[Senate Hearing 111-461]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-461
THE DIPLOMAT'S SHIELD: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN TODAY'S WORLD
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 9, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-150 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts
Lisa M. Powell, Staff Director
Joel C. Spangenberg, Professional Staff Member
Jessica K. Nagasako, Professional Staff Member
Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director
Thomas A. Bishop, Minority Professional Staff Member
Benjamin B. Rhodeside, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Senator Voinovich............................................ 2
WITNESSES
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State.................. 4
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S.
Government Accountbility Office................................ 6
Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann (Ret.), President, American Academy
of Diplomacy................................................... 21
Susan R. Johnson, President, American Foreign Service Association 23
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Boswell, Ambassador Eric J.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Ford, Jess T.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Johnson, Susan R.:
Testimony.................................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Neumann, Ambassador Ronald E. (Ret.):
Testimony.................................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 55
APPENDIX
Background....................................................... 77
Responses to questions submitted for the Record:
Ambassador Boswell........................................... 84
Ambassador Neumann........................................... 100
Ms. Johnson.................................................. 102
THE DIPLOMAT'S SHIELD: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN TODAY'S WORLD
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and
the District of Columbia to order.
I want to welcome our witnesses and thank you for being
here today. Today's hearing, ``The Diplomat's Shield:
Diplomatic Security in Today's World,'' will examine the
results of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of
the Department of State's Diplomatic Security Bureau, which
provides security for the State Department worldwide so our
diplomats can advance U.S. interests.
Since the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania in August 1998, and the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, Diplomatic Security's (DS) responsibilities
have grown and evolved. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
further increase the challenges of keeping our diplomats safe.
Last week, President Obama announced his new Afghanistan
strategy. Thirty-thousand U.S. troops will deploy in support of
this effort. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the
number of civilians in Afghanistan will triple by early next
year. DS must be fully prepared to support an even greater role
in protecting our civilians.
Over the last decade, DS's budget has increased almost 10-
fold, to about $2 billion, and its direct-hire staff has
doubled. Unfortunately, these extra resources have not
guaranteed DS's readiness. In particular, I have concerns in
three areas that I hope will be addressed today.
First, the State Department must address the ongoing
staffing challenges. GAO identified key workforce gaps that
hinder DS in carrying out its duties. Less than half of
Regional Security Officers serving in language-designated
positions meet their proficiency requirements. More than one-
third of diplomatic security positions are filled by officers
below the appropriate grade. And, there are personnel gaps at
domestic offices and at key posts overseas. I believe that DS
should invest more in its workforce by having enough people
with the experience and language skills necessary to fully
support its critical missions.
Understaffing leads to an over-reliance on contractors. GAO
found that there are 36,000 contractors that work in DS, which
is about 90 percent of Diplomatic Security's total workforce.
According to GAO, some DS employees are not prepared to manage
this large contractor workforce. Recent security lapses at the
U.S. Embassy in Kabul have illustrated the need for better
contractor oversight.
Second, the State Department must better manage the tension
between fulfilling its diplomatic operations and providing
strong security. Today, State Department employees serve in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other posts where they would have
previously been required to evacuate. These diplomatic
operations are critical to U.S. interests, but providing
security for such dangerous missions places a great burden on
DS.
Because of these dangers, some of our overseas posts
resemble fortresses and, for security reasons, may not be in
locations considered most appropriate and accessible for
diplomatic operations. GAO reported that some diplomats are
concerned that security measures make it more difficult for
visitors to attend U.S. embassy events, making person-to-person
engagement less likely. We must be mindful that the way our
diplomatic presence is seen and felt in other countries may
reinforce or undermine our broader diplomatic goals. It is
certainly critical that the United States protect its personnel
from threats, both on and off-post. Security, however, must be
carried out in concert with our diplomatic mission.
Finally, I want to emphasize the need for improved
strategic planning efforts within DS. I support GAO's
recommendation for the State Department to conduct a strategic
review of Diplomatic Security. The Department has already
stated that DS will benefit from the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review. I am looking forward to hearing more about
this from our State Department witness and how strategic
planning for DS can become a part of its culture.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
But first, Senator Voinovich, your opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Akaka, and I
appreciate your holding this hearing today. I have been
concerned about the management of the State Department, not
only as a Member of this Oversight of Government Management,
the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
Subcommittee, but also as a former member of the Foreign
Relations Committee and now on the Appropriations Committee on
the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.
I think that, too often, the management of some of our
agencies hasn't been given the consideration that they should
have been given. I know that Secretary Clinton has indicated
that she wants to move forward and improve the management, and
there is going to be a large number of people that are going to
be hired by the State Department. We are anxious to make sure
that they get the right people on board to get the job done,
and I think that is one of the reasons why we are here today
because we are concerned about the issue of diplomatic
security.
I move around the world and visit some of our embassies and
am very impressed with some of what I have seen and in other
instances, after reading this report, a little bit concerned.
It appears that the Bureau lacks the strategic planning and
with little capacity to prepare for future security needs. I
have talked this over with my staff and it seems that we just
have too many people that are under contract, although from
what we can tell, those that are under contract do a pretty
good job.
I know when I was in Iraq, I had Blackwater--and I asked
them who was the security. I was in a helicopter. I thought
maybe it was our guys. No, it was a private security operation.
I got out of the helicopter and got into a SUV and I wanted to
know, who is the security, and it is another private operation.
And I wanted to find out who was training the Iraqi
government's folks in the special unit and they were also hired
people. Of course, that was the Department of Defense.
So we would just like to look into how this is being looked
at by the State Department. I think the thing that bothers me
the most, and I think, Senator Akaka, you did a good job of
laying it out, is that it appears that the people that have
been brought on don't have the training that they need to get
the job done.
I know I spent a couple of hours over at the State
Department with Richard Holbrooke and visited with the people,
the team he is putting together to go to Afghanistan, and I was
impressed that he is taking his time and trying to make sure he
gets the right people and they are not in a big rush to just
bring people on, but try and find the right ones.
So I really would like to know just what percentage of the
people that are going to be doing this ought to be on the
government payroll and not private contractors. Are there too
many that are on the private payroll?
Second of all, can we do a better job of preparing those
individuals that we are asking to do this job? I understand
that it takes about 3 years to train somebody up for one of
these jobs.
And the other thing I am interested in is who decides
whether or not the private contractor is doing the job that you
are paying for? I have found that, too often, they have private
sector people on, and the question is, does the agency know
whether or not they are getting a return on the investment that
they are putting into that private sector.
So I am anxious to hear your testimony and the other two
witnesses to follow.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
I want to welcome our first panel of witnesses to the
Subcommittee today, Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, and Jess T. Ford,
the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the U.S.
Government Accountability Office.
As you know, it is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses and I would ask you to please stand and raise
your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this
Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Ambassador Boswell. I do.
Mr. Ford. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let it be noted in the record
that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Before we start, I want you to know that your full written
statements will be part of the record. I would also like to
remind you to please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes.
Ambassador Boswell, will you please proceed with your
statement.
TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR ERIC J. BOSWELL,\1\ ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Boswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
afternoon to you, sir, and to the Members of the Committee,
Senator Voinovich, as well. I am very honored to appear before
you today. I would like to thank you and the Committee Members
for your continued support and interest in the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security's programs. With Congressional support,
Diplomatic Security has been able to safeguard American
diplomats and facilities for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy
and maintain our robust investigative programs which serve to
protect the borders of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ambassador Boswell appears in the
Appendix on page 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With your permission, I will make this brief statement.
While Diplomatic Security continues to provide the most secure
environment possible for the conduct of America's foreign
policy, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening
remarks, the scope and scale of DS's responsibilities and
authorities have grown immensely in response to emerging
threats and security incidents. Increased resources were
necessary for the Bureau to meet the requirements of securing
our diplomatic facilities in the extremely high-threat
environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other
locations. The Department currently operates diplomatic
missions in locations where, in the past, we might have closed
the post and evacuated all personnel when faced with similar
threats.
As you may know, Mr. Chairman, I also served as Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security from 1995 to 1998. This is
not the same organization as when I left. It is far, far more
capable. Not only has DS grown in personnel and resources, it
has developed the organizational structure necessary to meet
all of the current challenges as well as those of the future.
The recently released Government Accountability Office
review of my Bureau correctly assesses that DS must do more to
anticipate potential and emerging global security trouble spots
in order to create risk management and mitigation strategies
that best focus our limited resources and prioritize security
needs. Such plans must also incorporate the strategic
management of the resources available for our Bureau to fulfill
its mission, both currently and in the future.
Two years ago, Diplomatic Security created the Threat
Investigations and Analysis Directorate to enhance our
intelligence analysis capability. This directorate concentrates
our threat analysis and intelligence gathering efforts under
one streamlined command structure and fosters closing working
relationships among all our analysts and those responsible for
investigating, deterring, and mitigating threats.
Our next challenge is to sharpen our focus, as you
mentioned, sir, not only on predicting future security threats,
but on planning in advance for the security solutions and
resources needed for tomorrow's crises and foreign policy
initiatives. Over the coming months, we will begin working
toward the development of a strategic planning unit charged
with ensuring that DS is even better positioned to support
future foreign policy initiatives and manage global security
threats and incidents.
At the same time, we must balance our resources and
security requirements to achieve an effective mix of highly-
skilled personnel while controlling costs associated with
requirements that have grown tremendously over the last 20
years. We are embarked on a new Bureau-wide planning process
that will allow us to better measure the performance of our
120-plus existing programs and utilize data to make better and
more informed resource decisions. Having decision-supported
data available will enable DS to determine how well current
programs and resources align with the Bureau's and the
Department's strategic goals.
DS is actively participating in the State Department's
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, (QDDR), that
Secretary Clinton has focused on improving the Department's
resources and training to ensure the right people for the right
job at the right time are in place to conduct diplomacy around
the world. We are also participating in the QDDR working group
responsible for the foreign affairs community's activities and
contingency response environments.
