stated his commitment to a regional summit, however, we would like to
see Mali take a more proactive stand in combating AQIM.
With respect to Mauritania, while all DOD military cooperation
activities with Mauritania were suspended in August 2008 following the
military coup, DOD is restarting military cooperation following
Mauritania's return to a constitutional system following democratic
elections in July 2009. DOD outreach activities with Mauritania have
already begun, with exercises and training to start after January 2010,
and possible equipment enhancements starting near the end of FY10.
Unfortunately our cooperation with Niger is limited because of
President Tandja's decision to suspend the constitution. Past U.S.
military cooperation with the Nigerien military was good and was
similar in scope and effort to current activities with Mali. However,
DOD military cooperation with Niger was terminated in compliance with
growing U.S. policy restrictions against Niger due to President
Tandja's actions. We hope that the Nigerien Government will return to a
democratic and constitutional framework, so that DOD can again work
with the Nigerien military to address the challenges posed by AQIM in
the Sahel.
Your invitation letter asked me to talk about our interagency
coordination related to our Sahel programs. In my opinion, TSCTP is an
excellent example of how interagency coordination should work. While
our Departments' and Agencies' programs are typically separately funded
and implemented, in the case of TSCTP, there is close collaboration
between the State Department, USAID, and DOD, including in annual
planning, leveraging appropriate resources from multiple and disparate
programs, monthly interagency teleconferences between Washington
organizations and the field (including our Embassies and USAFRICOM, and
synchronizing scheduling and implementation of activities on the ground
in our partner nations.
I assess that the greatest challenge to our regional partner's
security forces is due to the vast distances and harsh environment of
the Sahara. This vast, sparsely populated region, has a long tradition
of trade and routes that carry whatever goods are traded. In addition,
there are preexisting tensions and wide porous borders that also
contribute to the region's challenges. It is the geographic and
environmental realities of this region that is used by AQIM to find
refuge in the vast, undergoverned spaces. Our partner nations have a
daunting challenge from a security perspective in maintaining
awareness, monitoring their borders and providing the necessary
security functions traditional of a government to its population.
I'd like to again say thank you for this opportunity to discuss
DOD's role as part of the larger U.S. Government team addressing the
challenges posed by AQIM in the Sahel and Maghreb region in Africa. My
colleagues and I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Huddleston. And thank all
of you.
Let's start with the rounds--7-minute rounds--in the hope
that each of us could get a round in before the votes start.
Ambassador Benjamin, as you cite in your testimony, there's
been a long concern about AQIM's ability to establish itself in
Europe and carry out attacks there. You've said that, ``We view
the near-time likelihood of such an expansion of those
operations as less likely than before.'' But, as you know, the
AP recently reported the arrest, in Italy and elsewhere in
Europe, of 17 Algerians suspected of raising money to finance
terrorism. Do we believe that AQIM is still trying to gain a
foothold and carry out attacks in Europe? And to what extent
does this continue to be a pressing concern for our European
partners?
Ambassador Benjamin. Senator Feingold, it certainly remains
a high concern for our European partners. I think that, at the
moment, it would be safe to characterize AQIM activity outside
of Africa, and particularly in Europe, as being aspirational
and focused, at the moment, more on fundraising and logistics;
and they have not yet acquired an operational capability on the
continent.
That said, it remains a high priority. But judging by what
we know about the goings-on within the group and also the very
strong capacities of Algerian law enforcement and also French
intelligence, we believe that the group's ability to project
itself has been somewhat degraded and that, as I said in my
testimony, it's probably less likely than before.
That said, we are always confronted with the same problem
in terrorism, and that is, it's an arena in which small numbers
can make a big difference and you can't ensure that you can
detect every small number, every operative, every small cell. I
think we are fairly confident in our assessment, but,
nonetheless, we can't be absolutely certain that nothing would
happen.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Your testimony states that,
``Our capacity-building assistance has enabled Niger and Chad
to take on antiregime rebels successfully.'' Is this a
reference to AQIM or to other opponents of the regimes?
Ambassador Benjamin. It's primarily a reference to other
rebel groups, Senator.
Senator Feingold. And isn't that outside the scope of the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership? Isn't there some
risk that, if we're providing general support to these abusive
governments, that we could fuel anti-American attitudes and
undermine our overarching counterterrorism goals?
Ambassador Benjamin. It is certainly true that the
fundamental target of this assistance is al-Qaeda in the
Maghreb, but, as a general rule, this is about capacity-
building, and capacity-building often allows governments to
strengthen themselves and extend their controls over larger
areas of territory.
Perhaps Secretary Carson would like to add to that.
Ambassador Carson. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that we
are constantly monitoring how our assistance is used by
different governments, not only in the Sahel, but across
Africa. The last thing that we want to do is to provide bad
governments with the capacity to inflict harm on their people,
to carry out human rights violations. So, we do monitor these
assistance programs very, very carefully.
And in the case of a country like Chad--Chad has been
subject to invasions from rebels coming across the border from
Sudan, and, in some of those instances, it is believed that
those rebels have received assistance from foreign governments.
In those instances, we think that it is important to help
governments strengthen their capacity to defend against rebel
groups and rebel incursions.
Now, our assistances may not, in fact, exclusively be from
or out of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
Program, but may come from other assistance that we provide.
One of the other points we're also making when we extend
assistance to the government of a country like Chad is that it
is important that their militaries operate under civilian
control, that they follow human rights norms that are
universal, and that they not act against their citizens.
Senator Feingold. Well, obviously it's terribly important
that we get this right. The nature of these regimes is not
something to be very comfortable with vis-a-vis this kind of
activity. So, whether it's part of the Trans-Sahel or some
other source of funding, this is something that I'm going to
want to monitor closely and be as fully informed as possible
with regard to non-AQIM uses of this capacity that we're help
building.
Ambassador Benjamin, AQIM's activity cuts across several
countries and involves both the Bureau of African Affairs and
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department.
What mechanisms exist to encourage information-sharing and
collaboration among the relevant embassies and these two
bureaus, and what role does your office play in ensuring that
State has a coordinated approach to dealing with AQIM?
Ambassador Benjamin. Senator, thank you for that question.
One of the virtues of the TSCTP is that it has led us to
create, I think, a more robust coordinating mechanism than we
have for many other areas of the world. There is a standing
interagency working group for the Trans-Sahara, which meets
regularly on a monthly basis in Washington, with action
officers from State, OSD, and USAID, to discuss issues. There
are an enormous number of daily contacts. We also have a
regular monthly videoconference with AFRICOM. TSCTP has annual
conferences that include DCMs or ambassadors from all the
embassies in the region, as well as representatives from across
the interagency. We also host two regional strategic initiative
meetings per year that include the ambassadors and senior
interagency representatives. It was the first RSI that I had
the pleasure of addressing.
So, I think that this is one very well-coordinated process.
There's always room for improvement, but I think that we're
pleased with the way it has worked and that it's a model for
cooperation in other geographical areas.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Benjamin.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carson--and this may apply to someone else as
well; feel free to chime in--we had a hearing a few weeks ago
on narcotrafficking in West Africa, and with AQIM in that area,
are they being financed, in part or in whole by
narcotrafficking?
Ambassador Carson. The AQIM groups that are operating in
the Sahel are engaged in a lot of illicit activities, including
smuggling across the border, and probably to include some
narcotrafficking, as well.
We don't have specifics on precisely how they get all of
their money, but we do know that they engage in smuggling
goods, smuggling and trafficking people, probably moving
illegal drugs, and, most recently, engaging in high-profile
kidnappings for ransom of Europeans.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Mr. Daniel, we had a death of a British citizen, I believe,
in Mali or Mauritania, an American citizen there, as well. What
is the level of cooperation with those governments in bringing
those who perpetrated those crimes to justice?
Ambassador Benjamin. As a general rule, Senator, the level
of cooperation is very high. In fact, one of my colleagues from
the British Embassy is right behind me. We have met multiple
times on a range of counterterrorism issues, including this
one. I was in Ottawa last month to discuss this and other
relevant issues with Canadian officials. In general, we are in
touch on a very close and regular basis to do what we can both
to prevent such kidnappings and hostage-takings and murders,
and to deal with them when they happen, but also to track down
the offenders and bring them to justice. And there's close
cooperation with regional partners, as well.
Senator Isakson. Was either of those crimes tied to AQIM?
Ambassador Benjamin. I believe they both were.
Senator Isakson. They both were.
Ambassador Benjamin. Yes. The American NGO worker and the
British hostage, Dyer, were both, I believe, victims of AQIM.
Senator Isakson. Well, I know we, unfortunately, had a
Georgian, who was a Peace Corps volunteer that was murdered in
Benin earlier this year, and I want to say again, how much I
appreciate the Government of Benin, which is in the region,
it's not a part of the partnership, I don't think, but it's
just south of there--they've done a wonderful job in helping to
bring justice to the perpetrator of that crime.
Mr. Gast, you made an interesting comment in your remarks,
and I wrote it down. You talked about ``strategies, given the
realities of the day.'' And then you made a reference to the
four areas you were focusing on, which were youth empowerment,
education, government, and then young men.
I have found in my travels to Africa that some of the
efforts we're working on relate to reducing the vulnerability
of young African men to be exploited or misdirected, for lack
of a better term, because it is a serious problem in many
African countries. Are you developing any programs that deal
directly with young African men?
Mr. Gast. Very good question, and it's something that we've
been struggling with for more than a year, is looking at the
youth bulge and looking at many of the states that are in
conflict now throughout the continent, or just emerging from
conflict. There is a very large youth population and a very
large young male population, and we're seeing violence
perpetrated by young men in southern Sudan, and we're coming up
with country-specific or region-specific approaches in trying
to deal with those issues.
We in AID also have recognized that this is a big issue,
and not just in Africa, but also in Asia, and we're coming up
with an agency strategy and approach to addressing the issues
related to young men--unemployed young men; idle young men.
Senator Isakson. Well, I--my observation is--and I have not
been to any of the countries--well, I have been to Algeria and
Tunisia, but I haven't been to any of the ones directly
involved here--but, in my travels in South and Central Africa
and in Sudan and Ethiopia, it seems like the single largest
vulnerability we have is to get the energies and direction of
these young men out of nefarious activity and into some type of
productive economic activity.
For many women, this has been done in terms of the Village
Savings and Loan programs and things of that nature.
I appreciate your answer on that, because I think it is a
critically important thing to do.
Ms. Huddleston, you mentioned AFRICOM and some visibility
or support in the counterterrorism partnership. Is some of that
coming out of our deployments in Djibouti?
Ambassador Huddleston. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
The most of the support that we do under the Operation
Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara is from, what we call, SOCAF, our
Special Forces of the Africa Command. And so, although Djibouti
supports, it's mainly out of Stuttgart and component commands
from the Special Forces.
And I wondered if I could just go back one moment to the
chairman's question regarding our accountability of our
training of forces in the region.
Senator Isakson. Please.
Ambassador Huddleston. Senator Feingold, I'd just like to
point out that I think we've been particularly good on this
one. In Mali, of course, they have remained democratic and the
forces that we've provided--JSETs to, as well as train and
equip, have been the forces that are focused on the AQIM; in
other words, the region to Timbuktu and the Gao region where
those--where the AQIM is active.
In the case of Chad, we actually redirected a train-and-
equip because we were dissatisfied with the chain of command.
That has now been resolved.
In the case of Niger, of course, we have suspended our
assistance. And in the case of Mauritania, we suspended our
assistance; and now we'll resume. But, again, that training and
those--that assistance will be directed at military capacity
that is directed at counterterrorism activities.
So, just----
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Ambassador Huddleston [continuing]. To clarify a bit.
Senator Isakson. That's all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. I'm going to continue until the vote
starts, and we'll leave the record open for this panel so we
can ask additional questions if we like.
But, let me go to Assistant Secretary Carson. As you know,
the GAO study released in July 2008 found that the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership suffered from a lack of
comprehensive integrated strategy. Given that the Africa Bureau
is the program lead, I'd like to ask you now: Is there now a
comprehensive integrated strategy that has been agreed to be
the interagency?
Ambassador Carson. We are still working off of the previous
documents with respect to strategy, but the strategy that we're
using, Mr. Chairman, focuses on several elements. One is to
deter violent extremism and to put programs in place that will
help prevent violent extremism from taking root in various
countries. The second part of the strategy is to build security
capacity within the various African militaries in the region.
And the third is to strengthen the coalition and the regional
cooperation among states. These remain a core part of our
activity: deterring extremism, building security capacity, and
strengthening regional focus.
We, here in Washington, work extraordinarily closely
together, as Ambassador Dan Benjamin has pointed out in his
testimony. We are in frequent contact, coordinating our efforts
in the field and our strategic efforts back here in Washington.
We----
Senator Feingold. A little more specifically, what
mechanisms exist for the interagency to review and assess the
appropriateness and progress of specific activities in light of
this strategy?
