[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
CARGO SECURITY AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY: ARE WE MEETING THE CHALLENGE?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER,
MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 22, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-40
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California PETER T. KING, New York
JANE HARMAN, California LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
Columbia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Mississippi
LAURA RICHARDSON, California PETE OLSON, Texas
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas
JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
MARY JO KILROY, Ohio
ERIE J.J. MASSA, New York
DINA TITUS, Nevada
VACANCY
I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director
ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel
MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
ROBERT O'CONNER, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARTIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona CANDICE S. MILLER, Michichgan
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
AL GREEN, Texas Officio)
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Alison Northop, Staff Director
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Subcommittee Lead
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 1
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Martime, and Global Counterterrorism................... 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Todd Owen, Executive Director, Cargo and Conveyance Security,
Office of Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Ms. Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Panel II
Ms. Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Stephen Russell, Chairman and CEO, Celadon Group, Inc.
(representing American Trucking Associations):
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Appendix
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Janice Ayala....... 53
Question From Honorable Mark E. Souder for Janice Ayala.......... 54
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Colleen M. Kelley.. 55
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Todd Owen.......... 56
Questions From Honorable Mark E. Souder for Todd Owen............ 57
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Stephen Russell.... 60
Questions From Honorable Mark E. Souder for Stephen Russell...... 62
CARGO SECURITY AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY: ARE WE MEETING THE CHALLENGE?
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Thursday, October 22, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Sanchez, Thompson, Harman,
Cuellar, Kirkpatrick, Green, and Souder.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
order. The Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Cargo Security at Land Ports of Entry: Are We Meeting the
Challenge?''
So good morning, everybody. Today's hearing will examine
cargo security at our land ports along entries on our northern
and southern border. This subcommittee is focused on reviewing
the growing challenge the Department of Homeland Security faces
in identifying, interdicting and investigating cargo security
threats.
To put the challenge we face at land ports of entry into
perspective, let's think about it this way. There are over 160
land border crossings between the northern and southern
borders; 43 of these crossings are dedicated to commercial use
only, and many of those are operated and staffed 24 hours a
day. Over 11 million truckloads and 2 million railcars come
through those ports annually, contributing to over $338 billion
dollars and $109 billion worth of imports respectively.
With those numbers in mind, it is important to facilitate
trade and to ensure that cargo and truck crossings are secure,
and that is the challenge that we will examine today.
This hearing comes at a time when our ports of entry are
experiencing infrastructure limitations and staff shortages
that result in overworked offices. This hearing--also, a new
wave of violence has hit many of our major ports, such as the
recent shootings that we saw at the Port of San Ysidro in San
Diego, which were linked to a human trafficking attempt. In
addition, there has been an increase in cocaine and cash
trafficking between the United States and Canada.
With the volume of trucks and railcars entering and exiting
the country, it is imperative that we have means to ensure that
they are secure and that we inspect them as needed. As a
sovereign nation, we need to be able to control the ingress and
the egress from our country, not just the people, but of cargo,
and that is why I am interested in hearing from both of our
government and industry witnesses today about what is and what
is not working.
Also, I am interested in hearing from ICE about
investigations into truck-related seizures that originate in
Mexico or Canada but are found in the United States. I believe
that we must improve our overall border infrastructure to
accommodate the growing amount of commerce and increasing
number of people who really do cross back and forth on the
border today--and I saw Mr. Cuellar, and I know that he has
talked to me about this over and over--because we need to avoid
delays and we need to make sure that trade is going on in a
smooth manner.
Considering many of the primary inspections of trucks
crossing into the United States are done by CBP officers, there
is a valid argument to be made that staff shortages at ports of
entry facilitate the importation of narcotics into this
country. I have always advocated for an increase in officer
staff. I know that Chief Aguilar, in particular, has been very
interested in this issue, and we have worked on it together,
and I hope that we will take a look at a CBP authorization bill
that might address some of these problems. That is also one of
the reasons why I wanted to hold this hearing today.
I want to thank all of you for being here today, and I look
forward to receiving your testimony.
Now I will yield to my ranking member, Mr. Souder, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Souder?
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think this hearing is important and timely. On the one
hand, we have the U.S. manufacturing industry suffering from a
recession, and the last thing we need to worry about is whether
or not that we will be able to get parts and supplies across
the border.
On the other hand, we have Secretary Napolitano and FBI
Director Mueller confirmed before Congress at the end of
September that Al Qaida remains committed to attacking the U.S.
According to FBI Director Mueller, ``of particular concern to
the FBI are individuals who can travel with fewer restrictions
to these areas of extremist activity and then enter the United
States under less scrutiny.''
We know that terrorist groups, not to mention criminal and
drug organizations, are constantly looking for vulnerable
points in order to bring weapons or people or drugs into the
United States. In addition, we see a growing trend of
intellectual property right violations, which are reportedly
helping to fund cartels and terrorist organizations and
dramatically hurt U.S. industry.
Our inspection and investigative capabilities must be
robust. This hearing is an opportunity to hear how CBP's
advanced targeting is working and the status of imaging and
radiation scanning equipment, also what our ICE investigators
are seeing in terms of trends and how do they allocate
resources across the wide-ranging mission sets.
At the same time, we must evaluate whether we are
unnecessarily causing delays or hurdles at the border.
According to testimony from the American Trucking Association
on the second panel, the value of trade between the U.S. and
Canada has decreased by 30 percent. The trade value between the
U.S. and Mexico has decreased by 18 percent. This decrease is
not the fault of the customs inspections, but I think we need
to take an objective look at the processes at the border to see
where additional facilitation is needed and could be helpful.
I would like to welcome Steve Russell, representing the
American Trucking Association, on the second panel. His company
is based in Indianapolis, Indiana, and I think his testimony
will be especially valuable, given his experience moving cargo
on both borders.
The security and facilitation at land ports of entry is not
just an issue for border states. My congressional district in
Indiana, it is the largest manufacturing district in the
country. The recession is heavily felt there. It is essential
for timely delivery of goods for companies to stay in business.
Specific facilitation issues that should be on the table are C-
TPAT and the FAST expansion, especially options for extending
the lanes leading up to the expedited processing lane for
program participants.
Additionally, where do things stand with ACE and the ITDS,
two programs intended to modernize border processing for both
trade and CBP, as well as link in other federal entities? To
the extent that they are able, I hope the witnesses will be
forthcoming with additional resource requests and legislative
changes that may be necessary to work with CBP and ICE--to
assist the work CBP and ICE are doing to carry out their
critical missions. I am confident that Ms. Kelley and Mr.
Russell in the second panel will have multiple recommendations
for us.
On a related note, I would again like to express my desire
for this subcommittee to consider border security legislation
that will address both sides of this issue, how to better
secure our borders and ports of entry and how to better
facilitate legitimate trade and travel.
Thank you again, Madam Chair, and I look forward to the
testimony.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank Mr. Souder. And, believe me, we are
taking a look. I have been talking to our chairman of the full
committee about those bills that we might be able to mark up,
so we are hoping some will come forward in this new month of
November.
The chair will now recognize the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for convening
today's hearing on cargo security at our nation's land ports of
entry.
America's land ports of entry are critical gateways to
travel and trade. Every year, approximately 11 million
truckloads and more than 2 million railcars arrive at U.S. land
borders. The dedicated men and women of the Department of
Homeland Security have the difficult task of detecting,
interdicting and investigating threats in this stream of
commerce.
At the same time, they are charged with facilitating the
legitimate trade and travel that is the lifeblood of the
economy, both in border regions and across the country. This is
no easy task.
Given the volume of commercial traffic crossing our
borders, it is imperative that DHS ensure cargo trucks and
railcars do not become vehicles for smuggling operations. Just
this month, a Canadian truck driver was arrested in Blaine,
Washington, with 192 pounds of cocaine, worth about $3 million.
In June of this year, a total of 1,090 pounds of marijuana was
discovered in two commercial trucks in El Paso, Texas.
Incidents such as these are a warning sign regarding other
possible threats coming into the U.S. through our ports of
entry. This method of smuggling narcotics or other contraband
could also be attractive to those who seek to do harm. It is
imperative that we address the potential threats.
DHS has made strides in utilizing inspection technology and
equipment, encouraging stakeholders to assist in securing the
supply chain, and enhancing cooperation among law enforcement
agencies.
However, significant challenges remain. Many ports of entry
were constructed decades ago and were simply not built to
accommodate modern security technology and procedures. In
addition to infrastructure challenges, staffing has not kept up
with the need. Thousands of new Border Patrol agents have been
hired in recent years, while only a relatively small number of
Customs and Border Protection officers have been added to the
ranks at the ports of entry.
These limitations not only undermine our security, but
hamper the department's ability to expedite vital commerce.
Ultimately, we must do what it takes to secure our borders and
ensure our ports of entry operate efficiently in moving goods
and people across our borders. Each of our witnesses today
bring a unique perspective on how best we can meet that
challenge.
Madam Chair, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us
today, and I look forward to hearing from their testimony.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the chairman.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
the committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record. I welcome our first panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Mr. Todd Owen, was appointed Executive
Director of the Cargo and Conveyance Security Office within the
Office of Field Operations at Customs and Border Protection--
that must be a long title on your card--in May of 2006. Mr.
Owen is responsible for all cargo security programs and
policies for the CBP, including the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism program, all non-intrusive inspection
technology, and radiation portal monitor deployments, the
National Canine Enforcement Program, and the National Targeting
Center for Cargo.
Welcome.
Our second witness, Ms. Janice Ayala, currently serves as
the Deputy Assistant Director of the Financial, Narcotics and
Public Safety Division within the ICE Office of Investigations.
Another long title there. In this position, she has direct
oversight of the financial, narcotics and national gang
programs conducted by ICE offices throughout the United States.
So without objection, your testimony, your written
testimony, will be put into the record. I know that you have it
before us. I will ask you to summarize your statements in 5
minutes or less.
Let's start with Mr. Owen.
STATEMENT OF TODD OWEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CARGO AND
CONVEYANCE SECURITY, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Owen. Good morning.
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to be here this morning to discuss
how U.S. Customs and Border Protection is fulfilling our border
security and trade facilitation responsibilities at our land
border ports of entry.
I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to the
Congress for its continued support of the mission and people of
CBP. Among the numerous priorities that were recognized in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress
provided CBP with $680 million for greatly needed improvements
to our aging port of entry infrastructure, tactical
communications equipment, and non-intrusive inspection
technology. This funding will allow CBP to more efficiently
meet our twin goals of border security and facilitation.
CBP has made tremendous progress in ensuring that supply
chains importing goods into the United States are more secure
against potential exploitation by terrorist groups or narco-
smugglers. CBP uses a multilayered approach to ensure the
integrity of supply chains from point of stuffing through
arrival at U.S. ports of entry. This multilayered defense is
built upon interrelated initiatives, which include the Trade
Act of 2002, the Automated Targeting System, non-intrusive
inspection equipment, radiation portal monitors, the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT program, and the
Free and Secure Trade initiative, or FAST. These complementary
layers enhance security and protect our nation.
In the land border environment, CBP receives advanced
manifest data on every truck and every rail shipment prior to
arrival at the border crossing. CBP performs a risk analysis on
each shipment using our Automated Targeting System and, along
with other targeting tools, high-risk shipments are identified
by the primary CBP officer and sent to a secondary examination
location for closer scrutiny and inspection.
In our ports of entry, CBP deploys non-intrusive inspection
technology, which includes large-scale X-ray and gamma imaging
systems, which allows CBP officers to assess the contents of
each trailer or container for anomalies or areas of concern.
Prior to 9/11, CBP deployed only 64 large-scale, non-
intrusive systems to our nation's borders. Today, we have over
230 systems operational, with another 50 new or replacement
systems to be deployed over the next 18 months as part of the
stimulus funding that CBP received this year.
In fiscal year 2009, one out of every four trucks that
crossed our land borders underwent a non-intrusive inspection
technology review. CBP also deploys radiation detection portals
at entry points nationwide. The first radiation portal monitor
was deployed in Detroit in 2002, and today we have over 1,400
scanning portals, allowing us to scan 100 percent of the cargo
from Mexico, 99 percent of the cargo from Canada, and 98
percent of our maritime cargo arriving into our sea ports.
CBP also works in partnership with the trade community to
secure supply chains before arrival at the U.S. port of entry.
Under the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program,
9,000 companies voluntary strengthened their security measures.
CBP validates these security enhancements and affords the
member reduced inspections to facilitate this low-risk trade.
Additionally, the FAST program promotes free and security
trade by using common risk-management principles, supply chain
security, industry partnerships, and advanced technology to
improve the efficiency of screening and clearing commercial
cargo at our shared border. Collectively, C-TPAT and FAST
programs address CBP's dual responsibility of security and
trade facilitation through voluntary partnerships with the
trade community.
Madam Chairwoman, members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to describe some of our land border security
initiatives and to highlight some of our progress to date. I
would be happy to take any questions. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Owen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Todd Owen
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, esteemed members of the
Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today
to discuss the work U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does in
performing our twin goals of border security and facilitation of
legitimate trade and travel. Our work is of critical importance-we must
be constantly vigilant towards meeting the challenge of securing our
borders and enforcing trade laws, yet we must accomplish these tasks
without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so
critical to our nation's economy.
I want to begin by expressing my ongoing gratitude to the
Subcommittee for its continued support of the mission and people of
CBP. It is clear that the Subcommittee is committed to providing CBP
with the resources we need in order to increase and maintain the
security of our borders. We appreciate your efforts and assistance.
CBP is the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency in the
country. We station over 21,000 CBP officers at access points around
the Nation, including air, land, and sea ports. We have deployed over
20,000 Border Patrol agents between the ports of entry. These forces
are supplemented with 1,266 Air and Marine agents, 2,392 agricultural
specialists, and other professionals.
CBP has a wide range of responsibilities that include stemming the
illegal flow of drugs, contraband and people; protecting our
agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases;
protecting American businesses from theft of their intellectual
property; enforcing textile agreements; detecting import safety
violations; regulating and facilitating international trade; collecting
import duties; facilitating legitimate travel; and enforcing U.S. trade
laws. At the same time, our employees maintain a vigilant watch for
terrorist threats. In fiscal year 2008, CBP processed more than 396
million pedestrians and passengers, 122 million conveyances, and 29
million trade entries; examined 5.6 million sea, rail, and truck
containers; performed over 25 million agriculture inspections;
apprehended over 720,000 illegal aliens between our ports of entry;
encountered over 220,000 inadmissible aliens at the ports of entry; and
seized more than 2.8 million pounds of illegal drugs.
OVERVIEW OF CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS
I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee today to highlight
key accomplishments related to cargo security in the land environment.
I would also like to take this opportunity to bring attention to
holistic cargo security programs that are applied to all environments.
CBP has made tremendous progress towards securing the supply chains
bringing goods into the United States from around the world, and
preventing their potential use by terrorist groups, by: using cutting-
edge technology to increase the ability of front-line CBP Officers to
successfully detect and interdict illicit importations of nuclear and
radiological materials; moving resources where they are most needed;
integrating all CBP offices; sharing information, including actionable
intelligence, across all aspects of CBP; and utilizing a multi-layered
approach to ensure the integrity of the supply chain from the point of
stuffing, through arrival at a U.S. port of entry. This layered
approach includes comprehensive cargo security programs that are
applied to all modes of transportation:
Advance Information
o 24-Hour Rule
o Automated Targeting Systems
o Importer Security Filing
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology and Mandatory Exams
for All High Risk Shipments
Southwest Border Initiative
I will discuss each one of these layers in greater detail.
ADVANCE INFORMATION
CBP requires advanced electronic cargo information, as mandated in
the Trade Act of 2002, for all inbound shipments for all modes of
transportation. This advanced cargo information is evaluated using the
Automated Targeting System (ATS) before arrival in the United States.
ATS provides decision support functionality for CBP officers
working in Advanced Targeting Units at our ports of entry and Container
Security Initiative ports abroad. The system provides uniform review of
cargo shipments for identification of the highest threat shipments, and
presents data in a comprehensive, flexible format to address specific
intelligence threats and trends. ATS uses a rules-based program to
highlight potential risk, patterns, and targets. Through rules, the ATS
alerts the user to data that meets or exceeds certain predefined
criteria. National targeting rule sets have been implemented in ATS to
provide threshold targeting for national security risks for all modes
of transportation: sea, truck, rail, and air. The DHS Science and
Technology Directorate is exploring additional methodologies for
conducting risk assessment.
The Importer Security Filing interim final rule, also more commonly
known as "1 went into effect earlier this year and has already yielded
promising results. This program will provide CBP timely information
about cargo shipments that will enhance our ability to detect and
interdict high risk shipments. Comments on aspects of this rule were
accepted until June 1,2009, and implementation using informed
compliance will continue until January of next year. Shipments
determined by CBP to be high-risk are examined either overseas as part
of our Container Security Initiative, or upon arrival at a port.
CUSTOMS TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM (C-TPAT)
CBP works with the trade community through the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to better secure goods moving
through the international supply chain. C-TPAT has enabled CBP to
leverage supply chain security throughout international locations where
CBP has no regulatory reach. Under the C-TPAT program, a prospective
member submits basic company information and a security profile via an
internet based portal system. CBP conducts records checks on the
company in its law enforcement and trade databases and evaluates the
security profile, ensuring the company meets the minimum security
criteria for its particular business sector. Members who pass initial
vetting are certified into the program. Using a risk-based approach,
Supply Chain Security Specialists conduct on-site visits of foreign and
domestic facilities to confirm that the security practices are in place
and operational.
In 2009, CBP continued to expand and strengthen the C-TPAT program
and ensure that certified member companies are securing their goods
moving across the international supply chain to the United States.
Teams of Supply Chain Security Specialists conducted validations and
revalidations of C-TPAT members' supply chains. This ensures that
security protocols are reliable, accurate, and effective.
As C-TPAT has evolved, we have steadily increased the rigor of the
program and program membership. CBP has strengthened the C-TPAT program
by clearly defining the minimum-security requirements for all
categories of participants wishing to take part in the program, and
thereby gain trade facilitation benefits. As of October 8,2009, there
were 9,484 companies certified into the C-TPAT program. CBP's goal is
to validate all partners within one year of certification, revalidate
all companies not less than once every three years, and revalidate all
highway carriers on an annual basis, due to the risks associated with
the Southern Border Highway Carrier sector of C-TPAT.
Membership consists of 9,484 Certified Partners which includes
4,327 importers, 2,585 carriers, 817 brokers, 783 55 Marine Port
Authority and Terminal Operators and 917 Foreign Manufactures as of
October 2009. C-TPAT has conducted 12,947 on-site validations of
manufacturing and logistics facilities in 90 countries. 298 C-TPAT
importer partners have been designated Tier 3, meaning they have
exceeded the minimum security criteria and have been granted the
highest level of program benefits.
FREE AND SECURE TRADE (FAST)
CBP's Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program is an innovative
partnership between the United States, Canada, and Mexico designed to
ensure security and safety while enhancing the economic prosperity of
the member countries. This innovative trusted shipper program allows
for expedited processing for commercial carriers who have completed
background checks and fulfill certain eligibility requirements. At the
land border ports of entry, FAST is integrated into the C-TPAT program.
The C-TPAT and FAST programs promote supply chain security from the
point of origin in a foreign country to the point of destination in the
United States. Participation in FAST requires that every link in the
supply chain, from manufacturer to carrier to driver to importer is
certified under the C-TPAT program.
Any conveyance using FAST lane processing must be a CBP approved
carrier, carry qualifying goods from a CBP approved importer, and
employ a driver with a valid FAST-Commercial Driver Card. To be
approved, the carrier and importer must be participants in C-TPAT. In
addition to these requirements, manufacturers in Mexico must be C-TPAT
participants, and all FAST shipments, when crossing the border, must
have a high-security seal properly placed, adhering to guidelines
outlined by CBP.
The FAST program promotes free and secure trade by using common
risk-management principles, supply chain security, industry
partnerships, and advanced technology to improve the efficiency of
screening and clearing commercial traffic at our shared borders. FAST
expedites and facilitates commercial crossings by implementing the
mandated requirements of securing the flow of people, transportation,
and goods under a secure infrastructure. FAST is aimed at improving and
ensuring the integrity of the supply chain of participants ranging from
manufacturing to transportation and importation.
For all U.S.-bound FAST trucks, Mexico Customs uses automated
readers that interface with the U.S. system in order to verify the
status of the FAST driver card. Mexico Customs receives a "yes" or
"no"response when the card is read, indicating whether the card is
valid with CBP. This process ensures that only approved FAST drivers
are utilizing the dedicated lane to enter the U.S. from Mexico. FAST
shipments also receive expedited processing through the Mexico export
process.
CBP's layered enforcement strategy begins with the vetting and
approval of all applicants through the FAST and C-TPAT programs. CBP
has further implemented a strategy that incorporates rule-sets
established at the headquarters level combined with the efforts of the
National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) and port Manifest Review Units
(MRU). Based on findings from the NTC-C and MRU, CBP officers are able
to take the appropriate actions on arriving shipments. These
enforcement actions may include document review, canine sweeps, Non-
Intrusive Examinations, Radiation Portal Monitoring, and physical
examination. In addition, CBP uses Random and Stratified Compliance
Examinations along with high-security seals to measure compliance with
program participants.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI)
Although the Container Security Initiative (CSI) is maritime-
focused, containers are commonly routed across multiple modes of
transportation, making this layer of security an integral aspect to
national security. CSI was announced in January 2002 and is currently
operational in 58 foreign seaports in 32 countries to address the
threat of terrorist use of maritime containers before those containers
are loaded on vessels destined for the U.S. CSI stations
multidisciplinary teams of CBP officers, along with our colleagues from
ICE, to work with host country counterparts to identify and examine
containers that are determined to pose the highest risk for terrorist
activity. In fiscal year 2009, CSI officers reviewed over nine million
bills of lading and examined over fifty-six thousand containers in
conjunction with host country counterparts.
NON INTRUSIVE INSPECTION RADIATION DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
The deployment of imaging systems and radiation detection equipment
has contributed to tremendous progress in ensuring that supply chains
bringing goods into the United States from around the world are secure
against exploitation by terrorist groups. Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) technology serves as a force multiplier that allows officers to
detect possible anomalies between the contents of a container and the
manifest. CBP relies heavily on the use of NII, as it allows us to work
smarter and more efficiently in recognizing potential threats.
Prior to 9/11, not a single Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM), and
only 64 large-scale NII systems were deployed to our nation's borders.
By October of 2002, CBP had deployed the first RPM at the Ambassador
Bridge in Detroit. Today, CBP has deployed 453 RPMs at Northern border
land ports of entry; 385 RPMs at Southern border land ports of entry;
431 RPMs at seaports; 55 RPMs at mail facilities; 232 large-scale gamma
ray or x-ray imaging systems; and 3,000 small scale NII systems
nationwide. Additionally, CBP has deployed over 1,400 Radiation Isotope
Identifier Devices and over 18,000 Personal Radiation Detectors. These
devices allow CBP to inspect 100 percent of all identified high-risk
cargo.
Currently, CBP uses radiation detection technologies to scan 99
percent of trucks and 98 percent of personally owned vehicles arriving
through northern border ports, 100 percent of vehicles arriving through
southern border ports, and 98 percent of arriving sea containers. CBP
uses RPMs to scan 99 percent of all cargo arriving in the U.S. by land
and sea. In addition, CBP officers now use handheld radiation
identification devices to scan 100 percent of private aircraft arriving
in the U.S. from foreign destinations. To date, CBP has used the
deployed systems to conduct over 37 million examinations, resulting in
over 8,300 narcotic seizures, with a total weight of over 2.5 million
pounds, and over $27 million in undeclared currency seizures.
