[Senate Hearing 111-654]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-654
STRUCTURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND HOMELAND SECURITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
of the
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Beth M. Grossman, Senior Counsel
Eric P. Andersen, Professional Staff Member
Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew E. Weis, Minority General Counsel
Adam J. Killian, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 3
Senator Pryor................................................ 19
WITNESSES
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Hon. Thomas J. Ridge, Former Secretary of Homeland Security...... 5
Frances Fragos Townsend, Former Assistant to President George W.
Bush for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism................ 8
Christine E. Wormuth, Senior Fellow, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........ 10
Hon. James R. Locher III, Executive Director, Project on National
Security Reform................................................ 14
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Locher, Hon. James R. III:
Testimony.................................................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Ridge, Hon. Thomas J.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Townsend, Frances Fragos:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Wormuth, Christine E.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 33
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Ridge.................................................... 50
Ms. Townsend................................................. 54
Ms. Wormuth.................................................. 56
Mr. Locher................................................... 58
STRUCTURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND HOMELAND SECURITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Pryor, Burris,
Collins, McCain, and Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning and welcome to this
hearing. Thanks to everybody for being here, particularly to
our witnesses.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United
States on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, which not only created the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), but also formally established a
Homeland Security Council (HSC), within the Executive Office of
the President of the United States. Before being codified in
law, the HSC operated under an Executive Order which President
Bush issued a month after September 11, 2001.
The Homeland Security Council was created to advise the
President of the United States on homeland security matters.
Like the National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security
Council's statutory direction is general, ``more effectively
coordinating the policies and functions of the U.S. Government
relating to homeland security.'' Its central role is to also
advise the President of the United States on matters related
broadly to homeland security. Its required membership includes
only the President, Vice President, Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Secretary of
Defense. Although the position is not in statute, it has been
led since President Bush's original Executive Order by the
Homeland Security Advisor.
The Homeland Security Council also acts as the originator
of Homeland Security Presidential Directives, which in the
lingo of this field are called HSPDs. They promulgate homeland
security policy across the government and are quite
significant. Like the National Security Council, policy on
specific issues is typically developed by coordinating
committees consisting of subject matter experts from relevant
agencies and normally are negotiated up through to the Deputy's
Committee and finally the Principal's Committee before being
approved by the President.
In recent years, a number of analysts and a number of
commission reports have questioned the wisdom of having a
separate Homeland Security Council and a National Security
Council, arguing that they should be merged. The basis of the
argument, and I am going to state it too simplistically, is
that homeland security is really just one element of national
security, so it should be the purview of the National Security
Council. Proponents of this point of view say that in an era
when threats are transnational and borderless, it does not make
sense for the White House to split its coordinating
organization, and have separate councils for domestic and
international security issues.
Others, argue that our homeland security challenges are
broad, that is they are not just counterterrorism but involve,
for instance, national disasters, and also that the concerns of
homeland security may well be lost or at least inadequately
focused on if the Homeland Security Council merges with the
National Security Council.
Last month, in early January, President Obama appointed
John Brennan to serve as both a Deputy National Security
Advisor for Counterterrorism and as Homeland Security Advisor,
bringing those functions together. This Committee has worked
with John Brennan over the years in his time of service to the
government. I personally have the highest respect for him and I
welcome his appointment to work in the White House on our
behalf.
More recently, President Obama has asked John Brennan over
the next 50 days to consider this question of whether the
Homeland Security Council should be merged with the National
Security Council. I have spoken with Mr. Brennan and told him
that I am at this point of open mind on this question. Today's
hearing really is to draw from the advice of experienced people
who have thought about this to help the Committee be in a
position to answer questions and interact with Mr. Brennan, and
ultimately with President Obama, on the question of whether
these two councils should be merged.
There is a certain extent to which the President of the
United States can have broad latitude by Executive Order or
informally within the White House, but as I said at the outset
of my statement, the unique, separate Homeland Security Council
is a matter of statute now and it would be our intention to
make some decision related to statute and hopefully to work
together with the Administration in doing that.
Every President since President Truman, who was President
when the previous most significant reorganization and reform of
our national security apparatus occurred--that is, prior to the
post-September 11, 2001, period--has adapted the structure of
the National Security Council to best serve the needs of the
country and the needs of the President and the Presidential
leadership style, in light of the challenges then facing the
Nation. President Obama, of course, will want to do the same
with both the National Security Council and the Homeland
Security Council.
But on this Committee, I would say there is a bottom line
to these discussions, that whatever structure emerges, we have
to believe that it will protect our homeland security, that it
will provide the best coordination and information to the
President of the United States on matters related to homeland
security with the aim of providing the best security possible
to the American people. Where legislation may be needed to
either effect some changes or alter in some way the existing
statute. I look forward to working with Members of this
Committee and with the Administration to make sure that we get
this right, because though it is in some senses a relatively
dull matter of governmental organization, the consequences of
it are very significant for our homeland security.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The decision on whether or not the Homeland Security
Council and the National Security Council should be merged
should not be taken lightly. While some dismiss this question
as being too inside-the-beltway, the fact is that a decision to
merge these two councils could have serious unintended
consequences.
In my judgment, merger advocates need to answer a number of
difficult questions. First, are there any examples of how
having separate entities has actually impeded or undermined
national security? To the best of my knowledge, the answer to
that question is no. There are none. To the contrary, the
Nation has achieved considerable success in the one area in
which the Homeland Security Council and the NSC share joint
responsibility, and that is counterterrorism policy. Multiple
terrorist attacks have been thwarted, including a 2002 plot to
hijack an airplane and fly it into the tallest skyscraper in
Los Angeles, a 2003 plot to hijack and crash planes into
targets on the East Coast, and a 2006 plot to blow up multiple
jets traveling from London.
Another important question: Will the NSC with its
traditional focus on international diplomatic and military
issues, be able to devote enough time and attention to the
domestic aspects of homeland security? I am very concerned that
vitally important domestic security issues could become less
visible within the White House were a merger to take place.
These issues include emergency preparedness and response,
critical infrastructure protection, and disaster recovery.
The breadth of issues with which the National Security
Advisor must contend on a daily basis is daunting: Managing the
conduct of two wars, attempting to contain terrorism and
proliferation activities, deciding the future of detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, and that is just a sampling. Is it really
feasible or practical to add an entirely new and massive
portfolio of domestic issues to that weighty agenda?
Think of the issues that the Homeland Security Advisors
have had to contend with. They range from responsible for the
levees' integrity in New Orleans, flooding in Maine, an ice
storm in Kentucky, a wildfire in California. What should be the
coordinated response? Which agencies should do what? I am
concerned that adding those responsibilities would divert the
NSC's primary focus from the Nation's military and diplomatic
missions.
The fact is, no matter how qualified, having one of the
NSC's many deputies as the senior-most White House official in
charge of homeland security will likely not be sufficient to
ensure enough of a focus on homeland security issues. Disaster
declarations, catastrophic planning, grant funding, and State
and local information sharing must receive high-level support
and attention within the White House.
