[Senate Hearing 111-810]
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2011
S. Hrg. 111-810
THE FORT HOOD ATTACK: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
of the
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 19, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Gordon N. Lederman, Counsel
Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
Seamus A. Hughes, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Ivy A. Johnson, Minority Senior Counsel
John K. Grant, Minority Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 3
Senator Carper............................................... 26
Senator McCain............................................... 29
Senator Ensing............................................... 32
Senator Levin................................................ 34
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 43
Senator Collins.............................................. 45
Senator McCaskill............................................ 47
Senator Burris............................................... 48
Senator Bennett.............................................. 49
WITNESSES
Thursday, November 19, 2009
General John M. Keane, USA, Retired, Former Vice Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army............................................... 5
Frances Fragos Townsend, Former Assistant to President George W.
Bush for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism................ 7
Mitchell D. Silber, Director of Intelligence Analysis, New York
City Police Department......................................... 11
Hon. Juan Carlos Zarate, Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and
International Studies; and Former Deputy National Security
Advisor for Combating Terrorism................................ 15
Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser, RAND Corporation.......... 20
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Jenkins, Brian Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 72
Keane, General John M., USA, Retired:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Silber, Mitchell D.:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Townsend, Frances Fragos:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Zarate, Hon. Juan Carlos:
Testimony.................................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 58
APPENDIX
Statement submitted for the Record from Alejandro J. Beutel,
Government Liaison, Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC),
November 18, 2009, with attached report and handbook........... 77
THE FORT HOOD ATTACK: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Carper, Pryor,
McCaskill, Collins, McCain, Ensign, and Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. This
morning, our Committee begins an investigation as serious and
consequential as any it has ever undertaken. An American
soldier, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, has been charged with killing
12 of his fellow soldiers and one civilian on an American
military base in Texas in what I believe, based on available
evidence, was a terrorist attack.
The purpose of this Committee's investigation is to
determine whether that attack could have been prevented,
whether the Federal agencies and employees involved missed
signals or failed to connect dots in a way that enabled Major
Hasan to carry out his deadly attack. If we find such errors or
negligence, we will make recommendations to guarantee as best
we can that they never occur again. That is our purpose here.
We are conducting this investigation because we believe it
is our responsibility to do so according to law and Senate
rules. We are both the Homeland Security Committee and, over
the long term, the Governmental Affairs Committee, which under
the rules has a special responsibility to conduct oversight of
Executive Branch actions, particularly when, as in this case,
there are questions about those actions. We know it will be
very difficult to fulfill our Committee's responsibility
without the cooperation of the Executive Branch.
Yesterday, I want to report, I spoke with Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates and Attorney General Eric Holder and asked
their cooperation in allowing the bipartisan staff of this
Committee to interview relevant individuals in their
Departments and obtain relevant documents as part of this
investigation of the murders at Fort Hood, Texas. Secretary
Gates and Attorney General Holder both said they respected our
authority to conduct such an investigation and wanted to work
out an understanding in which they could cooperate so long as
our investigation did not hamper or compromise the criminal
investigation and prosecution of the accused murderer Major
Hasan.
I assured them that our Committee understood and respected
the difference between their criminal investigation and our
congressional investigation. Their criminal investigation is to
bring an accused to justice. Our congressional investigation is
to learn whether the Federal Government or any of its employees
could have acted in a way that would have prevented these
murders from occurring. Their investigation in one sense looks
backward and is punitive; ours looks forward and is preventive.
I am optimistic that we will work out a way for both
investigations to proceed without compromising either. Our
staffs will be meeting with representatives of the Departments
of Justice and Defense very soon to try to work out ground
rules for both investigations without interfering with each
other.
But I can say that I am encouraged and appreciative that
Senator Collins and I, and our top-level staff, have received
one classified briefing on Major Hasan's case and will soon
receive another and have been given access to some very
relevant classified documents relating to this matter. So we
are off to a good, cooperative start. And we are going to be
insistent about this because it really is our responsibility to
do so.
At the conclusion of our investigation, we will issue a
report and recommendations. I want to make clear this morning
that we intend to carry out this investigation with respect for
the thousands of Muslim-Americans who are serving in the
American military with honor and the millions of other
patriotic, law-abiding Muslims who live in our country. But we
do no favor to all of our fellow Americans who are Muslim by
ignoring real evidence that a small number of their community
have, in fact, become violent Islamists and extremists.
It seems to me here at the outset, and based on what we
know now, that there are three basic areas of importance in
which our Committee in this investigation will want to gather
facts and draw conclusions.
First, if, as seems to be the case, there were colleagues
of Major Hasan in the U.S. Army who heard him say things or
watched him do things that raised concerns in their minds about
his mental stability and/or his political extremism, the
question is: Were those concerns conveyed up the chain of
command? And were they recorded anywhere in Major Hasan's
personnel files? And did the Army do anything in response to
those concerns?
Second, what information did the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTF) headed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) have about Major Hasan, including transcripts of e-mails
which he had with a subject of investigation that the FBI
acknowledged publicly it had in its possession? Acknowledgment
came last week. What judgments were made about those e-mails?
Was any attempt made to investigate Major Hasan further after
his e-mail traffic with the subject of an ongoing Joint
Terrorism Task Force investigation was intercepted?
And, third, was the information which the Joint Terrorism
Task Force had on Major Hasan shared with anyone in the U.S.
Army, the Department of Defense, or anyone else in our
government?
Those to me are three central questions, though by no means
all the questions, we will pursue painstakingly and answer as
completely as we can before we reach conclusions and make
recommendations.
This morning, we are really grateful to have with us to
help us consider both those questions and others a very
experienced and thoughtful panel of witnesses, with experience
in terrorism, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and the
military. We have asked our witnesses to give us their first
reactions to what we know of the murders at Fort Hood and to
what we know of the accused murderer, Major Hasan, based on the
publicly available evidence. I also hope that they will offer
us their advice about what other questions our investigation
should raise regarding the focus of our inquiry, which is the
conduct of employees of the Department of Justice, the
Department of Defense, or any other Federal agency or
department.
I really want to thank the witnesses for being here, and I
look forward to your testimony, which I am confident will get
this Committee's investigation off to exactly the right start.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, let me begin this morning by saluting you for
your leadership and for your courage in proceeding with this
investigation and these hearings. I can think of no more
important task for this Committee to undertake.
In investigating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
the 9/11 Commission led by Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton discovered
vital information scattered throughout the government, confined
by agency silos, that might have prevented the deaths and
destruction of that terrible day if only the dots had been
connected.
In the wake of the mass murder at Fort Hood, we once again
confront a troubling question: Was this another failure to
connect the dots?
Much has been done since September 11, 2001, to respond to
the failures exposed by those attacks. We created the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), additional Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, and fusion centers. We revised information-sharing
policies and promoted greater cooperation among intelligence
agencies and law enforcement. And the results have been
significant. Terrorist plots, both at home and abroad, have
been thwarted. The recent arrest of Najibullah Zazi
demonstrates the tremendous benefits of information sharing and
joint efforts by the NCTC and other intelligence agencies as
well as Federal, State, and local law enforcement.
But the shootings at Fort Hood may indicate that
communications failures and poor judgment calls can defeat the
systems intended to ensure that vital information is shared to
protect our country and its citizens. This case also raises
questions about whether or not restrictive rules have a
chilling effect on the legitimate dissemination of information,
making it too difficult to connect the dots that would have
allowed a clear picture of the threat to emerge. These are the
overarching questions that we will explore with our expert
witnesses today.
Our ongoing investigation will also seek answers to
questions specific to the Fort Hood case. For example, how did
our intelligence community and law enforcement agencies handle
intercepted communications between Major Hasan and a radical
cleric who was a known al-Qaeda associate? Did they contact
anyone in Major Hasan's chain of command to relay concerns? Did
they seek to interview Major Hasan himself?
When Major Hasan reportedly began to openly question the
oath that he had taken to support and defend the Constitution
of the United States, did anyone in his military chain of
command intervene? When Major Hasan in his presentation at
Walter Reed in 2007 recommended that the Department of Defense
allow ``Muslim soldiers the option of being released as
conscientious objectors to increase troop morale and decrease
adverse events,'' did his colleagues and superior officers view
this statement as a red flag? Were numerous warning signs
ignored because the Army faces a severe shortage of
psychiatrists and because the Army was concerned, as the Chief
of Staff has subsequently put it, about a backlash against
Muslim soldiers?
These are all troubling questions that we will seek to
answer.
For nearly 4 years, this Committee has been investigating
the threat of homegrown terrorism. We have explored
radicalization in our prisons, the cycle of violent
radicalization, and how the Internet can act as a virtual
terrorist training camp. We have warned that individuals within
the United States can be inspired by al-Qaeda's violent
ideology to plan and execute attacks even if they do not
receive any direct orders from al-Qaeda to do so. And we have
learned of the difficulty of detecting lone-wolf terrorists.
To prevent future homegrown terrorist attacks, we must
better understand why law enforcement, intelligence agencies,
and our military personnel system may have failed in this case.
Major Hasan's attack targeted innocent civilians and soldiers,
regardless of their religious faith. The patriotic soldiers and
citizens of all faiths who were injured and killed, not on a
foreign battleground but, rather, on what should have been safe
and secure American territory, deserve a thorough
investigation.
With so many questions still swirling around this heinous
attack, it is important for our Nation to understand what
happened so that we may work to prevent future incidents. We
owe that to our troops, to their families and communities, and
to all the American people.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
for that excellent opening statement.
We will now go to the witnesses and begin with Jack Keane,
retired General of the U.S. Army, former Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army. We are honored to have him here, a decorated American
soldier, who in particular has relevant experience here about
which I hope General Keane will testify. He was commander of
the base at Fort Bragg right after a soldier with white
extremist views was involved in the murder of an African-
American couple. That experience I think informs his view of
this incident, and, of course, we would welcome his reflections
on that and the broader issue of extremism in the military and
how we hope the Army has handled this situation.
General Keane, it is a great honor to have you here, and we
welcome your testimony at this time.
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA, RETIRED,\1\ FORMER
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY
General Keane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins,
and Members of the Committee. I truly appreciate you inviting
me here to testify this morning on a subject of such national
importance which directly affects the security of the American
people and in this case, equally or more important, our
soldiers and their families.
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\1\ The prepared statement of General Keane appears in the Appendix
on page 50.
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How painfully and devastatingly ironic that our soldiers
were gunned down at Fort Hood while preparing to deploy
overseas to fight jihadist extremism. As we are rapidly
becoming aware, the preliminary reports suggest that Major
Hasan himself is a jihadist extremist as he indicated during
the act of shooting our soldiers by crying out the jihadist
refrain, ``Allahu akbar.'' It appears likely that Major Hasan's
targets and his radical beliefs are directly related as he
chose to kill those who were destined to fight jihadist
extremism.
We all welcome the investigations that the Army, the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, other agencies of government, and this Congress
are conducting to determine who was Major Hasan; what were the
patterns of his behavior and attitude; what did we know about
what appears to be his extremist beliefs; how did we share that
information, and what actions did we take or fail to take as a
result; and, most definitely, what must we do to prevent such
incidents in the future?
The Department of Defense has a longstanding policy of
intolerance for organizations, practices, or activities that
are discriminatory or extremist in nature. This policy was
updated in 1986 as a result of service member participation in
supremacist activities and again in 1996 after two Army
soldiers committed two racially motivated murders at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, resulting in the death of two African-
Americans and prompting a DOD review of the 1986 policy and a
subsequent revision in 1996. In fact, the Army issued a
pamphlet titled ``Extremist Activities'' as a result of that
incident.
I took command of Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps
weeks after that incident occurred, and there was much that we
learned that eventually became Army policy. First and foremost,
we were tolerating racially motivated skinheads who were in our
units at Fort Bragg. When extremism occurs in a unit, there is
a natural tendency for soldiers to pull away from it because it
is so disturbing to their beliefs and to the beliefs of the
Army. As such, it can often polarize a unit and directly affect
its cohesion, morale, and capability to perform at a very high
standard.
What we found at Fort Bragg is that our policies were not
clear in identifying what extremist behavior was--in this case,
tattoos, specific dress, racial rhetoric, Nazi symbols, etc. As
a result, racial extremists were allowed to exist in our units.
Twenty-one soldiers were eventually eliminated from the service
for exhibiting such behavior--unfortunately, all after the
racially motivated murders were committed. Two soldiers were
tried and convicted for these murders.