Ambassador Carson. Well, we do, in fact, get together,
under the guidance of the NSC, and we also meet regularly
within the State Department, under various mechanisms that have
been outlined for myself and for Ambassador Huddleston and for
Special Coordinator Dan Benjamin, to review where we are,
review the progress that we're making in the field, and review
what we need to do to modify and adjust our core elements in
the strategy.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Huddleston, you have a unique
vantage point, given your experience as previous U.S.
Ambassador to Mali, and we were there together, as you, I'm
sure, remember. As you know, the Malian military has engaged
this year in several military confrontations with AQIM. Have
these been successful engagements? And, more broadly, what are
the greatest needs of the Malian military and other militaries
in the Sahel as they seek to combat AQIM and carry out
effective counterterrorism?
Ambassador Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
remember your visit very well; in fact, you said it was one of
the better USAID projects, if not the best----
Senator Feingold. It was excellent.
Ambassador Huddleston [continuing]. That you had ever seen.
[Laughter.]
Thank you.
Mali has been a good partner, but Mali lacks capacity. And
so, it is sometimes also hesitant in the way in which it
carries out its operations.
Right now, in order to address that issue, we are providing
$3.5 million through the Department of State to help them
improve their logistics capacity, as well as their training.
And this is continuing to be an enormous problem for Mali,
because the area up there, as you know so well, Senator, above
the Niger River is so vast. I think that area itself is about
the size of Texas. And there have been two Tuareg rebellions in
that area. And as a result, in many ways Mali has lost the
capacity to govern successfully in that area.
And so, long-term success depends upon its ability both to
reestablish its security presence, something that we are trying
to help them do, along with the State Department, as well as to
have the support of the people, both the Tuaregs and the
Berabiche, in the area.
I think you saw this one operation in which a number of
Malian military were killed. I think that showed, in itself,
that they were--there was a resolve on the Malian part to try
to face this threat. But, it also showed that sometimes they're
not--they don't have the capacity to do it as well as they
should.
And that's why this Algerian/Malian initiative, at which
they held in Tamanrasset with the chiefs of staff of the
various defense organizations of Niger, Mauritania, Mali, and
Algeria, is so important. Because the only really effective way
to address this challenge is for the region to address it
together.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Mr. Gast, when USAID carries out assessments to identify
communities most at risk to violent extremist organizations or
ideology, what are the characteristics that you're really
looking for? And how specifically has USAID adapted its
development programs to try to target these kinds of risk
factors?
Mr. Gast. Yes, thank you, Senator Feingold.
Recently, within the last year, we had a final version of
our Drivers of Extremism paper, as well as our programming
options, which we peer tested. And, from that, we have used--we
have come up with an analytical framework that we're using in
the countries. And we've used this analytical framework in all
four of the primary participating countries. And we're looking
at areas that are most vulnerable to violent extremism. And so,
that would be, for instance, areas where there's
marginalization; it could be ethnic conflict, it could be high
unemployment. And so, it depends on the region.
And, for example, in Mauritania, we have determined--and by
the way, these assessments are done on an interagency basis, so
it's not just AID; State Department officers, DOD officers
participate in the assessments, as well--in Mauritania, we've
determined that the youth who've come into the city are most
vulnerable to messages of violent extremism. So, the program is
urban-targeted. In Mali, for instances, it is in the north,
and--as well as Niger, also in the north.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Just one question, and Secretary Carson,
I'll ask you, but somebody else might answer it.
The eastern border of Chad borders western Sudan, which is
where Darfur is, and in the displacement and the tremendous
refugee problem that we have there, a lot of those people
were--in Darfur--were displaced by Chadian rebels. Is there any
evidence, that you know of that AQIM-supported, in whole or in
part?
Ambassador Carson. Senator, no, we have no indication that
AQIM has been operating in that part of Africa along the Chad
border with Sudan. No indication whatsoever.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. One more quick question for Deputy
Assistant Secretary Huddleston.
Assistant Secretary Carson's testimony states that,
``Chiefs of mission must concur with all proposed activities,''
related to TSCTP. Can you assure the committee of the
Department of Defense's unqualified support for this principle?
Ambassador Huddleston. Yes, Senator, I can, and I would
cite the fact that General Ward has been very conscientious in
always going to the ambassadors and making sure that the
ambassadors in each of the countries are comfortable with and
support whatever activity we are engaged in.
Senator Feingold. I thank you, and I thank all the
panelists. We will recess at this point, because the votes are
about to start. I'm hoping we'll be able to come back and begin
with the second panel in roughly 45 minutes.
I thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Feingold. Call the hearing back to order.
Thank you for your patience. And it was almost exactly 45
minutes, so I thank the second panel for waiting.
And, at this point, I would like to ask Ms. Lianne Kennedy-
Boudali to give her testimony. And, of course, we'd be more
than happy to put your full statement in the record.
STATEMENT OF LIANNE KENNEDY-BOUDALI, SENIOR PROJECT ASSOCIATE,
RAND CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA
Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. Thank you, Chairman Feingold.
It's my honor to be here. I have been asked to provide an
assessment of threats to the Sahel from al-Qaeda in the Lands
of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, and other extremists groups.
Insecurity in the Sahel is not a new condition, and
although recent terrorist incidents have drawn greater
attention to the region, terrorism is not the primary problem.
Weak states, ineffective governance, civil conflict, smuggling
of goods and people, drug and weapons trafficking, and
criminality all contribute to insecurity in the region.
The problems of poor education, a lack of economic
opportunity, and poor social mobility create an environment in
which AQIM's recruitment messages find an audience. AQIM has
the capacity to threaten U.S. citizens and U.S. interests in
the region; however, the group is not in a position to
destabilize any of the states in the Sahel, and it is not
likely to form the nucleus of a Taliban-like insurgency.
I would like to briefly discuss AQIM's current activities
in the Sahel.
In September 2006, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat,
the GSPC, declared its allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and
became an al-Qaeda affiliate in January 2007 by changing its
name to ``the al-Qaeda Organization in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb.''
AQIM's goal--the overthrow of the Algerian state--has not
changed since the merger, although the group has increased its
rhetorical attacks on the West, and it has greatly expanded its
outreach to jihadists in the region. AQIM has incorporated
increasingly sophisticated IED technology into its attacks
against Algerian security services, and it began conducting
suicide attacks in 2007. Suicide attacks make up a small
percentage of AQIM's attacks, however, and the deadliness of
these attacks has been decreasing over time.
AQIM's association with al-Qaeda may have provided new
sources of external donations, but the group still appears to
get most of its funds from its own criminal activities,
including kidnapping and smuggling in Algeria and the Sahel,
and from petty crime in Europe.
AQIM has capitalized on insecurity in the Sahel to maintain
safe havens in Mali and Mauritania, but its ability to operate
beyond Algeria depends on maintaining cooperative relationships
with the Tuareg and Berabiche tribes in the region.
AQIM's alliance with al-Qaeda allowed it to attract
fighters from the Sahel, but, despite this, the group does not
appear to be gaining strength. The recent expansion of activity
into Mauritania and Mali is taking place in part because AQIM
has been increasingly constrained in Algeria, and because it
has been unable to organize operational cells in Morocco,
Libya, or Tunisia.
AQIM's strict interpretation of Islam holds little appeal
in the Sahel, and its recent actions in Mali--the execution of
a British hostage in May and the assassination of a Malian
military officer in June--may have put its safe haven in
jeopardy.
The group also suffers from internal personality conflicts
and has lost many of its experienced fighters to the Algerian
Government's amnesty programs and its aggressive
counterterrorist actions.
Despite fears to the contrary, AQIM does not appear to have
received a large influx of foreign fighters from Iraq, which is
one of the few variables that could have significantly
increased the group's capability for violence.
AQIM is likely to continue kidnapping foreigners, and it
may increasingly seek to target Western interests in the
region. As such, the group poses an ongoing threat to U.S.
citizens and interests in the region. This threat is best
countered by a multipronged U.S. policy response that includes
programs designed to support development, governance, and
security.
States in the region need assistance in creating the
conditions for social development, including better education,
more economic opportunity, more transparency in governance,
stronger rule of law, and support for countering both criminal
and terrorist violence.
Additionally, longstanding civil conflicts, notably the
ongoing problems between the states in the region and the
Tuareg minorities, require resolution before progress can be
made in improving security and development.
The best option for reducing terrorism and improving
security in the Sahel is to focus our efforts on improving
human security in all forms--physical, economic, environmental,
and so on--by supporting the Sahel states' ability to deal with
these problems themselves.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kennedy-Boudali follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, Senior Project Associate,
RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA
Chairman and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity
to testify before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations'
Subcommittee on African Affairs session on ``Examining U.S.
Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy across Africa's Sahel
Region.'' This testimony will focus on the nature of the terrorist
threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
regional instability in context
As this committee is well aware, the Sahel is a sparsely populated
area that is extremely difficult to govern. National borders are remote
and poorly monitored, and significant distances separate the developed
areas in the south from the northern areas where terrorist activity
largely takes place, making it difficult for security services to
respond rapidly to terrorist activity. The states themselves are weak
or poorly institutionalized, and effective governance is hindered by
lack of transparency and accountability. Corruption and a lack of
professionalization negatively affect the performance of local security
services, while ongoing civil conflict with minority ethnic groups
creates distrust between the governments and their citizens.
Insecurity in the Sahel is not a new condition, and although recent
terrorist incidents have drawn greater attention to the region,
terrorism is not the primary problem. Corruption, civil conflict,
smuggling of goods and people, drug and weapons trafficking, and
terrorism all contribute to insecurity in the region. Although the
indigenous practice of Islam in the Sahel is tolerant and syncretic,
less tolerant external religious influences are increasingly making
inroads in the region as foreign-sponsored religious organizations
introduce Salafi, Wahabi, and Tablighi teachings. Given that many
people cannot read at all, let alone read the Qur'an in Arabic, Muslims
in the Sahel are vulnerable to the influence of extremist clerics,
particularly those who have external support and are thus able to
attract followers through charitable spending and provision of Qur'anic
education, Poverty, environmental degradation, poor access to primary
education, and a lack of economic, social, and political progress
create conditions for radicalization and extremism, and AQIM's calls
for Islamic governance and anti-Western violence have found traction
with certain audiences in North Africa and the Sahel. That said, the
majority of Muslims in the region appear to reject the extremist
messages put forth by violent groups such as AQIM, and despite the
apparent increase in violence in the region, terrorist groups do not
pose a strategic threat to governments in the region. In sum, AQIM has
the capacity to threaten U.S. citizens and U.S. interests in the
region, however, the group is not in a position to destabilize any of
the states in the Sahel, and it lacks the resources and popular support
that would be needed to form a broad, Taliban-like insurgency.
aqim
AQIM emerged in January 2007 when the Salafist Group for Call and
Combat (GPSC), having declared its allegiance to Osama bin Laden in
September 2006, changed its name to the ``Organization of al-Qaeda in
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb.'' Prior to the merger, the GSPC was
considered a nationalist jihadist organization focused on challenging
the Algerian state, although it had longstanding ties to al-Qaeda and
the wider international jihadist movement.\1\ Since the merger, AQIM
has increasingly mirrored al-Qaeda in its rhetoric and its actions, and
this has led to speculation that AQIM might become a much more
dangerous group, capable of threatening U.S. interests and conducting
attacks in Europe. Although its alliance with al-Qaeda has given AQIM
greater legitimacy among jihadists, provided increased access to media
outlets, and possibly introduced the group to new sources of private
funding and other resources, the group itself is under enormous stress,
and its ability to operate in Algeria appears increasingly constrained.
This has forced AQIM to shift its focus toward the Sahel, particularly
Mauritania, in search of new recruits and easier targets. The expansion
of operations in the Sahel should not be taken as an indication of
greater strength, however; the group may have become more violent, but
it is not necessarily more dangerous, as the following discussion will
show.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Interview with Emir Abu Ibrahim Mustafa, Media Committee of the
Salafi Group for Call and Combat, December 18, 2003; Muhammad Muqaddam,
``Nabil Sahraoui Confirms Relationship with al-Qaeda and Stresses
Continuation of Struggle Against Algerian Authorities,'' al-Hayah,
January 9, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Effects of the al-Qaeda Affiliation
AQIM's overarching goal--the overthrow of the Algerian state--has
not changed since the merger with al-Qaeda, despite an increase in
rhetorical attacks on the West and the governments of neighboring
countries.\2\ AQIM has sought to legitimize its violence by associating
itself with al-Qaeda's vision of global jihad, and its recruitment has
increasingly drawn on themes linked to al-Qaeda, particularly the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.\3\ AQIM has attempted to radicalize
potential recruits in neighboring countries by pointing out events that
appear to have negative consequences for Muslims or by inserting itself
into local affairs.\4\ For example, AQIM commented on apparent police
brutality in Morocco in June 2008 and later warned Mauritanians about
the futility of participating in national elections in May 2009.\5\
Although AQIM appears to have succeeded in recruiting some fighters
from the Sahel countries, its overall success in attracting new
recruits appears marginal, as the group has shown few signs of
increased strength or capability as a result of its various
radicalization efforts. Furthermore, AQIM does not appear to have
received a large influx of ``foreign fighters'' from Iraq, which is one
of the few variables that could have significantly increased the
group's capacity for violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Abu Obeida Yusuf al-`Annabi, ``Congratulations to the People of
Tawhid in the Occasion of Eid,'' Al-Fajr Media, October 6, 2008, and
Abu Musab `Abd al-Wadud, ``A Message to Our Ummah in the Islamic
Maghreb,'' Al-Fajr Media, September 21, 2008.