The Department of State operates increasingly in dangerous
locations, and this requires extensive resources to mitigate
the risk. Although DS's workforce has grown substantially over
the past decade, the fluid nature of the security environments
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan presents an ongoing
challenge to our program and staffing structures in those and
other posts.
To meet the challenge of securing U.S. diplomatic
operations under wartime conditions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other high-threat zones, DS relies on Worldwide Personal
Protective Services contract (WPPS), to provide protective
security, aviation support, and fixed guard services. These
contracts allow the scalability required for increased threats
or new operational requirements and provide specialized
services in extraordinary circumstances.
In recognition of the early challenges DS experienced in
contract oversight, specifically in Iraq, we have improved
contract officers representative training for all security
officer personnel and increased agent staffing in Iraq and
Afghanistan to directly supervise the personal security
contractors.
In addition, DS has established a new Security Protective
Specialist skill code, a limited non-career Federal employment
category designed to augment DS special agents by providing
direct oversight of WPPS protected motorcades in critical
threat locations where such resources are needed most. We are
similarly evaluating other staffing options to adequately cover
this important oversight function.
Although the Bureau is experiencing a surge in new
positions, uneven staff intake in the 1990s has resulted in
significant experience gaps in our agent and security
engineering corps. To limit the effects of this experience gap,
we have increased training and mentoring programs and carefully
identified personnel capable of serving in what we call stretch
assignments.
Over the past 10 years, the Bureau has embarked on an
ambitious recruitment and hiring program. We have increased our
outreach to colleges and universities with an eye toward
building a professional service that reflects America's
diversity. In order to quickly deploy highly-qualified
personnel into the field, we have revamped some of our training
programs and are carefully evaluating our entire agent training
program to ensure that the instruction provided to new and
existing DS special agents is relevant to the new realities of
our Bureau's mission.
DS continues to strive to meet the security needs of the
Department in increasingly dangerous locations by anticipating
needs and dedicating appropriate resources to accomplish our
mission. Through these changes, DS remains one of the most
dynamic agencies in the U.S. Federal law enforcement and
security community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to brief you
on the global mission of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and
on our unique ability to safeguard Americans working in some of
the most dangerous locations abroad and the taxing requirements
that we face. With your continued support, we will ensure
Diplomatic Security remains a valuable and effective resource
for protecting our people, our programs, facilities, and
interests around the world.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ambassador Boswell, for
your statement.
Mr. Ford, will you please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF JESS T. FORD,\1\ DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich. I
am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which is responsible for
protection of people, information, and property at over 400
embassies, consulates, and domestic locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears in the Appendix on
page 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 1998, and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East
Africa, the scope and complexity of threats facing Americans
abroad and at home has increased significantly. Diplomatic
security must be prepared to counter such threats, such as
crime, espionage, visa, passport fraud, technological
intrusions, political violence, and terrorism.
My statement today is based on our report, which we
released 2 days ago, and was requested by this Subcommittee. I
am going to briefly summarize our findings.
We found that since 1998, DS's mission and activities, and
subsequently its resources, have grown considerably in reaction
to the security threats and incidents that I just outlined. The
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the need to enhance the physical
security of our embassies and our facilities domestically, the
increased protection missions that DS has to undertake,
investigations of passport fraud and visa fraud, have all led
to significant budgetary and personnel growth.
Diplomatic Security's budget has increased 10-fold since
1998, from approximately $200 million to about $2 billion
today.
In addition, the size of DS's direct-hire workforce has
doubled since 1998. The number of direct-hire security
specialists, special agents, engineers, technicians, and
couriers has increased from approximately 1,000 in 1998 to over
2,000 today.
At the same time, the Diplomatic Security Bureau has
increased its use of contractors to support its security
operations worldwide, specifically through increases in their
guard force and the use of contractors to provide protective
details for American diplomats in high-threat environments.
As a consequence of this growth, Diplomatic Security faces
policy and operational challenges. First, DS is maintaining
missions in increasingly dangerous locations, necessitating the
use of more resources and making it more difficult to provide
security in these locations.
Second, although DS has grown considerably in staff over
the past 10 years, it still faces significant staffing
shortages in domestic offices. It still has a number of
language deficiencies of its staff. And it still has experience
gaps, as well as other operational challenges which need to be
addressed.
Finally, State has not benefited from good strategic
planning for the Bureau, which is an area that we made
recommendations for in our report.
We identified several operational challenges that impede DS
from effectively carrying out its missions. Just to cite some
examples, staffing shortages in its domestic offices. In 2008,
about one-third of DS's domestic offices operated with a 25
percent vacancy rate or higher. Several offices reported that
this shortage of staff affected their ability to conduct their
work, resulting in case backlogs and inadequate training
opportunities.
Foreign language deficiencies. As you cited in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman, we found that about 53 percent of the
Regional Security Officers overseas do not speak or read at the
level required of their positions, and we concluded that these
foreign language shortfalls could negatively affect several
aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including security operations. To
cite an example, an officer at one post told us that because
she could not speak the language, she had to transfer a
sensitive phone call from an informant on a potential criminal
activity to one of her locally-engaged staff.
Experience gaps. Our analysis showed that about 34 percent
of DS's positions, not including Baghdad, are filled with
officers below the position grade. For example, several
Assistant Regional Security Officers with whom we met in the
course of our work indicated that they did not feel adequately
prepared for their jobs, particularly with the responsibility
to manage large security contracts. We previously reported that
experience gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness.
Balancing security and diplomatic missions. DS's desire to
provide the best security possible to its staff overseas has at
times resulted in tension within the Department over its
diplomatic mission versus its security needs. For example,
Diplomatic Security has established strict policies concerning
access to facilities that usually include both personal and
vehicle screening. Some public affairs officers that we met
with indicated that they were frustrated that they could not
operate as freely as they would like, and this continues to be
a challenge within the Department in terms of balancing
appropriate security versus enhancing our diplomatic posture
outside the embassy walls.
In our view, the increasing growth and expanded missions
and operational challenges facing the Bureau require a
strategic review of the Department. While DS has undertaken
some planning efforts, we found that they had not adequately
addressed the resource needs or management challenges that we
outlined in our report. Several senior Diplomatic Security
officers indicated that DS remains largely reactive in nature,
stating that several reasons for the lack of long-term planning
was that they had to react to policy decisions made elsewhere
in the Department or in the White House or in the Congress.
Finally, past efforts to strategically plan at DS have not
resulted in good, solid strategic planning. We cited an example
in our report. In fiscal year 2006, DS indicated that it needed
to develop a workforce planning strategy to recruit, sustain
efforts, and find highly-skilled personnel and that they needed
to establish a training flow, which I can discuss later, to
help deal with staff shortages. We found, as of 2009, that
these issues had not yet been resolved.
In our report, we recommend that the Secretary of State, as
part of the Quadrennial Diplomatic Review, conduct a strategic
review of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its
missions and activities address the Department's priority needs
and address the challenges that we outline in our report.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy
to answer any of your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford.
Ambassador Boswell, last week, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton testified that the United States is on track to triple
the number of civilian positions in Afghanistan to 974 by early
next year. How will this large increase impact DS operations in
Afghanistan, and how much additional DS staffing will be
required?
Ambassador Boswell. Mr. Chairman, that will be a great
challenge to DS, as the surge in Iraq was some years ago. But
we have the advantage this time of having a little more advance
notice. We are going to be doubling the staff of our security
office in Kabul and we have, shall we say, a large resource
package included in the discussions that will go forward
regarding the budget for 2011. But it is a very significant
change.
At the moment, the DS agents in Afghanistan largely protect
the U.S. mission in Kabul. They do not have responsibilities
outside of Kabul. We, the U.S. Government, are going to be
opening up two new consulates in Afghanistan this year--next
year, I should say, in 2010, one in Mazari Sharif and another
one in Herat in the West. Those consulates will be protected by
DS agents. The civilian personnel that are further in the
field, mostly in the south and the east, are under the
protection of the military.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, the State Department
just announced its intention to find a new contractor to
provide security at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul after reviewing
allegations of misconduct and security lapses by the current
contractor. A prominent government watchdog group questions
whether embassy security in a combat zone should be handled by
the private sector instead of by government employees. Has the
State Department considered whether these positions in combat
zones should be performed in-house?
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, sir, we have. That contract, which
as you mentioned the Department has decided not to exercise a
renewal, an option year in that contract, is going to be
recompeted. It is going to be recompeted among guard companies.
I have to clarify that what we are talking about here are the
guards that provide the static security around the embassy in
Kabul. They man the guard posts around the embassy in Kabul.
They check the vehicles. They man the checkpoints. They screen
the people that are admitted to the compound. These are not the
people that provide bodyguard services that protect our people
when we move. These are the fixed-post guards.
Around the world, that function has been provided by
contractors for many years. I don't see any real chance that
they could be provided by direct-hire U.S. Government employees
or military simply because there are so many. You mentioned the
number of people we have in DS, and the proportion of which are
contractors. Out of the 34,000 people that you mentioned,
something like, I think, 32,000 are these fixed-post guards
that guard embassies around the world, just like the fixed-post
people that stand outside the Capitol or around the State
Department, and that has been a successful program for many
years.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, according to the GAO
report, DS is planning to replace some contractors with Federal
employees. Please tell us more about DS's plans for reducing
the number of contractors.
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, sir. I think it is fair to say
that the civilian surges in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also in
Pakistan, which we haven't mentioned quite yet, severely
challenge DS from the point of view of stretching us and making
very great demands on our resources. And I think DS did
extremely well in stepping up to the plate and meeting those
challenges. But I think one of the places where we could have
done better and we didn't was in the administrative--in
providing the administrative tail that supports the teeth, the
agents in the field.
And this was pointed out in a recent State Department
inspection, also, of DS, that we had under-resourced the
administrative management end, mostly in the States, in both
headquarters and our field offices. So we are significantly
increasing the number of direct-hire people for positions that
have in the past been filled by contractors.