CBP is working in close partnership with the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate to develop the next generation of NII Scanners
and Automated Target Recognition Systems for deployment to maritime,
land, and air ports of entry.
Used in combination with our layered enforcement strategy, these
tools provide CBP with an increased capability to detect contraband,
including illicit nuclear or radiological materials.
SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE
In March, Secretary Napolitano announced its comprehensive border
security policy, aimed at supporting the Mexican government's campaign
against violent drug cartels and reducing the flow of contraband in
both directions across the border. Along with the Merida Initiative,
the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, and the
Administration's renewed commitment to reduce the demand for illegal
drugs in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security has
engaged in a far-reaching Southwest Border Security Initiative to crack
down on Mexican drug cartels. The initiative focuses on enhanced border
security, including the deployment of hundreds of new personnel, and
enhanced intelligence technology to maximize capabilities and
strengthen coordination with other federal law enforcement entities
such as the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigations, as well as state, local, tribal, and
Mexican law enforcement authorities.
A key and growing area of emphasis involves DHS' role in
interdicting the illegal flow of weapons and currency into Mexico. A
large portion of illegal consumed in the United States pass through
Mexican territory and territorial seas. Illicit trafficking profits
back to Mexican drug trafficking organizations across our common
border. The recent surge in violence in the interior and border cities
of Mexico poses a significant threat in Mexico and is a serious concern
of the United States. Secretary Napolitano has tasked all DHS
components, including CBP, to examine how we can reasonably increase
our enforcement activities in an effort to identify and interrupt
efforts to smuggle weapons and bulk cash shipments into Mexico.
CBP is working with its partners in the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area centers to
expand the National License Plate Reader (LPR) initiative to exploit
intelligence on drug traffickers and drug trafficking organizations.
The LPR initiative will utilize established locations to gather
information regarding travel patterns and border nexus on drug
traffickers to enable intelligence driven operations and interdictions.
It should be noted that the LPR program is not specific to the
Southwest border. The initial phase of the initiative is along the
Southwest border, but the program will be expanded to encompass the
Northern border and other areas throughout the country. Its
capabilities can be utilized to assist other law enforcement entities
in investigations of their high value targets, by combining existing
law enforcement database capabilities with new technology to identify
and interdict conveyances being utilized to transport bulk cash, drugs,
weapons, and other illegal contraband.
In a spirit of cooperation, CBP has established positions at the El
Paso Intelligence Center, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force Fusion Center, and the Drug Enforcement Administration Special
Operations Division. These initiatives enhance interaction with the
Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies to more effectively
facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable
drug-related intelligence. CBP has also established two full-time
positions at the National Gang Intelligence Center and has partnered
with the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement and Coordination Center.
With regard to CBP, the Southwest Border Security Initiative:
Initiates 100 percent southbound rail scanning--CBP previously did
not screen any of the cargo traveling by rail from the United States
into Mexico; it is now scanning all rail cargo for weapons, ammunition,
and currency. Existing non-intrusive inspection equipment is being used
to detect contraband in cargo on each of the eight rail crossings on
the southwest border.
Adds Border Patrol Agents at POEs--CBP placed up to 100 Border
Patrol agents at southwestern ports of entry to assist the Office of
Field Operations (OFO) and to bolster outbound inspections from the
U.S. into Mexico in order to detect arms and bulk-cash smuggling.
Added Mobile Response Teams--Three Mobile Response Teams of 25 CBP
officers each are periodically deploying to the southwest border to
participate in focused operations developed to combat arms and bulk
cash smuggling.
Augments Search Technologies--An additional four low-energy mobile
x-ray units have been moved to the southwest border, in addition to the
seven already present, to help CBP identify anomalies in passenger
vehicles.
Engages Canine Teams--A total of twelve teams of ``cross-trained''
canines--trained to identify both firearms and currency--have been
deployed to the southwest border.
Adds License Plate Readers--Outbound lanes currently equipped with
license plate readers will receive upgraded license plate reader
technology to improve ability to identify the vehicles of known or
suspected smugglers of cash, weapons, drugs, or persons. This
information is shared with other law enforcement agencies through El
Intelligence Center and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
Fusion Center.
Enhances Operation Stonegarden Grant Funding on the Border--Through
Operation Stonegarden, an additional $30 million in Operation
Stonegarden grants were made available to state, local and tribal law
enforcement to be used for law enforcement personnel, overtime, travel
and other related costs in order to further increase the law
enforcement presence along the Southwest border. This funding has
enhanced the Department's capabilities to coordinate with state, local
and tribal law enforcement in order to effectively deter violence,
enforce immigration laws and combat illegal trafficking.
Actively Engages State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement--DHS is
aggressively reaching out to law enforcement in border communities and
is leading bi-monthly conference calls with chiefs of police and
sheriffs in a classified setting.
CONCLUSION
Madame Chairwoman, Members of the Committee, thank you again for
this opportunity to testify and thank you again for your continued
support of CBP. CBP has employed a thorough, multi-layered approach to
address cargo security in the land environment, while continuing to
facilitate the flow of legitimate trade.
At CBP, we strive for seamless integration between our component
offices, and we pride ourselves on the use of actionable intelligence
gathering and the ability to adapt to potential threats by use of a
multi-layered, flexible approach. With your ongoing support, I feel
confident that we will make more and more strides towards efficiently
and effectively achieving our twin goals of border security and
facilitation of legitimate trade and travel.
I will be happy to answer any of your questions.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Owen.
I will now recognize Ms. Ayala for 5 minutes to summarize
your testimony, please. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF JANICE AYALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Ms. Ayala. Thank you.
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss ICE's role in combating
smuggling at our land ports of entry.
First and foremost, ICE uses its broad federal authorities
to meet the challenges of security at the ports of entry by
conducting investigations through collaboration with the
intelligence community and other federal, state, local and
foreign partners.
More than 6,500 ICE personnel stationed both in the United
States and abroad keep ports of entry and transit points
provide a 24/7 investigative response to any call for
assistance to a seizure or incident from our law enforcement
partners, especially CBP.
ICE routinely responds to initiate investigations with
reports of seizures of weapons, narcotics, undeclared currency,
counterfeit goods, and other forms of contraband. ICE special
agents respond with the identifying, disrupting and dismantling
the entire illegal enterprise. ICE special agents utilize our
customs and immigrations authorities to initiate investigations
into the larger transnational criminal organizations who seek
to exploit our borders and ensure their prosecution by the U.S.
judicial system.
ICE special agents also provide actionable intelligence and
source information to CBP gleaned from ongoing investigations,
source debriefs, trend analysis, and other sources in order to
interdict contraband at and between the ports of entry. ICE has
the largest force of investigators in DHS, and we protect our
borders by investigating criminal organizations who exploit
weaknesses in our legitimate trade, travel and financial
systems.
ICE has the ability to expand the scope of investigations
beyond the domestic 26 SAC offices and the 56 attache offices
situated throughout the world. This worldwide investigative
posture enables us to address security threats before they
reach our borders and ports of entry.
The challenges of conducting investigations in the port
environment are many, but not insurmountable. The port and port
environments vary by geography, size and activity. In some
instances, the larger size of the port makes surveillance a
challenge, while small port of entry invites possible detection
by co-conspirators.
In the port environment, ICE agents routinely overcome
these issues of counter surveillance, internal conspiracies,
and other impediments by utilizing the investigative tools
available to them. These investigations are enabled by
roadblocks, cross-border coordination, and information-sharing
amongst our law enforcement partners which positions ICE to
respond to any incident at or between the ports of entry.
The following is an example of the type of investigation
done by ICE special agents to identify, dismantle and disrupt
not only the money-laundering components of criminal
organizations, but the underlying criminal activity. Beginning
in June 2006, ICE Special Agent in Charge Atlanta began
investigating a member of a drug-trafficking organization based
in northern Mexico, with criminal enterprises established in
McAllen and Atlanta, Georgia, metropolitan areas.
In particular, this organization was responsible for the
clandestine introduction of large quantities of cocaine and
marijuana into the U.S. from Mexico through south Texas ports
of entry by utilizing commercial tractor-trailer trucks loaded
with legitimate merchandise. This same type of commercial
tractor-trailer truck smuggled currency back to Mexico.
During the course of the investigation, the SAC Atlanta
employed numerous investigative methods to infiltrate the
organization, and this multi-jurisdictional, bi-national
investigation resulted in the indictment of 41 individuals in
the U.S. and Mexico, including a high-ranking member of the
Gulf Cartel. Furthermore, ICE and its partner agencies were
able to seize over 12,000 pounds of marijuana, 200 kilograms of
coke, and almost $23 million in currency.
In addition to the exemplary casework done by ICE special
agents, ICE employs initiatives such as Operation Armas
Cruzadas and Firewall, the Container Security Initiative,
Vetted Investigative Foreign Units, the Border Enforcement
Security Task Forces, or BESTs, the Northern Border Integrated
Border Enforcement teams, or IBETs, and intelligence fusion de-
confliction centers.
The BEST is an international law enforcement model
confronting the multifaceted threat of border-related crimes
through the sharing of resources, information and expertise.
BESTs serve as a platform from which interagency and our
international partners can work together to address cross-
border crimes and is the investigative foundation of bulk cash
smuggling Operation Firewall and weapons smuggling operation
Armas Cruzadas.
They also complement and support the Container Security
Initiative, overseas, and IBET program. Both ICE and CBP remain
committed to work collaboratively to fulfill our overall
homeland security mission. In properly communicating and
coordinating our referrals, as well as information gained from
those referrals, ICE and CBP can ensure the interdictions are
brought to the logical and most effective conclusion, which is
through proper investigations that can provide border
intelligence and additional opportunities to secure the border
and ports of entry.
I would like to thank the subcommittee for its continued
support of ICE and its enforcement missions, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Ms. Ayala follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janice Ayala
INTRODUCTION
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee:
On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)'s role in combating smuggling at our land ports of
entry through robust interagency coordination. First and foremost, ICE
uses its broad federal authorities to meet the challenges of security
at the ports of entry by conducting intelligence-driven investigations
through collaboration with the intelligence community, and other
federal, state, local and foreign partners.
The challenges of conducting investigations in the port environment
are many, but not insurmountable. The port and border environments vary
by geography, size, and activity. In some instances, the large size of
the port of entry makes surveillances a challenge, while a small port
of entry invites possible detection by coconspirators. In the port
environment, ICE agents routinely overcome issues of
countersurveillance by co-conspirators, internal conspiracies,
corruption, and other impediments by utilizing their knowledge of
customs and immigration laws, investigative tools, specialized
techniques, and law enforcement authorities to initiate investigations
into the larger transnational criminal organizations who seek to
exploit our borders and ensure their prosecution by the U.S. judicial
system. These multiagency investigations are enabled by robust,
crossborder coordination and information sharing amongst our law
enforcement partners, especially U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), which positions ICE to respond on a 24/7 basis to any incident
at the port of entry or the borders that poses a potential threat to
security.
ICE has the largest force of investigators in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and we protect our borders by investigating
criminal organizations that exploit weaknesses in our legitimate trade,
travel, and financial systems to further their illicit enterprises.
More than 6,500 ICE special agents detect, disrupt, and dismantle
crossborder criminal networks engaged in the smuggling of people,
narcotics, bulk cash, and weapons across our borders. ICE is focused on
countering the illicit activities that occur at our land ports of entry
along the shared border with Mexico and Canada. Furthermore, ICE has
the capability to expand the scope of its investigations beyond the
domestic 26 Special Agent in Charge offices to the 56 Attache offices
situated throughout the world. This worldwide investigative posture and
shared initiatives enable us to address security threats before they
reach our borders and ports of entry.
Outlined below and explained in detail in this statement are
several ICE and DHS programs and initiatives designed to challenge the
criminal organizations that perpetuate the criminal activity that
threatens the security of our borders and ports of entry. ICE works in
concert with its domestic and international law enforcement partners to
investigate the smuggling of weapons, narcotics, contraband, and the
bulk cash which fuels the criminal activity. ICE capitalizes on its
robust authorities and expertise to remain vigilant and adaptive to
threats to our borders and ports of entry.
ICE's efforts, along with the broader U.S. Government response to
combating smuggling at our land ports of entry, require effective
operational collaboration and expanded information sharing with
domestic and other foreign law enforcement agencies. ICE facilitates
these objectives through unique initiatives, which I will describe
later, such as Operation Armas Cruzadas, Operation Firewall, the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), Vetted Foreign Investigative
Units, Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs), the Integrated
Border Enforcement Team (IBET), the Border Violence Intelligence Cell
(BVIC), the Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF), and through the use of
formal interagency agreements. We also collaborate and share
information with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners in
national and regional coordination centers. And not long ago, we
renegotiated formal interagency agreements with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) to facilitate even closer coordination and expanded
information sharing.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOUTHWEST BORDER INITIATIVE
The Southwest Border is an important area of focus for the
Department of Homeland Security, which plays an integral role in
implementing the comprehensive U.S.-Mexico border security policy
announced by Secretary Napolitano on March 24. Along with the Merida
Initiative, the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy,
and the Administration's renewed commitment to reduce the demand for
illegal drugs in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security
has taken important steps to improve security along the U.S.Mexico
border. As first outlined by the Secretary on April 15, DHS has
redeployed personnel and technology in order to bolster the federal
government's action against cartels on the southwest border. ICE
doubled assignments to ICE BESTs; tripled the number of intelligence
analysts working at the border; and quadrupled the number of agents
designated as Border Liaison Officers to work in close cooperation with
Mexican law enforcement. Within Mexico, ICE increased its investigative
workforce by 50 percent.
COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO
Cooperation is a critical piece to effective law enforcement along
the borders and at the ports of entry-this includes ICE coordination
with its counterparts in Mexico. The violent cartels operating in
Mexico are a binational threat that must be dealt with in a bilateral
way--both the United States and Mexico must focus on smuggling channels
that flow both ways across the border. Indeed, earlier this year,
President Calderon of Mexico identified the illegal flow of weapons
from the United States as one of the greatest security threats to his
country. On April 1, Secretary Napolitano traveled to Cuernavaca,
Mexico with Attorney General Holder to attend a joint U.S.Mexican
conference on arms trafficking. At the conference, the Secretary and
the Attorney General discussed future joint efforts to prevent firearms
from being smuggled into Mexico from the United States.
Interagency collaboration with the Mexican government is a part of
a broader theme of shared responsibility that Attorney General Holder
and Secretary Napolitano agree is central to our strategic effort to
secure the SWB. Stopping the flow of firearms and bulk cash into Mexico
is an important component of the larger strategy to secure our borders
from the criminal organizations that use those resources to traffic
contraband and perpetrate violence. Comparative to CBP uniformed
presence at the nation's borders to stop the flow of firearms and bulk
cash, ICE's investigative presence at the ports of entry serves an
equally important role to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the criminal
organizations engaged in the movement of firearms and bulk cash
smuggling. ICE accomplishes this through Operation Armas Cruzadas and
Operation Firewall.
Operation Armas Cruzadas. ICE has intensively deployed resources
for Operation Armas Cruzadas, a comprehensive, collaborative effort
with the Government of Mexico (GoM) to identify, disrupt, and dismantle
the criminal networks that illicitly transport arms across the border.
ICE and CBP have stepped up efforts to interdict southbound weapons
smuggling, pursuant to DHS authority to enforce export provisions of
the Arms Export Control Act as specifically designated within 22
C.F.R.Sec. 127.4 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and
to prevent smuggling of weapons in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 554.
Under Operation Armas Cruzadas, ICE has implemented numerous activities
that promote an intelligencedriven, systematic approach to arms
trafficking investigations. Since its inception in 2008, Operation
Armas Cruzadas has resulted in the seizure of 1,880 weapons, more than
$7.9 million, 206,412 rounds of ammunition, and the arrests of 257
individuals on criminal charges, resulting in 147 criminal indictments
and 96 convictions.
A recent case out of Laredo, Texas, demonstrates the significant
impact of our proactive efforts at penetrating Mexican weapons
trafficking networks with ties to the interior of the United States. A
joint investigation by ICE and ATF began with a seizure of 25 .22
caliber rifles, a 9mm pistol, a 16-gauge shotgun, a 20-gauge shotgun,
100 rounds of 9mm ammunition, and other various parts of disassembled
weapons by CBP during an Armas Cruzadas operation. ICE special agents
from the Laredo BEST responded with ATF special agents to interview the
driver, in which they learned that he was paid to drive the truck to
Mexico by a resident of Oklahoma. What followed was a joint
investigation between ICE and ATF in which investigators uncovered a
conspiracy to purchase firearms in the U.S. illegally and arrange for
their covert movement to Mexico.
Based on this collaborative information, ATF agents obtained a
search warrant for a residence in Oklahoma and subsequently seized
approximately 950 firearms, including rifles, shotguns and handguns,
ammunition and approximately $30,000 in U.S. currency. This
investigation illustrates how criminal organizations facilitate the
movement of weapons through our ports of entry. However, through
innovative initiatives like Operation Armas Cruzadas, coupled with the
collaboration of multiple law enforcement agencies and authorities,
this criminal organization was unraveled and its future efforts to
utilize the ports of entry to smuggle firearms were stymied.
Operation Firewall. In addition to addressing weapons smuggling,
ICE partners with CBP to combat the illegal movement of cash across the
SWB. This currency is the lifeblood of the violent drug cartels; the
United States must interrupt the illegal flow of money derived from the
illicit narcotics trade and other criminal activity. ICE's Operation
Firewall counters bulk cash smuggling through partnerships and close
operational collaboration with foreign partners, including Mexico. On
the first day of operations in 2005, at the Benito Juarez International
Airport in Mexico City, Mexican authorities seized $7.8 million en
route to Cali, Colombia, concealed inside deep fryers, rotisseries and
voltage regulators. Other notable seizures in Mexico include $7.3
million seized inside rolls of fabric and plastic, and $4.7 million
concealed inside air conditioning equipment and metal piping destined
for Colombia. ICE and CBP continue to make seizures in the arena of
bulk cash smuggling. This September, ICE and CBP analyzed trade data of
containerized cargo and seized over $22 million concealed inside
containers in Colombia and Mexico. These seizures demonstrate that
criminal organizations continue to utilize containerized cargo as a
prime mode of transportation for contraband and the illicit proceeds
generated by it.
While ICE can point to many successes overseas in the area of bulk
cash smuggling, the work done here at home is of equal importance to
identifying, dismantling, and disrupting not only the money laundering
components of criminal organizations, but the underlying criminal
activity as well.
Beginning in June 2006, and in conjunction with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Atlanta Division, the ICE Special
Agent in Charge (SAC) Atlanta began investigating members of a drug
trafficking organization (DTO) based in Northern Mexico, with criminal
enterprises established in the McAllen, Texas, and Atlanta, Georgia,
metropolitan areas. In particular, this DTO was responsible for the
clandestine introduction of large quantities of cocaine and marijuana
into the United States from Mexico through the utilization of
commercial tractortrailer trucks loaded with legitimate merchandise.
The organization also utilized commercial tractortrailer trucks to
smuggle currency back to Mexico.
During the course of the investigation, SAC Atlanta, with the
assistance of DEA Atlanta, employed numerous investigative methods to
infiltrate the organization, including 24 court orders. The results of
this multijurisdictional, binational investigation resulted in the
indictment of 41 individuals in the United States and Mexico, and
included the indictment of a high ranking member of the Gulf Cartel.
Furthermore, ICE, DEA, ATF, FBI, CBP, and the Georgia State Patrol were
able to seize approximately 12,833 pounds of marijuana, 224 kilograms
of cocaine, $22.7 million in currency, forfeiture sought on 14
properties, and 18 bank accounts.
COORDINATION OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS
Container Security Initiative. Announced in January 2002, the CBP
Container Security Initiative (CSI) was first implemented in foreign
ports that ship the greatest volume of containers to the United States.
Under the CSI program, a team of CBP officers and ICE special agents
are deployed overseas to work with host nation counterparts to target
all containers that pose a potential threat, ensuring that they are
identified and inspected at foreign ports before they arrive at the
ports of entry in the United Sates. In September 2002, CSI commenced
operations at the ports of Rotterdam, Netherlands and Le Havre, France.
There are presently 58 ports with a CSI presence and 28 with ICE
Special Agents assigned overseas. As members of the CSI team, ICE
Special Agents act as an extension of the ICE Attache office, gathering
information and intelligence to identify, disrupt and dismantle
criminal organizations that attempt to exploit the international
transportation system.
BEST. More than a DHS program, BEST is a law enforcement model that
recognizes confronting the multifaceted threat of borderrelated crimes
such as narcotics, weapons and human trafficking requires sharing
resources, information, and expertise. BESTs serve as a platform from
which interagency--and international--partners can work together to
address crossborder crime. The BESTs operating on our land borders, at
or near land ports of entry, and in major maritime port cities,
incorporate personnel from ICE, CBP, DEA, ATF, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and respective U.S.
Attorney's Offices, along with other key federal, state, local, tribal,
and foreign law enforcement agencies. The Mexican Secretaria de
Seguridad Publica (SSP) currently participates in BESTs along the SWB,
and Canadian law enforcement agencies such as Canada Border Services
Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ontario Provincial Police,
Niagara Regional Police Service, and Toronto Police Service participate
in the BESTs along the Northern Border.
As testament to the success of the BEST, the GoM has agreed to
provide representatives to every BEST team on the SWB. Additionally,
other GoM agencies and foreign partners are working with ICE to expand
their participation in the BESTs, thus enhancing the international
scope and participation of the initiative. Since the launch of the
Southwest Border Initiative on March 24, ICE has established new BESTs
in Las Cruces and Deming, New Mexico, as well as in Detroit and Mexico
City resulting in a total of 17 BESTs covering highthreat smuggling
corridors.
A major component of the BEST in Mexico City is the use of the
joint vetted units. ICE Attache personnel are working closely with
their Mexican counterparts to build specialized, vetted investigative
units to focus on bilateral weapons smuggling investigations, and
provide an immediate investigative response to weapons seizures within
Mexico. These vetted units will address an information requirement gap
that currently exists with respect to tracing weapons and exploiting
investigative leads. With the establishment of the vetted units, weapon
serial numbers will be more consistently obtained and traced within
ATF's eTrace database prior to the weapons being turned over to the
Mexican military. More comprehensive weapons trace data will facilitate
better identification of U.S. sources of weapons. The vetted units will
better exploit the seizures through interviews, telephone data/record
analysis and other investigative tools, leading to the identification
of crossborder weapons smuggling networks. This information is then
shared with BESTs located at the ports of entry to investigate and
identify the larger criminal organizations. A robust information
sharing platform will facilitate the exchange of leads for coordinated
exploitation of U.S. leads by U.S. agencies, and Mexican leads by GoM
agencies.
Overall, the BEST model has been very successful. ICE, with the
help of our partners, has cracked down on arms trafficking, human
smuggling, bulk cash smuggling and narcotics smuggling organizations.
These efforts have disrupted cartel operations in both the United
States and Mexico. Since July 2005, the efforts of BEST teams, working
in conjunction with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other law
enforcement agencies, have been responsible for 2,895 criminal arrests,
3,463 administrative arrests, 1,306 indictments and 1,114 convictions.
In addition, BESTs have seized approximately 9,618 pounds of cocaine,
213,553 pounds of marijuana, 1,106 pounds of methamphetamine, 131
pounds of crystal methamphetamine, 1,560 pounds of ecstasy, 263 pounds
of heroin, 113 pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 2,471 weapons,
over 365,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,090 vehicles, and $30.7 million in
U.S. currency and monetary instruments.