In a city where rank matters, I also question whether a
deputy will have sufficient stature to compel the most senior
officials, particularly members of the President's Cabinet, to
take action on a pressing homeland security issue. Given those
realities, who will referee the inevitable turf battles and
rivalries between the Department of Homeland Security and other
Federal departments and agencies? Because DHS is still a
relatively new department, it is particularly vulnerable to the
machinations of other agencies seeking to enhance their
homeland security footprint. We have seen that, for example,
with the Department of Justice, which has sought to minimize
the Department of Homeland Security's role in terrorist bombing
prevention, despite a presidential directive to the contrary,
and that dispute has delayed the release of a national bombing
prevention strategy plan for more than a year.
Almost 6 years since its inception, DHS is still enmeshed
in jurisdictional disputes with other departments over the
homeland security mission, battling the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) over the responsibility for medical
preparedness and response, jousting with the Department of
Agriculture (USDA) over agricultural inspections and
agroterrorism. The Department needs a neutral arbiter within
the White House to settle disputes like this. An independent,
effective, and I would argue, stronger HSC would better fulfill
that essential mission. And NSC, not focusing relentlessly on
the homeland will almost certainly fail to give the attention
that is needed.
Nevertheless, I am, of course, open-minded on this issue--
-- [Laughter.]
And I look forward to hearing the statements of our
witnesses. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins, for that
very thoughtful and open-minded opening statement. [Laughter.]
You and I are both open-minded in the same direction.
I thank Senator McCain and Senator Burris for being here.
We have a great panel to advise us, people of experience
and expertise, and I appreciate very much that you are here.
We are going to start with Governor Tom Ridge, the former
Governor of Pennsylvania, and the Nation's very first Homeland
Security Advisor. Though he is now a figure in history, he
remains youthful nonetheless.
Mr. Ridge. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. We are very glad you are here, Governor
Ridge. He then went on to become the Nation's first Secretary
of Homeland Security and served in that position until January
2005. I was thinking that former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson once wrote a book called `Present at the Creation,'' in
which he described the creation of the post-Second World War
world and the formation of American security policy. You really
have been both present at the creation and a tremendous
contributor to our security since September 11, 2001, so we
thank you for your extraordinary service and welcome your
comments now on this question before us this morning.
TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS J. RIDGE,\1\ FORMER SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Ridge. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member Collins,
Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak to
you this morning. It has been roughly 5 years since I last sat
before you. I cannot remember when I had so much fun.
[Laughter.]
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Ridge appears in the Appendix on
page 27.
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Chairman Lieberman, I spoke to you many times as the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and later as
Secretary of the Department. I wore a different hat then and I
notice chairs have changed on the dais, as well--the same
people, different chairs. But nothing has changed for me, and I
suspect for you, when it comes to the desire we still all have
to do what we can and what we must to keep our country secure,
our economy thriving, our people safe, and our republic free as
we continue to face the ominous domestic and global challenges
these 8-plus years after September 11, 2001.
I welcome and appreciate the opportunity to offer my
thoughts as you review whether or not to merge the Homeland
Security Council and its functions under the umbrella of the
National Security Council. I also appreciate that you have
brought before you people of differing points of view on this
issue, my colleagues on the panel, which I think allows for an
approach that hopefully is consensus-driven and an outcome that
is both thoughtful and bipartisan.
My personal viewpoint on this issue is that the Homeland
Security Council should not be subsumed by the National
Security Council. The Department of Homeland Security is still
a young, maturing Cabinet agency established just 6 years ago.
It needs an independent ally and advocate within the White
House. A good working relationship with the National Security
Advisor is also important to be sure--but it needs its own
voice, and a voice that will be heard by its chief report,
President Obama.
On the face of it, it is easy to understand why some
believe that HSC folding within NSC sounds easy enough, and
certainly appears to be simple, common sense. Many people view
each council through a national security lens, so why not put
the two together?
However, in my view, the merger of these two councils would
not work and if carried forward would diminish and potentially
damage a council whose work needs to be elevated, accelerated,
and properly resourced versus diluted in a mix of security
roles and responsibilities of an entirely different kind.
The NSC focus is primarily on foreign governments, military
involvement, diplomatic involvement, enemy combatants overseas,
calming geopolitical tensions, mapping the strategies around
the world, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and addressing
bubbling military conflicts.
The Homeland Security Council focuses more on the American
people. Their constituency is 300 million strong, and the aim
is keeping our citizens safe and helping them to recover from
an incident on home soil, not foreign soil.
The Department as its primary mission is not, on the
whole--and I repeat this again--not a counterterrorism agency.
Rather, the chief focus of DHS is the protection of the
American people. Prevention is part of the DHS role, but as
much if not more is the responsibility to respond to an attack
or catastrophic event, minimize the damage should an incident
occur, and assist in the often long and arduous process of
recovery.
Sometimes the true scope of homeland security, frankly,
gets lost in all the talk of terrorists and tyrants, but it is
important to underscore that the Department of Homeland
Security is an all-hazards agency focused on threats and
potential attacks of any kind, including the threats of
terrorism, but also the threats and the power and the influence
of Mother Nature and hurricanes, wildfires, flooding,
biospills, tornadoes, nuclear accidents, anything that
threatens the safety of our citizens, in addition to all the
traditional legacy missions of all those units and bureaus that
were combined and aggregated into the Department.
Addressing such hazards requires that the mission of
Homeland Security not be federally-driven, but national in
scope. At the Federal level, homeland security encompasses the
horizontal integration of many Federal Cabinet agencies. From
HHS to Energy to the Department of Defense (DOD) to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) and elsewhere, more than 30
departments and agencies have homeland security functions.
Take biosecurity, for example. I wanted to highlight--and I
think this is a good way to demonstrate the concern that I
have. What the United States needs to do to improve our
biosecurity against major biological threats is extraordinarily
complex. Biosecurity depends on different programs managed by
different agencies. There is no way to simplify that.
DHS is in charge of the biological risk assessment that
analyzes these threats. HHS is responsible for the research and
development of medicines and vaccines. DOD does its own
research and development (R&D). The Food and Drug
Administration has a role. Let us not forget the National
Institutes of Health. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) is responsible for our Strategic National
Stockpile and for coordinating the grant program and technical
assistance to States and locals. The intelligence community is
responsible for assessing the biological threats posed by our
adversaries. Without very close White House coordination, our
bio programs will move in different directions, different
goals, at different time lines.
Putting this and other challenges under the NSC's purview
would only complicate, in my judgment, the NSC's mission and
the HSC's ability to receive adequate attention as part of the
National Security Council that is already engaged in Iran,
North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, India, the Middle East, and
other matters around the world.
Moreover, the vast interagency coordination does not end
there. Federal agents have equally key roles in providing grant
support, technical assistance, and other forms of aid to State
and local agencies, those who are first on the scene, whether
it is a bio event or not.
And that brings me to one of the most important
complexities, vertically integrating homeland security
responsibilities. Homeland Security is a Federal Cabinet
agency, but the mission is national, and so you worry about the
horizontal integration, but I also think you have to worry
about the vertical integration. It is a national mission. It
requires a national response, and that means well-established
coordination, communication, and cooperation with our 56 States
and territories and thousands of localities.
