[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE:
WILL CONTINUING CHALLENGES WEAKEN TRANSITION AND IMPEDE PROGRESS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 18, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-43
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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2011
__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection Programs
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Mr. Gary W. Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service,
National Protection Programs Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security:
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Mr. Robert A. Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service,
General Services Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Panel II
Mr. David L. Wright, President, American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 918:
Oral Statement................................................. 52
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
Mr. Stephen D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National
Association of Security Companies:
Oral Statement................................................. 60
Prepared Statement............................................. 62
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Letter From the American Federation of Government Employees
(AFGE Local 918--Federal Protective Service)................. 4
APPENDIX
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection Programs
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security................... 71
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Rand
Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection Programs
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security................... 76
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Gary W. Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service,
National Protection Programs Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 77
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Gary
W. Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National
Protection Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 102
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Robert A. Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General
Services Administration........................................ 102
Question From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
Robert A. Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General
Services Administration........................................ 102
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Government Accountability Issues............................... 103
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
David L. Wright, President, American Federation of Government
Employees--Local 918........................................... 103
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
David L. Wright, President, American Federation of Government
Employees--Local 918........................................... 105
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Stephen D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National
Association of Security Companies.............................. 106
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
Stephen D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National
Association of Security Companies.............................. 106
FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: WILL CONTINUING CHALLENGES WEAKEN
TRANSITION AND IMPEDE PROGRESS?
----------
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Cuellar,
Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Himes, King, Dent, Olson, Cao, and
Austria.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Federal Protective Service: Will Continuing Challenges Weaken
Transition and Impede Progress?''
Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for
appearing before us today.
We are here this morning to discuss the continuing
challenges faced by the Federal Protective Service, and how
those challenges may affect its future. The Federal Protective
Service is responsible for protecting Federal Government
property, personnel, visitors and customers, by providing law
enforcement and related security services for about 9,000
buildings that are under the control and custody of the General
Services Administration.
FPS responds to incidents, conducts risk assessments,
participates in security meetings with GSA property managers
and tenant agencies, and determines whether GSA buildings meet
security standards established by the Interagency Security
Committee.
To carry out this mission, FPS currently employs about
1,200 Federal employees. About one-half of the FPS workforce
are Federal law enforcement security officers. But those
officers are not responsible for providing a law enforcement
presence at Federal facilities. On the contrary, these
employees are dedicated to overseeing the 15,000 members of a
contract guard force.
For most people, the contract guards are the face of the
Federal Protective Service. FPS officers, formerly major actors
in Federal law enforcement, have become primarily responsible
for administration and management of a large and growing
network of private guards. This trend is likely to continue.
While Congress has mandated that FPS maintain staffing
levels of at least 1,200, GAO has found that the agency
continues to have a high attrition rate. Like most other
Federal agencies, FPS must address the impending retirements of
the baby boom generation. About 30 percent of the FPS employees
will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years.
The impending retirements, combined with a high attrition
rate, indicate that FPS must implement a strategic human
capital plan. Yet GAO has found that FPS does not have a
strategic human capital plan.
The lack of a human capital plan could be mitigated by
stellar oversight of its force of contract guards. But GAO has
found that FPS does not effectively oversee training and
performance of these guards. In fact, in one region, FPS failed
to provide X-ray or magnetometer training to 1,500 guards since
2004. Nonetheless, these guards were assigned to posts at
Federal facilities.
In addition to training and oversight challenges, GAO has
identified substantial security vulnerabilities in the FPS
guard program. GAO investigators were able to successfully
carry the IED components through security checkpoints monitored
by contract guards in 10 out of 10 Federal facilities it
tested.
Failures in the guard program could be mitigated by
accurate FPS assessments of risk, and the implementation of
countermeasures by GSA and its tenant agencies. However, GAO
has found that FPS has only limited influence over the
allocation of resources, because resource allocation decisions
are a responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies.
I think it is fair to say that the current state of FPS is
bleak. However, the Department has put forward a transition
plan to move FPS and implement changes throughout the agency.
We cannot assume that relocation alone will resolve FPS's
problems. The multi-dimensional and complex challenges faced by
this agency have been in the making for years. The solution to
these problems will require resources, planning, and
commitment.
This plan is a first step, but it cannot be the only step
taken.
I look forward to the testimony presented today, and I look
forward to the actions that follow.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
We are here today to discuss the continuing challenges faced by the
Federal Protective Service and how those challenges may affect its
future.
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting
Federal Government property, personnel, visitors, and customers by
providing law enforcement and related security services for about 9,000
buildings that are under the control and custody of the General
Services Administration (GSA).
FPS responds to incidents, conducts risk assessments, participates
in security meetings with GSA property managers and tenant agencies,
and determines whether GSA buildings meet security standards
established by the Interagency Security Committee.
To carry out this mission, FPS currently employs about 1,200
Federal employees. About one-half of the FPS workforce are Federal Law
Enforcement Security Officers (LESO). But those officers are not
responsible for providing a law enforcement presence at Federal
facilities. On the contrary, these employees are dedicated to
overseeing the 15,000 members of a contract guard workforce.
For most people, the contract guards are the face of the Federal
Protective Service.
FPS officers, formerly major actors in Federal law enforcement,
have become primarily responsible for administration and management of
a large and growing network of private guards.
And this trend is likely to continue. While Congress has mandated
that FPS maintain staffing levels of at least 1,200, GAO has found that
the agency continues to have a high attrition rate.
And like most other Federal agencies, FPS must address the
impending retirements of the Baby-Boom generation. About 30 percent of
FPS employees will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years.
These impending retirements combined with a high attrition rate
indicate that FPS must implement a strategic human capital plan. Yet
GAO has found that FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan.
The lack of a human capital plan could be mitigated by stellar
oversight of its force of contract guards. But GAO has found that FPS
does not effectively oversee training and performance of these guards.
In fact, in one region, FPS failed to provide X-ray or magnetometer
training to 1,500 guards since 2004. Nonetheless, these guards were
assigned to posts at Federal facilities.
In addition to training and oversight challenges, GAO has
identified substantial security vulnerabilities in the FPS guard
program. GAO investigators were able to successfully carry the IED
components through security checkpoints monitored by contract guards in
10 out of 10 Federal facilities it tested.
Failures in the guard program could be mitigated by accurate FPS
assessments of risk and the implementation of countermeasures by GSA
and its tenant agencies. However, GAO has found that FPS's has only
limited influence over the allocation of resources because resource
allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies.
I think it is fair to say that the current state of FPS is bleak.
However, the Department has put forward a transition plan to move
FPS and implement changes throughout the agency. We cannot assume that
relocation alone will resolve FPS's problems.
The multidimensional and complex challenges faced by this agency
have been in the making for years. The solution to these problems will
require resources, planning, and commitment.
This plan is the first step. But it cannot be the only step taken.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr.
King, for an opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
courtesy. Thank you for scheduling this hearing. I welcome all
the witnesses here today.
Unfortunately, I will not be able to stay past 10:30. There
is a large press conference with 9/11 victims, which will be
held--which I will have to attend. They have come here from New
York.
But I am very interested in this hearing. I know that the
Federal Protective Service is a vital component of our Nation's
homeland security. I certainly look forward to going through
the testimony and reviewing what is said here today.
One of the concerns I do have, which echoes what the
Chairman says, is the GAO reports, which did show significant
weaknesses in the Federal Protection Services as far as
providing the security that is needed at our Federal
facilities.
I also bring that up in view of the fact that, of the
recent decision by the attorney general to hold the trial of
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Manhattan, in the Southern District.
I would be, again, very interested in the testimony as to how
you feel the measures will be taken to protect the Federal
facilities in Lower Manhattan, what extra steps are going to be
taken.
Obviously, I know you are not going to go into detail. But
whether or not you feel that that job can be done. In that
regard, I will be introducing a letter which recently--I guess
it is a copy of a letter to you, Mr. Schenkel, from the
American Federation of Government Employees, where they talk
about severe staffing shortages in the New York region.
So, to me, again, not saying whether that letter is
accurate or not, but the fact these are serious issues in any
event, but to be raised with upcoming Federal proceedings in
New York with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. I think they take on a
particular significance, and I will be looking forward to you
addressing that.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for
scheduling the hearing. I look forward to the testimony, and I
regret the fact that I will probably have to leave here about
10:30. I am sure you will be able to carry on without me, and
your heart will not be broken.
Chairman Thompson. It will be difficult.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Without objection, we will enter the letter into the
record.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE Local
918--Federal Protective Service) Submitted for the Record by Ranking
Member Peter T. King
October 14, 2009.
Gary W. Schenkel,
Director, Federal Protective Service, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 800 N. Capitol St. NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC
20002.
Subject: Region 2: Critical Staffing Levels; Poor Leadership and
Management
Mr. Schenkel: I write to you today to formally express my serious
concerns about Region 2 leadership and critical staffing levels within
New York City.
AFGE Local 918-FPS remains extremely concerned about severely
inefficient staffing levels in New York City and the poor leadership
within Region 2. We find that the Federal Protective Service is in
severe crisis in New York City and despite repeated warnings there have
been no significant changes or actions taken to address the issues. FPS
lacks the necessary staffing and proper leadership within New York City
and is unable to effectively carry out its mission in the highest risk
metropolitan area within the United States. Federal buildings in New
York City are at great risk and urgent action is needed to address this
situation.
Senior leadership and managers of Region 2 have consistently
demonstrated that they lack the necessary skill, experience, and
initiative to ensure the protection of Federal facilities in New York
City. AFGE Local 918 finds the Regional management decisions and
actions, and the lack thereof on numerous occasions, to be a major
threat to mission accomplishment. The following are some of the primary
issues that detail AFGE Local 918's serious concerns about Region 2.
The staffing levels of Region 2 are critical. The Region
lacks adequate staffing to accomplish the mission. As one of
the most at-risk metropolitan locations in the country, New
York City staffing levels are severely inadequate. FPS does not
maintain 24-hour coverage in New York City or any part of the
Region. Yet, despite the critical staffing levels, the Region
continues to allow members to travel on temporary duty to
locations outside of the Region, fails to have a formal
mechanism in place to ensure coverage during employee absences
and lacks a formal procedure for the appropriate use and fair
distribution of overtime. Region 2, especially in New York
City, needs to ensure maximum coverage by uniformed FPS staff
at all times and limit the temporary assignment of staff until
such time as a major increase staffing is accomplished in the
Region. Region 2 lacks sufficient staffing to participate in
special details and assignments. The risk to Federal facilities
in New York City is just too great to allow the very few staff
available in New York City to be assigned to work in other
locations. The following demonstrate serious issues that
severely strain the staffing and ability for FPS to accomplish
its mission in Region 2.
The Metro New York District Director David Metzger has
been temporarily assigned to serve as an instructor for the
RAMP training program. This action will leave New York City
without a District Director for the period of September 15,
2009 through January 15, 2010. This same District Director
has been attending training and otherwise on leave or
temporary assignment and out of the District for extended
periods throughout the year. With staffing already at
critical levels in the District and the recent terrorist
threat against New York City which is being called the most
significant terror threat since September 11, 2001, we find
it incomprehensible that the Region would allow the Metro
District Director to be absent for such an extended period
of time. Mr. Metzger has lost touch with the day-to-day
operations of his command and the lack of leadership has
negatively impacted the effectiveness of the District.
In addition to the District Commander, the Region has
assigned an Area Commander and an inspector to RAMP
instructor duties outside the Region. The Region has also
assigned two inspectors to the G-20 detail in Pittsburgh.
In addition, the Region has experienced the extended
absence of one Metro District Inspector due to a line of
duty injury, a second Metro District Inspector for a
misconduct allegation, a third Metro District Inspector for
a firearms qualification issue, a fourth Metro District
Inspector has been detailed for many months to the Chemical
Security Compliance Division, a fifth Metro District
Inspector has been detailed for many months to Plum Island.
The pending retirements of a Metro District Police
Sergeant, Police Captain and a Physical Security Specialist
all contribute to the negative staffing issues that
continue to persist in Region 2 and particularly in New
York City.
Two recently hired Inspectors have been without a bullet-
resistant vest for over 3 months. These Inspectors have
been in soft uniform performing administrative duties
during this time period. Despite the Local's repeated
inquiries and calls for urgent action, neither the
inspectors nor the Local have seen any indication that
management is taking any action to obtain the vests so
these inspectors can return to full uniformed duty.
There is an insufficient number of Field Training
Inspectors to ensure the success of the Field Training
Evaluation Program required of all new inspectors. This
shortage will surely delay the proper implementation of the
Program--resulting in otherwise qualified law enforcement
officers to perform administrative duties.
The Risk Management Branch Chief, Joseph Cuciti, and Law
Enforcement and Security Program Manager Terence Hoey are
frequently out of the office on details to FLETC, FPS
Headquarters, military leave and the like. The Region 2
Risk Management Branch is ineffective as a result.
On September 11, 2009, the 8th anniversary of the 9/11
terror attacks, Region 2, took no special actions. It was
business as usual in New York City and throughout the Region
with the Metro District pressuring staff to continue work on
facility security assessments, security level determinations
and other administrative work rather than directing highly
visible and vigilant patrols of Federal facilities throughout
the Region, especially in New York City. Despite the fact that
the Vice-President of the United States, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security were in Lower
Manhattan, Regional management did not so much as send out an
email to staff urging vigilance or marking the anniversary of
the attacks that had such a major impact on Region 2 and New
York City. Regional management should have directed all law
enforcement personnel to be in uniform and conducting highly
visible directed patrol of Federal facilities throughout the
Region, the suspension of non-essential administrative work by
law enforcement officers for the day and established a formal
plan in advance to ensure maximum staffing coverage. We now
know that terrorists linked to al Qaeda had planned to carry
out attacks in New York City on September 11, 2009. Region 2
would have been severely unprepared for any attacks. Further,
the President of the United States was in New York City at a
Federal facility in Lower Manhattan and still the Region
continued with business as usual. AFGE is baffled and disgusted
with Regional management for their lack of care or concern on
September 11 and for its continuing lack of attention for
events going on around New York City in and around Federal
facilities.
There are two Area Commanders within Metro District. Area
Commander Rafael Bou covers the New York City boroughs of
Manhattan, Brooklyn, and The Bronx while Area Commander Saul
Roond covers Long Island and New York City borough of Queens.
Both of the Area Commanders are routinely operating on the 30th
floor of 26 Federal Plaza at adjacent desks. Considering the
geographic dispersion of personnel throughout these two areas,
it is difficult to understand why both of these Area Commanders
are working in such close proximity.
Area Commander Rafael Bou rarely wears the class C duty
uniform and is routinely in plain clothes. With an inspector-
based work force, the Area Commander is now the first-line
supervisor of the uniformed workforce. Mr. Bou does not seem to
understand that. He routinely relies on the two remaining
Police Sergeants to serve as the uniformed supervisor. This is
problematic as GS-10 Police Sergeants should not be supervising
GS-12 inspectors. In addition, Mr. Bou is frequently out of
contact with his subordinates. He rarely answers his cell
phone, his voice mailbox is always full and messages cannot be
left. He rarely replies to emails citing the fact that his
email folder is full, preventing him from replying. He
frequently is not available on the radio. He arrives and
departs at varying times and no one seems to know when he is in
or when he is out. He repeatedly claims he is retiring within
days but obviously by his continued presence that is false. We
find Mr. Bou's actions to be abhorrent and a significant risk
to the uniformed staff and the Federal facilities in New York
City.
Area Commander Rafael Bou serves as the ``Lead COTR'' for a
number of security guard contracts in the Region. He routinely
fails to take timely or appropriate action on issues reported
by inspectors. In a recent incident, an FPS Police Officer
reported to an inspector that he discovered a contract guard
had abandoned his post at a Level IV facility for at least 2
hours. The inspector conducted a review of security camera
footage which revealed the guard had left his post for a
majority of his tour of duty. The inspector recommended to Mr.
Bou that the contract guard be immediately removed from
performing work on the contract. Mr. Bou subsequently
approached the Police Officer who initially discovered the
incident and asked the Officer if a letter of reprimand would
suffice as a form of punishment to address the matter. The
Police Officer deferred the matter to the inspector. The guard
was not immediately removed as recommended and the contract
guard was found to have abandoned his post again on his next
tour of duty. The inspector reported the incident to Mr. Bou
and again called for the guard's removal which was completed a
few days later. The fact that Mr. Bou would consult with the
Police Officer and not the inspector on the appropriate means
to address this matter as well as his failure to promptly
address this matter in light of the recent national media
attention given to FPS oversight of contract guards is
bewildering.
On a separate contract guard issue, a contract security
guard in Manhattan was removed from performing work on a
contract due to the guard's failure to take appropriate action
to prevent and identify persons who vandalized Federal property
in his presence. In addition, it was determined through close
monitoring by a group of inspectors that the guard had serious
issues with following instructions and paying attention to his
duties. A few months later, the same individual who was removed
from the Manhattan contract was found to be working at two
Security Level IV facilities in Queens. The matter was reported
to Mr. Bou for action yet he failed to take action. The guard
continues to work as a contract security guard at Level IV
Federal facilities in Queens. The Local is bewildered how an
individual can be removed from performing work under a Federal
contract in one borough and yet be allowed to gain employment
under a separate Federal contract in another adjacent borough
in the same District of the same Region of FPS. Further, we
find it abhorrent that the matter was not immediately addressed
by Mr. Bou when it was brought to his attention. The matter was
referred to the Joint Intake Center for action but the guard
continues to work as a contract guard.
In the Upstate New York area, the limited staffing and vast
geographic area requires inspectors to conduct extensive
travel. Inspectors are expected to travel over 120 miles to
conduct checks of Federal facilities and contract guards.
Recently, inspectors were required to travel 240 miles to pick-
up ToughBook laptop computers. They also travel the same route
quarterly to conduct firearms qualification. It is neither fair
nor safe to expect these inspectors to travel such extensive
distances during a tour of duty.
The Region has demonstrated that it has no clue when it
comes to processing worker compensation claims. A recent line
of duty injury suffered by an inspector revealed the lack of
knowledge by Regional management in handling these issues which
resulted in the delayed filing of paperwork. In meetings with
AFGE representatives, the Regional Director and Deputy Regional
Director indicated that the responsibility for the
administration of the program was being transferred from
Mission Support Chief Martin Mcrimmon to Special Assistant John
Natale. At a subsequent meeting, the Deputy Regional Director
indicated that the Mission Support Chief would again be
handling OWCP matters. Shortly, after that meeting Regional
management advised the Local that OWCP matters would again be
handled by Special Assistant John Natale. In order to avoid the
problems encountered in past line of duty cases, the Local
recommended that Regional management establish a standard
operating procedure and provide training to its supervisors on
handling line of duty injuries. Rather than accept the lessons
learned from past incidents, the Region took a lax approach to
the matter. They put together a cut-and-paste job of a memo
which they placed on the shared server drive using a Region 11
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). They failed to change the
points of contact in the policy, leaving the Region 11 point of
contact and not adding a Region 2 point of contact. This lack
of attention to detail is indicative of the manner in which
Region 2 management handles all matters.
Region 2 Threat Management Branch distributes a daily report
via email to FPS HQ and Regional staff--to include non-law
enforcement personnel and staff of other agencies. Until recent
inquiry by an AFGE representative, the report routinely
contained the name, date of birth, social security number and
residence of subjects. This information is now being redacted
in most instances but the report continues to contain an
excessive amount of information to include the names of law
enforcement personnel taking actions, investigative and
operational methods and techniques employed in Regional daily
operations. The unauthorized disclosure of this information
could adversely impact the conduct of Regional law enforcement
and security operations or the privacy or welfare of involved
persons. Routinely, the synopsis of the form 3155 is cut and
past into the daily report with little or no modification. This
amounts to releasing the form 3155 each time the daily report
is prepared and distributed. If a daily report to non-law
enforcement personnel and outside Agencies is necessary, its
content should be minimal with very short and minimally
descriptive summaries of daily events. In addition, the report
should be reviewed for accuracy, proper format and any errors
prior to distribution. The frequently observed typographical
errors, cut-and-paste formatting errors that include use of a
variety of fonts on occasion and other minor errors indicate
that a careful review of this product before its dissemination
is not being conducted.
The Region replaced all portable radios. As a continuing
evidence of the Region's lack of attention to detail, only one
Region 2 channel was programmed into the new portable radios.
To date, this has not been corrected and the Region 2 portable
radios continue to have only a single change programmed. On a
related note, when the Region received new vehicles, the
vehicles sat in a parking garage for months before being
assigned. When vehicles were replaced, old vehicles sat in the
garage for months. There was no timely issuance or return of
vehicles to ensure maximum cost efficiency. The Region 2
Mission Support Service Branch frequently creates more problems
than they solve.
Region 2 recently hired three Area Commanders for Metro
District. Each of these new managers was hired from outside the
agency. There were no internal promotions. Two of the Area
Commanders have sat around for several months while they await
required FLETC training dates. One of the Area Commanders has
accumulated nearly 200 hours of leave-without-pay during his
tenure with FPS. The agency needs to promote from within its
current ranks and have an effective, formal mechanism in place
to develop inspectors for leadership and management positions
within the agency.
AFGE Local 918-FPS has been expressing its serious concerns about
Region 2 for several years. Our concerns have gone mainly unaddressed.
There is a systemic problem with poor leadership and management in
Region 2. We believe that senior Region 2 leadership lacks the
motivation, skills, and abilities to effectively lead and manage FPS
operations in the 21st Century. Changes in senior Regional leadership
are necessary if Region 2 is to become an effective component of FPS.
I would like the opportunity to discuss these issues with you and
work together to find solutions. We remain extremely concerned about
the critical staffing issues in New York City. I felt it necessary to
address the staffing issue in further detail in additional
correspondence with you and to Members of Congress. I strongly urge
immediate action to address the management deficiencies in New York
City.
Sincerely,
David L. Wright,
President, AFGE Local 918-FPS.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under committee rules, opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
November 17, 2009
Mister Chairman, thank you for convening this very important
hearing today examining the continuing challenges faced by the Federal
Protective Service. I appreciate your commitment to this vital issue. I
would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today.
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) provides law enforcement and
security services for almost 9,000 Federal facilities and countless
millions in Federal assets. The sheer scope of this kind of service
means that we must do everything we can to ensure that they have the
resources and organizational structure in place to effectively do their
job and keep our many buildings and employees safe in the face of the
many threats to their security.
The reports regarding lapses in security due to carelessness,
negligence, and lack of training is distressing, to say the very least.
We are relying on FPS for the security of so many people and places--
and too many reports of this nature indicate an epidemic, not an
isolated incident. And considering that one of the buildings breached
was a House office building right across the street from the Capitol,
an important symbol of our Nation and an irresistible target for
terrorists, I would think that is a clear sign that change is needed.
As the representative of the 37th Congressional District in
California which is a target-rich area for terrorists due to its close
proximity to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, I have a
particular interest in ensuring that this agency has the resources and
structure in place to not only adequately handle its duties but to
excel. Therefore, it is of particular import to me that the Federal
Protective Services is doing the best job it possibly can.
The transfer of FPS from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the
National Protection and Programs Directorate will most certainly have
an effect on FPS' governance, function, and accountability. With so
much at stake, we must ensure that this transition is as smooth and
seamless as it possibly can be. Too much time has passed already since
the problems within FPS have been identified. I look forward to hearing
the ideas and recommendations of our distinguished panel of witnesses
as to how we can improve this Service and further secure our Nation
against threats.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield
back my time.
Chairman Thompson. I now welcome our first panel of
witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Rand Beers, the Under Secretary
for the National Protection and Programs Directorate. Mr. Beers
oversees the operation of the directorate's subcomponents:
Cybersecurity and communications; infrastructure protection;
risk management and analysis; and the United States visitors
and immigration status indicator technology, commonly referred
to as US-VISIT program.
Soon, he will be adding FPS to this list of subcomponents
under his direction. I do not know what else after that, Mr.
Beers, but I am sure you will handle it.
Our second witness is Mr. Gary Schenkel, the appointed
director of Federal Protective Service in March 2007. Prior to
joining the FPS, he served as assistant Federal security
director for the Transportation Security Administration at
Chicago Midway Airport.
Welcome.
Our third witness is Mr. Robert Peck, the commissioner of
Public Buildings Service at the General Services
Administration. As commissioner, Mr. Peck is responsible for
design, construction, and leasing of 354 million square feet of
Government property.
Welcome, Mr. Peck.
Our final witness on this panel is Mr. Mark Goldstein, who
is the director of the Physical Infrastructure Issues team at
the Government Accountability Office. Mr. Goldstein is
responsible for GAO's work in the areas of Government
facilities and telecommunications.
I also welcome you here today, Mr. Goldstein.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
Mr. Beers, however, will make a single statement for both
FPS and NPPD. Mr. Schenkel will participate in the question-
and-answer segment of the hearing. We look forward to hearing
his responses under Members' questions.
I now recognize Secretary Beers.
STATEMENT OF RAND BEERS, UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Beers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and Ranking
Member King, and the other Members of the committee for
inviting us to appear before you today to discuss the
transition of the Federal Protective Service into the National
Protection and Programs Directorate.
We want to talk today about a number of those things. But I
also want to acknowledge Director Schenkel here, and Bob Peck
from GSA and Mark Goldstein from GAO, whom we work closely
with. Both gentlemen are contributing importantly to the work
of FPS.
Let me start by saying that Secretary Napolitano and I have
an enormous appreciation and tremendous respect for the work
that FPS does every day all over the country.
As you are aware, FPS was transferred to the National
Protection and Programs Directorate on October 28 of this year
with the signing of the Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Homeland
Security Act. The protection of Federal facilities and their
occupants is a critical mission.
We at DHS need to ensure that FPS has the resources and the
infrastructure to accomplish that mission. This is a charge
which Secretary Napolitano has levied on us, and one which we
take very seriously.
For the past 6 months with respect to this transition, NPPD
has worked closely with the Federal Protective Service and the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency to ensure an orderly
transition. We will be happy to elaborate on that in the
question period.
Additionally, I believe that we have made important
progress in addressing a number of the GAO recommendations. But
clearly, more work needs to be done.
With respect to that, as the committee is aware, since its
transfer to DHS in 2003, FPS has been the subject of five GAO
audits that have resulted in 20 recommendations for improving
management and operations.
With respect to those 20 recommendations, five have been
addressed and closed; 10 related to facility protection,
finance, and human capital planning are currently actively
being worked; and five are tied directly to the implementation
of FPS's Risk Assessment and Management Program, or RAMP, and
will likely remain open until RAMP, which is now in its initial
operating status, is fully operational in 2011.
I would also like to address some of the major areas
identified recently by GAO as needing improvement and review
some of the actions and initiatives taken by FPS to make these
changes.
First, with respect to human capital, FPS has made
improvements in its human capital management since the June
2008 GAO report recommended that FPS develop and implement a
strategic approach to manage staffing resources. FPS has
refined and is using a strategic staff allocation model to
manage its staffing resources. Director Schenkel can fill you
in on the details of that.
FPS has also enhanced its capability to identify and report
personnel strength levels, allowing FPS to better manage
resource levels. FPS's accomplishment led GAO to close this
recommendation last month. In addition to this major
accomplishment, FPS has used its human capital management plan
to make important progress in recruiting, training, and
allocating personnel during the past 18 months.
Further, I would note that NPPD and FPS human capital
management functions have been combined just this last week.
This moves us, I think, into an integration that builds on the
momentum, quite frankly, that FPS has already made and fully
integrates NPPD's human capital processes to improve the
overall approach to management of staffing resources.
Second, with respect to finance, GAO has offered
recommendations for improving FPS's financial processes. FPS, I
think, has made some important improvements in this area. With
Congressional support and guidance, FPS has improved its
business processes and its enhanced financial functions to pay
huge dividends. In the National Capital Region alone, for
example, an improved procurement process for contracted guard
services resulted in a $5.5 million cost reduction in 2008.
These savings were passed directly to the agency client.
Additionally, FPS has eliminated a backlog of 2,200
invoices totaling $92 million, some of which predated the
creation of DHS. FPS has consolidated and centralized the
entire invoice payment process. Since the beginning of 2008--
fiscal year 2008--has paid 95 percent of all invoices within 30
days. In its most recent month, the percentage rose to 99.5
percent.
I think this is a mark of the seriousness with which we
have taken the recommendations, and the efforts that FPS has
undertaken to move forward.
The third point I want to make is with respect to contract
guard oversight. FPS has been developing detailed performance
measures that are directly linked to the 2008 strategic plan.
In fiscal year 2010, FPS will formalize these performance
measures.
FPS has been developing a draft set of more than 80
potential measures that are aligned to FPS programs to
determine FPS's progress toward meeting the goals and
objectives in that strategic plan.