Integrated Border Enforcement Team. In addition to the BESTs along
the Northern border, the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)
concept was organized in 1996 and formalized in April 2001 to target
crossborder criminal activity along the Northern border with Canada. In
November 2006, ICE signed the IBET Charter as a core member and has
been involved in the IBET concept since its inception. IBET consists of
five core agencies with law enforcement responsibilities at the border.
These agencies include: ICE, CBP, USCG, the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, and the Canada Border Services Agency. Furthermore, the IBETs
are comprised of multiagency groups of law enforcement officials
dedicated to securing the integrity of the CanadaU.S. border while
respecting the laws and jurisdictions of each nation. As such, the IBET
investigative priorities are (1) national security, (2) crossborder
criminal activity, and (3) organized crime related to the U.S./Canada
border. Currently there are 23 offices located in 15 IBET regions along
the U.S./Canada border.
National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center. The ICE-
led National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR
Center) has employed a true task force model designed to optimize the
roles and coordinated enforcement efforts of the agency partners to
address the problem of counterfeit merchandise. The IPR Center has
imbedded representation from ICE, CBP, the FBI, the Food and Drug
Administration's Office of Criminal Investigations, and the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service. The IPR Center is further supported by the Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice.
The IPR Center serves as the U.S. Government's primary location--a
``One Stop Shop''--for investigations, intellectual property rights
holders, counterpart domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies, and
the public to submit intelligence and lead-based information for
analysis, assessment and investigative referral. The IPR Center also
serves as a clearinghouse for deconfliction of all leads generated or
received by partner agencies to ensure a timely, coordinated and
dedicated response.
The IPR Center also develops enforcement initiatives and provides
investigative guidance on a variety of commercial fraud and IPR
priority enforcement and targeting programs, including public health
and safety, inbond diversion, Fraud Investigative Strike Teams, anti-
dumping/countervailing duties, and various bilateral and free trade
agreements. Specifically, ICE developed and implemented Operation
Guardian, a comprehensive, multiagency enforcement initiative that
combines the specific areas of expertise from our partner agencies to
investigate illegal importations of substandard, tainted, hazardous and
counterfeit commodities posing a health and safety risk to consumers.
In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, Operation Guardian resulted in the
identification and detention of tainted, counterfeit and/or substandard
tainted infant formula, contaminated shrimp and honey, tainted pet
foods, counterfeit medical devices, computer components,
pharmaceuticals, and circuit breakers.
EXPANDED INFORMATION SHARING WITH FOREIGN, FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERS
Border Violence Intelligence Cell. The Border Violence Intelligence
Cell (BVIC) supports the national effort to combat weapons smuggling
and stem the surge in violence along the Southwest Border. This unit
facilitates timely information sharing with state, tribal, local,
foreign, and other federal law enforcement agencies, and serves as the
focal point for analyzing allsource intelligence in support of the
BESTs and ICE Attache Mexico offices. Through the BVIC, the BESTs, ICE
Attache offices, and the U.S.vetted GoM Arms Trafficking Group exchange
crossborder weaponsrelated intelligence through a virtual intelligence
network, creating a seamless investigation of the criminal networks
that span the SWB. The BVIC, in cooperation with the ATF weapons desk
at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), serves as the central point
for analyzing allsource intelligence and trends in firearms smuggling.
Since March 30, 2009, analysts working with the BESTs, in coordination
with the BVIC, have produced 213 intelligence reports, over 60
comprehensive target folders, and 114 investigative leads relating to
suspected weapons traffickers operating along the SWB.
Weapons Virtual Task Force. The Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF)
is a community of interest within the Homeland Security Information
Network--a secure, unclassified webbased information sharing platform.
The community was created to assist information exchange between ICE
and its Mexican law enforcement counterparts under the Armas Cruzadas
initiative. Using the WVTF, law enforcement on both sides of the border
can upload and share information pertinent to law enforcement actions
along the SWB. While currently in its infancy, it is anticipated that
the WVTF system will incorporate any GoM enforcement action results or
intelligence developed by Mexican law enforcement related to Armas
Cruzadas. The information will then be available for ICE investigators
and analysts to view and analyze. Last month, ICE sent a team to Mexico
to train Mexican law enforcement on the use of the system. This
training is a strong step toward a closer relationship and better
information exchange, and will continue as additional users on both
sides of the border are added.
FORMAL INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS
The successes of the BESTs, as well as Operations Armas Cruzadas
and Firewall, illustrate how colocated taskforces and multiagency
initiatives can stem the flow of crossborder criminal activity and
enhance the security of our ports of entry. Interagency roles,
responsibilities and coordination are guided by numerous statutes,
presidential directives and formal, interagency agreements. Given the
extent of ICE authorities in enforcing the nation's customs and
immigration laws, ICE has cooperation agreements with federal, state,
local, and foreign law enforcement agencies in order to more
effectively leverage our combined resources. I would like to highlight
two of the more recent partnerships entered into by ICE. These are the
June 18, 2009, Interagency Cooperation Agreement between ICE and DEA
and the June 30, 2009, Memorandum of Understanding between ICE and ATF.
Interagency Cooperation Agreement between ICE and DEA. On June 18,
2009, ICE and DEA announced an Interagency Cooperation Agreement
Regarding Investigative Functions Related to the Controlled Substances
Act. Specifically, the June 18, 2009, agreement provides the following:
(1) a commitment by both ICE and DEA to share information through
mechanisms including the Special Operations Division, the OCDETF Fusion
Center and EPIC; (2) authorization for the ICE Assistant Secretary to
select an unlimited number of ICE agents for crossdesignation by the
Administrator of DEA; (3) delineation of crossdesignated ICE agents'
authority to investigate narcotics smuggling with a clearly articulable
nexus to the U.S. border, including related transportation and staging
activities within the United States; and (4) procedures for
deconfliction and operational coordination in both the domestic and
foreign counternarcotics environments. The agreement took immediate
effect and will be reviewed one year after its initial effective date.
In addition, after the oneyear review, the agreement will be reviewed
thereafter every two years, or at any time, upon written request by
either party.
Memorandum of Understanding between ICE and ATF. When ICE and ATF
join forces through joint investigations or via the BEST teams, both
agencies bring balanced authorities to any investigation. The June 30,
2009, Memorandum of Understanding between ICE and ATF established the
clear roles that both agencies have over domestic and international
trafficking of firearms, ammunition, explosives, weapons, and
munitions. The agreement recognized that both law enforcement agencies
are actively engaged in the fight against persons and criminal
organizations involved in violent crime and gun trafficking.
The agreement requires that ATF report to ICE any information
relating to attempted or planned violations of federal law within the
jurisdiction of ICE. The agreement imposes a reciprocal requirement
upon ICE to report to ATF any information relating to attempted or
planned violations of federal law within the jurisdiction of ATF. The
agencies also agree to coordinate information concerning firearms and
explosives investigations that involve each other's investigative
jurisdiction.
Moreover, ATF and ICE will invite each other's participation in any
investigations within the jurisdiction of the other. In addition, the
agreement sets forth important policies concerning the shared use of
human confidential sources of information and the control of
intelligence. The agencies agreed to coordinate efforts as they relate
to activities at Federal Firearms Licensees, Federal Explosives
Licensees, gun shows, international borders and ports of entry.
CONCLUSION
The coordination and information sharing initiatives I have
discussed today portray the extensive cooperation currently underway
between ICE and our counterparts in CBP, as well as state and local
governments, the federal government, and foreign governments and how
this is enabling us to address the challenges of security at our ports
of entry. Taken together, all of these initiatives represent a
substantial advancement towards operating in a truly complementary
fashion, by harnessing each agency's particular authorities and
expertise in more efficient ways as opportunities arise to secure the
border and our land ports of entry.
I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its continued support of
ICE and our law enforcement mission. I would be pleased to answer any
questions you may have.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you for your testimony, Ms. Ayala.
I will now remind each member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the witnesses. And I will now recognize
myself for the questions I would like to ask.
Mr. Owen, it is my understanding that commercial vehicles
found to be carrying drugs have used the Trusted Traveler
Programs, such as FAST lanes, to transport those drugs. Is that
true? And if it is, how are commercial--are these commercial
vehicles carrying cargo with foreign license plates? What is
the process to have them--to come into the United States? And
how are they tracked within our country?
Mr. Owen. Madam Chairwoman, under the C-TPAT program, a
foreign--a Mexican highway carrier may apply for the program,
demonstrate to CBP that it is meeting clearly defined minimum
security criteria in terms of personnel screening, conveyance
tracking, stuffing of the container, those things. And the
driver will also apply for a FAST card, which requires
additional background checks on the individual.
There are 93,000 FAST drivers in the country right now, and
that includes both borders, the northern and southern borders,
and there are 9,400 C-TPAT members. The highest-risk enrollment
sector we have in C-TPAT are the Mexican highway carriers.
There were 71 incidents involving C-TPAT members over the
last 2 years, and 35 of those involve Mexican highway carriers,
so that is our area of most concern, are the individuals
driving the trucks that come in from Mexico. Taken again in its
totality over those 93,000 drivers, those 9,000 C-TPAT
companies, incidents of these are very, very infrequent, but we
do take them very seriously.
We will suspend the companies out of the program. We will
revoke the FAST driver's license or the FAST cardholder's
license until we conduct what we call a post-incident analysis
to figure out where the breakdown occurred, if it was just a
rogue driver that deviated from the policies and the procedures
of the company that he employed or if there is a more systemic
issue.
So while the incidents are very infrequent, they are very
significant to us, and we take them as such.
Ms. Sanchez. Now, I remember with respect to C-TPAT, when
we were working in the cargo containers at the water ports,
that the program had a lot to be desired as far as our ability
to--as I recall in the program, a company which did a plan, and
in some cases we would put it on a shelf, and we wouldn't take
a look at it, and we didn't have any audits going on. We
wouldn't go into the company to see if, in fact, they were
following that, if there were--obviously, if there weren't
initial audits, there were no follow-up audits going on, and we
have gotten to very few of those companies with respect to the
containers.
Can you talk a little bit about where we are, how often we
audit, what is the process with C-TPAT, as it applies to these
carriers that are bringing things across--cargo across the land
borders?
Mr. Owen. Yes, ma'am. In the first years of the C-TPAT
program, in 2003-2004, we did struggle with staffing. The
program was very well received by the trade community, and we
were, quite frankly, overwhelmed at the number of applicants.
Since that time, beginning in 2005, we significantly added
staffing. We went from 38 supply chain specialists in the early
years. We have 200 specialists now. We had three C-TPAT offices
nationwide. We now have seven C-TPAT field offices. These
employees perform the most critical work, which, as you
mentioned, is the verification that the plan they gave us in
paper has, in fact, been adopted and implemented throughout
their supply chains.
To date, we have now performed over 12,000 foreign
validations, so 12,000 times C-TPAT specialists have traveled
overseas to look at the point of stuffing, to look at the
drayage or the movement from the point of stuffing to the sea
port, worked with the sea port and the terminal operators,
making sure that whole supply chain is secure. So we have come
quite far from where we were in those early years where we were
doing very few validations.
As to your question, as to the routineness of the
validations, if you will, because Mexico is our greater threat
sector, we revalidate those companies every year, and we also
do unannounced validations or spot checks, if you will, on some
of the facilities.
The unannounced efforts are something that we just started
within the last year after a recommendation from GAO in 2008
that said you really need to take the program to the next
level. You need to do more robust validations, more spot
checks, those types of things.
So the rest of the members outside of the C-TPAT Mexican
companies are required to be validated once every 4 years by
the SAFE Port Act. And, in fact, we revalidate them once every
3 years, so we are a little bit ahead of the game with that.
But the Mexican segment does pose our greatest risk, and we do
revalidate them every year.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Owen, I am also concerned about the growth
of our forces, if you will, in looking at cargo and people
coming across the border, especially at the land border. We
have really increased the size of our force, which has brought
in a lot of new people. We hired a lot of these people during a
time when unemployment was low, so we were really fighting to
try to get people in, to train them, et cetera.
And I am a little worried about the increase in corruption
that we have seen. I know in 2007, we had eight confirmed cases
of corruption among those people who are working on the front
line for us. And in 2008, we saw 21 confirmed cases.
So can you explain to me, without giving out any big
information, but just to let us know what type of a system you
have got in place to target and weed out corrupt officers? How
do you incorporate anti-corruption into agent and officer
training in the culture at CBP? And have there been any cases
where outside groups have infiltrated into the CBP?
Mr. Owen. In terms of our Office of Internal Affairs, over
the last 2 years, they have significantly increased their staff
of criminal investigators in Washington, as well as throughout
the country. I believe we now have over 200 investigators just
within our Office of Internal Affairs.
They have also come up with a comprehensive strategy that
begins with the employment screening of an applicant trying to
obtain a job within CBP, and we are using polygraphs for some
critical candidates in certain key positions. There are also
analytical tools that we employ to identify certain trends
within officers' activities while on the job that may indicate
an area of concern for us.
So we do recognize integrity is a very critical aspect of
what we are doing. We cannot have a solid security program if
the weakest link is the officer at the front booth. So our
internal affairs office does take this very impressively. We
have increased staff, and they do, again, have some analytical
tools that work to identify trends that need to be looked at
more closely.
Ms. Sanchez. I have a lot more questions in that arena, but
I will ask my ranking member now, Mr. Souder of Indiana. The
gentleman is now recognized for his questions.
Mr. Souder. I have a number, as well, but I have a couple
of follow-ups. One is, why aren't all employees polygraphed? In
most law enforcement agencies, all applicants are polygraphed.
Why haven't we implemented that in CBP?
Mr. Owen. Well, I would have to defer that question back to
our Office of Internal Affairs, but I know it is something that
we are doing for the critical key positions as they are
entering, but we can take that back----
Mr. Souder. What is a critical position?
Mr. Owen. Again, I would have to defer to our Office of
Internal Affairs----
Mr. Souder. Please provide to the committee the definition
of critical and the status of the investigations Law
enforcement officers are routinely polygraphed. It is not a
perfect system, but it is usually just part of the hiring
process. "It has been intriguing why we haven't done that, as
we have ramped up concerns about the border and ports of entry.
It is not to question the overwhelming majority, but the
problem is the more you hire, the more risk you have, and it is
something we normally do in law enforcement.
I also wanted to ask Ms. Ayala, a ballpark here today and
get back to us, with what percent--and you might want to break
it by major and minor--what percentage of the things that we
find at the border, whether it be narcotics, other illegal
contraband, people on terrorist watch lists, and so on, but
particularly contraband, come from a tip or an investigation as
opposed to a cold hit?
It is important to do a cold hit, to make sure, but I am
wondering what kind of the balance is.
Ms. Ayala. I think it would be difficult to give you
percentages, because I think it varies depending on what area
you are in, as far as offices and the level of non-
discretionary work versus discretionary work that they have, as
far as response to large ports of entry or to airports or sea
ports. But we do have a variety of different ways, and we try
to maximize each and every opportunity, whether it be from a
cold hit so that we can respond and make sure that we develop
the information that we need to identify the organization, the
domestic and the international arena, and then be able to feed
back that information to CBP to then affect other interdicted
activity.
With that said, we also work with the interagency, through
a task force environment, such as a BEST and so forth, to look
at local area threats and how we can maximize our efforts in
developing proactive cases.
So I think it would be difficult to give you percentages
overall. It may be just, again, depending on----
Mr. Souder. What if I narrow my scope of my question? Most
commercial trucks come at El Paso and at the Otay Mesa
commercial of entry, And if you take the Otay Mesa entry, the
El Paso entry, the Buffalo, Detroit, and maybe the biggest in
Arizona, and those ports of entry on major cases and--or a
significant find, hopefully you are--like you say, if you get a
cold hit, you go the other direction.
Because when we are dealing with, for example, most major
trafficking organizations in the United States, in cities, or
whether we are dealing particularly in narcotics, which I am
most familiar with, coming through the Caribbean or through,
almost all those are investigations. And if the overwhelming
majority isn't from a tip, the question is, are we working that
structure hard enough?
To me, in other words, it is not if we are getting a
significant percentage on a cold hit, then we need more
investigators.
Ms. Ayala. We do get a significant percentage from cold
hits in order for us to be able to respond to those incidents.
Whether it be at, again, these busy ports of entry, of course,
then we need a larger investigative force to attack that issue.
And then we currently do that through our current ICE
investigators and through force multipliers through other task
forces.
But while that tip is important, that initial seizure, we
really do--our goal is to identify the entire organization,
which, then again, takes additional resources not necessarily
at those ports of entry, but in the interior of the United
States and abroad to bring the complete conspiracy to light and
the case to a complete fruition.
Mr. Souder. I will see. I may have some follow up to that.
Mr. Owen, given the fact that truck traffic is
significantly down the last few years, what are you doing to
make sure, during this period where we have less traffic, that
we are trying to expand the FAST lanes? I have seen it in a few
locations. What I have seen is much about being things--
projects being delayed as I have seen stepped up.
What are we doing at these critical crossings? Because,
clearly, the long waits are at a few major ports. We have
shorter waits at some of the smaller ones.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. And you are right. With the economy
being down, we still see about 57,000 trucks and sea
containers, rail containers that cross the border every day. So
even with the downturn in economy, the volume is still
significant.
Through the deployment of additional non-intrusive
inspection equipment, we have actually been able to increase
our exam rate in 2009. We examined 25 percent of the trucks
using X-ray or gamma ray in 2008. We are up to 30 percent this
year. So we are doing a good job, I think, of meeting those
twin responsibilities of security, yet facilitating the trade.
To your point as to the infrastructure, even if we have 20
booths at the port of entry and all 20 are staffed, if it is a
two-lane highway leading from Mexico into the port of entry,
you are going to have the backups. So I agree with you that the
solution is not necessarily infrastructure within the port of
entry, although that needs to be updated. The average age of
the ports are more than 40 to 45 years old. But the
infrastructure leading up to the port and out of the port is
just as critical as the booths that we have within the actual
port of entry.
Mr. Souder. It is not like this hasn't been a problem for a
long time in Detroit and Buffalo. Do you coordinate at all with
other stakeholders. Are we pushing that to be resolved? Because
the counter push is to weaken inspections because we have no
capacity.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. And we do work with the Canadian
government, as well as the stakeholders. Each crossing is a
little different as to whether it is owned by a private bridge
owner or a GSA facility, a CBP-owned facility. But we do work
with all of the stakeholders to try to address the
infrastructure challenges and not have a negative impact on the
wait times and definitely not compromise our enforcement
mission because of the--because of the backups.
Mr. Souder. I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Souder.
I will now recognize my colleague from Laredo, Mr. Cuellar,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for having
this meeting.
Ms. Ayala and Mr. Owen, thank you for being here with us.
The number of 18-wheelers coming across are tremendous. I
mean, just in my hometown of Laredo, as you know, Ms. Ayala,
there is about, both ways, 12,500 a day, 18, you know, cargo.
That doesn't include the railcars, doesn't include air cargo
coming in. So I can understand the pressure, and I certainly
appreciate the work that Treasury Union and some of the other
folks have been talking about, trying to get more men and women
in blue. I have always said, we need the men and women in
green, but we need the men and women in blue, also. So we are
hoping we can work with you.
Mr. Owen, do you have, quickly, the amount of money we
should adequately have in--when we are talking about men and
women in blue, to properly staff our ports of entry, both south
and north? I know the other administration didn't want to give
us, and they told me off the record why, but can you tell us
what we should be staffing it at?
Mr. Owen. I know for each of our crossings we do have
figures as to what is our appropriate staffing at those
locations. And we do work very aggressively to try to make sure
that the attrition rate is not significant enough where it is
negatively impacting the workforce that we have there.
I think two positive changes to help us attract and retain
CBP officers, as well as Border Patrol agents, in July of 2006
with the passage of the enhanced retirement for the CBP
officers, that definitely helps us retain the officers.
Mr. Cuellar. Well, let--well, let me ask you this question.
Could you, in private or whatever the terms might be, show the
committee later what the staffing models should be for each
level, for each port of entry? I am kind of curious to see what
we are looking at. And for two good reasons, I am not going to
put it out there, but I would like the Madam Chair to see that
later, see what the proper staffing should at each port of
entry, number one.
The other thing is, I have talked to the two rail companies
that come through Laredo. And I think this applies also to the
C-TPAT, also, where my understanding is what the drug cartels
are doing now, is they are looking for, instead of trying to
have somebody walk through or put them in a car, they are
looking at the 18-wheelers, the cargo and the railcar, also.
I know that the--just yesterday, I was talking to one of
the rail companies that were complaining, because they were
saying Homeland is fining us when this is happening across the
river, so why are they fining us? And at the same time, I can
understand where there has to be some responsibility, corporate
responsibility.
It is an issue that I would like to follow up at a later
time, because I know we can talk about that, but, you know,
they are looking for FAST, C-TPAT, railcars, where they think
they can go in. And if you put the probability chances--okay,
we get caught once, it is okay. We got another truck coming in
or we have another way or--you know, you all really need to
look at that and see how we can get more of the corporate
involvement.
I know they are trying hard, but that is what is happening.
And we know that is what is happening, the railcars and, of
course, this, because it is a concern, especially in an area
like Laredo. I mean, if you got 12,500 trucks a day--and I know
they are both ways--I mean, that is a lot of vehicles, and you
have got to provide the security while at the same time not
create those long bottlenecks that we have seen for miles
sometimes.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We are concerned with the
smuggling on the rail, and we are working cooperatively with
those two rail carriers that you addressed.
As for the penalties that are issued, the carrier has a
responsibility to ensure to do everything within their
possibility--that there are possible to make sure that the
conveyance has not been compromised. That is just the section
of the law where we--they are subject to the penalties.
But I will tell you that there are provisions for us to
offset some of those penalties and an acknowledgement of the
security enhancements that have been made, so we are working
cooperatively with the rail carriers on that.
I would also like it noted, too, that the eight rail
crossings that we have from Mexico, all of them are equipped
with non-intrusive inspection equipment, so we do X-ray 100
percent of the railcars that are coming in from Mexico. It
allows us to very effectively find any illegal aliens that are
attempting to make entry, as well as many of those narcotic
interdictions that you are referencing, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. The case in 2008 where there was this lady
that--I think your internal affairs got for importing drugs,
where drug cartels are recruiting people to get hired by you.
That is--as some of the other members said, that is something
that you have got to look at very carefully, because--and in
Mexico and other places, they have done a good job at
infiltrating law enforcement, and I am sure that doesn't stop
across the river.
So you are going to have this concerted effort to--where
those drug cartels are going to recruit to get people in, in
the inside. So whatever you all need to do to--you know, your
internal affairs and whatever counter work you all need to do,
that is a big concern, because if they are doing that across
the river, I don't see why they are not going to continue that.
But I want to thank Ms. Ayala. It is always a pleasure
seeing you again.
Mr. Owen, thank you for the work.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank my colleague from Texas.
We will now hear from the young lady from Arizona, Ms.
Kirkpatrick, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Owen, as you know, trucks that are coming from Mexico
northward into the United States are routinely stopped at some
point and subjected to some type of check. But southbound
vehicles routinely drive right through without stopping.
My concern is about the illicit trafficking of weapons and
cash southbound. And so my question is, do you currently have a
plan to stop southbound traffic in the same way that you do
northbound? If so, where are we in the implementation of that
plan? And do you require additional resources from Congress to
make that happen?
Mr. Owen. Thank you. Yes, ma'am. With the southbound
traffic, you are right. The challenge there is the
infrastructure. Unlike ports of entry when you are entering the
United States, in most cases there are not booths where the
trucks will slow down and be interviewed by a CBP officer,
present certain documents. It is usually just highway, straight
open into Mexico. And that makes our challenge very difficult.