By contractors, I don't mean guards. I don't mean
bodyguards. I mean, these are administrative and technical kind
of positions--secretaries, analysts, this sort of stuff.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Ford, your report states that when the
United States removes its remaining forces from Iraq by the end
of 2011, it will impact Diplomatic Security's operations. What
specific challenges do you foresee?
Mr. Ford. Well, we haven't seen the plan yet for exactly
how that withdrawal is going to be--how it is going to be
impacted in terms of the civilian side. As the military
withdraws, DS already has a very large presence in Iraq. We
believe that it will affect DS because some of the protective
services that the military may be providing currently could be
transferred over to DS, but we don't have any specific
information with regard to what the staffing implications of
that might be.
In our report, we had indicated that DS had 81 special
agents in Iraq, which is by far the largest number of any
overseas post. So the point we were making in our report is
there is likely to be some implications for DS as we withdraw
our forces from Iraq, just like there will be as we surge into
Afghanistan. But we have not yet been briefed on what the
actual numbers will be and what the resource implications might
be for providing protective services in Iraq once our military
starts to withdraw.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, would you have anything
to add to that question?
Ambassador Boswell. Only to say that it is certainly a
major challenge facing us. As the military withdraws, we, the
Department, will take over certain functions that are now
performed by the military, and I can give you an example. The
police training function, which is currently done by the
military, will be handled by the Department. That will mean a
significant increase in the number of direct-hire U.S.
Government employees and contractors that will be assigned to
the embassy in Baghdad and also around the country, and that
will be a big challenge for us because they will have to be
protected. This is a significant staff increase and these
folks' business is not in Baghdad. It is out in the
countryside, and we will have to protect them. We are seeking
the resources necessary to do that.
There is a very active planning operation regarding Iraq in
2010. It is department-wide. We are very much a part of it and
this aspect is one of the things that we are considering very
closely.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. One of the things that always bothered
me about Iraq was the lack of planning documented in several
books, Assassins Gate, The Fiasco, and a few others. We were
lucky that toward the end, we got our act together, and it
seems to me that we are doing a much better job of preparing
for the mission in Afghanistan.
Do you have a critical plan put in place? You mentioned
that you know in terms of Iraq who is going to leave; so you
are in a green zone and you know how much security is being
provided by the military, but when they are gone, how are those
people going to be taken care of. I don't think very much was
said about the number of people that we are going to leave in
Iraq that may continue with provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs). But has somebody really sat down on a piece of paper
and scoped it out so that you have confidence that once troops
are received in 2011, that you are going to be able to take
care of your folks?
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, we are, Senator. As I mentioned,
there is a very active planning program that is going on, not
only in the Department, but involves Ambassador Chris Hill's
staff in Baghdad, as well. I think it is reasonable to say here
that the Department will have a significant presence in the
countryside. It is likely that we will open up new consulates
which do not exist now. And it is also likely that there will
be some, what we are going to call Enduring Presence posts,
which is where State Department employees will be out in the
countryside, and we are very actively planning, one, for that,
and two, how we are going to protect them.
Senator Voinovich. Is there any paper anywhere that we
could look at that would kind of give us the long-range plan
and the commitment in Iraq so that we have some idea of where
folks are going and how long we anticipate their being there?
Ambassador Boswell. I am not aware of any paper that
exists. This is a planning process that is going on. I don't
think I could tell you that there is a formal roadmap out there
yet, but I do know that the planning is going on and is being
factored into the President's 2011 budget request.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a good
idea for us to talk maybe with Foreign Relations or to really
get an idea of just what the commitment is going to be made in
Iraq once the troops leave there.
The other thing that I think that hasn't been underscored
in the President's presentation, or quite frankly, I don't
think it has been brought up. I have seen some of the other
hearings. What are the plans that we have to move folks out to
do the PRTs and the government infrastructure building and so
forth that we have in Afghanistan? How long do we think that we
are going to need to do that in order to stabilize those
communities? It is a big part of it, I think. We talk about the
military side of this, but I think that we may not be as candid
as what we should be.
In other words, the information that I got was that we are
probably going to have to have folks there for a longer period
than what the President presented, though I wholeheartedly
support the idea of putting the pressure on them to get them to
do the things that they are supposed to be doing. But this
recent comment by Karzai about the fact that we are going to
have to be there for a long time, and one of the things that we
are not talking about is if we have an Afghanistan army, we are
going to have to pay for it. They haven't got the money to pay
for it. It is a little bit different than Iraq.
But beyond that--you are going to have a lot of people over
there, and I would be very interested in knowing, because of
this very good plan that was shared with me, what are you going
to do to make sure that when they get out in the boonies, that
they are being taken care of?
I did hear that you are going to initially rely on the
military, is that right?
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, sir. The arrangement that has been
made is that the Diplomatic Security are responsible for the
staff that are at the embassy in Kabul and associated missions
in Kabul and also our two consulates, the two future
consulates. And as you said, sir, I think we are going to be
there quite a long time.
But the protection for the civilians that are embedded with
the military in the field is provided by the military. I think
the rule of thumb is something like about 10 civilians per
battalion out there, 8 to 10, something like that. I am sure it
is not cookie-cutter, but that is roughly the number, and those
people will be protected by the military.
Senator Voinovich. You indicated that you have done an
analysis of the people that should be governmental and
replacing contractors. Do you have that anywhere written down,
about what somebody did? Have you made some decisions to say,
we are going to have people that are going to be on the Federal
payroll rather than have contractors, is that correct?
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, sir. I want to clarify that is not
wholesale replacement of a lot of contractors. What has been
the subject of controversy is the degree to which the U.S.
Government relies on contractors, largely in the field, and
that, I am afraid, is not going to change from a security point
of view. We really have no alternative to using contractors
both as our fixed-post guards, and I don't think really any
substantive reason not to use contractors for that purpose, but
also as a sort of force multiplier for us so that we can deal
with protecting our people when we get surges like this.
For example, there are something like 1,000 bodyguards,
including the ones who protected you when you were there, in
Iraq right now. That number can go up and down and change. I
don't see any way that those contractors will be replaced by
direct-hire people. The Commission on Wartime Contracting is
looking at that, among other things, and I don't imagine that
they are going to come up with an alternative to that.
Senator Voinovich. May I ask you something?
Ambassador Boswell. Sure.
Senator Voinovich. You say it has been happening for a long
time, and you might comment on it, but has somebody really sat
down and looked at a piece of paper and said, these folks are
costing us X number of dollars, they have certain competencies
that we need, compared if they were direct hires, and how does
that work out from a dollars and cents point of view? In other
words, you are saying, basically, we are going to stay with
those people. We have been with those people. Has anybody ever
thought of developing a cadre of individuals within the
Department that could do the same thing, and is there a reason
that you don't want to do that in terms of recruitment or cost?
Is it really cheaper to hire these people?
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, sir. I want to--that is a long and
complex subject, but I will do my best to answer it. And right
off the top, I need to make very clear the differentiation
between fixed-post guards, to man a perimeter, and the
bodyguards, who are much more controversial, the Blackwaters of
this world.
There is no question--I don't think I need a study to tell
you that hiring Ghanaians to stand fixed-post around our
embassy in Accra--which is what happens in every single country
in the world except the combat zones, that is, except for
Afghanistan and Iraq--that hiring local nationals is far
cheaper than trying to hire some American contractor who will
put Americans in there. Not only that, it is not necessary.
These are contractors who--and some of them are under
personal services agreements, they don't work for a guard
company.
Senator Voinovich. And, by the way, that has reminded me.
Senator Akaka, when you have traveled, you are right. They have
a lot of folks, professionals that have been attached to the
embassies for years that are nationals that are providing
security. Thanks for reminding me of that.
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, indeed, and that is the great bulk
of the contractors. They go home at night. They don't go into
some guard camp somewhere.
Senator Voinovich. So the fact is, it is cheaper.
Ambassador Boswell. It is much cheaper, infinitely cheaper.
Now, the second category is the security guards, the
bodyguards--Blackwater, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy. There has
been a question of whether it is cheaper to do it with
Americans on contract, or perhaps U.S. military--and I believe
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) came out with a study
last year in which they put up the true cost, or as best they
could get to it of the true cost of a civilian contractor,
bodyguard, and a military person, and when it came out, it was
very close to the same.
Obviously, if we substituted military, that is 1,000 new
military in Iraq at a time when we are drawing down the
military, it is really not very practical.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Mr. Ford, you testified that GAO identified both domestic
and overseas DS offices with significant staffing gaps. I want
to set the stage for why this issue is so important. Would you
please describe how these staffing shortfalls could affect our
diplomatic missions and the security of State Department
personnel? And I would like to ask for any additional remarks
from Ambassador Boswell, as well, on this.
Mr. Ford. Most of the staffing gaps that we identified in
our work tended to be in the domestic offices here in the
United States. I think, typically, what was happening was that
DS would receive protective missions for things like the
Olympics, or they needed to staff positions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, which was their highest priority, and they tended
to use agents that were here on domestic assignments. And so
the domestic offices here that are responsible for things like
passport fraud, visa fraud, other investigatory-type missions
that DS has, those were where the shortfalls tended to be in
terms of the mission.
So we had some examples we cited in our report. I think one
of the examples, as I recall, was in the Houston field office,
which we indicated they had about a 50 percent staff vacancy
last year. When we consulted with them about what the
implications of that, they told us that it resulted in case
backlogs on such things as the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative.
So some of the implications of the DS having to shift
resources to conduct, say, work in Afghanistan and Iraq by
taking people from the domestic offices, resulted in mission
shortfalls here domestically, and that is probably where most
of the impact occurred, based on our analysis.
Now, we also visited a number of overseas locations in
which we talked to a number of DS folks and other embassy
employees at various overseas missions that were not
necessarily the highest priority, compared to Pakistan, Iraq,
and places like that. DS officials told us a lot of their folks
were shifted over to work in those locations which had some
negative implications in terms of what Regional Security
Officers (RSOs) wanted to do with their individual locations.