Furthermore, FPS is currently developing additional
information collection and analysis tools to allow these
comprehensive measures to be fully implemented.
Specifically to address these, FPS has responded by first
identifying contract guards with expired certifications and
qualifications, and brought them into compliance with contract
provisions--or removed them. Second, it has required contract
guards to complete additional training in magnetometer and X-
ray screening operations and techniques.
Third, it has authorized the use of overtime to increase
the frequency of contract guard post inspections. Finally, we
have established a National study group to determine what the
causes of these lapses were and what more might be done.
Finally, FPS has established a covert testing working group
and set up a covert testing plan to complement these other
overall efforts.
In conclusion, transition of FPS advances Secretary
Napolitano's strategic vision and her commitment to align the
functions within the Department of Homeland Security in a
manner that leverages DHS's resources and competencies.
Director Schenkel and I would be happy to answer any of
your questions. Thank you very much.
[The joint statement of Mr. Beers and Mr. Schenkel
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Rand Beers and Gary Schenkel
November 18, 2009
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
discuss the transition of the Federal Protective Service (FPS). As you
are aware, FPS transferred from U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to the National Protection and Programs Directorate
(NPPD) on October 28, 2009, with the signing of the Fiscal Year 2010
Department of Homeland Security Act (Pub. L. 111-83). This move
advances Secretary Napolitano's strategic vision and her commitment to
align functions within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in a
manner that leverages the Department's resources and competencies to
maximize FPS' contributions to the Department and its value to the
Nation.
For the past 6 months, NPPD has worked closely with FPS and ICE to
ensure an orderly and seamless transition. I have an enormous
appreciation and tremendous respect for FPS's work. The protection of
Federal facilities and their occupants is critical, and we need to
ensure that FPS has the resources and infrastructure to accomplish that
mission. FPS Director Schenkel and I take our responsibility to provide
such resources and infrastructure very seriously; this framed our
transition plan, guided us throughout the transition period, and will
continue to inform our decisions as we move forward.
GAO AUDIT SUMMARY
Since its transfer to DHS in 2003, the FPS has been the subject of
five Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits that have resulted
in 20 recommendations for improving its management and operations. The
disposition of the 20 recommendations is as follows:
Five have been addressed and closed.
Ten related to facility protection, finance, and human
capital planning and are being actively worked.
Five are tied directly to the implementation of FPS's Risk
Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), and likely will
remain open until RAMP is fully operational in 2011.
I would like to address some of the major areas identified by GAO
as needing improvement--human capital, finance, and contract guard
oversight--as well as review some of the actions and initiatives taken
by FPS to make these changes.
Human Capital
FPS has made improvements in its human capital management since a
June 2008 GAO report recommended that FPS develop and implement a
strategic approach to manage staffing resources. FPS refined, and is
using, a strategic staff allocation model to manage its staffing
resources. It has also enhanced regional and headquarters capabilities
to identify and report personnel strength levels, allowing FPS to
achieve and maintain optimum resource levels. FPS's accomplishments and
improvements in this area led GAO to close this recommendation last
month.
In addition to this major accomplishment, FPS has used its human
capital management plan to make remarkable progress in recruiting,
training, and allocating personnel during the past 18 months. At the
beginning of 2008, as a result of budget requirements, FPS was directed
to reduce its staff from 1,100 to 950 employees. FPS immediately
developed an action plan to bring about those reductions while still
accomplishing its critical mission. To save the jobs of a large number
of valued employees, FPS identified programs that would reimburse FPS
for assignments of a substantial number of positions. Three months
later, the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2008 Omnibus Act required FPS
to increase its strength by 150 additional law enforcement personnel,
rather than reduce its staff to 950. FPS aggressively changed course
and conducted the most successful recruiting and selection campaign in
FPS history.
Further, just this week I combined NPPD and FPS human capital
management functions. This move capitalizes on the momentum made by FPS
in the human capital area and fully integrates NPPD's human capital
processes to improve the overall strategic approach to its management
of staffing resources.
Finance
GAO has offered recommendations for improving FPS's financial
processes, and FPS has made important improvements. With Congress'
support and guidance, FPS has employed a strategic approach to improve
its business processes, and its significantly enhanced financial
functions have paid huge dividends. In the National Capital Region
alone, an improved procurement process for guard services resulted in
reducing the cost of three new security guard contracts by $5.5 million
in fiscal year 2008, savings that were passed directly to the agency
client. An especially noteworthy accomplishment was the elimination of
a backlog of 2,200 invoices totaling $92 million, some of which pre-
dated the creation of DHS. To improve FPS' invoice payment processes,
FPS consolidated the entire process by requiring that all invoices be
sent to a central location. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2008,
FPS has paid 95 percent of all invoices within 30 days, and, in the
most recent month, the percentage of payments paid within 30 days rose
to 99.5 percent.
FPS continues to refine its financial business processes. This
year, it developed and implemented an activity-based cost model that
captures obligations and expenses and links them directly to the
appropriate line of business, activity, and cost center. The model is
still being tested, but early results indicate that it will allow us to
analyze security costs by facility, risk level, and performance. This
capability will assist in developing and evaluating potential
alternative fee methodologies that align costs of services required for
designated security levels.
Contract Guard Oversight
During the past year, FPS has been developing detailed performance
measures that are directly linked to its strategic plan, which was
issued in 2008. FPS has developed a draft set of more than 80 potential
measures that are aligned to FPS programs and can provide information
to determine FPS progress toward meeting the goals and objectives in
the strategic plan. FPS is now testing and refining the highest
priority measures to ensure their feasibility and accuracy. Based on
this testing, FPS will establish comprehensive performance measures in
fiscal year 2010. Further, FPS is currently developing additional
information collection and analysis tools to allow these comprehensive
measures to be fully implemented.
To specifically address the most recent oversight issues reported
by GAO, FPS has responded to improve oversight of it contract guard
force. For example, within hours of learning of lapses in screening
procedures in selected facilities, FPS:
Established a National study group to determine the causes
of the lapses and to recommend measures to prevent their
recurrence;
Authorized overtime to increase the frequency of contract
guard post inspections;
Required contract guards to complete additional training in
magnetometer and X-ray screening operations and techniques; and
Identified contract guards with expired certifications and
qualifications and brought them into compliance with contract
provisions or removed them.
In addition to these measures, FPS established a Covert Testing
Working Group and tasked its members to develop a Covert Testing
Program to enhance and complement on-going overt efforts to improve
oversight and promote attentiveness and professionalism of the contract
guard force. The working group has developed a draft program that will
contribute to a multi-faceted approach to achieve FPS strategic goals
effectively and efficiently and to ensure secure facilities and safe
occupants. This approach will be integrated with FPS' formal program
review process, which facilitates data analysis management and
consistent follow-up to ensure that corrective actions and identified
policy and training deficiencies are adequately addressed and resolved.
We anticipate that the new policy directive to implement the program
will be in place no later than December 11, 2009.
I thank you for your time today. I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss the Federal Protective Service's transition and progress. I
will be happy to answer any questions from the committee.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Commissioner Peck to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. PECK, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS
SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Peck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member,
Congressman King. Thank you for inviting GSA to come to this
hearing this morning.
Mr. Chairman, you noted the range of our buildings, 354
million square feet of buildings that house 1 million Federal
tenants all around the country. I think what I would like to do
most is to put the issue of security in context.
We always say that we have no more important mission in
GSA, a mission which we share with the Federal Protective
Service, of providing for the security of the people who work
in our Federal buildings, and for the citizens who come to
visit.
It is important to note that this is an incredibly
difficult undertaking, because our buildings, by and large, are
not high-security installations in the traditional sense of a
place where you can surround it with double concertina wire and
high-intensity lighting, and keep everybody out.
On the contrary, we invite the public into our buildings.
They paid for the buildings. The people who work in those
buildings serve the public. So, it is a balance that we have to
maintain, and it makes security quite a bit more difficult than
it is in other contexts.
Second, in our buildings we have agencies with a wide range
of responsibilities--and, commensurately, a wide range of
threats against them--from law enforcement agencies, courts,
U.S. attorneys' offices, to agencies like Social Security and
CIS, who are there to serve people who have business to conduct
with the Government.
Security is something that happens in a continuum,
beginning with intelligence, with the efforts of our military
overseas to disrupt those foreign threats against us, and
moving into technology in our buildings, and also the human
assets, which is the focus mostly of your hearing today. But it
is important for us to work on, and we are working with FPS and
other Federal agencies on defining what the threats are, and
what are those threats that we can reasonably and most
effectively mitigate by measures in our buildings.
As I said, some measures against threats have to be taken
outside our buildings. Then, there are those threats which we
need to accept, in a way, as a risk of doing business in a
democracy. All of that makes this a very complicated job, and a
job which requires a look at each and every Federal facility as
a separate security issue.
The question of what we do when we get down to what I often
refer to as the last line of defense, the human assets we have
in the buildings, which are mostly contract guards, but also
Federal Protective Service officers.
There are lots of issues which we are going to bring up
today. They have to do with training. They have to do with
costs. Whether the guards that we employ are Federal employees
or private sector, we need to consider how much money it is
going to cost us.
I think there may be opportunities in which we can find
that we need fewer human assets on site, and replace them
possibly with more roving patrols and with different sorts of
technology and different sorts of access procedures to our
buildings.
I would just tell you, we are working as hard as we can
with the Federal Protective Service. We have liaisons in each
one of our 11 regions, who are specifically dedicated to
working with the Federal Protective Service on doing asset
security risk analyses on our buildings, and working day-to-day
to make sure that security is done as seamlessly as possible.
Two days ago, we held a--Federal Protective Service, which
runs the Interagency Security Committee--held a conference in
which we discussed the physical standards which apply to the
construction and renovation of our buildings. We had some very
good conversations about the issues I have raised here about
balancing security openness and mitigating our threats in the
most effective way.
Finally I will just say, I will defer mostly to the
Department of Homeland Security and FPS on the issue that
Congressman King raised about the upcoming trial in New York. I
will just--I will note that we have had terrorist trials in
that venue before. As you know, Congressman, the State and the
city also have courts nearby. We have a lot of assets that we
rely on, quite frankly, from the city of New York and the
State. But we also do have Federal assets. We do have a pretty
robust Federal Protective Service presence in New York City.
The physical arrangement of the courthouse and lockup near
there, the detention center near there, I believe are among the
things that made us decide that this is a venue that we can
protect. But it will require more assets. It will require some
inconvenience to employees and visitors and drivers in New York
City.
Thank you, and I am happy to answer any questions,
obviously.
[The statement of Mr. Peck follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert A. Peck
November 18, 2009
Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of
this committee. My name is Robert A. Peck and I am the Commissioner of
the General Services Administration's (GSA's) Public Buildings Service
(PBS). Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss
GSA's role and expectations in the security of our facilities.
We have no more important responsibility than safeguarding our
roughly 1 million Federal tenants, housed in GSA facilities, and their
visitors in a manner that reflects the values of American democracy and
the responsibility of our Government to be open to the citizens it
serves. Our buildings must be secure and at the same time must also be
inviting and a good neighbor in their communities. This is a tall
order.
GSA's PBS is one of the largest and most diversified public real
estate organizations in the world. Our real estate inventory consists
of over 8,600 owned and leased assets with nearly 354 million square
feet of space across all 50 States, 6 territories, and the District of
Columbia. Our portfolio is composed primarily of office buildings,
courthouses, land ports of entry, and warehouses. GSA's goal is to
manage these assets efficiently, while delivering and maintaining
superior workplaces at best value to our client agencies and the
American taxpayer. Achieving this goal requires a complete
understanding of the threats facing our facilities, the accurate and
timely identification of vulnerabilities, and a clear understanding of
the tools available to us to overcome the vulnerabilities and counter
the threats.
We rely on the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to conduct risk
assessments of our facilities. These assessments and additional input
from FPS help inform how we design, acquire, and run our buildings.
Like all executive branch agencies, GSA and FPS are subject to the
security standards established by the Interagency Security Committee
(ISC). The ISC's membership includes representatives from more than 40
Executive departments and agencies, in addition to the U.S. Courts.
GSA is the only Federal agency whose mission is real property
management that is represented in the ISC. Through our participation,
we ensure that the real property perspective is included in all
standards. Specifically, PBS engages representatives from all
disciplines in developing our input: Leasing specialists, architects,
engineers, portfolio management professionals, customer service
representatives, child care center specialists, and building management
officials.
We are encouraged that the ISC is working to develop new standards
that are moving in a direction that allows greater flexibility about
risk-based allocation. At GSA, we firmly believe in the need for risk-
based allocation of resources throughout our portfolio. Even in the
area of physical security, this is particularly important. Funding and
efforts must first be focused on the highest risk facilities, and
against the highest risk threats.
GSA remains committed to providing our customers with a
comprehensive work environment to allow them to complete their mission.
We work continuously with FPS to assess, support, and safeguard our
Federal facilities. I met recently with FPS leadership in Kansas City
to advance the risk-based allocation approach to security.
In closing, I'd like to reiterate that PBS is committed to
providing our customers with the most effective working environments we
can. Current standards dictate security measures that applied across a
broad range of facilities. Integrating a new risk-based approach
provides us with the most flexibility to address site-specific
conditions and balance necessary security measures with openness of our
public buildings.
I look forward to working with the committee as we continue to make
great strides in this area. Thank you for allowing me to testify before
you today. I welcome any questions you might have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Director Goldstein to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK L. GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Federal
Protective Service and its progress in meeting its mission of
protecting Federal buildings, employees, and citizens.
As you know, FPS, within the Department of Homeland
Security, is responsible for providing law enforcement and
related security services for nearly 9,000 Federal facilities.
In 2004, GAO identified a set of key protection practices
from the collective practices of Federal agencies in the
private sector, which included allocation of resources, using
risk management, strategic management of human capital,
leveraging technology, information sharing and coordination,
and performance measurement and testing.
My testimony today is based on a GAO report being released,
as well as past reports and testimonies, and discusses
limitations FPS faces in protecting GSA buildings and resulting
vulnerabilities, and actions that FPS was taking.
To perform this work, we used the key practices as our
criteria, visited a number of GSA buildings, surveyed tenant
agencies, analyzed pertinent laws, and also conducted covert
testings at 10 judgmentally selected, high-security buildings
in four cities.
FPS's approach to securing GSA buildings reflects some
aspects of key protection practices. However, GAO found
limitations in each area and identified vulnerabilities.
More specifically, FPS faces obstacles in allocating
resources using risk management. FPS uses an outdated risk
assessment tool and a subjective, time-consuming process to
assess risk. In addition, resource allocation decisions are the
responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies. This leads to
uncertainty about whether risks are being mitigated.
Also, FPS continues to struggle with funding challenges
that impede its ability to allocate resources effectively, and
a lack of equity remains in the fees paid by tenants.
Second, FPS does not have a strategic human capital
management plan to guide its current and future workforce
planning efforts, making it difficult to discern how effective
its transition to an inspector-based workforce will be.
Furthermore, because contract guards were not properly
trained and did not comply with post orders, GAO investigators
concealing components for an improvised explosive device passed
undetected by FPS guards at 10 of 10 high-security facilities
in four major cities. Many contract guards lack required
certifications to stand post in Federal facilities.
Third, FPS lacks a systematic approach for leveraging
technology, and inspectors do not provide tenant agencies with
an analysis of alternative technologies, the cost and the
associated reduction in risk. As a result, there is limited
assurance that the recommendations inspectors make are the best
available alternatives, and tenant agencies must make resource
allocation decisions without key information.
Fourth, FPS has developed information-sharing and
coordination mechanisms with GSA and tenant agencies, but there
is inconsistency in the type of information shared and the
frequency of coordination.
Fifth, FPS lacks a reliable data management system for
accurately tracking performance measurement and testing.
Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and
improve the effectiveness of its efforts, allocate resources,
or make informed risk management decisions.
FPS is taking steps to better protect GSA buildings. For
example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program, and
has recently focused on improving the oversight of its contract
guard program. Additionally, GAO has recommended that FPS
implements specific actions to make greater use of key
practices and otherwise improve security.
However, FPS has not completed many related corrective
actions, and FPS faces implementation challenges to achieve
those objectives, as well.
Nonetheless, adhering to key practices and implementing
GAO's recommendations in specific areas would enhance FPS's
chances for future success, and could position FPS to become a
leader and benchmark agency for facility protection in the
Federal Government.
This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions the committee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Goldstein
November 18, 2009
GAO HIGHLIGHTS
Highlights of GAO-10-236T, a testimony to the Chairman, Committee
on Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing law enforcement
and related security services for nearly 9,000 Federal facilities under
the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA).
In 2004 GAO identified a set of key protection practices from the
collective practices of Federal agencies and the private sector, which
included allocation of resources using risk management, strategic
management of human capital, leveraging of technology, information
sharing and coordination, and performance measurement and testing.
This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and
discusses: (1) Limitations FPS faces in protecting GSA buildings and
resulting vulnerabilities; and (2) actions FPS is taking. To perform
this work, GAO used its key practices as criteria, visited a number of
GSA buildings, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed pertinent laws and
DHS and GSA documents, conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally
selected high-security buildings in four cities, and interviewed
officials from DHS, GSA, and tenant agencies, and contractors and
guards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no new recommendations in this testimony. DHS concurred
with GAO's past recommendations for FPS, but FPS has not completed many
related corrective actions.
HOMELAND SECURITY.--GREATER ATTENTION TO KEY PRACTICES WOULD HELP
ADDRESS SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AT FEDERAL BUILDINGS
What GAO Found
FPS's approach to securing GSA buildings reflects some aspects of
key protection practices; however, GAO found limitations in each area
and identified vulnerabilities. More specifically:
FPS faces obstacles in allocating resources using risk
management. FPS uses an outdated risk assessment tool and a
subjective, time-consuming process to assess risk. In addition,
resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and
tenant agencies. This leads to uncertainty about whether risks
are being mitigated. Also, FPS continues to struggle with
funding challenges that impede its ability to allocate
resources effectively.
FPS does not have a strategic human capital management plan
to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts,
making it difficult to discern how effective its transition to
an inspector-based workforce will be. Furthermore, because
contract guards were not properly trained and did not comply
with post orders, GAO investigators concealing components for
an improvised explosive device passed undetected by FPS guards
at 10 of 10 high-security facilities in four major cities.
FPS lacks a systematic approach for leveraging technology,
and inspectors do not provide tenant agencies with an analysis
of alternative technologies, their cost, and the associated
reduction in risk. As a result, there is limited assurance that
the recommendations inspectors make are the best available
alternatives, and tenant agencies must make resource allocation
decisions without key information.
FPS has developed information sharing and coordination
mechanisms with GSA and tenant agencies, but there is
inconsistency in the type of information shared and the
frequency of coordination.
FPS lacks a reliable data management system for accurately
tracking performance measurement and testing. Without such a
system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the
effectiveness of its efforts, allocate resources, or make
informed risk management decisions.
FPS is taking actions to better protect GSA buildings, in part as a
result of GAO's recommendations. For example, FPS is developing a new
risk assessment program and has recently focused on improving oversight
of its contract guard program. Additionally, GAO has recommended that
FPS implement specific actions to make greater use of key practices and
otherwise improve security. However, FPS has not completed many related
corrective actions and FPS faces implementation challenges as well.
Nonetheless, adhering to key practices and implementing GAO's
recommendations in specific areas would enhance FPS's chances for
future success, and could position FPS to become a leader and benchmark
agency for facility protection in the Federal Government.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: We are pleased to be
here to discuss the Federal Protective Service's (FPS) efforts to
ensure the protection of the more than 1 million Government employees,
as well as members of the public, who work in and visit the nearly
9,000 Federal facilities that are under the control and custody of the
General Services Administration (GSA). There has not been a large-scale
attack on a domestic Federal facility since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Nevertheless, the shooting death
this past year of a guard at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum--though
not a Federal facility--demonstrates the continued vulnerability of
public buildings. Moreover, the challenge of protecting Federal real
property is one of the major reasons for GAO's designation of Federal
real property management as a high-risk area.\1\
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\1\ GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, DC:
Jan. 1, 2009).
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FPS--within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is
authorized to protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are
under the control and custody of GSA, as well as the persons on the
property; to enforce Federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting
GSA buildings and persons on the property; and to investigate offenses
against these buildings and persons.\2\ FPS conducts its mission by
providing security services through two types of activities: (1)
Physical security activities--conducting building risk assessments of
facilities and recommending countermeasures aimed at preventing
incidents at facilities--and (2) law enforcement activities--
proactively patrolling facilities, responding to incidents, conducting
criminal investigations, and exercising arrest authority. To accomplish
its mission of protecting Federal facilities, FPS currently has a
budget \3\ of around $1 billion, nearly 1,200 full-time employees, and
about 15,000 contract security guards deployed at Federal facilities
across the country.
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\2\ 40 U.S.C. 1315.
\3\ Funding for FPS is provided through revenues and collections of
security fees charged to building tenants in FPS-protected property.
The revenues and collections are credited to FPS's appropriation and
are available until expended for the protection of Federally-owned and
leased buildings and for FPS's operations.
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We have identified a set of key facility protection practices from
the collective practices of Federal agencies and the private sector to
provide a framework for guiding agencies' protection efforts and
addressing challenges.\4\ The key practices essentially form the
foundation of a comprehensive approach to building protection. We have
used these key practices to evaluate how FPS protects GSA buildings and
will focus on the following five key practices for this testimony:\5\
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\4\ GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate
Federal Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key
Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington, DC: Nov. 30, 2004).
\5\ We did not include the key practice of aligning assets to
mission because GSA, not FPS, controls the asset inventory.
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Allocation of resources using risk management.--Identify
threats, assess vulnerabilities, and determine critical assets
to protect, and use information on these and other elements to
develop countermeasures and prioritize the allocation of
resources as conditions change.
Strategic management of human capital.--Manage human capital
to maximize Government performance and ensure accountability in
asset protection through, for example, recruitment of skilled
staff, training, and retention.
Leveraging of technology.--Select technologies to enhance
asset security through methods like access control, detection,
and surveillance systems. This involves not only using
technology, but also ensuring positive returns on investments
in the form of reduced vulnerabilities.
Information sharing and coordination.--Establish means of
coordinating and sharing security and threat information
internally, within large organizations, and externally, with
other Government entities and the private sector.
Performance measurement and testing.--Use metrics, such as
implementation timelines, and active testing, such as
unannounced on-site assessments, to ensure accountability for
achieving program goals and improving security at facilities.
This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies \6\ and
discusses: (1) Limitations FPS faces in protecting GSA buildings and
resulting vulnerabilities and (2) actions FPS is taking to address
challenges. Work for these past reports and testimonies included using
our key practices as a framework for assessing facility protection
efforts by FPS management and at individual buildings. We also visited
FPS regions and selected GSA buildings to assess FPS activities first-
hand. We surveyed a sample of 1,398 Federal officials who work in GSA
buildings in FPS's 11 regions and are responsible for collaborating
with FPS on security issues. Additionally, we reviewed training and
certification data for 663 randomly selected guards in 6 of FPS's 11
regions. Because of the sensitivity of some of the information in our
prior work, we cannot specifically identify the locations of the
incidents discussed. We also conducted covert testing at 10
judgmentally selected high-risk facilities in four cities. For all of
our work, we reviewed related laws and directives, interviewed
officials, and analyzed documents and data from DHS and GSA, and
interviewed tenant agency representatives, contractors, and guards. The
previous work on which this testimony is based was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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\6\ This testimony draws upon five primary sources. We reported on
FPS's allocation of resources using risk management, leveraging of
technology, and information sharing and coordination in GAO, Homeland
Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal
Protective Service's Approach to Facility Protection, GAO-10-142
(Washington, DC: Oct. 23, 2009). We reported on FPS's strategic
management of human capital in GAO, Homeland Security: Federal
Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial Steps to Address Its
Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist, GAO-09-1047T (Washington,
DC: Sept. 23, 2009); GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show
Federal Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is
Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO-09-
859T (Washington, DC: July 8, 2009); and GAO, Homeland Security:
Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human Capital Planning and
Better Communicate with Tenants, GAO-09-749 (Washington, DC: July 30,
2009). We reported on FPS's performance management and testing in GAO,
Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several
Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities, GAO-
08-683 (Washington, DC: June 11, 2008).
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FPS FACES CHALLENGES IN MANY AREAS, RAISING CONCERNS ABOUT
VULNERABILITIES
Risk Management Approach Is Inadequate and Has Limitations
FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to GSA and tenant
agencies; however, FPS's ability to influence the allocation of
resources using risk management is limited because resource allocation
decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies, which may
be unwilling to fund the countermeasures FPS recommends. We have found
that under the current risk management approach, the security equipment
that FPS recommends and is responsible for acquiring, installing, and
maintaining may not be implemented if tenant agencies are unwilling to
fund it.\7\ For example, in August 2007 FPS recommended a security
equipment countermeasure--the upgrade of a surveillance system shared
by two high-security locations that, according to FPS officials, would
cost around $650,000. While members of one building security committee
(BSC) told us they approved spending between $350,000 and $375,000 to
fund their agencies' share of the countermeasure, they said that the
BSC of the other location would not approve funding; therefore, FPS
could not upgrade the system it had recommended. In November 2008 FPS
officials told us that they were moving ahead with the project by
drawing on unexpended revenues from the two locations' building-
specific fees and the funding that was approved by one of the BSCs.
Furthermore, FPS officials, in May 2009, told us that all cameras had
been repaired and all monitoring and recording devices had been
replaced, and that the two BSCs had approved additional upgrades and
that FPS was implementing them. As we reported in June 2008, we have
found other instances in which recommended security countermeasures
were not implemented at some of the buildings we visited because BSC
members could not agree on which countermeasures to implement or were
unable to obtain funding from their agencies.\8\
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\7\ GAO-10-142.
\8\ GAO-08-683.
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Compounding this situation, FPS takes a building-by-building
approach to risk management, using an outdated risk assessment tool to
create building security assessments (BSA), rather than taking a more
comprehensive, strategic approach and assessing risks among all
buildings in GSA's inventory and recommending countermeasure priorities
to GSA and tenant agencies. As a result, the current approach provides
less assurance that the most critical risks at Federal buildings across
the country are being prioritized and mitigated. Also, GSA and tenant
agencies have concerns about the quality and timeliness of FPS's risk
assessment services and are taking steps to obtain their own risk
assessments. For example, GSA officials told us they have had
difficulties receiving timely risk assessments from FPS for space GSA
is considering leasing. These risk assessments must be completed before
GSA can take possession of the property and lease it to tenant
agencies. An inefficient risk assessment process for new lease projects
can add costs for GSA and create problems for both GSA and tenant
agencies that have been planning for a move. Therefore, GSA is updating
a risk assessment tool that it began developing in 1998, but has not
recently used, to better ensure the timeliness and comprehensiveness of
these risk assessments. GSA officials told us that in the future they
may use this tool for other physical security activities, such as
conducting other types of risk assessments and determining security
countermeasures for new facilities. Additionally, although tenant
agencies have typically taken responsibility for assessing risk and
securing the interior of their buildings, assessing exterior risks will
require additional expertise and resources. This is an inefficient
approach considering that tenant agencies are paying FPS to assess
building security.
Finally, FPS continues to struggle with funding challenges that
impede its ability to allocate resources to more effectively manage
risk. FPS faces challenges in ensuring that its fee-based funding
structure accounts for the varying levels of risk and types of services
provided at Federal facilities. FPS funds its operations through
security fees charged to tenant agencies. However, FPS's basic security
fee, which funds most of its operations, does not account for the risk
faced by specific buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost
of providing services, raising questions about equity.\9\ FPS charges
Federal agencies the same basic security fee regardless of the
perceived threat to a particular building or agency. In fiscal year
2009, FPS charged 66 cents per square foot for basic security. Although
FPS categorizes buildings according to security levels based on its
assessment of each building's risk and size, this assessment does not
affect the security fee FPS charges. For example, Level I facilities
typically face less risk because they are generally small storefront-
type operations with a low level of public contact, such as a Social
Security Administration office. However, these facilities are charged
the same basic security fee of 66 cents per square foot as a Level IV
facility that has a high volume of public contact and may contain high-
risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies and highly sensitive
Government records. We also have reported that basing Government fees
on the cost of providing a service promotes equity, especially when the
cost of providing the service differs significantly among different
users, as is the case with FPS. In our June 2008 report, we recommended
that FPS improve its use of the fee-based system by developing a method
to accurately account for the cost of providing security services to
tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee structure takes into
consideration the varying levels of risk and service provided at GSA
facilities.\10\ We also recommended an evaluation of whether FPS's
current use of a fee-based system or an alternative funding mechanism
is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency. While DHS agreed
with these recommendations, FPS has not fully implemented them.