We have increased our level of outbound inspections, both
not only in passenger vehicles, but in buses and bus--and
trucks. We have significantly increased the level of currency
that we have seized this year since we began this initiative in
March. I believe on the southwest border last year, we seized
approximately $10 million. And in the fiscal year that just
ended at the end of September, we were up to almost $38 million
just in bulk cash going out into Mexico along the southwest
border.
So the infrastructure is a challenging piece for us. The
making sure we have the sufficient dedicated resources to
direct towards outbound is important. But I would also note
that the Mexicans share responsibility here, as well. The
Mexican government also needs to build up their capacity to do
more inbound inspections, as the trucks are leaving the U.S.
heading into Mexico itself.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. And is anything happening with that from
the Mexican side?
Mr. Owen. Yes. Yes, we have different working groups with
the Mexicans. The Mexicans are securing additional technology.
They are making some personnel changes within their customs
service and things like that, so they are doing more southbound
inspections in certain locations.
We are better coordinating our outbound efforts and their
inbound efforts so that the smugglers cannot just wait us out
or move down the street, down the road to another crossing, so
there is a much higher level of engagement with the Mexican
government now, particularly in the last year, as we have been
focusing more on outbound.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. And do you have the resources you need to
make that happen, to really inspect the southbound as you wish,
pursuant to your plan?
Mr. Owen. Well, again, the infrastructure is not there. And
even our inbound ports are very outdated and not equipped for
the volume of today and not--definitely not equipped for the
post-9/11 security environment. So resources are a challenge
both at the current inbound ports of entry, as well as
outbound, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Thank you.
Ms. Ayala, each year, huge amounts of narcotics are
trafficked into the United States through the ports of entry
along the southwestern border while the Border Patrol which
defends the areas between ports of entries has doubled in size
over recent years. OFO and ICE have remained comparatively
stagnant. This makes it all the more important to maximize
existing resources, and one way to do this is to ensure that
the federal agents at the border have the full authority to
investigate drug offenses.
Over the summer, ICE and DEA signed an MOU that was
expected to provide ICE with a far greater authority to enforce
Title 21. Please tell me where you are in implementing this
agreement and whether it is having the intended effect.
Ms. Ayala. We are currently vigorously working with DEA to
finalize those local protocols. As you know, we are working to
salvage those protocols between 26 Special Agent in Charge
offices with very different areas of responsibility. And even
within those individual SAC offices, the landscape is
completely different, as far as land ports of entry, maritime
distances, and resources, among DEA and ICE.
We are very close in finalizing those agreements, and what
we want to do is make sure that they are flexible enough and
not rigid, where it locks us into having one protocol in one
area where there may be mature de-confliction centers, the same
as in another area where they are not, when we may need to use
other mechanisms.
Just last week, we participated in a meeting with DEA, and
we are very close to finalizing those protocols.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. And when you say ``very close,'' I mean,
are you thinking by the 1st of next year, or what is your
timeline?
Ms. Ayala. I think yes, but I will get back to you on
exactly the timeline.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Okay. Thank you. Thank you both very much.
I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Now for the young and gentlelady from
California, Ms. Harman, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Harman. Madam Chair, you make my day. I came over here
to be called young.
I also came over to commend you and the ranking member for
an excellent set of hearings over this term of Congress on
issues like this. This committee punches above its weight on--
this subcommittee on the full committee. And I just want you to
know that I am proud to be a young member of it.
So then, our borders. We have had a lot of conversation
about the southern border. I think about the northern border,
because that is where Ahmed Ressam was intercepted by a very
astute CBP agent in 2000. And his intention, so the legal
charges and conviction state, was to bring his trunk full of
fertilizer down to my district and to blow up LAX, the
international airport in my district.
So I want to commend you for the work that you did, but I
also want to point out that that work was not done by
technology. I don't think it was done by dogs, if I remember
it. It was done by someone who could really assess suspicious
behavior. I see a number of you nodding, so I think I have
nailed it.
So my question is about, how are we doing on improving our
tradecraft, on recognizing suspicious behavior? As we all know,
the Israelis are really good at this, so I want to know if the
Americans are really good at this.
Mr. Owen. Well, for the front-line CBP officers, yes, we do
provide advanced, if you will, behavioral-type analysis,
training so they can recognize the verbal and non-verbal cues
as we are going through the interviews at the primary. And you
are right. It was not technology; it was not a canine. It was
the knowledge, the experience, and the intuition of that
officer that was successful of that.
So I think we are doing a strong job of giving our officers
the training that they need to recognize those cues. And
ultimately, again, it does come down to the instinct and the
experience and the training of that front-line officer.
Ms. Harman. Any other comments on this? I think you need to
turn your mike on.
Ms. Ayala. I just wanted to say, as far as the northern
border, that both ICE and CBP are very much integrated into the
northern border, integrate border enforcement teams that share
intelligence and look for gaps along the northern border
between the ports of entry.
And, of course, we have three border enforcement security
task forces that are located on the border in Blaine, Detroit
and Buffalo, and we are working very closely with our Canadian
counterparts, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian
Border Services Agency, Ontario Provincial Police, Windsor
Police, Niagara Police, on all cross-border crime and threats
to our ports of entry.
Ms. Harman. Well, I appreciate that. And I recall a really
chilling video produced about 5 years ago by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative that showed a truck loaded with a radiological bomb
go driving across an essentially unguarded border point in the
north.
I am not saying that--well, that was the point of this
video. And that is sort of the last shot. And in enters the
radiological bomb. So I worry about this a lot.
I don't think 100 percent protection can be achieved.
Perfection is not possible. But risk management has to be the
approach. And that is why I say that recognizing suspension
behaviors and especially integrating your operations and
information sharing are a good start.
Is there anything else along the northern border that we
should be paying attention to that we are not or any other help
you need, in terms of--I am sure you could use more money, but
anything else you need from Congress with respect to assuring
that you manage risk as well as you possibly can on our
northern border?
Mr. Owen. If I could just make one comment about the
crossings and the radiological detection, in about 3 weeks, we
will reach a milestone on our border with Canada. We are
deploying the final few radiation portal monitors. So the first
week of November, we will have 100 percent coverage of all of
those crossings, so every passenger vehicle, every truck that
is now entering from Canada will have to first pass through a
radiation portal monitor. So I think that is an important layer
that we have been able to deliver on.
Ms. Harman. Well, I agree with that. We have a number of
radiation portal monitors at the ports of L.A. and Long Beach.
And I know that the chair of the subcommittee and I have
visited that many times. That technology is, again, not
perfect, even in its second generation, but I appreciate
everything you do, and I really want to commend you for being
one of the bright spots in our evolving efforts to protect the
homeland.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank my colleague from California.
Ms. Ayala and Mr. Owen, I have one question that I would
like to make before we bring the next panel up. Can you go
through what it looks like and if there is a difference from
the northern to the southern border, what it looks like--what
is the process? Let's say I am a trucker bringing in, I don't
know, tomatoes from Mexico and I am bringing them into
California. What is the process I have to go through,
especially if I am in FAST or something like this?
Does my company--you just--I know I have read everything,
but the company has to get certified if they want a FAST entry.
I have to have a background check and get certified. What about
taking a look at who--is there a safety check on the actual
vehicle? Is there a random check in the FAST when I go through?
And what is the difference between my going through a lane
like that, let's say, and not being able to get those types of
documents or pass those types of tests, in the sense that I
have to go through the regular line? And can you tell me if
there is a difference between what we really see in a practical
sense, what happens at a San Ysidro, for example, versus what
might happen coming into Michigan from the north?
Mr. Owen. Well, on the land borders, whether you are
importing from the north or from the south, the foundation,
first off, is what we call an e-manifest, an electronic
manifest. So we receive information before the truck gets at
the booth, okay, information on the driver, information on the
cargo. The entities are involved. That is different than 3
years ago. Three years ago, the truck would pull up to the
booth, hand the officer a piece of paper with some of that
information. He would start to run his checks.
So through the e-manifest program, as part of our automated
commercial environment, we now receive that ahead of time, 60
minutes ahead of time for a non-FAST shipment, 30 minutes ahead
of time for a FAST shipment. That gives us time to do more
analysis, to run it through our systems, to be ready for when
that truck appears, all right?
Once the truck is there, then, again, the officer will do
his thing. If he feels that there is no risk, the truck will be
on its way. If it is a secondary, it will be sent over.
Prior to this process, in an area where we call pre-
primary, is where you will have the canines working, perhaps.
You will have the anti-terrorism contraband enforcement teams
doing checks, talking to the driver. So there is that pre-
activity before the booth.
The only real difference between, again, a FAST shipment
and a non-FAST shipment, as you mentioned, a FAST shipment, all
of the entities have to be in C-TPAT. So you have the importer
that is in C-TPAT, the highway carrier, the Mexican
manufacturer, and then the driver has to have a FAST car.
What that affords them, again, is dedicated lanes which
will expedite the release of that cargo. We also focus our
inspections more so on our non-FAST lanes than our FAST lanes,
because, again, the FAST universe is more known than the
unknown FAST. But everyone in FAST is still subject to
inspection if there is cause or concern, still subject to the
canines, and we will do different types of random enforcement
operations. For the next hour, for example, everybody in the
FAST lane is going into secondary to do those randoms.
So we do build in quite a bit of random activities, even in
the FAST lanes, just to make sure, you know, everybody is
staying honest and we are not overlooking anything in those
lanes.
Ms. Sanchez. And this happens both at the Canadian and
the----
Mr. Owen. Yes, both at the Canadian and at the southwest
border crossings, as well.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. Southwest border.
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Souder, it looks like you have a follow-up
question or a question there?
Mr. Souder. If I could, it is from your first comments, Mr.
Owen, but it relates to this. Did you say you had 61 people who
violated the FAST lane?
Mr. Owen. There were 71 FAST cardholders in the last 2
years, yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. And what percentage of those were on the
Mexican border versus the north border?
Mr. Owen. I believe it was 35 of the 71, about 50 percent
were Mexican, and the Canadian--I am sorry. Let me double check
here. I am sorry. The FAST was 35 drivers; 71 was the C-TPAT
numbers that I was giving you. So from the FAST drivers, we had
had 35 incidents; 29 of those were narcotics-related, 4 were
currency smuggling, and 2 were alien. So a very small
percentage of drivers.
Mr. Souder. And are those--looking at the 35 and 71, what
was the north-south split?
Mr. Owen. I don't have the north-south split, but I can
provide you those. My instinct would be that the majority of
those were on the southern border.
Mr. Souder. And on the 35 and the 71, both those cases,
what percent were larger companies? You suggested that most of
these were single-truck operations or small companies.
Mr. Owen. I don't have that information, but we can provide
that as to the scope of the----
Mr. Souder. Because this is----
Mr. Owen [continuing]. The trucking company.
Mr. Souder. This comes at the core of something that I felt
for some time when we did a number of hearings on the border in
another committee when we were in the majority. We have
representatives of the Canadian trucking association and the
American Trucking Association that said that for expediting,
they would take even double penalties if they violated FAST.
Now, you have to address things like what you said. I mean,
did you have a rogue driver who loaded the trailer, but the
corporation has to do that and take some responsibility for
making sure what kind of drivers they have and so on. And one
thing would be enhanced penalties.
Now, the question here is, if very few of these were a
traditional company, it would suggest that in these larger
trucking companies in the United States, that we really don't
have a huge problem and that, in fact, our attention on
investigations and trying to clear a FAST lane person is much
more targeted. What you are really looking at, much like you do
when you check cargo or do an investigation is, what is the
risk of this? What do we have known with them?
And that the ones that are getting through may not be
really a trucking problem. We may be able to expedite some of
this with fewer checks, faster processes for companies that
have no track record. They still need to be checked, but that
if 90 percent of your problem is in one area and we have got
the whole thing tied up because even for random traffic coming
over for dinner, particularly at some of these crossings where
you don't have enough lanes, you get trucks jamming up people
for an hour when it is really we don't have a big enough truck
lane to get them out.
Can you provide that data to see how many of those were
what we would call major trucking companies?
Mr. Owen. Yes, I do know offhand that we have found drivers
in very large companies that were involved in the smuggling, as
well, so I don't think it is isolated to just the small
trucking companies from Mexico.
I think, unfortunately, the weakest link in any of these
companies could be that driver. And we have seen it break down
on large companies, as well as small companies.
Mr. Souder. And how much did those--would independent----
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. I would like to see some kind of a breakout on
targeting, and then you can zero in and figure out what we
might do, enhance legislative penalties, if you can identify
the problem.
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Owen, is there a safety check and who
performs that? And is that random at the border? And who is
checking? I mean, you know, I am also worried, you know, that
these--some of these drivers are overworked, they haven't
slept, and they are coming out into California.
I had an accident where a Mexican driver slammed into a van
on our freeway and, you know, that van had nine people in it
and it burnt them all to death. So where do we--where does that
happen in the system, also?
Mr. Owen. The safety checks come after it has cleared the
customs compound, if you will, by the state transportation
officials, so that is a state responsibility. It is not a CBP
responsibility. But most of those facilities, as the trucks
leave the compound, you will see the state DOT has got their
compounds right after it leaves the exit, if you will.
Mr. Souder. And is it your experience that most of those
trucks have to go through that? And has there ever--is it
infrequent or frequent that maybe, while they are doing these
safety tests, they might come across contraband or, you know,
weapons or whatever else that is being----
Mr. Owen. Yes, I can't speak to the frequency. I am not
familiar with that. But I do know that every once in a while
they will detect a load of narcotics that was not caught at the
border, and we work very closely with the state highway patrol,
depending on what state it is, like that, work with our
criminal investigators, with ICE to track that down.
So we do have a good relationship at the border with them,
but I am not familiar as to how much actually gets sent or what
their targeting methodologies are.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Harman or Ms. Kirkpatrick, before I release this panel,
any questions?
Mr. Souder, you are fine?
Thank you very much for your testimony before us today. We
really appreciate it.
And now we will ask the second panel up. Thank you.
And I welcome the second panel of witnesses. Our first
witness is Ms. Colleen Kelley, the leader of the National
Treasury Employees Union, NTEU, and it represents workers in 31
government agencies, including the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Officers and employees. As the union's top elected
officer, she leads the union's efforts to advocate for federal
employees and represents NTEU with the agencies in the media
and, of course, before Congress.
Welcome.
And our second witness is Mr. Stephen Russell, who has been
chairman and chief executive officer of Celadon--did I say that
correctly--trucking services since founding the company in May
of 1985. Mr. Russell is a member of the American Trucking
Association's executive committee and serves as the chairman of
the audit committee. He previously was chairman of the homeland
security policy committee.
Without objection, your full statements will be put into
the record, and I will now ask Ms. Kelley to summarize her
statement for 5 minutes or less.
STATEMENT OF COLLEEN M. KELLEY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
Ms. Kelley. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Sanchez,
Ranking Member Souder, and committee members. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify today.
NTEU represents Customs and Border Protection officers, CBP
agriculture specialists, CBP seized property specialists, and
CBP trade enforcement and compliance personnel at all 327 ports
of entry, land, air and sea.
CBP front-line employees at these ports of entry, as has
been noted, have twin goals: anti-terrorism and facilitating
legitimate trade and travel. A major challenge of this mission
is securing the movement of goods without costly wait times and
delays.
On the one hand, CBP officers and agriculture specialists
are to fully perform their inspectional duties; yet at all
times, they are made aware by management of wait times. In land
port booths, wait times are clearly displayed.
Now, technology has helped to improve the length of wait
times. With the use of these new technologies, the average
inspection time per vehicle, as reported by CBP, is 30 to 45
seconds in regular inspection lanes and, in the expedited
inspection lanes, like the Free and Secure Trade, or FAST,
truck lanes, the average processing time is 15 to 20 seconds.
NTEU has confirmed with talking with front-line CBP cargo
security personnel that these cargo inspection times per
vehicle cannot realistically be further shortened. CBP's
continuing emphasis on reducing wait times without increasing
staffing at the ports of entry creates an extremely challenging
work environment for front-line CBP personnel.
It has been reported that a September 2009 draft report
that the Homeland Security Advisory Council created--that was
created by Secretary Napolitano to review commerce and security
at the southwest border ports of entry has made the same
recommendation as NTEU--more staffing is needed in the ports of
entry--and has recommended that Congress fund CBP to hire more
CBP officers for ports of entry.
CBP's own 2007 staffing model shows that several thousand
additional CBP officers and agriculture specialists are needed
at our ports of entry. NTEU has repeatedly and continues to
call on and ask for help from Congress for an increase of at
least 4,000 new CBP officers in order for CBP to achieve this
dual mission.
In the past, CBP staffing shortages at the ports has been
exacerbated by challenges in retaining staff, contributing to
an increasing number of CBP personnel vacancies. CBP and
Congress are to be commended for taking two steps at the urging
of NTEU to greatly improve recruitment and retention of CBP
personnel at the ports.
In 2008, Congress prospectively provided to CBP officers
the same law enforcement retirement benefits that other armed
uniformed federal law enforcement officers receive. And just
last week, CBP administratively gave CBP officers and
agriculture specialists an increase in their journeyman pay
level from a GS-11 to a GS-12. Both of these measures were hard
won and well deserved.
NTEU believes that an initiative of the previous
administration that consolidated the roles and responsibilities
of the CBP inspectional workforce at the ports of entry, which
they call One Face at the Border, has actually resulted in a
large expansion of the duties of each officer and has led to
the dilution of the customs, immigration and agriculture
inspection specializations, thereby threatening the quality of
cargo inspections. We believe that inspection specialization
should be reinstituted in this workforce.
NTEU also recognizes that infrastructure impediments plague
the operations at the land ports of entry and contribute to
wait times and to costly delays and secure movement of cargo.
Many infrastructure improvements are already underway at the
U.S. land ports of entry, but all infrastructure projects take
years to plan, to fund, and to implement, while increasing the
number of CBP front-line personnel to address cargo security at
the ports would bring immediate results.
In conclusion, NTEU agrees with a leading report on CBP's
challenges and opportunities that says that the U.S. ports of
entry have been underfunded and understaffed for years. And we
recommend the following: One, fill all vacancies and increase
CBP officer and agriculture specialist staffing to those levels
in CBP's own staffing model and has been recommended--as has
been recommended by the Homeland Security Advisory Council
report to the secretary.
Two, fully staff all existing lanes at the ports of entry
to capacity. Three, end the One Face at the Border initiative
and re-establish specialization of prior inspectional
functions.
Four, extend the GS-12 journeyman pay to CBP personnel not
included in the recent increase. Five, extend law enforcement
officer retirement benefits to the CBP personnel not included
in the 2008 legislation. And, six, require CBP to submit yearly
workplace staffing models that include optimal staffing
requirements to fully staff all of the lanes at every port of
entry.
Thank you, and I would be glad to answer any questions you
have.
[The statement of Ms. Kelley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colleen M. Kelley
Chairman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, I would like to thank the
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on cargo security at the
land ports of entry. As President of the National Treasury Employees
Union (TEU), I have the honor of leading a union that represents over
22,000 frontline Customs and Border Protection Officer, CBP Agriculture
Specialists, CBP CBP Seized Property Specialists, and CBP Trade
Operations, Revenue, legal and administrative personnel who are
stationed at 327 land, sea and air ports of entry (POEs) across the
United States, 15 Preclearance offices in Canada and the Caribbean and
CBP headquarters.
CBP enforces the import and export laws and regulations of the U.S.
federal government and conducts immigration policy and programs. Ports
also perform agriculture inspections to protect the U.S. from potential
carriers of animal and plant pests, or diseases that could cause
serious damage to America's crops, livestock, pets, and the
environment. NTEU-represented CBP Officers, CBP Agriculture
Specialists, and CBP trade personnel are our nation's first line of
defense in the wars on terrorism and drugs, conteraband smuggling,
human trafficking, agricultural pests, and animal disease while at the
same time facilitating legitimate international trade and travel.
On a typical day based on fiscal 2008 data, CBP Officers, CBP
Agriculture Specialists and CBP trade personnel at the POEs arrested 73
suspected criminals, executed 614 refusals of entry, intercepted 76
fraudulent documents--1 for terrorism related/national security
concerns; processed 1.09 million passengers and pedestrians, processed
331,000 privately owned vehicles, processed 70,451 truck, rail, and sea
containers, processed $90.4 million in fees, duties and tariffs, seized
more than 7,621 pounds of illegal drugs, seized $295,829 in undeclared
and illicit currency and intercepted nearly 4,125 prohibited
agricultural meat, plant materials or animal products and 435
agricultural pests.
LAND PORTS OF ENTRY
The U.S. has 5,000 miles of land border with Canada and 1,900 miles
of land border with Mexico. Most travelers enter the U.S. through the
nation's 166 land border ports of entry. About two-thirds of travelers
are foreign nationals and bout one-third are returning U.S. citizens.
The vast majority arrive by vehicle. The purpose of the passenger
primary inspection process is to determine if the person is a U.S.
citizen or alien, and if alien, whether the alien is entitled to enter
the U.S. In general, CBP Officers are to question travelers about their
nationality and purpose of their visit, whether they have anything to
declare, and review the travel documents the traveler is required to
present.
Each day CBP Officers inspect more than 1.1 million passengers and
pedestrians, including many who reside in border communities who cross
legally and contribute to the economic prosperity of our country and
our neighbors. At the U.S. land borders, approximately two percent of
travelers crossing the border are responsible for nearly 48 percent of
all cross-border trips. At the land ports, passenger primary
inspections are expected to be conducted in less than one minute.
According to CBP, for regular lanes the average inspection time per
vehicle is 30 to 45 seconds during which CBP Officers should handle
documents for all vehicle occupants and, if necessary, detain and
transfer suspected violators to secondary inspection. For FAST truck
lanes, the average processing time is 15 to 20 seconds. (``CBP:
Challenges and Opportunities'' Memo prepared by Armand Peschard-
Sverdrup for: Mexico's Ministry of the Economy: U.S.-Mexico Border
Facilitation working Group, January 2008, page 5.)
Yearly, CBP Officers and CBP Agriculture Specialists process more
than 133 million conveyances--truck and rail containers--at the land
ports located along the 7,500 miles of land borders between the United
States and its North American neighbors.
Out of the total 327 official POEs, currently on 24 major land POEs
are situated on the Mexico-U.S. border: six in California, seven in
Arizona, one in New Mexico and ten in Texas. On the Canadian-U.S.
border there are 150 land POEs have a series of dedicated lanes for
processing commercial traffic, passenger vehicles, pedestrians and in
some cases rail crossings.
Between the U.S. and Mexico, 68.4 percent of the total commercial
two-way truck trade flow crossed through three land POEs--Laredo, El
Paso and Otay Mesa. In rail traffic, trade is heavily concentrated
(97.8%) in five rail POEs--Laredo, Eagle Pass, El Paso, Nogales, and
Brownsville (Facilitating Legal Commerce and Transit 2009 Memo Prepared
by Armand Peschard-Sverdrup for the Pacific Council/COMEXI Joint Task
Force on Re-thinking the Mexico-U.S. Border: Seeking Cooperative
Solutions to Common Problems, page 2).
Each year, 45 million vehicles cross into the United States from
Canada. Most of the trucks use 22 principal border crossings. By 2020,
the volume of truck traffic is projected to grow to 19.2 million per
year, an increase of 63% from 11.8 million in 1999. The six highest-
volume crossings on the Canada-U.S. border handled almost 90% of the
value and three-quarters of the tonnage and truck trips. The six
highest U.S.-Canada POEs are Ambassador Bridge (Detroit, Michigan),
Peace Bridge (Buffalo, new York), Blue Water Bridge (Michigan),
Lewiston-Queenston Bridge (New York), Blaine (Washington), and
Champlain (New York). (Truck Freight Crossing the Canada-U.S. Border,
September 2002, page 2, 6.)