A significant difficulty in the vertical integration piece
is that the President and the Federal Government as a whole on
many occasions lack the authority to mandate States to carry
forward all recommended or preferred protocols. The Federal
Government cannot ensure training is carried out and emergency
equipment is required. The President cannot call out the
National Guard. Only the governor of the State can do that.
These kind of sovereignty issues and others led to the creation
of the Homeland Security Council in the first place, and the
unique role between relationship building between States, local
and tribal governments.
I would also point out that one of our strongest partners
in the homeland security mission is that of the private sector.
Its responsibility to secure its own infrastructure, planes,
railways, bridges, nuclear facilities, and the like, and the
ability to drive technological innovation, to develop weapons
of detection, weapons of protection and response are critical
to the Nation's ability to secure everything from our chemical
facilities to our Nation's borders and the skies overhead.
The need to work effectively with the private sector has
not been a focus of the traditional national security
community, nor has it been the focus to work with State and
local governments. But it is readily understood, nurtured, and
advanced by those with existing national homeland security
expertise and authority.
I will not give you the full extent of my testimony, my
colleagues, but I would like to move forward and make a couple
of recommendations.
One, keep it where it is. Instead of relocating it, let us
reform it. The HSC staff and resources are minimal compared to
the National Security Council and the HSC is not sufficiently
empowered to lead the homeland security effort in the White
House, as was the intention when it was created by Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 1.
So let us talk quickly about reform. I would personally
like to see the Secretary of Homeland Security be a permanent
member of the National Security Council.
Second, the Homeland Security Council should not be faulted
for doing its utmost while lacking the resources to do its job.
Instead, it would be advisable to staff up the HSC with more
than adequate resources. It is quite slim compared to the
formidable staff of the National Security Council. I say again,
the complexity of its responsibilities far exceed what most
people understand. Less budgetary and salary constraints can
make sure that the personnel at the Homeland Security Council
have the tools and the experience and subject matter expertise
to do their job efficiently and without impediment.
And finally, I read about John Brennan's relationship and
I, too, Senator Lieberman, I have enormous respect for the man.
We worked with him very closely. His judgment, his analytical
capability, but I say this again, the third notion is let us
not categorize the Department of Homeland Security's primary
mission as counterterrorism. It is not. And having someone such
as John Brennan, with the stature and the experience, being a
liaison between the National Security Council and the
independent Homeland Security Council to make sure that the
information that HSC, DHS, States, locals and private sector
need is transmitted in a timely and appropriate way would be a
huge plus-up for the Department and for the Homeland Security
Council.
I think I have exceeded my time. I apologize for that to my
colleagues on the panel and I look forward to the questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Governor Ridge. Excellent
testimony, a good beginning to the discussion.
Next, we have Fran Townsend, who served our country as the
third person to be Homeland Security Advisor, from May 2004 to
November 2007. Before becoming Homeland Security Advisor, Ms.
Townsend served in a variety of positions in the Department of
Justice and at the U.S. Coast Guard.
We thank you for being here and look forward to your
testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND,\1\ FORMER ASSISTANT TO
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
Ms. Townsend. Thank you, Senator. It is a real privilege to
be here before the Committee. I have had the privilege of
working with the Committee, particularly Senators Lieberman and
Collins, on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act, the Homeland Security Act, and so it is a privilege to be
back before you.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Townsend appears in the Appendix
on page 31.
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There is no more solemn responsibility that the President
bears than to protect American lives. During my 4\1/2\ years at
the White House, I came to believe for that reason,
organization must be dictated by effectiveness, and so I think
you will find, Senator, that I, too, come here with an open
mind, not as an advocate, but suggesting a framework by which
you might consider this issue.
How best to maintain effectiveness will inevitably change
over time as we continue to see the weakening of al-Qaeda and
our other enemies and the continued strengthening of the
Department of Homeland Security and as our government better
learns how to integrate the various capabilities that it has
across the Federal Government since the tragedy of September
11, 2001.
As you consider the most effective means of organizing the
White House structure, I would respectfully submit that any
structure should be judged against three fundamental criteria.
First, there must be a single person both responsible and
accountable to the President who monitors threat information
and who has the authority to marshal all instruments of
national power--military, intelligence, law enforcement,
economic, diplomatic, and public diplomacy--to defeat those
threats. The individual cannot wait until the threat arrives on
our shores, but must have the responsibility, as I did, and the
means to identify those threats where they originate and to
ensure a coordinated response to defeat them. The President's
Homeland Security Advisor must not be constrained by geographic
boundaries that our enemies fail to respect.
Second, the Homeland Security Advisor must have direct and
immediate access to the President. Ultimately, if terrorists
successfully strike the United States, it is the President and
not his staff who will be accountable to the American people
for the failure. The Homeland Security Advisor must be able to
get to the President quickly without the clearance from his or
her colleagues on the White House staff. Unfortunately, there
will be times when American lives are at stake, whether that is
from a terrorist threat or a natural disaster, and the
President will need to be advised, and operational decisions
taken and communicated to the relevant Cabinet Secretary in
real time. These sorts of crises do not lend themselves to the
normal bureaucratic process.
Third, the homeland security issues faced by our government
are diverse and many, as Secretary Ridge outlined. They range
from preparedness and response to natural disasters, ice,
flooding, fires, wind, to pandemic planning and biological and
nuclear threats. These issues are often distinct from the more
traditional foreign policy issues faced by the National
Security Council and require experienced staff with significant
expertise. The staff must understand State and local emergency
management policy issues and concerns. They must be organized
not simply to facilitate the homeland security policy process,
but also to anticipate and respond to State and local political
leaders in a time of crisis. The Homeland Security Advisor
requires adequate staffing to deal both with counterterrorism
and homeland security issues.
We remain a Nation at war with a very determined enemy. We
have troops deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
National Security Advisor has many important responsibilities
in addition to those two theaters. For example, he must contend
with the Middle East peace process and counterproliferation
around the world, most especially in Iran and North Korea. I
worry that increasing the span of control of the National
Security Advisor could dilute the homeland security mission and
make it just one more item on a list that is already
overburdened.
That said, I wish to be clear. We should judge any
potential reorganization by the substance and criteria, as I
have suggested. We must be careful not to assume that a merger
means the President cares less about homeland security. We must
resist the easy organizational chart test and look at the
substance of how responsibilities are allocated and how we are
being protected as a Nation.
Again, let me suggest the three questions I would hope the
Committee would ask. Is there one person responsible and
accountable to the President who looks around the world and
advises the President? Second, does this one person have direct
and immediate access to the President? And third, does this
person have adequate staff to fulfill his or her
responsibilities? These are the questions that we should be
asking and the criteria against which we should judge the
effort.
Senator thank you again for the opportunity to be here and
to testify before you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Ms. Townsend. Excellent, very
helpful testimony.
We move now to our last two witnesses, both of whom have
been in government but also have thought a lot about these
issues. First, Christine Wormuth is a Senior Fellow at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and has
served previously in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
She has also written extensively on the need for interagency
reforms, particularly for more effective incident management.
We are very happy to have you here and please proceed with
your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Members of
the Committee, for inviting me here today. I greatly appreciate
the opportunity to share my views with you.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Wormuth appears in the Appendix
on page 33.