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\9\ Some of the basic security services covered by this fee include
law enforcement activities at GSA facilities, preliminary
investigations, the capture and detention of suspects, and completion
of BSAs.
\10\ GAO-08-683.
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Improvements Needed in Human Capital Planning and Contract Guard
Management
FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan to guide its
current and future workforce planning efforts, including effective
processes for training, retention, and staff development. Instead, FPS
has developed a short-term hiring plan that does not include key human
capital principles, such as determining an agency's optimum staffing
needs. Moreover, FPS has been transitioning to an inspector-based
workforce, thus eliminating the police officer position and relying
primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical
security activities. FPS believes that this change will ensure that its
staff has the right mix of technical skills and training needed to
accomplish its mission. However, FPS's ability to provide law
enforcement services under its inspector-based workforce approach may
be diminished because FPS will rely on its inspectors to provide these
services and physical security services simultaneously. In the absence
of a strategic human capital plan, it is difficult to discern how
effective an inspector-based workforce approach will be. The lack of a
human capital plan has also contributed to inconsistent approaches in
how FPS regions and headquarters are managing human capital activities.
For example, FPS officials in some of the regions we visited said they
implement their own procedures for managing their workforce, including
processes for performance feedback, training, and mentoring.
Additionally, FPS does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge,
skills, and abilities. These elements are necessary for successful
workforce planning activities, such as identifying and filling skill
gaps and succession planning. We recently recommended that FPS improve
how it collects data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and
abilities to help it better manage and understand current and future
workforce needs; and use these data in the development and
implementation of a long-term strategic human capital plan that
addresses key principles for effective strategic workforce
planning.\11\ DHS concurred with our recommendations.
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\11\ GAO-09-749.
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Furthermore, FPS did not meet its fiscal year 2008 mandated
deadline of increasing its staffing level to no fewer than 1,200 full-
time employees by July 31, 2008, and instead met this staffing level in
April 2009.\12\ FPS's staff has steadily declined since 2004 and
critical law enforcement services have been reduced or eliminated. For
example, FPS has eliminated its use of proactive patrol to prevent or
detect criminal violations at many GSA buildings. According to some FPS
officials at regions we visited, not providing proactive patrol has
limited its law enforcement personnel to a reactive force.\13\
Additionally, officials stated that in the past, proactive patrol
permitted its police officers and inspectors to identify and apprehend
individuals that were surveilling GSA buildings. In contrast, when FPS
is not able to patrol Federal buildings, there is increased potential
for illegal entry and other criminal activity. In one city we visited,
a deceased individual had been found in a vacant GSA facility that was
not regularly patrolled by FPS. FPS officials stated that the deceased
individual had been inside the building for approximately 3 months.
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\12\ This mandate in DHS's fiscal year 2008 appropriation act was
effective for fiscal year 2008 only, since mandates in annual
appropriation acts are presumed to be applicable for that fiscal year
unless specified to the contrary. DHS's appropriation act for fiscal
year 2009 also mandated that FPS have no fewer than 1,200 full-time
employees. See Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, 121 Stat. 1844, 2051-2052
(2007) and Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div D. 1222 Stat. 3574, 3659-3660
(2008).
\13\ GAO-08-683.
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FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have
the training and certifications required to be deployed to a GSA
building.\14\ We have noted that the effectiveness of a risk management
approach depends on the involvement of experienced and professional
security personnel.\15\ Further, that the chances of omitting major
steps in the risk management process increase if personnel are not well
trained in applying risk management. FPS requires that all prospective
guards complete about 128 hours of training including 8 hours of X-ray
and magnetometer training. However, in one region, FPS has not provided
the X-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 guards since 2004.
Nonetheless, these guards are assigned to posts at GSA buildings. X-ray
training is critical because guards control access points at buildings.
Insufficient X-ray and magnetometer training may have contributed to
several incidents at GSA buildings in which guards were negligent in
carrying out their responsibilities. For example, at a Level IV \16\
Federal facility in a major metropolitan area, an infant in a carrier
was sent through an X-ray machine due to a guard's negligence.\17\
Specifically, according to an FPS official in that region, a woman with
her infant in a carrier attempted to enter the facility, which has
child care services. While retrieving her identification, the woman
placed the carrier on the X-ray machine. Because the guard was not
paying attention and the machine's safety features had been
disabled,\18\ the infant in the carrier was sent through the X-ray
machine. FPS investigated the incident and dismissed the guard;
however, the guard subsequently sued FPS for not providing the required
X-ray training. The guard won the suit because FPS could not produce
any documentation to show that the guard had received the training,
according to an FPS official. In addition, FPS officials from that
region could not tell us whether the X-ray machine's safety features
had been repaired. Additionally, we found that FPS does not have a
fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying guard training and
certification requirements. We reviewed 663 randomly selected guard
records and found that 62 percent of the guards had at least one
expired certification, including a declaration that guards have not
been convicted of domestic violence, which make them ineligible to
carry firearms.
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\14\ GAO-09-859T.
\15\ GAO-05-49.
\16\ At the time of our review, a Level IV facility had more than
450 Federal employees, more than 150,000 square feet, a high volume of
public contact, and tenant agencies that could include high-risk law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, courts, judicial offices, and
highly sensitive Government records.
\17\ X-ray machines are hazardous because of the potential
radiation exposure. In contrast, magnetometers do not emit radiation
and are used to detect metal.
\18\ With this safety feature disabled, the X-ray machine's belt
was operating continuously although the guard was not present.
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We also found that some guards were not provided building-specific
training, such as what actions to take during a building evacuation or
a building emergency.\19\ This lack of training may have contributed to
several incidents where guards neglected their assigned
responsibilities. For example,
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\19\ GAO-09-859T.
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at a Level IV facility, the guards did not follow evacuation
procedures and left two access points unattended, thereby
leaving the facility vulnerable;
at a Level IV facility, the guard allowed employees to enter
the building while an incident involving suspicious packages
was being investigated; and,
at a Level III facility,\20\ the guard allowed employees to
access the area affected by a suspicious package, which was
required to be evacuated.
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\20\ At the time of our review, a Level III facility had between
151 and 450 Federal employees, 80,000 to 150,000 square feet, and a
moderate to high volume of public contact.
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FPS has limited assurance that its guards are complying with post
orders.\21\ It does not have specific National guidance on when and how
guard inspections should be performed. FPS's inspections of guard posts
at GSA buildings are inconsistent and the quality varied in the six
regions we examined. We also found that guard inspections are typically
completed by FPS during regular business hours and in locations where
FPS has a field office, and seldom on nights or weekends. However, on
an occasion when FPS officials conducted a post inspection at night,
they found a guard asleep at his post after taking a pain-killer
prescription drug. FPS also found other incidents at high-security
facilities where guards neglected or inadequately performed their
assigned responsibilities. For example, a guard failed to recognize or
did not properly X-ray a box containing handguns at the loading dock at
a facility. FPS became aware of the situation because the handguns were
delivered to FPS.
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\21\ GAO-09-859T.
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Because guards were not properly trained and did not comply with
post orders, our investigators--with the components for an improvised
explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons--passed undetected
through access points controlled by FPS guards at 10 of 10 Level IV
facilities in four major cities where GAO conducted covert tests.\22\
The specific components for this device, items used to conceal the
device components, and the methods of concealment that we used during
our covert testing are classified, and thus are not discussed in this
testimony. Of the 10 Level IV facilities our investigators penetrated,
8 were Government-owned and 2 were leased facilities. The facilities
included district offices of a U.S. Senator and a U.S. Representative
as well as agencies of the Departments of Homeland Security,
Transportation, Health and Human Services, Justice, State, and others.
The two leased facilities did not have any guards at the access control
points at the time of our testing. Using publicly available
information, our investigators identified a type of device that a
terrorist could use to cause damage to a Federal facility and threaten
the safety of Federal workers and the general public. The device was an
IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive and a low-yield
detonator--and included a variety of materials not typically brought
into a Federal facility by employees or the public. Although the
detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators determined
that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive and cause
significantly more damage. To ensure safety during this testing, we
took precautions so that the IED would not explode. For example, we
lowered the concentration level of the material.\23\ To gain entry into
each of the 10 Level IV facilities, our investigators showed a photo
identification (a State driver's license) and walked through the
magnetometers without incident. Our investigators also placed their
briefcases with the IED material on the conveyor belt of the X-ray
machine, but the guards detected nothing. Furthermore, our
investigators did not receive any secondary searches from the guards
that might have revealed the IED material that they brought into the
facilities. At security checkpoints at 3 of the 10 facilities, our
investigators noticed that the guard was not looking at the X-ray
screen as some of the IED components passed through the machine. A
guard questioned an item in the briefcase at one of the 10 facilities
but the materials were subsequently allowed through the X-ray machines.
At each facility, once past the guard screening checkpoint, our
investigators proceeded to a restroom and assembled the IED. At some of
the facilities, the restrooms were locked. Our investigators gained
access by asking employees to let them in. With the IED completely
assembled in a briefcase, our investigators walked freely around
several floors of the facilities and into various Executive and
Legislative branch offices, as described above.
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\22\ GAO-09-859T.
\23\ Tests that we performed at a National laboratory in February
2006 and July 2007 demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices
could cause severe damage to a Federal facility and threaten the safety
of Federal workers and the general public. Our investigators obtained
the components for these devices at local stores and over the internet
for less than $150.
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Systematic Approach for Cost-Effectively Leveraging Technology Is
Lacking
Leveraging technology is a key practice over which FPS has somewhat
more control, but FPS does not have a comprehensive approach for
identifying, acquiring, and assessing the cost-effectiveness of the
security equipment that its inspectors recommend. Individual FPS
inspectors have considerable latitude in determining which technologies
and other countermeasures to recommend, but the inspectors receive
little training and guidance in how to assess the relative cost-
effectiveness of these technologies or determine the expected return on
investment. FPS officials told us that inspectors make technology
decisions based on the initial training they receive, personal
knowledge and experience, and contacts with vendors. FPS inspectors
receive some training in identifying and recommending security
technologies as part of their initial FPS physical security training.
Since FPS was transferred to DHS in 2003, its refresher training
program for inspectors has primarily focused on law enforcement.
Consequently, inspectors lack recurring technology training.
Additionally, FPS does not provide inspectors with specialized guidance
and standards for cost-effectively selecting technology. In the absence
of specific guidance, inspectors follow the Department of Justice
minimum countermeasure standards \24\ and other relevant Interagency
Security Committee standards,\25\ but these standards do not assist
users in selecting cost-effective technologies. Moreover, the document
that FPS uses to convey its countermeasure recommendations to GSA and
tenant agencies--the BSA executive summary--includes cost estimates but
no analysis of alternatives. As a result, GSA and tenant agencies have
limited assurance that the investments in technologies and other
countermeasures that FPS inspectors recommend are cost-effective,
consistent across buildings, and the best available alternatives.
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\24\ U.S. Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of
Federal Facilities, (Washington, DC, June 28, 1995). The Department of
Justice standards recommend minimum security measures for Federal
buildings.
\25\ Following the Oklahoma City bombing, Executive Order 12977
called for the creation of an interagency security committee to address
the quality and effectiveness of physical security requirements for
Federal facilities by developing and evaluating security standards. The
Interagency Security Committee has representation from all major
Federal departments and agencies.
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For example, at one location we visited, an explosives detection
dog was used to screen mail that is distributed elsewhere.\26\ In 2006,
FPS had recommended, based on the results of its risk analysis, the use
of this dog and an X-ray machine, although at the time of our visit
only the dog was being used. Moreover, the dog and handler work 12-hour
shifts Monday through Friday when most mail is delivered and shipped,
and the dog needs a break every 7 minutes. The GSA regional security
officials \27\ we spoke with questioned whether this approach was more
effective and efficient than using an on-site enhanced X-ray machine
that could detect biological and chemical agents as well as explosives
and could be used anytime. In accordance with its policies, FPS
conducted a BSA of the site in 2008 and determined that using an
enhanced X-ray machine and an explosives detection dog would bring the
projected threat rating of the site down from moderate to low. FPS
included estimated one-time installation and recurring costs in the BSA
and executive summary, but did not include the estimated cost and risk
of the following mail screening options: (1) Usage of the dog and the
additional countermeasure; (2) usage of the additional countermeasure
only; and (3) usage of the dog only. Consequently, tenant agency
representatives would have to investigate the cost and risk
implications of these options on their own to make an informed resource
allocation decision.
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\26\ GAO-10-142.
\27\ In 2006 GSA established the Building Security and Policy
Division within its Public Buildings Service to oversee its security
operations and policies and liaise with FPS. Additionally, the division
developed the Regional Security Network, which consists of several
staff per GSA region to further enhance coordination with FPS at the
regional and building levels, and to carry out GSA security policy in
collaboration with FPS and tenant agencies.
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Information Sharing and Coordination Practices Lack Consistency
It is critical that FPS--as the provider of law enforcement and
related security services for GSA buildings--and GSA--as the manager of
these properties--have well-established lines of communication with
each other and with tenant agencies to ensure that all parties are
aware of the ever-changing risks in a dynamic threat environment and
that FPS and GSA are taking appropriate actions to reduce
vulnerabilities. While FPS and GSA top management have established
communication channels, the types of information shared at the regional
and building levels are inconsistent, and overall, FPS and GSA disagree
over what information should be shared. For example, the memorandum of
agreement between DHS and GSA specifies that FPS will provide quarterly
briefings at the regional level, but FPS had not been providing them
consistently across all regions. FPS resumed the practice in October
2008, however, GSA security officials said that these briefings mostly
focused on crime statistics and did not constitute comprehensive threat
analyses. Additionally, FPS is only required to meet formally with GSA
property managers and tenant agencies as part of the BSA process--an
event that occurs every 2 to 5 years, depending on a building's
security level. We identified information sharing gaps at several Level
III and IV sites that we visited, and found that in some cases these
deficiencies led to decreased security awareness and increased
risk.\28\
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\28\ GAO-10-142.
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At one location, we observed during our interview with the
building security committee (BSC) that the committee members
were confused about procedures for screening visitors who are
passengers in employees' cars that enter the building via the
parking garage. One of the tenants recounted an incident in
which a security guard directed the visitor to walk through the
garage to an appropriate screening station. According to the
GSA property manager, this action created a safety hazard. The
GSA property manager knew the appropriate screening procedure,
but told us there was no written policy on the procedure that
members could access. Additionally, BSC members told us that
the committee met as needed.
At one location, FPS had received inaccurate square footage
data from GSA and had therefore overcharged the primary tenant
agency for a guard post that protected space shared by all the
tenants. According to the GSA property manager, once GSA was
made aware of the problem, the agency obtained updated
information and worked with the tenant agencies to develop a
cost-sharing plan for the guard post, which made the primary
tenant agency's security expenses somewhat more equitable. BSC
members told us that the committee met regularly.
At one location, members of a BSC told us that they met as
needed, although even when they hold meetings, one of the main
tenant agencies typically does not participate. GSA officials
commented that this tenant adheres to its agency's building
security protocols and does not necessarily follow GSA's tenant
policies and procedures, which GSA thinks creates security
risks for the entire building.
At one location, tenant agency representatives and officials
from FPS told us they met regularly, but GSA officials told us
they were not invited to these meetings. GSA officials at this
location told us that they invite FPS to their property
management meetings for that location, but FPS does not attend.
GSA officials also said they do not receive timely incident
information for the site from FPS and suggested that increased
communication among the agencies would help them be more
effective managers of their properties and provide tenants with
better customer service.
At one location, GSA undertook a major renovation project
beginning in April 2007. FPS, GSA, and tenant agency
representatives did not all meet together regularly to make
security preparations or manage security operations during
construction. FPS officials told us they had not been invited
to project meetings, although GSA officials told us that they
had invited FPS and that FPS attended some meetings. In May
2008, FPS discovered that specific surveillance equipment had
been removed. As of May 2009, FPS officials told us they did
not know who had removed the equipment and were working with
tenant agency representatives to recover it. However in June
2009 tenant agency representatives told us that they believed
FPS was fully aware that the equipment had been removed in
December 2007.\29\
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\29\ In June 2009 tenant agency representatives told us that at all
times, they had been aware of the location of the equipment and assured
proper safeguarding of the equipment during the reconstruction process.
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Additionally, we conducted a survey of GSA tenant agencies and
found that they had mixed views about some of the services they pay FPS
to provide.\30\ Notably, the survey results indicated that the roles
and responsibilities of FPS and tenant agencies are unclear, primarily
because on average about one-third of tenant agencies could not comment
on how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with FPS's level of
communication of its services, partly because they had little to no
interaction with FPS officers. Although FPS plans to implement
education and outreach initiatives to improve customer service to
tenant agencies, it will face challenges because of its lack of
complete and accurate contact data. During the course of our review, we
found that approximately 53 percent of the e-mail addresses and 27
percent of the telephone numbers for designated points of contacts were
missing from FPS's contact database and the database required a
substantial amount of revising. Complete and accurate contact
information for FPS's customers is critical for information sharing and
an essential component of any customer service initiative. Therefore,
to improve its services to GSA and tenant agencies, we recommended that
FPS collect and maintain an accurate and comprehensive list of all
facility-designated points of contact, as well as a system for
regularly updating this list; and develop and implement a program for
education and outreach to GSA and tenant agencies to ensure they are
aware of the current roles, responsibilities, and services provided by
FPS.\31\ DHS concurred with our recommendations.
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\30\ GAO-09-749.
\31\ GAO-09-749.
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Furthermore, while FPS and GSA acknowledge that the two
organizations are partners in protecting and securing GSA buildings,
FPS and GSA fundamentally disagree over how much of the information in
the BSA should be shared. Per the memorandum of agreement, FPS is
required to share the BSA executive summary with GSA and FPS believes
that this document contains sufficient information for GSA to make
decisions about purchasing and implementing FPS's recommended
countermeasures. However, GSA officials at all levels cite limitations
with the BSA executive summary saying, for example, that it does not
contain enough contextual information on threats and vulnerabilities to
support FPS's countermeasure recommendations and justify the expenses
that GSA and tenant agencies would incur by installing additional
countermeasures. Moreover, GSA security officials told us that FPS does
not consistently share BSA executive summaries across all regions.
Instead, GSA wants to receive BSAs in their entirety so that it can
better protect GSA buildings and the tenants who occupy them. According
to GSA, building protection functions are an integral part of its
property preservation, operation, and management responsibilities.
In a post-September 11 era, it is vital that Federal agencies work
together to share information to advance homeland security and critical
infrastructure protection efforts. Information is a crucial tool in
fighting terrorism, and the timely dissemination of that information to
the appropriate Government agency is absolutely critical to maintaining
the security of our Nation. The ability to share security-related
information can unify the efforts of Federal agencies in preventing or
minimizing terrorist attacks. However, in the absence of comprehensive
information-sharing plans, many aspects of homeland security
information sharing can be ineffective and fragmented. In 2005, we
designated information sharing for homeland security as a Government-
wide high-risk area because of the significant challenges faced in this
area \32\--challenges that are still evident today. It is critical that
FPS and GSA--which both have protection functions for GSA buildings,
their occupants, and those who visit them--reach consensus on sharing
information in a timely manner to support homeland security and
critical infrastructure protection efforts.
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\32\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, DC:
Jan. 1, 2005).
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We recently recommended that FPS reach consensus with GSA on what
information contained in the BSA is needed for GSA to fulfill its
responsibilities related to the protection of Federal buildings and
occupants, and accordingly, establish internal controls to ensure that
shared information is adequately safeguarded; guidance for employees to
use in deciding what information to protect with sensitive but
unclassified designations; provisions for training on making
designations, controlling, and sharing such information with GSA and
other entities; and a review process to evaluate how well this
information sharing process is working, with results reported to the
Secretary of Homeland Security.\33\ While DHS concurred with this
recommendation, we are concerned that the steps it described in its
response were not comprehensive enough to address the intent of the
recommendation. For example, DHS did not explicitly commit to reaching
consensus with GSA in identifying building security information that
can be shared, or to the steps we outlined in our recommendation--steps
that in our view comprise a comprehensive plan for sharing and
safeguarding sensitive information. Therefore, it is important that FPS
engage GSA in identifying what building security information can be
shared and follow the information sharing and safeguarding steps we
included in our recommendation to ensure that GSA acquires the
information it needs to protect the 9,000 buildings under its control
and custody, the Federal employees who work in them, and those who
visit them.
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\33\ GAO-10-142.
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Performance Measurement Is Limited
We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the
effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA buildings.\34\ To determine
how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect GSA buildings, FPS
has identified some output measures that are a part of the Office of
Management and Budget's Performance Assessment Rating Tool. These
measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been
deployed and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes to
respond to an incident, and the percentage of BSAs completed on time.
Some of these measures are also included in FPS's Federal facilities
security index, which is used to assess its performance. However, FPS
has not developed outcome measures to evaluate the net effect of its
efforts to protect GSA buildings. While output measures are helpful,
outcome measures are also important because they can provide FPS with
broader information on program results, such as the extent to which its
decision to move to an inspector-based workforce will enhance security
at GSA facilities or help identify the security gaps that remain at GSA
facilities and determine what action may be needed to address them. In
addition, FPS does not have a reliable data management system that will
allow it to accurately track these measures or other important measures
such as the number of crimes and other incidents occurring at GSA
facilities. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate
and improve the effectiveness of its efforts to protect Federal
employees and facilities, allocate its limited resources, or make
informed risk management decisions. For example, weaknesses in one of
FPS's countermeasure tracking systems make it difficult to accurately
track the implementation status of recommended countermeasures such as
security cameras and X-ray machines. Without this ability, FPS has
difficulty determining whether it has mitigated the risk of GSA
facilities to crime or a terrorist attack.
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\34\ GAO-08-683.
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fps is taking steps to better protect gsa buildings, but has not fully
implemented actions and faces significant challenges
While FPS is taking some actions in each of the key practice areas
to improve its ability to better protect GSA buildings. Additionally,
GAO has recommended that FPS implement specific actions to promote
greater usage of key protection practices and otherwise improve
security. However, FPS has not completed many related corrective
actions and FPS faces implementation challenges as well.
FPS Is Developing a New Program to Assess Risk, Manage Human Capital,
and Measure Performance
FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program
(RAMP), which could enhance its approach to assessing risk, managing
human capital, and measuring performance. With regard to improving the
effectiveness of FPS's risk management approach and the quality of
BSAs, FPS believes RAMP will provide inspectors with the information
needed to make more informed and defensible recommendations for
security countermeasures. FPS also anticipates that RAMP will allow
inspectors to obtain information from one electronic source, generate
reports automatically, enable FPS to track selected countermeasures
throughout their life cycle, address some concerns about the
subjectivity inherent in BSAs, and reduce the amount of time inspectors
and managers spend on administrative work. Additionally, FPS is
designing RAMP so that it will produce risk assessments that are
compliant with Interagency Security Committee standards, compatible
with the risk management framework set forth by the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan,\35\ and consistent with the business
processes outlined in the memorandum of agreement with GSA. According
to FPS, RAMP will support all components of the BSA process, including
gathering and reviewing building information; conducting and recording
interviews; assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to
develop a detailed risk profile; recommending appropriate
countermeasures; and producing BSA reports. FPS also plans to use RAMP
to track and analyze certain workforce data, contract guard program
data, and other performance data such as the types and definitions of
incidents and incident response times.
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\35\ The National Infrastructure Protection Plan was founded
through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and sets forth
National policy on how the plan's risk management framework and sector
partnership model are to be implemented by sector-specific agencies.
FPS is the agency responsible for the Government Facilities sector.
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Although FPS intends for RAMP to improve its approach to risk
assessment, human capital management, and performance measurement, it
is not clear that FPS has fully addressed some implementation issues.
For example, one issue concerns the accuracy and reliability of the
information that will be entered into RAMP. According to FPS, the
agency plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems,
including the Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System
(CERTS), into RAMP. In July 2009, we testified on the accuracy and
reliability issues associated with CERTS.\36\ FPS subsequently
conducted an audit of CERTS to determine the status of its guard
training and certification. However, the results of the audit showed
that FPS was able to verify the status for about 7,600 of its 15,000
guards. According to an FPS official, one of its regions did not meet
the deadline for submitting data to headquarters because its data were
not accurate or reliable and therefore about 1,500 guards were not
included in the audit. FPS was not able to explain why it was not able
to verify the status of the remaining 5,900 guards. In 2008, we
recommended that FPS develop and implement specific guidelines and
standards for measuring its performance and improve how it categorizes,
collects, and analyzes data to help it better manage and understand the
results of its efforts to protect GSA facilities and DHS concurred with
our recommendation.\37\ RAMP could be the vehicle through which FPS
implements these recommendations, but the use of inaccurate and
unreliable data will hamper performance measurement efforts.
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\36\ GAO-09-859T.
\37\ GAO-08-863.
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Furthermore, it is unclear whether FPS will meet the implementation
goals established in the program's proposed timeline. FPS began
designing RAMP in early 2007 and expects to implement the program in
three phases, completing its implementation by the end of fiscal year
2011. However, in June 2008, we reported that FPS was going to
implement a pilot version of RAMP in fiscal year 2009,\38\ but in May
2009, FPS officials told us they intend to implement the first phase in
the beginning of fiscal year 2010. Until RAMP components are fully
implemented, FPS will continue to rely on its current risk assessment
tool, methodology, and process, potentially leaving GSA and tenant
agencies dissatisfied. Additionally, FPS will continue to rely on its
disparate workforce data management systems and CERTS or localized
databases that have proven to be inaccurate and unreliable. We recently
recommended that FPS provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with
regular updates on the status of RAMP including the implementation
status of deliverables, clear timelines for completion of tasks and
milestones, and plans for addressing any implementation obstacles.\39\
DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that FPS will submit a
monthly report to the Secretary.
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\38\ GAO-08-683.
\39\ GAO-10-142.
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FPS's Actions to Improve Guard Management May Be Difficult to Implement
and Maintain
FPS took on a number of immediate actions with respect to contract
guard management in response to our covert testing.
In July 2009, the Director of FPS instructed Regional
Directors to accelerate the implementation of FPS's requirement
that two guard posts at Level IV facilities be inspected
weekly.
FPS, in July 2009, also required more X-ray and magnetometer
training for inspectors and guards. For example, FPS has
recently issued an information bulletin to all inspectors and
guards to provide them with information about package
screening, including examples of disguised items that may not
be detected by magnetometers or X-ray equipment. Moreover, FPS
produced a 15-minute training video designed to provide
information on bomb component detection. According to FPS, each
guard was required to read the information bulletin and watch
the DVD within 30 days.
Despite the steps FPS has taken, there are a number of factors that
will make implementing and sustaining these actions difficult. First,
FPS does not have adequate controls to monitor and track whether its 11
regions are completing these new requirements. Thus, FPS cannot say
with certainty that it is being done. According to a FPS regional
official, implementing the new requirements may present a number of
challenges, in part, because new directives appear to be based
primarily on what works well from a headquarters or National Capital
Region perspective, and not a regional perspective that reflects local
conditions and limitations in staffing resources. In addition, another
regional official estimated that his region is meeting about 10 percent
of the required oversight hours and officials in another region said
they are struggling to monitor the delivery of contractor-provided
training in the region. Second, FPS has not completed any workforce
analysis to determine if its current staff of about 930 law enforcement
security officers will be able to effectively complete the additional
inspections and provide the X-ray and magnetometer training to 15,000
guards, in addition to their current physical security and law
enforcement responsibilities. According to the Director of FPS, while
having more resources would help address the weaknesses in the guard
program, the additional resources would have to be trained and thus
could not be deployed immediately.
FPS Is Developing a Program to Standardize Equipment and Contracting
FPS is also taking steps to implement a more systematic approach to
technology acquisition by developing a National Countermeasures
Program, which could help FPS leverage technology more cost-
effectively. According to FPS, the program will establish standards and
National procurement contracts for security equipment, including X-ray
machines, magnetometers, surveillance systems, and intrusion detection
systems. FPS officials told us that instead of having inspectors search
for vendors to establish equipment acquisition, installation, and
maintenance contracts, inspectors will call an FPS mission support
center with their countermeasure recommendations and the center will
procure the services through standardized contracts. According to FPS,
the program will also include life-cycle management plans for
countermeasures. FPS officials said they established an X-ray machine
contract and that future program contracts will also explore the use of
the schedule as a source for National purchase and service contracts.