Cargo security, that is, preventing the flow of arms, drugs, other
contraband, pirated merchandise, and undeclared cash, and invasive
agricultural items, while at the same time facilitating trade and the
legal movement of people as efficiently as possible is a daily
challenge for CBP Officers and Agriculture Specialists at the land
POEs.
Border Violence at U.S.-Mexico Land Ports:
In the last year, a new challenge also confronts CBP personnel at
the southwest land POEs. An epidemic of violence has erupted right
across the U.S. southern border in Mexico due to an increase in Mexican
drug cartel activity there and the crackdown on drug and human
traffickers by the Mexican government. Drug violence in northern Mexico
has skyrocketed with more than 13,800 homicides since January 2008.
This violence is fueled by arms smuggling and bulk cash drug proceeds
transiting south from the U.S. The incidence of violence is escalating
daily at or near U.S.-Mexico POEs. On October 9 and again on October
19, a victim of cartel violence was strung up at an overpass between
the U.S. and Mexico border and three weeks ago, CBP Officers confronted
with speeding vehicles running the port has to fire on three vans
filled with over 70 illegal immigrants at the San Ysidro POE.
NTEU is providing information to Congress and the Administration to
help assess security equipment and other needs to address the increased
threat to CBP personnel at the southern border. Safety of CBP Officers
at the ports of entry is a major concern. Appropriate facilities,
staffing and equipment are necessary at the southern land ports to
ensure CBP Officers' safety.
The FY 2010 DHS funding bill includes $8.1 million for 65 CBP
Officers and 8 support staff positions to be dedicated to ``Combating
Southbound Firearms and Currency Smuggling.'' NTEU believes that this
staffing increase is insufficient to address the staffing needs at
southern ports of entry and well below the 1,600 additional personnel
and 400 canine teams sought by the Senate authorizing committee in its
FY2010 funding request.
Also, the last Administration fell down on the job of inspecting
outbound traffic through U.S. and ports and not all U.S.-Mexico
passenger vehicle, rail and truck port crossing are staffed or equipped
to conduct southbound inspections. Rightfully, the new Administration
is focused on putting more resources into southbound inspections to
help curb arms and bulk cask trafficking into Mexico.
Cargo Security Challenges
Cross-border commercial operators are acutely concerned about wait
times and costs of delay at the land POEs. Wait times differ across
POEs and vary depending on whether the congestion involves pedestrians,
passenger vehicles, trucks or railcars and whether the ports
participate in expedited crossing programs such as SENTRI for people or
FAST (Free and Secure Trade) lanes for trucks and railcars that are
certified as compliant with the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) agreement. Wait times also vary with the day of the
week and the time of day and holidays on either side of the border.
Currently, not all available lanes are staffed to capacity. Antiquated
port infrastructure and CBP personnel staffing shortages contribute
directly to wait times at the land POEs.
NTEU believes that there is no way you can speed up the inspection
process in which CBP Officers are currently conducting primary
inspections 30 to 40 seconds without increasing staffing. NTEU's
position was confirmed on October 1, 2009, by a draft report of the
Southwest Border Task Force created by Homeland Security Secretary
Janet Napolitano and reported by the Associated Press that recommends
the ``federal government should hire more Customs [and Border
Protection] officers.''
The task force led by former director of the FBI and CIA, William
Webster, was created in June 2009 to study the balancing of security
concerns with the need to facilitate trade between the U.S. and Mexico.
According to the report, as of July 2009, 5,586 Customs Officers worked
on the Southwest border and the fiscal 2009 DHS appropriations bill
includes funds to hire only 212 additional CBP Officers.
The report echoes the finding of the Border-Facilitation Working
Group (The U.S.-Mexico Border Facilitation Working Group was created
during the bilateral meeting between President George W. Bush and
President Felipe Calderon held in Merida in March 2007.) ``In order to
more optimally operate the various ports of entry, CBP needs to
increase the number of CBP Officers. According to its own estimate, the
lack of human resources only for the San Ysdiro POE is in the
``hundreds'' and the CBP Officer need at all ports of entry located
along the border with Mexico is in the ``thousands.'' (``CBP:
Challenges and Opportunities'' page 1 and 2. Memo prepared by Armand
Preschard-Sverdrup for: Mexico's Ministry of the Economy: U.S.-Mexico
Border Facilitation Working Group, January 2008.)
NTEU strongly supports the findings of the September 2009 Homeland
Security Advisory Council draft recommendation to increase CBP staffing
at the POEs.
CBP STAFFING SHORTAGES
The most recent public data that NTEU has regarding CBP staffing
needs at the POEs is from a report that Congress requested from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled Border Security:
Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our
Nation's Ports of Entry (GAO-08-219), on November 5, 2007.
The conclusions of this report echo what NTEU has been saying for
years:
CBP needs several thousand additional CBP Officers and
Agriculture Specialists at its ports of entry.
Not having sufficient staff contributes to morale
problems, fatigue, and safety issues for CBP Officers.
Staffing challenges force ports to choose between port
operations and providing training.
CBP's onboard staffing level is below budgeted levels,
partly due to high attrition, with ports of entry losing
officers faster than they can hire replacements.
In order to assess CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture Specialists
staffing needs, Congress, in its FY 07 DHS appropriations conference
report, directed CBP to submit by January 23, 2007 a resource
allocation model for current and future year staffing requirements.
In July 2007, CBP provided GAO with the results of the staffing
model. ``The model's results showed that CBP would need up to several
thousand additional CBP officers and agricultural specialists at its
ports of entry.'' (See GAO-08-219, page 31) CBP has determined that
data from the staffing model are law enforcement sensitive and has not
shared this data with NTEU.
IMPACT OF STAFFING SHORTAGES
According to GAO, ``At seven of the eight major ports we visited,
officers and managers told us that not having sufficient staff
contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support and
safety issue when officers inspect travelers--increasing the potential
that terrorists, inadmissible travelers and illicit goods could enter
the country.'' (See GAO-08-219, page 7.)
``Due to staffing shortages, ports of entry rely on overtime to
accomplish their inspection responsibilities. Double shifts can result
in officer fatigue. . .officer fatigue caused by excessive overtime
negatively affected inspections at ports of entry. On occasion,
officers said they are called upon to work 16-hour shifts, spending
long stints in primary passenger processing lanes in order to keep
lanes open, in part to minimize traveler wait times. Further evidence
of fatigue came from officers who said that CBP officers call in sick
due to exhaustion, in part to avoid mandatory overtime, which in turn
exacerbates the staffing challenges faced by the ports.'' (See GAO-08-
219, page 33.)
Staffing shortages have also reduced the number of CBP Officers
available to conduct more in depth secondary inspections. In the past,
there were three inspectors in secondary processing for every one
inspector in primary processing. Now there is a one to one ration. This
has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of illegal cargo
seizures. For example, at the Port of Sweet Grass, Montana , from 2000
through 2007, there has been a 59% reduction in the number of seizures
of illegal drugs, hazardous imports and other contraband and at the
Port of Blaine, Washington as of August 2006, there were 192 narcotics
and other seizures, while by August 2001, there were 434 narcotics and
other seizures. Port-by-port seizure data is deemed law enforcement
sensitive and it is now very difficult to compare number of seizures at
a port from year to years.
Without adequate personnel at secondary, wait times back up and
searches are not done to specifications. This is a significant cargo
security issue. For example, a full search of one vehicle for
counterfeit currency will take two officers on average a minimum of 45
minutes. Frequently, only one CBP Officer is available for this type of
search and this type of search will then take well over an hour.
Finally, NTEU has been told that when wait times in primary
inspection becomes excessive in the opinion of the agency, CBP Officers
are instructed to query only one occupant of a vehicle and to suspend
COMPEX (Compliance Enforcement Exams) and other automated referral to
secondary programs during these periods. This is an improvement over
the past practice of lane flushing, but is still a significant security
issue. Also, when primary processing lane become backed up, passenger
vehicles are diverted to commercial lanes for processing. At the Port
of Blaine, for example, on heavy traffic days, CBP Officers often route
private vehicles through the commercial cargo facility where the lanes
and the computers are not set up for private vehicle inspections. Truck
drivers have complained that someone is going to get killed when they
do this because they often cannot see the cars maneuvering around them.
CBP Officer Staffing:
NTEU was pleased that Congress, in its FY 2007 DHS appropriations
conference report, directed CBP to submit a workplace staffing model
for current and future year staffing requirements. For years, NTEU has
said that CBP needs several thousand additional CBP Officers and CBP
Agriculture Specialists at its ports of entry; that insufficient
staffing and scheduling abuses are contributing to morale problems,
fatigue, and safety issues for CBP Officers and CBP Agriculture
Specialists, and that CBP is losing personnel faster than it can hire
replacements.
CBP's staffing model concluded ``that the agency needs 1,600 to
4,000 more officers and agricultural specialists at the nation's air,
land and sea ports, or a boost of 7 to 25 percent, the GAO reported.''
(Washington Post, November 6, 2007)
NTEU is disappointed that the FY 2010 DHS appropriations conference
report increasing new hires for CBP Border Patrol Agents from 17,499 to
20,000--an increase of 1,500, but no increase in frontline CBP Officer
or CBP Agriculture Specialist new hires.
NTEU agrees with the findings of the Border Facilitation Working
Group, ``when you look at the budgets that are normally handed out to
CBP to POEs, one can conclude that this unit has been traditionally
under-funded.'' (See CBP: Challenges and Opportunities, page 1.)
Again NTEU concurs with the AP-reported September 2009 Homeland
Security Advisory Council Southwest Border Task Force Draft Report that
calls on Congress to authorize funding to increase staffing levels for
CBP Officers. NTEU urges Congress to authorize funding for CBP Officers
and CBP Agriculture Specialists at the levels specified in CBP's own
workforce staffing model, in addition to funding an increase in CBP
Officer staffing needed to expand outbound inspection and address the
increasing violence at the U.S.-Mexico border.
NTEU also strongly supports legislation introduced by
Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) H.R. 1655, ``Putting Our
Resources Towards Security (PORTS) Act.'' Representative Reyes' PORTS
Act would authorize 5,000 additional CBP Officers and 1,200 additional
CBP AS new hires, in addition to 350 border security support personnel
at the nation's 327 official ports of entry over the next five years.
In addition, the bill authorizes funding for infrastructure
improvements at the existing ports of entry to repairs and improve the
gateways into our country.
CBP Agriculture Specialists:
In 2008, NTEU was certified as the labor union representative of
CBP Agriculture Specialists as the result of an election to represent
all Customs and Border Protection employees that had been consolidated
into one bargaining unit by merging the port of entry inspection
functions of Customs, INS and the Animal and Plant Inspection Service
as part of DHS' One Face at the Border initiative.
According to GAO-08-219 page 31, CBP's staffing model ``showed that
CBP would need up to several thousand additional CBP Officers and
agriculture specialists at its ports of entry.'' And GAO testimony
issued on October 3, 2007 stated that, ``as of mid-August 2007, CBP had
2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared with 3,154 specialists
needed, according to staffing model.'' (See GAO-08-96 page 1.)
NTEU urges Congress to authorize and fund the additional 2,274 CBP
Officers and the 880 CBP Agriculture Specialist needed according to
CBP's own staffing model.
Also, NTEU continues to have concerns with CBP's stated intention
to change its staffing model design to reflect only allocations of
existing resources and no longer account for optimal staffing levels to
accomplish their mission.
Finally, NTEU strongly supports Section 805 of S. 3623, the FY 2009
DHS Authorization bill introduced in the Senate last Congress, that
through oversight and statutory language, makes clear that the
agricultural inspection mission is a priority and increase CBP
Agriculture Specialist staffing, impose an Agriculture Specialist
career ladder and specialized chain of command. H.R. 3623 in Section
815 also extends CBP Officer enhanced retirement to their ranks and to
CBP Seized Property Specialists.
Hiring of Supervisors v. Hiring of Frontline CBP Officers:
NTEU continues to have concerns that CBP is continuing to increase
the number supervisors when a much greater need exists for new
frontline hires. In terms of real numbers, since CBP was created, the
number of new managers has increased at a much higher rate than the
number of new frontline CBP hires. According to GAO, the number of CBP
Officers has increased from 18,001 in October 2003 to 18,382 in
February 2006, an increase of 381 officers. In contrast, GS 12-15 CBP
supervisors on board as of October 2003 were 2,262 and in February 2006
there were 2,731, an increase of 462 managers over the same of time.
This is a 17% increase in CPB managers and only 2% increase in the
number of frontline CBP Officers. (See GAO-06-751R, page 11).
In 2009, CBP reports that there are 19,726, CBP Officers of which
16,360 are bargaining unit frontline employees--a ratio of one
supervisor for every five CBP Officers. And according to CBP data, the
current number of CBP Agriculture Specialists staff is 2,277, of which
312 are non-frontline supervisors--a ratio of one supervisor for every
six CBP Agriculture Specialists.
ONE FACE AT THE BORDER
As part of the establishment of the Bureau of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) in March 200, DHS brought together employees
from three departments of government--Treasury, Justice and Agriculture
to operate at the 327 ports of entry. On September 2, 2003, CBP
announced the One Face at the Border Initiative. The initiative was
designed to eliminate the pre-9/11 separation of immigration, customs,
and agriculture functions at US land, sea and air ports of entry.
Inside CBP, three different inspector occupations--Customs Inspector,
Immigration Inspector and Agriculture Inspector were combined into a
single inspectional postition--the CBP Officer.
The priority mission of the CBP Officer is to prevent terrorist and
terrorist weapons from entering the U.S., while simultaneously
facilitating legitimate trade and travel--as well as upholding the laws
and performing the traditional missions of the three legacy agencies,
the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and the Animal, Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS).
This change in job description and job duties established by the
One Face at the Border initiative resulted in the Herculean task of
retraining and cross training newly created CBP Officers. It became
clear after several months that Agriculture Specialists job duties and
background was significantly unique to establish a CBP Agriculture
Specialist job series 401, separate from the CBP Officer job series,
1895.
In practice, the major reorganization of the roles and
responsibility of the inspectional workforce as a result of the One
Face at the Border initiative, has resulted in job responsibility
overload and dilution of the customs, immigration and agriculture
inspection specializations and in weakening the quality of passenger
and cargo inspections.
In addition, the processes, procedures and skills are very
different at land, sea and air ports, as are the training and skill
sets needed for passenger processing, cargo and agriculture inspection.
Under the One Face at the Border initiative, former INS agents that are
experts in identifying counterfeit foreign visas are now at seaports
reviewing bills of lading from foreign container ships, while expert
seaport Customs inspectors are now reviewing passports at airports.
It is apparent that CBP saw its One Face at the Border initiative
as a means to ``increase management flexibility'' without increasing
staffing levels. According to CBP, ``there will be no extra cost to
taxpayers. CBP plans to manage this initiative within existing
resources. The ability to combine these three inspectional disciplines
and to cross-train frontline officers will all CBP to more easily
handle projected workload increases and stay within present budgeted
levels.'' This has not been the case. The knowledge and skills required
to perform the expanded inspectional tasks under the One Face at the
Border initiative have also increased the workload of the CBP Officer.
NTEU believes the One Fact at the Border initiative has failed to
integrate the different border functions is sought to make
interchangeable, because they are not. The Customs, Immigration and
Agriculture functions performed at our borders enforce different laws
and require different training and skills. For these reasons, NTEU
urges CBP to reinstate Customs and Immigration specializations, as it
did with the Agriculture specialization, at the POEs.
NTEU suggests that the Committees include the following provision
in any upcoming CBP authorization.
SEC. _. ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIZED OFFICER OCCUPATIONS----The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish within the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection two distinct inspectional specialization
occupations for Customs and Border Protection Officers at the air, sea
and land ports of entry; an immigration inspection specialization and a
customs inspection specialization.
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION ISSUES
Reported staffing shortages are exacerbated by challenges in
retaining staff, contributing to an increasing number of vacant
positions nationwide. ``CBP's onboard staffing level is below its
budgeted level. . .the gap between the budgeted staffing level and the
number of officers onboard is attributable in part to high attrition,
with ports of entry losing officers faster than they can hire
replacements. Through March 2007, CBP data shows that, on average, 52
CBP Officers left the agency each 2-week pay period in fiscal 2007, up
from 34 officers in fiscal year 2005. . .Numerous reasons exist for
officer attrition.'' (See GAO-08-219, page 34.)
``Aside from the budgetary constraints confronting CBP, there have
also been dysfunctional ties within the civil service system of worker
classification that applies to CBP officers. Because CBP officers were
not classified as law enforcement officers, they were automatically
excluded from eligibility for higher salary levels, benefits, and early
retirement. CBP officers, for example, are normally ranked as GS-11-
level employees, a level that is considered a ``journeyman grade``and
provides a salary that ranges between $54,000 and $70,000. Conversely,
officers in other law enforcement agencies--such as Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Marshals Service--have the
opportunity to ascend to GS-12 or GS-13 levels, in which the salary
range is $70,000--$100,000. Moreover, CBP officers tend to have better
prospects for promotion outside of CBP--in such agencies as Immigration
and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Marshals Service--than within CBP
itself.'' (See Facilitating Legal Commerce and Transit by Armand
Peschard-Sverdrup, page 10).
NTEU is pleased to commend Congress and the Department for
addressing these two major CBP Officer recruitment and retention
challenges--lack of law enforcement officer retirement status and a
lower rate of journeyman pay with respect to most other federal law
enforcement occupations. In July 2006, Congress extended enhanced
retirement prospectively to CBP Officers and on October 14, 2009
announced an increase in the rate of CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture
Specialists journeyman pay from GS-11 to GS-12. It is unfortunate that
this pay increase and enhanced retirement coverage was not extended to
the 120 armed, uniformed CBP Seized Property Specialists and the pay
increase was not given to the nearly 400 CBP Officers (enforcement).
NTEU is working to remedy these inequities in pay and benefits for CBP
SPS and CBP Officers (enforcement.)
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES
``The average land POE is 40--45 years old. Urban sprawl has
enveloped some of these ports, rendering them effectively landlocked.
For example, the port of San Ysidro currently has 21 lanes, but only 4
traffic lanes feed all the traffic to the booths; in addition, local
street traffic intersects with border crossing traffic. Over time,
eroding infrastructure and limits on the availability of land--along
with projected growth in the legal movement of goods and people
stemming from the continued deepening of economic integration--will
require both governments to erect new infrastructure.'' (See
Facilitating Legal Commerce and Transit by Armand Peschard-Sverdrup,
page 4).
Infrastructure issues vary from port to port. NTEU does not dispute
that the infrastructure problems at the POEs need to be addressed. But
all port infrastructure solutions, including constructing additional 24
hour port facilities, will take years to achieve. What is necessary
today is to staff all existing lanes to capacity. Without adequate
staffing to achieve this, excessive overtime practices, as well as
increased wait times, will continue.
Also, the observations and suggestions of frontline CBP Officers
should be taken into account when planning new infrastructure
solutions. For example, since before 9/11, the lack of a manned egress
point for the Cargo Inspection facility at the Port of Blaine has been
noted by numerous port runner incidents. After years of lobbying by
Officers, a manned egress booth is being built as we speak. But, there
is still no way to physically stop a vehicle and driver who want to run
the port. There are no gates, no tire shredders, or deployable bollards
at the new egress point. Pulling into secondary is still largely
dependent on the honor system. A manned egress point will intercept the
lost drivers, and the drivers who can't understand instructions from
the primary officer, but it won't stop deliberate port runners.
I am told that there is a similar egress lane configuration and
port runner issue at the new Port of Champlain that is allowing
absconders to avoid stipulated secondary inspection.
Another concern is that the upcoming Winter Olympics in February
2010 will increase travel volume through the Blaine POE. According to
CBP Officers, there is room for two or more additional traffic lanes at
the Pacific Highway crossing. On busy weekends, CBP routes cars through
the truck area forcing them to maneuver around semi trucks. Can
something be done to get these two lanes in place prior to the
Olympics?
TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
Customs and Border Protection relies on technology to process
border crossings with greater efficiency and speed. To compensate for
the inadequacy of personnel at land POEs CBP is relying more on
technology, such as Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) and Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID).
Technological advances are important, but without the training and
experience, technology alone would have failed to stop the millennium
bomber at Port Angeles, Washington. Today, primary processing is
increasingly dependent on technology. CBPOs are instructed to clear
vehicles within thirty seconds. That is just enough time to run the
license through the plate reader and check identifications on a data
base. If the documents are in order the vehicle is waived through. The
majority of a CBPO's time is spent processing I-94s documents non-
resident aliens need to enter the U.S.
Also, technology improvements can't overcome deficiencies in port
infrastructure. For example at the Blaine POE, CBP management recently
moved the primary lane vehicle queue within 10 feet of the primary
booth in order to speed processing time an average of eight seconds per
car. This creates a great deal of confusion locating Radiation Portal
Alerts, Traveler Enforcement and Compliance System (TECS) hits, and
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) hits from the RFID technology
as two or three cars are now past the RPM detectors and RFID readers
moves these vehicles into the ``fatal funnel``for any ``Armed and
Dangerous'' encounter in primary. Earlier this month, there was an NCIC
hit that the officers responded to on primary. They took proper cover
behind the car in primary and extracted the occupants only to later
discover that the NCIC hit was in queue behind the car stopped in
primary. The stacking of vehicles in the queue just prior to the
primary booth is creating problems for officers locating and isolating
radiation portal alerts. The price of these eight seconds could be very
high if Officers miss a vehicle smuggling radioactive materials or an
``Anned'and Dangerous'' encounter goes bad and innocent people are
trapped in the cross fire with nowhere to retreat.
Expedited inspection programs such as FAST work very well for the
participants in these programs in that their clearance process is
reduced. CBP, however, needs a higher level of verification of FAST
participants because of the higher risk their expedited clearance
creates. For example, at the Blaine POE, many of CBP Officer's
narcotics seizures have come out of FAST approved Carriers and
Consignees. Expedited inspection programs such as FAST and C-TPAT,
require additional CBP Officers to conduct these verifications.
NTEU RECOMMENDATIONS
One of the key goals of the new administration's senior management
is to earn the respect and trust of frontline workers. To that end,
NTEU is pleased that a CBP Commissioner has been recently nominated.
Federal employees represented by NTEU look forward to working with
the new CBP leadership that will provide agencies with the staffing,
tools and resources they need to accomplish their missions and will
listen to employees' ideas about how to do the work better.
As noted by DHS's own Advisory Council headed by William Webster,
for too long, CBP at the POEs has been unfunded and understaffed. DHS
employees represented by NTEU are capable and committed to the varied
missions of the agency from border control to the facilitation of trade
into and out of the United States. They are proud of their part in
keeping our country free from terrorism, our neighborhoods safe from
drugs and our economy safe from illegal trade. The American public
expects its borders and ports be properly defended.
Congress must show the public that it is serious about protecting
the homeland by:
fully funding CBP ``salaries and expenses at the
POEs'' to hire more CBP personnel at the POEs as recommended by
the draft September 2009 Homeland Security Advisory Council
Report and Recommendations;
fully staff all existing lanes at the POEs to
capacity;
ending the One Face at the Border initiative by
reestablishing CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture Specialist
inspection specialization at our 327 ports of entry;
extending LEO coverage to armed, uniformed CBP Seized
Property Specialists and uniformed CBP Agriculture Specialists,
and
extending GS-12 journeyman pay to CBP personnel not
included in the recent GS-12 journeyman pay increase--CBP trade
operations personnel, CBP Seized Property Specialists and CBP
Agriculture Specialists; and
authorizing CBP to submit yearly workplace staffing
models that include optimal staffing requirements for each POE
to fully staff all lanes and reduce wait times.