\3\ ``The War of Bombs and Mines,'' video released November 3,
2008. Summary available from SITE Intelligence Group, November 4, 2008;
Information Committee of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, ``Press or
Nonsense?! In Response to Some of the Lies Published in the Algerian
Press,'' al-Fajr Media Center, December 25, 2008; Abu Mus'ab `Abd al-
Wadud, ``A Message to the Algerian Muslim People,'' January 2006.
\4\ Abu Musab `Abd al-Wadud, ``A Message to Our Ummah in the
Islamic Maghreb,'' al-Fajr Media Center, September 21, 2008; Abu Musab
`Abd-al-Wadud, ``Gaza: Between the Hammer of Jews and Crusaders and the
Anvil of Apostates,'' al-Fajr Media Center, January 15, 2009.
\5\ `Abd al-Rahman al-Shanqiti, ``My People, Follow Me, for I Will
Lead You to the Path of Right,'' May 30, 2009; Abu Musab `Abd al-Wadud,
``Statement in Relation to Moroccan Sister and Baby Who Were Beaten
Near the Prison,'' June 4, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AQIM's headquarters remains in northeast Algeria, but AQIM
maintains several operational units (called katibah--plural kata'ib--in
Arabic) in the Sahel.\6\ These units are nominally under the command of
AQIM's national leadership, led by Emir Abdelmalek Droukdal (aka Abu
Mus'ab Abd-al-Wadud), but some units in the Sahel control independent
resources and are selfsustaining.\7\ AQIM appears to get most of its
funds from its own criminal activities, including kidnapping and
smuggling in Algeria and the Sahel, and from petty crime in Europe.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ AQIM is organized into four operational zones: Center, East,
West, and South (alternately Sahara), each with its own military
commander. The Southern zone contains the kata'ib that operate in the
Sahel.
\7\ Mokhtar bel Mokhtar, who was also active in the Sahara under
the GPSC, has longstanding ties to Touareg and Berabiche tribes in Mali
and Mauritania. It is bel Mokhtar who is believed to run AQIM's Saharan
training camps.
\8\ ``The Sinews of the `Holy War ': Racketeering, Holdups, and
Kidnappings,'' Le Monde, December 11, 2008; ``Bejaia Court: The
Terrorists' Treasurer Given Life Sentence,'' Liberte, May 2, 2007;
``Sahara Zone Kidnappings,'' Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor,
March 3, 2009; International Crisis Group, ``Islamism, Violence and
Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page,'' ICG Middle East Report No. 29,
July 30, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The vast majority of AQIM's attacks are in the form of ambushes,
roadblocks, kidnapping, extortion, and bombings. AQIM has occasionally
attacked Algeria's energy sector, targeting natural gas pipelines with
explosive devices or attacking foreign personnel involved with gas
production. Following its merger with al-Qaeda, AQIM incorporated
increasingly sophisticated IED technology into its attacks against
Algerian security services, and it adopted suicide attacks in 2007.\9\
Suicide attacks make up a small percentage of AQIM's attacks, however,
and the deadliness of these attacks has decreased over time, as has
their frequency. The group suffers from internal personal conflicts and
has lost many of its experienced fighters to the Algerian Government's
amnesty programs and aggressive counterterrorist actions, which may
have resulted in the loss of experienced trainers, planners, and bomb-
makers.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Andrew Black, ``AQIM's Expanding Internationalist Agenda,'' CTC
Sentinel, Vol. 1 Issue 5, April 2008; Hanna Rogan, ``Violent Trends in
Algeria Since 9/11,'' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1 Issue 12, November 2008.
\10\ Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, ``JTIC Briefing:
Algerian Jihadists Continue Attacks Despite Internal Rifts,'' September
27, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
aqim's new emphasis on the sahel
The recent expansion of terrorist activity into Mauritania and Mali
is taking place in part because Algerian security services have put
AQIM on the defensive, but also because AQIM has been unable to
organize operational cells in Morocco, Libya, or Tunisia. In Morocco,
there is no logical counterpart with whom AQIM might form an effective
relationship. Moroccan security services arrested thousands of suspects
after the 2003 suicide attacks in Casablanca, effectively splintering
the emerging jihadist movement. Jihadist presence is weak in both
Tunisia and Libya, and as a result, AQIM's outreach in North Africa has
been limited to attracting a handful of recruits to join its Algerian
units.\11\ AQIM has had little choice but to turn its focus to the
Sahel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ In 2008, al-Qaeda announced that the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group (LIFG) had merged with al-Qaeda. LIFG has little (if any) ground
presence in Libya, as most of its members were either arrested or fled
the country in the late 1990's. As a result, LIFG is unlikely to
provide much in the way of support to AQIM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AQIM, like the GSPC before it, has been able to capitalize on
insecurity in the Sahel to maintain safe haven, capitalize on smuggling
routes, and draw recruits from criminal groups and disenfranchised
populations. AQIM's continued ability to operate outside of Algeria
depends on maintaining cooperative relations with the Touareg and
Berabiche tribes in the region. Cooperation between these tribes in the
Sahel and the Algerian jihadists is based on mutual interest in
generating revenue and avoiding interference from state security
services. However, AQIM's actions generated a great deal of attention
from the international community--particularly following the execution
of British hostage Edwin Dyer in May 2009--and this increased tensions
between the Algerian terrorists and the Touareg. Most Touareg do not
share AQIM's goal of establishing an Islamic state, and even militant
Touareg groups are not seeking to overthrow the governments of Mali and
Niger. If AQIM's presence becomes too disruptive, the Touareg are
probably capable of eliminating AQIM's safe havens in Mali and Niger--
either alone or with the help of their governments' security services.
Despite these tensions, the number of fighters recruited in Mali,
Niger, and Mauritania--although not large--is believed to be
growing.\12\ Some of these fighters are operating in the Sahel, while
others have been incorporated into AQIM's Algerian-based units. In
2008, AQIM claimed responsibility for two attacks in Mauritania,
including an attack on a military patrol that resulted in the beheading
of 12 Mauritanian soldiers near Zouerate and an attack on the Israeli
Embassy in Nouakchott.\13\ In 2009, AQIM claimed responsibility for the
murder of an American working in Mauritania and for a suicide attack
targeting the French Embassy in Nouakchott (during which only the
bomber was killed).\14\ AQIM claimed the suicide attack after a delay
of 10 days, suggesting that AQIM's central leadership may not have
anticipated the attack, and it appears that AQIM's Mauritanian cells
remain weak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Hamid Yas, ``Police Investigation Reveals that Mauritanians,
Nigerians, and Libyans are Members of Al-Qaidah in Algeria,'' EI-
Khabar, May 22, 2007.
\13\ Media Committee of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb,
``Statement on New Victories of the Mujahidin in Algeria and
Mauritania,'' AI-Fajr Media, December 29, 2007.
\14\ Media Committee of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, ``Claim
of Responsibility for Killing the American Infidel: `Christopher Langis
(sic),' in Nouakchott,'' Al-Fajr Media, June 24, 2009 and ``Statement
Claiming the Operation on the French Embassy in Nouakchott,'' Al-Fajr
Media, August 18, 2009, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Until recently, AQIM appears to have had a tacit noninterference
agreement with the Malian Government: AQIM refrained from attacking
Malian interests and the government ignored its presence.\15\ However,
AQIM's execution of Edwin Dyer in May 2009 followed by the June
assassination of a senior Malian army officer in his home in Timbuktu
appear to have tipped the balance.\16\ Malian forces engaged AQIM in
May and again in July of this year, killing dozens of AQIM fighters
while losing at least five of their own.\17\ AQIM may be at risk of
losing its safe haven in Mali as a result of its strategic
miscalculation. In order to permanently deny AQIM sanctuary, however,
the Malian Government would need the cooperation of the local Touareg
population. In the near term, AQIM may be able to ride out the Malian
armed forces' campaign by relocating to Mauritania or Niger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ In a statement released on July 7, 2009, AQIM articulated its
understanding of the tacit agreement: ``You know very well that we do
not have to fight you. . . . We only came your way in the past after
you captured our brothers and you committed acts of aggression against
us.'' Media Committee of al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,
Al-Fajr Media, July 9, 2009.
\16\ Jeune Afrique, ``Murders in the Sahel,'' June 9, 2009.
\17\ BBC News, ``Mali Army `Takes al-Qaeda Base' ''--June 17, 2009,
online report, last accessed August 23, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/8104491.stm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There has been some speculation that AQIM could join forces with
other militant Muslims living in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically
extremist groups in Northern Nigeria and the Polisario in Western
Sahara. Although AQIM may share some ideological common ground with a
small number of militant Nigerians, there are cultural, linguistic, and
geographic barriers that inhibit cooperation between them. Conservative
Islamist elements in Nigeria have been primarily concerned with
implementing shari'a law in the northern areas of Nigeria. AQIM has
little to offer them, and they are unlikely to see any benefit in
aligning with a foreign terrorist group. While a handful of Nigerians
may join AQIM's combat units or provide logistical support, it is
unlikely that AQIM will recruit large numbers of Nigerian jihadists. As
for the Polisario--an armed group seeking an independent state for the
Sahrawi people in the Western Sahara--while Salafi and Salafi-jihadist
ideologies may be making inroads within the Polisario camps, the
Polisario does not share AQIM's goal of establishing an Islamic state,
and the Polisario itself has denied any association with al-Qaeda.\18\
As such, the likelihood of AQIM absorbing or affiliating with the
Polisario is remote, although it is possible that the groups may
cooperate on the movement of people or materiel.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Anneli Botha, ``Terrorism in the Maghreb: The
Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism,'' ISS Monograph Series, No.
144, June 2008.
\19\ Abu Mus'ab al-Sun suggests that some cooperation took place
between the early Algerian jihad movement--specifically the GIA--and
the Polisario, but he later states that the relationship deteriorated
over time. See al-Suri, ``A Call to Global Islamic Resistance,'' p.
781.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the needs of states in the region and u.s. policy responses
AQIM is likely to seek to expand its activities in the Sahel,
including the kidnapping of foreigners, and it may increasingly seek to
target Western interests in the region as a means to maintain its bona
fides within the larger jihadist movement. As such, the group poses an
ongoing threat to U.S. citizens and interests in the region. This
threat is best countered by a multipronged U.S. policy response that
includes programs designed to support development, governance, and
security.
The causes of insecurity in the Sahel need to be understood and
addressed in a regional context. Although each country in the Sahel
poses unique opportunities and challenges for engagement, U.S. policy
toward the region needs to take an integrated approach that
incorporates both the Sahel and the states in North Africa. Although
certain kinds of engagements--such as police training and support for
greater rule of law--that target particular ministries or departments
are best conducted via bilateral agreements, many of the problems in
the region are transnational in nature, and are best treated as such.
It will be of little use to improve education in Mali without a
comparable effort in Niger, and little help to improve police
capability in Mauritania but not in Mali.
Recent studies indicate that emphasizing police and intelligence
capabilities is particularly useful in countering terrorism, and
research also suggests that political violence may be reduced through
measures that improve the quality of life for people in the affected
areas.\20\ The Sahel states need support in improving governance,
transparency, accountability, political participation, and rule of law.
Traditional development assistance should be targeted toward building
local capacity to improve health, the environment, sustainable
agriculture, and education, with particular emphasis on improving
educational access for girls. Security sector training and assistance
is needed to professionalize local security services--including the
police and judiciary, the gendarmerie, and the military--and to
institute legal and judicial frameworks to facilitate criminal
prosecution of terrorist suspects. Regional military and security
services also need support in developing efficient intelligence
structures and appropriate mechanisms for rapid response to terrorist
incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Recent related RAND reports include: ``How Terrorist Groups
End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida,'' by Seth G. Jones and Martin C.
Libicki, MG-741-RC, 2008; ``Social Science for Counterterrorism:
Putting the Pieces Together,'' edited by Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin,
MG-8949-08D, 2009; and ``More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and
Political Violence in the Arab World'' by Dalia Dassa Kaye et al., MG-
772, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States has wide array of policy mechanisms to combat
terrorism in the Sahel. AQIM (as well as its predecessor organizations,
the GPSC and GIA) is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by
the State Department, and several AQIM members, including Emir Abu
Mus'ab `Abd al-Wadud, are on the Department of Treasury's list of
Specially Designated Nationals. Additionally, the FBI's legal attaches
support initiatives that promote regional counterterrorism cooperation,
and traditional bilateral military relationships facilitate
counterterrorism training and operations. One of the main avenues for
regional engagement on counterterrorism has been the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The goal of the TSCTP is to build
partner capacity for counterterrorism and facilitate efforts to counter
extremist thought. Begun in 2005 as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI),
this interagency program has grown to include nine countries--Morocco,
Algeria, Mali, Niger, Tunisia, and Mauritania, Senegal, Nigeria, and
Chad. \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp, accessed November 8, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some critics of the TSCTP have suggested that the program has
encouraged African governments to exaggerate the nature of terrorist
threats in their territory in order to receive military assistance that
might then be used to suppress internal dissent. This may have been the
case when the PSI was created in 2005, but given that AQIM has moved
aggressively into the Sahel over the last several years, Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger have even greater reason to participate. In the
early years of the program, there was an essential difference of
opinion between the United States and the African governments over the
nature of the terrorist threat in Africa. The United States has
necessarily been primarily concerned with incidents of international
terrorism, whereas most African officials are preoccupied with
terrorism that poses a threat to domestic security. In the last year,
AQIM has demonstrated that it, at least, is both a domestic and
international threat.