According to FPS, the National Countermeasures Program should provide
the agency with a framework to better manage its security equipment
inventory; meet its operational requirement to identify, implement, and
maintain security equipment; and respond to stakeholders' needs by
establishing Nation-wide resources, streamlining procurement
procedures, and strengthening communications with its customers. FPS
officials told us they believe this program will result in increased
efficiencies because inspectors will not have to spend their time
facilitating the establishment of contracts for security equipment
because these contracts will be standardized Nation-wide.
Although the National Countermeasures Program includes improvements
that may enhance FPS's ability to leverage technology, it does not
establish tools for assessing the cost-effectiveness of competing
technologies and countermeasures and implementation has been delayed.
Security professionals are faced with a multitude of technology options
offered by private vendors, including advanced intrusion detection
systems, biotechnology options for screening people, and sophisticated
video monitoring. Having tools and guidance to determine which
technologies most cost-effectively address identified vulnerabilities
is a central component of the leveraging technology key practice. FPS
officials told us that the National Countermeasures Program will enable
inspectors to develop countermeasure cost estimates that can be shared
with GSA and tenant agencies. However, incorporating a tool for
evaluating the cost-effectiveness of alternative technologies into
FPS's planned improvements in the security acquisition area would
represent an enhanced application of this key practice. Therefore, we
recently recommended that FPS develop a methodology and guidance for
assessing and comparing the cost-effectiveness of technology
alternatives, and DHS concurred with our recommendation.\40\
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\40\ GAO-10-142.
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Another concern is that FPS had planned to implement the program
throughout fiscal year 2009, but extended implementation into fiscal
year 2010, thus it is not clear whether FPS will meet the program's
milestones in accordance with updated timelines. Until the National
Countermeasures Program is fully implemented, FPS will continue to rely
on individual inspectors to make technology decisions. For example, FPS
had anticipated that the X-ray machine and magnetometer contracts would
be awarded by December 2008, and that contracts for surveillance and
intrusion detection systems would be awarded during fiscal year 2009.
In May 2009, FPS officials told us that the X-ray machine contract was
awarded on April 30, 2009, and that they anticipated awarding the
magnetometer contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009 and an
electronic security services contract for surveillance and intrusion
detection systems during the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. We
recently recommended that FPS provide the Secretary of Homeland
Security with regular updates on the status of the National
Countermeasures Program, including the implementation status of
deliverables, clear timelines for completion of tasks and milestones,
and plans for addressing any implementation obstacles.\41\ DHS
concurred with this recommendation and stated that FPS will submit a
monthly report to the Secretary.
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\41\ GAO-10-142.
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Key Practices Provide a Framework for Improvement for FPS and Other
Agencies
Finally, as we stated at the outset, the protection of Federal real
property has been and continues to be a major concern. Therefore, we
have used our key protection practices as criteria to evaluate the
security efforts of other departments, agencies, and entities and have
made recommendations to promote greater usage of key practices in
ensuring the security of public spaces and of those who work at and
visit them. For example, we have examined how DHS \42\ and the
Smithsonian Institution \43\ secure their assets and identified
challenges. Most recently, we evaluated the National Park Service's
(Park Service) approach to National icon and park protection.\44\ We
found that although the Park Service has implemented a range of
security program improvements in recent years that reflected some
aspects of key practices, there were also limitations. Specifically,
the Park Service: (1) Does not manage risk service-wide or ensure the
best return on security technology investments; (2) lacks a service-
wide approach to sharing information internally and measuring
performance; and (3) lacks clearly defined security roles and a
security training curriculum. With millions of people visiting the
Nation's nearly 400 park units annually, ensuring their security and
the protection of our National treasures is paramount. More emphasis on
the key practices would provide greater assurance that Park Service
assets are well protected and that Park Service resources are being
used efficiently to improve protection.
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\42\ GAO, Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but
Additional Actions Are Needed to Address Real Property Management and
Security Challenges, GAO-07-658 (Washington, DC: June 22, 2007). In
this report, we used the key practices to assess DHS's security
operations with respect to the Government-owned and leased buildings in
its real property portfolio, but did not specifically focus on FPS.
\43\ GAO, Smithsonian Institution: Funding Challenges Affect
Facilities' Conditions and Security, Endangering Collections, GAO-07-
1127 (Washington, DC: Sept. 28, 2007).
\44\ GAO, Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Security
Practices at National Icons and Parks, GAO-09-983 (Washington, DC: Aug.
28, 2009).
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FPS faces challenges that are similar, in many respects, to those
that agencies across the Government are facing. Our key practices
provide a framework for assessing and improving protection practices,
and in fact, the Interagency Security Committee is using our key
facility protection practices as key management practices to guide its
priorities and work activities. For example, the committee established
subcommittees for technology best practices and training, and working
groups in the areas of performance measures and strategic human capital
management. The committee also issued performance measurement guidance
in 2009.\45\ Without greater attention to key protection practices, FPS
will be ill equipped to efficiently and effectively fulfill its
responsibilities of assessing risk, strategically managing its
workforce and contract guard program, recommending countermeasures,
sharing information and coordinating with GSA and tenant agencies to
secure GSA buildings, and measuring and testing its performance as the
security landscape changes and new threats emerge. Furthermore,
implementing our specific recommendations related to areas such as
human capital and risk management will be critical steps in the right
direction. Overall, following this framework--adhering to key practices
and implementing recommendations in specific areas--would enhance FPS's
chances for future success and could position FPS to become a leader
and benchmark agency for facility protection in the Federal Government.
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\45\ Interagency Security Committee, Use of Physical Security
Performance Measures, (Washington, DC, June 16, 2009).
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Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We are pleased to
answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Thompson. I would like to thank all of the
witnesses for their testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel.
I will now recognize myself for questions. I do not often
do this, but, without objection, before I start the questions,
I would like to show a GAO video of some of the things Mr.
Goldstein talked about, to give the committee a broader flavor
for some of the issues we will be discussing here today.
We will now view the video.
[Video played.]
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for the video.
Mr. Goldstein, were those clips of some of the testing that
you talked about, the 10 out of 10 spots? Or can you just give
us some history of that?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, Mr. Chairman. What the video showed, it
showed three different things. The first was one of our
investigators going into a Level four Government facility. It
was actually one of the buildings that we tested. It occurred
in April and May of this year.
The investigator is carrying the implements to make the
device that the second and third frames show. So, it shows our
investigator going through security and not being stopped.
At none of the 10 buildings that we went into were we
stopped. We were able to go into the buildings with the
materials, assemble the devices in a bathroom, and walk
unimpeded through all of the various offices in the 10
buildings in the four cities that we went to.
These offices included a variety of different Federal
departments, including the Department of Justice, Department of
Homeland Security, Department of State, including the field
office of a Senator and a U.S. Representative.
The second shot was actually just the detonator which was
carried in, which has its own explosive power.
The third shot was an actual test that was done at a
National laboratory of the device being exploded itself.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Schenkel, have you been provided information relative
to these tests that GAO performed?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Fortunately, Mr. Goldstein
and his team came to us immediately after they conducted these
tests and informed us as to the seriousness of this situation.
Chairman Thompson. What did you do?
Mr. Schenkel. We took immediate actions. Within hours, we
had already contacted all of our regional directors, authorized
additional overtime, explained the situation as to what was
going on.
Added to this, though, is the challenge that none of the
items of the disassembled components or of the device itself
were prohibited items in itself, which adds to the challenge of
trying to----
Chairman Thompson. Why were they not prohibited?
Mr. Schenkel. The components themselves, or the
determination of what is prohibited items, is not determined by
the Federal Protective Service, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Who determines it?
Mr. Schenkel. It is determined by the Facilities Security
Committee of each building.
Chairman Thompson. So, is that Mr. Peck? Is that GSA?
Mr. Schenkel. No, sir. Each facility, each GSA facility,
all 9,000, have a Facilities Security Committee made up either
of the--if it is a primary or a single-tenant building, it will
be just the single agency that represents the Facilities
Security Committee. If it is a multi-tenant agent--or a multi-
tenant facility----
Chairman Thompson. Who oversees this committee?
Mr. Schenkel. The chairman is normally the largest tenant
within the building of a multi-tenant facility.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Beers, is this something you are
familiar with?
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir. It is something that Mr. Goldstein has
pointed out on several occasions. Mr. Peck mentioned that we
had a summit of Federal security officers this week to go over
this particular issue and the disconnect that Mr. Goldstein
notes between the security committee and the people who
actually do the protection.
We are instituting a number of changes to try to fix that
particular problem, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Well, my discomfort is, you have a
facilities committee, which probably has very little working
knowledge of what bad things happen to be from a security
perspective, making policy decisions that could jeopardize
anybody going into a Federal building. So, that causes me real
concern.
Mr. Beers. Sir, you are absolutely correct. What we are
trying to rectify with respect to that, and what this summit
was about to discuss, is, one, ensuring that there is a
security provider on each of those committees, that the voting
for undertaking measures--or, in this case, defining what are
prohibited items--include the security considerations, and that
the members of the committee will be trained in these
securities issues.
There are a number of other things that we consider, but
your point is exactly right. That is something that we at DHS
are trying to correct in association with GSA.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, of those 10 situations,
did we cancel any of the contracts of any of the contract
security personnel?
Mr. Schenkel. No, sir, we did not, because they did not
violate any of the post orders that they were instructed to
execute. The reason being, again, is that none of these
components, in and of themselves, were prohibited items.
Chairman Thompson. What is GAO's position on that?
Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Chairman, I would probably respectfully
disagree a little bit with Director Schenkel, in that our
investigators noted, and we informed FPS at the time, that a
number of the buildings through which we gained entry and
passed through security, the contract guards were not looking
at their monitors, first of all.
Many of the materials that were brought into the Federal
buildings to make these devices, while they may not be
specifically prohibited, are in themselves unusual. Guards
should have been asking questions as to why individuals had a
purpose for bringing such items into a Federal building.
Chairman Thompson. Well, we might do another round, but I
will yield to the Ranking Member for questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will address this question, I guess, to Secretary Beers,
Mr. Schenkel, Mr. Peck, whoever wants to answer it or jump in.
As you know, I am opposed to the trials coming to New York,
coming to the United States. That is neither here nor there for
the purpose of today's hearing.
I would like to, under the assumption that the trial is
going to be held in New York, ask what you think the role of
the Federal Protective Service will be. I think Mr. Peck
touched on some of this. You talk about coordinating with the
State and local law enforcement, because my recollection of
that area is, you have the Southern District courthouse, you
have the MCC. You have at least three city or State
courthouses. There is also, within about a 2- or 3-minute walk,
a significant Federal facility.
What role do you see for the FPS? In the context of your
answer, and then I will step back, address the staffing issue
that was raised by the union. Also, whether or not you have to
bring more personnel there from other facilities, such as the
Eastern District of New York or other Federal facilities.
Do you have the personnel to do what you think would have
to be done? Because unlike previous trials, this will obviously
receive more coverage, more publicity, more notoriety, et
cetera.
So, anyway, if you could just--you know, whatever you can
tell me about that. I am not looking for any specifics. I do
not expect you to have the answers today. But just at least in
a general way, discuss how this will be approached.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Schenkel. If I may, sir, I will address that question.
The Federal Protective Service has the responsibility for
the perimeters of U.S. courthouses. As in 1993 in New York, on
the occasion of the trials for the first bombing, what we will
do is work in conjunction with the United States Marshals
Service, and coordinate with State and local law enforcement
and other Federal law enforcement agencies, and integrate our
services with the other services, with the other law
enforcement agencies.
What we will do in general is that, just as at the
Moussaoui trial and previous trials that I mentioned in New
York, what we will do is have to deploy individual members from
the Federal Protective Service, certified law enforcement
officers. We have what we call a CIRT team, a Critical Incident
Response Team, in every one of our 11 regions.
What we will do is rotate those folks into the adequate
numbers that are necessary after they have developed the actual
protection plan. We will just continually rotate the
individuals to provide that necessary protection.
Mr. King. Now, in light of the correspondence from Local
918, do you feel there is sufficient staffing at that location
presently? Secondly, if you have to bring in personnel from
other sites within the area, is that going to leave them
understaffed?
Mr. Schenkel. It is certainly a challenge. That is region
two in New York. Region two does not have the staff to perform
their daily functions and provide the additional security
necessary for the courthouse, if it follows the same pattern as
the previous trials.
What we will have to do is rotate those CIRT teams. As I
have described, none of them will be out of their regions for
more than 14 days. We have to pull from all 11 regions to meet
adequate numbers. We had to do something very similar when
President Obama was elected, in Chicago, to protect his
facility. It is something we have worked down to a science, if
you will.
But the short answer is, no, we will not be able to support
it out of New York. We will have to use CIRT teams to assist.
Mr. King. How about the, I guess, the peripheral issue,
anyway, of there being not enough staffing in the region
anyway?
Mr. Schenkel. Staffing is a challenge----
Mr. King. I am not saying that is true. I am just saying--I
am asking you to respond to the charge.
Mr. Schenkel. Staffing is a challenge across the country.
It is a very difficult challenge. As we have discovered most
recently by these very disturbing videos, that it takes a lot
of oversight to provide the adequate supervision for the
contract guard force.
When we first transferred out of GSA, we had approximately
5,000 contract guards. We now have approximately 15,000
contract guards. We have fewer inspectors at this time than we
did when we transferred in 2003.
Mr. Beers. With respect to that, sir, if I might add, this
issue, that is, the staffing levels of FPS, is one of the major
study efforts that we have underway. Secretary Napolitano asked
us to work together with FPS to ensure that, in fact, we have
the right resource and staffing levels to match the missions
that FPS currently has.
That study is underway, and we will, obviously, report to
you and the other body on the results of that study as soon as
it is complete.
That will have, then, a statement by DHS about what the
appropriate level ought to be, and, if it is an increase, how
we will get there, and how we will pay for it.
Mr. King. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thanks.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Carney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just basically, then, are you--to continue on this vein--
are you saying that we do not have adequate staff, as
configured, to address this?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry.
Mr. Schenkel. For New York, sir.
Mr. Carney. For New York. For the upcoming trials.
Mr. Schenkel. Based on the seriousness of the trial and the
historical perspective, which is all we have to go on, is the
numbers that we needed for the previous trials, we do not have
any of our regions that could support that and provide their
daily operational requirements, as well.
We would have to use a CIRT team from--at least a CIRT
team--from another region.
Mr. Peck. Can I expand on that?
Mr. Carney. Yes.
Mr. Peck. I think what we are really saying is, as in a
typical military operation where you sometimes thin your lines
in one place to create the mass in another place to conduct an
operation, that is what we do.
I was in GSA in the Clinton administration, and I know that
when we had the Timothy McVeigh trial after Oklahoma City, we
did the same thing. We sent people to the trial in Denver.
But, you know, I do not think there is any way not to say
that that means you are taking resources from someplace else
where you do not feel that you have the same immediate need,
and putting them, in this case, into New York City.
But we do not--obviously, we do not staff, and never would
staff, for the maximum possible deployment level that you see
in any given place. So, they move people around.
Mr. Goldstein. If I may, Congressman, to just add to that,
that several of the reports the GAO has released in the past
get to this point in that moving people around in the way that
they need to does undermine the security of the remaining areas
and slows down lots of different other kinds of things, like
building security assessments. It reduces proactive patrols and
does undermine security in the other regions.
Mr. Carney. Well, Mr. Goldstein, let me ask this, then. By
GAO's assessment, how understaffed is FPS?
Mr. Goldstein. I think, at this point in time, nobody
knows. We are encouraged that the Department is doing a
staffing assessment to try and understand that.
But a concern we have raised before is that it is difficult
to understand what you are staffing needs will be until you
have done a risk assessment, an effective risk assessment
process, so you understand fully what the vulnerabilities and
threats are, because it is difficult to staff not knowing that.
We have had quite a number of criticisms of that process.
So, it is a little bit like shooting in the dark right now
until they can get in place an effective risk assessment
process that lets them understand what staffing is really
required to protect Federal property.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Beers, how far down the road are we? How
dark is that room?
Mr. Beers. We have been, at this point in time, through two
iterations of data that we and FPS have worked on. It has gone
back to FPS for some answers to some more questions.
I am reluctant to give you a precise date that it is going
to be done. But it will be done, if not by the end of this
calendar year, very early in the next calendar year.
The Secretary has charged us to come up with this response
in a timely enough fashion that we could present it to the
Congress, and on the assumption that it would require
additional resources and personnel, give you all an opportunity
to interact with us on how we get there, should that be the
requirement.
So, we need to get this done, or we are not going to be
able to respond to what has been a long-standing point by
Members of Congress, as well as the GAO, about the levels, the
staffing levels of FPS.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Schenkel, do you agree with that? Or what
is your assessment?
Mr. Schenkel. I certainly agree with the responsibility to
approach this in a fiscally sound manner. That is exactly what
Mr. Beers is talking about.
However, on the other hand, one of the things that I think
that we have made great strides in--and Mr. Goldstein has not
been able to see this one yet--is we have rolled out our Risk
Assessment Management Program this year. As was pointed out, we
had a very antiquated, very old system, where we were dependent
on six different systems to conduct an actual risk assessment.
As of Monday of this week, we have rolled out our new Risk
Assessment Management Program, RAMP. This was accomplished from
basically a cocktail napkin to actual fruition in less than 2
years by some very dedicated, very smart individuals within
FPS.
That piece will also provide those answers that we owe the
Secretary, because that will assist in providing the necessary
metrics to validate staffing numbers.
Mr. Carney. Well, that is good. I mean, yes, you owe the
Secretary, but you also owe, well, hell, everybody in this room
that comes to work in these buildings every day.
Mr. Schenkel. Totally understand that, sir.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. I guess, the question from me is, Mr.
Goldstein, have you seen this risk assessment document?
Mr. Goldstein. The new risk assessment program, as Director
Schenkel mentioned, is just this week being implemented. We are
quite pleased that they are, I think, actually a little ahead
of schedule, as I understand. So, that is the good news.
One concern we have remaining, though, is that much of the
information that is in RAMP may not be accurate--not
necessarily the part relating to the building security
assessment process, because that new tool is fairly vigorous.
But RAMP is also going to be used to track the certifications
and qualifications of contract guards.
As you know, we have had various concerns about whether
those qualifications are up-to-date. It is our understanding
that the information being put into RAMP to be able to track
whether guards are qualified is the old data, which has many
inaccuracies and flaws in it. So, while the agency has been
cleaning that up, we are concerned that they may be inputting
bad data into that new system, which has, obviously, a lot of
problems associated with it.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, are we putting bad data
into the system?
Mr. Schenkel. No, sir, we are not.
Immediately after we found out about the penetration tests,
coincidentally, I guess it would be, simultaneously, we were
also scrubbing the CERTS data. That is the guard--certification
information.
Previous to the outlay of RAMP, we had three points of
failure, where the CERTS could provide an inaccurate validation
of a guard's certification, either from the guard company, from
the individual region, or at the--in the CERTS system itself.
Subsequent to that, we did 100 percent scrub of all guard
certifications. We have narrowed this down now because of daily
inspections on these certifications. We have narrowed this down
and implemented all of this data into RAMP. If there is a
single point of failure, it is a failure on the side of
caution. In other words, it will prevent an individual guard
from standing post, as opposed to allowing someone to stand
post that is not certified.
Chairman Thompson. I am sure you know that a request for a
follow-up review by GAO is coming.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Olson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank the
witnesses for appearing before the committee today to help us
with this decision and some of the ramifications thereof.
I am concerned about the choice of the Southern District of
New York as the venue to try terrorists like Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed.
As many of you know, over the weekend, the Washington Post
reported on how Attorney General Holder came to choose New York
as the place to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The Post wrote,
``The U.S. Marshals concluded that the Southern District of New
York--with its hardened courthouse, secure Metropolitan
Correctional Center and underground transportation tunnels
through which to bring defendants to and from court each day--
was, hands down, the safest option.''
That courthouse, as you all know, is six blocks away from
Ground Zero. There are many family members of the victims who
are still living in that area.
There are going to be constitutional questions when Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed gets on United States soil. When he goes before
a judge, you can bet his lawyers are going to file for change
of venue. I can almost guarantee that.
Given that that is going to be something that is going to
happen, my question for the panel is this. Is there another
courthouse, any courthouse in the Nation, with a similar
security infrastructure that is equipped to handle a trial like
this? Or is such a security system unique to the Southern
District of New York?
Again, I would like all of your opinions on that. Thank
you.
Who wants to go first?
Mr. Peck. Yes, I probably know--I am thinking fast,
Congressman. I am thinking there are a few other complexes that
I can think of. I am thinking of the major cities where we have
a combination of resources like a correctional center and a
courthouse together. I could ask my colleagues.
I will answer for the record, but I believe that there are
only two other cities I can think of where we have a
metropolitan correctional center that close. I do not know if
the transportation system between that and the courthouse is
the same.
I will say, having seen high security trials take place in
the Southern District of New York, before I understand why the
attorney general made the decision, it is a place that we are
used to defending, and where there is a conglomeration of
resources that we have.
But I will be happy to answer for the record whether there
are any other places.
But honestly, had someone said to me, off the top of my
head, where would you go for a place like this? New York would
have probably been at the top of my list.
Mr. Olson. Again, my concern is, you know, New York was
where these attacks happened. It has a unique, historic, tragic
role in the day of September 11. In American jurisprudence, we
know what is going to happen. We know that that lawyer
defending Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is going to ask for a change
of venue.
Again, my question is, is there another place we can go and
have the security that, apparently, New York has?
Mr. Goldstein. We have not done the work, Congressman, to
be able to answer that question. So, I really could not respond
to you.
Mr. Olson. Is it something, Mr. Goldstein, you all are
considering? I mean, take a look at this sort of contingency
plan, depending--I mean, again, once we bring him here and put
him on U.S. soil, there is going to be a host of constitutional
issues that are going to come up. We need to be ahead of that.
I mean, these people are--you know, I went down to
Guantanamo Bay this January. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is an evil
man. I mean, he has hate in his heart. He will not back down.
Again, we need to make sure that we try him in the most secure
place in America and have backups in case something happens
again, New York being the venue that it is.
Mr. Goldstein. I would be happy to talk to you and your
staff at a further time.
Mr. Olson. Anybody else.
Mr. Schenkel. I can just tell you, from a security
standpoint, I am not as familiar as Mr. Peck with all the
facilities. I can only think of several that maybe have two of
the three.
But the security--there has to be modifications, no matter
where they would transfer him to. We would have to meet those
security requirements. But it would be an integrated effort,
not just an FPS or a U.S. Marshals Service. It would be an
integrated effort for all Federal and State and local law
enforcement.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for the answer to those questions.
Again, I encourage you to start thinking about that now,
because it is something that is going to be coming down the
pike when he stands in that courtroom.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think my colleagues today have raised some very important
issues with regards to the Federal Protective Service. We
certainly see the nearly 9,000 buildings throughout our Nation
as an important asset to us. Your Department plays an important
role in our Nation's homeland security, with the mission of
keeping all Americans safe.
Although small in size, with approximately 1,200 employees,
evidence of the hard work done by your employees can be seen
any time someone walks into any Federal building administered
either through GSA or DHS. So, I would like to say that from
the outset.
Our committee held a hearing in May 2007, about the
challenges that plagued the service at the time. During that
hearing, I was extremely dismayed at the service's low staffing
levels and dependence on poorly trained contract guards.
That, I think, is one of the biggest sticking points, given
the expanded role that people are going to actually see you in,
once this trial does come to the city of New York. I think we
have pretty much driven that point home.
Mr. Chairman, I am kind of shocked that after 2 years, you
know, the FPS has not become more robust. I think that is part
of the conversation that we are having here today. I have heard
about the study that is going to take place with regards to
staffing and the commensurate risk assessment tool that will be
applied to the staffing requirement of FPS.
But what do we expect the outcome will be? What can we do
in anticipation of that?
I think that, Mr. Schenkel, you have certainly--Director
Schenkel--you have certainly witnessed the strain on your
employees and the challenges that it has faced. Are there some
recommendations that you are giving to the Secretary, given
this heavy mandate now before you, which will mean a shifting
of resources, a pulling of CERTs, the opening of
vulnerabilities in other parts of the Nation, because of the
constraints that you are under?
Have you begun having those conversations?
Mr. Schenkel. Ma'am, what we are trying to do is look for
the most effective and efficient use of the resources we have.
When you talked about our contract guards--and we are
certainly proud of 99.9 percent of them and their activities--
that is one of the avenues that we are exploring, is those gaps
in training that perhaps could enhance the guard force, as
opposed to some of the things that we are dependent on
contractors to provide.
That, weighed against our resources, our Federal resources,
are some of the answers that we are looking for. It is a
proactive process. It is not something that we take lightly. It
is certainly something that we are making strides in on the
positive side in enhancing the guards' training and abilities,
but it is also giving us pictures, if you will, or a view into
what the most effective and efficient use of what our
inspectors are doing and should be doing.
Ms. Clarke. Director Schenkel, you do not, then, anticipate
any increase in the level of your staffing, given the expansion
of the mandate of the work that you do? You just do not
anticipate that. You are basically reconciled to a doing-more-
with-less mentality?
Mr. Schenkel. I think that is part of the process. To say
that we need a definite number of additional employees right
now, would not be the most effective and efficient use of our
resources.
I think that once we determine what they actually should be
doing, how much time it takes them to do that, especially with
the advance of these new technologies that will time stamp and
also develop other efficiencies, we may provide--may be able to
provide--more time in some areas than we had before.
I think those are the answers that need to be given before
we actually come up with a specific number.
Ms. Clarke. So, are you just saying--because I am running
out of time--that you are going to be working to craft out
specifically the role of the FPS in this unique situation, in
collaboration with other law enforcement entities that will be
operating simultaneously during this period?
Because I think that it is important for people to know
that there is this immediate sort of focus on FPS, because we
know of your role, the important pieces to understand
specifically, what that role would be, and what the chain of
command would be in an environment such as the courthouse
protection, that brings in other law enforcement entities.
Would you speak to that?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. We have enjoyed a very positive
relationship with State and local law enforcement, I think,
ever since the existence of our service.
As Mr. Peck spoke to earlier, we cannot staff for every
event in every location. So, consequently, we are very
dependent, and work very well with the State and local law
enforcement.
If it is an event that is on Federal property that we are
responsible for, we take command and control. If it is an event
that happens near our property, but could affect our property,
we support that local law enforcement or Federal agency that
has the lead on those instances.
Mr. Beers. If I might add to that, I would just say, first
of all, do not--with respect to the larger question of the
staffing size for FPS--do not walk away with the assumption
that we have ruled out increasing the size of FPS. We have
absolutely not ruled that out.
We just want to make sure, as Director Schenkel just
indicated, that, with the onslaught of new technology and new
procedures, that will increase the productivity of the current
workforce. Then, what other requirements are there on top of
that?
Second, with respect to--and this is with respect to the
New York City issue. Please understand, as I know you must, the
New York City Police Department has the strongest
counterterrorism activity of any police force in the country,
which is undoubtedly one of the major reasons that led to
Attorney General Holder's decision to place that in New York
City.
It is not just the Marshals. It is not just FPS. It is that
whole, total package put together that is going to provide the
security. Thank you.
Mr. Peck. Mr. Chairman, if I may? I mean, I do not know how
you want to allocate the time. But if I could put one other
thing on the table, I wanted to reinforce what Secretary Beers
said, which is that I think we all think that--I do not think
we think that FPS's current staffing level is sacrosanct, that
if they need more resources, that they should get it.
But before we do that, we really do need to do a better job
of assessing the threat and what other means we have to
mitigate the threats.
But the other point I wanted to add is this. It is
important for you to know that the Federal Protective Service
is mostly funded by security fee payments by Federal agencies
in Federal buildings. It does not get a separate appropriation.
There is an interesting conversation, I will just say, that
goes on when we ask Federal--when we tell Federal agencies
about the security they need. While I cannot say that anyone
has ever balked at a security measure that we or FPS recommend,
on the other hand, the charge is made per square foot, and we
do get questions sometimes from the central finance people in
Washington about how much they are paying, and what they are
getting for it, as they should question.
But it raises questions, just as the way we work with the
Facility Security Committees and what their role is. I think
the role of the security fee and how it is assessed, and
whether that is the only way to fund FPS, is something that at
some point ought to be on the table.
Chairman Thompson. One of the comments that come to mind,
Mr. Schenkel, how problematic is it that contract guards have
no arrest power?
Mr. Schenkel. It is not problematic, sir, because they
enjoy--if that is the correct term--the extension of our
authority in being able to detain individuals and/or exert
deadly force in the event that either their or someone else's
life is threatened.
The working relationships that we have in large Federal
facilities where we have FPS presence on hand, where they can
actually effect the arrest, works extremely well, and, plus,
our relationships with State and local law enforcement in all
of our other areas that we are responsible for.