Again, I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
be here today on behalf of the 150,000 employees represented by NTEU
and the 22,000 CBP personnel the ports of entry.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Ms. Kelley.
I will now recognize Mr. Russell to summarize his statement
in 5 minutes or less. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN RUSSELL, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, CELADON GROUP,
INC., INDIANAPOLIS, INC., (REPRESENTING AMERICAN TRUCKING
ASSOCIATIONS)
Mr. Russell. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, members
of the committee.
My name is Steven Russell, and I am chairman and CEO of
Celadon Group, based in Indianapolis, Indiana. We are a U.S.
trucking company that provides transportation services within
the U.S., as well as to Canada and to Mexico. Celadon was the
first motor carrier to be approved by CBP to participate in the
C-TPAT program in 2003, as well as ACE program. Today, I am
appearing on behalf of the American Trucking Association.
First, I want to commend the committee for getting the
SAFE, SAFE Trucker Act passed by the House. What that did was
eliminate the need for drivers to file various requests for
HAZMAT, various kinds of approvals, and we thank you from the
bottom of our heart, because it is meant a lot to our drivers.
The trucking industry has worked closely with government
agencies to increase security and improve trade facilitation.
After 9/11, C-TPAT was developed, establishing a more robust
and comprehensive security program. C-TPAT is an excellent
model for ensuring the security of our international supply
chain. It requires investing resources to develop security
processes and systems which are closely verified by CBP.
The growing concern of C-TPAT members is some drastic
measures that CBP has taken when a single truckload of
contraband is found in a C-TPAT truck. CBP immediately suspends
the carrier and turns off its identifying number. This number
allows the trucking company's customers to know if the carrier
is still in good standing with C-TPAT.
Before canceling a carrier's C-TPAT privileges due a single
incident, CBP should consider first investigating how the
illegal cargo got into the conveyance. Most trailers that cross
the border have one shipper's goods in it, and basically the
shipper loads it, packs it, and then seals it. It is important
to recognize when a carrier gets suspended from C-TPAT not only
does it affect the carrier, but its C-TPAT customers are also
impacted.
We also want CBP to differentiate between a single security
incident and a systematic security issue.
With regard to FAST lanes, a related program to C-TPAT is
the Free and Secure Trade program, or FAST. Basically, FAST
requires our drivers to undergo a thorough background check to
access the FAST lanes when transporting C-TPAT cargo.
I urge this committee to work on other relevant--and work
with other relevant congressional committees to improve border
infrastructure by developing true FAST lanes, because right
now, essentially, it is only the last few hundred yards, which
means the lines are long to get through.
Overall, I think we have established a very strong
partnership between industry and government agencies to meet
security challenges at our borders. However, with any
partnership or marriage, success can be achieved when both
partners are working together to achieve a common goal.
CBP could be somewhat more flexible in working with
partners to correct security breaches and in developing
security measures that will complement partner-business models
while working towards our common goal of securing the supply
chain. By improving border infrastructure and information
collection systems, in addition to trust-but-verify programs,
security at our land borders will continue to improve.
I thank you for your attention, and I would be happy to
answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Russell
Introduction
Madame Chair Sanchez, Ranking Member Souter, and members of the
Subcommittee, my name is Steve Russell, and I am Chairman, CEO and
founder of Celadon Group, Inc., headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana.
Celadon is primarily a truckload carrier with approximately 3,000 power
units, or tractors, and 10,000 53' trailers and about 3,900 employees.
Celadon generates about forty percent of our business from the movement
of freight across our land-borders with Canada and Mexico, while sixty
percent of our business is generated domestically. Celadon is one of
the top truckload carriers in North America serving a variety of
customers providing time-sensitive cargo shipments through trailer
``door-to-door``transport throughout North America. Celadon has been
recognized for our safety record as well as for our environmental
programs. For the second consecutive year, Celadon won the top award
from the Environmental Protection Agency's (``EPA'') Smartway program,
as a result of our achievements in reducing emissions through various
innovative programs.
Celadon is also a certified and validated member of the Customs--
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (``C-TPAT'') program, and we were
the first motor carrier approved for participation in the Automated
Commercial Environment's (``ACE'') electronic manifest system. Both of
these programs, as described further below, play an important role in
improving the security of international commerce at our land borders.
Celadon is also an ISO 9001 certified company and plays an integral
role in our customers' supply chain management process serving a
variety of high-intensity production lines, distribution channels, and
customer direct traffic.
Today I appear on behalf of the American Trucking Associations,
Inc. federation of motor carriers, state trucking associations, and
national trucking conferences created to promote and protect the
interests of the trucking industry. The ATA federation has over 37,000
member companies representing every type and class of motor carrier
operation.
First and foremost, I want to thank this Committee, specifically
your leadership madam chair together with Congressmen Thompson and
Lungren, and Congresswoman Jackson-Lee, in getting the SAFE Trucker Act
of 2009 introduced and passed by the House of Representatives. SAFE
Trucker is critical to the men and women of the trucking industry, by
bringing relief from redundant, unnecessary and expensive multiple
fingerprint-based background checks. Again, on behalf of the three
million commercial drivers who transport America's cargo, we thank you
for your leadership and support in passing the SAFE Trucker Act.
I commend the Subcommittee for holding this hearing today to gather
information on the status of our land border ports of entry. The
trucking industry supports efforts to address and eliminate to the
greatest extent possible any threats posed to our nation's security,
including establishing the necessary infrastructure, both physical--
i.e. ``bricks and mortar``--and implementing technologies, to improve
the clearance and throughput of trade with the highest standards of
security. At a similar hearing two years ago, I focused my comments on
three primary areas in relation to border operations:
Ongoing security programs involving trucking operations
across our borders with Canada and Mexico to ensure supply
chain security;
Implementing automated systems to improve the gathering and
analysis of data for targeting and release of cargo, people,
and equipment entering the U.S.; and,
Strengthening the relationships among the three North
American governments to develop joint border infrastructure and
improve information sharing mechanisms.
My comments today will update this Committee on the status of these
issues, in addition to discussing other critical aspects of cross-
border operations.
Background
Trucking continues to be a critical component of our country's
economy, and trucks continue to transport the majority of cross-border
trade with Canada and Mexico. However, compared to two years ago, today
we are facing the most challenging global economic conditions with a
significant negative impact on trucking operations.
Since 2007, freight levels have decreased dramatically:
domestically, the number of loads within the truckload sector has
decreased by more than 17 percent while revenue has decreased even
further by nearly 29 percent. In terms of cross-border trucking
operations, the value of trade transported by trucks with Canada has
declined nearly 30 percent, and about 18 percent with Mexico. For the
purpose of this hearing, it is important to keep in mind that this
precipitous drop in cross-border trade volumes means that we are not
seeing the same levels of trade that normally strain our border
facilities and personnel during better economic times.
However, this reduction in trade flows doesn't mean that trade has
stopped. Manufacturers, retailers, warehouses and, most importantly,
consumers, continue to count on trucks to get the goods and products
they need and use each and every day, transporting almost 70 percent of
the value of freight between the United States and Canada, and about 80
percent of the value of freight.\1\ The trucking industry is proud of
its role in delivering North America's freight and we will continue to
do so with the highest regard for security and efficiency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of
Transportation (2006).
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Today, we continue to work in partnership with our government
counterparts to improve the security and efficiency of cross-border
trucking operations. Our industry supports programs that help motor
carriers increase the security and safety of their operations,
especially if such programs can be implemented in an effective and
efficient manner and provide real security benefits. ATA believes that
the end goals of security and efficiency are not mutually exclusive.
Though it is impossible to achieve absolute security without bringing
trade to a standstill, we can greatly reduce the potential of being
targeted by our enemies by managing risk, increasing security awareness
among company personnel, and implementing simple cost-effective
security measures. In essence, we must continue to strive to establish
a ``security culture'' within our companies and we must continue to
improve our partnership and cooperation with our government
counterparts.
For many years, ATA has supported efforts to elevate the
coordination of human resources, infrastructure, and technology in
improving clearance systems and processes at our land borders. For
example, long gone are the days when our tractors and trailers were
literally drilled to inspect the inside of the conveyances--making our
equipment look like Swiss cheese and resulting in very costly repairs.
Now, through the use of Non-Intrusive Inspection (``NII'') systems, x-
rays and gamma rays are used to capture images of any anomalies within
our commercial vehicles. Such technological advances and tools have
improved CBP officers' enforcement capabilities while improving the
efficiency and throughput of commercial vehicles across our borders.
Cross-Border Security Programs
Security in cross-border operations pre-dates the 911 1 attacks on
our Nation due to the threat posed by drug and alien smugglers -a
threat that continues to challenge us, especially at our southern land
border. Through programs such as the Land-Border Carrier Initiative
Program (``LBCIP'') started in the mid 1990's trucking companies and
their drivers were certified to participate in this program after
undergoing audits and background checks. In return for participating in
the LBCIP, motor carriers gained expedited clearance of their cargo.
The LBCIP concept was upgraded immediately after 9/11 with the
creation of the C-TPAT program, which included the development of the
Free and Secure Trade (``FAST'') program specifically established for
motor carriers with cross-border operations in North America. The
overall goal of C-TPAT is to ensure the security of the entire
international supply chain: from overseas manufacturing operations, to
transportation providers, to entities such as importers, brokers, and
forwarders involved in the processing of cargo entering our country.
In order to participate in FAST, motor carriers must become C-TPAT
certified (See Appendix I for C-TPAT Minimum Security Criteria) and
their commercial drivers must complete an application and undergo a
background check through various databases. Once such steps have been
taken and verified, motor carriers benefit by receiving expedited
clearance of their equipment, driver, and cargo -as long as it belongs
to a C-TPAT importer -in addition to getting access to a dedicated
FAST-lane for use only by FAST participants.
The Need for FAST-Lanes at Ports of Entry
The biggest challenge trucking companies continue to face with the
program is the lack of ``true'' C-TPAT/FAST lanes--in essence, lanes
that extend far back from the port of entry, instead of FAST lanes that
begin only a few yards prior to arrival at the primary inspection
booth. This results in low-risk C-TPAT carriers being stuck in the same
traffic as non-C-TPAT certified carriers. Thus, C-TPAT certified motor
carriers with drivers who have undergone FAST background checks are not
getting the benefits that were promised for investing to comply with
the program.
I urge this Committee to consider alternatives for developing and
implementing extended FAST lanes to ensure the security of C-TPAT
operations by keeping these low risk vehicles moving and segregated
from regular traffic.
Suspension of C-TPAT Benefits: Single Incident vs. Systemic Problems
Another major challenge that motor carriers face regarding
participation in C-TPAT is the fact that a single security incident
that involves a motor carrier tends to result in the immediate
revocation of that C-TPAT status. Such a drastic measure takes place
before any investigation is undertaken to understand what led to the
security incident. For example, if during an inspection it is found
that a truck belonging to a C-TPAT carrier has illegal narcotics on
board, the motor carrier is suspended immediately without knowing if
the illegal cargo was place aboard the conveyance at the point of
loading or during the manufacturing process unbeknownst to the motor
carrier. It is simply unfair and unjust to hold the motor carrier
liable for a security breach that occurred at another point within the
supply chain.
ATA and its members have met with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (``CBP'') officials on repeated occasions to discuss our
concerns. ATA fully supports and applauds the efforts by the C-TPAT
office for an open dialogue with industry and working to improve the C-
TPAT program. They clearly recognize the security challenges faced by
cross-border trucking operations and have been extremely helpful in
trying to resolve industry concerns. However, our discussions have not
yet arrived at a ``justifiable'' suspension process for motor carriers
involved in a security incident.
ATA believes that the following steps should be considered and
taken prior to a motor carrier being suspended from C-TPAT due to a
security incident:
If this is the motor carrier's first security incident, CBP
should:
Not immediately suspend the motor carrier, and thus
it should not off' its Status Verification Interface
(``SVI'') number, until an investigation determines the
nature of the narcotics and at what point the illicit
cargo was introduced into the conveyance;
Consider putting the motor carrier on ``probation''
if the investigation demonstrates that the carrier was
not at fault. The ``probation``period can be lifted
once CBP is satisfied that the motor carrier has taken
steps to properly implement all the Minimum Security
Criteria and considered establishing applicable
recommended best practices to reduce the risks of
future security breaches;
If an investigation demonstrates a willful disregard on the
part of the motor carrier of the C-TPAT Minimum Security
Criteria, CBP could:
Suspend the motor carrier and turn off its SVI
number;
Require the motor carrier to reapply and undergo
again a full validation of the C-TPAT requirements
prior to being re-admitted to C-TPAT.
It is important for CBP, and for this Committee as well, to
recognize that C-TPAT motor carriers take their responsibilities very
seriously, and to recognize the challenging security environment that
cross-border operations can represent on a daily basis. I would like to
emphasize that no one is immune to the potential for ``bad'' actors
infiltrating our operations: neither private sector companies nor the
law enforcement agencies in charge of securing our border and
protecting our country. We all face the same risk. Therefore, a single
security incident should not result in a motor carrier being
automatically suspended unless an investigation demonstrates a
``systemic security'' problem and a lack of proper security measures by
the trucking company. Individual incidents, even if perpetrated by a
company employee, should not be treated as systemic problems.
Automated Clearance Programs
The trucking industry is also closely involved in the development
of information systems and technologies to facilitate enforcement
activities while at the same time expediting the movement of cargo
across our borders. ACE is a system that has been under development by
CBP for well over a decade, and is now fully deployed along our land
border ports of entry. ATA and many of its members worked on the design
and development of the ACE manifest data requirements necessary for the
transmission of data. The deployment of ACE is an important tool to
improve the efficiency for capturing trade data, clearing cargo
entering the US, and provides CBP an improved system for targeting,
risk analysis, and release of cargo. Although the ACE system has
suffered through a number of challenges, including service
interruptions, malfunctions of the in-bond system and of the FAST-ACE
interface, carriers are generally happy with the new e-manifest system.
CBP is also developing the International Trade Data System
(``ITDS'') as an integral part of ACE. The ITDS concept is simple:
Traders and carriers submit commercially based, standard electronic
data records through a single federal gateway for the import or export
of goods. As a single information gateway, ITDS distributes these
records to the interested federal trade agencies, such as CBP, the Food
and Drug Administration (``FDA''), DOT and others, for their
selectivity and risk assessment. In standardizing the process, ITDS
reduces the confusion and complexity of international trade, and speeds
the processing of goods, equipment and crews across our borders. ITDS
also benefits the government by providing more current and accurate
information for revenue, public health, statistical analyses, safety
and security activities, as well as significantly reducing data
processing development and maintenance costs.
The development and implementation of the is an essential component
in accelerating the flow of commerce while also improving the ability
of CBP to analyze and target data entries.
The trucking industry encourages the U.S. government, in
cooperation with both Canada and Mexico, to improve and to facilitate
the capture and exchange of information on goods and people crossing
our land borders. A large portion of the U.S. international trade and
immigration transactions generated every day occur from transactions
along our land borders. ATA recommends that the U.S. government move
forward with an aggressive in implementing both the Smart Border Accord
between the U.S. and Canada, and the 22 Point Plan between the U.S. and
Mexico, as well as implementing the recommendations established under
the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership.
Conclusion
The trucking industry believes that through NII technologies, C-
TPAT, ACE and industry initiatives, cross-border operations and the
international supply chain are becoming increasingly secure. C-TPAT and
FAST have created an excellent working relationship between industry
and government to jointly confront these challenges, but closer
cooperation and understanding between industry and government can yield
an even higher degree of security at our borders.
In summary, ATA raises the following issues for attention by this
Committee so we can continue to increase the security and efficiency
benefits of cross-border operations:
ATA encourages this Committee to work with other relevant
Congressional Committees to analyze funding to improve border
facilities and infrastructure. This is essential in ensuring a
smooth flow of legitimate travelers and commerce across our
borders while ensuring our national security.
Border infrastructure planning must incorporate the
development of access roads and lanes at our ports of
entry that are reserved solely for ``low and ``trusted-
travelers'' programs, such as FAST.
Such an analysis should consider an appropriate level
and mix of technology, equipment and personnel to
maximize the capabilities of border facilities.
CBP must establish clear, reasonable and manageable
procedures for suspending motor carriers from C-TPAT and
recognize the difference between ``single``security incidents
and ``systemic``security problems.
CBP/DHS must take a leading role among federal agencies in
managing systems and processes at our ports of entry,
especially with agencies outside of the DHS chain of command.
Though other federal agencies not within DHS have statutory
mandates requiring them to implement procedures for clearing
certain goods entering at U.S. ports of arrival (for example
FDA's implementation of the prior import notice requirements
under the Bioterrorism Act), these agencies should be required
to coordinate and work closely with CBP on the system.
ATA and motor carriers throughout North America are committed to
partnering with government and other sectors of our economy to improve
and ensure our country's national and economic security.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Russell. And I thank both of
the witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind each member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel. And now I will recognize myself
for a few questions.
Mr. Russell, I really enjoyed hearing specifically how you
described the important need to develop a security culture
within companies and subsequent need to improve cooperation
with the government. Can you describe CBP's security outreach
efforts to your industry? Can you give some insight into how
you educate your members on the issues that are important so
that we have a smoother ability to drive commerce, if you will,
across these borders.
Mr. Russell. Let me discuss that from a personal situation
at Celadon. We have about 4,000 employees. We run about 3,000
trucks and about 10,000 trailers.
Every one of our drivers is Highway Watch approved, which
means that basically they are trained by us to ensure that they
are looking for terrorist risks, et cetera. We also were the
first carrier that was C-TPAT and ACE. Basically, that was 6
years ago. We have been audited by the Department of Homeland
Security and stayed very focused on security from the
standpoint of America.
I think what you will find in the trucking--the American
Trucking Association is a focus on developing that culture and
a focus on developing that philosophy. Can we vouch for every
single owner-operator? No. But I believe that most of the more
significant companies in our industry follow the--basically the
philosophy espoused by the ATA and espoused by Celadon and
espoused by companies involved in international trade.
Ms. Sanchez. Because I have another question for you. What
could we further do at the land borders to expedite legitimate
cargo and legitimate companies, legitimate truckers, to get
across and not have to wait in lines? And in some cases, I have
seen long lines. In some cases, as Ms. Kelley says, the process
is pretty--you know, they are doing their part to make the
process fast as you go through, but sometimes the wait is
pretty long in these lines.
What can we do to bring the time to cross a border in a
legitimate way down? And are there any other frustrations with
respect to the whole process that you hear from the membership?
Mr. Russell. In January, I was having a tooth pulled, and
the orthodontist came in, gave me a shot of Novocain. And as he
finished giving me the Novocain, he said, ``I will be back in a
couple of minutes.'' And I looked at him, and I said, ``The
true test of someone in life isn't someone who can make an
asset into a bigger asset. It is somebody who can make a
liability into an asset.''
I said, ``Tell me something you have learned in life that
will make this experience positive, not negative for me.'' He
looked at me. He said, ``You have got to be kidding.'' I looked
at him, and I said, ``I am not kidding.'' And he thought for a
minute or two, and he said, ``I am not talking about your
tooth. I am talking about life.'' He said, ``Lean into the
pain. Don't run from it.''
That philosophy is one that I believe CBP is following. I
think, are there tweaks that can be done? Yes. In Laredo, for
example, it is--on weekends, the border is only open from 10
o'clock to 2 o'clock. Could that be extended? Absolutely. Can
there be more folks hired to make the process faster? Yes.
The biggest issue from an investment or a time standpoint
are these FAST lanes, because right now, a FAST driver who has
to pay to be FAST-approved, et cetera, the company has to
support it and all that, that essentially all he can do is sit
in the same traffic everybody else is until he gets to the very
end of the line. And if that takes 2 hours, that is costing our
driver money, it is costing the companies money, et cetera.
The FAST program as envisioned I thought was terrific. The
problem is, without the infrastructure changes in the roads
themselves, it is going to be difficult to achieve.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Ms. Kelley, your organization is aware, I hope, that I have
been one of the people that have been attempting to increase
the number of CBP officers for some time now, since I do
believe that they are understaffed across the board. Can you
tell me how it affects the workforce, this understaffing, and
how it affects, you think--what effect is has on the true
security of our nation, as you are trying to figure out who
should come in and who should stay out?
Ms. Kelley. On the workforce, the impact is seen in a
couple of ways. In many places, because of the staffing
shortages, officers are forced to work double shifts, working
16 hours at a time. That alone would raise questions for many
as to, you know, how alert and, you know, sharp you can be at
the 16th hour as you were at the 7th or 8th or 9th hour.
There is also a huge morale issue, because from an employee
perspective of trying to have a life and plan their family
obligations with their children or their parents or their
extended family, that becomes impossible in places where they
know they can always be held over, as they call it, for another
shift.
And it is also things like this that make officers look to
other occupations and decide maybe that this is not the place
for them for a career. And it creates safety issues. Officers
will tell you that often they believe that there should be more
than one of them, whether it is inspecting a truck or boarding
a ship, that they should not be going to many of these things
alone. And in many locations, they do them without the number
of officers that they believe they should have from a safety
perspective.
So there are a lot of aspects to it. And it impacts not
only the morale, but I think it does--it is a factor for
attrition, also.
Ms. Sanchez. Talking about that particular issue of safety
and your officers, let's say, checking a truck on their own
without backup officers or directly there with them, have there
been incidents where they have actually been attacked or
threatened or anything of the sort?
Ms. Kelley. I would have to go back and check the actual
records just from a time perspective. I mean, I know that there
have been incidents and there have been reports and concerns
raised. It is as much about trying to avoid a problem and just
kind of knowing in their guts, as a law enforcement officer,
you know, who they should have with them or what kind of
support and backup they should have.
Ms. Sanchez. And I also want to explore--and we can do
that, you know, outside of this environment, because I don't
want to take up too much more time--but this whole issue of One
Face at the Border, which initially, when that all happened, I
wasn't very happy personally about seeing that, because I
talked to many people--for example--you know, PhDs in I don't
know, vermin and pests and things of the sort.
I am in particular very interested in the issue of
agriculture, because California, my home state, is, as you
know, a big agriculture state. And we are always very worried
about bugs and things coming through on paths from some straw
that one would never even think there would be eggs in there,
et cetera, certain worms or what have you.
And it just felt to me like somebody who had 7 weeks or
training with respect to INS, with respect to immigration,
visas, customs rules, and then on top of that, agriculturally
intense issues, just put more on everything that they would
need to, whereas before we had very specialized people. So I
would like to follow up with you on that and see how--how much
we have missed or what we think we have missed in having put
everybody together in one person.
Ms. Kelley. I would welcome that opportunity, because as
you mentioned, the rules and the laws and the regulations are
very different for the customs focus, for the immigration
focus, and for the agriculture focus. And, really, what One
Face at the Border did was put everyone in one uniform and
cross-train them and pretend that there was an enhancement of
the workforce. And it was not.
They used it--they actually told us at the time they were
using it as a force multiplier without really having to add any
additional staff. So it gave the appearance that there were
more, but it really diluted, as you mentioned, the expertise.
And we need--they did maintain--I will say this--they did
at least maintain the agriculture specialist position. Where
they did not maintain, the customs inspector position or the
immigration inspector position. So at least there was a
recognition that that specialization had to exist.
Now, then there are a lot of issues about training that has
not occurred, the cross-training, still kind of the dilution,
the agriculture specialists having to do backup work in
immigration and customs, when that is not what they are trained
on, and then not having the time to do the agriculture
inspections that, as you say, are so important.