The Army investigation determined that we needed to update
our policies and, equally important, educate Army soldiers and
leaders on the patterns of behavior and signs and symbols of
racially motivated extremism. Those policies require soldiers
and leaders to identify such behavior and to report it so that
commanders can take appropriate action.
Commanders' options are numerous, from counseling,
efficiency reporting, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
or legal actions, and involuntary separation. Our commanders
then and now have full authority by Army policy to ``prohibit
military personnel from engaging in or participating in
activities that the commander determines will adversely affect
good order and discipline.''
I suspect strongly that after we conduct these
investigations, we will find that our policies will need
revision again to account for the specific behavior and
attitudes as expressed by radical Islamists or jihadist
extremists. It should not be an act of moral courage for a
soldier to identify a fellow soldier who is displaying
extremist behavior. It should be an obligation. And as such,
the commanders need specific guidelines as to what jihadist
extremist behavior is and re-emphasize how to use the many
tools and options they have at their disposal to curb the
behavior, to rehabilitate soldiers, if possible, or to take
legal or separation action. Because jihadist extremists are
potentially linked to terrorist organizations that directly
threaten the security of the United States, it is essential
that our government agencies are sharing information about such
individuals.
What has been in the media these last few days about Major
Hasan and his behavior, if determined to be true, is very
disturbing. There are allegations such as justifying suicide
bombing on the Internet, lecturing fellow soldiers using
jihadist rhetoric, warning about adverse events if Muslims were
not allowed to leave military service, repeatedly seeking
counsel from a radical Imam Anwar al-Awlaki with well-known
ties to al-Qaeda, attempting to convert some of his patients
who were suffering from stress disorders to his distorted view
of Islam--and, finally, was the FBI sharing with the Army what
it knew about Major Hasan and al-Awlaki, and was the Army
sharing what it knew about Major Hasan with the FBI?
While these patterns are preliminary and will be confirmed
by the investigations that are being conducted, it is very
similar to what we experienced at Fort Bragg in the late 1990s
where we were wrongfully tolerating extremists in our
organization who had displayed a pattern of behavior that put
them at odds with the values and character of the Army.
Let me conclude by saying that the incident and Major
Hasan's behavior is not about Muslims, and their religion, who
are a part of the fabric of American life, respected and
assimilated into every aspect of American society, nor is it
about the 10,000 Muslims in the military who, quite frankly,
are not seen as Muslims but as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines. Their contribution, their commitment, and their
sacrifice is not only appreciated, it is honored.
This is fundamentally about jihadist extremism, which is at
odds with the values of America and its military and threatens
the safety and security of the American people.
I was in the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and felt up
close the horror of this extremism, as the Army lost more
soldiers and civilians that day than any day in the last 8
years of war. I know our soldiers and families at Fort Hood are
stung by this tragedy because their friends and loved ones were
killed simply because of who they are and what they stand for.
They were committed to defend this Nation against the very
extremism that killed them.
Radical Islam and jihadist extremism is the most
transformational issue I have dealt with in my military service
and continues to be so today. In my judgment, it is the most
significant threat to the security of the American people that
I have faced in my lifetime. We are a society that espouses
tolerance and values diversity, and our military reflects those
values. But at the same time, we must know what a threat looks
like, and we must know what to do about it.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, General Keane, for that
clear, strong, principled, and, for myself, stirring statement.
I appreciate it very much.
We are honored next to have Fran Townsend with us, former
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism. We are really grateful to have you here to
put this case into the context of your experience in the field
of counterterrorism generally, so please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, FORMER ASSISTANT TO
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
Ms. Townsend. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins,
thank you. It is really a privilege to be here with you today.
After more than 20 years in the government, most of it as a
prosecutor and a Justice Department lawyer, the one thing I
think we know for sure is that things always look clearer
looking back than when you are in the heat of battle. So as you
well understand, I caution the American people to remember that
imperfect knowledge and facts in the heat of the investigation
often result in less than perfect judgments and less than
perfect knowledge. And I applaud the effort of the Committee to
understand how can we make that knowledge, in the heat of the
investigation, better so that we can ensure better judgments
and better action.
I can say I conducted many such reviews during my time in
government. Probably the most well known publicly was the
Katrina Lessons Learned. What I have found more often than not
is that in the wake of a national tragedy, while we typically
look for single points of failure, the failures tend to be
systemic. They are systemic weaknesses and systemic failures,
and so the importance of your work in identifying those so that
we can fix them.
When we look at this particular incident, I, as others I
think, without knowing all of the facts, come away with many
questions. I break them down into three distinct areas: First,
collection; second, law enforcement and the Joint Terrorism
Task Force investigation; and, third, the military. Let me
start with collection.
While we must rely at the moment on public reports, what we
understand is that there were lawfully intercepted
communications in an unrelated terrorism investigation. As a
result of that unrelated investigation, the intelligence
community identified less than two dozen communications culled
from this unrelated investigation that had more than 20,000
communications.
I must say to you, that is an extraordinary accomplishment
on the part of the FBI and would not likely have occurred prior
to September 11, 2001. We must acknowledge what that suggests,
and that is, a stronger, more capable FBI determined to protect
us, and that is to be commended.
Second, I look at the law enforcement and the JTTF
investigation. To evaluate that, it is difficult without
understanding several things. First, the content of the
communications they were looking at, they remain classified and
the subject of the ongoing investigation. Second, when the JTTF
investigators looked at those communications, what did they
look at them against? What information did they have access to
at the time that they evaluated those communications? And then,
third, once they had that information on the JTTF and made a
judgment, whether we ultimately agree with the judgments that
were made there or not, what did they do to share that
information with individuals who could have taken action
outside of a law enforcement context, presumably the U.S.
military?
Let me start with content, and while I cannot speak to the
specific content of Major Hasan's communications, here is what
we do know about al-Awlaki from the 9/11 Commission report. Al-
Awlaki in late 2000 was an imam in San Diego where also at that
same mosque were two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In
2001, al-Awlaki relocates to the Dar Al-Hijra mosque in
Northern Virginia, the same mosque that the same two September
11, 2001, hijackers from San Diego go to in Northern Virginia,
as well as a third September 11, 2001, hijacker. And, finally,
al-Awlaki's phone number is discovered in Ramzi Binalshibh's
Hamburg apartment as a result of a search that is conducted.
The FBI and the counterterrorism community know al-Awlaki
well. He has been the subject of interest and investigation
since before and after he left the United States in 2002. He is
well known to the international counterterrorism community and
to the Yemeni Government.
Certainly the information regarding what we knew about al-
Awlaki as well as these communications were shared on the JTTF.
Certainly the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) was
a part of that review and participated. Presumably they looked
at Major Hasan's personnel file. Of course, the question
remains: What was in that file? All of the things that General
Keane articulated, were they there, were they considered?
Frankly, based on the judgment that was made on the JTTF,
it raises some question whether or not any of that information,
negative and derogatory, made it into the personnel file that
the JTTF had access to. If it was not there, we must ask
ourselves why and what we can do to ensure that information is
in there so that the JTTF investigators could have had access
to it.
Now, once that information was shared among the JTTF and
they made a judgment, what happened next? What information was
shared? I can tell you from my experience in the Justice
Department, depending on how that information was collected
will dictate what rules apply in terms of information sharing.
There are two sets of rules that apply. To Senator Collins'
question, these can be complicated, perhaps unnecessarily so.
If the information in those e-mails or those communications
was collected pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, typically the warrant that permitted that collection would
restrict the further dissemination of that information that was
collected without the permission of the Court. It is not
difficult. One can go back to the Court, request the
information, and get permission for sharing. And, in fact, in
my experience, I could not recall, thinking back on this, a
time when the Court did not grant such permissions. So that is
a legal restriction on the sharing.
The second set of rules is a memorandum of understanding
that the FBI enters into with each agency that participates in
the JTTF. The essence of those agreements say that information
by participants in the JTTF is not to be shared with their home
agencies without the permission of the JTTF. Presumably that is
the FBI by whom they are led. Again, that approval can be
gotten. There is not a reason not to have it.
I will tell you, as I thought about this case, I think as
you read the press accounts, the question becomes: Did DOD ask
for that information to be shared? Did the DOD representative
on the JTTF ask for that information to be shared back with the
Army? Of course, we need to know the answer to that question,
but I will tell you there is something that offends me about
suggesting that the obligation was only on the part of the
Department of Defense. Certainly any law enforcement
investigator there, if they felt that they did not have the
authority to proceed, but another Federal agency could, whether
it was on personnel or other reasons, should have suggested
that the information be shared.
In the wake of the review, the information and the
evaluation of the JTTF, when they made that evaluation, did
they interview Major Hasan? If they did not believe him to be a
threat, if they believed the communications to be legitimate,
then why didn't you go and interview him? If you didn't want to
interview him, why didn't you go and interview his colleagues
at Walter Reed where the information that was not in the file
might have been discovered? There are three typical responses
to those questions.
First, the protection of sources and methods, that they
would not have wanted to reveal where they got those
communications. I would suggest to the Committee that there are
ways around that concern to mask the source and method by which
you did that collection.
Second, regrettably, I worry about a sense of political
correctness. I worry that, in a post-September 11, 2001, world,
because we very much respect and rely on the vast majority of
law-abiding Muslims, and we have done tremendous cultural
training inside the Federal Government and law enforcement
agencies, that there might have been some sort of self-
censoring, if you will, a reluctance for them to pursue a
senior uniformed military member, a doctor who was Muslim.
Last, there is the FBI's Domestic Investigation Operational
Guidelines. They were written in December 2008. They are
updated annually, and it has been suggested that they would not
have gone out to interview Major Hasan or his employers because
they would have been discouraged from doing that by the FBI's
own guidelines. That, too, needs to be looked at and considered
and whether or not that needs to be changed.
Last, when we look at the military, we must look at this
important aspect. As I have suggested, we have to know whether
or not there was a method by which the derogatory information
made its way into Major Hasan's personnel file. If it did, who
was responsible and accountable for following up on that
information before the intercepts and after the intercepts if
they had gotten the information?
We must ensure that even if the military had gotten the
intercepts and the information that would have been required,
that they have the process and procedures in place to ensure
that they not fall through the cracks. They must also have
adequate resources and training within the military to be able
to address this issue.
It is important not simply because you may want to weed out
someone who is mentally unfit to be deployed, but after all, we
want to make sure the military has adequate resources to root
out within their ranks the potential criminal, spy, or
terrorist.
As Senator Collins says, it is important that we assure
ourselves, we address these issues, because it is at the core
of our obligation to protect our military service members and
their families. We ask much of them. We owe them an honest
look. We owe them to redouble our efforts to ensure their
safety and their security.
It is easy to offer questions and opinions when we are
unburdened by the facts. And I am not here to second-guess the
hard-working public servants who investigated this case, but to
offer, based on my experience, how we might improve the system
and better protect our men and women in uniform. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Ms. Townsend. I really
appreciate the spirit and the context of your testimony, which
I think will be both very informative and helpful to us as we
go forward with the investigation.
Our next witness--and we thank him for coming down from New
York--is Mitchell Silber, Director of Analysis with the
Intelligence Division of the New York City Police Department
(NYPD). Mr. Silber has testified previously before the
Committee concerning what I would call a seminal report that he
co-authored for the NYPD, which was titled ``Radicalization in
the West: A Homegrown Threat.'' The NYPD has really quite a
remarkable preventive approach--understandably, I suppose, when
one considers what happened on September 11, 2001--to the
threat of terrorism generally, including a focus on homegrown
terrorism. So we are very grateful, Mr. Silber, that you have
returned to the Committee, and we welcome your testimony at
this time.
TESTIMONY OF MITCHELL D. SILBER,\1\ DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Silber. Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting me as the representative
of the New York City Police Department to testify here today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Silber appears in the Appendix on
page 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2007, as you mentioned, I testified before this
Committee about the findings of a recent study titled
``Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat'' that I had
co-authored and the NYPD had published concerning the process
of radicalization in the West and the threat that it
potentially posed to the United States. As it has elsewhere,
this threat has now materialized in the United States.
The Past 12 Months: During the past 12 months, U.S.
authorities have uncovered a number of radicalized clusters of
individuals intent on committing violent jihad within the
continental United States as well as abroad. These arrests,
along with intelligence operations, indicate that
radicalization to violence is taking place in the United
States.