Chairman Thompson. So, now, your testimony is that they
have the power to detain, but not the power to arrest.
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Is that your understanding, Mr.
Goldstein?
Mr. Goldstein. It is my understanding, sir, yes. The
problem arises, though--and we have reported this previously--
is that there is a great variety of instruction by the contract
guard companies to their guards about what kinds of actions
they should be taking.
We have done many interviews with the guards themselves. We
have interviewed hundreds of them over the course of the last
year-and-a-half. In talking to them, their understanding of
what their role is, even within an individual company, differs
greatly.
We know of certain instances and have reported them, where,
in fact, there was, at one Level four facility--and we reported
this not that long ago--where an individual who was being
detained by the Federal Protective Service, escaped from the
officers, ran through the building wearing just one handcuff,
had had his shirt ripped off when running out the front lobby
of--this is a Level four building.
All of the contract guards who were in the lobby, all of
whom were armed, simply stepped away. The FPS officers went
running after him and did not catch him. The individual was
actually apprehended by an FPS officer several blocks away, who
happened to be in a vehicle.
So, there is a great variety of response that the contract
guards actually provide, because there is not uniform training,
sir.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel, is there a written policy
directive on detention and arrest?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir. It is in our security guard
information manual. To agree with Mr. Goldstein, as I most
often do, that is one of the areas that we have really drilled
down into over this past year. That is the consistency and
standardization of guard training.
That is also one of the areas that would affect staffing.
We have to determine the appropriate number of guard--
inherently governmental guard training hours that we would need
to provide to all contract guards.
We have already assumed 16 additional hours from what we
had previously had, because that certainly is an area of
concern.
Chairman Thompson. Can you provide the committee with the
written detention policy that FPS provides for the contract
guards, with respect to both detention and arrest?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Next is the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cao, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for Mr. Schenkel. In the GAO report made
September 23, 2009, the GAO found that FPS does not have a
fully reliable system for monitoring, and there find whether
guards have the training and certification which are required.
How far are you in addressing the need to implement this
system to monitor and verify whether or not the guards have the
requisite training?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir. We have already institutionalized
that by placing that piece into RAMP. We recognized that there
was a failing in that area, approximately a year ago, and had
incorporated that into phase one of our Risk Assessment
Management Program.
All of our guards are in that system. In the event that
there is--and the way this system works, I should provide that
first. The way this system works is, if a guard certification
is due on 1 July, that guard, that guard company and the region
will receive a notice 30 days prior to that. That individual
will be notified to have to go regain his or her certification
prior to that time.
In the event that we have conducted guard post inspection
after the 1st, and that individual is not certified, he or she
will be immediately removed from post, because that is built
into the automated system.
Mr. Cao. Now, in your training and certifications, do you
make sure that these contracting companies, these training
facilities, do they provide training to the guards to make sure
that they recognize new techniques, new equipment that are
being used by terrorist groups around the world?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, our threat
management division publishes regular training bulletins, and
our training division has produced specific training bulletins
in regard to the penetration. We have also produced a training
video. We have completed about 99.4 percent of all of the
15,000 guards have completed that training, as well, sir.
Mr. Cao. Okay.
Also, in April of this year, the inspector general
concluded that FPS did not use consistent selection practices
to award guard contracts. In addition to these problems with
awarding contracts, the IG noted a significant lack of
oversight of the contractors once they are posted to security
details.
What have you done to address this issue?
Mr. Schenkel. We work hand-in-hand with our consolidated
contracting groups, currently under the leadership of the
Office of Procurement Operations at DHS. But they are
technically FPS employees.
So, what we have done is promulgated specific directives
addressing this consistency. Again, this is a consistency
requirement across all 11 regions that was done, basically, 11
different ways several years ago.
As a result of these policy changes, we have also
incorporated a project management office that reviews the
performance, and we have incorporated a semiannual performance
review of each individual guard contract company. Subsequent to
that review, we will make the determination as whether or not
to reward that contract or to terminate that contract.
Mr. Cao. In 2009, the ISC published the use of physical
security performance measures, which requires assessing the
effectiveness of security procedures through performance
measures and testing.
What is the status of this implementation? Do you know?
Mr. Schenkel. Again, part of that is incorporated into
RAMP, where we have all the countermeasures that are in a
specific building are now incorporated into that system, where
we can not only identify the necessity for a replacement,
repair, et cetera, but it also provides the visibility across
all 9,000 buildings to give us the comparison necessary.
Mr. Cao. So, can you assure us that we are safer now in
these Federal buildings than we were 4 months ago?
Mr. Schenkel. I would say yes. Mr. Thompson had asked me
that 2 years ago. I said I think they were safer then. I think
they are safer now, 2 years, because we--2 years even later--
because we have focused on our core mission, on our core
competencies, and really have made tremendous strides across
the board, not only on the mission support side, but certainly
on the inspector side. Our uniformed operations and our
investigators are totally dedicated to the protection mission.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
For the committee's information, Mr. Schenkel, where are we
from FPS's training of contractors, in terms of what FPS
requires? Do we have a backlog?
Mr. Schenkel. We do not have a backlog now. All of our
contractors have been trained to the adequate levels for the
magnetometer and X-ray training, which is our part of it.
We have additionally institutionalized what we call a
National weapons training program, which provides an additional
16 hours of magnetometer and X-ray training.
Chairman Thompson. So, your testimony is that there is no
backlog on any of the training of the contractors.
Mr. Schenkel. If there is a backlog, it is not dependent on
the FPS training.
Chairman Thompson. Is there a backlog of contractor
training of its employees?
Mr. Schenkel. Sir, I am sorry, but I would not know that,
because those employees would be prevented from standing post.
Chairman Thompson. But that is not the case. Mr. Goldstein
just said that they checked records of people who were working,
whose credentials had expired.
Mr. Schenkel. That is absolutely correct, sir. That was
prior to the outset of RAMP and the 100 percent scrub of all
the certifications.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Goldstein, do you agree with that?
Mr. Goldstein. I cannot answer that question specifically,
however, something quite related, which is when FPS recently
did the scrub that Director Schenkel is mentioning. This was
just a couple of months ago. To prepare for RAMP and after our
recent report, they found themselves that upwards of 50 percent
of the guards did not have adequate certifications in place. At
least one whole region was unable to provide information to the
system, because it simply was not adequate.
So, I know that that is certainly a goal of the Federal
Protective Service to achieve, but we have not gone back in to
check. Based on the kind of information that we are gathering
to complete the report that we are doing for this committee, we
are still concerned that that is not the case.
Chairman Thompson. So, Mr. Schenkel, your testimony now is,
all that is done, it is correct, and that we are 100 percent.
Mr. Schenkel. We are 100 percent of guards in our system.
If they have guards on the contract that are not working on a
FPS contract, we have no control over that. Nor would they be
allowed to stand in a FPS post.
Chairman Thompson. I do not want us to get into semantics,
but if we have contract guards at any Federal building, your
testimony is that those guards have met the requisite training
that FPS requires.
Mr. Schenkel. I will give you a 99 percent qualification of
yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I am going to allow you to provide
that to the committee in writing, based on your review, and
taking into consideration what Mr. Goldstein just shared with
the committee.
You are aware of the FDA situation with the guards, right?
Mr. Schenkel. Was that the Chenega situation, sir?
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir. That contract was terminated 30
September.
Chairman Thompson. Did FPS find that out? Or somebody else
found that out?
Mr. Schenkel. It was found out on an Operation Shield
conducted by the National Capital Region of the Federal
Protective Service, at which time they conducted the guard post
inspection and discovered, I believe it was 58 guards, that did
not have certifications in the system. That does not
necessarily mean that they were not certified. It is just that
they were not in the system. That is that very difficult and
challenging three-piece system that we used to operate under.
Chairman Thompson. So, RAMP has replaced it?
Mr. Schenkel. I am not positive which company has taken
over that----
Chairman Thompson. No, no. I am not----
Mr. Schenkel. Oh, RAMP. I am sorry, sir. Yes, sir, RAMP is
the new----
Chairman Thompson. Okay.
Mr. Schenkel. RAMP has replaced the old CERTS system. Yes,
sir.
Chairman Thompson. Okay, well, the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
witnesses for being here with us.
Let me go ahead and go and talk about contract oversight.
Since 1995, the number of contract guards have gone up to about
13,000. The number of uniformed Federal officers has gone down
to roughly about 600 individuals.
Let me go back to the issue that I believe the Chairman
brought up on power of arrest. As an attorney, I will tell you
that--and I think we all know this--that the contract guards do
not have the power to arrest. If you put me--and I am not a
peace officer, not certified by any law enforcement entity--if
I stood next to one of those contract officers, we both have
the same power.
Is that correct, Mr. Schenkel?
Mr. Schenkel. Basically, that is. Yes, sir. The same as a
citizen arrest.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. If you put any individual member of the
public out there next to one of those contract officers, that
individual has the same power as that guard.
Is that correct?
Mr. Schenkel. Technically, yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. When you say ``technically,'' legally? I
would say, ``yes.'' I mean, I would say, yes, technically. You
are trying to say, technically, there is a difference. I am
talking about legally.
What is the technical part of it?
Mr. Schenkel. Well, the technical part would be that they
are trained individuals in the use of force. They have a
minimal protection, as opposed to a standard citizen.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Now, I understand that the inspector
general, GAO also, that there have been different reviews that
have come out on the operations of FPS. I believe, October
2006, the Department of Homeland, Office of Inspector General,
the OIG audited the operations, and found that the agency was
not performing effective oversight over the contract guard
program.
Is that correct?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. I believe that on April 2009, the OIG report
again concluded that the FPS was not performing adequate
contract oversight of its guards. Is that correct?
Mr. Schenkel. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. June 2008, GAO report also
identified inadequate oversight of the contract program as, you
know, one of the key challenges in order to give protection. Is
that correct?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. When do you start implementing the
recommendations that the OIG or the audit, or the GAO provided?
I mean, I would assume--I mean, if I was you, or I was in your
place, I would assume that, if somebody gave me some
recommendation, I would sit down with that agency who were
trying to implement this. It was not only one time, but I see
three different types.
When do we start implementing those recommendations?
Mr. Schenkel. We started in 2006 and 2007, when we made the
determination to go to an inspector-based force and concentrate
on our core mission of protection, as opposed to some of the
other distracting law enforcement missions.
Since that time, we have had to standardize the policies
and procedures for the Federal Protective Service.
Mr. Cuellar. Do you all have a--I am sorry--do you have a
strategic plan?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, we do, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Mr. Chairman, could I ask for a copy of
that?
I would ask you if you could send that within 3 days, if
you do not mind. I am sure you have it available, handy.
Now, GAO found different issues, first of all,
qualifications and certifications. The large number of contract
guards who do not have training and certification required to
be deployed at a Federal facility, has that been addressed?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir, it has.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
GAO, is that correct? Mr. Goldstein?
Mr. Goldstein. At this point in time, we are not certain.
We have not gone back and retested to determine whether or not
the new system in place is adequate. It is something we
certainly could do for the committee. But we cannot answer that
question today.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman, could I request that answer for
the committee?
Compliance with post orders.
GAO found that the agency was inconsistent in its
inspection of guard compliance with post orders. Has that been
complied with? Have the post orders been complied with?
Mr. Schenkel. FPS provides the template for post orders.
The Facility Security Committees actually write the post
orders.
Mr. Cuellar. All right.
Mr. Schenkel. We have standardized the template, but we do
not have the authority to standardize the procedures.
Mr. Cuellar. GAO, any response on that, on the post order
compliance?
Mr. Goldstein. I think the post orders really come down to
a question of adherence by the contract guard companies,
ensuring that the contract guards are trained properly, but
also oversight from FPS. As Director Schenkel mentioned, one of
the biggest challenges they have is having sufficient staff to
really oversee the contract guard program, which is
challenging.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. Well, let me ask, because my time is
up, on the covert testing problems that we had on the
allocation of resources using risk management, and some of the
issues that were brought up on the management of human capital
deficiencies, on the difficulty of meeting mandated staffing
levels, on a lack of human capital plan.
By the way, a capital plan should be part of the strategic
plan also, Mr. Schenkel.
On those issues, could I--Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask
the GAO and Mr. Schenkel if they can provide that information
to the committee.
One last question, and I will close, Mr. Chairman, on the
GAO. Has any of the customers, tenants ever complained about
paying a higher fee for more security, that you know of?
Mr. Goldstein. We have talked to many tenants in the course
of our work, and we have had a little variety of responses.
Many tenants are concerned. Our report on human capital in July
2009, has a survey of many of the tenants.
Many of the tenants have been concerned that their fees are
going up, but their services may not be going up with it, you
know, at the same time. In other words, because of the
challenges FPS has faced and the lack of officers in many
places, there have been concerns that the security is not what
it was, that there are not officers present at all at times,
and the way it used to be.
The FPS is challenged by the staffing situation, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. If the Chairman allows me, if I could, on
those responses. Strategic plan, within 3 days that should be
available. The other one, I assume, maybe 30 days from both of
you, or if that would be an adequate timetable.
Chairman Thompson. Three days for both is fine with me.
Is that a problem?
Beg your pardon?
Mr. Schenkel. I am sorry. I do not believe so.
Chairman Thompson. Okay.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentlelady from California for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, hopefully, Mr. Beers, has the question been
asked to you about the payment during the transition period of
collecting fees? Have we already--did anyone do that question
yet?
Mr. Beers. About the level of fees for----
Ms. Richardson. During the transition period?
Mr. Beers. Yes. It was brought up by Director Schenkel in
the transition briefings that we received as part of the
transition team.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Beers. These issues have all come up during that
period.
Ms. Richardson. But it is my understanding that the NPPD
requires the FPS to pay the transition costs. Is that correct?
Mr. Beers. That is correct. There are services rendered on
behalf of them. We would be out of compliance if we used other
monies to pay for our servicing of FPS.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. But has that cost us anything in
terms of our current staffing levels?
Mr. Beers. The cost of the transition is--we have some
estimates. It is not finally determined. We are working with
FPS to determine precisely what those costs will be.
This is an additional cost, quite frankly, over and above
the cost, the services that ICE has been providing, or that FPS
will provide when this transition is complete, which will be by
the--by no later than the end of fiscal year 2010. But our
effort is to have that completed earlier than that time.
Ms. Richardson. So, if it is in addition to what has been
done before, have you considered increasing the building
security fee to cover----
Mr. Beers. We are trying to make this transition not cause
an increase in the overall fees.
Ms. Richardson. Then who is going to pay for it?
Mr. Beers. FPS.
Ms. Richardson. Do you feel that they have the sufficient
budget to do so?
Mr. Beers. We are working on that.
Ms. Richardson. What do you mean by that?
Mr. Beers. I mean we are in discussion about where the
funding would come from within the FPS budget in order to pay
for those costs. At this particular point in time, that is a
subject that is still under discussion, so I am not in a
position to tell you precisely where that money will come from
in the FPS budget.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Goldstein, is that something you are
privy to? Do you have an opinion on that, of whether you feel
they would be able to absorb that in their budget?
Mr. Goldstein. We have not looked at it specifically. They
are clearly hamstrung with respect to their budget in many ways
today.
Our concern is one of transparency for the agencies who pay
their security fees. They do not have the understanding that it
is going to pay for administrative costs in transitioning an
agency from one part of the Department to another. They believe
it is going to pay for enhancing the security of their
facility. So, that is a concern that we have.
Ms. Richardson. So, then, you would be of the mind that the
costs would not be increased, or that would be your
recommendation.
Mr. Goldstein. I do not have a recommendation at this
point. We have not sat down with DHS to discuss this
specifically.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Do you have any intentions to do so?
Mr. Goldstein. We certainly can. We have not done so at
this point.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. My last question is for Mr. Peck.
The GAO recommends that the FPS and the GSA make
improvements to facilitate information sharing. If would say
anything across the board, you know, what this committee talks
a lot about is information sharing and communication.
How would the GSA collaborate with the NPPD and the FPS
during the transition to address any information-sharing
issues?
Mr. Peck. Like I say, I have been in this job for 3 months.
I think my first week on the job, because I had done it before,
I had a conversation with the security people we have at GSA,
because we have certain National security responsibilities
aside from just protecting our buildings, about intelligence
and security information sharing with FPS, other agencies of
the Federal Government.
I do not think that the transition--specifically on the
question of FPS and GSA--I do not think that the transition
will affect our information sharing. I do believe that we have
a good channel of communication between us and the DHS and the
Federal Protective Service on the information sharing that we
need.
There are certain things that could happen that would
require that we take certain actions at a Federal building on
the management side, that we depend on DHS and other agencies
of the Government to tell us. I think we have pretty good
channels.
I am not going to tell you, however, that I believe that
all of the information sharing in the Government, some of the
information that they may need from time to time, I would not
guarantee that we have fixed that problem totally inside the
Government.
But I must say, we believe we have the channels. We have
the security clearance, if necessary, the handling of
classified documents and information that we need to do that.
Ms. Richardson. Do you anticipate figuring out whether it
is fixed? Well, not necessarily whether it is fixed, but
whether it is working?
Mr. Peck. I mean, we run exercises. We do all those sorts
of things you do to see if things are working well.
I am confident that we, as I say, that we have the
information we need with DHS on those threats that are specific
to Federal facilities. Yes, we do.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, could I have another 20
seconds? I think he wanted to respond.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Schenkel.
Mr. Schenkel. I just wanted to help Mr. Peck out here,
because the most contentious issue was the sharing of the full
facility security assessment. Under our new program of RAMP, we
have provided--we will be providing, I should say--the fully
disclosed facility security assessment.
You know, we have enjoyed an ever increasing, positive
relationship with the GSA over the last several years. This is
a giant step forward. That was the issue in particular that
came up under Mr. Goldstein's audit.
Mr. Peck. With respect to that, may I say that, if I can,
Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Thompson. Go ahead.
Mr. Peck [continuing]. That is really important, what
underlies an awful lot of the questions here and that we really
need to talk about is, it is one thing for us to establish
uniform standards with respect to security in facilities, which
we do for how much of a blast resistance they should have, for
example, or what the overall training for guards should be.
But as I started out by saying, that each facility is
unique in the kinds of agencies it houses, the accessibility we
need from the public, how far they are from a curb, or whether
they are in a threatened geography in this country or not, that
it makes this job much more complicated.
I will just say with respect to our question about security
guards and overseeing them, this is something that I have seen
over some 15 years being associated with GSA and FPS, if you go
back to my first term in GSA. That FPS has transitioned, I
would not say, though, all the way, but from a force where many
of the members of FPS regarded themselves primarily as
uniformed police officers, to an organization where they are
doing security.
So, I think that shift of resources has happened. Clearly,
we all need to keep working on it.
But it is because security guards get hired, and then they
have to adapt to specific circumstances in a building, that the
training is even more complicated, and overseeing them is more
complicated.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. I am happy to see that GSA and FPS are
talking, because at some point, GAO said, that was not the
case. But we now have it before this committee that you are
doing that. We thank you.
The gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
the witnesses for their presence here today, and the witnesses
of the second panel.
I think we have to direct questions in the backdrop of an
enormous number that is really shocking to me. I recognize that
Federal Government has a large number of Federal buildings. I
will find the number here in a moment.
But what shocks me is that we are talking about 5,000
contractual companies or contracts dealing with the security of
Federal buildings post-9/11.
I find that both disturbing in terms of the ability for
oversight and the carefulness in which the personnel are
actually trained, the certification, and the Federal Government
even knowing what the level of security is for the thousands
upon thousands of Federal employees and individuals who have to
go into Federal buildings on Federal business.
So, Secretary Beers, if I can, can you give any explanation
as to what happened in the video that Chairman Thompson showed?
Mr. Beers. Yes, ma'am. As we have indicated in a variety of
fora, the issues at hand involve several aspects, the first of
which is, were the guards at the facilities that the GAO looked
at adequately trained and certified in order to be able to
perform the job that should be expected of them to do that?
That particular issue was addressed by Director Schenkel
and his staff in terms of an immediate audit of all the
contract guards, to make sure that their certifications were
up-to-date. Now, this past week, the initiation of the Risk
Assessment Management Program, RAMP, which they now have an
automated, uniform, national system----
Ms. Jackson Lee. When do you think that program--forgive me
for doing an intervention here. When will the RAMP program be
fully operational?
Mr. Beers. Fully operational, it will be 2011. But the
initial point, and the point of Mr. Goldstein's investigation,
that is the first part of the program, which is the listing of
all the contract guards and their certification status, so that
Director Schenkel and his staff will know when they need to
have that updated, will provide indications to the company that
they have got a 30-day window to finish that and get it done,
or they will not be allowed to stay on post.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say that, if this was not a
play game, if you will, lives would have been lost. I am taken
aback by the answers--and this is on-going. This is, obviously,
preceding this administration. So, you are now having to be the
problem-solvers, and I acknowledge that.
But I need to be pointed in the fact that this could have
resulted in massive loss of life.
The question is, have we changed the mindset--again, 5,000
outside contractors. What is the present position on increasing
the number of those who are under the Federal Protective
Service as employees?
Mr. Beers. We have, at the direction of Secretary
Napolitano, undertaken a review of the staff size of the
Federal Protective Service. We have had two data calls and
meetings to discuss that information. We have asked for more
information. We owe her, as soon as possible, the results of
that, in order both to provide that to her, but also to provide
that to you, so that you know what we think the optimal
resource and personnel----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, what do you think that--if Mr.
Chairman would indulge me, I see my seconds are running out.
What is your perception of 5,000? What do you think you
would need to increase it by to have a balance of the huge
number of outside contractors, which I can imagine you can get
your hands around in training, no matter what kind of system
you put in place?
Mr. Beers. Let me let Director Schenkel answer the specific
question, because I am not aware that, under his
responsibilities, he has 5,000 contracts. That would be one for
every three guards. I do not think we are--I think that is for
all Federal facilities, and not what FPS is responsible for
protecting.
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. There are 372,000, I think,
Federal facilities. We are only responsible for the 9,000 GSA
owned or leased, of which we have approximately 52, 53
contractors, and approximately 126 contracts.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me move quickly to the General
Accountability Office, please, and Mr. Peck. What is your
assessment of what they have?
Mr. Peck. The number of contracts? It has got to be much
more like what they are discussing. We have 1,500 Government-
owned buildings, about 8,000 that are leased facilities, some
of which--many of which we have contract guards for. So, it is
15,000 guards in GSA facilities. It would be much more like a
smaller number of contracts.
Ms. Jackson Lee. A small number of contracts?
Mr. Peck. I mean a smaller number of contracts than--I
would be inclined to think the number that Mr. Schenkel cites
is probably closer--I do not know specifically--than anything
like 5,000. That may refer to contracts at Department of
Defense installations, and all those other Government agencies.
Mr. Goldstein. If I may, ma'am. Director Schenkel is
basically right. There are 300-and-some-odd contracts
covering----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are the 5,000 covering all the other
buildings?
Mr. Goldstein. That I do not know. We have not looked at--
we have only looked at the 9,000 Federal buildings under GSA--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just get this to this final
question.
In our report it says that GSA, that FPS, provides regular
briefings on building security, performs security assessments
and makes recommendations on security countermeasures to GSA
and tenants. However, GSA and tenant agencies ultimately decide
whether to sign onto the recommended countermeasures.
So, to GSA, which is Mr. Peck, I would just like to get in
writing the FPS recommendations for the last year--if we have
to go back further--and then, the response of GSA in terms of
funding or complying with those recommendations.
Mr. Peck. Okay. I would like to be clear. The decisions on
those recommendations--it goes back to something we said
before--the decisions on what to do in specific buildings is
made by something called the Facility Security Committee, which
is not a GSA committee. It is chaired by the largest--the head
of the largest--tenant in a Federal building.
Having said that, I will go back and see what--I will go
back and get you the documentation that you asked for.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would only say
that there is a lot of confusion. There seems to be one hand
not knowing what the other hand is doing. But I would hope
that, at some point, we can balance contracts with hired
personnel, trained by the Federal Government, and being under
the auspices of the Federal Protective Service, National
Protection Programs Directorate.
Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I would like to thank our panel of witnesses for their
valuable testimony, and the Members for their questions,
likewise.
Secretary Beers, the facilities committee is troubling. I
think I do not have to say anything else. I would suggest that
you have to look at it. Whatever we need to do--if there is
legislation, or whatever--from a security perspective, to have
people with no security training making security decisions is a
no-brainer, in my estimation, and, I think, based on GAO's
situation.
The other issue is the 2010 transition plan. Committee
staff has been working with your staff on making sure that we
are kept up with what is going on.
We need your word that we will not be impeded from doing
our work by your staff, by a lack of information.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir. With respect to the first issue, we
are in total agreement with respect to dealing with the
Facility Security Committees. That is why--and this is one of
the values as a marriage of FPS and NPPD.
We had always in NPPD been responsible for the Interagency
Security Committee, which is the oversight body of this larger
process. That is why we had this summit meeting this week that
Mr. Peck and I both attended, and that our leader, Austin
Smith, ran.
We are expecting a number of solid recommendations coming
out of that. I gave you some indication of what they--the
direction that we are going.
But I can tell you that Secretary Napolitano is personally
interested in this. I have had at least two conversations with
her specifically on this point after she became aware of this
challenge that Director Schenkel and Mr. Goldstein, as well,
have pointed to. So, we really are focused on that.
With respect to the provision of information, we owe you a
report, I believe by the end of this calendar year, on the
status of the transition. That is not to say that we will not
talk or provide information in between. But we owe you, as we
owe ourselves, a constant monitoring of this process. We will
keep you informed, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. We look forward to
it.
Before being dismissed, I would remind our first panel of
witnesses that the Members of the committee may have additional
questions for you. We will ask you to respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions.
Thank you again. It was a good hearing.
I would now ask the clerk to please prepare the witness
table for our second panel.
I would like to thank the panel again.
Welcome to the second panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. David Wright, president of the
AFGE, Local 918. Mr. Wright is a 23-year veteran of the Federal
Protective Service. During his tenure at AFGE Local 918 as
president, he sought to expose management problems at ICE and
FPS.
Welcome, Mr. Wright.
Our second witness is Mr. Stephen Amitay. He is the Federal
legislative counsel for the National Association of Security
Companies, the Nation's largest contract security association.
Its member companies employ over 400,000 security officers
throughout the United States in the commercial and governmental
sections.
Welcome.
I would once again like to thank all our witnesses for
being here today. As previously stated, the witnesses' full
statement will be inserted in the record. I would now ask each
witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, beginning
with Mr. Wright.
STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 918
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of the
committee. My name is David Wright. I am president of AFGE
Local 918, the FPS union.
Since the 9/11 attacks, I have watched with growing
frustration and outrage as the FPS was allowed to deteriorate.
Despite intervention by Congress to establish minimum staffing
levels, FPS still has less boots on the ground than when it
joined DHS. With our move to NPPD, I am hopeful that DHS can
finally get the vital mission of protecting Federal employees
and facilities right.
The FPS faces daunting challenges, and its officers and
inspectors have been shocked and dismayed by the recent GAO
reports and vulnerabilities that continue to exist. Every day,
they put their lives on the line to accomplish the DHS mission,
and have sacrificed their family time to work the many hours of
overtime to ensure that facilities are protected.
While we are finally confident that DHS leadership wants
FPS to succeed, we need your help to make sure the embedded,
intransigent and unaccountable bureaucrats at OMB cooperate to
provide the resources necessary to accomplish our mission.
One glaring example is the monitoring and training of FPS
contract guards. In 2001, there were 5,000 contract guards and
1,450 total FPS personnel. By 2009, there were 15,000 contract
guards, but only 1,225 total FPS personnel.
That threefold increase in guards, coupled with a 16
percent cut in FPS staff, was a recipe for failure. No one
should have been surprised to discover the deficiencies in
contract guard management, performance and guards' abilities to
detect weapons and explosives.
Despite this critical shortfall, OMB actually decreased
security charges collected to monitor and administer contract
guards by 25 percent this year.
When GAO covertly entered FPS jurisdictions with
explosives, FPS over-reliance on contract guards was exposed.
Security has clearly been reduced. Staggering lapses by GAO
make in-sourcing of contract guards at high-risk buildings an
important component of any overall reform effort for FPS.
Among the other challenges faced by FPS is a funding
structure that has resulted in cuts of $700 million since 9/11.
We have FPS law enforcement officers that do not have
Federal law enforcement retirement or benefits. FPS operates
only during normal business hours in New York and other major
cities. Criminals and terrorists do not work business hours,
and neither should FPS.
Building security committees have failed to approve
critical security countermeasures. There is a case going on
right now of an FPS recommendation for a night-time guard at a
courthouse in a western State. That guard countermeasure has
been declined for years by the non-security professionals of
the FSC, and very recently, there were gunshots directed into
that Congressional office window.