We also found that it impacted DS's ability to provide
sufficient training for all of its staff because there isn't a
sufficient training float within DS--and, by the way, this is a
State Department-wide problem, it is not unique to DS--where
staff are not able to get the training they need because they
need to go overseas and immediately fill a position, which in
some cases resulted in people that may not be as experienced as
they should be to fulfill that mission, and we cited some
examples in our report of people telling us, I am not sure I am
fully trained to do my job. I am going to have to learn from
the job training what I need to do here.
So those are some of the, I guess you could say, negative
implications of staffing shortages that DS is faced with
because of these other higher priorities.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, do you have anything to
add to that?
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, sir. I think it is true, as I
mentioned earlier, that the challenge, the stress of trying to
staff up major initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan had a
downstream effect, or backstream effect. We were dealing with
our highest challenge. We were dealing with our highest
priority.
It is true that it caused some vacancies in domestic field
offices. I think we have gone a long way toward addressing
that. Our vacancy rate in the field offices is much lower now
than the figures used in the GAO report, which were, I think,
for 2008. We have a vacancy rate in the domestic field offices
now of 16 percent Foreign Service and Civil Service and we are
working to close that last remaining gap.
I would like to take a little issue with what Mr. Ford said
in terms of training. I don't think any DS agent had their
training cut short, that is, their agent training cut short to
go to any assignment overseas. We just wouldn't do that. But I
think where we did fall short is on the issue of language. And
I know, Senator Voinovich, this is something that you are very
interested in and that the Director General testified about
before this Committee several weeks ago.
The GAO report accurately points out that we have about 50
percent of the DS jobs overseas that are language designated
that do not have people that have tested at that level. And I
think there was some curtailment of language training or
waivers put into place to get people out.
Having said that, as I mentioned at the top, I was in this
job 10 years ago at a time when there were very few Diplomatic
Security positions overseas that were ever language-designated.
It was just not part of the deal. And I am very pleased now to
see that the Bureau and the corps of agents has evolved in a
good direction in the sense that many more agents are getting
language training, including hard language training--Chinese--
over a long period of time. That had not been done in the past.
Now we are still catching up. There are a lot of positions
that were language-designated that we haven't had the chance or
the time--they haven't been designated long enough for us to be
able to put people with that kind of training in. But I can
assure you that it is a very high priority of mine of making
sure that agents get the right kind of language training to go
to their posts. The human resources people at the State
Department are very much adhering to this, as well. There are
much fewer language waivers that are being approved. But we
have a certain amount of catching up to do in that regard.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador, senior diplomats worldwide have
been provided fully-armored cars to protect them from terrorist
attacks. Both Ambassador Neumann and Ms. Johnson state that in
some situations, the use of high-profile armored vehicles may
put our diplomats at greater risk. Also, in some cases, these
vehicles may not be the correct ones for the local terrain.
Is Diplomatic Security also hearing these concerns, and are
there steps DS can take to provide more flexible, lower-profile
security wherever it is appropriate?
Ambassador Boswell. Yes, sir. One of the other bits of
culture shock I had coming back to this job after 10 years'
absence was to find, as is mentioned in the report, that
whereas 10 years ago, there were a very relatively small number
of armored vehicles out in the field--there are a relatively
small number of embassies where the ambassador rode in an
armored vehicle--now it is thousands of armored vehicles, and
certainly every ambassador is required to have an armored
vehicle, and in many places it is more than one. I think we
have 3,000 armored vehicles, maybe more than that, in the
field, mostly in the combat zones, as is appropriate.
In terms of what kind of vehicles, I think it is a fair
criticism. We are to some degree limited, I have to remind the
panel, we are limited by America. The kind of American vehicle
that you can put heavy armoring on is a Chevy Suburban, and
that is a lot of what is out there.
I think we have made a good deal of progress. We do have
some other kinds of vehicles, particularly in places where we
are exempt from Buy America because of right-hand drive, for
example--Pakistan is a place like that--but also we are, I
think, making a lot of progress in mixing up the kind of
vehicles that we are using, a combination of high-profile, low-
profile vehicles, and vehicles much better adapted to the
terrain, as you mentioned. I think that is a fair criticism,
but I think we are moving in the right direction on that.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Boswell.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. I would just like to get back to
the issue of the training float. How is the Department coming
on that? I mean, that impacts you, but it impacts everybody
else, too.
Ambassador Boswell. The training float has been a dream of
department managers for many years. I think the Department got
some training positions on a one-time basis in 2009 and DS got
its share of those positions, but that is a one-time shot. We
have never been able to maintain, you could call it a training
float--it has had many other names over the years--Man in
Motion. It is not just training. There are always gaps between
assignments in the Foreign Service. It is just the nature of
the game. There are leaves. There is training. There is home
leave. And there are the complications that result from trying
to match up a departure date with an arrival date. And so those
gaps exist and it would be nice to have that kind of float, but
I don't think--we have never seen it.
Senator Voinovich. In terms of the language gap, either you
hire new people that have the languages or you take the people
that are there and you upgrade their language skills. In order
to do that, you have to give them time off for that to occur,
which means that if they are not doing their job, then somebody
else has to do it. You are saying that, still, you are not to
the point where you are robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Ambassador Boswell. No, sir. I didn't mean to imply that at
all. The Department has always had it as a matter of principle
that we will train our people. If people come on board with
languages, that is fine. That is great. But we will train our
people, including the DS agents, and we intend to train our
people to the language required by the position.
We have taken steps such as, for example, advertising world
language--advertising means putting out a list that DS agents
can compete for, can express their preferences for jobs, in
which we have world language lists advertised well ahead of
time so that we can properly put people into training to
fulfill a language requirement.
Senator Voinovich. Just one other thing, just for
information purposes. You have an embassy and they have people
with various jobs. You have people from the CIA, and you have
people from the military. Then is there somebody that has a
special slot for your operation in each of the embassies, that
is kind of the security coordinator?
Ambassador Boswell. Almost every embassy in the world has
what is called a Regional Security Officer. That is the chief
security officer for the embassy. It is always a DS agent. Some
of them are very senior and manage enormous operations. Some of
them are very small. But there is a RSO at virtually every
post.
My dad was the head of Security years ago for the State
Department when there were, in the 1960s, probably 20 security
officers in the field in the Department, in the Foreign
Service, and they were truly regional because there were only
about 20 of them. But there is nothing regional about the jobs
now. There are very few security officers that are responsible
for more than one country. Regional Security Officers are the
chief security official and the chief----
Senator Voinovich. And they are State Department employees
that are----
Ambassador Boswell. Always.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. So really, in effect, if that is
the case, that is the group of people that you are trying to
bring on board and train up to take on these positions, would
that be----
Ambassador Boswell. That is right. We have about 700 agents
in the field, security officers in the field. About a little
under half of our entire agent population is in the field, and
the ones that are stateside spend a lot of time doing temporary
duty (TDY) in the field.
Senator Voinovich. I don't have any other questions.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, in August my staff
traveled to U.S. embassies and consulates in the Near East and
Central Asia and saw firsthand posts that looked like
fortresses. Of course, strong security measures are necessary
to protect embassy personnel. Nonetheless, our diplomats
informed my staff that these posts make it more difficult to
build relationships with the local population, either due to
stringent security standards or the relative inaccessibility of
these posts.
How do we build better relationships and increase our
public diplomacy while ensuring that posts are well protected?
Ambassador Boswell. Mr. Chairman, my responsibility is the
security part of the balance, but it is a balance that we are
trying to reach and we in security try to play our part in
helping the Foreign Service, the rest of the Foreign Service,
achieve that balance.
Having said that, I think if somebody was here from the
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operation that is responsible for
building embassies, they would tell you that they work very
closely with Diplomatic Security to try to produce designs and
buildings and standards that are more, what shall I say,
approachable, humane, a little less of the fortress.
But you have got to understand, also, that in the wake of
the terrorist attacks on our embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania
in 1998, the Congress mandated new standards for buildings and
the Department went through an incredibly intense building
program. I think we built 50 new embassies, or maybe it is 60--
65 new embassies, thank you, in the last several years. And to
do that in an economical way, much use was made of something
called a standard embassy design. A standard embassy design is
not very pretty, I will tell you that right now. It is very
functional. And many of the embassies that your staff saw in
Central Asia were certainly of that kind of design.
I do think that we have made a lot of effort in the
Department, have made a lot of effort to make these buildings a
little less fortress-like, but, Senator, I am a big fan of very
secure buildings. When I get a threat, when I sit in my morning
meeting and look at threats in new places, one of the first
questions I ask is, what kind of building do we have there to
protect our people? And I am very reassured when it is one of
these new buildings.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ambassador Boswell, Ambassador
Neumann stated in his written testimony that the State
Department needs to give its deploying officers secure
communication devices to be used in the field, because officers
currently rely on the military for these capabilities. Is the
Department considering doing this, and are there any obstacles
to moving forward on this?
Ambassador Boswell. We have a capability, fly-away packages
that we use for secure communications in certain instances, for
example, when the Secretary travels. But they are not in
general use, as Ambassador Neumann pointed out in his
statement.
The State Department personnel in the field in Afghanistan,
for example, as I mentioned, are closely linked to the military
and do use the military communications. We need to do some more
on our side, though. I think some things are being done. We
have just, for example, in Afghanistan, made available our open
net, which is not classified--it is sensitive, but
unclassified, but nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction--to all the people that we have in Afghanistan.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Ford, the GAO report identified the
challenges DS faces of balancing security with State's
diplomatic mission. Do you have any recommendations on how DS
and State's diplomatic corps can best achieve this balance?
Mr. Ford. Well, we haven't got a report that has a
recommendation in it on this issue. I think, based on working
in this area for many years, I think the key thing here is
communication. There is sometimes miscommunication that occurs
between security folks that work for DS and the diplomatic side
of the house, which is trying to accomplish an outreach mission
or reach a broader audience in an individual country, and in
many cases, there is just a lack of communication about what
types of security is necessary for them to conduct their work
and how to get outside the building.
So, I mean, I would say, at a minimum--and this may be a
training issue--we need to make sure that our security folks
are sensitive to what the diplomatic mission is and we need to
make sure our diplomatic folks are sensitive to security, the
security mission that DS has.