Approximately 1 year ago, in November 2008, the Department
of Homeland Security and the FBI issued a warning relating to
an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist plot against the Long Island
Railroad commuter network. The origins of this plot was linked
directly to Bryant Neal Vinas, a New Yorker, who radicalized to
violence in and around New York City before traveling to
Pakistan to seek out an opportunity to participate in violent
jihad.
In April 2009, before their arrest by the Joint Terrorism
Task Force, four men placed what they believed was C4
explosives outside a Jewish synagogue and community center in
Riverdale in an attempt to carry out a terrorist act. These men
were radicalized in the United States.
In July 2009, seven men were arrested by Federal
authorities in North Carolina. They possessed weapons and more
than 27,000 rounds of ammunition and had plans to attack the
Marine Base at Quantico, Virginia. These men, known as the
Raleigh 7, were inspired by al-Qaeda and radicalized in the
United States.
This past September, Najibullah Zazi, age 24, was arrested
as part of an al-Qaeda-linked conspiracy to attack locations in
New York City with hydrogen peroxide-based explosives. The plot
has been called one of the most serious since September 11,
2001. Zazi, who lived in Flushing, Queens, during his formative
years--ages 14 to 23, before departing for Pakistan--
radicalized in the United States.
Later that same September, Betim Kaziu, a 21-year-old New
Yorker from Brooklyn, was indicted for conspiracy to commit
murder abroad and support for foreign terrorists. Arrested in
Kosovo, Mr. Kaziu sought to join a foreign fighter group
overseas and ``take up arms against perceived enemies of
Islam,'' meaning American troops potentially in Iraq or
Afghanistan. He was also radicalized in the United States.
And there are more: In Boston, Tarek Mehanna, age 26 and a
graduate of the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy, was arrested
last month. Not only did he seek to fight abroad, but he was
also charged with conspiring to attack civilians at a shopping
mall in the United States, as well as two members of the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government. He was radicalized
in the United States.
At least 15 men of Somali descent have radicalized in
Minneapolis over the last few years and have left the United
States to fight in Somalia. They joined al-Shabaab, a terrorist
group associated with al-Qaeda and based in Somalia. Our fear
is: What happens when they return to the United States?
Australia has already thwarted a plot just this year involving
individuals who fought alongside al-Shabaab and then returned
to Melbourne seeking to attack an Australian military base.
This past September also saw plots involving lone wolves in
both Dallas, Texas, and Springfield, Illinois. In Dallas, a
large office building was targeted with a vehicle-borne
explosive. In Springfield, a Federal building was targeted.
Though these individuals were not part of any group, much of
their radicalization seems U.S. based.
And, finally, there were the recent arrests of two
Chicagoans with direct links to Lashkar-e-Taiba. This is the
group that was responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai
terrorist attack. Though these men seemed to be plotting
against targets in Denmark, once again it appears that these
individuals were radicalized in the United States.
Given the evidence of the past 12-month period, one must
conclude that radicalization to violence is occurring in the
United States.
Process and Radicalization: Given what seems to be a
pattern of individuals radicalizing to al-Qaeda-inspired
violence, the NYPD has invested a substantial analytic effort
in order to assess the causes and process that marked the
radicalization trajectory of these individuals. Among the cases
previously mentioned, we saw the pattern repeating itself. It
is consistent with the model from the 2007 NYPD report that
suggested of four phases: Pre-radicalization, self-
identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. And driving
this process is a combination of the proliferation of al-Qaeda
ideology intertwined with the real or perceived political
grievances that cite a Western ``war against Islam'' and
provide the justification for young men with unremarkable
backgrounds to pursue violent extremism.
Let me describe in greater detail the four phases.
Phase I, Pre-Radicalization: Pre-radicalization is the
point of origin for individuals before they begin this
progression. It is their life situation before they were
exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own
ideology. Based on the cases, individuals who are vulnerable to
radicalization tend to be male Muslims between the ages of 15
to 35 who are local residents and citizens from varied ethnic
backgrounds. Significant proportions come from middle-class
backgrounds and are educated, at least high school graduates,
if not university students. Based on our case studies, the vast
majority of individuals who end up radicalizing to violence do
not start out as religiously observant or knowledgeable.
Phase 2, Self-Identification: Self-identification is the
phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and
external factors, begin to explore more literal interpretations
of Islam, gradually gravitating away from their old identity
and beginning to associate themselves with and adopt this
ideology as their own. The trigger for this ``religious
seeking'' is often a catalytic event or a crisis which
challenges the individual's previously held beliefs and causes
that individual to reconsider their previously held outlook and
worldview.
Phase 3, Indoctrination: Indoctrination is the phase in
which an individual intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts his
extremist ideology, and concludes without question that action
is required to support and further the cause. That action is
violence. Indoctrination is the manifestation of accepting a
religious-political ideology that justifies, legitimizes, and
encourages violence against anything kufir, or un-Islamic,
including the West, its citizens, its allies, or those whose
opinions are contrary to their own extremist agenda.
The signatures associated with this phase include becoming
an active participant in a group and simultaneously becoming
increasingly isolated from one's life. Gradually, the
individuals begin to isolate themselves from secular society
and self-radicalize. They come to believe that the world is
divided between enlightened believers (themselves) and infidels
(everybody else).
Phase 4, Jihadization, or the ``Violence Phase'':
Jihadization is a phase in which individuals accept their own
individual duty to participate in violent jihad and self-
designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen. Often,
individuals will seek to travel abroad to participate in a
field of jihad such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir,
Chechnya, Somalia, or Iraq, only to be redirected back to the
West to do ``something for the cause.'' Frequently, the group
members participate in outdoor activities like rafting,
camping, or paintball with the purpose of vetting, bonding, and
training. In addition, mental preparation commences as jihadist
videos are watched. And, last, potential targets are chosen,
surveillance and reconnaissance begin, and the group weaponizes
with readily available components.
New Analysis: While much of the 2007 radicalization study
remains directly applicable to the last 12 months' events,
additional research has highlighted some new findings. The most
important is that the Internet has become an even more valuable
venue and a driver for radicalization. In fact, this finding
was also highlighted by a 2008 report that this Committee
produced, noting accurately that, ``the use of the Internet by
al-Qaeda and other violent Islamist extremist groups has
expanded the terrorist threat to our homeland. No longer is the
threat just from abroad, as was the case with the attacks of
September 11, 2001; the threat is now increasingly from within,
from homegrown terrorists who are inspired by violent Islamist
ideology to plan and execute attacks where they live. One of
the primary drivers of this new threat is the use of the
Internet to enlist individuals or groups of individuals to join
the cause without ever affiliating with a terrorist
organization.''
In 2007, we discussed the concept of a ``spiritual
sanctioner,'' an individual who provides religious
justification for violent political extremists. Within the last
6 months, we have identified a new catalyst for radicalization.
We call this the ``virtual spiritual sanctioner,'' and although
he is not the only one, Anwar al-Awlaki, though based in Yemen,
is an exemplar of this concept.
Both Anwar al-Awlaki's extremist ties, as previously
discussed, as well as his ability to translate literature that
promotes violent jihad into English have enabled his widespread
radicalizing effect. Not only has al-Awlaki been a religious
authority cited by the convicted Fort Dix plotters, who were
disrupted in a 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey, but
his tapes were also played for all of those who attended the
Toronto 18's makeshift training camp, held north of Toronto in
the winter of 2005. That group plotted to explode three tons of
ammonium nitrate in Toronto in the fall of 2006.
Key Judgments: First, in recent years, U.S. authorities
have uncovered significant and increasing numbers of
radicalized clusters or individuals intent on committing
violent jihad either in the United States or abroad. These
arrests confirm that radicalization is taking place in the
United States today.
Second, it is also noteworthy that in the past year, there
have been a half dozen cases of individuals who, instead of
traveling abroad to carry out violence, have elected to do it
here in the United States. This is substantially different from
what we have seen in the past and may reflect an emerging
pattern.
And third, the al-Qaeda threat to the U.S. homeland is no
longer limited to al-Qaeda core. Rather, it has decentralized
and now consists of three primary elements: Al-Qaeda core; al-
Qaeda allies, like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Islamic Jihad Union, and
others who have begun to target the West; and, most recently,
the al-Qaeda-inspired or homegrown threat that has no
operational relationship with al-Qaeda core, but consists of
individuals radicalized in the West who utilize al-Qaeda
ideology as their inspiration for action.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, thank you, Mr. Silber. Just two
quick comments.
One, the testimony that you gave, the summary of the
various homegrown terrorist plots that have been formed and
stopped in the last year, reminds us that though we are in an
unconventional war with the Islamist extremists who attacked us
on September 11, 2001, that war increasingly has come within
our borders. It started here officially, if you will, even
though it was coming at us before September 11, 2001, but this
pattern of homegrown radicalization is a very significant new
front and is one that law enforcement is obviously dealing with
quite effectively. Most of these plots, except for the ones
that were lone wolves such as the Little Rock case and
presumably Major Hasan's case, at least what we know of him
now, were true groups and have been stopped.
My second comment is that in the question-and-answer period
I am going to ask you to relate this schematic framework that
you have of the phases of radicalization to Major Hasan based
on what you know about him from public sources now.
Our next witness is Juan Carlos Zarate, former Deputy
Assistant to the President, Deputy National Security Adviser
for Combating Terrorism, and before that Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Terrorist Financing. Mr. Zarate comes to us
today as Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
Thank you very much for being here.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JUAN CARLOS ZARATE,\1\ SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; AND FORMER DEPUTY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
Mr. Zarate. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins,
and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you very much
for the opportunity to testify today about the horrific attacks
that occurred on November 5, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Zarate appears in the Appendix on
page 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, I have written testimony that I ask be
entered in the record.
Chairman Lieberman. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Zarate. Thank you. My testimony today, Mr. Chairman,
addresses some of the implications of the Fort Hood attack,
including the continued terrorist threats to our military in
the United States, the challenges of dealing with the lone-wolf
insider threat, and the increasing problem of radicalization
and the threat of violent Islamic extremism.
The horrific event at Fort Hood was shocking not only for
its lethality but because an attack against our men and women
of the military occurred in our own country, on a major
military base, and allegedly by an Army officer whose job it
was to care for the mental well-being of our soldiers.
The attack has obviously raised legitimate questions about
why such an event happened; whether authorities, both civilian
and military, could have prevented such an attack; and the
national security implications of this incident moving forward.
Unlike any event since September 11, 2001, it has also fueled
discussion about the specter of a violent extremist ideology in
our midst.
I think it is premature, though, to answer any of these
questions completely or make final judgments without more
information about the event and the alleged perpetrator. There
may indeed have been a failure to connect the dots or, more
importantly, a failure to evaluate completely what those dots
meant, but I think it is too early to tell.
What makes the Fort Hood case particularly difficult to
assess, especially at this point, is that there may have been a
mixture of motives or factors at play in the alleged
perpetrator's mind. What makes it a case that appears to have
been harder to disrupt was that Major Hasan seems to have acted
alone, in lone-wolf fashion, and may have used his medical
research to mask his own inner turmoil and attraction to a
violent ideology.
Unfortunately, as Mr. Silber points out, this event follows
a line of attacks against military personnel in separate
incidents, including a murder at a military recruitment center
in Little Rock, an act of fratricide at Camp Liberty in Iraq,
and another act of fratricide at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait in
March 2003. The event also occurred in the wake of several
disrupted terrorist plots in the United States, raising
questions about whether we are facing a new wave of terrorism
driven in part by self-radicalized actors. The FBI, in concert
with other authorities, recently disrupted, as Mr. Silber
mentioned, a series of serious plots and arrested potential
terrorists from New York and North Carolina to Texas and
Illinois. Some of these plots were homegrown and more local in
nature, while at least two of them appear to have serious
international terrorist connections. Some of these plots, like
the foiled attack on Quantico, the attempt to shoot down a
military transport plane in Newburgh, and the failed attack on
Fort Dix in 2000, were aimed directly at our military here at
home.
Even with all these events occurring in a short period of
time, I think we must be careful not to draw final conclusions
about how the Fort Hood attack fits into these series of
arrests and incidents and whether there is a recognizable
pattern that ties this event to all the others.