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I want to say, as a self-described homeland security
zealot, I very much want to see homeland security issues
elevated inside of the White House and receive more time and
attention from the President. I very much want to see the
Department of Homeland Security be more effective and spend
less time fighting bureaucratic battles. So I actually, while I
am a proponent of merging the Homeland Security Council into
the National Security Council, I offer that recommendation in
the spirit of trying to achieve, I think, the same objectives
as the witnesses here on the panel and many of the objectives
that Senator Collins mentioned.
I would like to talk a little bit about why I think
organizational changes at the White House are necessary and
then I would like to put out a handful of design principles
that I think are worth thinking about when considering
organizational options. And finally, I would like to talk
briefly about how I think a merged Security Council might work.
Fundamentally, homeland security issues, in my view, are
both inextricably part of national security issues and are
inherently interagency and intergovernmental in character, that
vertical integration of which Governor Ridge spoke. In our
system of government where you have a Cabinet made up of
independent department secretaries who each answer directly to
the President, I think the only way to have a well-functioning
homeland security enterprise is to have a White House structure
that is very strong and that provides overall direction, sets
priorities, and resolves interagency disputes in the policy
development process.
To date, I think the Homeland Security Council has
struggled to be effective in this role for three reasons.
First, by establishing a separate council and an associated
staff to address homeland security issues, the White House
under President Bush artificially bifurcated its approach to a
wide range of important national security challenges.
Today, most national security challenges have international
and domestic components that need to be addressed holistically.
For example, preventing and countering nuclear proliferation
starts overseas, but has important elements here at home, such
as preventing movement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
into the country, neutralizing WMD, if possible, and then
consequence management strategies are going to be needed at
home if we are not able to keep the worst from happening.
Effectively combatting terrorism involves not only tracking
down the terrorists overseas, but also working with State and
local law enforcement to prevent radicalization of individuals
here in the United States. Another example is determining how
to allocate finite military capabilities, and that requires
weighing and prioritizing international and domestic
requirements to best manage the overall level of risk to the
Nation.
Addressing these kinds of challenges requires an integrated
approach, but I think that is difficult to achieve when you
have two separate organizations working the issues in the White
House. In a world where it is difficult to define where
homeland security ends and national security begins, managing
today's globalized challenges using two separate organizations
may no longer be the best answer.
Second, as numerous practitioners and commentators have
noted, the agency to date, sadly, has largely been perceived as
the NSC's weak stepbrother. For example, the NSC has more than
200 staff and the HSC most of the time has had around 35 to 45
people. Given the breadth and complexity of the homeland
security challenges and the homeland security landscape, this
just is not enough people to do justice to the issues.
Moreover, I believe that the perceived second-class status
of the HSC has made it more difficult to attract the best and
brightest staff to the organization. While there have
absolutely been excellent public servants serving on the HSC,
on balance, more of the HSC staff come from political
backgrounds and have a lesser overall level of professional
experience than their NSC counterparts. This disparity, I
think, has made it more difficult for the HSC staff to work
effectively with their peers in the interagency.
From an organizational process, you want to have a
structure in the White House that is going to provide the best
possible advice and support to the President, be able to inject
that advice into the interagency process, and oversee its
implementation. It is not clear in my view to date that the HSC
has had the personnel to really fulfill this mandate.
Third and finally, I think the HSC as a separate
organization so far has struggled to lead the interagency
process in developing core strategy and guidance on homeland
security issues and in overseeing the implementation of those
policies once they are developed. I think a part of this is
because of the small staff and some of the issues that Governor
Ridge mentioned, but I think it is also associated with the
Bush Administration's preference for the lead agency approach,
which has the NSC and HSC staffs playing more of a coordination
role than a policy development role.
In my view, as security challenges become more complex and
interrelated, the lead agency model is likely to prove
inadequate to many of the security tasks we have ahead. Current
and future security challenges require a strong White House
structure to develop integrated strategies and oversee their
implementation. I also believe a more effective White House
structure would enable DHS, a relatively new and fragile
bureaucracy, to spend less time fighting bureaucratic battles
and more time maturing as an organization, which I think is
very important.
When you think about how you might reorganize or
restructure in the White House, really, it is results, not
wiring diagrams, that are what matter. With that in mind, I
would like to put forward four principles that I think could
guide thinking about how to organize at the White House level.
First, the White House structure should enable homeland
security issues to be considered substantively as part of the
larger national security domain.
Second, the White House structure should facilitate
consideration of homeland security issues as equally important
to traditional national security issues. As a former DHS
official said in a New York Times article about the potential
for a merger, you want your issues considered. You do not want
to be off in some second bucket, which is, I think, how a lot
of people have perceived it so far.
Third, the White House structure should enable the staff
organization to serve as an honest broker in the interagency
process, and if necessary, to be strong enough to enforce
implementation of presidential decisions and priorities on
reluctant Cabinet actors, if that is necessary.
Fourth and finally, the White House structure should
facilitate recruitment and retention of the best possible staff
with the full range of expertise and experience that is needed
across the spectrum of the homeland security disciplines.
In my view, the best way to achieve an organization that is
consistent with these design principles is to merge the HSC
into the NSC. In reports we have published at CSIS, we offered
a structure that would include two, and only two, Deputy
National Security Advisors under the National Security Advisor:
A Deputy for Domestic Affairs and a Deputy for International
Affairs. Reflecting the view that most national security
challenges have international and domestic components, many of
the staff in the merged council would report to both of these
deputies.
And to try to address a concern Senator Collins raised, she
is absolutely correct that the individuals in the White House
that are going to be managing the homeland security issues have
to have the stature to be able to interact effectively and
adjudicate, frankly, disputes between Cabinet secretaries. To
do that, these two deputies would have to have very significant
stature and experience to be able to operate effectively at
that level.
But I believe under this kind of arrangement, you would no
longer have a situation where homeland securities are
organizationally stovepiped, and I think they would be more
likely to receive the kind of serious attention that
traditional security matters receive in the NSC.
The merged Security Council that we put forward would be
empowered to lead the interagency in formulating homeland
security policy and to oversee its implementation on behalf of
the President. In reading last Sunday's article in the
Washington Post, it seems evident to me that President Obama
and General James Jones, the new National Security Advisor, are
clearly envisioning a more robust structure in the White House
to address national security issues.
While many scholars and organizations have recommended a
merger of the two councils, there certainly are arguments
against a merger, and we have heard some of them this morning.
I think the two most prevalent arguments against a merger are
that, one, the National Security Advisor (NSA) already has too
many issues on his or her plate, and two, the traditional
National Security Council staff does not have the expertise in
homeland security issues to do justice to those issues, and
under a merger you then might actually run the risk of having
the issues be handled less skillfully than they are today.
It is true that the NSA already has one of the most
grueling jobs in Washington, bearing responsibility for a vast
array of issues. Merging the two councils would, I believe, add
to this burden. But in my view, the benefits of addressing
security challenges holistically and elevating homeland
security issues to be on an equal footing with traditional
national security issues outweighs the concerns about the span
of control.