When you talk to both DS officials in the field and State
Department employees in the field, I often hear perceptions
that indicate that one doesn't really understand what the
other's job is, and as a consequence, there are sometimes some
negative viewpoints on both parts with regard to what the
mission is overseas. So I think the main thing is to make sure,
through training and through other communication mechanisms,
that the Department makes it clear there are certain reasons
why we have security standards in our embassies and in our
packages for people that want to go outside the embassy. And I
think on the DS side, there needs to be an understanding that
we want to outreach to the local population there because we
have other diplomatic objectives. So in my mind, communication
is the key.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much. That was my final
question.
Senator Voinovich. Do you have a criterion that you use in
terms of where you are going to build the new embassies? By
that, I mean I was in China in 2005 and they were building a
new embassy 45 minutes outside of Beijing and it is just a long
distance away. Currently--or maybe they have already moved--it
was downtown, very close to other embassies. So it is now way
out somewhere else. Is there something that you could go to to
say that we made the decision to move it there for 10 different
reasons, or is there a standard? In Macedonia, they got one of
the prize pieces of property in the area way out, I think in a
residential area, to build their new--it is probably built,
too, but what is the criteria that you use about where you put
these places?
It gets back to something I am going to ask the next panel
about, is that you get them way out someplace where you are not
close to the business area or maybe other embassies. Does
anybody weigh that in terms of its location and the image that
it is going to create?
For example, the biggest one was the one we built in Iraq.
I mean, who in the devil ever figured to build that thing? What
was the basis for their building it?
Ambassador Boswell. The short answer to your question,
Senator, is that there is a standard and it does govern, to a
large degree, where we put our embassies, and that is the
requirement, the classic requirement, well known, for a 100-
foot setback between our buildings, buildings occupied by
Americans, and the edge of the property where the wall is. That
is an essential, in fact, probably the most important security
measure that I can put into place is that 100-foot setback.
And, of course, that means if you are going to have a
significant embassy, that means you need a significant piece of
land, and a significant piece of land of that size is often
very difficult to find. So it is true that new embassies, and
as I mentioned before in my testimony, there have been an awful
lot of new embassies built, that many of them are not right in
the downtown core. I would put in parenthetically that the one
in Beijing is in the downtown--Beijing is a pretty big city,
but it is not in some field. It is in town and is, in fact, in
an area where a lot of other embassies are being developed.
Senator Voinovich. You are talking about the new one?
Ambassador Boswell. The new one. I am very intimately
familiar with it.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Well, that is good news to me,
because I was told that they were building it way out and it
would take the ambassador 35 or 40 minutes to come down to
meetings and----
Ambassador Boswell. I think, it was not being built way
out. It is just that Beijing is a very big city and it has been
built in a different part of town. And it is true that it is
farther away from the ambassador's residence. But in terms of
where it is in Beijing, it is in a very active area--the
Intercontinental Hotel is right across the street from it, and
several other embassies.
It is also true, I think, that while we do have embassies
that are distant--that has been one of the byproducts of
building these new embassies--towns and cities grow up around
embassies. I was part, years ago, of putting together the real
estate package for our embassy in Oman, a critical high-threat
post at the time, brand new embassy. We got a lot of criticism
for having to put together a site that was half-an-hour away
from the downtown location where the old, very difficult to
defend embassy was. And the site was in a bunch of tomato
fields owned by local farmers, and it was a 13-acre site. And I
went back to that site last year where the new embassy has been
in place for 15 years and the town has grown up around it. It
is a highly prestigious area of Oman with an enormous number of
other buildings around it, including prestigious buildings.
So I am not saying that happens in every case, but that
certainly happened there.
Senator Voinovich. And some, like in the U.K., in London,
that prized piece of property, the State Department folks said,
we are going to get so much money for this that it will help
pay for the new embassy.
Ambassador Boswell. That is right, sir. But the reason for
the new embassy was simply that the existing embassy is
extremely----
Senator Voinovich. Too close to the street.
Ambassador Boswell [continuing]. Difficult to protect,
almost impossible to protect well. About as much unattractive
barbed wire and barriers and things have been put around that
rather classic, famous embassy, and there is a real threat in
London, as we have witnessed in the last few years. So that
embassy is being sold--I think it has been sold, though we are
still in it. A rather remarkable new site has been found.
Senator Voinovich. I have seen it.
Ambassador Boswell. Centrally located and expensive.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
I want to thank our first panel for being here today. Your
responses will be helpful as we continue to review DS. And
again, I thank you and wish you well in your positions. Thank
you.
Now, I would like to call up panel two. Our second panel of
witnesses are Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, the President of
the American Academy of Diplomacy, and Susan R. Johnson, the
President of the American Foreign Service Association.
As you know, it is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear
in witnesses and I will ask you to stand and raise your right
hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the
Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Ms. Johnson. I do.
Ambassador Neumann. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let the record note that the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Before we start, I want you to know that your full written
statement will be part of the record. I would also like to
remind you to please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes.
Ambassador Neumann, will you please proceed with your
statement.
TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR RONALD E. NEUMANN (RET.),\1\ PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY
Ambassador Neumann. Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich,
thank you for inviting me to appear again before you. As you
know, I am not a security specialist. Rather, I speak to you as
one who has lived with security issues, been under fire, and
served in three critical threat posts, two as Ambassador.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ambassador Neumann appears in the
Appendix on page 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, however, I would like to pay special tribute to the
brave and hard-working RSOs and ARSOs, security officers, who
have protected me and my mission in dangerous times. I also
would like to acknowledge my respect for the people of DynCorp
and Blackwater, who protected me in Iraq and Afghanistan. They
performed with courage, judgment, and restraint, and one lost
his leg in the process. Whatever fault now attaches to others,
I owe all those gallant men, State Department and contractor
employees, my gratitude, and I wanted to have this moment to
express it.
To sum up, the problems that I wanted to talk about are the
inadequate security communications that you referred to in the
previous panel; security mobility issues, especially the need
for expanded air assets that may be required; utilizing local
security forces for PRTs and branch posts; and accepting some
greater degree of risk when the gains warrant; and finally, the
consideration of funds for security emergencies.
The GAO report observed the changing security conditions
that govern our life, and that has produced a vast expansion of
security facilities and resources. But there are still gaps
between some of our standards and practices and the needs that
we have to serve. We lack the standards, not the equipment, to
provide secure, deployable, computer-based communications. We
have had this problem for years and we have never solved it. We
have delegated it to the military, but that is going to be a
problem as they go away. And, frankly, we have people serving
with allied militaries that don't have compatible, secure
communications.
This is a bureaucratic issue. This is an issue of
willpower. The military protects the exact same secrets in
deployable circumstances. It is time for State to summon the
willpower to resolve the bureaucratic problems involved and
find a way to send deployable secure computers to the field
with our officers. I would add, this is not exclusively a DS
problem. This is a problem between bureaus and standards.
You raised the comment in the previous panel from my
testimony about our vehicles. I think we have made progress in
Afghanistan and Iraq on the mix of vehicles. I think we still
have a problem in some areas. I am probably a little out of
date. I know DS has made a good deal of progress on that and I
think it is something that needs close attention and further
follow-up work.
I would note that part of the problem is also a
congressionally-mandated problem. That is the Buy America
standards. But Congress has supported waivers and changes and I
hope you will continue to do that.
As the military redeploys from Iraq, we are going to face
complex issues of how to handle protection for our movements.
State may need much more robust vehicle maintenance
capabilities than it now has, and I think State should consider
having greater air assets of its own, both fixed and rotary
wing, in these critical threat areas.
I understand there is some planning going on for this, but
many issues remain to be settled and future funding is a
significant issue. These resources and the authorities to use
them wisely need to be thought about now and budgeted for.
Supplemental budgets are not the answer. They are neither
sustainable nor dependable for year-to-year operating costs.
This problem, as you well know, goes to everybody,
Administration and Congress alike, but really, it is time to
stop flinching from the requirement to pay for the mitigation
of the dangers we ask our personnel to accept.
Operating in areas like Afghanistan and Iraq requires we
adopt new ways of thinking about risk. Our Foreign Service
officers are not soldiers, but our Nation's need for informed
judgments on complicated economic and political subjects does
not end when risk arises. And you cannot coordinate effectively
over the telephone with foreigners that work on face-to-face
and personal relationships.
We are hampered not only by issues of numbers of vehicles
and shortages of RSOs, but by our self-imposed standards, often
described informally as zero tolerance. We have avoided the
problem in the field by turning over the security to the
military so that our people are moving on different standards
than those which we would use if they were secured by RSOs. But
as the military withdraws from Iraq and we are on our own, or
as we establish branch posts in Afghanistan, we are going to
face increased problems.
I want to be clear. I do not advocate that we easily assume
high levels of risk for civilians, and I absolutely would be
opposed to ordering officers to take risks they consider
unreasonable. But we must find better answers than we have to
date. We have made progress in Iraq. We have too many places
where we have 48-hour requirements still for movements in
cultures that don't make appointments 48 hours in advance for
necessary work.
We have to have standards that allow for the use of
judgment in weighing the risk of doing something against the
grain to be derived from the action. I want to be clear. I am
not criticizing the excellent RSOs who worked for me. They did
a fine job. I hope we are beyond the issues of the past in
which dedicated officers frequently pushed the bureaucratic
boundaries to accomplish what they often correctly believed to
be essential tasks. These were not matters of officers
necessarily taking foolish risks or using bad judgment--
although I have known that to happen. Rather, the point is to
note the tension between security standards and what we need to
know and do.
I believe we have made progress, but I believe we are going
to find this problem coming back in spades. And so we do need
to focus on it.
Some speak of risk management. It is an antiseptic and
bureaucratic term to avoid saying that someone may get killed
or hurt taking a risk that seemed sensible at the time. But it
is the flexibility to make such difficult decisions that we
need to strengthen on two different levels.