That said, I think it is important in the first instance to
recognize the constant threat to our military from terrorist
attacks. From the attacks at the marine barracks in Beirut in
1983, the destruction of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996,
the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, to the present day attacks
on Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, terrorists have purposefully
targeted U.S. military and installations abroad.
For homegrown or self-radicalized individuals or cells,
military bases provide the most visible and legitimate targets
that help them justify their actions by tying their attacks
directly to the perceived attacks on Muslims by the U.S.
military. Attacks on our military I think will continue and
will grow more likely over time. U.S. military presence abroad
will remain a visible target for our enemies--including Sunni
and Shia dominated and inspired terrorist groups. At home,
violent radicals will see the military as an obvious and
legitimate target. It is important, then, for the military to
continue to review and refine its security procedures at all
our installations and for all our personnel. The problem in
this case, the case of Fort Hood, though, seems not to have
come from the outside but from within.
Based on publicly available information, it appears likely
that the alleged perpetrator acted alone. Unlike a classic lone
wolf, though, the alleged perpetrator in this case used his
privileged role as an insider--an officer and doctor--to attack
the military and murder his fellow soldiers. In many ways, the
lone-wolf insider threat is the most challenging and difficult
of problems for the counterterrorism and law enforcement
communities. The more a terrorist is interacting,
communicating, and manifesting intent and capabilities, the
more likely the plot can be prevented.
The U.S. Government and foreign partners have uncovered a
variety of such cells and networks since September 11, 2001,
and prevented numerous attacks. If there is no expression of
violent tendencies or plans, then it is difficult not only for
authorities but also friends, colleagues, and neighbors to
determine that a violent threat is looming.
Law enforcement, in addition, is often limited in its
ability to inquire or follow up without indications of directly
suspicious or criminal behavior. The June 1, 2009, murder at
the military recruitment center in Little Rock is a sobering
reminder of these limitations.
In retrospect, the Fort Hood case could prove to be even
more complicated than past events. It may be that we will not
see a smoking gun that revealed Major Hasan's true motivations
and signaled an intent to resort to violence. Like other such
violent incidents in the United States, there will likely be a
patchwork of data points and behavioral clues which, in light
of the incident, and with hindsight, as Ms. Townsend indicates,
appear to point to a path of violence. A key question, then, is
whether those data points were seen and evaluated properly.
The most troubling of the alleged data points revealed to
date involved suspicious and supposed communications between
Major Hasan and Anwar al-Awlaki. As has been testified to, al-
Awlaki is Yemeni-American radical cleric with ties to the
September 11, 2001, hijackers and with popular appeal on the
Internet and in Yemen with Western violent extremists. Al-
Awlaki has been and is well known to the U.S. Government.
Though too early to fully evaluate, what may have made
these communications in the alleged case of Major Hasan more
difficult to diagnose is that the alleged perpetrator's own
doubts and conflict about serving in the military may have been
masked by his own academic and medical research about the mind
of Muslim soldiers.
The threat of an American lone wolf--radicalized remotely
in the United States, perhaps via the Internet--presents the
most difficult problem for U.S. law enforcement. The reality is
that attacks by such actors are difficult to predict and to
prevent, even more so when they are acting from the inside.
In light of this attack, there has begun a heightened
debate about the threat posed by the ideology of violent
Islamic extremism. The core narrative of this ideology--that
the West is at war with Islam and that Muslims around the world
must unite to fight the United States in defense of fellow
Muslims--has widespread appeal. This is a simple,
straightforward narrative that helps explain world events and
local grievances. It is a narrative that is widely believed in
many corners of the world and acts as a siren song for troubled
individuals in crisis.
Al-Qaeda and their adherents take full advantage of this
ideology to lure cannon fodder for their cause. Osama bin Laden
and al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's number one and two, have frequently
crafted messages directed to American audiences. In this case,
there is no doubt that al-Qaeda will reference and use the Fort
Hood attack in its propaganda as a way of convincing their
adherents that the U.S. military is under pressure and
suffering at the hands of al-Qaeda.
Though this is an ideology that is inherently exclusionary
and violent, it is not illegal to believe in or espouse it.
Many do throughout the world, including some people in the
United States. Given our First Amendment protections, merely
espousing such views cannot be considered illegal, and absent
proximity and causality tied to an act of violence, the
preaching of such hatred and advocacy of violence is not
prosecutable as incitement under U.S. law. There are many
radical ideologues, like al-Awlaki, who skate the line between
spreading this hateful ideology and inciting violence under
U.S. law.
Fortunately, the United States has largely been immune from
the larger social and economic problems of Muslim citizen
integration and the attendant problems of radicalization found
throughout Europe and in parts of Asia. Much of this can be
attributed to the fundamental integration of all immigrants
into American society as Americans and to the common ideals and
counter-narrative of the American dream. The danger of this
ideology in the United States is for more individuals to fall
prey to radicalization and for a divide to form within American
society.
This is why I think American citizens--Muslims and non-
Muslims alike--have a special responsibility not to play into
the hands of the violent extremists and their ideology. There
cannot be a divide in our society. To the credit of our great
country and our citizens, reaction to the horrors of Fort Hood
has been measured and civil.
Muslim-Americans, I think, have a special responsibility in
this ideological battle. Regardless ultimately of the
motivations of the perpetrator, the attack at Fort Hood is an
important moment for Muslim-Americans to stand up directly
against this ideology that has proven to be so deadly and
destructive. This involves more than just condemnation of
violent attacks but an active participation in the debate about
how to isolate, discredit, and ultimately displace the allure
of this false ideology, especially in the United States.
I applaud leaders like Salam al-Marayati, the Executive
Director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, who has issued a
clarion call to fellow Muslim-Americans. In a recent article,
he called the Fort Hood attacks a ``defining moment for Muslim-
Americans'' and concluded the following: ``We as Muslim-
Americans are the answer to this frightening phenomenon of
terrorism and violent extremism. We own our own destiny, and it
is fundamentally intertwined with our nation's destiny.
Terrorism will be defeated with our work on the front lines,
not in the battlefields, but in our mosques and community
centers and youth associations. By standing up and working for
change, we are acting on the best and guiding principles of
Islam and of America.''
Indeed, I think it is our vibrant American Muslim
communities and leaders who must rise up and face down the
ideology that glorifies death and aims to foment division in
our society.
As the review of this incident unfolds, I think it will be
critical to ensure that information was shared and evaluated
properly. But I also think it will be important to preserve the
necessary tools to law enforcement and the intelligence
community that will allow them to uncover data points related
to domestic extremist terrorism. In this regard, I think the
two provisions of the PATRIOT Act set to sunset this year,
including the roving wiretap provision and business records
authority, should be renewed. Importantly, the provision from
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA),
commonly referred to as the ``lone-wolf provision,'' should
also be renewed. These I think should be renewed without
unnecessary or burdensome requirements that may dissuade or
prevent the effective use of these techniques by law
enforcement.
In addition, I think Congress and the Administration should
ensure that the revised Attorney General Guidelines, mentioned
by Ms. Townsend, are fully in effect, fully supported and
implemented. In addition, the Administration and Congress
should look at existing laws and authorities to determine
whether modifications or more aggressive use would be
appropriate against those providing material and ideological
support to lone-wolf terrorists and violent extremists.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Zarate, excuse me for interrupting,
but if you can come to a close--I actually went over your
statement last night, and it is very good, including the
questions that you suggest we raise. But we have got a number
of Committee Members here, and I know they will want to get
into the questioning soon.
Mr. Zarate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just conclude
then with a couple of the key questions I think that not only
build on the questions that have been raised, but also point to
some forward-looking dimensions.
Obviously, the key and core question is whether or not
there were any restrictions in terms of information sharing,
both horizontally and vertically, that affected the ability to
see the collective body of information about Major Hasan, the
suspect.
Are there existing ties with radical ideologues abroad or
via the Internet that should be reviewed, again, for the threat
of radicalization posed?
Are there common warning signs in the Fort Hood case and in
the 2003 Camp Pennsylvania attack that can be used to prevent
such future attacks?
Are there realistic expectations about preventing lone-wolf
attacks? And in that regard, are there relevant laws and
authorities in place to allow authorities to get in front of
such threats?
Importantly, how much of this prevention goes beyond the
Federal Government? How much of this bears societal response of
heightened vigilance, without creating an atmosphere of fear,
suspicion, and recrimination among neighbors? How do we strike
that balance?
And, finally, should there be a more formal mechanism for
enlisting Muslim-Americans to empower them to take on violent
Islamist extremist ideology and to allow Federal, State, local,
and tribal authorities an ability to more actively address
community concerns?
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any
questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much for that very helpful
testimony.
Our last witness today is Brian Jenkins, who is Senior
Adviser at the RAND Corporation. Mr. Jenkins was involved in
the study of terrorism before most people focused on the
concept and a long time before we, much to our dismay and
surprise, ended up in a war with one group of terrorists, as we
are now. He was last before the Committee in January testifying
on the Mumbai attacks of last November. We welcome you back and
look forward to your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS,\1\ SENIOR ADVISER, RAND
CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Collins, and Members of the Committee, for inviting me to talk
to you about this tragic and disquieting and event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins appears in the Appendix
on page 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This small pin I wear on my lapel was designed by a
fireman. It was given to me in memory of those who were killed
on September 11, 2001. I am wearing it this morning out of
respect for those who were killed and wounded at Fort Hood.
You may recall that, when I testified before this same
Committee last January on the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, in
response to the question, ``Could a Mumbai-style attack happen
in the United States?'' I said, ``It could. The difference lies
in the scale of events.'' While the recruiting and training of
10 suicide attackers was far beyond anything that we had seen
in any of the conspiracies uncovered since September 11, 2001,
I did point out that we had seen lone gunmen and pairs of
shooters, motivated by political cause or mental illness, run
amok, determined to kill in quantity. Therefore, an attack
carried out by one or a small number of attackers armed with
readily available weapons, nothing exotic, perhaps causing
scores of casualties, was certainly not inconceivable.
I mention that now because the threat we face is not so
much one of organizations penetrating the United States as it
is of the spread of ideologies and models of behavior. And that
is what we are talking about here, models of behavior. It is
noteworthy that the only terrorist attackers to succeed in
harming anyone in the United States since September 11, 2001,
have been lone gunmen.
Now, at a glance, Major Hasan's rampage at Fort Hood looks
a lot like what used to be called ``going postal''--a deepening
sense of personal grievance culminating in a homicidal rampage
directed against co-workers, in this case, fellow soldiers. For
Major Hasan, ``going jihad'' reflects the channeling of obvious
personality problems into a deadly fanaticism.
We must wait for a full inquiry to thoroughly understand
Major Hasan's motives, his preparations, his objectives, but on
the basis of what has been reported in the news media, we
clearly have a troubled man who engaged with extremist
ideologies via the Internet that resonated with and reinforced
his own anger, leading him at some point to a decision to kill.
The markers on his path to the November 5, 2009, slayings
correspond to many of those laid out in previous studies of
radicalization, notably, the excellent study by the New York
Police Department.
If some of the signposts are missing, it is because, except
for Major Hasan's reported correspondence with al-Awlaki, his
journey may have been largely an interior one.
I mention signposts. Were there signposts? Clearly, there
seemed to have been some. Mass killings like the one at Fort
Hood invariably prompt the question, could it have been
prevented? I am going to join the other members of the panel
and say that it is premature for me, on the basis of what we
know now, to make that judgment. I do have to say that
experience has taught me to be exceptionally cautious in this
domain. I know that, seen through a rearview mirror, a lot of
these clues seem tantalizingly obvious--if only we had been
able to connect the dots. That famous phrase sometimes seduces
us into overestimating what is knowable, especially in the
realm of human behavior. We are just not very good at
predicting human violence. We do not have an X-ray for a man's
soul.
I do, however, think that a very useful line of inquiry,
separate from the specifics of this case, would be exploring
the issue of self-radicalized individuals. Much of what we say
about radicalization derives from looking at groups. Individual
terrorists lie at the edge of our knowledge here, implying
perhaps a need for the capabilities of both forensic psychology
and radicalization theory. It would be useful to explore what
we should be looking for here and, just as importantly, what we
can reasonably expect to know.
Senator Collins, you mentioned a shortage of psychiatrists
in the military. Let me offer an aside here. The long duration
and the nature of the conflicts we confront today create
exceptional challenges to members of our armed forces. The
stresses are showing up in the form of breakdowns, suicides,
sometimes homicides. Now, mark my words, this by no means
excuses Major Hasan's acts. It does suggest, however, that we
are going to have to be extraordinarily sensitive to the
mindset, the morale, and the mental well-being of our men and
women in uniform upon whom we have placed such a great burden.