High-profile programs like TSCTP are an effective way to focus
human and financial resources on the problem of terrorism in the Sahel,
but difficulties in implementation and interagency cooperation appear
to hinder the effectiveness of the program. Furthermore, a visible U.S.
footprint may not be appropriate in all countries, as particular
aspects of the TSCTP are politically sensitive. For example, when the
United States assisted the Algerian Government in expanding its
physical military infrastructure in the south of the country, local
press reports immediately suggested that the United States was
constructing a secret intelligence base in the desert. Suspicion,
misinformation, or confusion about the nature of U.S. counterterrorist
programs in the Sahel will undermine our ability to reduce terrorism,
extremism, and anti-American sentiment. Many people in the Sahel are
already suspicious of U.S. motives for involvement in local security
affairs, and on several occasions, AQIM has pointed to TSCTP activities
and AFRICOM's presence as evidence of American ``occupation'' of Muslim
lands.\22\ In planning anti- or counter-terrorist policies, the United
States needs to take into account local sensitivities and ensure that
the scope and the reasons for our activities are communicated to both
the host government and the local population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Abu Musab `Abd-al-Wadud, ``A Message to Our Ummah in the
Islamic Maghreb,'' September 21, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
Reducing terrorism and insecurity in the Sahel requires steady,
consistent, long-term engagement by the United States in order to
address the immediate threat of terrorism and criminality while
improving human security in a broader sense. There is no silver bullet
for solving the problems in the Sahel, and the region faces complex,
interconnected problems that require integrated solutions. Going
forward, the United States should continue to focus its efforts on
developing partner capacity. Specifically, the United States should
seek to build counterterrorist, antiterrorist, and judicial capacity in
the affected states and, rather than emphasizing military capabilities,
the United States should focus on programs that support the
professionalization and modernization of police, investigative, and
intelligence services. The United States should also push for serious,
tangible mechanisms for regional cooperation, specifically
intelligence-sharing, both within the region and with European
partners.
AQIM and other terrorist groups will always be able to find
recruits among the small pool of fellow extremists who share their
distorted vision of jihad, but their ability to draw active or tacit
support from populations in the Sahel can be curtailed with a
combination of targeted security assistance and development aid.
Activities that allow local governments to reduce AQIM's ability to
operate while also undermining its appeal to potential recruits stand
the best chance of reducing insecurity in the Sahel.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Ms. Kennedy-Boudali.
Dr. Gutelius.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID GUTELIUS, FOUNDER AND PARTNER, ISHTIRAK,
CONSULTING SENIOR FELLOW, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED
PHYSICS LABORATORY, SAN FRANCISCO, CA
Dr. Gutelius. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to testify on a set of issues that I believe is key to the
stability of both the Sahel and greater Saharan region.
Today we face an uncertain, complex, ever-shifting
situation across the nations that straddle the Sahara and
Sahel. While certain issues seem new--natural resource
exploitation, the emergence of AQIM, and recent revolts in both
Niger and Mali--these are, in many ways, simply newer threads
of a much older weave.
From a local perspective, neither GSPC nor AQIM are
considered major threats, nor is Salafism, per se. To those
living on the southern edge of the Sahara, the most critical
issues are perhaps not surprising: (1) Environmental
degradation; (2) differential access to resources and extreme
poverty; (3) the sharp growth of smuggling; and (4) continued
political disenfranchisement of key northern populations.
Many of these issues, with one exception, is new. The Sahel
has seen serious desiccation punctuated by periodic droughts
over the last 40 years, which has had a devastating local
impact.
Northerners, Berabiche and Tamashek in particular, are
largely marginalized by southern majorities that control
national politics, armed forces, foreign direct investment, and
the foreign aide that flows into Mali and Niger.
Informal trade remains a staple of economic activity
through the desert because there are few other ways for people
to sustain themselves.
One major exception to these longer term dynamics is the
changing nature and scale of smuggling. Over the last 4 to 5
years especially, the volume of the cross-desert trade has
grown sharply, and cocaine has overtaken other commodities:
people, cigarettes, fuel.
This new trade may be creating the conditions for serious
political disintegration. This, to me, is the largest current
threat to regional stability, rather than either AQIM
specifically or reformist Islam more generally.
My written testimony discusses AQIM's shifting fortunes,
the tenuous links between ideology and violence in the Sahel,
the rise of the Trans-Saharan drug trade, and local perceptions
of the TSCTP response.
Let me just summarize in saying that the threat of
instability in the Sahel is very real, but the source of that
threat is more directly linked to economic desperation,
criminality, differential access to political and economic
control, rather than al-Qaeda or Salafist ideology.
Terrorists do indeed pose a real threat, but we tend to
give these groups more credit than they deserve. U.S.
counterterrorism efforts should provide a well-integrated
programmatic focus on those larger regional challenges and hold
U.S. agencies and their partners accountable for outcomes. The
stakes are high and growing, not just for African Governments,
but for the United States and Europe, as well.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gutelius follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. David Gutelius, Partner, Ishtirak, Consulting
Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, San
Francisco, CA
Thank you, Mr Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on a set of
issues that I believe is key to the stability of both the Sahel and
greater Saharan region.
Today we face an uncertain, complex, ever-shifting situation across
the nations that straddle the Sahel and Sahara. It is worth pointing
out, however, that this is hardly new. While certain factors seem new,
such as the discovery of and interest in natural resource exploitation,
the emergence of a new al-Qaeda franchise in AQIM, and recent revolts
in Niger and Mali, in many ways are simply newer threads of an older
weave and belong to a much longer history.
Today the committee is focused on two related subthemes, roughly
the performance to date of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and especially
the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and emergence
and prospects for violent extremism and criminality in Mali and Niger,
with a particular focus on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM). From
a local perspective, neither GSPC nor AQIM have ever been considered
major threats, nor has Salafism's more violent strain, per se. U.S.
policy, on the contrary, has made these a priority and in doing so, has
sometimes made worse local political and social dynamics in Sahel and
worked to bolster, rather than suffocate, AQIM and the GSPC before it.
To be sure, AQIM poses a certain kind of threat and the United States
and its Malian and Nigerien allies have had important tactical
successes over the last 6 years. But these successes have come at some
cost, and it is unclear if U.S. officials appreciate that those
continuing costs affect the overall success of such programs as the
TSCTP.
The most critical regional issues are (1) environmental change (2)
differential access to resources and extreme poverty (3) the growth of
the value and volume in real terms of smuggling (4) and continued
political disenfranchisement of northern populations, particularly the
Tamashek (Tuareg). Yet U.S. policy has more narrowly focused on
terrorism and extremism, and indirectly addressing these much more
pressing concerns.
None of these larger issues--with one exception--is new. The
southern Sahara has seen serious desiccation punctuated by severe
periodic droughts over the last 40 years, which has had a devastating
impact on local livelihoods. Northerners (Arabs and Tamshek in
particular) are, as ever, largely seen and treated as bandits by the
southern majorities who control national politics, armed forces,
foreign direct investment, and the foreign aid that flows into Mali and
Niger. Informal trade remains a staple of economic activity through the
desert--there are few other ways for people to sustain themselves in
the Sahara's edge.
The one major exception to these longer term dynamics is the
changing nature and scale of smuggling. Over the past decade, and
particularly in the last 4 to 5 years, the volume of trade has
increased and cocaine has rapidly overtaken other commodities (people,
cigarettes, fuel) in the long distance cross-desert trade. Demand from
Europe and the relative efficiency of South American cartels in moving
drugs to and through West African ports has led an exponential growth
in the value and volume of the trade. Less appreciated, however, is
that this has affected social and political patterns that may be
creating more opportunities for political disintegration as the sheer
number of those involved in this new trade grows. In my view, this is
the largest current threat to regional stability--rather than either
AQIM specifically or reformist Islam more generally. I will return to
this point, below.
gspc and aqim
The fortunes of AQIM and of Abdel-Wadoud (Abdel Malik Droukdal)
have waxed and waned over the past 5 years since he rose to the head of
GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la predication et le combat). His
reputation in the community and related ability to command have relied
on several discrete factors: (1) closeness (real and perceived) to the
al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan; (2) success in attacking Algerian
military targets, the older focus of GSPC's ire; (3) attacks against
Western civilian targets; and (4) personal relationships between key
lieutenants (called Emirs) located across the major Algerian provinces,
and particularly the Emirs of Zone IX, the southernmost Algerian
province, and other Saharan-based cells.
By 2005, serious rifts appear to have threatened Droukdal's
authority and AQIM's ability to keep or attract members. His move to
ally himself and the remnants of the GSPC with al-Qaeda in 2006 was
likely a last-ditch effort at shoring up support among a core of
harder-line, more ideologically driven members of his organization and
a perceived path to gaining newer, younger adherents. In some ways, the
move has succeeded. From all accounts, the GSPC in 2005-06 was a
broken, dysfunctional organization of loosely affiliated gangs, with
those hiding in the Sahel seemingly more interested in smuggling and
extortion rather than any particular Salafi Jihadiyya ideals. While
Droukdal also likely expected a windfall of financial resources and
perhaps equipment and advisors, AQIM has not done much better than GSPC
did. It has attracted new members (who appear to be a mixture of
everything from committed Salafis to common criminals), but also seen
many of the older guard GSPC leave, retire, or take advantage of the
periodic amnesty programs Algeria offers. It appears to have received a
small sum of money from abroad in 2006-07. But it also appears that a
combination of multinational, multiagency counterterrorism efforts
effectively put pressure on key transnational networks that could link
AQIM with other groups.\1\ It seems clear that today AQIM finds it
difficult to effectively resource its operations from foreign
donations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, ``Ragtag Insurgency Gain a
New Lifeline From al-Qaeda,'' New York Times, July 1, 2008. Nicolas
Schmidle, ``A Saharan Conundrum'' New York Times Magazine, February 13,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Algerian military establishment remained the main stated focus
of GSPC violence throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Droukdal's
somewhat abrupt switch from Algerian military targets to mainly Western
civilian in 2006 was carefully calculated to manage his new brand. At
the same time, Droukdal purged much of the senior GSPC leadership, in a
conscious effort to reject the semi-independence (particularly in an
economic sense) of what he saw as less ``pure'' Salafists--mainly those
south of the Atlas Mountains. The calculation also took into account
the fact GSPC as a brand had a weak reach outside of Algeria proper,
the fact that America and allies had begun the Pan-Sahel Initiative
which had already stirred local anger in conservative Islamist circles
across North and West Africa, and the hope that
al-Qaeda would reward the newly reminted organization for its renewed
commitment to proper Salafi credentials.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A fascinating example of this can actually be heard in a New
York Times audio interview with Droukdal, where Droukdal uses carefully
chosen classical Arabic when explaining AQIM's Islamist credentials and
goals, but inadvertently switches to his native Algerian dialect when
asked about his opinions of Bouteflika and the Algerian Government. He
literally could not reframe the older, familiar anti-Algerian state
GSPC rhetoric in the language of the global Jihad. Available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html?_r=2&hp&
oref=slogin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But below the surface, Droukdal balanced a new commitment with
older GSPC tendencies and principles. Fearful of alienating a large
contingent of older GSPC members, Droukdal renewed tactically familiar
hit and run attacks on Algerian military targets even while younger
members of the AQIM blew themselves up in the hopes of gaining
martyrdom (for example, the 11 April 2007 suicide bombings in Algiers
that killed 30 and wounded 220).
In late 2008 and early 2009, however, AQIM scored important
victories that have put them in a stronger position, and more
importantly offered a path to financial independence. The committee is
no doubt familiar with the spate of recent kidnappings in Mali and
Niger. More than any other single factor, the willingness of
governments and companies to pay ransoms for prisoners has been the
decisive factor in bolstering AQIM and its growing network of
semiadherents and smuggler allies. It has created in the two several
years a small-scale industry of targeting foreigners, mostly
Westerners, and served to help realize some of Droukdal's larger
ambitions in the region. While formal recruitment into the organization
is still likely challenging, the organization has been able to
strengthen its ties with a number of local leaders, throughout the
Sahara and Sahel--not on the basis of ideology, but mostly on the basis
of shared economic interests. This does not mean an increase in the
absolute numbers of fighters under AQIM command, but does mean that
AQIM is developing an enabling support network for its larger
interests.
ideology and violence
AQIM's stated brand of Islam is generally and quite often roundly
rejected in the Sahel. There is something of a stereotype of ``African
Islam'' being more ``tolerant'' and moderate than Islam as it is
practiced elsewhere, and like most sterotypes it has a shade of truth
to it. The vast majority of Muslims in the Sahel follow the generally
more tolerant Maliki and Shafi'i jurisprudence rather than the Hanbali
school associated with Wahhabism and Salafism. But the Sahel is
generally a fairly conservative place; memory is strong (if fluid),
customary practice matters, and there is a long history of Islamic
intellectual production--the traces of which are on full display today
in traveling exhibitions of unique manuscripts from places like
Timbuktu, Gao, and Agadez.