One is in the field. You talked in the last panel about
security officers and regular officers not understanding each
other. I think that is true. I think we need to move to having
this kind of training be a part of regular training for all
State Department officers, not just senior officers and
security officers. There is no telling when you go to a quiet,
sleepy post whether you are going to have the next coup in the
world. So this needs to be part of the training that we don't
do anyway.
The second issue concerns Washington. We need a more
systematic policy on where the balance should lie between local
responsibility and Washington responsibility. I believe we have
made some progress. I think it is probably too dependent on
individual officers. And I think that if we are going to ask
people to take risks, they need to know that they are going to
have some bureaucratic back-up if they get unlucky.
As we go to the PRTs, branch posts, we have repeatedly had
problems for the last 8 years on how we secure these people and
we have not done well with our answers historically. Delegating
the protection of civilians to the military has been only
partially successful, in my judgment. I, frankly, do not
believe that our military will be able--that is not willing, I
don't question their willingness--but I do question that they
will have the resources to secure all our people and allow them
to move with the frequency required of their mission.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Neumann, will you please
summarize your statement?
Ambassador Neumann. Yes, that is about it. I think we can
use local security. I think we know how to do it, but we have
to make decisions. We have to fund it.
And finally, I would just make two last points, Mr.
Chairman. One is we need some kind of financial reserve,
because the State Department does not have the resources--the
Defense Department does--to swing money in a crisis. That would
take a lot of work with Congress to design in a way that
wouldn't be a slush fund.
The last thing is strategic planning. We haven't done
nearly enough. We need to do a lot more. It is hard. We don't
have enough people. But I think we are still playing catch-up
in the strategic planning. Thank you, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Ambassador Neumann. Ms. Johnson,
please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF SUSAN R. JOHNSON,\1\ PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FOREIGN
SERVICE ASSOCIATION
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Chairman Akaka and Senator
Voinovich. Thank you again for inviting the American Foreign
Service Association (AFSA) to testify on this important and
complex issue. I welcome the opportunity to share some of our
perspectives and to be testifying again along with Ambassador
Neumann, with whom we almost always agree.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson appears in the Appendix
on page 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFSA is proud to represent Diplomatic Security Specialists
at the State Department. They make up about 10 percent of our
total membership, and we are proud to salute their dedication,
courage, and hard work to protect both our overall mission and
our personnel.
The challenges and demands facing the Foreign Service
abroad, as well as concern for security and safety of our
diplomatic personnel, have grown exponentially over the last
two decades. For reasons of security, centrally located and
accessible embassies and missions seem to be largely a thing of
the past. Our ability to travel throughout many of the
countries we are assigned to is far from what it used to be.
As the young daughter of a career Foreign Service Officer,
I recall traveling into remote areas of the Sahara, and later
in what was then Ethiopia, going horseback riding after school
with friends from the U.S. base at Kagnew Station, many miles
into the country outside of our consulate general in Asmara.
These now seem like distant memories.
The need for increased vigilance and better security
measures has led to new and tougher security standards,
constricting access to and travel outside of our embassies and
missions. We can no longer rely primarily on the ability of
host countries to provide adequate security. Finding the right
balance between prudent and effective security measures and
policies, and the ability to do our jobs as diplomats
effectively is more challenging than ever.
AFSA welcomes the GAO report calling for strategic review
of the recent growth in the mission and the resources required
by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. We support the GAO
recommendations. We also concur with Ambassador Neumann's
points and recommendations.
Within the last 6 years, I served in Iraq as a senior
advisor to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry from July through
December of 2003, and then for the next 3 years in Bosnia as a
Deputy High Representative and supervisor of Brcko District, a
high-profile position that came with a full security detail--
armored vehicle, lead and follow cars, a U.S.-led team of local
security personnel provided for under a DynCorp contract. This
Close Protection Unit, as it was called, was dedicated, highly
professional, and if I had to have security 24/7, I couldn't
have had better people. But along with many others I questioned
then, and I still do today, whether that particular security
package was needed in Bosnia 10 years and more after the Dayton
Peace Accords. It seemed that it was either an all or nothing
proposition. Either you have the whole package or you have
nothing, and nothing was not the right answer, either.
In Iraq in 2003, as I have described in my written
testimony, the stated policy was all travel outside the Green
Zone required full military escort. I arrived with the first
induction or surge of civilian advisors and it was quickly
apparent that such escort was not available to the majority of
the civilian advisors, although we needed to travel to our
respective ministries, especially in this early and chaotic
period. Many of us considered a several-vehicle military
convoy, with civilians wearing armored vests and helmets,
projected a high-profile potential target and that it was safer
and more effective for us to travel quietly under the radar,
avoiding regular time tables and taking other prudent security
measures. So we did that in order to do our jobs, and
fortunately, no disaster occurred.
My personal experiences there and in other posts lead me to
suggest, first, the need for more and better internal dialogue
or communication between the policy and security sides of the
State Department on what is the best security posture.
Second, that the one-size-fits-all approach is not the best
one for us today.
And third, that senior officials on the ground in country
should have more flexibility and take more responsibility to
determine which mix of security measures is most appropriate in
a given situation at a given point in time. I second the
remarks that Ambassador Neumann made that this can't be left to
personal decisions of individuals ambassadors of deputy chiefs
of mission (DCMs). There has to be some bureaucratic support.
There has to be some consensus that lays out guidelines for
this, because you can't expect someone to take a position that
I am going to authorize or have somebody take on a risk when
the other side of it is, you take all responsibility if
anything goes wrong. There has to be a better way.
Finally, the increased prominence of security issues today
underscores the need to do more to avoid the experience gaps
highlighted in this and other GAO reports prepared for this
Subcommittee. Lack of experiences, from my perspective,
increases security risk at both the personal and the mission
level, and having season, experienced veterans in the right
positions decreases those risks. The training now offered at
Foreign Service Institutes (FSI) certainly heightens security
awareness, but it cannot be expected to substitute for years of
accumulated experience.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to respond to any
questions that you may have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
As you know, GAO found that over half of the Regional
Security Officers do not have the language competency that they
require. What impact could this have on overseas security for
our diplomats, and what recommendations do you have to improve
their language competency?
Ambassador Neumann. I will go first.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Neumann.
Ambassador Neumann. It is a help when they have language.
Regional Services Offices are not only responsible for
protection, they are also responsible for negotiating and
working out a lot of security arrangements with the host
government. Being able to do that directly rather than depend
on translators that may be inadequate is a big advantage. I
don't think we are hurting in a fatal way, but we need to do
it.
It goes back, however, to this issue of training float
questions, Senator Akaka and Senator Voinovich, you were
raising earlier. First, State has to have enough people to be
able to take them off the line and train them. Otherwise, we
are just flapping our gums.
Second, they have to have a strategic plan for how they are
going to use the training. I don't yet see that emerging, and
it is something that is of quite a bit of concern to me. State
management is drinking out of a fire hose, trying to assign the
people they are getting. It is a good problem to have, but I am
concerned that if we don't have the plan and the budget--as you
and I have talked about, it gets more difficult next year--you
are not going to have a template to fill in against for the
long term. So I see that need to lay out the strategic plan as
the next critical piece beyond getting the bodies.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. I would agree that there is an impact, but it
is felt most greatly in the most difficult or dangerous
countries. The lack of language skills really depends on which
country. In some places, it is important. In others, less so.
I think that as part of this planning effort that
Ambassador Neumann has mentioned and others have mentioned,
there needs to be a review of the criteria for designating
language-designated positions in general, and certainly for DS
officers, and the levels at which those languages should be,
taking into consideration that we need higher levels of
proficiency in sensitive, difficult, dangerous countries and
maybe lower levels in countries where that is not the case and
where use and knowledge, good command of the English language
is much greater.
I think to do that--DS is now recruiting many people who
don't have any experience with learning languages and don't
necessarily have any aptitude for learning languages, and I
think we need to recognize that it may take longer and we may
need to review the approach we have to the language training
and then reinforcing it once we have given it. So I think that
whole approach of the Department to language training needs to
be more carefully targeted and a little more creative in the
way we give the training, particularly to differentiate more
between those people who have strong language aptitude and
experience with learning languages and those who don't. And
right now, we don't. We mix everybody together to the advantage
of both groups.
Ambassador Neumann. But don't look at me when you talk
about strong language aptitude. [Laughter.]
Senator Akaka. To both of you, GAO testified that
Diplomatic Security's workload likely will increase as the
military transitions out of Iraq. Ambassador Neumann, you
mentioned that, also. What should the State Department be doing
to ensure that the transition is a smooth one?
Ambassador Neumann. There are several things. Some of them,
they may be doing. Remember, I am now out of the Department for
a couple of years, so I may be behind.
The first thing is they need to plan for what the post is
supposed to do. What are the missions you are going to have to
accomplish, in broad terms, how much you are going to have to
move as well as to protect the base. Then you backplan from
that and say, OK, what does that mean that I need in terms of
people for security details, facilities, and vehicles. And then
from there, you go to looking at your choices for how you are
going to fill those needs.
I doubt that the process is yet well advanced. They should
be doing it right now because they have to give you the budget
because those things are not going to be there, I am reasonably
sure, in the current budgets because we didn't have to pay for
them, the military paid for them. So that whole planning
process needs to take place at a pretty high level of detail in
order to come to the Congress with a request for the requisite
assets that is really solidly documented, and I think there is
work on that now. I don't mean that they are asleep at the
switch, but I think that they are probably not up to the speed
they themselves would like to be.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Well, I would agree with the points that
Ambassador Neumann just made. I guess one consideration for me,
representing rank-and-file or the people, is that whatever
planning is going forth or might go forth in the future, that
perhaps AFSA have a role or a seat at the table in some of this
so that we can provide a constructive value-added to this
process factoring in the unfiltered views of people who have
served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and who have practical, first-hand
experience and views on what are likely to be the problems, the
conditions. It is a little hard to look ahead and see what
analysis we are going to make as to what are going to be the
conditions on the ground after our military withdraws and,
therefore, what can we take on as civilians.