Now let me shift quickly from Major Hasan to this event in
the context of the current terrorist threat.
According to research at RAND, the number and geographic
range of al-Qaeda-inspired attacks have grown each year since
September 11, 2001, although clearly at the same time there has
been a decline in the quality of these actions. Some analysts
say that al-Qaeda is following a strategy of ``leaderless
resistance'' as a consequence of the relentless pursuit to
which we have subjected it.
Leaderless resistance envisions an army of autonomous
terrorist operatives, united in a common cause but not
connected organizationally. It is difficult to destroy a
leaderless enterprise, but leaderless resistance is ultimately
a strategy of weakness. As I say, we have greatly reduced al-
Qaeda's operational capabilities. And outside of Pakistan and
Afghanistan, its leaders can do little other than exhort others
to violence.
What leaderless resistance does offer is the opportunity
for terrorist leaders to assert ownership of just about every
homicidal maniac on the planet. And therefore, it is not
surprising that Major Hasan's Internet imam was quick to praise
the Fort Hood murders as another jihad success.
Since September 11, 2001, authorities in the United States
have uncovered nearly 30 plots to carry out attacks here in the
United States or abroad or to provide support for terrorist
organizations. Not all of these, even if undiscovered, would
have resulted in successful terrorist attacks, but I do remind
you that very little separates the ambitions of terrorist
wannabes from deadly terrorist assaults. The essential
ingredient is intent, and that is what we are talking about
here. Therefore, domestic intelligence collection remains a
necessary and critical component of homeland security.
Mr. Silber mentioned the plots discovered in 2009. We have
had eight plots discovered thus far this year, plus two actual
attacks--the one in Arkansas and the one at Fort Hood. This is
a much higher number than in previous years. There appears to
be common inspiration. There is no evidence of organizational
connection between these events. These are individual responses
to jihadist propaganda in the context of U.S. policy decisions
that portray what we do as an assault on Islam.
Six of the plots since September 11, 2001, have been
directed against American soldiers or military facilities in
the United States, and, again, this reflects jihadist
exhortation as well as the plotters' own perceptions that
attacking military targets is more legitimate than attacking
civilians--although I hasten to point out that the majority of
the plots were aimed simply at causing mass civilian
casualties, especially in public transportation venues.
What does this case tell us about the radicalization of
Muslims in America? Here I join you, Senator Lieberman, in
saying we have to be careful about overreaction. In all of
these 30-some plots, about 100 individuals who were arrested
for terrorism-related crimes, almost all of them recruited
locally. It does show that radicalization and recruitment to
terrorism is occurring in the United States and is a security
concern. It has, however, yielded very few recruits. Indeed,
the paucity of significant terrorist attacks since September
11, 2001, suggests not only intelligence and investigative
success, but an American Muslim community that remains
overwhelmingly unsympathetic to jihadist appeals.
What authorities are going to confront going forward are
tiny conspiracies or the actions of individuals which, in a
free society, are always going to be hard to predict and
prevent.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. Excellent
background, excellent context. And you are right, the record
shows that the number of Muslim-Americans involved in these
plots is quite small. Obviously what is unsettling is that a
small number of people can do terrible harm. But it is very
important to put that small number in the context of the larger
Muslim-American community, which obviously is not a part of
this.
We are going to have 7-minute rounds of questions for the
Members of the Committee.
I want to quickly focus on something in your testimony, Dr.
Jenkins. After the murders at Fort Hood and information began
to come out about Major Hasan, there was commentary that he was
obviously an unstable person, a person under stress and, to
some extent, going from that to a willingness to conclude that
this was not a jihadist act or a terrorist attack.
You comment on that in your prepared testimony, and I just
want to draw you out on it. My conclusion from your testimony
is that the existence of mental stress or instability does not
mean that the act carried out is not a jihadist or terrorist
act. Is that correct?
Mr. Jenkins. Absolutely. These are not mutually exclusive
categories. In many cases, individuals who are terrorists were
attracted to these extremist ideologies because of their own
personal difficulties and discontents. I mean, terrorism does
not attract the well-adjusted.
Chairman Lieberman. Absolutely. That is the point.
Mr. Jenkins. So what often happens in these cases is that
individuals who are angry at something reach out toward some
ideology that, as I say, resonates with and reinforces that and
channels them down a path toward a particular action.
So if we find, for example, that there are many aspects of
Major Hasan's personality that are troublesome, that this was a
man in some type of personal crisis, that clearly does not
exclude his act from being properly labeled an act of
terrorism.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
General Keane, I believe Mr. Zarate talked, quite
correctly, about the premium we put in our country on free
speech and where one draws the line between free political
expressions, even if they are extremist, and actionable
behavior of any kind. But I think in this case, we have to view
that in the context of what it means to be in the U.S.
military? And I wonder if you could just help us understand,
particularly in light of the concerns that Ms. Townsend
expressed, that others have expressed, that we have been
concerned about, whether some fear of being politically
incorrect inhibited earlier action against Major Hasan by those
who had heard him express extremist views.
So does a soldier have the right to say anything he wants
to say without any consequences?
General Keane. Absolutely not. Certainly free speech is an
integral part of the rights of Americans, but in the U.S.
military, not too surprising, the mission comes first. And to
be able to perform that mission, you need in a team cohesion,
morale, discipline, and good order. And anyone who is
contributing to break that cohesion and that moral and good
discipline and order with rhetoric, with speech, with actions,
with behavior, can be held accountable by the chain of command
for that speech, for that behavior, and, therefore, be
counseled and rehabilitated for it, and that if there is such
an unwillingness to change or such a commitment to those
beliefs, then be separated for it, all of this short of any
criminal behavior.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
General Keane. As some of the panelists discussed. A
military unit cannot function and perform its mission under
considerable stress without the necessary cohesion, morale,
good order, and discipline, it has confidence in each other.
When this speech starts to occur, this inflammatory speech that
aggravates other members of the team, it polarizes a unit. It
differentiates people in the unit. It forces them to choose
sides. And that is where the commanders and the supervisors
have to step in and start to address this issue. Regardless of
people's sensibilities, the order and planning and morale of
the unit takes priority over those sensibilities. That is the
reality of the military and its mission and what the American
people are holding us accountable for.
Chairman Lieberman. Agreed. What then is the responsibility
of an individual soldier who hears a fellow soldier express
political views that he deems are extremist? In the case in
which you were involved at Fort Bragg, they were white
supremacist views. What we are worried about here, obviously,
is violent Islamist extremist views. But what is the
responsibility of a soldier to report up the chain of command
such observations?
General Keane. Yes, the members of the team have an
obligation to identify and report to the chain of command any
of this type of extremist behavior, rhetoric, etc. That was
clearly one of the problems we had at Fort Bragg inside our
units. It was being tolerated by the soldiers and also being
tolerated by the immediate chain of command to a certain
degree.
It is unclear in my mind that we have in the military today
and in our army units clear, specific guidelines as to what is
jihadist extremist behavior.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
General Keane. How do you identify this behavior? How does
it manifest itself?
I think that is one of the things that this investigation
will probably determine, as I said in my remarks, and I believe
that the Department of Defense will more than likely have to
issue some very specific guidelines, as we had to do after the
racially motivated murders and the skinhead extremism we had in
our midst in the 1990s.
Chairman Lieberman. So we will definitely pursue that, and
that may be an area of recommendation for us. But to the best
of your knowledge now, does existing army policy about
extremism generally prohibit extremist activity or is it more
focused based on the Fort Bragg case on white supremacist
activity?
General Keane. The Army pamphlet that was published in
2000--it is titled ``Extremist Activities''--driven by the Fort
Bragg incident, deals with racial extremism, period. That is
its focus. It is under the general capstone of an Army policy
that has a much broader focus than that. But I think the
pamphlet was designed to give the commanders and the chain of
command some specifics in terms of how to deal with this
problem given that particular incident.
So what we are dealing with here now, in my view, dealing
with jihadist extremists potentially--certainly preliminary
evidence would suggest that--those kinds of guidelines in terms
of defining that and how to deal with that as a specific case
in that behavior and that attitude and that rhetoric are not in
the hands of our commanders.
Chairman Lieberman. If our investigation finds that is
true--and I suspect it is--that is a real omission and an area
for correction, particularly in light of the record that other
witnesses have testified on the way in which jihadists or
people are actually being self-radicalized or radicalized over
the Internet, are being exhorted to attack the American
military on bases, not just abroad but here at home. My time is
up. Thank you, General.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General let me pick up where the Chairman left off. I have
the pamphlet on extremist activities that you just mentioned,
and I commend you for taking strong action after the racially
motivated murder at Fort Bragg. As I read through this
pamphlet, however, the types of conduct prohibited in the
policy manual really do not apply in the case of Major Hasan.
Would you agree with that?
General Keane. I absolutely would agree. The pamphlet, as
pamphlets are in the hierarchy of information provided to our
leaders and our units, normally deals with something that is
very specific as a result of a particular action under the
umbrella of a general policy. That is what that was designed to
do. We do not have anything like that dealing with Major
Hasan's incident and his behavior and his attitude and what
should be the actions that guide the leaders and also guide our
soldiers.
Senator Collins. That is my conclusion as well. The
prohibited activities that are listed in this manual are all
geared toward organized activities. They really do not apply to
the kind of lone-wolf conduct that we saw with Major Hasan, and
I agree with the Chairman that this is an area that we need to
pursue.
Ms. Townsend, there has also been discussion this morning
and previously about Major Hasan's First Amendment rights, and
I want to pursue this issue with you. Both the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Attorney General's
Guidelines prohibit collection based solely--and that is the
important word, in my view--on activities protected by the
First Amendment. And these restrictions were adopted to prevent
abuses that occurred in the past where Federal intelligence and
law enforcement agencies targeted individuals based solely on
their political activities. And no one wants to see that.
I am concerned, however, by reports that our Federal law
enforcement and counterintelligence agents may have backed off
from further inquiries into Major Hasan's activities based on
concerns about his First Amendment rights.
Do the restrictions in FISA or in the Attorney General's
Guidelines in any way prohibit investigations if there are
other reasons to do so? In other words, to give you a specific,
wouldn't the fact that Major Hasan had been in repeated contact
with a radical extremist Islamist cleric who was a known
associate of al-Qaeda terrorists be a reason to pursue an
investigation?
Ms. Townsend. Senator Collins, I agree with you completely.
To the extent that there would have been concern of infringing
on Major Hasan's either right to free speech or his freedom to
practice his religion, there were other factors to which you
could point beyond that having nothing to do with his religion
or his speech that could have caused concern. While it is not
public, from the content of those communications, and now what
we are hearing from his other colleagues up at Walter Reed, any
combination of those factors, as long as it was not based
solely on his exercise of his constitutional freedom, could
have formed the basis of further inquiry and investigation by
the FBI.
Senator Collins. So if we are being told that one reason
this was not aggressively pursued was concerns that it would
violate the FISA restrictions or the Attorney General's
Guidelines, you would disagree with that decision based on what
you know?
Ms. Townsend. Based on what I know now, yes, I would
disagree with that. And, frankly, this is, Senator, why I
mentioned my concern about political correctness. I think we
have to ensure that our investigators feel sufficiently backed
up, if you will, to follow the facts wherever they lead them.
And if the facts lead them to an investigation of a senior
member of the uniformed military who happens to be a Muslim
doctor, then that is where they lead them. But they have to
feel confident that they can pursue the facts wherever they
take them against whoever the target may be.
Senator Collins. And the other very important point that
you made in your testimony is while the members of the JTTF are
prohibited from sharing information with their home agency
without permission of the FBI, not only can they ask
permission, but presumably the FBI could direct a referral to
the Army or the DCIS. Is that correct? It goes in both
directions?
Ms. Townsend. That is right, and I think the best way to
explain this to folks is by example. Imagine if you had an
intercept that was not of a Federal crime. Perhaps it was a
rape. Perhaps it was child abuse. Suppose you had that sort of
information come over a wiretap into the JTTF and the local
police officer did not say, ``Can I share it?'' Presumably, the
Good Lord willing, somebody paying attention on the JTTF would
say, ``This needs to be shared with local authorities to either
prosecute a crime or to protect a child in my example.