It is vital that we not lump reformist-oriented Muslims together.
Following a more or less conservative interpretation of Islamic law (in
comparison to what?) does by no stretch necessarily mean sympathy with
AQIM or even with nonlocal interpretations of Islam such as Wahhabism.
Do Wahhabi and Salafi ideas find some purchase in the Sahel? To a
certain limited extent and in some communities, yes. But so do the
ideas of the Pakistani Jama'a al-Tabligh as well as the Libyan Dawa
(both of which opened missions in northern Mali in the past several
years). More importantly, there exists a long, rich and local history
of quite conservative interpretation of Islamic law; whether within the
Songhai, Arab or Tamashek populations, sources of reformist thought and
education are readily at hand.
The question about the ``spread'' of Salafism/Wahhabism/Qutbism as
it has so often been posed within U.S. analyst circles (each of which
is distinct) is both distracting and unhelpful. It presumes both a kind
of ideological epidemic and weakness of mind on the part of local
actors. It also presumes a causal connection between ideology and
violence in the Sahel that does not exist. In any case, countering
ideology is fraught with difficulty, and carries the burden of
neocolonialism that makes it nearly impossible to succeed. More
importantly, however, the presumed spread of Salafi al-Jihadiyya is not
nearly as important to the stability of the region as more prosaic
problems of smuggling, differential resource access, and the changing
natural environment.
The U.S. has the opportunity to avoid making similar mistakes and
becoming perceived as a neocolonial power in the region. But this will
take not just reframing questions and avoiding easy stereotypes of
entire populations as ``tribal'' and susceptible, but also taking a
substantively different tack in addressing deeper regional challenges.
And it will take a level of coordination and commitment that we have so
far been unwilling or unable to muster.
smuggling
One key variable in the political stability of the Sahel remains
control of informal capital flows and markets, which, next to aid
dollars, bolster the wider Saharan region (Keenan 2006: 286-287). The
question over who gets access to capital of differing types--to a more
expansive sense of capital that includes social prestige, baraka\3\,
authenticity, rightful claims to privilege as well as property, goods,
and currency--and the extent to which local leaders establish their own
social positions as providers of this capital directly reflect the
social power they can wield.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Literally, ``blessing'' or divine presence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Particularly since 2001, smuggling has become a major site of
struggle between various interest groups, including U.S. military,
national governments, and local authorities, as the main way (outside
foreign donations or investments) for many northern leaders and their
communities to remain self-sufficient and autonomous. American pressure
to completely shut down illicit market networks completely in order to
starve potential terrorist networks has largely backfired so far. Here
again, Kel Ifoghas and Kunta leaders have told me that the United
States is increasingly characterized as working with corrupt government
lackeys against the interests of everyday people in the Saharan fringe,
the vast majority of whom rely on informal economies to get by every
day.
These informal marketing activities include important social
practices by which communities in desert-side societies not only cope
with environmental degradation and social change, but also shifting
formal sector markets that continue to put northern populations at a
disadvantage. Smuggling remains a long-cherished symbol of autonomy and
control and an important part of both social practices (ideas of
protection, blessing, or right of passage) and shifting political
alliances. Here, religious authority and memory may be mixing in ways
akin to the 19th century Sahara when the Kunta, for instance, used
their religious authority to legitimate the tobacco and slave trades,
partially as a way of competing with reformist Massina leaders in the
south. Today's struggle over illicit trafficking bears resemblance to
the ways in which leaders established and deployed Islam both before
and during the colonial era. The rhetoric of this social process may
differ, but the outlines of that past remain powerful. This is not to
make excuses for illicit trafficking, but it does point up that there's
more to smuggling than outright banditry.
While analysts rightly point out how ransom revenues has allowed
AQIM to purchase an ever-more sophisticated array of weaponry, there is
a far more productive way of putting that capital to work for longer
term growth: smuggling drugs. The older smuggling operations in people,
fuel, cigarettes, and other commodities still exist but the potential
profits simply cannot compare to cocaine. This is relatively new. When
I first lived in Timbuktu over a decade ago, smugglers favored
cigarettes as the preferred commodity and had constructed sophisticated
and relatively efficient mechanisms that included import, remanufacture
and repackaging, forgery, a secure system of exchange and a network
that spanned from the ports of West Africa through the Sahara to
Eastern Europe. The new cocaine operations, bankrolled now by a number
of stakeholders from major South American cartels to AQIM to Eastern
European mafia, make the cigarette trade seem quaint.
As pressures have grown on smugglers since 2002, increased risk
seems to have recently helped push some key commodity prices higher in
major Saharan markets, and touched off violent competition between
major merchant groups operating in and around the desert (Cisse 2003;
Sylla 2004).\4\ But with the newer cocaine trade there is a
qualitatively and quantitatively different phenomenon. The stakes and
scale of both the extended trade networks supporting it and the levels
of violence are growing at an alarming rate. And trying to kill off the
entire regional informal economy without viable short- and long-term
livelihood alternatives would likely have the opposite effect to what
most American strategists and Bamako or Niamey politicians intend: that
is, it would increase political instability in the north and ire
against the governments of both Mali and Niger.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The recent bitter feud between prominent Kunta and Moor
families, particularly since 2003, are apparently linked to these
market shifts--again with echoes of competition that are, in this case,
well beyond a century old.
\5\ Certainly the recent history of the unintended consequences of
trying to quash black markets can provide lessons, most particularly in
Afghanistan and Columbia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The rise of the cocaine trade, fueled by South American cartels'
credit and transport from West African ports, has grown exponentially
over just the past 5 years. The United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime estimated that West Africa handled 40 to 50 tons of cocaine,
worth an estimated $1.8B at European wholesale prices, in 2007.\6\ The
real volume is likely much higher.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Douglas Farah, ``Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa''
Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on African Affairs, June 23, 2009.
\7\ Thomas Harrigan of DEA estimates between three and five times
higher than the U.N. estimate in 2007. See his ``Confronting Drug
Trafficking in West Africa'' Testimony before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, June 23, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This growth has worked to both destabilize authority (both central
government authority and that of local leaders) and catalyze or
concretize networks that support the trade. If the trans-Saharan
cocaine trade develops as other cocaine smuggling routes have, we can
expect to see an explosion of violence as different gangs, groups, and
factions vie for control and a share of the profits. Distribution
networks will be paid in drugs, which will likely fragment competition
and gradually draw more people into the traffic. Again, if history is
any guide, this will likely infect police and military forces and could
eventually lead to the Sahel to become a fragmented narcoregion.\8\ And
in fact, the phenomenon is currently on full view in places such as
Senegal, where drug money is reportedly fueling a building boom in
Dakar.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Farah, ``Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa.''
\9\ Christopher Thompson, ``Fears for Stability in West Africa as
Cartels Move In.'' Guardian U.K. March 10, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So far it remains unclear how deeply involved the AQIM organization
is in these networks, but anecdotal evidence suggests that individual
AQIM members--particularly operating in Mauritania, Mali and Niger are
already directly involved.\10\ It seems clear that at least sections of
AQIM are not just willing to engage in drug smuggling, but are also
looking for additional ways to support their future operational
activities. Their expansion in the Sahel will depend less on finding
those who share their ideology and more on where economic opportunities
coincide with other groups. Again, this highlights the importance of
the larger shifts in informal markets, protection rackets, and money
laundering rather than the particular attitudes and ideologies in the
future of AQIM in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Cf. the blog Moor next Door, ``AQIM-Mauritania--Quite Saharan,
In Fact.'' Sept 21, 2008. Accessed 11/10/09 at http://
themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2008/09/21/aqimmauritania-quite-saharan-
in-fact/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pan-sahel initiative and tsctp
In 2002, the U.S. Government's goal was simply to watch and monitor
activity in and around the Sahara, since at that point there was little
consensus within the American administration as to what next steps
should be. What began as an extension of intelligence gathering,
however, became an important campaign to quash what at that time was
loosely referred to as ``Al Qaida in Africa.'' In late 2002, this
culminated in the formation of the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), the U.S.
State Department-funded, Defense Department-run program meant to
provide training and equipment to regional militaries as well as to
develop military-to-military relationships with key regional military
commanders.\11\ American military advisors spent time in Mauritania,
Mali, Niger, and Chad between 2003 and 2005, training security forces
in weapons and communications technologies, small unit maneuvers, and
mobile warfare.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See the State Department's official announcement at http://
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From the beginning in 2003, key Tamashek and Arab populations were
largely left out of PSI-sponsored activities, exacerbating the
longstanding ill-will between these groups and the national governments
of Niger and Mali. This fact, combined with the rhetoric U.S. officials
and their local allies used at the time very quickly brought out older
tensions and suspicions, and linked them to the U.S. military.\12\
Fearful, highly speculative language remains a common element in
reports and public statements from the American Government--statements
which are widely published and easily accessible across Mali and Niger,
including the north (Fisher-Thompson 2004; USAID 2005: 3-4; Keenan
2006: 274-275). Part of this self-
fulfilling prophecy stems from the outlook of U.S. analysts and other
personnel, who have tended to lump reformist leaders and organizations
in the Sahel as undifferentiated Salafist-oriented threats to regional
peace and stability. On a trip into the north of the Mali, for example,
former U.S. Ambassador to Mali Huddleston warned with alarm: ``With the
Dawa [alTabligh], were dealing with something even more worrisome
because they're in the north. The Salafists are in the north and they
are terrorists. And there are connections between them.'' (Anderson
2004) This attitude, along with the Malian Government's responses, had
the effect of driving Islamic missionaries and at least some Muslim
community leaders closer together (Kimbery 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Gutelius, ``U.S. Creates Enemies Where There Were None,''
Christian Science Monitor, June 11, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rumors of inappropriate conduct of U.S. personnel also began to
spread across the southern Sahara over 2004, and public statements by
American military leaders and interpreted and rebroadcast by northern
political leaders added to resentment among northern leaders (ICG 2005:
31; U.S. House of Representatives 2005: 22-27). The rhetoric on the
American side often continues to repeat allusions to the Sahara as a
lawless, traditionally violent place; a breeding ground for terrorists,
and a swamp that needs draining (For example, Powell 2004; CBSNews
2004; Motlagh 2005; McKaughan 2005). Political pundits and armchair
analysts in the West have used the repeatedly same imagery and even
phrases repeatedly--imagery that some political clients in Mali and
Niger in the Sahara have since adopted in their own statements as way
of attracting and maintaining American aid (Diarra 2006; Takiou 2006).
On the desert side, stories about these stories and about U.S. forces
began to spread both informally among trade networks and in radio
broadcasts--at a time (in 2003) when the American military in Iraq had
become the daily focus of every Middle East media outlet in the world.
For its missteps, PSI also had clear and important successes, most
notably in helping to capture El Para and a number of accomplices when
they kidnapped several dozen European tourists in 2003. But these
strategic successes have come at some cost. In Mali and Niger, PSI
money and programs acted to widen the perceived gulfs between north and
south, as well as between northern nomadic and sedentary populations.
The U.S. has funneled millions of aid dollars to the Malian and
Nigerien Governments since 2003 under PSI and subsequently under TSCTP.
Northerners complain that these new moneys have remained solidly within
the hands of the Bambara-dominated government, taking both local
political and economic opportunities away from local people. It seems
that whatever the case, the PSI program aid--and to a lesser extent,
TSCTP aid--quickly became a politicized symbol of a contest for power
in the North. It is unclear to what extent this affected the dynamics
of the most recent (but separate) Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger
in 2007-09, but infighting and claims of economic and political
oppression became core rallying cries of both movements.
ways forward
In assessing the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism activities
and particularly the TSCTP, I can only speak from the perspective of
(a) what I see firsthand and through local French and Arabic press and
(b) what locals and NGO practitioners in Northern Mali, and less
directly, in Niger tell me--and less from any privileged government
view.
Partnering with the Malian and Nigerien Governments, while without
a doubt necessary, has had a mixed record, in my view. The emphasis on
working with national-level institutions, while necessary, creates a
preset friction in the northern Sahel that is difficult to overcome
without balancing those efforts with more local society outreach,
sustained local presence and specifically nonmilitary programming.
PSI's initial execution increased local resentment of both national
armies and their U.S. backers. Over time and with TSCTP, the United
States began to alter the approach and although TSCTP programs are
showing the first signs of progress, more needs doing. Related, TSCTP
programs appear as overly executed by proxies, whether those are NGO
subcontractors or Malian and Nigerien Government institutions.