But this is another area where I am not sure what the
Department is doing. I would agree that if the planning is not
very far along, and I would like to work with management to see
that AFSA is somehow involved in an ongoing basis in this and
that we can figure out a role together as to how we can add to
the process so that the end product is, in fact, better, and
better understood by the people who are going to have to
implement it.
Senator Akaka. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. I sit at these hearings, and it is
my 11th year--Senator Akaka, you have been around longer than I
have and you will be around longer than I have, because I am
leaving the end of the next year--and I always wonder about
these hearings and what comes out of it. I have asked my staff,
Senator Akaka, to go back over some of the hearings that we
have had and the questions that we have had and these folks
that are here to testify today.
In terms of the practical things that the two of us can do
and the Subcommittee can do, when I think about Iraq--and I was
on Foreign Affairs and I look back on that--we assumed, based
on what was told to us, that they had figured this out, and the
fact is, they didn't and we thought they did. Now, I met with
Richard Holbrooke and his team. I was very impressed with what
it was, and he was saying that people are complaining because
we are not bringing people on fast enough, but I am trying to
do this thing in a way that we can get the best people and so
forth. I was impressed with that.
But if you were in our shoes, how would you go about making
sure that the plan in terms of Iraq has been well thought out
in terms of human capital and security and the other things,
kind of a critical path about the things that we need to do,
and to get an idea of just how long we are going to be in Iraq,
because we are not talking about that. It is the same thing
that I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, in terms of
Afghanistan. I mean, to my knowledge, nobody has talked about
the commitment that we are going to make towards nation
building, and anybody that knows what is going on has got to
understand that is as much important or more important than the
military side. But very little attention has been paid to that.
How do we get a guarantee that, in fact, Holbrooke has got
it figured out, the State Department has got it figured out,
about how many people and how long and where they are going to
be and all the other details to make sure that 2 years from
now, when I am no longer in the U.S. Senate, I don't read about
some fiasco over there where somebody didn't do their homework
and we are in real trouble because the planning wasn't done?
How do we get that information?
Ambassador Neumann. The best realism I can give you--and I
certainly agree with your going in proposition. I came to Iraq
just after Ms. Johnson did and I drove the same unarmored
vehicles in the same fashion with the same dubious adherence to
regulation because they had not thought out these issues.
I would segregate my answer into two pieces. They are not
going to think of everything. Afghanistan is too much in flux
and too changing. You will read of something that is not
thought of. So part of what we have to do is to look at our
capacity to react when we become aware of the thing, whatever
it is, that we didn't think of.
Senator Voinovich. But you ought to have a plan, at least--
--
Ambassador Neumann. You ought to have a plan. You ought not
to be guilty of not having thought of the things that were
squarely in front of your nose and which we have seen ourselves
mess up before.
Senator Voinovich. Now, is that ordinarily somebody, if I
got a hold of Richard Holbrooke and said, do you have something
written down that shows that you have thought, and here is the
plan, how many people, human capital, etc., do you think that
is in place?
Ambassador Neumann. I think it is in place in theory. I
think that some of that theory will be very thin, I mean,
especially when you talk about--and I want to be realistic
here. When you talk about putting new people on the job to do
jobs that have never been done, there is going to be a limit to
how much you can think that through in a vacuum. So when those
people arrive, there is always going to be a certain amount of
muddle, quite frankly, while real humans work out what they can
really do in a complex place.
I, frankly, have every expectation that there is going to
be a huge amount of muddle, particularly on the civilian surge,
when we actually get people. And we don't own enough people who
have the requisite qualifications. I mean, not just we don't
own them in the State Department, they don't exist in America.
So part of the planning is going to be, how are you going
to learn from your mistakes? How is the plan going to be
flexible enough that you can adapt instead of having to just
come up here on the Hill and defend what may have been an
inadequate plan because you didn't see something and say it was
right when, in fact, what you really want to say is, I learned
something and am fixing it.
The other piece is the detail of planning, which I think
your staff is going to have to work on. What are the
questions--I think, sir, you have got to go beyond does the
plan exist to say, what are the questions you are trying to
answer in your plan, and it needs to get down to a level of
detail on numbers of--not just numbers of people, but how many
people are going to secure them.
Right now, the answer that is being given, as I understand
it, to how you are going to handle security and movement of
your civilian surge is the ``military is going to do it.'' I am
very skeptical that the answer is going to be adequate to the
job. But I think that goes beyond people just arguing about
views and saying, OK, what is it you are going to have to do
and how are you going to do it, and why do you think the
military can do this? And I think it is just going to be a lot
of grilling from you all, frankly.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. I hope I am not going out on a limb here, but
as I reflect on this question, I know that you have been asking
and urging the Department to produce various plans on various
things, and those plans may or may not be in the works and may
or may not be forthcoming. So it is possible you will have to--
and the only thing I know of that sort of ensures that you will
get a product is to tie it to money.
The other question is the quality of the plan. I think the
thinking and planning up front is critical, and one of the
weaknesses in State Department planning from my perspective is
that it is insufficiently inclusive, if it is done at all. Not
enough people get to have input. Not enough people get to see
it and critique it or ``Red Game'' it.
Second, once you have your plan, and as Ambassador Neumann
says, it is not going to be perfect and it is not going to
foresee everything and there will be some unexpected things
that happen, so make sure that you have two critical factors
addressed, and that is good communication and good mobility.
And then, third, try to get the best people you can into
those dangerous places. And if you have those mix of things
there, I think our chances of avoiding any sort of catastrophe
and dealing with the unexpected emergencies are rather good.
But we often don't have--in fact, right now, we are missing
most of those ingredients.
Senator Voinovich. I have some more questions, Senator
Akaka, but it is your turn.
Senator Akaka. Fine. Ambassador Neumann, in your testimony,
you mention that the State Department needs more people to do
strategic planning, and that is one of your priorities. This
may impact the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and
perhaps later efforts. Along with adding more personnel, how
will the State Department's culture need to change to support
ongoing strategic planning?
Ambassador Neumann. Clearly, there are cultural changes.
Some of that, I think, is that we have to get a plan right for
professional growth in the Service as a whole. We have not had
that in the past, or we haven't had the choice, frankly,
because we didn't have the people. Now, we are getting with
thanks for what the Congress has done, what this Committee has
supported, they are getting large numbers of people. The
numbers are going to change the complexion of the Department.
We have worked on the basis of the old training the young, but
the old are retiring and the young are multiplying, and so the
result is that more and more people are going to be trained
more often by people that don't have nearly as much experience
and seniority as they used to have.
So I think we have got to grow--we have got to create a new
paradigm, a new plan that looks at professional development--
not just formal training at FSI, not just language training,
but professional development writ large, as our military
colleagues have managed to think about it for some time. I
think if we get that plan in place, although it will change and
shift over the years, that we will then begin to grow people
with somewhat different attitudes toward a number of the things
you are concerned about.
If we don't have a strategic plan for professional
development, then I think it will all be ad hoc. I think you
will get pieces of what you want, but you will always be kind
of cramming it down against the grain.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Johnson, you testified that some U.S.
embassies have become less accessible, and Senator Voinovich
was speaking about this, moved to the outskirts of capital
cities and have a fortress profile that may send the signal of
a militarized America. What needs to happen to make our
embassies more accessible while continuing to meet security
requirements?
Ms. Johnson. Well, that is a tough question because we have
embarked over the last decade in this direction that we are
currently on of building already 65 or more of these kind of
fortress-like embassies outside the center, and we often see
that the properties that we sell are taken over by other
European powers and they use it for an embassy. I am thinking
of Zagreb right now.
One concern is that in trying to defend ourselves from
attack and trying to address the security of our diplomats and
our people overseas, we are always going to be fighting the
last technology. We are now working with this 100-foot setback
and it is my understanding that this might have been either
imposed by Congress or perhaps was in the Inman report, but it
was something that now appears to be cast into law or cast in
stone.
But I think we are reading now about suicide bombers and
attacks that are taking place at 500 feet detonated and are
still blowing up entire buildings, and so it is very possible
that the technology in the hands of the people who are setting
off explosions is going to make the 100-foot setback obsolete.
So I am not sure that particular defensive tactic is going to
serve us well over the long term and we may find that we have
spent a great deal of money to fight the last war and we will
just be confronted with a new set.
So I am not sure that I have the answer to that, but I know
that it is a problem for conducting diplomacy, and from where I
sit, in many of the posts I have been in in the last decade, I
am finding that the business world and the non-governmental
organization (NGO) world is becoming better informed and more
knowledgeable about what is going on in the country where they
are living and working than many of the people in our
fortresses, who are handicapped by many constraints that make
it impossible for them to get out, form the relationships, and
get their finger really on the pulse of the country that they
are in.
And I think we need to think about this as we develop a
vision for what is going to be the mission of the Diplomatic
Security of the United States in the coming years. What is the
vision? Is the vision that we are going to be increasingly
involved in nation building, in post-conflict or even
continuing conflict, fragile or failed states, and that we are
going to build up for that, or is there some other notion?
And how does the role of the U.S. Government fit with what
the private sector is now doing? And how do we, in looking at
public-private partnership models, how do we get a better grip
on what is the appropriate and optimal role for the public part
of that, let us say the embassy, and what is the appropriate
role for the private part, the private sector? And who should
be coordinating? Should the embassy play some sort of
clearinghouse role, or what should be the role of the embassy
in all of this?
I think many of these questions are not really being
addressed in the ``public square,'' are not being addressed
with sufficient thought. We may end up spending a lot of money
and training even for the wrong things if we don't figure this
out.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ambassador Neumann, you recommend
that Foreign Service Officers at the State Department and
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
should be given risk management training. How do you suggest
the Department implement this training, and who should be in
charge of providing it?
Ambassador Neumann. New curriculum will have to be
developed. Right now, this is, I think, primarily a mid-level
and senior-level training issue. It is not a junior level one.
But it does go to this question of people not understanding
each other. That came up with GAO and what you talked about in
the first panel, Senator Akaka.