We also face field law enforcement staff that is
significantly below Congressionally mandated minimums, and
lastly, a critical manpower shortage in New York City.
We need your help to remedy these challenges by: No. 1,
mandating sufficient FPS staff to protect Federal employees and
facilities; No. 2, recognize FPS dedicated law enforcement
officers with appropriate law enforcement benefits and pay; No.
3, in-source contract guard positions at high-risk facilities
by replacing them with Federal police officers; and No. 4,
remedy the FPS manpower crisis in New York.
A trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed at the New York City
Federal courthouse will present a security risk that FPS is
ill-equipped to handle with depleting security to other Federal
buildings in the country.
Since 2001, while FPS has decreased and the risk of attack
on Federal facilities has increased, the number of non-DOD and
non-FPS security specialists and police officers has increased
by over 3,200 positions. The V.A. police, which protects 154
medical centers Nation-wide is twice the size of FPS in
manpower.
The sole Federal agency charged with the critical mission
of protecting thousands of Federal buildings and millions of
Federal employees and visitors from terrorist and criminal
attack, the Federal Protective Service is now within NPPD, but
remains an agency in crisis.
I believe the state of the FPS right now is little
different than that of the airline industry's security prior to
9/11. Then, a reliance on poorly trained, unmonitored contract
guards with no law enforcement authority, security
implementation by conflicting entities, an unworkable funding
structure, and a perception of security through inspections
instead of protection by boots-on-the-ground Federal officers
proved disastrous.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King, Members of the
committee, when America demanded professional security at
airports in the wake of 9/11, Congress and the administration
responded by hiring over 20,000 Federal officers to staff the
TSA. Now is the time to do the same for FPS. The dedicated men
and women of FPS need your help to enable our success and to
protect Federal employees and properties across the Nation.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of David L. Wright
NOVEMBER 18, 2009
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of the
committee: My name is David Wright. I am President of AFGE Local 918,
which represents the dedicated men and women of the Federal Protective
Service. I have been an FPS Law Enforcement Officer for the past 23
years. In the 8 years since the September 11 attacks, I watched with
growing frustration and outrage, as the Federal Protective Service was
allowed to deteriorate and drift like a rudderless, sinking ship.
Despite intervention by Congress to establish minimum staffing levels,
FPS still has significantly less boots-on-the-ground in-service field
staff than when it joined DHS. The transition to the National
Protection Programs Directorate is clearly a welcome change in the
right direction. I am hopeful that under the leadership of Secretary
Napolitano and Under Secretary Beers, DHS can finally get the vital
mission of protecting the over 1 million dedicated civil servants who
work in the 9,000 FPS secured facilities located in over 2,100 American
communities right.
The Federal Protective Service indeed faces daunting challenges,
and its officers and inspectors have been shocked and dismayed by the
recent GAO reports and vulnerabilities that continue to exist. Every
day, they put their lives on the line to accomplish the DHS mission and
have willingly sacrificed their leisure and family time to work the
many hours of overtime required to make sure facilities are protected
and contract guards are correctly trained and proficient in their
duties. Despite these yeoman efforts, FPS does not have sufficient
staff to accomplish these vital tasks. While we are finally confident
the Department leadership wants FPS to succeed, we need your help to
make sure the embedded, intransigent, and unaccountable bureaucrats at
OMB cooperate to provide the minimum resources necessary to accomplish
our mission.
One glaring example is the monitoring and training of contract
guards. In 2001 there were 5,000 contract guards and FPS was authorized
over 1,450 total personnel. By 2009 there were 15,000 contract guards,
but FPS was authorized only 1,225 total personnel. A three-fold
increase in guards coupled with a 16 percent cut in FPS staff was a
recipe for failure. No one should have been surprised to discover
shortfalls in contract guard management, performance, and ability to
detect weapons and explosives. Clearly OMB should have increased the
resources available for monitoring, rather than imposing a cut.
Based in the GAO test, where without detection, they entered
facilities with explosives; the overreliance on contract guards--
particularly at the highest security level buildings--has clearly
reduced the effectiveness of security provided around these facilities.
The staggering lapses found by the GAO make insourcing of contract
guards at high risk buildings an important component of any overall
reform effort for FPS.
We do not dispute GAO findings that FPS could better manage its
roles, and are encouraged that implementation of the long planned Risk
Assessment Management Program (RAMP) is a major step foRAMPrward to
provide a viable tool that will assist our officers and inspectors to
manage defined risks at the facility and local levels. While will apply
GAO key practices to facility protection, the additional workload and
tracking of field staff actions will result in increased time to
complete assessments. Since the overall mission will not change RAMP
could add to the real root cause of most FPS failures and the largest
impediment to progress, which is a lack of sufficient field staff.
Major challenges that hamper the protection of Government employees
and members of the public who work in and visit Federal facilities
include:
Diminished security and increased the risk of crime or
terrorist attacks to facilities as a result of decreased or
eliminated law enforcement services such as proactive patrol in
many locations.
Contract guards that lack law enforcement authority, and are
not adequately monitored or trained.
An unworkable and inefficient funding structure that has
resulted in funding being cut by $700 million since 9/11,
employee pay reduced by 10 percent, and unbudgeted transition
costs.
The fiscal year 2010 appropriations act requires FPS to pay
the costs of transition to NPPD from its revenues, but OMB has
not yet raised security charges to provide any increased
revenue.
FPS consistently loses high performing employees because our
law enforcement officers are not recognized as such and do not
have the same benefits as other agencies with equivalent
missions.
Limited service hours in major cities impact critical
monitoring tasks.
Inadequate time to complete necessary tasks, including
security assessments.
Building Security Committees that fail to understand or
approve critical security measures.
ISC guidance interpreted by tenant and GSA security staff
that could result in hiding rather than accepting or mitigating
risk.
Coordination with other agencies security personnel who
frequently attempt to ineffectively duplicate FPS provided
services and hamper consistent application of risk-based
security measures.
In-service field staff below Congressionally mandated
levels.
FPS lacks membership on the interagency security committee
and no longer has a role as an honest broker to ensure
compliance with security standards.
FPS field managers need to build a labor management
partnership to establish one team dedicated to the critical
Federal facilities protection mission.
To meet these challenges and to achieve the promise of one
Department responsible for securing the Homeland, including Federal
employees and facilities, an effective long and short-term strategy is
necessary. Congress should take these critical initial steps:
1. Immediately mandate sufficient FPS staff to meet mission
requirements.
2. Recognize FPS's dedicated law enforcement officers as such with
appropriate pay and benefits.
3. Stop the fee-funding scheme that forces agencies to choose
between adequate protection for their employees and service to
the public, by proposing direct appropriation of essential
basic and mandated security measures.
4. In-source contract guard positions at high-risk facilities, by
replacing them with Federal Police Officers.
5. Give DHS the tools to protect Federal facilities by codifying
the role of the Interagency Security Committee; and restoring
FPS Committee membership as its honest broker.
continuing challenges to effective protection
1. Diminished security and increased the risk of crime or terrorist
attacks in many facilities as a result of decreased or eliminated law
enforcement services such as proactive patrol in many locations.
The GAO has pointed to the importance of a uniformed, Federal law
enforcement presence surrounding Federal buildings as an essential
security requirement to detect and deter attack. It is an approach
embraced by virtually all law enforcement agencies across the country.
A properly staffed FPS would function as a community police
organization where security and law enforcement tasks are integrated.
The focus would be proactive and designed to prevent criminal and
terrorist attack, rather than the traditional police model of merely
responding to reports of crime, determining if a law was violated,
initiating action through the criminal justice system and cleaning up
the resulting mess. FPS' protection mission will be best accomplished
by using inspectors, augmented by Federal Police Officers (series 083)
in the largest cities, and at the highest risk facilities. Inspectors
would be assigned as the designated service provider for a mix of high
and lower risk facilities to conduct facility security assessments,
support facility security committees, assist facility emergency
planning, train facility tenants on security topics, assist with
facility emergency plans, train contract guards, and verify
functionality of most security countermeasures. Both police officers
and inspectors would provide law enforcement response, proactive
patrol, guard performance inspections, verification of guard
certifications, and guard training monitoring.
2. Contract guards that lack law enforcement authority and are not
adequately monitored or trained.
The GAO has documented the risks inherent in depending on contract
guards as a force multiplier without adequate Government inspection,
performance monitoring, and training. Contract guards lack the
authority to arrest. With additional staff, FPS would have
significantly higher assurance guards are performing and are trained to
the specifications of the contract, through robust inspection and
monitoring protocols. Contract guards should not have the
responsibility for all dedicated facility patrol, access control, CCTV
monitoring, and weapons detection at all facilities, including complex
buildings with established high and very high risks. Roving patrol and
weapons detection positions at the highest risk facilities should be
performed by Federal police officers, just as they are at the White
House, the Capitol and Congressional office buildings, and the
Pentagon. In-sourcing these positions at select facilities to use FPS
police officers would materially reduce the risk of successful attack
using tactics similar to those used by the GAO. The use of contract
guards can continue for monitoring functions, for agency specific
requirements, and at lower risk facilities with guard requirements,
such as Social Security offices. Additionally, these police officers
would have a natural career path, building on their experience as
Federal officers, to the inspector position, thus creating an initial
accession position within FPS.
3. An unworkable and inefficient funding structure that has
resulted in funding being cut by $700 million since 9/11, employee pay
reduced by 10 percent, and unbudgeted transition costs.
The history of the unworkable FPS funding method has been well
documented. Congress created DHS to prioritize risk mitigation
strategies based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence of attack.
DHS cannot perform this function for the Federal facilities it is
charged with protecting under the current security charge FPS funding
scheme.
In the post-9/11 world of today, it makes virtually no sense to
rely upon a square footage based fee to entirely determine funding for
the FPS. While State and local taxes are used to fund basic police and
security functions, no Government collects fees from other Government
budget accounts for these essential services. Relying only on increased
basic fees, as OMB has done, ultimately reduces the basic security
services agencies can afford and increases the risk of their employees
and facilities to attack. Prior to its transfer to DHS, GSA subsidized
the FPS by $139 million above security fee collections and paid FPS
overhead and other costs from its appropriated base. DHS however, has
relied only on security fee collections, resulting in a net cut of $700
million (including inflation adjustments of 2.5%) between 2003 and
2008, despite increases in the fees charged to agencies for their
protection.
4. The fiscal year 2010 appropriations act requires FPS to pay
transition costs from its revenues but OMB has not raised security
charges to provide any increased revenue.
Without increased security charges, particularly after this year's
25 percent cut in the FPS charge to administer and monitor contract
guards, to cover FPS support costs which were previously provided
without charge by ICE, FPS will likely be forced to cancel procurement
of critical capital items and may have to curtail operations or hiring
of replacement staff.
5. FPS consistently loses high performing employees because our law
enforcement officers are not recognized as such and do not have the
same benefits as other agencies with equivalent missions.
FPS officers have been denied the same benefits many other officers
with equivalent missions receive including the Capitol Police and the
Secret Service Uniformed Division. This results in excessive attrition,
and impedes recruitment of many superbly qualified law enforcement
candidates.
6. Limited service hours in major cities that impact critical
monitoring tasks.
The GAO found that in most regions FPS is only on duty during
regular business hours. Guards are not routinely monitored at night and
on weekends. FPS does not even have 24-hour staffing in New York City.
Criminals and terrorists don't work business hours and neither should
FPS. Night and weekend staffing should be established in the 18 to 20
major metropolitan areas with the greatest number of high-risk and
total facilities.
7. Inadequate time to complete critical tasks, including security
assessments.
The GAO has reported FPS inspectors do not have enough time to
complete Facility Security Assessments. Some only have 10 percent of
the time required to complete quality assessments to established
standards. In the last 2 years, as FPS attempted to reduce the various
increased risks reported by the GAO without increased FTE, our
inspectors and police officers had to rob Peter to pay Paul to get the
job done. In some cases this had the effect of reducing risk in one
area by adding it in another. Additional staffing, including police
officers, coupled with a reduction in the number and mix of facilities
assigned to each inspector is critical to the success of a viable
community policing model.
8. Building Security Committees that fail to approve critical
security measures.
The GAO reported Building Security Committees (BSC), which are not
composed of security professionals, have responsibility for approving
security countermeasures to reduce that facilities vulnerability to
attack. Additionally, due to budget pressures agencies had competing
uses, in addition to security, for their funds. Recently at an
unguarded courthouse in a western State, there were gunshots directed
into a congressional office window. FPS has proposed a nighttime guard
for that facility each year since initial building planning in 2002,
but it has not been implemented by the BSC. Action to place DHS in
charge of this process is necessary to ensure facilities are properly
protected.
9. ISC guidance interpreted by tenant and GSA security staff that
could result in hiding rather than accepting or mitigating risk.
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) recently promulgated new
guidance on the establishment of Facility Security Level (FSL). The FSL
determines what level of protection a building should have. Members of
the GSA and other agency security staff have stated that if a facility
is not going to implement required security standards, the FSL level
should be downgraded as a risk acceptance measure. This has the effect
of hiding, not mitigating risk. DHS should be assigned a clearly
defined management and oversight role for the ISC to ensure consistent
implementation of its critical security guidance, rather than the
``consensus basis'' under which it currently operates.
10. Coordination with other agencies security personnel who
frequently attempt to ineffectively duplicate FPS provided services and
hamper consistent application of risk-based security measures.
Since 2001 the number of non-DOD security specialists and police
officers has increased by over 3,200 positions. Many of these security
positions appear to duplicate functions and services provided by FPS,
and may represent inefficient empire building. Some agencies have even
claimed that since they have security specialists they should not have
to pay security charges. This is like a homeowner buying a shotgun and
garden hose, then claiming he should be exempt from paying taxes for
police and fire protection. Ad hoc security staff and procedures can
create additional vulnerabilities and make coordination of Government-
wide standards difficult. It was even reported that the DHS Office of
Security attempted to create its own law enforcement agency to protect
its GSA owned space, rather than use FPS for the service. The ``I will
take care of my agency and everyone else be damned'' attitude prevalent
in some of these uncoordinated security staffs increase the risk that
we may fail to put the pieces together to prevent an attack. These
separate organizations each build their own supervisory and overhead
staff and in total cost more than placing the responsibility with a
single agency. A single provider like FPS can achieve Nation-wide
economies of scale that elude most non-DOD security staffs.
11. In-service field staff below Congressionally-mandated levels.
The fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act mandates that OMB and
DHS shall ensure fee collections are sufficient to ensure that the
Federal Protective Service maintains not fewer than 1,200 full-time
equivalent staff and 900 full-time equivalent police officers,
inspectors, area commanders, and special agents who, while working, are
directly engaged on a daily basis protecting and enforcing laws at
Federal buildings (referred to as ``in-service field staff''). Based on
ICE and OMB guidance the FPS in-service field staff has been
interpreted as including all personnel assigned to FPS law enforcement
positions. Thus the 900 minimum includes recruits who have not even
attended FLETC Uniformed Police training, personnel on long-term
restricted duty that prevents service as a law enforcement officer,
regional office GS-14 and -15 managers, regional intelligence and JTTF
Agents, and staff assigned to the FPS National headquarters. This
appears to be at variance with the very specific language of the act.
The committee should clarify to the DHS Secretary and Director of OMB,
that in-service means in-service, and FPS should be immediately funded
to recruit sufficient staff to ensure compliance.
12. FPS is not a member of the interagency security committee and
no longer has a role as an honest broker to ensure compliance with
security standards.
When President Clinton issued Executive Order 12977 in 1995 he
specified that the Director (then Assistant Commissioner) of FPS was a
member of the ISC. He also made the Director of FPS responsible for
monitoring Federal agency compliance with the policies and
recommendations of the ISC. When the Bush administration revised the
order upon the creation of DHS, these critical roles were eliminated.
13. FPS field managers need to build a labor management partnership
to establish one team dedicated to the critical Federal facilities
protection mission.
In some regions managers attempt to manage workload by imposing
impossible deadlines rather than working together with employees to set
achievable goals. We have inspectors and police officers who work up to
60 hours a week to meet management demands for National and regional
goals, but in some locations these dedicated officers work the extra
hours without overtime pay because they cannot do all that is necessary
in the time allowed by their management. Officers also report that
administrative contracting tasks detract from essential protective
activities, while other regions get these tasks done at the region
headquarters. Better partnering can build a cohesive team where goals
can be accomplished without fear as a primary motivation.
14. With the potential terrorist trials in New York likely
requiring significant augmentation of the FPS NYC staff, more staff is
required to prevent diversion of staff from other areas.
actions to meet challenges and ensure progress
To meet these challenges and to achieve the promise of one
Department responsible for securing the homeland, including Federal
employees and facilities, an effective long- and short-term strategy is
necessary. Congress should take these critical initial steps:
1. Provide sufficient FPS staff to meet mission requirements.
In fiscal year 2010 FPS is projected to have 1,225 personnel
and approximately $240 million to protect 9,000 facilities and
over 1 million employees Nation-wide.
There are over 1,600 Capitol Police with $292 million, to
protect the Capitol and Congressional offices in a 12-block
area of Washington, DC.
The Secret Service has over 1,300 officers in its Uniformed
Division, to protect its assigned facilities in Washington, DC.
The Veterans Health Administration has over 2,500 police
officers to protect their 154 medical centers Nation-wide.
Clearly FPS is not adequately staffed to accomplish its
mission.
Immediately establish a minimum requirement of 1,200 field
law enforcement staff (in-service field staff as defined in the
DHS Appropriations Act) to protect buildings, including
effective monitoring of contract guard performance and
training.
Mandate night and weekend service in the largest cities with
the highest number of high-risk facilities, using police
officers to augment the inspector force.
Notify DHS and OMB that in-service field staff as defined in
the fiscal year 2010 appropriations act means in-service staff
in the field, not merely any position categorized as law
enforcement.
Additional resources may be required after receipt of a
budget request that reflects an output driven staff allocation
model.
2. Recognize FPS' dedicated law enforcement officers as such with
appropriate pay and benefits.
FPS officers should be granted the same authority given to
all other Federal law enforcement officers to carry their
service weapons on a 24/7 basis. Not only does this provide an
additional police presence in communities where these officers
reside, it also gives the officers protection against
retribution from persons they have arrested and others who
might wish to do them harm.
FPS police officers and inspectors are treated as second-
class citizens in regards to the Federal law enforcement
status. They should be granted the same retirement benefits
afforded to other law enforcement personnel with virtually the
same mission.
FPS police officers and inspectors received a retention
allowance and were placed on special pay tables until 2007.
These initiatives significantly slowed attrition and retained
highly qualified employees. When these were eliminated, many of
the most qualified and experienced employees moved to other law
enforcement and security positions with higher pay rates. FPS
law enforcement personnel should receive Administratively
Uncontrollable Overtime (AUO) at an initial rate of 25 percent.
This will enhance overall facility security and guard
monitoring by ensuring officers can accomplish of all assigned
tasks. Chemical inspectors and Protective Service Advisors
within NPPD currently receive AUO to improve their ability to
accomplish the myriad of tasks they are assigned, thus showing
two situations in NPPD where this proposal works to improve
mission performance.
3. Stop the fee-funding scheme that forces agencies to choose
between adequate protection for their employees and service to the
public, by proposing direct appropriation of essential basic and
mandated security measures. All basic, building-specific and security
fixture security costs should be authorized and directly appropriated
to FPS to implement an integrated risk-based strategy to protect
Federal facilities.
Direct appropriation for basic operations could be achieved
through a transfer of funds by the Office of Management and
Budget to the FPS of $0.66 for each square foot assigned to
each Department and agency occupying GSA space (excluding
facilities protected by the Secret Service Uniformed Division)
from the agencies appropriation, with unoccupied and out-leased
space considered as assigned to the GSA.
Direct appropriation for Building Specific Security
Services, can also be achieved through a transfer of the costs
paid by each agency, plus the charge paid for FPS program
administration.
Optional security services to meet agency standards, such as
guards at SSA Service Offices, should continue to be provided
through the existing Security Work Authorization process.
4. In-source contract guard positions at high-risk facilities, by
replacing them with Federal police officers.
Just as Congress and the White House use Federal police
officers for dedicated patrol and weapons detection positions,
all high-risk Federal facilities should use these highly
qualified law enforcement personnel rather than depending
entirely on contract guards to perform these functions.
Direct the Department to in-source these positions.
Implement the transition at the rate of 300 officers a year.
5. Give DHS the tools to protect Federal facilities by codifying
the role of the Interagency Security Committee; and restoring FPS
Committee membership and its honest broker.
With the mandate of section 1315 of title 40 USC that the
DHS protect all Federal facilities, the ISC should be codified
as well.
FPS should be restored to its roles in the original
directive.
Clear guidance should be provided that DHS is in charge of
security standards for Federal facilities. Federal facility
security standards are too important to be left to a consensus
decision by ad hoc committee members.
6. Recognize the FPS manpower crisis in New York City--particularly
in relation to upcoming terrorist trials.
Obtain an immediate assessment of present law enforcement
and support staffing in NYC.
Obtain an immediate status of present management challenges.
Mandate FPS to correct management deficiencies and hire
personnel sufficient to ensure 24/7 law enforcement coverage
and to staff security for the upcoming terrorist trials.
SUMMARY
Mr. Chairman, the sole Federal agency charged with the critical
mission of protecting thousands of Federal buildings and millions of
people from terrorist and criminal attack is on a path to mission
success within NPPD. However, it is faced with significant challenges
that if not remedied will impede progress. I believe the state of the
FPS right now is little different from that of the airline industry
security prior to 9/11. There, a reliance on poorly trained,
unmonitored contract guards with no law enforcement authority; security
implementation by conflicting entities; an unworkable funding
structure; and a perception of security through inspections, instead of
protection by boots-on-the-ground Federal officers proved disastrous.
It should not have happened then, and it should not be allowed to
happen now. The dedicated men and women of FPS need your help to enable
our success and to protect Federal employees across the country. Again,
thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Amitay to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. AMITAY, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY COMPANIES
Mr. Amitay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear here today to discuss the continuing challenges of FPS
as they transition from ICE to NPPD.
I am Federal legislative counsel to the National
Association of Security Companies, NASCO. NASCO is the largest
contract security trade association, as you said, representing
private security companies that employ more than 400,000
security officers across the United States of America.
Private security officers protect Federal facilities,
businesses, public areas, and critical infrastructure, and they
are often the first responder on the scene of a security or
terrorism incident.
NASCO member companies employ many former law enforcement
and military personnel as both security officers and in their
management.
Sadly, the death of private security Officer Stephen Johns
earlier this year at the Holocaust Museum was a tragic reminder
of the vital role that private security officers play every day
in protecting the public.
NASCO firmly believes that Federal facilities can be
sufficiently protected, and in a cost-efficient manner, through
the utilization of private security officers. However, the
recent findings of the GAO in its study of the FPS contract
guard program were troubling, and the problems identified need
to be addressed by both FPS and contractors.
On the operational level, the impending roll-out of RAMP, a
centralized, interactive database management system, should
provide for a significant improvement over the current
unreliable, decentralized system for collecting and monitoring
security officer training and certification data.
FPS is also updating and planning to provide more, and more
frequent, X-ray and magnetometer training. Given the security
officer's primary role of building access control, deficiencies
in this critical training were understandably highlighted by
the GAO. NASCO members have also called for improvements to be
made to current FPS firearms training for security officers.
NASCO strongly agrees with the GAO recommendation for
better building-specific and scenario-specific training.
One long-standing issue that has already been discussed
today has caused much confusion among FPS contract security
officers, and where better or clearer guidance is needed, is on
the subject of what actions constitute detention of a person,
which can be lawful, and what actions constitute an arrest,
which usually is unlawful, and can give rise to a lawsuit.
NASCO is also hopeful that efforts to improve program
management and increase oversight will lead to better
communication between FPS offices and between FPS and
contractors. At certain levels, the communication between FPS
and contractors is excellent, but in others it is not so good,
which has resulted in delays and added expenses in the hiring
and processing of officers.
However, in the final analysis, the flaws and weaknesses in
contractor and security officer performance found by the GAO
expose a more fundamental issue at hand: Quality versus cost.
It is NASCO's position--and we think the public agrees--
that quality should always play a primary role when selecting a
private security company, particularly when the protection of
Federal employees, visitors, and facilities is involved.
There are tangible reasons why higher quality security
costs more. Higher salaries attract higher caliber officers;
internal company training, screening, and operational
procedures will be better; and internal company management
oversight will be stronger.
The FPS contract award process needs to be adjusted to
ensure that quality service and performance is properly
considered in relation to cost. NASCO is not alone in believing
that FPS security contracts, awarded based on best value, are
often realistically awarded based on lowest cost. Technical
capability and past performance of a company are not being
valued as they should.
As for the impending transfer of FPS from under ICE to
NPPD, we believe it is a very positive move. As many have
already pointed out, the Federal infrastructure protection
mission of FPS aligns with NPPD's mission to protect all
critical infrastructure.
In closing, while work needs to be done to address and
resolve the current problems in the contract guard program,
NASCO believes that, with a greater regard to quality in the
procurement process, and with improvements in contract and data
management, oversight and training, the performance of FPS
contractors and security officers will increase, and thus, so
too, will the level of security at Federal facilities.
NASCO stands ready to work with the committee and its staff
on any and all efforts to improve the standards and quality of
contract security at FPS and elsewhere.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Amitay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen D. Amitay
November 18, 2009
BACKGROUND ON NASCO AND PRIVATE SECURITY
NASCO is the Nation's largest contract security trade association,
representing private security companies that employ more than 400,000
security officers across the Nation who are servicing commercial and
Governmental clients including the Federal Protective Service (FPS).
Formed in 1972, NASCO has strived to increase awareness and
understanding among policy-makers, consumers, the media, and the
general public of the important role of private security in
safeguarding persons and property. NASCO also has been a leading
advocate for raising standards at the Federal, State, and local level
for the licensing of private security firms and the registration,
screening, and training of security officers.
Nearly 2 million people are employed in private security
domestically compared to fewer than 700,000 public law enforcement
personnel. Approximately 75 percent of private security personnel work
for contract security companies, with the balance serving as
proprietary or ``in-house'' security. The vast majority of contract
security firms employ many former law enforcement and military
personnel in senior management.
Private security officers are guarding Federal facilities,
businesses, public areas, and critical infrastructure sites (of which
85 percent are owned by the private sector) and they are often the
``first'' responders on the scene of any security or terrorism-related
incident. Sadly, the death of private security officer Stephen Johns
earlier this year at the Holocaust museum, killed in the line of duty
protecting museum patrons, was a tragic reminder of the vital role that
private security officers play every day in protecting the public.
As mentioned, raising standards for the industry and security
officers is a core NASCO mission. In recent years, NASCO and its member
companies have worked to pass licensing and training legislation in
States such as Mississippi, Alabama, Colorado, and California. Earlier
this year, Alabama enacted a law to set up a State board to regulate
and oversee the licensing of private security companies and set
training for security officers. In California, over the past several
years, laws have been enacted to increase training requirements for
security officers and to include weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism awareness courses. In addition, with NASCO support,
California has lead the way in bringing ``in-house'' security officers
and employers into compliance with existing security licensing and
training requirements.
On the Federal level, NASCO is currently working with Congress and
the Justice Department to provide for the effective implementation of
the ``Private Security Officers Employment Authorization Act of 2004''
(PSOEAA) that provides Federal authorization to employers of private
security officers to request a limited FBI criminal history check.
The principal role of private security officers is to protect
people and property from accidents and crime, control access to a
facility or location, and observe and report suspicious activities.
They serve as the ``eyes and ears'' of public law enforcement and play
an important supporting role to law enforcement. They conduct incident
interviews, prepare incident reports and provide legal testimony.
Private security officers may be armed pursuant to State and Federal
laws, and in certain jurisdictions armed security officers are granted
police powers. Generally though, private security officers do not have
police powers and their powers correspond to those of private citizens.
Overall, private security provides businesses, organizations, and
Governmental entities with a readily available efficient proven layer
of security and deterrence.
CONTRACT SECURITY AND THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE
There are approximately 13,000 contract security officers--working
for 67 contractors--at facilities under the jurisdiction of Federal
Protective Service (FPS). FPS contract security officers are primarily
responsible for controlling access to Federal facilities by checking
identifications and operating screening equipment, such as X-ray
machines and magnetometers. In most instances, security officers do not
have arrest authority but can detain individuals who are being
disruptive or pose a danger to public safety until the arrival of law
enforcement.