In a merged council, the National Security Advisor
ultimately would be the single person responsible and
accountable to the President for the full range of challenges.
Again, to try to ease the burden of that span of control, we
offer two deputies who would essentially manage the two
portfolios, homeland and national security, on a day-to-day
basis. In the event of a crisis, the President would have to be
able to turn to either one of those deputies to do day-to-day
crisis management. Both deputies would have to have a very
close relationship with the National Security Advisor for that
to work effectively.
The second major argument against merging the two councils
is that the traditional NSC staff does not have the appropriate
expertise or experience. I think the best way to address this
concern is to be straightforward. Do not try and staff the
homeland security issues with people with traditional national
security backgrounds. Instead, populate the merged council
staff with sufficient numbers of personnel with backgrounds in
the full range of disciplines, from law enforcement and
intelligence to critical infrastructure to emergency
preparedness and response, and ensure that these individuals
understand and are sensitive to the concerns of State and local
governments.
I see that I have run over time, so I just want to end and
say, again, I think that how you manage these issues out of the
White House is one of the most important determinants of
ensuring we approach these challenges from a whole of
government perspective, and I think the best way to do that is
to merge the two councils. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. That was clear and
direct, and different from what we heard from our first two
witnesses. I will look forward to their response to some of the
things that you had to say. I appreciate it very much.
Our final witness is James Locher. He has had quite an
extraordinary record and resume of service. Most significant to
us here is that he served as a staff member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, and particularly during the Goldwater-
Nichols legislation, which was very important. He has also been
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict, both under President Clinton and under the
first President Bush.
He comes to us now as Executive Director of the Project on
National Security Reform, which was a congressionally organized
and supported entity that recently culminated 2 years of study
with an extensive report and implementation plan which was
presented to the Administration. Incidentally, and for what it
is worth, among the bipartisan guiding coalition for the
Project on National Security Reform were General Jim Jones, now
the National Security Advisor, and Admiral Denny Blair, now the
Director of National Intelligence.
Mr. Locher, thank you for your work, and for being here.
Please proceed with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES R. LOCHER III,\1\ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM
Mr. Locher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. I am delighted to be here to talk to you about the
organization for national security and homeland security in the
White House and across the Federal Government.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Locher appears in the Appendix on
page 41.
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Most fundamentally, I believe that drawing a bright line
between national security and homeland security, as current
arrangements do, is a mistake. The Nation would be better
served by merging the National Security Council and Homeland
Security Council into a single council, but with safeguards to
ensure that homeland security issues are not lost in a unified
system.
This hearing addresses a key issue: How should the highest
level of the U.S. Government be organized to protect the
Nation's security? It is important, however, Mr. Chairman, to
put this specific issue into a much larger context. The overall
national security system, including its national security and
homeland security components, is broken. About the seriousness
of our organizational problems, the Project on National
Security Reform's guiding coalition, made up of 22
distinguished Americans, stated in its November report, ``We
affirm unanimously that the national security of the United
States of America is fundamentally at risk.''
The basic problem is the misalignment of the national
security system with 21st Century challenges. Today's threats
require a tight integration of departmental expertise and
capabilities. We need highly effective teams that stretch
horizontally across departmental boundaries. Our government,
however, Mr. Chairman, is dominated by rigid, bureaucratic,
competitive, vertically-oriented departments and agencies. In
sum, we have horizontal problems and a vertical government.
This misalignment results from a gross imbalance. We have
powerful departments and agencies, while our integrating
mechanisms, the National Security Council and Homeland Security
Council, and their staffs are weak. Missing are robust
mechanisms capable of producing tight, effective integration.
This imbalance was a design flaw of the National Security Act
of 1947 and this flaw was carried forward into the Homeland
Security Council, which was modeled on the 60-year-old National
Security Council.
In recent years, Mr. Chairman, there has been compelling
evidence of the inadequacy of current arrangements: The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, troubled stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the poor response to
Hurricane Katrina. These setbacks are not coincidental. They
are evidence of our organizational dysfunction. Bold
transformation of the national security system must happen.
Otherwise, we will suffer repeated setbacks, wasted resources,
and declining American power and influence.
Among the early reform topics to be addressed is the issue
of this hearing, how to organize our integrating mechanisms at
the top of government. In response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, we bifurcated national security into two
major components, what we called national security and homeland
security. This bifurcation served the important function of
jump-starting our attention to many long-neglected tasks in
protecting the American homeland. Although additional
improvements are needed, we have succeeded in elevating these
tasks to an appropriate level of attention.
The basic question now becomes, does this bifurcation at
the very top of government serve our needs in handling the
increasingly complex and rapidly changing security environment
of the 21st Century? The answer is no. Dividing our security
components at the water's edge is artificial and creates an
organizational boundary, a barrier, gaps and seams that weaken
our overall security posture.
The security challenges that the United States faces, Mr.
Chairman, must be viewed in the context of one global system.
National security and homeland security are subsystems of the
larger global system. But the overarching organizing principle
for the U.S. national security system must be the global
system. We must assess this system as a whole and understand it
in the global security environment. Decisions on our policy,
strategy, planning, development of capabilities, and execution
will maximize our security when they are taken in an
integrated, systemwide context, not when they are artificially
subdivided. Moreover, by having separate National Security and
Homeland Security Councils, we force the President to integrate
across this divide. He does not have the time or capacity to do
so.
This past week, General Jim Jones, President Obama's
National Security Advisor, discussed the major changes that the
President and he intend to make at the top of the national
security system. In an interview in the Washington Post this
past Sunday and a speech on the same day in Munich, General
Jones stated that the National Security Council would expand
its membership and have increased authority to set strategy
across a wide spectrum of international and domestic issues. In
essence, many, if not all of the functions of the Homeland
Security Council may be subsumed into the National Security
Council. At the same time, as has been mentioned, General Jones
has asked John Brennan to do a 60-day review to ensure homeland
security issues will receive appropriate attention in a merged
council.
The Project on National Security Reform agrees fully with
the changes that General Jones outlined. Our own
recommendations parallel the direction that President Obama and
General Jones have set. This convergence is not surprising. As
the Chairman mentioned, General Jones served on the Project on
National Security Reform's guiding coalition, as did other
Obama appointees, Admiral Denny Blair, Jim Steinberg, and
Michele Flournoy.
Merging the HSC and NSC is a critical step towards building
a more coherent and unified approach to national security in
the broadest sense of the term. Though I believe that a merger
is a necessity, it must be undertaken with safeguards that will
ensure homeland security issues remain at the forefront of
national security affairs. Merging the NSC and HSC must be done
in a way that ensures that homeland security issues receive the
focus and resources they deserve.
Mr. Chairman, as the Committee approaches this issue, it
has two hats to wear. The first hat is as the Senate's overseer
of homeland security functions. The second hat, focused on
government affairs, in my view, ranks more important in
examining this issue. To make a wise decision on this
organizational question, we must take a whole-of-government
perspective focused on the global system. Doing so, in my view,
reveals the value of the new direction that the Obama
Administration intends to pursue.