So I think it is not that hard to have professionals invent
role-playing scenarios, curriculum, training, but right now, we
are not even doing much--we are doing mid-level training in a
series of postage stamp modules that we try to cram into
people's transfer summer. I think this is the kind of thing
that you need in-service training to expose officers to very
broadly across the Foreign Service.
For instance, the State Department has done team exercises,
crisis exercises, for years, where they have teams that travel
out to embassies and they do simulations and go through a
crisis. So you could build some of this kind of training into
that. You could build it into training here. But right now, we
are not doing it, so we are getting past the question of
misunderstanding that you raised only by accident, or by
officers who live both of the different worlds, but not
everybody needs to do four wars the way I did.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. I really didn't understand, Ambassador
Neumann. You are talking about communications and computers
that are secure, and tell me about that. I am not clear.
Ambassador Neumann. I am trying to be a little careful,
because there are some issues that are still forward projection
and have security implications.
Senator Voinovich. OK.
Ambassador Neumann. But basically, when we first sent
officers to Iraq, we gave them no deployable secure computers.
Until they got on the military net, they had only unsecure
methods of receiving information, which means they were blind
to a lot of threat information and they could not report
appropriately--with appropriate classification, in all cases,
developments in their own areas.
That problem has not really been fixed. Right now, what we
have done is we have done a workaround. We send them out with
the U.S. military. They are using the military computers. I
know it is the same government, but they have completely
different standards from the State Department on what they can
take to the field and how they can use it.
As long as we are with them, our officers can use their
computers or similar computers. They can talk to our computers.
As soon as they go off on their own, its different. If you have
big groups like the team you send out if an embassy is bombed,
they do have a communications package. But when you are talking
about a few officers going someplace, the State Department does
not own any releasable, usable technology they can give an
officer to put him in secure contact with his embassy. He can
use his private account. He can use his Yahoo!. I don't think
that is a very good way to handle what we need to control, and
so either we don't control or we don't have enough protection
on what we control, and we haven't figured this out.
So right now, take North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), for instance or another problem. In Afghanistan about
half of the PRTs, as you know, are NATO PRTs. We have State and
USAID people in a lot of those PRTs. They work on a
functionally different computer system that does not talk--I
mean, you cannot cross-communicate secure communications
between NATO communications and either the American military or
our computers.
So I can get a State officer out in a PRT with a NATO force
and they can be friendly and give him their computer, but he
can't send to my account in the embassy. We were physically
dealing with this in Kabul. We actually were running fiber
optic cable off the telephone poles, down the street, to
connect my office with General McNeil's so that we had a NATO
communication. He had the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) so he and I could talk to each other. But the
headquarters didn't. So we had to go out and buy computers that
aren't in the State Department's system, run fiber optic cable
off of telephone poles, and connect--and then we had to
physically handle data because you can't electronically move it
from one system to the other. I think this is ridiculous.
Senator Voinovich. So the point is that there needs to be a
lot more coordination, to start off with, that you would have
these secure computers, and they probably are going to have to
talk with the military part of this----
Ambassador Neumann. Exactly. But it is a bureaucratic issue
of what standards are acceptable.
Senator Voinovich. All right. So what you try to do is have
uniform standards. You have got consistency there and you can
talk. It really gets back to the other thing about--I will
never forget, when I was in Iraq, we went out to one of the
camps, and I don't even know if there are any State Department
people that were there. There will always be military people.
But the fact of the matter is that they had developed a very
good relationship with these sheiks. You could just tell. They
were talking. There was like kind of a little celebration and
it was that kind of thing that makes a difference.
It seems to me that if you are going to do the Afghanistan
and you are going to have your military out there, that one of
the things you are going to make sure is that they are trained
in counterterrorism and they are trying to make friends. But
then that kind of segues in with your State Department people,
so there is a movement there from one to the other that
probably is as effective as anything that we can do.
Lots of challenges.
Ambassador Neumann. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. You talk about the whole concept of
having an overall plan for human capital and training and the
rest of it. So often, what we do is we spend all our time
putting out fires and never have time----
Ambassador Neumann. That is, I think, part of what is
happening right now in the State Department. I mean, in one
way, it is a good problem. I would rather they have the problem
of suddenly having a lot of people to deal with than not having
that problem. But the fact is, or my impression--remember, I am
on the outside, I don't speak for the Administration--but my
impression is that they are now so beleaguered trying to get
people assigned that they are having a lot of trouble dealing
with the sort of out-year big strategic issues.
How do you fill the knowledge gap between bringing people
in at the bottom and the fact that a lot of what we need is not
just bodies, but a certain level of experience, and what is
your long-term training? Your staffs were both involved with us
in preparing the report of the Academies on the budget. And we
made a big deal in that of the need for a training and
transition float. In my judgment, the State Department needs,
though, to come up with a strategic plan for training.
Senator Voinovich. Let me just ask you one other thing. The
last time around, I was disappointed in Secretary Rice because
she had Mr. Zoellick in there and then she had Mr. Negroponte
in there, and then they finally got Mr. Kennedy, and then they
had the lady that was there trying to focus on management,
similar to Colin Powell and Mr. Armitage, who it seemed to me
had a really good focus on human capital planning.
Where do you think we are right now? Ms. Johnson, they have
the new organization. Secretary Clinton has decided to have one
person in charge of policy, and the other in terms of
management. Is there anybody over there, from your
observations, that is getting up early in the morning and
staying up late at night working on management, working on
developing the human capital, the training, and looking at the
big issues that the Department has to undertake if you are
really going to get the job done overall?
Ambassador Neumann. I think they are all getting up early
in the morning and staying late at night. Whether they are
thinking about the correct issues--I think they are trying to.
I don't think, actually, I can answer the question and I think
we will have to see what comes out----
Senator Voinovich. Who is in charge of that?
Ambassador Neumann. QDDR? Well, it was under Mr. Lew, I
believe----
Ms. Johnson. Yes. I mean, we have two deputy secretaries,
and Mr. Lew is doing that with Anne-Marie Slaughter of Policy
Planning. The two of them are co-chairing the QDDR effort, and
there are five or six working groups under it that are working
on different things. And, in fact, we at AFSA are trying to see
how we might relate to those different working groups. Some of
them affect USAID in particular, and we are concerned with
getting our USAID folks in touch with the people who are doing
that kind of planning.
Senator Voinovich. In terms of the plan, the
recommendations that you made, do you know if anybody is
spending any time looking at those recommendations from the
Academy to see if they are implementing them or following
through or responding?
Ambassador Neumann. Not very much. They are certainly
interested in the numbers. I don't think they are using the
plan. We are talking to the Director General's Office about
having the Academy take on another planning effort; that is try
to help; don't feel proprietary about it. If they could do it
without us, we don't need to be horning in, but we have got an
awful lot of experience in the Academy, an awful lot of
knowledge, and we would like to find a way to work with them to
make some of that knowledge useful--Tom Pickering's favorite
joke, we are 200 members with 7,000 years of experience and we
would like to make some of that available to help with this
effort.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very
much for having this hearing. I don't have any other questions.
But this has been a great hearing and I am fired up, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much, Senator
Voinovich.
What are your top three recommendations for improving our
diplomatic security efforts within the State Department?
Ambassador Neumann. Ms. Johnson, I will let you go first
for a change.
Ms. Johnson. I listened with great interest to Assistant
Secretary Boswell give his testimony and talk about what they
are planning and what they are trying to do. I would go back
to, I think, the suggestions that I made in my oral testimony
earlier, is consistent with what Mr. Ford from GAO was saying.
The need for more, and I say better, communication between
the policy side and the Diplomatic Security side, because all
of these either misunderstandings or miscommunications. And I
think that communication has to happen at multiple levels, and
some of it could be by having more joint training, where DS
people and other officers are taking or addressing the same
issues together in the same room from their different
perspectives. I think that always adds value to both sides.
So first is just to find ways to pay more attention to that
dialogue, because I don't think it really exists in any kind of
consistent systematic or formal way. It is ad hoc and
unrecorded and out of date and we need a new one.
Second, I think, would be some discussion about whether
this basically one-size-fits-all approach needs to be changed,
and the fact that we have these unique situations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, I think, give a good opportunity to reassess that
and to say we need a more differentiated approach.
And the last thing has to do with finding a way to take
advantage of AFSA's connection and ability to get the
unfiltered views of our members, because--and compare those
unfiltered views with whatever else is coming up through the
more hierarchial system. We often hear very different things
from our members than what apparently management is hearing
when they ask the question. So I think we need to confront that
a little bit and see what is happening.
Why is it that people feel that they can say--and do say--
one thing to us where it is not necessarily for attribution and
another thing in their more official capacity? We need to
narrow that gap. There will always be a little bit of a gap
there, but I think we need to narrow it a bit. If it gets too
far out of whack, it is a signal that we need to open the
discussion and management needs to send a signal, as Secretary
Clinton has said and said early on, that she encourages and
wants to hear different points of view. But I don't think
people have internalized that yet.
I will turn it over to you.
Ambassador Neumann. Well, you know the real estate joke
about three things that are most important, location, location,
and location. I think in this case, I would say plan, plan,
plan. We have got a lot of big issues. It also picks up Ms.
Johnson's issue of the need to talk across functional and
substantive lines. But if one doesn't plan, then you are always
reacting and our budget cycle is not conducive to acting in a
reactive mode, because then you can't get the resources to, in
fact, react. Then you have to pull from someplace else. You
just cascade your problems. You shuffle them from one place to
another. So of the things I laid out, I think planning is my
overall priority.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Well, I want to thank you both
very much and thank all of our witnesses today.
Our diplomats repeatedly have been targets of attacks and
DS is charged with keeping them safe so they can advance U.S.
interests abroad. You have provided key insights in support of
this effort.
Additionally, I am hopeful that Diplomatic Security will
begin taking a strategic approach to addressing its staffing
and operational challenges. This is critically important, since
the Department must be fully prepared for new challenges in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other crises that may emerge.
The hearing record will be open for one week for additional
statements or questions other Members may have.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