Agencies involved in TSCTP should consider increasing their
presence where establishing long-term local relationships are key to
the success of its programs. There continues to be a severe lack of
information about ongoing programs and their effects at the local
level, in large measure because we have few people on the ground and
few specialists with relevant languages and training interfacing with
local communities. Funding for local data gathering and analysis,
including survey instruments, should be a part of the TSCTP toolkit
(and in fact exactly such a capability has inexplicably been removed
from AFRICOM's FY 2010 budget). This may also mean opening staffed
offices in Timbuktu, Agadez, and perhaps even Kidal. At the same time,
more concerted nonmilitary efforts to visit effected communities on the
desert edge, support of local cultural programs and institutions, and
above all addressing local economies' viability are all requisite to
addressing the larger issues of stability in the Sahel. In this
connection, appropriate diplomatic pressure should be brought to bear
on both Bamako and Niamey to ensure that aid and other resources are
reliably reaching populations in the north of Mali and Niger and that
U.S.-funded programs are having some expected local impact.
Can innovative technology help in addressing these questions? Yes,
particularly in better information gathering, coordination, and
decisionmaking. At Ishtirak, for example, we are working with NGOs and
corporate social responsibility programs on a series of tools that can
track development projects, lessons learned, and metrics, and assist
with program planning and resource allocation. This can be coupled with
lightweight data collection applications that work on any modest mobile
or satellite phone, providing a near-real time picture of what's
happening, who's involved, and how to improve outcomes. Technology,
appropriately designed and deployed, can provide transparency,
accountability, and coordination at a much higher level than we see
today. As most of this technology is based on free open source
software, there is no excuse not to make the most of it.
USAID, at its best, is one of the most effective ways to change
minds on the ground about the United States and its motives. It needs a
larger presence in the region, and should make program and
infrastructure investments in concert with other U.S. agencies,
development NGOs, and local partners. We should increase commitments to
local livelihood programs and environmental monitoring and training
programs and target more specifically fragile communities scattered
across the Sahara's southern edge. GeekCorps and other creative USAID
communications programs should be focused to improve communications
networks in these areas, and should create a cadre of Malians and
Nigeriens who can help sustain these networks on an ongoing basis. Most
importantly, sustainable, small-scale businesses are needed to
counteract the growing influence of illicit trafficking.
AFRICOM must work in concert with USAID and other agencies in both
meeting the demands of the TSCTP and its own mission. While the command
is still in its early days, General Ward has a chance to shape an
innovative, nimble organization that works cohesively with both local
African partners and other U.S. Government agencies. AFRICOM is making
headway and this should be commended and fully supported. But there is
also a great deal of suspicion on the part of those who have not seen
direct benefit from its military-to-military exchanges. AFRICOM should
consider extending its outreach activities directly to those in
northern Mali and Niger, in ways that also align with bettering lives
in the region. And of course, working closely with USAID and the
Department of State here can help in a number of ways.
Many of these ideas are recognized within U.S. policy circles
already. The GAO completed an assessment of the TSCTP in July 2008 and
found a number of aspects of the program that needed improvement.\13\
There is no comprehensive, integrated TSCTP plan. TSCTP lacks both
coherent high-level goals and metrics for assessing progress against
those goals over time. This holds true for U.S. Government activities
and with Malian and Nigerien partners. While interagency coordination
seems to have improved over time, it is clear that cooperation needs
improvement. Continued tensions over State Department's authority over
Defense Department personnel under TSCTP reflect this need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ GAO, GAO-08-860 ``Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed To
Enhance Implementation of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership,'' Report to the ranking member of the House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond this, however, TSCTP needs to shift its frame of reference
from terrorism per se to the context that makes a sustained AQIM
possible. It must more directly address the deeper, more immediate
threats to Mali and Niger: environmental degradation, systematic
disenfranchisement of Northerners, and the new smuggling economy. TSCTP
in its current form will likely never have more than tactical successes
against what is in reality small, loosely organized, opportunistic
terrorist franchise--because addressing the larger threats are largely
secondary to its focus on terrorism.
We must be clearer about what the stakes are in the Sahel and what
our national interest is. I can tell you that the local perception,
based on PSI and the initial activities under AFRICOM and the TSCTP is
still strongly that the United States is first concerned with
protecting and expanding American economic interests followed by
controlling an al-Qaeda threat that exists mostly in the minds of
American Government analysts and some European allies. The more we
ignore the region's larger issues, the more this misperception gets
reinforced.
In summary, the threat of instability in the Sahel is real, but the
source of that threat is more directly linked to economic desperation,
criminality, and differential access to political and economic control
rather than al-Qaeda or Salafist ideology. AQIM and its allies still
pose a real threat. But we tend to give the group more credit than it
deserves. U.S. counterterrorism efforts should provide a well-planned,
integrated programmatic focus on those larger regional challenges and
hold itself and its partners accountable for outcomes. The stakes
related to the growing criminality in the region that feeds violence
and erodes societal institutions are high and growing--not just for
African Governments, but for the United States and Europe as well. We
ignore these at our collective peril.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much. And I certainly
agree with you that the problem here has to do with the types
of things you're talking about. It's an environment in which
al-Qaeda-type organizations can thrive, but that is not
necessarily the leading issue. It's something we have to
address as a country with regard to our national security
interests. But, having been to most of these countries, I
certainly would share that assessment.
Let me start with Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. You wrote in your
testimony that one of the reasons AQIM has turned its focus to
the Sahel is that it has not been able to organize operational
cells in Morocco or Libya or Tunisia. In your view, why is
that? What challenges does AQIM face in these three countries?
Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. Thank you, Senator. I think that's a
really important question, because those three countries are
the most logical partners for AQIM to seek support--support or
recruits. But they have been unable to do so, in part because
those states are that much more capable than the Sahel states,
in terms of their ability to monitor extremist recruitment in
their region, in their ability to keep track of who's entering
and exiting the country, and in their ability to control their
populations, frankly. Those three states have very strong
security services, as I mentioned. In Morocco, in particular,
after the bombings in Casablanca in 2003, there was a wave of
arrests, as I'm sure you're aware, of extremists; not only
those with jihadist tendencies, but anyone who opposed the
government, frankly. And as a result, whatever public support
there might have been for terrorist activity was fragmented and
splintered.
In the case of Libya, there was a jihadist movement that
was quite active there in the 1990s, but it is severely
weakened. And, additionally, a number of the jihadists that
might have supported AQIM in Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia have
probably switched their attention to conflicts elsewhere, such
as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So, the pool of recruits that might have supported jihad in
the region may now be more interested in looking toward Iraq or
Afghanistan as a theater for their activities.
Senator Feingold. You write that, while AQIM has succeeded
in recruiting some fighters from the Sahel, its overall success
in attracting new recruits is actually marginal. Now, to what
do you attribute that lack of success, and what are the
constraints to AQIM expanding its region's support in the
Sahel? And you've alluded to some of these already, but----
Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. Within Algeria, Senator, I think it's
important to remember the context of that country's experience,
with an extremely bloody civil war in the 1990s that killed--
estimates range up to hundreds of thousands of people.
So, I think there's a sense, in Algeria itself, that the
people are, quite simply, tired of hearing about these jihadist
groups, and they're not supporting them because they've seen no
benefit from them. They're--they make the lives of the people
more difficult through extortion, through roadblocks, through
violence and criminality. They're not proposing any positive
political solution. They're seeking to overthrow the state, but
I don't think people in the region see that their success would
be any kind of improvement in their lives.
In the Sahel region--this has been mentioned by the
previous panel, as well--I think AQIM's idea of what Islam
means and what a good Muslim should do is, quite simply, an
anathema to the people in the region. They don't support the
idea of a Shariah-based governance; they're not interested in
overthrowing the states in the region. It's just not a very
competitive message.
Senator Feingold. And you've mentioned the Tuareg, most of
whom do not share al-Qaeda's ideological goals, either. What do
you see as the key to gaining the support of Tuareg communities
in the fight against AQIM?
Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. I think this is probably the most
important question regarding ways to disaggregate the threat in
the Sahel. Different populations of Tuareg have different
interests, so we don't want to bunch them together. Certainly,
there is an element of some of the Tuareg populations that is
involved in criminality, and they are probably best
disaggregated from AQIM by highlighting the danger to
themselves that AQIM has posed, because the increase in their--
AQIM's--activity in the Sahel has drawn the attention of, not
only American, but also European and local security services.
AQIM is making peoples' lives harder there.
For the majority of the Tuareg, who are law-abiding
citizens with political concerns about representative
government or the level of state interference in their affairs,
I think governments in the region need support in finding
solutions to reduce those grievances, whether that's a matter
of increased educational opportunities, education in local
languages, or increased access to economic opportunities, by
presenting a better alternative. I think whatever level of
Tuareg support or tolerance or tacit support may be going on,
it could be reduced through engagement.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Dr. Gutelius, I'm very interested in your observation of
the trade in cocaine across the Sahel as rapidly increasing.
And this subcommittee held a hearing earlier this year to
explore the growing problem of drug trafficking in West Africa.
In your assessment, what is driving the increasing trade in
cocaine, and who are the key players in the trade?
Dr. Gutelius. Yes, that's an excellent question, Senator,
thank you.
This is really a change over the last 5 years of, you know,
being based in the north, living in Timbuktu for some time in
the late 1990s, I've watched the nature of smuggling really
change in pretty substantial ways.
It seems clear that South American cartels are directly
involved from the supply end, but it goes beyond that. These
cartels, as you've heard testimony on before, have a quite
sophisticated array of both ways of getting the goods to the
eventual markets, but also things like financing mechanisms.
They've done this before, they're very experienced at it, and
now it seems that they're following a similar pattern in West
Africa, which I think is, you know, akin to the cancer we see
throughout Central and South America.
The November 5 crash outside of GAO--I don't know if you're
aware, but it was a--I think it was a DC-10, about 10-ton
capacity flying from Venezuela, crashed on takeoff; it was able
to deliver its goods, unfortunately, and forces are still
trying to recover those. But, it highlights this problem of
these desert-side entrepots--these desert-side centers--for the
trade across the Sahara.
The other part of the problem, obviously, is demand, and
largely demand in Europe now, which is driving that trade and
sucking it across the desert. The profits involved, I'm afraid,
are driving different kinds of social and political
relationships in the desert that I haven't seen before,
alliances that I wouldn't have expected, necessarily.
Senator Feingold. Give an example of an alliance----
Dr. Gutelius. Well, so, in the older--say 6 to 8 to 10
years ago, with the cigarette trade, which was the kind of king
trade across the Sahara, in terms of profitability--about a
billion-dollar industry 5 years ago--was really run by a set of
Berabiche and Tuareg families, Tamashek families, that were
fairly well known, they'd been in the trade for awhile, and,
you know, had established networks that not only got the goods
from West African ports, but also safely across the desert to
their partners in North Africa.
Those same families are now competing with new kinds of
networks that are much more directly related to the cocaine
trade; much more specialized, in some ways. And that poses a
problem for those older families and the power structures that
they represent.
So, young guns--Lianne and I were actually talking about it
before the session--young guns are actually able to challenge,
in some ways, these more established networks. And a big
problem there is that the middlemen are being paid now--just
like we see in other areas where drug smuggling's a problem,
being paid in drugs.
So, you have--as the sheer number of people involved in the
trade grows, you have this possibility that the cancer that has
affected other parts of the world will infect these societies,
as well. That's not the case yet, but I fear, given the current
trajectory, and just the, it seems, focus of the South American
cartels and the ease with which they can still move those goods
across the desert, that's where we're headed.
Senator Feingold. OK.
Doctor, you were critical in your testimony of the tendency
by U.S. analysts to sometimes conflate the spread of
conservative Islam, particularly Wahhabism, and violent
extremism. What are the implications of this tendency for
counterterrorism efforts? And how could you recommend that the
United States could shift its programming to avoid this kind of
conflation?
Dr. Gutelius. I think there are several areas that we can
focus on, and first and foremost is continuing to improve the
execution of TSCTP. I think it's an innovative program in many
ways, it can be an example for similar types of programs in the
future. At this point, I still have to agree with the 2008 GAO
assessment. And, from what I see on the ground, there's still a
lot of fragmentation, in terms of, again, carrying out the
program elements.
I think, from a Washington, DC, perspective, I think they
are making a lot of progress, in terms of coordination. From a
field perspective, from an on-the-ground perspective, it
doesn't look that way.
So, I think a lot can be done there to harmonize what's
happening on the ground. I think a big need is simply to listen
a lot more for what some of these local populations, especially
the targeted populations--Berabiche and Tamashek--want and need
in their communities.
And I think the speaker from the previous panel--Ambassador
Gast, I believe--mentioned listening clubs in Niger. And that's
a great example. That's a great example of creating support on
the ground and using that information to drive priorities, in
terms of--whether it's USAID or AFRICOM types of activities.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor.
Finally, before I turn to Senator Isakson, I agree with you
that we need to increase our diplomatic presence in order to
better gather information and build long-term local
relationships. And I've been saying this about many neglected
regions of Africa for many, many years.