This Committee, Mr. Chairman, worked hard to create the
Department of Homeland Security and to guarantee in law a
functioning Homeland Security Council. The idea of merging the
HSC and the NSC is intended to preserve and enhance the key
roles of both councils through integration, not subordination.
And since the details of the integration are still under study
by the new Administration, I trust that this Committee's views
can help shape the final arrangements. I believe that you
should view integration as an opportunity for preserving high-
level focus on homeland security issues, not as a threat to
that vital function.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you again for
inviting me to speak on this important subject and I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Locher. Thanks
for the case that you put before us.
Incidentally, Mr. Brennan has made very clear that he wants
to hear the Committee's opinions on this question of whether to
merge. As I said at the outset, ultimately, the basic structure
should be in law. Presidents will come and go who will change
pieces of it, but the basic judgment is there.
Secretary Ridge and Ms. Townsend, Ms. Wormuth and Mr.
Locher put together strong arguments before this Committee now
for merging the two councils. You obviously have different
points of view and I want to give you a chance to respond now.
Mr. Ridge. Well, first of all, I want to thank my
colleagues on the panel. I think it has been a very thoughtful
and a very thought-provoking discussion----
Chairman Lieberman. It has.
Mr. Ridge [continuing]. And I appreciate that. It just
seemed to me that running through the testimony of my
colleagues who disagree with this opinion, they talk about
staffing, which I do not think has as much to do with
integration as it does with adequate resources. They talk about
the need to elevate the visibility and the stature of the
Homeland Security Council. It is tough for me to conclude that
you elevate the stature by subsuming it into a large
organization that is dominated by the military.
They do talk very specifically, and I share the point of
view with them that it ought to be integrated into the global
perspective, but I would say to them, respectfully, that the
National Security Council is uniquely and almost exclusively
global. The Homeland Security Council, there is redundancy
there. In part the focus is global, but in equal part or even
larger measure, it is national, State, local, and private
sector.
Whether it is immigration or whether it is bioterrorism,
these issues being subsumed into a completely different
structure where the voice of the Homeland Security Council
mission is part of, again, this larger, more complex entity, I
just think reduces and diminishes, does not elevate. I think
the one cause we all believe in, we need to elevate it.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Ridge. But subsuming it, I do not think gets us where
we all want to be.
And then the other concern I might have is just that
Homeland Security is not a mature agency. The Department is not
mature yet. The traditional NSC, DOD, and the Department of
State are. National security is more external. Homeland
security is more internal. For national security, there is
overlap within HSC, but foreign affairs and foreign engagement
are the primary responsibility of the NSC, and only secondarily
for the Homeland Security Council though in important ways.
Two quick examples, and then I will turn to my colleagues.
There was a notion that you think about in terms of nuclear
proliferation. Is there a potential role for Homeland Security
there? Yes, but is it the same level, status, focus, resources,
and outreach as the National Security Council? Absolutely not.
It becomes a role for the Homeland Security Council in terms of
prevention or in terms of response and recovery if the NSC does
not do its job with regard to proliferation.
In terms of intelligence sharing, the Homeland Security
Council and the Homeland Security Department are consumers of
information. It does not really generate it. The great role is
to have global information being shared with the Department and
with the State and locals. There is a joint global interest
there, but it is primarily in the NSC's sphere, not in the
HSC's sphere.
So at the end of the day, I think suggesting everything
that the Homeland Security Council or the Department of
Homeland Security does you can tie into the global dimension, I
think is an inadequate description of the overall
responsibilities that it has, and I apologize for the lengthy
answer.
Chairman Lieberman. Not at all. Ms. Townsend.
Ms. Townsend. Senator, both of my colleagues make the
argument that there should not be the bifurcation that
currently exists, that a bright line would be a mistake. I
would say to you that as a sort of theoretical matter, I agree
with that.
There was not a bifurcation when I was there as Governor
Ridge experienced as Secretary and after he departed the
Department. I had responsibilities overseas, as well, as
related both to counterterrorism and homeland security because,
of course, to the extent any individual Nation takes seriously
their own homeland security and invests in their homeland
security, it reduces the threat to us. And so I worked across
geographic boundaries. It was not limited. I spent a tremendous
amount of my time on the homeland issues. But the fact that we
have a staff that is a Homeland Security Council that focuses
exclusively on homeland missions is not a bifurcation that
causes a problem. In fact, it enhances the capability.
The HSC was not treated, in the 4\1/2\ years I was at the
White House, as a second-class citizen or a stepchild. I sat in
many NSC meetings, for example, in the counterterrorism area,
related to Pakistan and the tribal areas because that posed a
threat to the United States.
Chairman Lieberman. Who would decide that, when you would
attend a NSC meeting?
Ms. Townsend. It was a very collaborative relationship with
the National Security Advisor. Obviously, I worked both with
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, when she was the National
Security Advisor, and with Steve Hadley when he was. It was
also true if it was a proliferation issue. I sat in on those
meetings. Or, as you can imagine, when you are discussing
immigration policy or visa waiver, issues that have a very
serious homeland security impact, if this was a homeland
security meeting, Steve Hadley was invited and members of his
staff, so we worked as an integrated whole.
What was important was, as to Governor Ridge's point,
homeland security issues need an advocate in the White House
who can work across and ensure the very integration that my
colleagues suggest.
Let me make one last point, because in fairness, it is the
one that I cannot just let go. There have been suggestions by
my colleagues that there is more staff needed. I think that is
right. I think the issues are serious and there are many, and
so I do agree there needs to be more staff. But to suggest that
the Homeland Security Council staff at the White House was
political or inexperienced is unfair and inaccurate. In fact,
these brave public servants who worked many long hours to
protect the American people came from not only the various
departments and agencies across the Federal Government, they
came from academia and from Capitol Hill, some of whom have
returned here, so I presume that my colleagues in Congress
would not think them inexperienced. And so in fairness to those
people, they worked very hard and we recruited them and
retained them because of their experience.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much.
I want to ask a quick question to Ms. Wormuth. In your
testimony, you say that HSC has been viewed often as NSC's weak
stepchild, and part of that was the lack of comparable funding
resources for the Homeland Security Council as compared to the
National Security Council. Am I correct to assume, however,
from your testimony, that you think the problem was more than
that? In other words, let us assume that we could equalize the
resources, or at least greatly increase the resources, staff,
etc., that the Homeland Security Council had, that would not do
the job because even then, a merger would be necessary?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, Senator Lieberman, for me, the primary
argument in favor of the merger as opposed to a reform of the
HSC, as Governor Ridge has argued--I think there is a lot of
value there. I think many of the issues that have been
challenges for the HSC could be addressed through reforms in
terms of getting at some of the staff issues. But to me, the
most important issue is the integration issue that Mr. Locher
and I talked about. So I think that is the strongest argument,
trying to change how we address the issues conceptually.
That said, to your specific question, you could fix the
funding issues, I think, and you could clearly fix the number
of staff that have been on the homeland security side without
doing a merger. I think the issue really in part is a somewhat
intangible one. Because the HSC, whether fairly or unfairly,
was perceived as being weaker than the NSC, it simply made it
more difficult for the staff to get the job done and that is
what I am getting at.