Ms. Sanchez. And just as I am concerned about the
agriculture specialists, if you look at all the types of visas
and documents one can enter this country in----
Ms. Kelley. Specialization.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. It is a pretty good book. So to
be specialized in that is a difficulty.
Thank you for your testimony.
I will recognize my ranking member for 5 minutes.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
First, Ms. Kelley, Congressman Cuellar asked the agency to
provide what they believe the optimum strategy would be at the
different crossings. Could you provide to the degree possible a
similar type of thing? It would be interesting to match, and it
also may make theirs a little more adequate.
Ms. Kelley. Well, I would be glad to provide NTEU's
estimates based on the information we have, but the information
that Mr. Cuellar asked for that you will receive I will never
see. It is designated as sensitive information.
So I know anecdotally what we know from the staffing and
talking to our members at the ports of entry, but I would not
have nearly the detail that they will have.
Mr. Souder. I think we had a few, because, obviously, it is
not this administration or the last administration. You could
say it is almost every administration, since OMB basically
writes testimony, and if it relates to a cost issue, it becomes
very hard for us to estimate what is actually needed outside of
what the president wants us to know or OMB wants us to know.
Even if it is anecdotal at different things and we say,
``Hey, what is this gap here?'' We are hearing from agents in
the field that they feel they are short-staffed there, and you
are saying you are full-staffed there.
Ms. Kelley. I would be glad to--I can tell you where they
are working double shifts----
Mr. Souder. That was going to be my next question. Where
can you show----
Ms. Kelley [continuing]. I can tell you where there--where
all the lanes are not open because they don't have enough
staff----
Mr. Souder. That would be another.
Ms. Kelley [continuing]. To staff the lanes, where all the
technology is not being used because there is no one staffed to
back us that day.
Mr. Souder. Yes, those would be very interesting things to
know.
Ms. Kelley. I can give you our----
Mr. Souder. Where do we have technology that isn't being
used?
Ms. Kelley [continuing]. Best guess about----
Mr. Souder. Where are we double-staffing? Those things
would be all very helpful.
Ms. Kelley. Sure. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. Souder. We would like to think that there weren't those
places, but that is a little naive, too, I guess.
Mr. Russell, We had some discussion about the differences
in Canada and Mexico, and particularly, for example, the
Canadians have more equipment and are fairly aggressive with
their equipment and inspections. You know, this question of
outbound, when you go into Canada, could you describe what
happens to one of your trucks, as opposed to when you go into
Mexico?
Ms. Sanchez. I am sorry. We can't hear you. Can you bring
the mic closer?
Mr. Russell. I am sorry. Thank you.
Right now, the law prohibits American trucks to go into
Mexico, so our trucks don't go into Mexico. Our trucks do go
into Canada. And basically, there is not much difference
between going into Canada and coming back into the U.S. If you
were to ask, you know, the time, et cetera, from a driver's
standpoint, but there is no way to compare going into Canada
with going into Mexico.
Mr. Souder. And I----
Mr. Russell. A trailer goes into Mexico, but not the
tractor.
Mr. Souder. We have had this huge Mexican trucking argument
about whether Mexican trucks are safe coming into the United
States and all this type of things. And I have been involved
with that for years, but I am not sure I fully understood. You
can't go into Mexico? Why do we allow Mexican trucks in the
United States if you can't go into Mexico?
Mr. Russell. We don't. There was a pilot test. The pilot
test was stopped about 6 months ago. But the only thing that
can go across today are drayage trucks, and those drayage
trucks may have been the ones that the chairwoman talked about
in that accident. But the drayage trucks literally can only go
20 or 30 miles. I forgot the exact number of miles. And those
are generally Mexican trucks that cross the border just to pull
their trailer, and then they go back to Mexico. They are not
allowed to run in the U.S.
Mr. Souder. So all the drivers are contracted, in effect?
When you say trucks, are you talking about the driver's unit,
as opposed to the trailer?
Mr. Russell. Exactly. The trailer goes through. We were the
first carrier--that is how I started the company in 1985. We
were the first carrier to allow the trailer to go into Mexico.
Mr. Souder. So when we are allowing--when we are doing
accountability for the trucking companies that--and we are
talking about violations, because one of my questions is going
to be, what percent--even domestically, different companies
deal with contractor drivers. So no drivers on either side are
basically employees of your company, if they are in Canada and
Mexico? In other words, no--
Mr. Russell. No American driver.
Mr. Souder. No American--the cab going into Mexico will not
be yours and the cab coming into the United States will not be
Mexican?
Mr. Russell. Correct. Basically, our U.S. tractor will take
the trailer to Laredo or to El Paso, the north side of the
border.
Mr. Souder. So how does accountability work here? So when
we get the trailer, how do you do an investigation--how do you
keep rogue cab drivers from sticking things on your trucks?
Mr. Russell. Basically, in our case, we are a truckload
carrier, which means that we have one company's goods in the
trailer, General Electric, Cara Corporation, whoever. That
trailer is taken from a point in the U.S. to the Mexican border
where the trailer is then turned over to a customs broker, who
then arranges the drayage, meaning just across the border. So
that is basically the way it works today.
Mr. Souder. So in the----
Mr. Russell. That is on the Mexican border.
Mr. Souder. Have you been directly involved in a violation?
Or do you know, obviously, other execs who have been? And how
exactly does this sort through it? Because if we are trying to
figure out how to, in effect, accelerate this, give more
flexibility, find out who are the highest risks, hold them
accountable, I mean, I have run into this, because every time
we define it, it seems like everybody has some kind of excuse,
because the driver can walk back, stick it underneath into
that, the load--well, it wasn't the loader. It wasn't me, the
driver. I didn't know. Somebody, when they opened the door,
stuck it in. They attached it as I was getting dinner. How do
you--
Mr. Russell. The reality today is the Canadian border is,
say, a free-flow border. An American tractor can take a load
from Kansas City to Toronto, same driver, same trailer, same
tractor crossing the border. A Canadian driver or an American
driver can take it from Montreal to Dallas.
The Mexican border doesn't work that way. The Mexican
border, the American truck can take it to the northern part of
the border itself. The Mexican truck can take it to the
southern part of the border. And then these little drayage
trucks take it back and forth.
That may well be a real security risk today. It has always
been that. About 5 years ago, we had an issue with a marijuana
movement. And upon review and working with the FBI, the issue
became the drayage company itself. It was neither the Mexican
trucker or the U.S. trucker, but it was the same trailer.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
We have about 9 minutes left on a vote that is on the
floor. We have three votes up. So I would like to give some
time for Ms. Kirkpatrick to ask a few questions, and then we
will stop the hearing and end it, okay?
Ms. Kirkpatrick. And I just have a quick question.
Ms. Sanchez. Go right ahead.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Ms. Kelley, I noticed that you have an
accounting degree, undergrad and master's degree, so I have a
quick numbers question. You said that we need 4,000 more CBP
officers. Does that include existing vacancies? And, also, do
you have an estimate of the increased cost that that would be
to the department?
Ms. Sanchez. Can you--yes, thank you.
Ms. Kelley. We believe the 4,000 is over and above current
authorized staffing. That would be 4,000-plus existing
vacancies.
From a cost perspective, I have not done those numbers for
today, at least, and we have gathered that data over the years,
so I can recalculate that today.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Okay. That would be great. I appreciate
that.
And then you talked about the inspection specialization.
Can you give me an idea of the type and length of training that
it takes to have these specialized officers?
Ms. Kelley. You know, again, I will have to check what the
current training is versus what it used to be. It used to be
that if you were an immigration inspector, you went to FLETC,
the law enforcement training academy, and you are--you had--I
am going to hesitate--I will be wrong on the weeks, but say it
was 13 weeks. And if you were a customs inspector, you got 11
weeks. And if you were an agriculture specialist, you went to a
different academy, actually, that was specific. And most
agriculture specialists have degrees in science, in botany or
biology, and many times advanced degrees, not just a
bachelor's.
And when they created this One Face at the Border and put
them all in one uniform, they merged all the training together.
And now they go through--maybe it is a 14-week training where
they combined everything, and you get--and you always got a bit
of immigration, a bit of customs, because you are the first set
of eyes when anything comes across--you know, any of the--
through any of the ports of entry.
So there was always some training so you would at least
recognize things to send over to secondary. But now it just all
got consolidated, and everybody gets the same training, and
especially in the immigration and customs. They all get trained
on immigration. They all get trained on customs. But there are
volumes of law rule and regulation about customs and about
admissibility.
They did actually create an admissibility position a few
years ago and only staffed it with a few hundred people. And I
had hoped they were going to recognize the need for the
specialization for the immigration position and then someday
see it for customs, but that has not happened.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Madam Chairwoman, in the interests of
getting to the floor for a vote, I will yield back the balance
of my time.
And I thank the witnesses very much for being here today.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Souder has asked something for the record.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Russell, if you are comfortable, if you
could provide both your personal and if the trucking
association would, as you talked about this lane crowding and
inability to get trucks separated out, could you rank the top
five crossings north and south--or make it the top three north,
top five south--of where this problem occurs so we have that?
Ms. Sanchez. And what type of a problem it is, so that we
have some sort of working knowledge of what it is that we might
put assets to and----
Mr. Souder [continuing]. Over a bridge farther south here,
but I would like to know what the industry feels----
Mr. Russell. We will get you that information.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. Perfect. Thank you so much.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
members for their questions. And the members of the
subcommittee may have additional questions for you all. We will
ask you to respond quickly in writing to those questions.
And hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Janice Ayala
Question 1. Over the summer, ICE signed a new MOU with DEA to
better coordinate their narcotics investigations and provide additional
resources to fight violence along the border.
Please describe the current state of the MOU's implementation.
When does ICE anticipate local protocols will be finalized?
Answer. On June 18, 2009, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) signed a new
interagency cooperation agreement regarding investigative functions
related to the Controlled Substance Act.
Both Secretary Napolitano and Attorney General Holder have made
clear that this agreement is the most efficient and effective way to
promote coordination, de-confliction, and streamline communication
between the two agencies. This agreement, which went into effect
immediately, strengthens collaboration and partnership between ICE and
the DEA, bolsters information sharing and coordination, and provides
ICE agents the authority needed to work important drug trafficking
cases.
Negotiations between ICE and the DEA are currently underway to
determine specific implementation plans for the MOU including
finalizing local protocols that will be mutually beneficial to the
respective agencies and field components.
Question 2. Trafficking drugs in commercial trucks allows the
cartels to move larger quantities of drugs faster and with relative
ease compared to the time it may take a smuggler to transport a smaller
shipment through the desert.
Please provide this Committee with the number of investigations ICE
conducted on commercial carriers in fiscal year 2009 by northern and
southern border.
Has ICE noticed any trends with respect to the use of commercial
carriers in drug and human trafficking?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 2009, ICE initiated 901 investigations
stemming from seizures involving commercial modes of transportation,
such as commercial trucks and trains.
With respect to trends involving the use of commercial carriers,
ICE has observed that narcotics trafficking and human smuggling
involving commercial trucks and trains are generally encountered during
the inbound examination process into the United States, whereas bulk
cash smuggling is generally encountered during outbound examinations.
Question 3. DHS offers many programs that allow expedited
processing at our ports of entry for trusted travelers and companies.
Has ICE's investigations indicated any loopholes or vulnerabilities in
C-TPAT or FAST that can be exploited by the drug traffickers?
Answer. To date, ICE has not identified any loopholes or
vulnerabilities to the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) or Free and Secure Trade (FAST) programs. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection employs a layered enforcement strategy for FAST and C-TPAT,
which includes vetting all applicants, validating the entire supply
chain from point of stuffing to receipt of the goods in the United
States, and conducting random and non-intrusive inspections.
Question 4a. Please explain the operational differences between the
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and the Border Enforcement
Security Task Forces (BEST). Both appear to be bi-national (U.S.-
Canada, and U.S.-Mexico) multi-agency efforts to enhance cooperative
border enforcement.
Answer. The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) are
intelligence-led, multi-agency, field-level groups of law enforcement
officials dedicated to securing the integrity of the shared border
between Canada and the United States. They include multi-disciplinary
intelligence and enforcement units, and, unlike BESTs, they do not
concentrate on one specific geographic location, but rather focus on
national security, organized crime, and other criminal activity more
generally between the ports of entry.
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) leverage Federal,
State, local, and foreign law enforcement resources in an effort to
identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations that seek to exploit
vulnerabilities and threaten the overall safety and security of the
border. BESTs concentrate in particular cities or areas to investigate
individuals and organizations involved in drug smuggling, human
smuggling, arms trafficking, bulk cash smuggling and money laundering.
There are currently three BESTs along the Northern Border operating at
the ports of entry in Buffalo, New York, Detroit, Michigan, and Blaine,
Washington. On the Southern Border there are currently ten BESTs
located in Laredo, Texas, El Paso, Texas, Rio Grande Valley--Texas,
Phoenix, Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, Yuma, Arizona, Deming, New Mexico,
Las Cruces, New Mexico, San Diego, California, and Imperial Valley,
California. Additionally, there is one BEST operating in Mexico City,
Mexico.
Question 4b. When would a case or investigation be referred to a
BEST as opposed to an IBET, particularly where the BEST and IBET
jurisdictions overlap?
Answer. While the BESTs on the Northern Border operate at major
ports of entry, the IBETs operate between the ports of entry. In
particular, at the ports of entry, the BESTs generally obtain their
investigation leads from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Office of Field Operations. Conversely, IBETs obtain their
investigative leads from agencies operating between the ports of entry,
such as CBP's Office of Border Patrol.
Question 4c. How are BEST cases and investigations prioritized and
coordinated (if at all) with those of the IBETs?
Answer. BEST and IBET coordinate, cooperate, interact, and
deconflict intelligence and investigative information. The IBET Joint
Management Team (JMT), which meets quarterly to provide specific
guidance and contributions to case prioritization for BEST/IBET
activity, is composed of IBET member agencies; ICE, United States
Customs and Border Protection, United States Coast Guard, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, and Canada Border Services Agency.
Question 5. Please provide the Committee with resource allocation
models for land ports of entry.
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field
Operations (OFO) uses the Workload Staffing Model (WSM) to assist in
requesting personnel and aligning staffing levels. OFO developed the
WSM for CBP Officers, focusing on all aspects of CBP processing for
passengers and cargo in the air, land, and sea environments.
The existing model for assessing staffing needs at land ports of
entry is based on workload data, processing times, and complexity and
threat levels. When allocating available resources, both the WSM as
well as the judgment of experienced personnel are taken into
consideration. In addition, CBP evaluates other factors such as
overtime constraints, special enforcement initiatives, wait times,
specific local issues, and the unique attributes of each port. Also
considered is CBP's ability to hire, train, and deploy officers in a
timely manner, the training capacity at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC), and the physical constraints of current
facilities and infrastructure.
Question From Honorable Mark E. Souder for Janice Ayala
Question. Of the contraband and human smuggling seizures made by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agents, excluding
those referred to ICE by Customs and Border Protection and other
agencies, how many are related to intelligence versus ``cold hits?''
Answer. While U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) patrols the
front line, ICE by virtue of its investigative responsibilities,
generally is not in a position to experience ``cold hits.'' As such,
ICE initiates its own investigations and investigates leads from other
law enforcement and regulatory agencies.
Currently, there is no auditable way to track which contraband and
human smuggling seizures are a direct result of ICE intelligence leads.
However, during Fiscal Year 2009, ICE's Office of Intelligence
satisfied 1,429 requests for intelligence support related to human
smuggling issues and 908 related to contraband investigations. Many of
these requests were for strategic intelligence products that identify
smuggling routes, methods of concealment, and avenues for identifying
active smuggling investigations. The intelligence provided back to
field offices helps ICE appropriately direct resources to maximize
enforcement efforts. The resulting shift in resources or enforcement
methods leads to increased seizures overall.
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Colleen M. Kelley
Question 1a. A few years ago, it was widely reported that CBP
needed roughly several thousand new front-line officers to adequately
fulfill its mission at the ports of entry. Since that time, CBP has
made only modest increases in staffing.
What are NTEU's recommendations for staffing?
Answer. Based on CBP internal documents, the Washington Post
reported that CBP needs to hire 1600 to 4000 new CBP Officers and
Agricultural Specialists to adequately staff the nation's air, sea and
land ports of entry while allowing for contingencies, such as training.
This number is in line with NTEU's estimation of CBP Officer staffing
needs based on our own research.
The actual number of frontline non-supervisory CBP Officers remains
elusive (as Rep. Cuellar can attest to.) CBP claims to have 19,972 CBP
Officers, yet NTEU's most recent number of CBP Officers in the
bargaining unit is about 17,750. Are the rest (over 2,200) non-
frontline supervisors? The ratio of non-frontline working CBP
supervisors to frontline CBP Officers has been of major concern to
NTEU's members for years.
Question 1b. How is the lack of CBP officers affecting the
workforce and the security of our ports of entry?
Answer. The Federal Human Capital Survey released in 2009 shows
that DHS continues to receive some of the lowest scores of any federal
agency on a survey for job satisfaction, leadership and workplace
performance.
One of the most significant reasons for low morale at CBP is the
continuing shortage of staff at the 367 ports of entry (POEs). Despite
CBP's own staffing allocation models and a GAO report that states that
CBP needs up to 4000 additional CBP Officers at the POEs, there was not
new CBP staffing at the ports of entry included in the fiscal year 2010
DHS Appropriations bill.
Also, CBP Officer staffing shortages at the POEs have resulted in
limited staff available at secondary to perform those inspections
referred to them because the majority of CBP Officers are assigned to
primary passenger processing to reduce wait times. CBP Officers are
extremely concerned about this diminution of secondary inspection in
favor of passenger facilitation at primary inspection since the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security. A robust secondary
inspection regime is vital to the nation's security.
Question 2a. Over the last few years, CBP has implemented a number
of new technologies and programs to increase security and expedite the
flow of commerce at ports of entry.
Do you believe CBP has placed an overreliance on technology to
compensate for the lack of personnel and inadequate infrastructure?
Answer. Advances in technology have been useful in enhancing port
security. Risk-based targeting and implementation of expedited crossing
programs such as SENTRI for people or FAST (Free and Secure Trade)
lanes for trucks and railcars that are certified as compliant with the
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) agreement help in
speeding frequent travelers and known cargo conveyances through the
inspection process. Today, primary processing is increasingly dependent
on technology. CBPOs are instructed to clear vehicles within thirty
seconds. That is just enough time to run the license through the plate
reader and check identifications on a data base. If the documents are
in order the vehicle is waived through. The majority of a CBPO's time
is spent processing I-94s--documents non-resident aliens need to enter
the U.S.
Technology, therefore, has its limits. There is no way you can
speed up the inspection process in which CBP Officers are currently
conducting primary inspections in 30 to 40 seconds without increasing
staffing. NTEU's position was confirmed on October 1, 2009, by a draft
report of the Southwest Border Task Force created by Homeland Security
Secretary Janet Napolitano and reported by the Associated Press that
recommends the ``federal government should hire more Customs [and
Border Protection] officers.''
Also, reliance on technology should not discount well-honed human
instinct that is based on years of experience in the job. Technological
advances are important, but without the training and experience,
technology alone would have failed to stop the millennium bomber. It is
important to remember that Ahmed Ressam, the millennium bomber, had a
valid passport when he attempted to enter the U.S. from Canada by ferry
at Port Angeles, Washington. It was years of experience that convinced
now-retired U.S. Customs inspector Diana Dean, after brief questioning
at primary, to send Ressam to secondary where the true purpose of his
visit to the U.S. was discovered.
Without adequate personnel at secondary, wait times grow and
searches are not done to specifications. For example, a full search of
one vehicle for counterfeit currency will take two officers on average
a minimum of 45 minutes. Frequently, only one CBPO is available for
this type of search and this type of search will then take well over an
hour.
Question 2b. Are you satisfied with the level of training your
members are receiving to operate these new technologies and programs?
Answer. Because of staffing shortages at the POEs, there is never
enough time for adequate training because it takes staff away from
primary processing and adds to wait times. Training is always a
secondary priority when scheduling work at the POEs.
Question 3. Please describe how the One Face at the Border
initiative has affected CBP Officer training, expertise and port of
entry inspections. How does current training compare to training before
the implementation of the initiative?
Answer. In June 2007, NTEU testified before the Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations and Oversight, on this very
issue. Please find attached NTEU's June 19, 2007 testimony entitled
``Ensuring We Have Well-Trained Boots on the Ground at the Border.''
The testimony outlines the changes in training time, subject matter
and type of training (i.e., computer-based versus on-the-job training)
since the institution of the One Face at the Border initiative. Also
attached to the testimony is a virtual learning certificate of training
that goes into each Officers personnel file upon completion of a
computer-based training module. Computer-based training is now the
norm, not on-the-job training with an experienced Officer.
Questions From Chairman Loretta Sanchez for Todd Owen
Question 1a. Congress provided $720 million through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) for construction at land
ports of entry.
How will this stimulus funding support the processing of commercial
traffic?
Answer. The $420 million of ARRA funding dedicated to both the
General Services Administration (GSA) and the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP)-owned land ports of entry and the $300 million
dedicated to General Services Administration (GSA)-owned land ports of
entry provides for critical security upgrades to enable law enforcement
officers to do their jobs and protect national security along our
Northern and Southern Borders. The modernization will also improve
commercial inspection infrastructure, enabling CBP to efficiently and
expeditiously screen, assess risk, and inspect incoming cargo. The
ports will be built with dual-use primary inspection booths that can be
configured to process both commercial and non-commercial traffic, and
infrastructure to support radiation portal monitors to comply with the
Congressional mandate to screen all commercial traffic entering the
United States.
Question 1b. What is CBP's long-term strategy to improve and
further enhance commercial cargo processing at land ports of entry?
Answer. CBP's long-term strategy to improve and further enhance
commercial cargo processing at land ports of entry is to continue to
expand the physical processing capacity through infrastructure
improvements, which includes leveraging the most up-to-date technology
available to perform screening and scanning of incoming cargo at the
ports of entry. CBP's strategy also includes modernizing automated
systems that contribute to the risk assessment and release decisions
made by CBP. Additionally, CBP will continue to work with the trade
community and others to obtain their input on operational and policy
concerns. This collaboration enables CBP to incorporate feedback from
the private sector into key initiatives while fulfilling its dual
missions of securing our borders while facilitating legitimate travel
and trade.
Question 2. The fiscal year 2010 Congressional Budget Justification
for CBP indicates that one of the goals for fiscal year 2010 for CBP is
to maintain 90 percent or higher compliance rates for C-TPAT members in
terms of the ratio of suspensions/removals to the overall number of
certified/validated partners. Please explain this measure and how CBP
plans to achieve this goal.
Answer. This measure determines the percentage of members whose
security procedures were validated by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and were found to be in line with the program's
security criteria. The figure is calculated by dividing the number of
failed validations, i.e. companies suspended and/or removed as a result
of a Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) validation,
into the total number of validations performed in a given period.
Historically, the compliance rate has ranged from 95--99.97%
depending on the period reported, showing that the vast majority of
companies pass the validation. C-TPAT provides members a period of 90
days to address the validation findings and the member's status is
tracked automatically. In those cases where the company does not
adequately resolve the findings, the program takes action to suspend
the member.
Question 3a. Recently, CBP issued a number of solicitations for
various large-scale non-intrusive inspection equipment (NII) systems.
What is the status of the $88 million in American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act funds pledged for non-intrusive inspection (NII)
technology at the ports of entry? Has the new equipment been installed?