And so, absolutely, my view of this is all members of the
JTTF have an obligation when they see information--the NYPD has
a public program. It's called ``See It, Say It.'' Certainly if
it passes you, just because it is not in the jurisdiction of
your particular agency, doesn't relieve you of the fundamental
law enforcement obligation to follow it up.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
I just want to say very briefly, in Connecticut, some years
ago we had a case just as you describe, unrelated to terrorism,
where a local official was being investigated for corruption,
and wiretaps picked up the fact that this local official was
involved in basically sexual abuse of children. And it went
right up to the Attorney General at that time to determine
whether he should be arrested for those acts of abusing the
children. And, of course, the correct judgment was made, which
was that the corruption investigation was forgotten and he was
arrested, convicted, and is still in jail for those crimes.
As is our custom on this Committee, we call on order of
arrival, so the order, for the information of my colleagues, is
Senators Carper, McCain, Ensign, Levin, Graham, McCaskill, and
Pryor. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses,
thank you very much for joining us today and for the time that
you have invested in preparing for your testimony and
responding to our questions.
Mr. Chairman, this testimony has been both illuminating
and, I believe, most constructive.
I want to return to the testimony that Mr. Zarate gave us,
and near the end of your testimony, you quoted--I did not catch
it, and I tried to find it in your statement who actually said
these words--I believe it was a Muslim leader who said
something to the effect, ``we, the Muslim-Americans, are the
defining answer.'' Do you remember that?
Mr. Zarate. That is right, sir.
Senator Carper. Just go back with us and revisit that
comment, please.
Mr. Zarate. Right. This comment comes from Salam al-
Marayati, who is the Executive Director of a group called the
Muslim Public Affairs Council, an important group. He is based
in Southern California, and soon after the Fort Hood attack, he
posted on Huffington Post what is, in essence, an op-ed. And as
I described it, he called it a defining moment for American-
Muslims, which was to, in essence, own our own destiny and
fundamentally deal with terrorism in our midst.
What I found incredibly important was--and this is based on
my experience both at Treasury and at the National Security
Council (NSC), having interacted and engaged with Muslim-
American leaders and community members for some time on these
issues of terrorism--the realization and the articulation about
the importance of the battlefields and the front lines in the
mosques, community centers, and youth associations. I think
that is an incredible statement by Salam. I think it is an
important realization that Muslim-Americans have to take
ownership of the ideological battle happening within Islam
itself and have to find ways of isolating those who are
radicalizing our youth and getting into the heads of American
citizens.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Of all the comments that were
given by witnesses, that one just jumped right off the page at
me. And I just wanted to ask each of our witnesses to respond
to what you heard here.
We are a legislative committee. We are not the FBI. We are
not the Justice Department. We are not the judge; we are not
the jury. We are a legislative committee. And one or two of you
have given us, I think, pretty good advice on some things we
may want to do legislatively, and I suspect that we will want
to do most of those things. But in terms of what
responsibilities the Muslim community in this country have,
what they can do to help the rest of us to try to make sure
this kind of thing does not ever happen again, we have heard
one piece of advice here, and I just want the other witnesses
to respond to that and share your views, please.
General Keane. Well, my reaction to that is certainly one
of encouragement, and I certainly praise them for making those
remarks. In the largest context of what we are dealing with in
terms of the challenge inside Islam between the radicals and
the moderates and traditionalists, and many of those are
moderates themselves, it is hard to see defeating radical Islam
itself without the willing cooperation of the moderates to
reject it. I mean, we are going to kill a lot of these radical
Islamists over the next coming years, just as we have done over
the last 8 years. But as we all know who have been involved up
close in this fight, the fact of the matter is that killing
them will not defeat this movement. This movement will have to
be defeated by moderate Muslims who reject it.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Ms. Townsend.
Ms. Townsend. As you know, Senator, most Muslim-Americans
are patriotic, law-abiding citizens, and, in fact, while very
few actually speak publicly--and I will explain why--many
cooperate quietly with local law enforcement and Federal law
enforcement, and we will not be successful without that
continuing, and that is to be commended.
Oftentimes, moderate Muslims are reluctant to speak out
because the radicals label them--the word is called
``takfiri,'' and that is ``un-Islamic''--and separate them from
the larger ummah of the Muslim world. And it is both
discouraging to them and frightening to moderate Muslims and
intimidates them from speaking out. And we have to understand
that is the environment they live in, so there are few who have
got the sort of courage to speak publicly, but we do not want
to discourage them from privately and quietly cooperating with
Federal and local officials.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Silber.
Mr. Silber. I think the question is in terms of what are
the ways to combat extremism and what role does the Muslim
community play, we are informed by our discussions with
intelligence officials in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the
Netherlands who have had to deal with this problem in a
magnitude greater than we have to date in the United States.
And, clearly, their response is right along the same lines as
that. At the end of the day, it is going to be the members of
the Muslim community themselves who have to de-legitimize this
as an ideology, and the challenge is for those governments and
local entities to find willing interlocutors to help them de-
legitimize that ideology.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. I would just underscore what Ms. Townsend
said. I think it is important for Muslims to speak out
publicly, but also there is evidence of a great deal of quiet
activity going on within the community. We are talking about
people attempting to ensure that their own family members,
friends, and colleagues do not go down destructive and self-
destructive paths. So there is a great deal of pressure in the
community against this type of activity.
Senator Carper. All right. I said earlier we are not the
FBI, we are not the Justice Department. We are none of those
things. We are a legislative committee. Several of you have
suggested things that we should be doing legislatively to
reduce the likelihood that this kind of horrific thing will
happen again in our country--or outside of our country. A
couple of you made those legislative recommendations. Just go
back and revisit those, re-emphasize them for us, please.
Mr. Zarate. I had made the suggestion, Senator, of making
sure that law enforcement and intelligence authorities have the
relevant legal authorities to be able to investigate
domestically because, again, what we are talking about in this
context--and this has been described by the panelists--is a
very difficult problem to ferret out, especially when you are
talking about a lone-wolf scenario. And so it becomes
incredibly important for authorities to have not only the legal
backing, structures, and procedures, but also then the
resources.
One of the key questions, I think, for the FBI will be: To
the extent that there are additional pressures to try to ferret
out these types of actors and events, do they have the
resources to cover these types of events, to follow up on the
kinds of communications and leads that may exist, where there
may be thousands of communications with a figure like an Anwar
al-Awlaki from the United States. And so that I think is a
critical question moving forward in addition to others I have
presented.
Ms. Townsend. Senator, the two that I would focus on, one
has to do with--this is my pet issue, as Senator Collins
knows--the information sharing and the rules. Sometimes we make
them too cumbersome that it is just discouraging. It is not
that it is not permitted, but the rules become so cumbersome
that they are discouraging, and so people do not do it. And I
think the Committee has a real opportunity to look at things
like the restrictions pursuant to FISA, the restrictions in the
Attorney General's Guidelines, and the FBI's own internal
guidelines. All taken together, it may be that just discouraged
people from doing what they really needed to do.
Then the second piece to that I really think is the U.S.
military, it does not look like the Army got the information
that they could have acted on within their system. I would not
stop there. I think we have got to look at whether or not the
U.S. military, if they had gotten the information, had the
training, tactics, procedures, resources, and business process
to ensure that they identify and deal with these things
effectively.
Senator Carper. Thank you again very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Carper. Good questions
and very constructive answers.
Senator McCain, thanks for being here. You are next.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding the hearing.
I would like to ask the witnesses, do you believe that the
attack on Fort Hood was an act of terror?
General Keane. In my mind I do, based on the preliminary
reports and what Major Hasan was screaming at the time of the
act and his behavior and attitude prior to that. Just based on
that preliminary report. Certainly investigations will confirm
what his motivations are, but what is in front of us right now,
I do.
Ms. Townsend. Senator, when you look at just the basic
English dictionary definition of ``terror,'' which is the use
of violence to instill fear and intimidation, I think it is
hard to imagine that this was not an act of terror. I think
what remains to be seen from the investigation is whether or
not this is an individual bent on terrorizing or whether he is
part of some larger conspiracy. But I do think it is an act of
terror.
Mr. Silber. From the New York City Police Department's
perspective, this is an ongoing investigation run by other
agencies, so we are not going to prejudge their findings.
Senator McCain. Well, I asked your opinion, not your
findings. If you do not want to voice your opinion, that is
fine with me.
Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Senator McCain, it certainly looks like an act
of terror to me. I think for the technical definition under
U.S. law, the question of political motivation behind the
attack is going to be central, obviously, to determining
whether or not you can legally classify it as such. But I think
it looks like an act of terror to me.
Senator McCain. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Terrorism is defined in the quality of the
act, and certainly the act itself, I think, meets the criteria
of an act of terrorism. Under a legal definition, in terms of
the law, Major Hasan is charged with 13 counts of murder, and
that is appropriate. We do not need to reach into the criminal
statutes to find the word ``terrorism'' to prosecute him. We
have charged him with an ordinary crime, and that is good
enough.
Senator McCain. Thank you. Let me just briefly review what
we do know. We know that Major Hasan had communications with a
Yemeni-American imam. We know that the FBI had some knowledge
of this and reviewed certain communications between Major Hasan
and the subject. That investigation asserted the content of
these communications was consistent with research being
conducted by Major Hasan in his position as a psychiatrist at
the Walter Reed Medical Center. There are allegations of
communications with other extremists; a Web posting advocating
suicide bombing; possibly him, an individual named Major Hasan
wrote a post on the Web site that favorably compared an
American soldier jumping on a grenade to save the lives of his
fellow soldiers to suicide bombers; extremist activities at
Walter Reed; and that Major Hasan antagonized some students and
faculty by espousing what they perceived to me extremist
Islamist views; and, of course, the most notable is his
activities while working at Walter Reed was a medical
presentation to fellow students where he included statements
such as, ``We love death more than you love life,'' and
``Fighting to establish an Islamic state to please God, even by
force, is condoned by Islam.''
General Keane, the military is most sensitive of any
organization I know to any taint or allegation or impression of
being discriminatory, which is appropriate. Do you think that
political correctness may have played some role in the fact
that these dots were not connected?
General Keane. Yes, absolutely. And also I think a factor
here is Major Hasan's position as an officer and also his
position as a psychiatrist contributed to that because of the
special category in the military I think someone who is
operating as a clinician every day treating patients is in. It
is an individual activity versus a group activity, which
provides considerably more supervision in squads, platoons,
companies, and the like inside our units. So there is no doubt
in my mind that was operating here.
But, in fairness to many of the people who are associating
with him, based on what preliminary research I have done and I
think what the Committee is doing, I think we are going to find
very clearly that we do not have specific guidelines on dealing
with jihadist extremism in terms of the obligations of the
members of the military to identify it, report it, and what
actions to take and what constitutes jihadist extremism itself.
So you take some of this burden away from people by having
those guidelines, and when you have those guidelines in place,
you are clearly saying to the institution that this is
important to us, we are not going to tolerate this kind of
behavior, and we want to identify it immediately to try to curb
the behavior through counseling and rehabilitation, and, if
necessary, separate that individual from the service if it
cannot be curbed.
Senator McCain. I have talked to military officers who have
stated that they, at least up until now, have had a significant
reluctance to pursue what may be these indications because of
this political correctness environment. Have you heard the
same?
General Keane. Well, I know it exists, no doubt about it,
and what I am trying to say is that the way to deal with that--
it should not have to be an act of moral courage on behalf of a
soldier to report behavior that we should not be tolerating
inside our military organizations. It should be an obligation.
The way to make that an obligation is provide very specific
guidelines through the chain of command as to what their duties
are in regards to this issue. That begins to take this issue
off the table because the institution is speaking clearly in
terms of what its expectations are and what it will tolerate
and what it will not tolerate.
Senator McCain. And perhaps err on the side of caution
instead of erring on the side of correctness.
General Keane. Yes, absolutely, Senator.
Senator McCain. Ms. Townsend.
Ms. Townsend. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, I have
the same concern that you have articulated in the U.S. military
and the law enforcement community. We have invested lots of
time and effort in the post-September 11, 2001, world to ensure
that people understand we are going to provide people First
Amendment protections in their freedom and practice of
religion.