I would argue that by merging the two organizations into
one, and the NSC having already a long-established history with
a lot of stature, it is easier to recruit people to that
organization because there are literally civil servants banging
down the door to have the opportunity to go to the NSC. So that
is a slightly intangible thing.
And just to be clear, I certainly do not, and I tried to be
clear on this in my statement, I do not want to impugn in any
way the quality of the people on the homeland security staff.
They were excellent public servants. The experience issue, I
think, is relative to the NSC staff, but I am by no means
saying that you had inappropriately qualified or
inappropriately politicized staff. I just want to be clear on
that.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. I appreciate that you said that.
I am going to yield now to Senator Pryor. I want to express
my regrets to the Members of the Committee because I have
really been engaged in your testimony.
Senator Collins and I, as you may have heard, are not only
involved in matters of homeland security, we are also involved
in matters of economic security these days. She is out of here
for that reason. I have been asked to go join her. I hope I can
return. But Senator Pryor, enjoy the chair.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. If you are ready to adjourn, just send
somebody back to make sure that we do not want to come back
out. Thank you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR
Senator Pryor [presiding]. I would be glad to. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership on this and all of
the Committee pending issues.
Let me, if I may, start with Mr. Locher. Your organization
is the Project on National Security Reform, and the first
question for you is how important is it to you in your effort
to reform national security to have this merger? How important
is that?
Mr. Locher. We think it is one of the very fundamental
reforms that needs to be undertaken.
Senator Pryor. And why?
Mr. Locher. Well, in our view, as I mentioned in my
statement, the world is incredibly complex and it is moving
very rapidly, and this bifurcation into two components at the
very top of our government is not serving us well now and will
serve us less well in the future. We think that in the National
Security Council, we need that expertise on homeland security
and it needs to be improved over what it is today. But we want
it in one system where we can look at the global security
environment instead of having two separate organizations that
are doing that.
When you have two separate organizations, you have two
separate strategies, you have two separate sets of policies,
you have different processes, and we have the view that the
integration at the highest level will serve us well. There will
be much more integration that is required at lower levels where
we can bring departments and agencies together in a true
teaming fashion to address the Nation's problems.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask again on your vision and what
your group is working on, how would you like to see it
structured? Would you like to see the homeland security
component of that to be a separate subset of the National
Security Council, where they would always be a little bit
distinct and always focused on the homeland issue of this? Tell
me how you guys would structure it if you could.
Mr. Locher. The first thing I should say is that if you
look at our current approach to national security, the National
Security Council, it really has the World War II concept of
national security. It is still focused on defense, diplomacy,
and intelligence. That is the membership. The Secretary of
Energy has been added recently by the Congress.
We know in today's world that national security is much
broader than that. We have all of the economic issues that need
to be addressed. There are lots of law enforcement and legal
issues that need to be part of it. There are the environmental
issues and the energy issues that need to be addressed.
And so in our project, as we looked at this broadening
scope of national security, we have proposed that there be one
council at the top to serve the President. It would not have a
specified membership, rather the President would pull to that
council table the expertise that he or she needed for any
particular issue. So it would be a much more flexible
arrangement. It would be driven issue by issue. If the meeting
gets too large and it becomes a formal arrangement as to who is
going to attend, it does not serve the President's needs and it
wastes lots of time of our senior busy officials at the top of
our government.
So we have in mind, and this is something that General
Jones in his interview in the Washington Post and in his speech
at Munich laid out in terms of his view as to how the National
Security Council would be structured in the Obama
Administration, a much larger membership because we know that
we need more expertise brought in on national security issues,
but that the membership would be selected, the attendees would
be based upon an issue-by-issue basis.
Senator Pryor. How do you protect against the concern that
if you do the merger, that the homeland security focus will be
swallowed up by the national security focus?
Mr. Locher. Well, obviously, that is a legitimate concern.
I think, in my view, that we can get the benefits of a merged
system while ensuring that the homeland security issues receive
appropriate attention, and I think the step that General Jones
has taken by asking Mr. Brennan to do this 60-day review is a
good indication that he understands that there are benefits to
be achieved by merging the two councils, but he wants to make
certain that we are going to have the safeguards to make
certain that homeland security issues are at the forefront.
In my view, I have lots of confidence in General Jones. He
is quite a capable leader and manager and I think that he would
be a forceful advocate on homeland security issues. I think he
is very determined to ensure that they have a proper place in a
merged council.
Senator Pryor. Yes. I think a lot of us have a lot of
confidence in General Jones. One of the things that I am sure
we are thinking about is the next guy, whoever that may be, and
just to make sure they get it.
Let me, if I can, change to Secretary Ridge. Again, Mr.
Secretary, thank you for your public service. We appreciate
your time very much.
When I look at these two organizations, you have the
Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council.
The names sound the same because they both contain the words
``security council.'' In your view, are they fundamentally
different in what they do and should be doing, and can you put
them together in a way where the two missions that exist right
now can be compatible under one roof?
Mr. Ridge. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I think
there are fundamental differences between their missions. There
is no doubt in my mind that homeland security has, to Mr.
Locher's point and Ms. Wormuth's point, a global and an
international component, and it is a significant part, but it
is not the exclusive domain of homeland security, whereas the
National Security Council, given the perils of the world today
in the 21st Century, you spin the globe and you say, General
Jones is going to deal with all that with just 200 people?
In a culture, let us face it, that is dominated by
primarily one large department, the Department of Defense, a
culture that historically rarely is engaged within the domestic
front--I mean, there was some logistic support in Hurricane
Katrina, but for a lot of legal reasons, we do not have the DOD
doing some of the work that DHS would do, there is a whole
range of legal issues like posse comitatus--so you say to
yourself, the missions are fundamentally different.
The constituency they seek to serve--obviously, they both
serve 300 million Americans, but how they effect their mission
is quite different. A successful National Security Council is
engaged in countries and citizens of other worlds and a
successful Homeland Security Council is engaged primarily with
citizens of the United States.
Senator Pryor. Let me interrupt you right there, not to
knock you off track but just for clarification. In your view,
do both right now have the same and equal access to the
President?
Mr. Ridge. I cannot speak for the situation now, but my
colleague, I think, had a very unique perspective when she
indicated that as the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, a great deal of her time was on counterterrorism. A
great deal of her time was on the global side, the
international side. But she would put another hat on and go to
another meeting and deal with domestic concerns within the
Department of Homeland Security--this is an organization and a
Cabinet agency that is still maturing, still growing, still
learning, and still needs to integrate. There are still
significant turf battles not only within the Department, within
the horizontal framework within which it has to operate.
And I say to myself, will a Deputy Secretary of the
National Security Council be bringing together two or three
Cabinet members and say, this is the way it is going to be? I
do not think so. It is not as if General Jones does not have
enough on his plate.
And I just think, again, you subsume it into a much larger
organization with a different culture, with an exterior focus
rather than an interior focus, and I think you have not
elevated it. I think you have created some problems in terms of
organization and in terms of outreach to the State and locals.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask the rest of the panel, if I can,
to comment on what Secretary Ridge said about the mission being
fundamentally different. Would any of you like to comment?