Answer. CBP received $100 million dollars in American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds for purchasing Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) technology to be deployed to U.S. ports of entry. Approximately
95% of the funds have either been obligated or awarded. Vendors are
currently producing the equipment and the entire inventory of ARRA-
funded equipment is scheduled to be deployed during the 2009 and 2010
calendar years.
Question 3b. How will CBP ensure that this investment meets the
challenges of detecting new and emerging weapons and concealment
methods?
Answer. CBP constantly evaluates its Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
Acquisition and Deployment Strategy and continues to make appropriate
adjustments aimed at enhancing the overall efficiency and effectiveness
of the program. CBP is currently replacing obsolete and aging systems
with a mixture of fixed and mobile high-energy and low-energy systems
that possess the performance characteristics that meet the mission-
specific requirements of CBP. These systems must be seamlessly
integrated into an existing port's processes and infrastructure.
There is no single technological solution to improving security. As
technology matures, we must evaluate and adjust our operational plans.
CBP will continue to pursue a mix of new and emerging technologies with
enhanced performance characteristics designed to complement one another
and present a layered defense to smuggling attempts.
Question 3c. How does CBP evaluate the total life cycle costs for
NII equipment deployed at ports of entry?
Answer. Total life cycle costs for NII equipment are based on a 10-
year life-cycle that includes acquisition, testing, deployment,
training, operation and maintenance, and disposal/retirement at the end
of the equipment life.
Question 3d. It is our understanding that CBP purchased mobile
backscatter NII with ARRA funds. How does CBP plan to use this
technology?
Answer. NII technology is an essential element of the CBP layered
enforcement strategy. The goal is to match the technology and equipment
with the requirements at each location based upon a comprehensive
analysis of the unique configuration at every deployment site.
Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), DHS
recently received funding to purchase additional NII technology,
including mobile low-energy backscatter technology, and deployment to
land border ports of entry. Low-energy portal and mobile systems have
minimal penetration capabilities, they allow CBP to effectively image
privately owned vehicles, buses, recreational vehicles and empty-only
cargo conveyances for the presence of contraband. These systems require
a much smaller footprint and have bidirectional capabilities which
provide CBP with the added flexibility to image conveyances both
arriving and departing the United States.
Question 4. Please provide the Committee with resource allocation
models for land ports of entry.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Mark E. Souder for Todd Owen
Question 1a. Please provide the following information regarding C-
TPAT and FAST violation incidents involving highway carriers:
The number on the northern border versus the southern border.
Answer. Eleven northern border vs. 35 southern border violations
(CY 08-09).
Question 1b. The number involving drayage trucks on the southern
border.
Answer. C-TPAT and FAST do not maintain drayage statistical
information is not kept by C-TPAT and FAST. If a highway carrier
company crosses the border with cargo, has a Standard Carrier Alpha
Code, a Department of Transportation number and meets the Minimum
Security Criteria, then it is generally eligible to participate in C-
TPAT.
Question 1c. A comparison of the incidents between small and large
companies.
Answer. A comparison of the incidents between small and large
companies: CBP does not keep statistical information differentiating
small and large carriers.
Note: In many of the cases involving security breaches, C-TPAT
members were utilizing the services of non-C-TPAT members. C-TPAT has
sent out information bulletins to remind all members that they are
expected to use C-TPAT partners to the extent possible and that they
are expected to conduct extensive screening on their non C-TPAT
business partners.
Question 2. What mechanisms exist for bi-lateral and tri-lateral
discussions for ways to improve port of entry infrastructure and roads
leading to the ports of entry, as well as harmonization of security and
trade policies?
Answer. The United States, the Government of Canada (GOC) and the
Government of Mexico (GOM) are linked by common borders and economic
ties, and have strong bilateral and trilateral partnerships concerning
law enforcement and trade issues.
Canada
Joint Border Risk Assessment
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA) are working on a joint border risk threat assessment
focused on activity at the northern border ports of entry. This project
is on schedule and the assessment will be available by the April 2010
deadline.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)/Partners in
Protection (PIP)
C-TPAT, a voluntary public-private sector partnership program, is
an integral part of DHS's layered enforcement strategy. C-TPAT members
agree to incorporate certain supply chain criteria into their business
practices and in return, DHS offers trade-based incentives for
participants. For example, DHS provides pre-vetted members access to
the FAST lanes on the Canadian border. Canada's equivalent of the C-
TPAT is the Partners in Protection (PIP). In June 2008, DHS and CBSA
signed a mutual recognition arrangement on C-TPAT and PIP, enhancing
the ability of the two programs to share information, recognize the
findings of the validation visits conducted by each program, and
provide participating businesses with a standardized set of security
requirements, as well as a reduced number of validation visits. On
November 25, 2009, the United States Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Canadian Minister of Public Safety publicly announced that CBP and
CBSA will continue to work together closely in order to achieve
harmonization of these two programs as quickly as possible. The
harmonization of these two trusted shipper programs will improve the
security of private sector supply chains and benefit shippers.
Bilateral Partnerships
Both the U.S. government and GOC recognize the need to enhance and
expand national and bilateral partnerships to increase security and
facilitate trade and travel. Examples of these bilateral partnerships
currently in place include the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams,
Cross-Border Crime Forum, Shared Border Accord Coordinating Committee,
Cooperative Border Management Working Group, and the Export Controls
Working Group.
Cross-designation of CBP and CBSA Officers
CBP and CBSA are examining the feasibility of cross designating
CBSA officers as CBP officers. This cross designation will increase
cooperation between CBP and CBSA by allowing officers to work together
to prevent criminals and terrorists from using the border to evade
enforcement or to inflict harm on U.S./Canada.
Shiprider
On May 26, 2009, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Canadian Minister of Public Safety publicly announced the Shiprider
initiative. The Shiprider initiative involves law enforcement officials
from both countries operating together in integrated teams. Utilizing
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and U.S. Coast Guard vessels, the
U.S./Canada combat smuggling, organized drug crime, gun trade and other
criminal activity in shared waterways. Shiprider enables the RCMP and
the U.S. Coast Guard to cross-train, share resources and personnel and
utilize each others' vessels in the waters of both countries. Working
together, Canadian and U.S. law enforcement will help ensure that
criminal organizations no longer exploit the shared border and
waterways because of the inherent jurisdictional challenges associated
with cross-border policing.
Capital Planning and the Establishment of Joint Facilities
CBP and CBSA met in September 2009 in order to discuss the
establishment of joint CBP and CBSA facilities (one facility for both
agencies on the border) and other long-term capital plans. The CBP and
CBSA working group will be holding additional meetings on this topic.
Mexico
Bilateral Strategic Plan (BSP)/Declaration of Principles (DOP)
On June 08, 2007, DHS and Mexico's Department of Finance and Public
Credit signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP) to provide for
increased commitment and cooperation. A key provision of the DOP was
the direction to implement a Bilateral Strategic Plan between U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Mexico Customs (MXC). The BSP was formally
implemented by the three agencies on August 13, 2007, establishing four
working groups to coordinate and implement the goals set forth in the
document (the Capacity Building Working Group, the Customs Security
Working Group, the Border Management Working Group, and the Customs
Enforcement Working Group). On June 15, 2009, DHS Secretary Napolitano
and SHCP Secretary Carstens signed a Letter of Intent to revise and
update the BSP and DOP. Subsequently, CBP, ICE, and MXC jointly revised
the BSP and DOP which was signed by Secretary Napolitano and Secretary
Carstens on December 7, 2009.
Port Bi-National Security Committees
The establishment of Port Bi-National Security Committees between
the United States Government (USG) and the GOM will serve as the
foundation for a formalized process to address security concerns and
other related issues at ports of entry on both sides of the border.
Canine Training
As part of the Merida Initiative, CBP and the Department of State
will conduct canine training for experienced Mexican dog handlers and
supervisors. The Canine Center in El Paso is planning to train 44
canine detection teams (40 for MXC and 4 for the Mexican Navy),
including eight canine instructors for MXC. The teams will be trained
in the discipline of 22 narcotics and 22 currency/firearms.
Coordination of Border Infrastructure
There are a number of formal mechanisms in place for coordination
of border infrastructure. These include:
The U.S.-Mexico Joint Working Committee led by the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA), whose focus is evaluating and
coordinating border-wide transportation improvements.
The Binational Bridges and Border Crossings Meeting, led by
the Department of State (DOS), whose focus is on coordination
and alignment of project priorities and implementation
schedules
The Border Liaison Mechanism (BLMs) meetings, which provide
land port of entry project-specific work groups to address all
aspects of project design, construction, and delivery. These
forums consists of government officials from the Federal,
State, and local levels and also include private stakeholders,
such as bridge board members, metropolitan planning
organizations, and other such entities.
Question 3. What other agencies or departments are authorized to
place holds on commerce crossing the border? How does CBP coordinate
with these entities to move legitimate cargo through as quickly as
possible?
Answer. Other agencies or departments authorized to place holds on
commerce crossing the border are as follows: U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, U.S.
Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Department of Treasury's Office
of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of State's Directorate of
Defense Trade Control, and the Department of Commerce's Bureau of
Industry and Security.
CBP coordinates with these agencies and departments to move
legitimate cargo as quickly as possible. CBP can either release the
cargo to the other agency or department or CBP can inspect on its
behalf.
Question 4. What is the process when another federal entity places
a hold on an import but is not physically present at the port of entry
to do an inspection?
Answer. When another Federal entity places a hold on an import, but
is not physically present at the port of entry to do an inspection, CBP
communicates with that entity electronically or verbally, and then
either releases control of the cargo to the other agency or department
or inspects the cargo on behalf of the other agency or department.
The process may be initiated through any of the following methods:
Other agencies or departments may delay the release of cargo
by based on criteria submitted to CBP and entered into the
Automated Commercial System (ACS).
Other agencies or departments may request CBP to flag
specific commodities for intensive examination which can
further delay its release.
Other agencies or departments may call CBP and request a
shipment be held for examination.
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Stephen Russell
Question 1a. Despite the various steps CBP has to process
commercial traffic more efficiently, the Committee continues to hear
about growing wait times, longer inspections, and limited staffing at
our ports of entry.
Are you satisfied with the steps that CBP has taken to process
legitimate commercial traffic?
Question 1b. What more needs to be done to expand and expedite
commercial processing?
Answer. Chairwoman Sanchez, I do believe that CBP, operating under
the present constraints of our border infrastructure, has taken a
number of steps to improve the throughput of commercial cargo across
our land border ports of entry. The use of certain technologies has
allowed CBP to become more efficient reviewing manifest information,
performing risk analysis and targeting, and for inspecting commercial
vehicles for any potential anomalies that could indicate the presence
of illegal cargo. As I mentioned in my testimony, the use of Non-
Intrusive Inspection (NII) systems has not only allowed CBP to look
inside tractors and trailers without spending hours loading, unloading
and reloading freight from a trailer to inspect for potential
contraband, but it has also averted any physical damage being done to
our equipment through the use of other more rudimentary inspection
tools such as drills.
We are clearly seeing a large reduction of commercial flows across
our borders with Canada and Mexico due to the present economic
situation. This has alleviated some of the congestion and usual delays
faced by trucking companies. Of course, we are concerned that once
economic output begins to increase again throughout North America, that
long lines at border crossings will once again become the norm.
As a member of the Customs_Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), Celadon is proud to work in partnership with CBP in securing the
international supply chain so critical to our country's economic
wellbeing. However, one of the key incentives and benefits for motor
carriers to participate in C-TPAT is the concept of Free and Secure
Trade (FAST) lanes. The concept of the FAST lane is that C-TPAT motor
carriers, transporting freight for a C-TPAT importer, and using a
driver who has undergone a FAST background check, get to use a FAST
``lane'' that separates ``low-risk'' cargo from the regular traffic.
However, today the concept has not evolved into a FAST-lane, but simply
into a FAST ``gate'': C-TPAT motor carriers are commingled with the
rest of the traffic until the point at which they arrive at the gate
and proceed to a FAST gate, not providing any real benefit or relief
from congestion. CBP must work with their Canadian and Mexican
counterparts to implement true FAST/C-TPAT lanes.
I also encourage this Committee to monitor and review how border
infrastructure needs are developed and implemented. Agencies such as
CBP, the General Services Administration (GSA) the Departments of State
and Transportation, and others need to closely coordinate their
planning and operational needs to have the proper level of physical
infrastructure, technology systems and human resources to ensure that
our ports of entry operate securely and efficiently. For example, the
development of FAST/C-TPAT lanes has to be part of border
infrastructure planning and financing.
I urge the Committee to take the following steps:
Work with other relevant Congressional Committees to improve
border infrastructure, including the building of FAST/C-TPAT
lanes, so low-risk commercial carriers get the one true benefit
of expedited processing and clearance at our ports of entry;
Increase the number of NII systems at our busiest land-border
ports of entry to further increase throughput of commercial
vehicles while improving CBP's ability to detect illicit cargo;
and,
Provide CBP with the necessary resources to ensure the agency
has enough personnel to operate every gate during peak-times so
that our border infrastructure is utilized at its optimal
capacity.
Question 2a. The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) has
undergone some significant modifications over the last few years and
more are scheduled so that the system can included all modes of cargo
shipments.
Please discuss your use of the ACE system and how the system can be
improved.
Question 2b. What type of input have ATA members had in the
development of ACE?
Answer. The development and implementation of the ACE system has
been in the making since 1993, the year in which Congress passed the
Customs Modernization Act. If you consider that the first electronic
manifest within ACE was implemented in December of 1994, and we are
still lacking some functions, it has taken nearly 16 years to get the
ACE system up and running.
For the trucking industry, the implementation of the e-manifest
system has been critical for several reasons. First, it allows trucking
companies to be in compliance with the Trade Act of 2002 requirements
for submitting information in an electronic format prior to arrival at
a port of entry. The Trade Act mandates that cargo, equipment and
driver information has to be received electronically by CBP 1 hour
prior to arrival--30 minutes for C-TPAT members. The ACE e-manifest
allows motor carriers to provide key data elements directly to CBP for
the review of freight information and clearance of freight prior to
arrival. Second, the trucking industry was the only transportation mode
prior to ACE that did not have an automated manifest system. Thus, the
trucking industry was still operating under a cumbersome, paper-based
system in which we relied on third parties to provide and submit the
information to CBP for clearance, which in turn resulted in unnecessary
delays and negatively impacted our operations. Third, the ACE e-
manifest provides CBP a much improved system and process for reviewing
the information and data provided for review and clearance of the
cargo, vehicle and driver even prior to the cargo arriving at the port
of entry.
Regarding the input that ATA members have had in the development of
ACE, I can tell the Committee that ATA has been actively involved from
the very beginning in the various working groups and committees
developing the ACE Multi-Modal-Manifest system. Obviously, we have been
very involved for several years in the development specifically of the
e-manifest for trucks with several ATA members of different sizes
testing and providing feedback on the system. ATA has spearheaded bi-
weekly teleconferences with CBP to discuss issues and fixes to the ACE
truck e-manifest for the past several years. These teleconferences
began in 2005 and are ongoing, providing a forum for both CBP and the
trucking industry to work on improvements that need to be made to the
system. At this time, the trucking industry is waiting for the ocean
and rail ACE e-manifests to be rolled out, which will add significant
flexibility and function to the ACE truck e-manifest.
We understand that CBP and Congress have been looking at the cost
of ACE relative to the functions it will provide for the agency and
trade. At this time, the ACE system needs to be expanded, rather than
contracted so our trade systems stop depending on a paper-based system.
One of the improvements recommended by the trade community is to
enhance ACE with the ability to pass imaged information to CBP. Another
is to enhance the communication between brokers and transportation
providers by improving the already programmed but seldom used ``broker
download,'' which would put a stop to faxing and phone calling. In
order to make these improvements, and others, ACE needs to be fully
funded.
Question 3. In your testimony, you state that CBP could exercise
more flexibility with industry partners in correcting security breaches
and developing security measures that complement partner business
models. Please elaborate.
Answer. Members of C-TPAT take their responsibilities for
implementing security measures required by the program very seriously.
Securing our operations is not only vital to improving the security of
our Nation, but to also ensuring the security of the international
supply chain, and the security of our customers' cargo. In essence, C-
TPAT is a ``partnership'' program between CBP and the trade community,
a partnership that requires understanding each other's operations and
needs. Thus, there is a need for greater ``flexibility'' by CBP when a
C-TPAT member has been targeted and used by smugglers to try to
introduce illegal cargo or aliens into the U.S. by using one of our
conveyances.
This request for flexibility arises from the present CBP policy of
terminating a C-TPAT member's privileges due to a single security
incident. When illegal cargo, such as illegal drugs or aliens, is
discovered in a conveyance belonging to a C-TPAT motor carrier, the
Status Verification Interface (SVI) number for that motor carrier is
turned off even prior to an investigation taking place by CBP. The SVI
number allows C-TPAT importers to review if a motor carrier is in good
standing within the program. If a C-TPAT importer finds that the motor
carrier's SVI has been turned off, the importer will then need to
scramble to find another C-TPAT motor carrier to transport its cross-
border cargo. At the same time, the motor carrier whose SVI number has
been turned off could potentially lose a large account of business.
The scenario described above can dramatically disrupt cross-border
operations for both the motor carrier and the C-TPAT customers who
depend on the carrier to transport their cargo safely and securely. C-
TPAT motor carriers have requested that CBP not turn off the SVI number
until a preliminary investigation has taken place and it has been shown
that the motor carrier did not have the necessary security steps to
stop illegal cargo from being introduced into the conveyance. If the
carrier has had security breaches in the past that have resulted in
past reviews and suspensions, then we recognize the need by CBP to take
action, noting a potential ``systemic'' security problem within the
company. However, if the motor carrier has implemented the security
criteria expected by CBP and demonstrated efforts to continually
improve security, a ``single'' security incident should not result in
the motor carrier's suspension from C-TPAT. Rather than operate under a
``gotcha'' mentality in which the motor carrier is suspended, ATA and
its members believe that CBP should a take a pro-active approach of
working with the motor carrier to review and suggest security
improvements.
This is especially a concern on the U.S.-Mexico border where cross-
border trucking operations and business models are quite different from
those on the U.S.-Canada border. For example, let's consider a load of
computer parts that travels from Silicon Valley in California down to
an assembly plant in Guadalajara, Mexico. A U.S. carrier picks up the
cargo in California and drives to Laredo, Texas, where the U.S. motor
carrier drops off the trailer with the parts. After being cleared for
entry into Mexico, a ``drayage'' tractor will come across the border,
hook up the trailer and transport the trailer just to the other side of
the border, where the long-haul Mexican partner of the U.S. motor
carrier will then hook up the same trailer and transport it to its
final destination in Guadalajara. Once the computers are assembled and
ready for the U.S. market, they will be transported by the Mexican
long-haul motor carrier and be dropped off at Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas.
After being cleared by CBP for entry into the U.S. a ``drayage'' truck
will again pick up the trailer and transport it across the border to
Laredo, Texas, and drop it off at the U.S. motor carrier's terminal for
further delivery in the U.S.
The challenge faced by these types of operations is that neither
the U.S. long-haul nor the Mexican long-haul carriers have ``control''
of the trailer when crossing the U.S.-Mexico border because the drayage
tractor is an independent agent that tends to have a relationship with
either a customs broker or freight forwarder. In essence, this
operation in which multiple companies are in charge of transporting a
trailer across the border results in a much tougher risk-management
process due to a higher threat level for smugglers to target and
introduce illicit cargo into a conveyance. Long haul motor carriers
would like to have greater control over the movement of such cargo
across the U.S.-Mexico border. But today, long-haul motor carriers from
both countries are not allowed to operate across the border. Allowing
long-haul motor carriers to cross the border would greatly improve not
only cross-border trucking efficiency, but also greatly improve the
security of such operations especially by C-TPAT motor carriers.
Questions From Honorable Mark Souder for Stephen Russell
Question 1. What do you believe are the most crowded ports of entry
on both land borders of the United States and what do you attribute the
main cause for congestion?
Answer. I believe the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit, Michigan
and Windsor, Ontario, and the bridge between Laredo, Texas, and Nuevo
Laredo, Tamaulipas are the two busiest border crossings for commercial
vehicles at the northern border and southern border, respectively. At
the Ambassador Bridge the automotive industry plays a very large role,
with plants on both sides of the border, which produce and manufacture
auto-parts that travel back and forth across the border. Because the
larger ports at the northern border are able to process freight 24
hours a day, it has been easier to stagger scheduled freight crossings;
however, we still see peak hour congestion at these crossings.
Developing better and more flexible infrastructure both leading to and
leaving the ports would be a positive step towards reducing congestion
at the northern border. At the southern border, the causes of
congestion range from limited hours at the ports, the need for more
inspections, and the business systems in place that prevent crossings
at times other than daylight hours.
Question 2. During the hearing, there was discussion regarding the
potential vulnerability to the supply chain created by drayage
companies on the southwest border. Please expand upon this issue,
including the impact on C-TPAT and FAST Membership when a violation
with a drayage truck or trailer moved by a drayage truck.
Answer. As I described above in a similar question by Chairwoman
Sanchez, ATA and motor carriers have held discussions with CBP
regarding how motor carriers participate in the C-TPAT program on the
U.S.-Mexico border, where long-haul motor carriers are unable to cross
the border to pick up or deliver cargo. The business model of the
``drayage'' operation, primarily used at the Laredo-Nuevo Laredo
crossing, by far the largest commercial border crossing on the U.S.-
Mexico border, has always represented a challenge to motor carriers
providing cross-border services on the southern border because long-
haul motor carriers tend to lose control of the trailer and thus the
ability to mitigate security risks and prevent the introduction of
contraband or unauthorized cargo.
In the early discussions about C-TPAT between ATA and CBP, trucking
industry representatives explained to CBP that drayage carriers pick up
trailers on the U.S. side and transport them across the border into
Mexico. And because one of the critical qualifying components for motor
carrier participation in C-TPAT is that the motor carrier's equipment
and driver must physically cross the border, this drayage model means
that only the drayage carrier qualified to participate in C-TPAT, and
not the U.S. or Mexico-based long-haul carriers. This limitation on
motor carrier participation applies to all movements across the
southern border, north and south. Thus, the major participants in the
movement of freight into and/or out of Mexico--i.e., the long-haul
carriers--are, for the most part, were excluded from membership in C-
TPAT because they do not actually cross the border. After these early
discussions, CBP decided to incorporate a Mexican long-haul C-TPAT
highway carrier program, which allowed for this important segment of
cross-border operations to finally participate in C-TPAT and have
improved security controls over the long-haul leg in Mexico.
C-TPAT certified carriers are required to screen business partners
(including drayage companies) to determine whether or not they meet C-
TPAT security recommendations. If business partners are not C-TPAT
certified, the carriers must ensure through contractual agreement that
they are willing to commit to C-TPAT security recommendations.
Regardless of commitments from drayage companies, the C-TPAT carriers
are ultimately responsible for their equipment and associated freight
as it crosses the border despite the carrier's lack of physical custody
or control.
If unauthorized cargo, tampering, or anomalies are discovered at
the border, CBP's promulgated 17 point conveyance inspection checklist
used to inspect equipment en route is critical in determining where the
breach occurred. If C-TPAT carriers can demonstrate through documented
inspections while the equipment was in their custody that it was secure
from unauthorized cargo, tampering or anomalies--CBP will then
investigate the drayage carriers to determine their responsibility for
the violation(s). If C-TPAT carriers have not performed the 17 point
conveyance inspections en route, it is impossible to determine where
the breach occurred or that the carrier or driver was not involved in
an attempt to introduce unauthorized cargo or contraband. If it is
impossible to determine where the breach occurred, the carrier's C-TPAT
membership and associated FAST privileges can be revoked.
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