I do fear that because this was a senior member of the
uniformed military, there was a reluctance to proceed, and I
think that this is an area that the Committee should and ought
to investigate and uncover in terms of our law enforcement
system that we cannot allow them to be reluctant to follow the
facts just because they are afraid that they are going to be
criticized for not being politically correct.
Senator McCain. Mr. Silber.
Mr. Silber. In the NYPD, if we had a concern like that, it
would be forwarded up the chain of command as well as to the
Department of Internal Affairs for investigation.
Senator McCain. Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, given my experience with the FBI, I do
not think there would have been a sense of political
correctness with respect to the ethnicity or religious beliefs
of the individual. This is my assessment based on what I know.
I think his status in the military, the fact that he was a
medical doctor, the fact that he was engaged in research with
respect to potential conflicts in the minds of Muslim soldiers,
that may have affected the judgment of the FBI in this context
and much less a question of his ethnicity or beliefs.
Senator McCain. Well, if they believe that those kinds of
e-mails that they detected were a part of research which
advocates extreme Muslim activity, at least I would find out
what kind of research is going on. Frankly, I have never heard
of such research. So I am kind of skeptical about your answer.
Go ahead, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. I do not think religion is an acceptable basis
for any group being stigmatized, but religion provides no
shield against any legitimate inquiry and therefore should not
have inhibited an appropriate inquiry.
Let me, however, underscore a point made by General Keane
which I think is important here. My military experience is in
combat units. In a combat unit, actions like Major Hasan's,
attitudes like his, would be picked up much faster than in the
individual professional activity of a psychiatrist even though
in military service.
Senator McCain. I thank you. I thank the witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator McCain. An important
exchange.
I want to add just this. After the Fort Hood massacre, I
received a call from a friend of mine who is a high-ranking
officer in the Army, just to confirm what you said, and also
basically to go to your point, that we have great respect for
diversity of religion, but it should not be a cover for bad
behavior. And this officer said to me that, ``If the Army and
the rest of the services make clear that Islamist extremist
behavior is not tolerated and you have an obligation to report
it right away, you will be doing an enormous favor to all the
other Muslim-American soldiers who serve under me because
without that,'' this officer said to me, ``I worry that the
non-Muslim soldiers are going to have hesitation to have what
we have to have in combat, which is blind trust in one
another.''
I think it is a really important point, that insofar as we
focus on the extremists, we are actually going to be doing a
favor to everybody else of that particular religion who is in
the military and helping military cohesion.
Senator Ensign.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENSIGN
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this
hearing has been important for a lot of different reasons, and
some of the issues you just articulated I think are definitely
some of them.
This whole idea of political correctness, whether that is
political correctness due to an officer, whether that is
political correctness of somebody's particular religion, I am
curious, Mr. Silber, when you said we would refer up the chain
of command, what if that chain of command--in other words, what
if you had a high-ranking officer in the New York City Police
Department, you discovered that person happened to be of the
Islamic faith and was having contacts with one of these radical
clerics, one of these imams over in Yemen, what would be done
at that point in the New York City Police Department?
Mr. Silber. If no action was taken, I would then take it up
to the deputy commissioner level.
Senator Ensign. Ms. Townsend, you talked about the
obligation to share with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and I
think that is important. Does that happen with the military
today? In other words, would they share that information with
the military? Or is it just other law enforcement agencies?
Ms. Townsend. What happens is on the Joint Terrorism Task
Force, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), sits
on it. And in this instance, my understanding is the
information came to the JTTF, was shared with the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service, but the memorandum of
understanding (MOU), as well as perhaps FISA restrictions,
would have prevented the DCIS agent from sharing it back to the
Army and DOD, the Pentagon, without permission. Depending on
where the information came from, they would have----
Senator Ensign. But you said that permission is pretty easy
to get.
Ms. Townsend. They can get it. That is right. And what this
sort of suggests to me is that the assessment on the JTTF was
that they did not view it as a close call. They looked at these
communications. They looked at, in my understanding, the
personnel file. There was no derogatory information. And so
they saw no reason.
Now, I think over time, as more information comes out, the
Committee will be in a better position to judge whether or not
that was the right judgment. But mechanisms certainly did exist
if there was a desire on the part of the JTTF or the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service to share that back with DOD.
Senator Ensign. One of the concerns that I see here is, we
heard about the silos pre-September 11, 2001, and some of the
statements that he allegedly has made, talking about, in one
instance when Colonel Terry Lee said that he heard him say that
maybe people should strap bombs on themselves and go to Times
Square in New York, the contacts with the imam. Are those silos
still in place where you hear this over here or you hear
something else going on where that information is not being
shared? Do those still exist?
Ms. Townsend. To be fair, I think tremendous progress has
been made in terms of information sharing, and I think when we
see that there was collection and it came into the JTTF, that
is an indication that we have made a lot of progress in that
area.
Based on what I have read publicly--because, of course, we
do not have all the facts yet--it is not clear to me that the
information from Walter Reed and his colleagues that would have
been in the personnel system ever made its way into the
personnel file. And if that is the case, that means the JTTF
and the DCIS agent, when they had the communications and would
have looked at the bare record of the personnel file, if there
was no derogatory information in it, they were at a
disadvantage. And we have to fix that system. If there was
information inside the military, it needed to make its way into
a format where it could be shared.
Senator Ensign. I see. General Keane, I think you have
brought up some of the most important testimony today as far as
fixing this going forward, and it sounds like this obviously
should have been in place, as very simple as what the New York
City Police Department has as far as their policies and
procedures. Going forward, I think what Senator Lieberman
talked about, if these policies and procedures are in place, it
does take pressure off somebody in the future, if they know
they are obligated to report. Let us say that you have somebody
who is a Muslim who feels that, ``Gee, should I report this or
not? Maybe I am going to be stigmatized. I do not know whether
I should report it.'' Now they have an obligation. That
actually, I agree that protects them, and so I think that was
very important.
I want to go back to something, Ms. Townsend, you said that
is a little bit disturbing in the general Islamic community,
when you say there are moderate Muslims out there, and they
feel like they would be stigmatized, they would be kind of set
apart. It would seem to me, getting back to what Mr. Zarate
said as far as the obligation of the Muslim-American community,
they have an obligation to stigmatize, to separate those who
are radical, so that somebody who is moderate in their views
feels like they can come out and condemn. That would seem to me
the overarching obligation of the Muslim-American community, to
not let the radicals control their community in such a way that
if you feel like you are being a loyal American, you are
actually disloyal to the Muslim community out there.
Ms. Townsend. Senator, you and I do not disagree, I do not
think.
Senator Ensign. And that you were just reporting the facts.
Ms. Townsend. That is exactly right. I am simply telling
you that, based on my experience, this is a continuing
challenge to law enforcement community, that is, to encourage
moderate Muslims to speak out. And I suppose my only suggestion
is we ought to take some heart and some reassurance in the fact
that there are many patriotic, law-abiding Muslim-Americans who
actually, while they are not speaking out publicly, do what
they can to stigmatize those who have radical extremist
beliefs, bring them to the attention of local and Federal law
enforcement, and weed them out of their communities before they
can do harm. And for that, we are very grateful.
Senator Ensign. Well, I think this panel, all of you, have
had some excellent testimony today, have given us some
direction, but probably have given others in the military even
some further direction to go as well. And we need to renew some
of the tools, obviously, for law enforcement and maybe make
some of the tweaks that you all have suggested to make that
information sharing a little less cumbersome so it will be done
a lot more as well. So I thank all the witnesses for your
testimony today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Ensign. Thanks very
much. And, there are obviously lessons here that relate to this
particular case for behavior of employees of the Department of
the Army, the U.S. military generally, and the Department of
Justice. But there are broader implications for society and
particularly in these lone-wolf cases, which are the hardest,
as our witnesses have said. When people hear people saying
things that seem extreme, respecting First Amendment rights,
you have to begin to reach out and see if you can stop somebody
before they do something very harmful.
Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is already a great deal in the public record about
Major Hasan that raises concerns about the adequacy of our law
enforcement, about whether the military acted on the
information that was not only available to it, but was, in
fact, noticed and commented upon in some of Major Hasan's
Department of Defense records.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's investigation in this
matter is going to focus on the military and any connections of
JTTF to the military. Our investigation is going to be carried
out in a way that is consistent with the essential need to
avoid jeopardizing the criminal investigation into this attack
by Major Hasan. And I think this Committee has been careful and
I want to commend the Committee and the witnesses who have been
careful not to say something--particularly you, Mr. Silber, to
avoid saying anything which could jeopardize the criminal
investigation and the prosecution of this man. It is essential
that we both investigate, correct where it is necessary, and
hold accountable where it is necessary, but also that we
prosecute without running into the defense that there has been
a prejudgment by people who have either some kind of command
authority or anyone else that is in law enforcement.
Ms. Townsend, your testimony, it seems to me, is right on
point when you talk about the JTTF being encumbered or
apparently being encumbered by some of its procedures. The
memorandum of agreement--it looks like a contract, small
print--between itself and the Department of Defense is 16 pages
long.
Ms. Townsend. That is right.
Senator Levin. It took 3 months for three people to sign
that agreement. The way it was characterized just in April
before a House committee by the Los Angeles County sheriff was
that a local task force officer may not share information with
his or her home agency without demonstrating the receiving
entity's specific ``need and right to know.'' That is not
factual, I do not believe. You would agree, Ms. Townsend, that
is not factual. But that is what a sheriff believed.
Ms. Townsend. Right.
Senator Levin. And I am afraid there is too much of that
feeling of restriction as to the reaching out potential for
information that is in the JTTF files.
There is also a problem, it seems to me, from what we can
tell in terms of the JTTF piece here, with the follow-up either
into other agencies' records and back into JTTF, but perhaps
within JTTF itself when subsequent information comes to its
attention, in particular. And I am wondering if you can quickly
tell us, Ms. Townsend, whether or not you know that a JTTF, if
it gets information in year one, has the ability--and, in fact,
does--when it gets information in year four, to connect that
back to the information that it had. Could you give us a really
quick answer if you know the answer to that?
Ms. Townsend. I think it is fair to say the possibility
exists that they could put that together because there are
records and communications involved, so it is possible and that
information is indexed, and I think you have to look on an
individual basis.
Senator Levin. Because there is some question as to
whether, in fact, that did occur in this case.
Now, a number of witnesses have said that the fact of these
investigations and the need for corrective actions does not
impugn and should not impugn the contributions of the loyal
Muslim-Americans to our military and to our society. I think
you all have said that, as have the Chairman, the Ranking
Member, and others on this panel. The diversity of our Nation's
military and of our Nation as a whole has been a great
strength. It has been one of our most effective weapons against
the fanatics of any religion who claim the right to murder
those who hold different beliefs.
Mr. Zarate, you quoted a statement which I think is a very
significant quote of a Muslim leader here both in terms of the
responsibility of the Muslim community, and I share that. But
you also point out that as a counternarrative, there is no more
powerful weapon than the promise and the reality of the
American dream with the opportunity for Muslim-Americans to be
integrated, as have all other immigrants, into the American
society.
I want to ask you to comment on a statement of Reverend Pat
Robertson, who recently and very publicly asserted the
following: That Islam is ``not a religion but a violent
political system bent on the overthrow of the governments of
the world and world domination.'' And as to whether or not a
statement such as that by a well-known American cleric makes it
more difficult for moderate Muslims to make the argument and,
indeed, whether that kind of statement really helps the enemy
to radicalize people who would then commit terrorist acts
against us. Do you have a reaction to that comment, Mr. Zarate?
Mr. Zarate. Senator, I think I will just stand by what I
said, which is the division of our society would be detrimental
and would be the worst manifestation and effects of this
violent Islamist extremist ideology. Islam is one of the great
religions of the world, and I think at the end of the day it is
going to be Muslim-Americans who help us to defeat this violent
brand of it.
Senator Levin. But I want to press you on this question,
because I think it is important that it be contested and that
it be opposed for a major religious leader in this country to
label Islam--Islam as a whole--as a violent political system
bent on the overthrow of governments, it seems to me plays
right into the hands of the extremists and the fanatics. It
gives them the propaganda tool that they look for, and I would
like to know whether or not you believe that is the case.
Mr. Zarate. I do not think it is helpful, and I do think it
plays into the radicals' ideology and narrative of the West,
and the United States, in particular being at war with Islam.
And so I do not think those kinds of statements are helpful.