Before being assigned to a post or an area of responsibility at a
Federal facility, FPS requires that all security officers undergo
background suitability checks and complete approximately 128 hours of
training provided by the contractor and FPS, including 8 hours of FPS
provided X-ray and magnetometer training. Security officers must also
pass an FPS-administered written examination and possess the necessary
certificates, licenses, and permits as required by the contract. Each
security officer's required qualifications, certifications, and other
requirements are tracked through the FPS Contract Guard Employment
Requirements Tracking System (CERTS) and by the contract security
company.
FPS CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAM ISSUES
NASCO firmly believes that Federal facilities can be effectively
protected--and in a cost-efficient manner--through the utilization of
private security officers. However, there is no question that the
recent findings of the GAO in its study of the FPS Contract Guard
Program were troubling and the problems identified need to be addressed
by both FPS and contractors. NASCO has maintained a good working
relationship with FPS officials involved with the Contract Guard
Program, and we appreciate that FPS leadership has encouraged a strong
partnership between contractors and FPS. We believe that efforts
underway at FPS to address problems identified by GAO with the Contract
Guard Program can be successful, and that there are other means also
that can lead to better performance and greater security all around.
On the operational level, the impending roll-out of the Risk
Assessment Management Program (RAMP)--a centralized interactive
database management system--should provide for a big improvement over
the current unreliable de-centralized CERTS system for collecting and
monitoring training and certification data. RAMP should make the input
of data more efficient and provide FPS with access to more up-to-date
and reliable data in one location. More so, it should enable FPS to
manage and control contractor data better, which has been a real
problem for contractors. It is envisioned that one day RAMP will even
be able to provide notices to contractors when a security officer's
certification is about to expire. FPS is also upgrading its post-
tracking system which should allow for quicker reconciliation of
invoices and allow for more prompt contractor payment. NASCO also
supports FPS' on-going effort to standardize and professionalize the
contract security officer force.
The GAO report was particularly critical of lapses and weaknesses
in the FPS's X-ray and magnetometer training. Given the contract
security officer's primary role as one of access control, adequate
training in this area is crucial. The GAO noted that in some cases the
required training was simply not provided to the contract security
officers by FPS and in other cases it was inadequate. NASCO member
companies with FPS contracts have encountered such difficulties with X-
ray and magnetometer training. FPS has reported that it has moved to
update the X-ray and magnetometer training, as well as provide it more
frequently, and we applaud this action.
The GAO also noted that improvements in building-specific and
scenario-specific training are needed and we strongly believe
improvements in these areas could be very beneficial. One long-standing
area of confusion for contract security officers is the line between
detaining an individual (lawful) and arresting an individual (usually
unlawful and subject to a lawsuit). If a security officer has reason to
believe an individual is committing or about to commit an unlawful act
and he stops and handcuffs that individual and calls the police, is
that an arrest or detention? Better training and better contractual
guidance is needed to address this important issue.
Another area where some contractors believe better training and
additional contractual requirements are needed is in the area of
firearms training. FPS mandates that all contract security officers
pass a rigorous firearms course which is very commendable, but only
requires one firearms qualification a year (FPS officers, who fire the
same firearms course, train and qualify four times a year). Without a
corresponding contract requirement for sufficient training and
qualifications for contract security officers to stay proficient, there
could be dangerous ramifications in a scenario like the one that
unfolded at the Holocaust museum.
NASCO also supports the GAO's call for better management and
oversight of Contract Guard Program contracts and the need for more and
better trained Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs)
and efforts are underway to assign more COTRs. Nonetheless, underlying
the issue of better management and oversight is need for better
communication between FPS offices, and between FPS and contractors. The
results of such communication problems were pervasive in the GAO's
findings. At certain levels the communication between FPS and
contractors is excellent, and FPS is working hard to ascertain the
problems and concerns of contractors. But regular instances of
information and documents not flowing from one area of FPS to another--
resulting in multiple requests for the same information--have caused
delays and added expenses in the hiring and processing of officers.
There have also been problems that have resulted from inconsistent or
inadequate notification and administrative procedures involved in the
officer application process, as well as in the process for submitting
officer certifications. The conduct of certain training has also been
affected by a lack of communication between FPS headquarters and the
field.
In the final analysis though, while improvements in contract
oversight and management, data automation, communication, and training
will improve the Contract Guard Program, the flaws and weaknesses in
contractor performance found by the GAO expose a more fundamental
issue, ``quality versus cost.'' It is NASCO's position, and we think
the public agrees, that quality should always play a primary role when
selecting a private security company, particularly when the protection
of Federal employees, visitors, and facilities is involved. There are
tangible reasons why higher quality security costs more. Higher
salaries attract higher caliber officers; training and screening will
be better; and management oversight will be stronger. The FPS contract
award process must be altered to ensure that quality service and
performance, in relation to cost, is properly considered. FPS efforts
to improve training and oversight can lead to improved contractor and
officer performance, but until procurers of contract security services
effectively put quality ahead of cost, problems with contractors such
as those that the GAO report highlighted will persist.
Currently, FPS Contract Guard Program contract awards are not bound
by lowest bid requirements, and all eligible bidders must meet an
acceptable qualifying standard. However, NASCO is not alone in
believing that awards allegedly based on ``best value'' are more
realistically based on lowest cost, and technical capability and past
performance are not being valued as they should. NASCO supports the
inclusion of higher performance related standards in contracts, as well
as taking steps to ensure that the quality of a company's training,
personnel, management, and operational procedures--which result in a
higher bid--are adequately considered during the procurement process.
Some have speculated that bringing FPS security ``in-house''
through the creation of a federalized FPS security force could be a
solution to the current challenges in the Contract Guard Program. NASCO
contends that the cost of an in-house force (let alone the issues and
costs involved in creating such a force), versus the current cost of
contract security officers will reveal that there is a great deal of
room to increase compensation, selection, and training standards for
FPS contract security officers to provide better security at Federal
facilities, while at the same time remaining at a much lower cost per
officer than ``in-house'' security officers.
THE TRANSFER OF FPS FROM ICE TO NPPD
We believe the impending transfer of FPS from under ICE to NPPD is
a very positive move. It has already been pointed out by many observers
that the Federal infrastructure protection mission of FPS aligns with
NPPD's mission to protect all critical infrastructure (of which Federal
buildings is an important element). This alignment should lead to
greater effectiveness for both NPPD and FPS. NPPD also chairs the
operations of the Interagency Security Committee, which not only is the
lead in the Federal Government for setting Government-wide security
policies for Federal facilities, but the committee has also been
working with FPS in its effort to bring better standardization to
Federal contract security officers.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
When FPS was taken out from GSA and put under ICE in 2003, FPS
faced significant challenges and difficulties, some old and some new.
Combined with subsequent significant reductions in the FPS inspector
and law enforcement officer force, those difficulties contributed to
serious flaws and deficiencies in the Contract Guard Program. However,
NASCO believes that under the leadership of Director Schenkel, FPS is
making considerable strides to rectify the problems with the program.
While there is still much work to be done, with FPS (now better
situated under NPPD), security contractors, and Congress all working
together, the shared goal to provide for better safety and protection
of Federal employees, Federal contractors and visitors in at Federal
facilities protected by FPS can be attained. As it has for the past
several years, NASCO stands ready to work with the committee and its
staff on any and all efforts to improve the standards and quality of
contract security within and outside the Federal Government.
Chairman Thompson. I would like to thank the witnesses for
their testimony. I remind each Member that he or she will have
5 minutes to question the panel.
I will now recognize myself for the first questions.
Let me again thank both of you for your testimony.
Every now and then we get labor and contract people
together on the same panel. One of the things I want to assure
both of you, is that this committee is looking at, how can we
keep the security at those Federal buildings the best that we
can. The options are either ramp up the Federal employment
aspect, look at the contracting, ramp that up.
But one of the issues that both of you gentlemen talked
about, spoke of training. We are really concerned about it.
If you heard the testimony and questions from the committee
on the first panel, we kind of burrowed down. We just want to
make sure that it is done right.
That facilities committee caused us real heartburn, because
you have some people in those buildings making security
decisions in many instances that do not know anything about
security. They just happen to be the largest tenant, or
something like that.
With respect to the FPS training, Mr. Wright, are you
satisfied with the training that the officers in your local
receive on the full-time side?
Mr. Wright. I will take a little bit of credit for opening
this can of worms. Since the whistle blowing in 2006, the
exposure of the FPS deficit--I think we all recall accounts of
between $40 million and $80 million in deficit--there were huge
cost-cutting measures undertaken. Part of those cost-cutting
measures was a reduction in training for Federal officers.
We have had very few what we call LERTs, or law enforcement
refresher training, at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center. So, security has definitely suffered in the times of
what was described as a deficit.
Prior to that, FPS had excellent training and pretty much
the funds to accomplish that training. But as it stands today,
I think there is a deficiency in Federal officer training in
FPS.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Amitay, with respect to FPS's requirements for contract
security personnel, what has been the position of your trade
group with respect to their training requirement?
Mr. Amitay. Well, contractors are required to provide 128
hours of training. In addition, and then there is also FPS-
provided training.
We think the amount of training is sufficient, with certain
exceptions. As has been noted, the FPS provided X-ray and
magnetometer training. There have been problems with that. This
has been related to NASCO from contractors with FPS contracts.
But FPS, we have been working with FPS. So, the
contractors--and they have seen that FPS is trying to beef up
that X-ray and magnetometer training, to provide it more, to do
updated and to provide more of it.
In other areas, for instance, firearms training, some have
said that, whereas law enforcement FPS officers qualify four
times a year for the firearm training, the contract security
officers only qualify once a year. It is a very rigorous
firearms training, which is to be commended. But we feel that
the proficiency level could be lacking without the proper
amount of qualifications per year.
But we have noticed that FPS has really started to work on
improving the training that it currently has.
Chairman Thompson. Without getting too deep in the weeds,
there was a question about arrest power. What has your
membership said about arrest powers?
Mr. Amitay. Yes, it has been--this is a big issue.
Normally, private security officers do not have arrest
power. However, there are some exceptions. For instance, in
Virginia, a licensed, armed security officer does have arrest
power at the facility where he is protecting. Also, in the
District of Columbia, there is a class of officer called a
``special police officer,'' who has arrest authority.
But primarily, contract security officers----
Chairman Thompson. Now, is this with FPS?
Mr. Amitay. Well, if FPS made it a requirement of the
contracts that the contract security officer be a special
police officer, then, yes, it could be incorporated into the
contract.
Chairman Thompson. So, do you know of any?
Mr. Amitay. Excuse me, sir.
Yes. Very few contracts require SPO training as of now, but
more could.
Chairman Thompson. So, the answer is yes or no?
Mr. Amitay. The answer is ``yes.''
Chairman Thompson. That you know of contracts that FPS has
in force that allows arrest powers for the private security.
Mr. Amitay. Right. Yes. Again, it is based on the local
jurisdiction.
But if the local jurisdiction does allow for a class of
private security officer to have arrest powers, it is the local
law, then, yes, then those types of officers with arrest powers
can be included--you know, can be guarding FPS facilities--if
the contract says that for these facilities, for this contract,
the security officers need to be special police officers.
Chairman Thompson. I would love for you to provide the
committee with a list of those contracts.
Mr. Wright, has the mix between full-time Federal and
contract employees provided any tensions in the workplace, to
your knowledge?
Mr. Wright. Yes, and very timely to this discussion here
today.
We have instances of, since the July 8 hearing, the
increased oversight and increased contract guard monitoring.
This results in tensions between Federal officers and private
guards.
One tactic that I have noticed in one region in particular,
is a propensity to allege harassment by private guards alleging
harassment towards Federal officers. In those cases, we have
very definite problems getting our officers into these
facilities, getting them protected and shielded from these,
what I consider malicious charges by private guards.
There are tensions. I mean, we are the monitors. We are the
ones that find the wrongdoing. We are--our Federal officers are
the ones that find individuals sleeping, or without proper
commissions. So, yes, there is absolutely tension.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from California.
Ms. Richardson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want
to thank you for holding this hearing, because as we are
hearing now on both sides, and information, clearly, you know,
this information needs to be had.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask, could we get a
clarification from the folks who spoke in the first panel, if,
in fact, as Mr. Wright has just presented, that the staffing
costs have been decreased by 25 percent?
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
My second thing is, Mr. Wright, do you guys have an on-
going contract? Your local, do you guys have an on-going
contract?
Mr. Wright. No. No, we do not.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. I am new on the committee. I know
with transportation, for example--and I am, actually, fairly
new to Congress--a year or so ago there was the whole thing of
TSA was not, you know, under contracting.
Is that the same with the FPS, with the officers, that they
are not?
Mr. Wright. What has happened is, we all know we were
formerly GSA. We had GSA contracts. In December 2005, we were
certified by FLRA as AFGE.
At that point, in December 2005, FPS was placed under a
year 2000 labor contract. Once we were inside of ICE, we
started our labor contract negotiations in February 2007 were
the preliminaries. June 2007, we started actual negotiations.
To this day, that contract has not been signed--not even close
to being signed.
The one complication now--and certainly, I do not view it
as a complication--is that we are now under NPPD and no longer
subject to those ICE contract negotiations.
So, very technically, we are tied to a year 2000 labor
agreement, originally under the Immigration and Naturalization
Service----
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Let me stop you there, because there
is only so far we are actually able to delve into this.
Mr. Chairman, might I also suggest that, being on the
Transportation Committee, I know there was a long time that our
contract has been left out. Secretary LaHood has made a
commitment to get to the table and address some of these
issues.
I might also suggest that we request of Secretary
Napolitano any outstanding things that might be hanging, that
have not been resolved, that they go to the table and do them--
or whoever the appropriate people----
Chairman Thompson. If the gentlelady would yield.
This committee has a longstanding commitment to giving
workers the right to choose representation. I do not see why
your suggestion is not consistent with that longstanding
commitment.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Then, Mr. Amitay, could you describe for me what are the
qualifications for--do you have a list of standard
qualifications that the contract officers must meet? Is there a
standard?
Mr. Amitay. That standard is set completely by FPS. I know
that they do have--I recently saw a brochure that--it was
titled ``Standards for the FPS Contract Guard Program.'' All
the standards for the guards are set by FPS.
Ms. Richardson. To your knowledge with your association,
how much auditing actually goes on to determine if what the
contractor says that they are meeting, in terms of who they are
bringing forward, is, in fact, correct information?
Mr. Amitay. We do not do any studies of that.
But I would like to say, though, that we welcome more
oversight of the program. We welcome more oversight of
contractors. There have been problems with contractors. If
there are problems with certain contractors, then maybe they
should not continue to have those contracts.
NASCO has always stood for raising the standards in the
industry. We fully believe that when you have raised standards
and you base your contracts based on quality as opposed to
cost, you will be able to get that sufficient level of
protection that is required, and at a much lower and more
efficient rate than hiring full-time Federal police officers.
In some instances, you just do not need a full-time law
enforcement officer monitoring X-rays and magnetometer
machines, you know.
Ms. Richardson. Well, my time is about to expire. Let me
just say this.
Mr. Chairman, I think, in light of some of the things that
have happened, you know, even on full military bases very
recently, and with what we have dealt with in the last few
years, and certainly, probably what is ahead, I would venture
to say, we have to be very careful. We do not know what we are
going to expect, that any person might walk into any building
on any given day to do something that is inappropriate.
So, I would actually say that, I would prefer, particularly
in a Federal building, where there is a public expectation that
appropriate security does exist, that all efforts are made to
do that.
I will not get into the nuts and bolts of whether it is one
or whether it is the other. But I think we have an obligation.
The public expects us, that we are providing a certain level of
service. Unfortunately, there have been a couple of instances
where that probably has not been the case.
So, I look forward to working with the Chairman. I thank
you for having this hearing, and I look forward to all of the
follow-up to ensure that we can create that within our
buildings. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Now, I would like to thank the
gentlelady from California, as well as our witnesses, for their
valuable testimony, and the Members for their questions.
Before concluding, however, I would like to remind our
panel of witnesses that the Members of the committee may have
additional questions for you, over and above what we have
already laid out. We ask that you respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions.
Now, the other commitment I give to both witnesses is from
an oversight standpoint. Our job is to see that any of those
DHS-related components do the best job possible. If there is
anything going on that you do not see consistent with
established policies, please let us know.
I know staff loves to hear me give them work, but one
mistake and we are in trouble. We do not want any of that to
ever happen. So, that is a standing offer to anybody. If the
policies are inconsistent, whatever, the regulations, be they
contract security as well as Federal employees, please let us
know.
Hearing no further business, however, and a vote has been
called, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Rand
Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection Programs Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. GAO's investigation revealed glaring gaps in the
security capability of the FPS contract guard force. GAO found that
contract guards failed to conduct adequate screening to detect
improvised explosive devices and other prohibited weapons. In addition,
GAO observed security breaches during evacuations and emergencies
caused by the guards' lack of familiarity with the specific buildings
they were guarding.
Answer. To ensure that guards are properly trained and familiar
with the facilities they protect, the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) recognizes that it is essential to collect and
continually manage a wide range of information on both the guards used
by the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the facilities FPS
protects. This includes the certifications of guard training provided
by the guard companies to FPS, as well as detailed facility and
countermeasure information necessary to appropriately mitigate risk for
the facility. FPS has greatly enhanced its capabilities to collect and
manage this range of information through the Risk Assessment and
Management Program (RAMP), which began operations in November 2009.
With the implementation of RAMP as a centralized tool for managing
facility risk, FPS has initiated electronic tracking of certification
records by all contractors. This allows FPS to rectify the deficiencies
that existed in legacy systems and provides real-time, up-to-date
information on guard certifications in two ways:
1. The certification information comes directly from the source
(e.g., the contract companies that are responsible for
maintaining records on the training their employees have
received); and
2. FPS receives regular updates from certifications that are
uploaded and verified within the centralized RAMP system. This
allows for improved tracking of certifications and directly
supports the regular audits of contractor records.
The FPS Risk Management Division is currently revising the FPS
policy (09-001) that details the site inspection and audit procedures
of contractors. This policy will increase the requirement for audits
from 10 percent of the files quarterly to 10 percent of the files
monthly. The revised policy will also provide prescriptive instructions
on specific record-auditing methods. As a result, the frequency and
scope of guard certification audits will be greatly increased. This
will provide FPS with increased assurance the contract guards
performing on FPS contracts possess the appropriate training and
certification.
In addition to the increased oversight of the contractor-provided
training and inspection of the guard posts within the Federal
buildings, FPS has developed a National Weapons Detection Program
(NWDP) to increase the guard's awareness and detection capabilities.
The NWDP requires 16 hours of additional training on the newly
purchased magnetometers and X-ray machines. This training addresses the
proper use of screening equipment, screening procedures, and overall
education on potential threats. FPS has published three additional,
specific training bulletins, produced a training video, and modified
guard contracts to ensure 100 percent compliance with this essential
guard training.
FPS provides guard post orders for each specific guard post within
a Federal building. These post orders are coordinated with the tenant
agencies and describe the exact functions the guards are to perform at
their posts. The guards are trained on the post orders and rehearse the
emergency response portion of the orders during annual exercises,
including fire drills, occupant emergency plan exercises, and shelter-
in-place exercises.
Question 1b. How does NPPD plan to improve security at Federal
buildings?
Answer. As stated above, the Federal Protective Service (FPS)
increased the required number of hours of training and developed the
National Weapons Detection Program (NWDP), which requires additional
training on the proper use and overall education on the newly purchased
magnetometers and X-ray machines. In addition, FPS is in the final
stages of implementing a Covert Security Testing Program to test the
effectiveness of security countermeasures as part of its multifaceted
strategy to achieve its core mission: Secure facilities and provide
safety to occupants within those facilities. The Covert Security
Testing Program is designed to assess countermeasure (e.g., contract
security guards) effectiveness, identify policy and training
deficiencies, ensure immediate corrective action, and document,
analyze, and archive results. Each covert security test will be
followed immediately by a corrective action briefing, which will be
used to inform regional management officials and the Contracting
Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) that they have been the
subject of a covert security test. The test team will share the results
of the testing and recommend remedies for any identified control
weaknesses, deficiencies, or security vulnerabilities, if necessary.
Finally, regional directors will be responsible for ensuring the
submission of accurate and complete contractor performance evaluations
that include deficiencies identified during covert security testing
when appropriate.
Question 1c. Who will be responsible for carrying out NPPD's plans
for improving security?
Answer. The National Protection and Programs Directorate's (NPPD's)
Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and FPS will be responsible
for carrying out NPPD's plans on facility security improvements. The
ISC has the responsibility for determining the direction of security
for all Federal facilities and has already begun to take on some of the
hardest questions concerning the appropriate Federal building security
standards. Although FPS has responsibility for only 9,000 of the more
than 350,000 Federal facilities that fall under the ISC responsibility,
the ISC has recognized the unique position of the General Services
Administration (GSA) facilities. They represent the facilities that
house the preponderance of Federal employees and visitors to those
facilities. Therefore such facilities may need to be addressed in a
special manner. FPS and GSA have already begun drafting minimum
security standards for GSA properties. FPS will receive direct
oversight from the Under Secretary of NPPD and will continue its effort
in the positive direction it has taken over these past several years.
Question 1d. What has NPPD done to consider reducing the reliance
on contract guards, given their shortcomings?
Answer. FPS has initially explored several operational options
including the conversion of some or all of the nearly 15,000 contract
guards to Federal positions. Currently, FPS uses a hybrid model in
which FPS inspectors are assigned to directly oversee the contract
guard force at specific facilities. NPPD has not had an opportunity to
fully review and evaluate all the challenges related to federalizing or
partially federalizing the guard workforce. Full analysis of these
challenges would need to evaluate the security benefits of a very
complex transition effort, average costs, and the logistical management
of new hires. NPPD and Department leadership will work together to
review the recommendations of previous studies conducted for FPS. NPPD
will also reach out to the Transportation Security Administration to
gain the benefits of their experience.
Question 2. The FPS transition plan describes a transition process
that will take about 20 months. The first briefing to Congress is
scheduled to occur in April 2010. Can you give me your commitment that
we will receive an update prior to that time? I would hope that we
would receive a progress report no later than February 2010.
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) Transition Plan
submitted to Congress in August 2009 included structured reporting
requirements and proposed two Congressional briefings during the 20-
month period. The plan recommended that these briefings take place in
April 2010 and December 2010. The submitted plan was premised on an
effective transition date of October 1, 2009. The FPS plan was
transmitted later than planned, on October 28, 2009, so the transition
date was adjusted accordingly in the plan's milestones outlining the
detailed phases for the transition. The FPS Transition Senior Working
Group has met regularly since June 1 and will continue to meet until
the transition is complete. This group consists of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Management at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
the Chief Operating Officer of the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD), and the Director of FPS as co-chairs with reporting
staff-level working groups including an Operations Working Group and an
Acquisitions Working Group. We intend to keep Congress informed of our
progress throughout this process and expect to provide additional
information before the end of February 2010.
Question 3. According to the transition plan, FPS is working with
NPPD and DHS leadership to create a workforce staffing model that is
based on changes to risk, threat, and consequence. Please explain the
expertise that NPPD brings to bear in helping FPS refine its risk-based
staffing model to focus on high- and very high-level risk facilities
and how this approach will address the limitations in the current risk
assessment and countermeasure acquisition programs which have been
raised by GAO.
Answer. As noted in the Federal Protective Service (FPS) Transition
Plan, FPS is refining its staffing model focusing threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences at high- and very high-risk
facilities. The model is expected to project workforce needs based on
identified risk consistent with a high concentration of Federal
facilities, large populations, and designation as an Urban Areas
Security Initiative city. As noted in the plan, the National Protection
and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and FPS leadership will review the final results of the analysis
and will forward any appropriate recommendations in subsequent budget
requests. Through this transition period, NPPD and FPS will work
together on new Government Accountability Office (GAO) and DHS Office
of the Inspector General (OIG) engagements and also review
recommendations that remain open after the effective date of FPS
transitioning from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
to NPPD.
FPS has already prepared a workforce study based on identifiable
risks to ensure the maximum risk mitigation at the National level. The
workforce study is a fluid, living collection of data and observations
that need to be adjusted continuously based upon mission assignments,
GAO or OIG recommendations and findings, changes in Interagency
Security Committee requirements, and a host of other National security
and regulatory recommendations. Although the document remains a draft
and does not necessarily reflect the DHS or administration position, it
will serve as a starting point for continued review within NPPD. As
part of NPPD, FPS can avail itself of a full range of risk-management
tools and practices available throughout the NPPD components, including
the Office of Risk Management and Analysis and the Office of
Infrastructure Protection with its Homeland Infrastructure Threat and
Risk Analysis Center. These risk-oriented tool kits offer bona fide
threat data and provide professionally trained analysts and potentially
alternative risk models.
Question 4. FPS is constrained to influence the allocation of
resources based on the results of its risk assessment because FPS does
not own the buildings it protects. Tenant agencies are free to reject
the security measures recommended by FPS. Without a change in this
situation, little will be accomplished. What do you believe can be done
to assure that tenant agencies and GSA will implement FPS's security
recommendations?
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is professionalizing
its work force and customer service and introducing the Risk Assessment
Management Program (RAMP). These activities increase FPS's credibility
and ability to work with the Facility Security Committees (FSC) to
determine appropriate and timely implementation of countermeasures. FPS
has made strong recommendations to the Interagency Security Committee
(ISC) on strengthening the position of security professionals and
ensuring that security expertise is part of the FSC makeup. To enhance
the ISC's efforts to provide guidance to the operation of FSCs, FPS has
petitioned the ISC for a full, voting-member position. In addition,
because FPS is responsible for providing law enforcement and security
services for approximately 9,000 buildings under the control and
custody of the General Services Administration (GSA), FPS is working in
step with GSA to provide portfolio-specific solutions. Consequently,
FPS and GSA have engaged in conversations to establish a working group
to address minimal security standards for GSA owned and leased
properties that FPS is charged with protecting. In addition, FPS and
GSA are in the midst of rewriting the FPS/GSA Memorandum of Agreement,
which will continue to move our two organizations in the right
direction of consistency and standardization of security of the GSA
properties.
Question 5. You testified that a summit was held to discuss plans
to ensure that each facility security committee with authority to
approve or deny FPS security recommendations has at least one voting
member who is a security provider, and that all committee members are
trained on security issues. Please provide the committee with a
narrative description of this summit, a copy of the agenda, and minutes
or other contemporaneous recordings of this meeting.
Answer. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) held a summit on
November 16, 2009, to bring together thought leaders from throughout
the Federal Government with differing perspectives on how security
decisions should be made, to review and discuss the questions and
comments that correspond with the four feedback themes. The Hon. Rand
Beers, Under Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
Robert Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings, General Services
Administration (GSA) addressed the Summit participants and encouraged a
united Federal front. Eighty leaders from 30 agencies and departments
spent the day together and presented an outline for how the ISC should
move forward to address how to make security decisions in Federal
facilities.
Expectations are for the ISC Working Group to reconcile the Summit
participants' comments, and develop a new draft to release for comment
in mid-2010. If necessary, the ISC will hold another Summit to
determine if follow-up, testing, and/or validation are required. The
ISC will closely monitor and support the progress of the Working Group.
A draft of guidelines for Facility Security Committees (FSC) was
released for comment in the summer of 2009 and the feedback was then
categorized into four overarching themes:
1. Who are the decisionmakers and what are their roles?
2. What information do decisionmakers need and how is voting
weighed?
3. How is security funded?
4. How is risk accepted?
Please find attached the agenda from this meeting.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 6. GAO recommends that FPS develop a comprehensive plan
for sharing and safeguarding information with GSA. How will NPPD assist
FPS in developing this comprehensive plan on information sharing?
Answer. As the Government Accountability Office's report findings
and recommendations noted, the General Services Administration (GSA)
experienced difficulties with getting requested information from the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) because of information dissemination
restrictions on the FPS-generated reports. The inability to share the
reports with GSA's non-law enforcement security personnel presented a
major obstacle. These law enforcement-sensitive reports included on-
going investigations and other law enforcement activities, and the
information GSA needed was difficult to extract for release to GSA. FPS
recently implemented a new program initiative known as the Risk
Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which is designed to more
easily facilitate conducting comprehensive risk assessments and provide
those results to applicable stakeholders. The Facility Security
Assessment report produced by RAMP includes sensitive-but-unclassified
information that is For Official Use Only, but segregates the law
enforcement information. As a result, while there remain specific
constraints on sharing that information per Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) policy, these restrictions do not include those placed
on law enforcement information. FPS has evaluated this policy and is
pleased to share information with GSA while meeting the necessary
requirements to protect sensitive information. The reports produced
from RAMP include this detailed information on safeguarding For
Official Use Only information and state that it must be provided only
to those with a valid need to know and who have the ability to secure
the information either electronically or physically. The National
Protection and Programs Directorate, FPS and DHS leadership will
continue to monitor report-user stakeholders such as GSA to ensure that
such information is made accessible while safeguarding information
marked accordingly.