If you were to advise the United States on expanding our
presence in the Sahel, where would you begin? In your view,
where could opening a new U.S. office tomorrow make the biggest
difference?
Dr. Gutelius. Yes. I think, Timbuktu, for a few different
reasons. It's geographically central and allows us a kind of
reach, not only in terms of just purely geography, but also
culturally, that would afford us much more reach into the
communities that we're interested in working with. And that's
not simply the Tuaregs who, you know, many of which are based
up in the Kidal region. But, also, it is, traditionally, a kind
of, sort of, cross section of the desert population down there.
So, that's one area, I think, where having a permanent mission
or some small presence, especially with the State Department or
USAID kind of leading that outward-facing representation of the
United States would make a huge difference, in terms of
credibility, for local populations.
Senator Feingold. Well, I strongly agree with that. I had--
one of the most memorable moments of my career was in Timbuktu,
meeting, having lunch ceremony with the local Tuareg and other
people, and we were discussing these kinds of issues, but also
the broader range of issues. And this sense of it being not
only a critical place now, but a traditional crossroads, as
well as the classic center of Islamic learning, centuries ago.
It really does make sense as a location.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize I was
late, to both of you. I really have two questions. The first,
just to both of you. I think you both were here for the
previous panel, is that not correct? If I state this wrong,
please correct me, but our policy with regard to the
partnership in the Sahel is basically to be a partner but sort
of a step back from the forefront. Do you agree? I'd like for
both of you to answer this. Do you agree with the posture the
United States is taking with regard to the Counterterrorism
Partnership?
Dr. Gutelius. I'll begin. Thank you, Senator.
In a sense, yes, especially when we're considering--
specifically counterterrorist activities, and specifically with
our AFRICOM initiatives. I think that's the right thing to do.
I think that can be balanced; if you look at the program as a
whole, I think that can be balanced. And, in fact, I think we
need to actually put a United States or American face on
especially some of the development activities that are
happening, even ones that AFRICOM carries out. I think that's
an important message that we're interested in more than simply
bolstering militaries. We're interested in actually improving
societies, in a very general sense.
And so, in a sense I understand the approach to kind of
being a silent partner; at the same time that generates some
cost, I think, for us. And one of the best ways this country
has of showing its support for development worldwide is USAID.
And I would love to see them more, kind of, publicly on the
ground, creating these programs, and, again, putting an
American face on the effort.
Senator Isakson. So, not a bunch of a public face in
counterterrorism, but a big public face in terms of economic
development, health care, things of that nature. Is that what I
hear you saying?
Dr. Gutelius. That's correct.
Senator Isakson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. I would agree with what Dr. Gutelius
has said. And I would add that I think that approach is
appropriate; to keep the counterterrorism and antiterrorism
mission somewhat in the background, because it is very prone to
misinterpretation in the region, particularly with the--I don't
want to say the tendency--particularly with the fact that there
are few trusted media outlets in the region, and so there's a
great deal of rumor and misinformation and misinterpretation
about the U.S. military presence in the region.
I think one of the things that could be done better is
explaining to local governments and local media outlets what
exactly the United States is doing in the region, to reduce
this tendency for misinterpretation.
As far as putting a U.S. face on development activities, I
think that's a great idea, and it does build--it does support--
it could contribute to a reduction of anti-American sentiment,
particularly programs, not only like USAID, but also the Peace
Corps, which I--Senator, I believe you're also a member of the
committee that governs Peace Corps funding. And that's dollar
for dollar, a great program that puts an American face on very
positive work that's done in the region.
Senator Isakson. Yes, it's something we lovingly refer to
as ``soft power'' around here, but it is very important. I have
not traveled to any of these countries, but many all around it
where we have significant USAID, CARE, Save the Children, the
Basic Education Coalition, and others that are winning a lot of
friends and really changing the lives of the African people.
I have one other question. And I was reading the
conclusion, Ms. Boudali, of your report, where you talked about
there not being a silver bullet for solving the problem. I
certainly agree with that, but I have a great concern because
when you look at the map and you end at Chad, if you go further
to the east is Sudan, next is Ethiopia, and next is Somalia.
And if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement--which comes to a
head, I think, February 2011--falls apart, and we get into
civil war in Sudan again, it is close to tying a heavily
terrorist-based Somalia closer and closer to some of these
other organizations. Is that something that you worry about, or
is the expanse of territory between the Sudan and Ethiopia so
great you wouldn't worry about it?
Ms. Kennedy-Boudali. That's a good question, Senator. I
would worry about it, but I think we want to be careful to keep
the caveats in mind. As you mentioned, there is a distance that
separates those two conflicts, currently--not only a geographic
distance, but there's also a cultural distance--that we should
keep in mind.
One of the things that we know now from declassified
documents is that al-Qaeda has experienced difficulty operating
in Africa, and they are considered foreigners when they go
there. So, despite the fact that they do seem to be
increasingly involved in the conflict in Somalia, there are
reasons to think that there are local interests that are not
particularly supportive of al-Qaeda. And, although there has--
it looks like there's some evidence of trafficking of weapons
and people and things back and forth from the Horn of Africa to
the Sahel and to North Africa, those relationships have existed
throughout time. And I think when we look at those two
conflicts, we need to keep in mind that there are some
differences between them.
I think it is important to watch what's going on and keep
in mind what assistance we might give to states in the region
that would particularly help them monitor borders and to keep
track of flows of goods and people, because that could be one
of the earliest indicators that there is a greater connection
between the two theaters.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Isakson, for your very
active participation in this helpful hearing.
I want to thank the witnesses very much for your expertise
and for your sharing it with us.
And that concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson to Questions Submitted
by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. As was mentioned, there have long been tensions between
nomadic Tuareg communities and the governments in Niger and Mali,
leading to a series of rebellions in the past. The most recent
rebellions have ended, thanks to successful peace talks in both
countries, but AQIM may seek to exploit lingering resentment among the
Tuareg and to link up with existing rebel groups. How much of a concern
is this and what can be done to prevent such partnerships from forming?
Is there any risk that we could become a target of Tuareg grievances
and play into AQIM's hands if we are seen by them as too closely
associated with the government and specifically the military in Mali
and/or Niger?
Answer. Tuareg communities in Niger and Mali have not proven
receptive to
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) ideology or tactics. There
have been isolated instances where Tuaregs have tolerated AQIM's
presence in their areas or entered into temporary arrangements to
facilitate smuggling or other opportunistic trade. This dynamic has
been problematic in cases where AQIM has purchased goods locally and
provided small amounts of food and other consumables to generate good
will or at least tolerance among those living in the vicinity. However,
we have not seen a trend toward durable alliances or successful
recruitment of individual Tuaregs. In fact, there have been indications
that AQIM's murder of a Malian military officer this summer, the
unprecedented execution of a British hostage, and murder of an American
in Mauritania may have alienated certain groups in northern Mali that
occasionally did business with the group.
We recognize, however, that AQIM may wish to exploit low levels of
development and frustration produced by unmet economic expectations in
northern Mali. Furthermore, in Mali a political settlement of Tuareg
unrest is closely linked to promises of government attention and
resources to the underdeveloped north. Whether in service of countering
prospective extremism, or preventing renewal of tensions between the
Tuareg and the Government of Mali that could undermine the recently
solidified united front against AQIM, government development efforts in
northern Mali are important. We are also concerned that breakdowns in
the rule of law and poor economic conditions in certain areas have made
individual Tuaregs and non-Tuaregs receptive to AQIM offers of bounties
for hostages.
The United States has traditionally enjoyed good relations with
Tuareg communities and our strong ties with the Malian Government have
not negatively impacted those relations. Our Embassy in Bamako
implements a range of outreach initiatives, including radio
programming, with communities in the north that include Tuareg
populations. USAID and State Department resources support a range of
conflict resolution and development initiatives. In Niger, this has
included the ESF-funded U.S. Institute of Peace conflict mitigation
workshop held in Niamey in October 2008, which the High Commissioner
for Restoration of Peace personally credits for advancing peace talks
with rebel Tuareg groups. We have also been unequivocal during our
contacts with Tuaregs and government officials that we support peaceful
resolution of outstanding political and economic disputes.
Question. As you know, Niger is in the midst of a political crisis.
I am pleased that the administration has spoken out against the
disputed legislative elections there in October and President Tandja's
blatant disregard for democratic institutions. What is the
administration currently doing to press for the resolution of this
political crisis? And if it is not resolved soon, how will it affect
our ability to cooperate with Niger on counterterrorism matters?
Answer. Our Ambassador to Niger on several occasions has made it
very clear both to President Tandja and to other levels of the
Government of Niger (GON) that there will be consequences to President
Tandja's recent undemocratic actions. We are cutting off all bilateral
nonhumanitarian assistance to the government and have placed visa
restrictions on government officials who block Niger's return to
democracy. We also support the efforts of international and regional
organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the African Union, and the European Union, to pressure the
Nigerien Government to return to democracy. ECOWAS, for example, has
recently suspended Niger and sent a high-level mediator to start a
dialogue between the GON and the opposition. The United Nations
Secretary General offered for U.N. offices to work with regional
partners, in particular the African Union and ECOWAS, to find a
solution to this political crisis.
The current political situation limits the scope of our
counterterrorism engagement with Niger. Prior to the events of the last
several months, our military-to-military engagement had already been
severely curtailed following credible reports of human rights
violations by a Nigerien military unit. We anticipate using a similar
approach to that used in Mauritania after the August 2008 coup, where
security sector engagements were limited to low-profile activities that
addressed potentially imminent threats. Security-sector engagements
with longer term capacity-building objectives were halted.
Question. In the case of Chad, we are engaging with government that
has a troubling record with regards to the rule of law and respect for
human rights. As you know, the State Department's most recent human
rights report for Chad cites ``torture and rape by security forces''
and ``the use of excessive force and other abuses in internal conflict,
including killings and use of child soldiers.'' Given that record and
the lack of internal controls for accountability, does it make any
sense to provide new capabilities to Chad's military without
significant reforms? Outside of training and equipping the military,
what are the other ways we can engage with the government there to
strengthen the rule of law and law enforcement?
Answer. We continue to engage with the Government of Chad (GOC) on
its human rights record, in particular, because of its abuses by its
security forces and we do hold them accountable when abuse is
confirmed. The GOC has taken steps to address certain human rights
abuses, most notably the issue of child soldiers. The government, along
with UNICEF, has visited Chadian military barracks in recent months to
raise awareness on the issue of child soldiers and hand over child
soldiers to UNICEF. We continue to urge the GOC to launch initiatives
to eradicate child soldier recruitment and enforce the Chadian National
Army Law prohibiting such recruitment. The GOC has also made its own
attempts to reform the Chad Armed Forces (ANT) since February 2008,
including efforts to support ethnically mixed units, eliminate military
salaries to nonauthorized persons and enforce mandatory retirement for
long-serving generals to rationalize its command structure. The GOC has
further plans to retire some 300-500 colonels in the coming months.
The State Department seeks to ensure all Leahy vetting requirements
are met. The State Department conducts thorough Leahy vetting
procedures on any USG training of security officials or units, and has
denied trainings due to reported human rights abuses. In an advocacy
effort, we regularly discuss with the GOC our concerns with reports of
human rights abuses attributed to individuals in the Chadian Army
(ANT), including specifically with the PSI chain of command. Chad's
PSI unit and its new chain of command recently have been vetted and
cleared for training.
U.S. counterterrorism (CT) training will not provide Chad with new
capabilities, but will provide its CT unit with expertise and training
on combating terrorism. This training will have a multiplier effect on
our ability to achieve other U.S. strategic goals in Chad. Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) security assistance can
professionalize Chad's Armed Forces, including training on respect for
human rights, while making the exercise of state power more legitimate
in the eyes of the Chadian people and making Chad a more reliable
partner in efforts to reinforce regional security. Our programs allow
U.S. security experts to reach out to Chadian police, customs officers,
and other law enforcements officials as well as to the Chadian
military.
Governing justly and democratically is a USG strategic goal that
includes strengthening the rule of law in Chad. With limited Economic
Support Fund resources, we have provided support for the Justice
Ministry, and coordinate with our international partners, including the
EU, which has a 35 million euro project to strengthen Chad's judicial
system, including 4.8 million euros for training criminal
investigators, magistrates, court clerks and other justice personnel,
including those working in the penal system. For the rule of law to
take hold in Chad, a change in mentality needs to occur and this must
begin at an early age. Accordingly, we have supported the Education
Ministry's efforts to develop a standardized civics education
curriculum for Chad's schools, which led to the development of locally
produced textbooks for grades 1-12 currently being used throughout the
country.
______
Responses of Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin to
Questions Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. You acknowledged that sometimes our counterterrorism
training and assistance is used by governments in the Sahel ``to take
on antiregime rebels successfully.'' When we provide training or
assistance under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),
what mechanisms do we have to monitor and account for how governments
use these new capabilities? And can you provide a thorough description
of ways in which we have witnessed the use of our assistance by
governments against groups not connected to al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM)? This may be classified if necessary.