Senator Levin. Does anyone else want to comment on this
statement on the panel as to whether or not you believe that
kind of statement is----
General Keane. Yes, I would comment on it, Senator. I think
it is an outrageous, irresponsible statement by a religious
leader, it is full of discrimination, it is offensive to
Muslims in general, and it no doubt inflames the situation and
makes no contribution to what we are trying to achieve, and
that is, a stable situation.
Senator Levin. Does anybody else want to comment on that?
Ms. Townsend.
Ms. Townsend. Senator, I agree completely with General
Keane. I think it is offensive, it is ignorant, it lacks a
basis in fact and knowledge. There is a very small extreme wing
not only, by the way, of Islam, but there are extreme wings of
other religions which are found to be deeply offensive to the
vast majority of the believers of those religions, just as
fundamental extremism is to Islam. The vast majority of people,
Muslim or not, ought to take grave offense at this
irresponsible statement and reject it.
Senator Levin. Anybody else?
[No response.]
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Levin. Thanks very
much. Thanks for raising that last question. Of course, I agree
not only was it outrageous, but as you said, it hurts our
efforts to succeed in this conflict.
The other Senators who came earlier had to leave. If the
witnesses can stand it, I think Senator Collins and I will do
one more quick round.
Mr. Silber, I wanted to ask you some hypotheticals, if you
would. If the New York Police Department was doing court-
ordered surveillance of somebody in the city who was known to
be involved in Islamist extremist activities, and as part of
that surveillance came across a member of the NYPD
communicating with that individual, what would the reaction of
the Department be. Let us assume first that the communications
were of a religious nature, not particularly inflammatory but,
still, communicating with an individual who is known as an
extremist. What would the reaction of the Department be?
Mr. Silber. I think the Department would look at the nature
of the communications because in the nature of the
communications would give us an insight as to what the purpose
of this interaction is. Obviously, any type of interaction
between a member of the service and individuals who are being
investigated just across the board would be something of
concern and would get senior-level attention within the
Department.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Right, the simple communication
with somebody who had a record of being involved in association
with terrorism or terrorists would raise concerns and raise
this up to a higher level within the NYPD.
Mr. Silber. Yes, Senator. I think the two issues are the
pedigree of the individual who has been contacted as well as
the content of the communication.
Chairman Lieberman. So I assume that if the content took a
more extreme direction--in other words, let us say an officer
in the NYPD was found communicating with this subject of an
NYPD investigation and was expressing extremist views, and
perhaps even suggesting the justification for violent actions
in pursuit of extremist views, then I presume that would raise
real alarm bells.
Mr. Silber. Yes, and as I stated earlier, Senator, I think
the process would be to reach out to our Internal Affairs
Bureau to move that up the chain of command so that got the
appropriate level of attention.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, it would depend, I assume, what
that would mean. In other words, I presume you would watch that
person more carefully or take more aggressive action.
Mr. Silber. Yes, I think we would need to understand, what
that dot, in a sense, means in context. We would look at the
radicalization process and say, is that an isolated interaction
or does that fit into a larger continuum.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Now let us step back, and you
have developed from your experience the four phases of
radicalization. And to the extent you are able, based on the
public record, I wanted to ask you if you would apply that
framework to what you know about Major Hasan.
Mr. Silber. Sure. Senator, I think Mr. Jenkins made a good
point that when you are dealing with a lone wolf, an individual
actor, to some degree they really are at the margins of the
process that we have looked at and others have looked at. And,
in fact, our study primarily looked at groups of individuals.
That said, we have looked at some of the preliminary
information out there, and it is suggestive that he went
through some type of radicalization process. I think the key
questions to ask are look at his behaviors and see how those
correlate through some of the phases and through some of the
indicators that we have identified in the model.
Chairman Lieberman. From what you know--I was interested in
the concept you introduced of a virtual spiritual sanctioner--
that is, somebody operating over the Internet. Incidentally, as
I understand it, someone like al-Awlaki whom we have been
talking about operates a public Web site with quite open
expressions of exhortation to jihadist behavior. In other
words, you do not have to have an authorized surveillance of
his e-mails--and there are a lot of others like this--to
conclude that this guy is at war and urging others to get at
war. But I wanted to ask you whether from what you have heard
of al-Awlaki, does that seem to fit into your vision of a
virtual spiritual sanctioner?
Mr. Silber. I think based on his pedigree going back to
September 11, 2001, and also looking at what he has done more
recently in terms of his Web site, promoting in English
jihadist views, he is clearly an individual of concern. So I
think the next question we would ask is: What was the nature of
the relationship between him and another individual? The
spiritual sanctioner functionally moves somebody down that
pathway, and that really is the key question. Functionally,
what was the relationship between him and another individual?
Did he move that person down the pathway, encouraging him to
move from, let us say, self-identification to indoctrination,
or indoctrination to jihadization? And that I think is a key
issue.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, it struck me also that we have to
go into these e-mails. They are classified, of course, but
there has been some description--and I cannot say whether it is
based on fact or not--that this was part of Major Hasan's
research, his reported communication with the subject of this
investigation. But the choice of this recipient of e-mails says
a lot, I think, about what Major Hasan was looking for. In
other words, there are a lot of Muslim imams, authorities, and
scholars that he might have communicated with as part of
research or even to ask personal religious questions. Doesn't
it say something about him? And what I am getting at is that he
may have been looking for spiritual sanctioning of what he is
accused of ultimately doing.
Mr. Silber. Yes, Senator, I agree wholeheartedly with that
view. I think who you reach out to for theological or doctrinal
questions does give some indication to some degree to what
message you are looking for.
Chairman Lieberman. Just a final quick question. Mr. Zarate
raises a question in his testimony about whether the U.S.
military is doing enough to protect its bases in the context of
the clear appeals by jihadist leaders to attack our military in
their bases and now the evidence in the United States of this
string of plots, fortunately most of them not successful, but
tragically, the one in Little Rock and Fort Hood, successful.
General Keane, do you have any response to that? Is there
more that we should be doing to protect the security of the
bases generally, even in the United States, from terrorist
attack?
General Keane. Well, I think we dramatically changed the
security on our bases post-September 11, 2001, for all the
obvious reasons, and I am confident that the military goes
through continuous reviews to ensure that force protection is
of the rigor it should be.
The Fort Hood incident is so dramatically different because
it comes from within as opposed from without, and in that
problem lie the issues that we have discussed here. It is more
up to the members of that organization within to deal with that
issue than it is to guard at the gate or others who are dealing
with force protection issues as associated with a military
base. And certainly the other thing that goes hand in glove
with this is cooperation with law enforcement agencies and
intelligence services, in terms of stopping these incidents
before they actually take place--and that is crucial and that
is what has prevented certainly most of these incidents from
taking place--is the tremendous work that law enforcement is
doing in cooperation with other agencies. And that certainly
has got to continue, and if we can improve the process, as
Frances Townsend is suggesting, that will add to it as well.
Chairman Lieberman. Well said. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jenkins, we hope that one of the results of our
investigation will be a new pamphlet on extremist activities
that incorporates the lessons of this case. That still begs the
question of what should the military do when it identifies a
soldier who is embracing radical views, extremist views. We
know, due to the good work of the NYPD, about the four stages
of radicalization, and it is possible that intervention at an
early stage could make a difference and could lead to something
short of discharging the individual from the service.
In 2007, when you testified before Congress about jihadist
radicalization and recruitment, you talked about the
possibility of countermessaging. I would like to ask you today
whether you see opportunities for the Army to intervene at
stage one of the radicalization process to try to help some
members of our military get back on track.
Mr. Jenkins. I think it is important that we look at this
in the context of military service. I mean, to be quite honest
with you, Senator, when I was in the military, I did not know,
nor did I care what the religion was of the members of my unit.
I dealt with them as individuals. What it said on their dog
tags about their preferences for method of burial was something
that did not concern me.
I think it is entirely appropriate, when an individual is
displaying behavior that is inappropriate within the context of
the military unit or is demonstrating behavior that is contrary
to morale or suggests a destructive or a self-destructive path,
that there be an appropriate intervention. And as I say, in
many cases in a combat unit, that will be picked up fairly
quickly, and there will be that appropriate intervention.
I think what we have to do is empower individuals so that
they need not be shy about this--our understandable concerns
about free speech, about protecting civil liberties, should not
cause us to hesitate where there is clearly manifest behavior
that is inappropriate, wrong, contrary, and so on.
In many cases, I think there is intervention. We know about
radicalization only from those terrorists who have made it all
the way through a terrorist act or an arrest. We do not have
information about all of those who drop out along the way, and
there are a lot who do drop out along the way or are counseled
along the way.
It will be interesting to know about the radicalization in
the case of Major Hasan. He has been subjected to extraordinary
scrutiny in the last couple of weeks because of this event.
There are literally thousands of reporters who are picking up
every statement that he made, every piece. That right now is
chronologically flat, and one would really like to see, in
order to compare it to what we know here as researchers, a
chronology constructed here. When was he communicating with
this imam? When was he making these statements? What were his
actions over time? Can we see a trajectory and then at that
point identify where there might have been a useful
intervention?
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, let me just end my comments today by going
back to the 9/11 Commission Report because it does appear to me
that we did have--it is too early to say for sure, but that we
did have a failure to share critical information, a failure to
ask questions, to initiate an investigation, or at least an
inquiry or an interview, and that the results were tragic,
horrible consequences: A terrorist attack.
The 9/11 Commission reminds us--and I want to read from the
report. ``In the 9/11 story, for example, we sometimes see
examples of information that could be accessed--like the
undistributed NSA information that would have helped identify
Nawaf al-Hazmi in January 2000. But someone had to ask for it.
In that case, no one did. Or, as in the episodes we describe in
chapter 8, the information is distributed, but in a
compartmented channel. Or the information is available, and
someone does ask, but it cannot be shared.
``What all these stories have in common is a system that
requires a demonstrated `need to know' before sharing. This
approach assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will
need to use the information.''
The point is that information must be shared with those
that have the ability to understand the full context and take
action. If you look at Major Hasan's presentations--there were
two of them that I am aware of; one I have looked completely
through--there are warning signs and red flags galore. If you
look at his contacts with the radical imam, without revealing
what those specific e-mails said, just the fact that he was
seeking advice and communicating with a known al-Qaeda
associate, when you start to put together all of the pieces of
information, it reminds me very much of the siloed information
that was available throughout the Federal Government in
different agencies prior to the attacks on our country on
September 11, 2001. And our challenge is to make sure that we
have not allowed new silos to build up, that the JTTFs, which
have been tremendous and have had a lot of successes, do not
inadvertently become another silo where information cannot be
shared without jumping through too many hoops. And that is our
challenge, as we learn more through our investigation, to
identify legal barriers, administrative impediments that may
have blocked the sharing of information in this case, and to
identify in our military whether we need better systems to
encourage reporting, as the General put it so well, that it is
no longer a moral act of courage but, rather, an obligation to
report disturbing information.
That is what our investigation is aimed at, and, again, I
want to thank the Chairman for initiating this very important
investigation and to express my appreciation to all of you
today for your forthright, candid, and expert testimony.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins. It, as
always, is a pleasure to work with you. We are going to conduct
this investigation in the same thorough and bipartisan/
nonpartisan way we have done everything on this Committee,
including some controversial and sensitive investigations into
Federal Government behavior prior to September 11, 2001, and
also during Hurricane Katrina. I think you stated well what we
have accomplished today.
I cannot thank the five witnesses enough for their
testimony. I cannot imagine a better way to inform our
investigation. You have brought your experience and
considerable expertise to the table. You have helped us begin
to understand how to best approach this. You have made some
specific suggestions not just about questions to pursue in our
investigation, but about reforms to initiate as a result of
what we already know about Major Hasan and the murders that
occurred at Fort Hood.
So I honestly cannot thank you enough, and I would like to
take the liberty of keeping in touch with you as this
investigation goes on. I also would invite you not to hesitate
to initiate to us as you watch this occurring.
We are going to continue the investigation now. I hope we
can conduct the investigation in the cooperative way that we
have begun with the Executive Branch. It will inevitably now
take a less public turn with a lot of interviews and reviewing
of documents, and we will reconvene in public session when and
if we think it is appropriate and constructive to do so, and
then ultimately to issue a report and recommendations.
But you have done a real service not just to the Committee
but I honestly believe to the homeland security of the people
of our country. I thank you very much.
The record will stay open for 15 days for additional
statements and questions.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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