Ms. Wormuth. I think there are certainly differences and
unique aspects to homeland security, and particularly in its
vertical quality, that is a characteristic, I think, of the
mission that you have not seen to date as much on the national
security side. I absolutely agree with the recommendation that
Governor Ridge made in his statement that whatever the
structure is in the White House, you need to have a very strong
core of State and local understanding to be able to address
that part of the homeland security challenge.
However, I think the national security side is evolving to
a certain degree to move beyond its traditional overseas focus,
and you see this more and more, for example, on the evolution
of the regional combatant commands in the military that are
starting to have different structures inside of them to deal
more effectively with the interagency activity and to deal more
effectively with the private sector. You are really starting to
see, I think, that evolution, and in my mind, that again is a
global evolution, which is where we need to go.
So I think in a way, the homeland side is already farther
along, but I think the national security side is moving in that
direction, as well, and again, I tend to see the issues as part
of a single system and I just think trying to address it
structurally as a single system is the best way to go.
Mr. Locher. Senator, if I might, I would like to add one
point. Secretary Ridge was talking about how we only have 200
people in the National Security Council staff. If you think
about the headquarters of our national security system, we have
two components now, the National Security Council staff and the
Homeland Security Council staff. They are incredibly small. We
have a four million-person national security system and we have
a headquarters that is that small and it has no headquarters
powers. It is completely advisory. Not only does it have a
small staff, it has an incredibly small budget. I know the
budget for the National Security Council is like $8.6 million
for all of the things that they have to do.
One of the things that General Jones said in his interview
that was in the Washington Post is he talked about a much more
robust role for the National Security Advisor, essentially
going from a National Security Advisor to a National Security
Manager, where, right next to the President, we have much more
authority to make a system that is decisive, a system that is
fast, that ensures that we have integrated activity, and that
we have lots of collaboration.
And so when we think of this one issue that we are
discussing today, it needs to be put in the larger context of
some of the other changes that President Obama and General
Jones have in mind.
Senator Pryor. OK.
Ms. Townsend. Senator, if I might make----
Senator Pryor. Yes, ma'am?
Ms. Townsend [continuing]. Two quick points: You asked
Secretary Ridge about equal access with the National Security
Advisor. I was the longest-serving Homeland Security Advisor to
date and I can tell you, I was in the President's daily
briefing in the morning. I had the complete access that Steve
Hadley or Condi Rice had. I never had a problem in terms of my
immediate access to the President, particularly in a crisis
where I needed to advise him. And so it was not a question of,
at least from my perspective, having a disparity in terms of
accessibility to the President or into information.
One example I would use, Governor Ridge talked about the
difference of focus on issues. Probably one of the things I
spent a tremendous amount of time on that the National Security
Council just did not have the staff or the width to do was the
strategy to deal with pandemic influenza. It meant dealing with
State and local public health officials and first responders.
It meant dealing with doctors and CDC, a variety of agencies
that the National Security Council did not ordinarily deal
with, in addition to the traditional, the National Guard and
the active duty military, making sure people had the response
capability, and that it was a fully integrated plan. By the
way, it also meant dealing with the World Health Organization
and health organizations and governments around the world.
I use that as an example, but I think it is important to
understand it is just one of those sorts of issues that the
Homeland Security Council brought to bear its experience in
planning for a bioterrorism event and other sorts of events,
but was able to pull together a strategy that worked seamlessly
with the National Security Council and the interagency.
Senator Pryor. Great. Ms. Wormuth, let me ask you a
question. I think you mentioned in your statement that the
current structure has impaired preparedness efforts. Could you
elaborate on that and tell us how you think it has impaired
preparedness?
Ms. Wormuth. Well, I think I was citing as an example the
challenges in trying to oversee the implementation of policy
and I specifically called out the implementation of Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) on national
preparedness. I think it speaks to the challenges of the
smaller staff, the challenges of the perception of the relative
strength or weakness of the organization. But HSPD-8 was put
out quite early in the history of the Administration and called
for development of a vision on national preparedness and the
development of an overall system to assess preparedness in the
United States and that process of putting all of those pieces
in place has been very slow. I would also say, in the same
vein, I think it has taken quite a bit of time for the
interagency to try and develop the integrated planning system
to try and help us think through how we will address the
various scenarios.
This is a case where, again, it speaks to the need to
elevate within the White House the treatment of these issues
because I think we have made progress, but that progress has
been slower than most Americans would like to see, and part of
it is because of the various challenges that the HSC has faced
that we have talked about this morning.
Senator Pryor. Let me go ahead and alert the Chairman's
staff that this is going to be my last question, so if you want
to ask the Chairman and Ranking Member if they want to return.
Otherwise, I am sure we will leave the record open for a few
days to ask questions in writing.
Let me change gears a little bit. We all know that
President Obama and his national security team are looking at
whether the Homeland Security Council and the National Security
Council should be merged or restructured in some ways. Have any
of you been involved in that White House review that they are
doing?
Mr. Ridge. No.
Mr. Locher. No.
[All shaking heads from side to side.]
Senator Pryor. Does anyone know what the time frame is for
them to make a decision? Have they laid out any sort of time
frame?
Mr. Locher. None.
Senator Pryor. This question may be for you, Mr. Locher,
you may know more about this than anyone. As it stands today
with the Obama Administration, and I know we are very early in
this Administration, 3 or 4 weeks, who is the primary advocate
in the Obama Administration today for homeland security issues
in the White House? Is it the Department of Homeland Security
or is it the National Security Advisor? How is that working
today? I know it will change because they are still filling out
their slots there.
Mr. Locher. I really do not have a lot of insight, but I
think that General Jones sees himself, given the approach that
they are currently taking, as having this as part of his
portfolio. He has John Brennan, who is more designated to have
this responsibility, but those details have not been made
public. I really cannot say exactly who has that
responsibility.
Senator Pryor. Right.
Mr. Ridge. We are coming to the conclusion of this hearing.
It has been very helpful, and hopefully it has been a
provocative enough discussion that the staff and the Members
will get some insight that they did not have before.
But I would just like again to put my oar in the water one
more time in opposition to the merger. Homeland security is a
national mission. It has a national mission that has
international dimensions, no question about it. But in order
for it to achieve its national mission with these international
dimensions, you need an advocate and a staff and a capacity in
the White House, personified by an Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security, in order to accomplish its national
mission to integrate the entire country, and that means
horizontally, across Federal agencies, bureaus, and the like,
and vertically, State, local, private sector, academic
institutions, and nonprofit organizations.
That horizontal and vertical integration, I am just very
concerned, gets absolutely subsumed if it is put in an agency
or a unit, National Security Council, that has primarily an
international mission with some national implications, a
fundamental difference in the mission, outreach, and
constituency.
Senator Pryor. Well, I thank you all for being here and
thank you for your comments and your insights and your views on
whether this merger should take place or not.
Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins will not be able to
return. They have asked me to let the Committee and the panel
know that we are going to keep the record open for 15 days. Be
prepared to receive some written questions. There are a few
senators, I know, who were trying to get here that could not
attend today.
Again, we want to thank you for your time and your focus on
this issue and thank you for your public service. We appreciate
all that you do.
With that, we will adjourn the hearing, and thank you
again.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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