Answer. The fundamental goal under the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) remains that our assistance be
used specifically for counterterrorism (CT) purposes but we recognize
that such assistance, like training and equipping, is fungible. We
constantly monitor how our assistance is used and we remain vigilant to
any reports of abuse. We do make it clear that our assistance comes
with the price tag of the military operating under civilian control and
that the military operate under respect for human rights norms in a
bona fide and concrete manner.
We establish 505 End Use Agreements on how equipment can be used
and we vet the personnel to be trained under the auspices of the Leahy
law. We may also enter into a Memorandum of Understanding that will
spell out the intended use of this equipment or training. Use of this
equipment and the activities of the units is monitored on a continual
basis by our embassies, Global Combatant Command personnel, and by
visits from Washington-based officials. If a country acts in
contravention to these agreements we can place future engagement on
hold until the situation is clarified. We can also cancel or redirect
engagement as we have done in Mauritania and Chad in the past and are
doing currently with Niger.
The U.S. trained and equipped one Niger mobile light infantry
company in 2005, funded during the pilot program to the TSCTP, the Pan
Sahel Initiative. This company was active in providing security along
Niger's northern border, but was, at times, deployed against the
Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ) rebels which was conducting a low-
intensity fight predominately consisting of skirmishes, ambushes, and
mining of roads. At the time, the MNJ was a Tuareg-based rebel group
challenging central government authority over the issue of perceived
economic marginalization. The democratically elected Government of
Niger, with U.S. encouragement that included a conflict negotiation
workshop facilitated by the U.S. Institute for Peace, pursued several
rounds of peace talks with the MNJ and other rebel groups, resulting in
a de facto cease-fire, weapons handovers, and an executive order
providing amnesty to rebels and those who supported them, including
members of the Nigerien Armed Forces. In the end, the U.S. strategy was
successful in encouraging a peaceful end to the conflict.
In Chad, units trained and equipped the Pan Sahel Initiative, known
as PSI units, were utilized by the Chadian Government to thwart a
Sudan-backed rebel takeover of the capital and government; i.e., during
a national emergency. Upon learning that the government placed PSI
units under a different chain of command with a primary mission that
did not have CT as a core mission, we objected and halted assistance.
Eventually, Chad reorganized again and placed its PSI units under an
appropriate chain of command after the United States made it clear that
further assistance would be impossible without this change.
Question. In your assessment, what motivated AQIM's predecessor,
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, to formally merge with al-
Qaeda in 2006? And without getting into classified information, how
would you characterize the current relationship between AQIM and al-
Qaeda?
Answer. The decision to affiliate followed after the Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was increasingly marginalized by
Algeria's successful amnesty program and security operations. We
believe that first and foremost the GSPC saw linkage with al-Qaeda as
an attempt to enhance its recruiting ability by co-opting the name of a
larger, more notorious, and more famous terrorist organization, a move,
likely to secure steadier streams of financial and other types of
support. Shortly before and after the announced merger, AQIM conducted
an attack on a western oil worker bus (10 December 2006) and a car bomb
attack on the Algerian Prime Ministers office (April 2007) and the
attack on the United Nations compound in December 2007, which garnered
significant media attention, which seemed to underscored the new link
with al-Qaeda. However, AQIM has not been able to sustain these types
of large jihadist operations. AQIM has published many public statements
that heavily borrow from al-Qaeda's style and rhetoric, especially as
it pertains to a call for jihad in North Africa and the Sahel. However,
AQIM is different in that it still retains GSPC's focus on traditional
targets of the Algerian State as a practical matter while taking haven
in the northern regions of neighboring Mali.
Question. You mentioned a meeting with European partners in Paris
last month. Given France's historic relationship with many of the
countries in the region, its partnership in our overall
counterterrorism strategy is particularly important. Do we have the
same strategic priorities as France in the Maghreb and the Sahel? And
what is the day-to-day working relationship like between our embassies?
Answer. Strong French ties in this region remain pivotal and France
has expressed a sincere desire to cooperate with the United States in
this area of the world. The Paris meeting in September was the first
senior-level meeting that mapped out a way forward for such
cooperation.
Our strategic counterterrorism (CT) priorities in this region are
very similar, focusing as they do on building law enforcement, military
capacity and development. We expect that further meetings in the new
year will spell out more specific areas of cooperation in followup to
the information that we exchanged about our respective activities in
the reason.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary Vicki Huddleston to Questions
Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. As you've said, DOD is engaged, at different levels, in
training and equipping militaries across the Sahel for purposes of
counterterrorism. However, is there a risk that these militaries could
misuse their new capabilities, particularly to suppress groups with
arguably legitimate political grievances or opponents of governments?
To what extent is that risk considered before DOD decides to provide
training or equipment, and what steps can be taken to minimize that
risk?
Answer. DOD conducts a wide range of military cooperation
activities with partner nation militaries in Africa. These activities
span the spectrum from relatively simple outreach efforts (e.g.,
seminars and conferences), to training events and on to joint/combined
exercises. The principal objective of DOD military cooperation
activities is to work with our partner militaries in Africa to foster
stability, build capacity, and reduce threats. DOD achieves these goals
by promoting civil control and defense institutional reform, developing
professional militaries, and building or strengthening African security
capacities.
While military capacities can be a foundation for stability and
security in a society, there is always a risk that the capabilities, if
misused or misdirected, could be used to suppress legitimate political
processes or oppress rightful civil activities. DOD takes this risk
seriously, and works closely with the State Department to mitigate the
possibility of abuse. Both DOD and State Department monitors what Chad
does with the assistance the United States provides and does not
hesitate to inform the Chadian Government of the consequences should
any abuse be detected. In every case, DOD military cooperation events,
including section 1206 train and assist programs are closely
coordinated with the respective U.S. Embassy as well as
the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to
ensure that partner nation military participants; i.e., individuals and
units, are appropriately nominated, reviewed, and vetted by the State
Department in accordance with the requirements of the Leahy amendment
prior to their participation in a DOD activity.
Question. Chad is perhaps the most extreme example in this regard.
Since 2005, we have provided some training and equipment to Chad
through 1206 funds. However, DOD recently briefed committee staff that
it had to redirect some equipment originally intended for Chad because
we learned that a unit we had trained for counterterrorism was being
used for unrelated domestic purposes. As you know, Chad's security
forces have a poor human rights record with reports citing torture,
rape and the use of excessive force as well as the use of child
soldiers. Looking to the future, under what conditions, would we seek
to provide new training or equipment to the Chadian military?
Answer. This question refers to DOD plans to implement two section
1206 projects for Chad in FY07. The first was a tactical airlift
equipment package of $1.7M, which was processed and delivered. The
second was a combined $6.0M equipment and training package for a
counterterrorism (CT) unit in Chad. Delivery of the equipment to the
Chadian unit, a former recipient of U.S. assistance under the Pan Sahel
Initiative (PSI), was initially delayed due to instability surrounding
Chadian rebel attacks into Chad in February 2008. Following the attacks
and the government's successful effort to reestablish control over the
capital city of N'Djamena and other key areas, the government placed
their CT unit under a new chain of command with the primary mission of
regime protection.
In response to this unit's command and mission reorganization, the
USG interagency suspended CT cooperation with the unit due to concerns
that Chad had shifted the unit's primary focus away from CT activities.
By spring 2009 it was not clear when or if the CT unit would return to
its previous organization and CT mission, and DOD was incurring monthly
storage fees for the purchased equip-
ment. DOD and the State Department jointly decided in May 2009 to
redirect the original equipment and training package to Nigeria,
thereby reducing the FY09 section 1206 program cost by the amount of
the Chad package. The Secretary of Defense approved, the Secretary of
State concurred, and Congress was notified of the redirection.
In July 2009, Chad realigned the CT unit back into the main Chadian
Army chain of command and restored its primary mission to CT, which
allowed DOD to consider a measured resumption of the suspended security
cooperation program. DOD monitors what nations do with U.S.-provided
military training or equipment. DOD will continue to work closely with
the U.S. Embassy in N'Djamena and the Bureau of African Affairs at the
State Department to mitigate the risk of possible abuse by the Chadian
military. DOD also will work closely with the State Department to
ensure that Chadian military participants, both individuals and units,
are appropriately nominated, reviewed, and vetted in accordance with
the requirements of the Leahy amendment prior to their participation in
a DOD activity.
Question. As you know, there has been some suspicion throughout the
continent about AFRICOM's activities and intentions. As DOD carries out
its work in the Sahel, how are you seeking to address these suspicions?
What public diplomacy activities is DOD carrying out, and how are those
efforts coordinated with the efforts of State and USAID?
Answer. DOD provides information to the public regarding military
cooperation activities in Africa principally through its public affairs
system and the local U.S. Embassies. This public affairs effort is
conducted mainly through U.S. Africa Command, which coordinates all DOD
military cooperation activities in Africa. U.S. Africa Command
maintains a robust public affairs Web site (www.africom.mil) which
outlines the purpose, mission, leadership, and organization of the
command, as well as providing updates on U.S. Africa Command
activities, such as senior leader travel on the continent, conferences
and seminars, training events, and exercises. This Web site also
provides a discussion-thread forum by which the public can post
comments as well as questions that can be addressed by U.S. Africa
Command personnel--in many cases by the commander himself. In addition
to this Web site, U.S. Africa Command's Public Affairs office works
closely with U.S. Embassies to prepare, coordinate, and support press
coverage, both international and local, of DOD activities and events in
Africa.
DOD works closely with U.S. Embassies in the region in support of
the State Department's public diplomacy efforts. U.S. Africa Command
has deployed military personnel to several regional embassies to ensure
the official message being disseminated is consistent with U.S. foreign
policy and national security objectives. These Military Information
Support Teams coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission and Public
Diplomacy officer.
______
Responses of Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator Earl Gast to
Questions Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. As I understand it, most of USAID's work with the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is carried out by contractors or
grantees. Are there any challenges to the fact that this work is not
being carried out directly by U.S. Government employees? How does USAID
oversee this work and monitor the impacts?
Answer. Countering violent extremism is a relatively new area of
work for USAID, and we are providing training to our officers. This
work does not naturally fall under one technical specialty; rather it
touches on several technical areas in which USAID has vast experience.
TSCTP programs are cross-cutting and bring in elements of education,
conflict mitigation, governance, and media. TSCTP targets its
activities at youth, a population group with which USAID works
extensively across development sectors.
As with other USAID programming, our implementing partners--
contractors and grantees--use familiar development practices such as
training, community development grants, microcredit, and community
radio. Wherever possible, they work through local nongovernmental
partners and associations as a way to promote sustainability and
partnerships. These local organizations are becoming the primary
partners in TSCTP implementation, sometimes involved from the initial
design phase of activities. In some cases, it is these organizations--
not USAID or a U.S.-based NGO--that are executing the community-level
grants.
In the countries where USAID does not have a bilateral mission--
Niger, Chad, and Mauritania--TSCTP activities are overseen by USAID's
West Africa Regional Mission based in Accra, Ghana, in conjunction with
USAID's resident representatives in Niger and Chad. The program in Mali
is managed by the bilateral USAID mission in Bamako.
Along with reporting on the standard foreign assistance indicators
related to counterterrorism, USAID has developed custom indicators at
the country level to help monitor more incremental progress in TSCTP
programs. For these indicators, our implementing partners have gathered
solid baseline data against which progress is being monitored
quarterly. Additionally, USAID and the Departments of State and Defense
are utilizing more broad-based, independent polling data to gauge
general attitudes and support for violent extremist organizations. We
expect that this polling data will allow for a broader assessment of
the impact of TSCTP activities. Meanwhile, the impact of the program is
becoming evident in certain trends; for example, youth beneficiaries
are more involved in their communities and are working to involve their
peers in positive and constructive activities.
Question. About how many staff in USAID work on programs of the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in, respectively, Washington
and in each of the participant countries?
Answer. There are seven USAID staff working on TSCTP programs: An
advisor based in Washington to provide technical support; a program
manager and program assistant in Niger; one program manager and program
assistant in Chad; a program manager and program assistant in Mali; and
a regional program manager based in the West Africa Regional mission
based in Accra, Ghana. While all of these staff manage TSCTP programs
as their primary duties, they all have additional program
responsibilities.
Question. Do you think USAID's limited presence in the region
affects its ability to be an equal partner in shaping and implementing
the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership?
Answer. The USAID West Africa Regional mission based in Accra,
Ghana, manages numerous programs in West African countries where USAID
does not have a permanent mission; the TSCTP program is not unique in
this respect. In the countries where there are TSCTP programs, other
development projects are being implemented with strong results. For
example, in Chad, USAID efforts focus on governance, elections, and
conflict mitigation and reconciliation.
In these countries, USAID's resident representatives work closely
with the embassies, other agencies, and implementing partners to ensure
the appropriateness and quality of TSCTP program activities. In fact,
the way USAID operates in close partnership with local organizations at
the grassroots level makes it uniquely qualified to undertake these
activities. However, we would prefer a greater level of coverage on
TSCTP and are looking to increase the number of officers working on the
program.
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