Question 7. Please provide an update on the status of labor
contract negotiations between DHS and FPS. Specify when DHS expects to
finalize FPS labor agreements, and who has responsibility for ensuring
that this process is completed in a timely manner.
Answer. National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
management looks forward to developing a strong and productive working
relationship with the Federal Protective Service's (FPS) exclusive
union representative. NPPD management received notification that the
American Federation of Government Employees filed a certification of
the unit petition with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to
seek representation of the FPS workforce eligible to be in a bargaining
unit. Once the FLRA makes a determination as to the exclusive
representative of the appropriate bargaining unit, NPPD and the
exclusive representatives will begin negotiating a new collective
bargaining agreement. A time frame to complete negotiations will be
established at that time. NPPD's Office of Resources Administration
will be responsible for ensuring that the process is completed in a
timely manner.
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Rand
Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection Programs Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Given recent FPS contractor force failure highlighted
by various GAO reports, is the Federal Protective Service's contractor
force adequately trained to secure the buildings and facilities that
will be used during the trials of detainees?
Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an
appropriate law enforcement presence at the trials.
Question 2a. Does the FPS have adequate resources in New York City
to meet its existing security responsibilities?
Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an
appropriate law enforcement presence at the trials.
Question 2b. Would the existing resources (as of November 18, 2009)
need to be augmented to meet the demands associated with transferring
detainees into New York City for the purposes of prosecution?
Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an
appropriate law enforcement presence at the trials.
Question 2c. If so, how does DHS plan to augment those forces, and
by how many additional personnel?
Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an
appropriate law enforcement presence at the trials.
Question 3. To what degree was DHS and specifically FPS consulted
prior to the decision to transfer these detainees to New York City?
Answer. FPS was not notified prior to the announcement.
Question 4a. How often are security assessments conducted by FPS on
these types of facilities?
Answer. Facilities such as the primary U.S. Courthouses in New York
City are rated as Facility Security Level (FSL) IV and are assessed
every 3 years.
In February 2008, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) issued a
standard titled, ``Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal
Facilities.'' This standard provides the criteria for determining the
facility security level for Federal facilities and establishes a
minimum standard for how often facilities at each level need to have a
risk assessment performed. The schedule is once every 5 years for Level
I and II facilities and once every 3 years for Level III, IV, and V
facilities. FPS will adhere to this schedule; however, assessments can
be completed before their established minimum schedule, and FPS will
retain the capacity to conduct assessments earlier than required in
certain circumstances that present a substantial change to the
operating state of the facility under consideration.
Question 4b. Is there a standard?
Answer. Yes. Following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Facility in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, the President
directed the Department of Justice to assess the vulnerability of
Federal office facilities to terrorism and other acts of violence. The
report that resulted, the 1995 Vulnerability Assessment of Federal
Facilities, established criteria for categorizing Federal office
facilities into five security levels and served as the foundation for
current ISC standards.
In 2006, ISC established a working group to review and update the
content of the 1995 report. The review of that report resulted in the
development of the ISC Standard Facility Security Level Determinations
for Federal Facilities, which redefines the criteria and process used
to determine the FSL of a Federal facility.
Specifically, it provides a risk-based approach to determining the
FSL that is consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan. It considers mission criticality, symbolism, facility population,
facility size, threat to tenant agencies, and intangible factors. In
addition, it discusses special considerations for Level V facilities;
campuses, complexes, and Federal centers; changes in the FSL; and co-
location of tenants with similar security needs.
This standard also changes the frequency for conducting recurring
building security assessments. The new frequency is:
Every 5 years: Level I and II facilities;
Every 3 years: Level III, IV, and V facilities.
Question 5. One of the problems identified by GAO and previous
inspector general reports is inadequate staffing of FPS. Although the
number of contract guards has increased three-fold since 9/11, the
number of FPS inspectors has decreased. Has the Department conducted a
staffing needs analysis to improve the coverage of oversight over
contract guards?
If so, could you please provide the most recent report to the
committee?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently
reviewing the staffing levels of the Federal Protective Service (FPS).
This is, in part, a response to the July 2009 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report entitled ``Preliminary Results Show Federal
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program.'' The review is
being conducted under the guidance of the Under Secretary for the
National Protection and Programs Directorate and in response to the
Secretary of Homeland Security's direction for a thorough review of
FPS's operations and staffing levels following the July 2009 GAO
report. Once that review is finalized, DHS will engage, as appropriate,
with Congress, including the House Committee on Homeland Security. It
should be noted, though, that FPS has previously conducted staffing-
level reviews and human capital planning efforts, including an analysis
conducted in 2009. This analysis document is in draft form and is
currently being reviewed within the Department; thus, it is not
appropriate at this point to share the document outside of the
Department.
Question 6. Should the FPS contracted guard force be federalized,
as was done with TSA screeners in 2001? If so, why? If not, why not?
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has initially explored
several operational options including the conversion of some or all of
the nearly 15,000 contract guards to Federal positions. Currently, FPS
uses a hybrid model in which FPS inspectors are assigned to directly
oversee the contract guard force at specific facilities. The National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has not had an opportunity
to fully review and evaluate all the challenges related to federalizing
or partially federalizing the guard workforce. An analysis of these
challenges would need to evaluate the security benefits of a very
complex transition effort, average costs, and the logistical management
of new hires. NPPD and Department leadership will work together to
review the recommendations of previous studies conducted for FPS. NPPD
will also reach out to the Transportation Security Administration to
gain the benefits of its experience.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Gary W.
Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection
Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Please provide the committee with the written arrest
and detention policy that FPS provides to contract guards.
Answer. Please see Attachment 12 entitled ``Federal Protective
Service (FPS) Security Guard Information Manual.''*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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Question 2. You testified that you are 99 percent certain that all
contract guards at Federal buildings have met FPS training and
certification requirements. Please provide the committee with
documentation demonstrating that all guards standing post at Federal
buildings have completed requisite trainings and certifications.
Answer. On July 7, 2009, each Federal Protective Service (FPS)
Regional Director was tasked to provide FPS Headquarters with up-to-
date and accurate information on all active contract security guards.
As stipulated in contracts with contract guard companies, contractors
maintain the systems of records. The records are maintained at the
contractor's business location and are audited by FPS. Through a
physical inspection of all active guard employee folders, it was
determined whether required records were present, current, and valid.
The outcome of this 100 percent review of records netted these results:
Guards were found to be disqualified and removed from post; deductions
were made from contracts for disqualified guards; and several criminal
investigations stemmed from fraudulent certification records
identified.
By September 14, 2009, individual guard records were uploaded in
the Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System based on
information received from the FPS Regions. This information then
underwent a data-level quality assurance review to ensure that required
information was present so that it could be migrated into the Risk
Assessment Management Program (RAMP), which will provide a near-time
reflection of the contractor guard records. For example, by November 5,
2009, this process corrected 75 percent of guard records that were
found not to have a company association. Any remaining records that
could not be associated with a guard company--and thus validated
through the 100 percent review--were not migrated into RAMP.
FPS put all contract guard companies on notice that substandard
performance by contract guards is unacceptable and will not be
tolerated and informed them that the number and frequency of
inspections of guard post and certifications will increase. All regions
were required to continue their enhanced oversight of guard
certification compliance through an increased number of post
inspections, operation shields, and administrative audits and to report
the specific actions they would take to address and correct contract
guard performance issues directly to FPS Headquarters. Operation Shield
activities test contract guard proficiency and compliance with post
orders, policies, and procedures. This additional scrutiny resulted in
a drop in the percentage of certified guards between September and
October.
Data was migrated into RAMP and on November 16, 2009, FPS provided
each guard company with reports of employment and certification data
for each of their employees. Companies were asked to review, validate,
and provide any additional updates for their employees to ensure that
the information held by FPS in RAMP is consistent with their records.
Based on information provided by guard companies on their employees,
the number of certified guards available to work on FPS posts has
already begun to increase because of continued updates and validation
of guard certification records by FPS Regions. FPS confirms that all
FPS guards at Federal buildings have met FPS training and certification
requirements through post inspections.
Question 3a. GAO reported that FPS no longer has officers patrol
buildings to prevent or detect criminal activity. As a result,
criminals could freely conduct surveillance of a Federal building
without the agency's knowledge.
Why has FPS eliminated proactive building patrols?
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has adopted a risk-
based approach to providing effective security for all facilities it
protects. In doing so, FPS leverages Federal and contract personnel, as
well as technology, to provide integrated security and law enforcement
services. With the current funding provided for FPS's basic operations,
a workforce of approximately 1,225 full-time equivalents can be
supported. Given that constraint, FPS has to effectively leverage those
personnel to provide the maximum risk mitigation to Federal facilities
across the Nation. Because Federal facilities do not experience uniform
levels of risk, FPS allocates its resources based on where its work
will provide the greatest security and risk reduction. Additionally,
FPS uses a variety of countermeasures in Federal facilities that serve
as a force multiplier, allowing the agency to accomplish its risk
mitigation goals while maximizing the time available for personnel to
conduct the varied activities for which FPS is responsible. These
countermeasures range from contracted protective security officers to
electronic systems such as closed-circuit video to intrusion-detection
systems. By leveraging technology and adopting a risk-based approach to
protection, FPS provides efficient security and law enforcement
services while adhering to key practices for risk management identified
by the Government Accountability Office.
Question 3b. How will FPS work with NPPD to ensure that FPS devotes
adequate resources to patrolling Federal buildings?
Answer. FPS and the National Protection and Programs Directorate
(NPPD) are working closely together to ensure that all Federal
buildings are safe. This responsibility encompasses numerous aspects of
physical security and protective countermeasures to protect the Federal
employees who serve in these facilities and the millions of visitors
who visit these facilities each year. NPPD and the FPS achieve these
goals through a risk-based approach to conducting security assessments,
offering emergency planning services and providing physical security to
these Federal facilities. NPPD and FPS take these responsibilities
seriously and are continuously developing new methods and incorporating
new technologies to enhance the security of these facilities and better
equip and train the FPS personnel who perform or support the
performance of these tasks.
Question 4a. GAO reported that in rural areas where FPS does not
have a field office, FPS rarely monitors contract guards.
How many field offices does FPS have in rural areas?
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has 125 field office
locations in rural areas.
Question 4b. How many FPS officers are stationed in rural field
offices?
Answer. FPS has 203 officers in rural areas.
Question 4c. For each FPS officer in a rural field office, how many
facilities is the FPS officer responsible for monitoring?
Answer. FPS does not track facilities per field office, but, with
approximately 9,000 facilities and at our current manning of 1225, each
Law Enforcement Security Officer (LESO) is responsible for monitoring
on average 12 buildings.
Question 4d. Will FPS and NPPD work on a solution for ensuring that
Federal buildings in rural areas are safe?
Answer. FPS and the National Protection and Programs Directorate
(NPPD) are working closely together to ensure that all Federal
buildings are safe. NPPD and FPS achieve these goals through a risk-
based approach to conducting security assessments, offering emergency
planning services, and providing physical security to these Federal
facilities. NPPD and FPS take these responsibilities seriously and are
continuously developing new methods and incorporating new technologies
to enhance the security of these facilities and better equip and train
the FPS personnel who perform or support these tasks.
Question 5a. In response to GAO recommendations to improve FPS
building inspections, in March 2009, FPS issued a policy directive to
standardize inspections across all FPS regions.
When will FPS complete the implementation of this directive?
Answer. The FPS Director implemented directive number FPS-09-001,
Guard Contract Performance Monitoring Program, in March 2009. This
directive established policy for FPS performance monitoring of contract
security guards, guard forces, and contractor management functions. It
also assigned organizational responsibilities for post, site, and
administrative inspections and annual contractor performance
evaluations.
To further our efforts to improve operations, business practices,
and overall standardization, FPS established the position of Assistant
Director for Compliance in August 2009, based upon the identified need
to integrate formerly unsystematic efforts to manage and address FPS
weaknesses in compliance and oversight. The coordinated activities of
the Directorate will enable FPS to adhere to a planned approach to risk
management and internal control by documenting and evaluating risk and
controls at the process level through compliance investigations,
program reviews, self-inspection cycles, data analyses, proactive
corrective action, policy oversight, and continuous quality
improvement.
In fiscal year 2009, FPS completed a gap analysis that identified
policy requirements to standardize operations and business practices.
FPS identified and initiated development of 48 priority policy
requirements by establishing a goal of 20 policies to be developed in
fiscal year 2009. Fiscal year 2009 success resulted in the
implementation of 26 policies that have standardized operations and
business practices. We made an effort to prioritize fiscal year 2009
policies to support or assist in achieving milestones toward resolving
open recommendations from the Government Accountability Office and DHS
Office of the Inspector General reports. In addition, FPS conducted
training for Headquarters Division Directors and key staff to implement
the directive development process and system. As part of the directive
development process and system, FPS implemented the Standard Subject
Identification Series, which provides the framework for a subject-
based, future-state policy manual that we are currently populating as
policy directives are implemented.
FPS will continue to remain flexible and responsive to the changing
needs of the organization while continuing to improve the quality and
clarity of policy directives. We have 27 policy directives currently in
the draft development stage that we will endeavor to implement during
fiscal year 2010.
Question 5b. Who is responsible for ensuring that the policy
directive is a success?
Answer. The FPS Director is ultimately responsible for ensuring
implementation and compliance with all policy directives. FPS-09-001,
Guard Contract Performance Monitoring Program, outlines roles and
responsibilities throughout the organizational structure of FPS.
However, Regional Directors are responsible for implementation and
adherence at the field level.
Prior to March 2009, FPS recognized the need for developing policy
directives throughout the organization. We have since undertaken a
comprehensive program by which we have developed and issued National
policy directives that have led to the standardization of business
practices, which includes the implementation of 29 policy directives.
Of these 29 policy directives, eight have impacted the improvement of
contract guard oversight:
07-005, Agency Technical Representative Program, 4/30/07.--This
directive establishes the roles and responsibilities for the assignment
and use of agency technical representatives (ATR) to provide limited,
on-site, contract, and operational oversight for the contract guard
program.
ATRs are appointed by the FPS Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative providing limited on-site contract and operational
oversight. Upon appointment of an ATR, the COTR provides the
appointment documentation to the Contracting Officer for record keeping
and auditing purposes.
08-003, Contract Guard Post Desk Book Program, 10/10/08.--This
directive establishes the FPS contract guard post desk book program and
assigns organizational responsibilities for the development,
management, and administration of standardized post desk books for all
contract security guard force activities.
08-007, Oversight of Contractor-Provided Training, 11/12/08.--This
directive establishes policy and procedures for FPS monitoring and
oversight of contractor performance in providing contract-required
security guard training.
08-008, Contract Guard Written Examination Program, 11/17/08.--This
directive establishes the policy and procedures requiring contract
security guards to pass a written examination to work on an FPS
contract.
09-001, Guard Contract Performance Monitoring Program, 3/11/09.--
This directive establishes policy for FPS performance monitoring of
contract security guards, guard forces, and contractor management
functions. It also assigns organizational responsibilities for post,
site, and administrative inspections and annual contractor performance
evaluations.
15.7.2.5, Operation Shield, 6/5/09.--This directive establishes FPS
policy, standards, responsibilities, and implementation procedures for
Operation Shield. Operation Shield activities test contract guard
proficiency and compliance with post orders, policies, and procedures.
15.9.1.1, Security Guard Acquisition Planning and Pre-Award, 9/23/
09.--This directive establishes standardized requirements for, and
organizational responsibilities of, the FPS Security Guard Acquisition
Planning and Pre-Award process. This directive improves oversight by
standardizing roles and responsibilities of employees engaged in
acquisition planning for contract security guard services.
15.5.1.5, Initial Offense and Incident Case Reporting, 9/30/09.--
This directive establishes the requirements for incident reporting by
FPS law enforcement officers and security guards. This directive
improves oversight by standardizing contract security guard reporting
of Part III offenses, which include security, assistance, and
miscellaneous incidents of a non-criminal nature.
FPS has also established a Covert Testing Working Group (CTWG),
whose membership includes supervisory and non-supervisory employees
from Headquarters and field offices. The purpose of the CTWG is to
enhance and complement on-going efforts to improve operational
oversight of the Contract Guard Program. The working group will
contribute to the overall approach to effect cultural change, both
inside and outside the organization, to effectively and efficiently
achieve the FPS Strategic Goals and ensure secure facilities and safe
occupants.
Specifically, the CTWG will:
Develop a covert testing program with Headquarters
leadership and oversight;
Draft National policy to address covert testing operations
(Complete);
Determine training requirements and equipment needs (e.g.,
standard covert testing kits), estimate cost and complete
procurement (Completion NLT 1/25/10, On Track); and
Deploy covert test teams and document results (First
deployment no later than April 1, 2010, On Track).
To complement the previous milestones, the CTWG will also:
Review existing resources on covert testing operations to
maximize policy development time frames and capitalize on
existing Government resources;
Determine additional human resource needs to ensure that
covert testing operations have the desired impact;
Develop a National schedule for the conduct of covert
testing operations at Federal facilities;
Consider counter-surveillance as part of pre-operational
planning for covert testing operations;
Develop standardized case management documentation,
reporting, and data management; and
Develop procedures for integration with the program review
process to manage data analysis and proper follow-up to ensure
that corrective actions and identified policy and training
deficiencies are adequately addressed.
Question 6. Please provide this committee with copies of all
current Memoranda of Understanding between FPS and local police
departments in the areas where FPS operates.
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) provides integrated
security and law enforcement services to nearly 9,000 Federal
facilities Nation-wide. Because FPS is a relatively small agency, it is
not possible to have personnel in all places at all times. Accordingly,
strong relationships with State and local law enforcement are essential
to accomplishing the FPS mission. Through information sharing
initiatives, joint training, exercises, and regular response
activities, FPS has always worked well with State and local law
enforcement partners. Given that there are approximately 17,000 law
enforcement organizations across the country, the time and cost
involved in initiating, negotiating, and maintaining formal Memoranda
of Understanding with this large variety of law enforcement agencies
make this an unfeasible arrangement. The question of financial
responsibility and liability prevents many local governments from
entering into formal written agreements. Additionally, depending on the
State or locality, existing local laws often prescribe the relationship
between Federal officers and their State and local counterparts.
Working within these existing legal frameworks and maintaining strong
relationships with partner law enforcement agencies allows FPS to work
well with other law enforcement agencies while focusing its efforts on
the protection of Federal facilities.
Question 7. Please provide a narrative of all security
countermeasure recommendations FPS issued to GSA or GSA tenants in the
past year, and the corresponding GSA or tenant agency response to each
FPS recommendation. For instances in which GSA or the tenant agency
declined to implement the recommended security countermeasure, specify
the basis for this decision.
Answer. Currently, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is
dependant on six disparate systems to conclude a Facility Security
Assessment (FSA). Consequently, FPS will have to review each of the
9,000 existing FSAs separately and make comparisons with each Facility
Security Committee (FSC). However, FPS's new Risk Assessment and
Management Program (RAMP) system, introduced November 2009, will
provide a comprehensive picture and analysis of all General Services
Administration (GSA) facilities under FPS control and will be able to
document those countermeasures that are recommended against those
countermeasures that are implemented. This process will be completed in
accordance with the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Facility
Security Level (FSL) schedule.
FPS works in conjunction with the GSA. FPS recommends
countermeasures for each building within the GSA inventory on a risk-
based approach. Based on that risk, specific countermeasures are
recommended that are either fixtures or features (i.e., considered
permanent alterations to the building or grounds) or categorized as
countermeasure equipment and guards. Examples of a fixture or feature
are bollards, structural hardening of a facility, or a device embedded
in the ground to prevent vehicle access. If the fixed countermeasure
recommendations are accepted by the FSC, GSA funds the purchase and
installation and amortizes the costs into the tenants' rent bill. The
countermeasure equipment and guards are also recommended based on the
comprehensive risk-based assessment and are the direct responsibility
of the tenants; thus, the FSC either accepts or rejects the FPS
recommendation for implementation. Examples of these are X-ray
machines, metal detectors, closed-circuit television cameras, perimeter
lighting, and contract security guards. The FSC does not produce a
document to reject the implementation of recommended countermeasures
formally and is not required to document those recommendations that
were not accepted or declined. For the most part, the FSC merely fails
to sign off on the FSA. There are no penalties or fines associated with
not complying with the recommendation to implement recommended
countermeasures.
FPS uses countermeasures from seven basic systems to enhance
security and mitigate risk for Federal facilities: Access control,
alarms, barriers, communications, guard forces, screening, and
surveillance. To determine the appropriate countermeasures to employ
for a particular facility, FPS conducts comprehensive risk assessments
that gather and analyze detailed information on likely threats,
vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. Along with this
information, FPS also used standards issued by the ISC to ensure that
countermeasures required by standards are present in Federal
facilities. The applicable countermeasure standards depend on the FSL
of the building under consideration. For instance, the use of physical
barriers is not applicable for Level I and Level II facilities (the
lowest of 5 levels), is desirable for Level III facilities, and is a
minimum standard for Level IV and Level V facilities. Using a
comprehensive risk analysis, FPS makes appropriate recommendations to
facility tenants for countermeasures to mitigate applicable risks.
These recommendations are presented to the FSC at the facility, and the
FSC determines which recommended countermeasures to implement. Given
this model for security decisions, the facility tenants, as represented
on an FSC, often may not move forward with implementing
countermeasures. FPS does not have the authority to mandate
implementation of recommended countermeasures. In the past year, FPS
conducted more than 2,400 facility security assessments. In some cases,
the existing level of risk mitigation was functioning well, and no
additional countermeasures were necessary beyond regular training for
facility tenants. In others, extensive countermeasure projects were
recommended. In some of these cases, implementing these countermeasures
entails extensive coordination with the tenants, GSA, and other
stakeholders (such as city planners, engineers, or preservation
groups). For example, barrier projects in the National Capital Area
have to be coordinated with the National Capital Planning Commission to
ensure that they adhere to the guidelines for designing security in the
Nation's Capital as issued by that organization. Accordingly,
countermeasure projects for FPS range from simple, low-cost items that
can be easily implemented to multi-year projects that require advanced
budgeting and extensive coordination.
Question 8a. At the hearing, David Wright of AFGE testified that as
of this year, FPS has reduced security charges used to pay for
monitoring and administrative activities related to contract guard
oversight by 25 percent.
Please explain whether FPS has decreased its security charges, and
if so, the reason for this reduction.
Answer. FPS has not reduced security charges; however, FPS reduced
its administrative surcharge. The surcharge reduction was made as a
result of an analysis of resource needs. As a result, FPS reduced its
overhead charge by 25 percent, from an 8 percent charge in fiscal year
2009 to a 6 percent charge in fiscal year 2010 ($15 million). Since
this time, FPS has developed a full costing of the funding needs
arising from the FPS transition to NPPD and for future fiscal years the
surcharge will be reevaluated.
Question 8b. Having reduced its security charges, how will FPS
ensure that it has adequate resources to conduct monitoring and
administrative activity related to contract guards?
Answer. As part of the National Protection and Programs Directorate
(NPPD) Transition Plan, FPS is working diligently with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and NPPD to maximize efficiencies for FPS.
FPS's dependency on ICE for many of its required services has been
defined in a series of agreements between NPPD and ICE to continue,
alter, or discontinue many of these services. With regards to
requirements that will be more cost-effective by absorbing or creating
services within FPS or NPPD, monies previously paid to ICE will be
recouped and redirected as appropriate. Examples of these are Fleet
Management, Facilities Management, and Services. In circumstances where
continuation of service with ICE makes better fiscal and operational
sense, FPS will continue to pay its appropriate share to ICE. An
example of this is a continuation of service with the National Firearms
Tactical Training Unit. Only in extreme circumstances will FPS either
delay or defray resources from forthcoming projects to meet immediate
requirements.
As indicated above, FPS has deferred certain capital investments to
ensure that funds are available to continue the increased levels of
contract guard monitoring and oversight initiated in fiscal year 2009.
Additionally, since 2008, FPS has invested in technology upgrades that
will substantially improve the way the contract guard force is
monitored and supervised. With rugged, mobile laptops and the Risk
Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), FPS inspectors will have
immediate access to a contract guard's training and certification
status. Time saved completing written forms and running computer checks
at the office will allow inspectors to spend more time servicing
Federal facilities and monitoring guard performance.
In addition to RAMP, in fiscal year 2010, FPS will procure a Post
Tracking System that will ensure that security posts are adequately
staffed and that disqualified guards do not stand post. The system will
alert if an unqualified guard seeks to enter on duty. If there is a
lapse, the guard company will be electronically notified that the guard
may not perform work on the contract. At present, contract guards sign
in on paper sheets at each Federal facility. Until those are collected,
reviewed, and assessed, the sheets are of little value. FPS
aggressively deducts fees when contract companies fail to provide the
service FPS expects. The automated system is a significant step
forward, removes delay, and provides automatic safeguards.
Question 9a. Please identify all companies holding current
contracts to provide guard services on behalf of FPS. For each
contract, indicate the term of the contract, the annual cost of each
contract, and whether the contract requires any contract guards to be
qualified or trained as special police officers, or requires any
contract guards to have arrest authority.
Answer. Attachment 20 to this response provides a listing of
companies that provide guard services on behalf of the Federal
Protective Service (FPS). Additionally, it includes the term of
contracts (remaining contract options) and estimated annual costs. Two
FPS contracts in the National Capital Region include a requirement for
special police officers:
Contract.--HSCEEC-08-D-00005.
Contractor.--Jenkins Security Consultants.
Awarded.--5/22/2008.
Period of Performance.--08/01/2008-7/31/2013.
Contract.--HSCEEC-09-D-00013.
Contractor.--Knight Protective Service.
Awarded.--7/31/2009.
Period of Performance.--11/01/2009-10/31/2014.
Question 9b. Has FPS or DHS analyzed the labor and overhead costs
associated with these contracts? If so, please provide contract guard
costs, separately delineating labor and overhead costs.
Answer. FPS guard service contracts are considered commercial
services under FAR 2.101 (see paragraph 6 of Commercial Item
definition), and, therefore, are exempt from certified cost or pricing
data requirements under FAR 15-403-1(c)(3). Accordingly, FPS acquires
guard services under FAR Part 12, Commercial Item Acquisitions, or
under FAR 8.4, Federal Supply Schedule procedures, which do not require
the contractor to delineate the separate components of its price, such
as labor and overhead. However, we recently have required the guard
service contractors to provide a price element breakdown of their
quoted/proposed rate to evaluate price realism, as provided by FAR
15.404-1(d)(3). The purpose of our price realism reviews is limited to
assessing the contractor's understanding of the solicitation
requirements and assessing performance risk. While such analysis may
include reviewing the proposed labor and components of overhead
pricing, these amounts are based on commercial pricing and, therefore,
may not be representative of the contractor's actual costs. To
determine the actual labor and overhead costs incurred by the
contractor in performing FPS guard services contracts, an audit of the
contractor's books and records would be necessary, which is not
permitted under commercially priced contracts.
DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated
FPS Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Total Contract Estimated Term/Options
Services Value Annual Value Remaining
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................ HSCEE1-08-D-00002... C&D Security MGMT Guard Services/MA, $17,722,240 $3,544,448 10/1/2009 thru 9/30/
INC. RI. 2010
10/1/2010 thru 9/30/
2011
10/1/2011 thru 9/30/
2012
10/1/2012 thru 9/30/
2013
1................................ HSCEE1-08-D-00001... C&D Security MGMT Guard Services CT.. $19,663,853 $3,932,771 10/1/2009 thru 9/30/
INC. 2010
10/1/2010 thru 9/30/
2011
10/1/2011 thru 9/30/
2012
10/1/2012 thru 9/30/
2013
1................................ HSCEEI-08-A-00001... MVM, INC............ Guard Services/New $60,000,000 $12,000,000 8/18/2009 thru 8/17/
England. 2010
8/18/2010 thru 8/17/
2011
8/18/2011 thru 8/17/
2012
8/18/2012 thru 8/17/
2013
2................................ HSCEE2-09-A-00005... Wackenhut Services, Guard Services-- $55,000,000 $11,000,000 Option 1 10/01/09-9/
Inc. (WSI). Upstate NY. 30/10
Option 2 10/01/10-9/
30/11
Option 3 10/01/11-9/
30/12
Option 4 10/01/12-9/
30/13
2................................ HSCEE2-08-Q-00003... FJC Security........ Guard Services..... $28,000,000 $5,600,000 Initial yr: 10/01/08-
9/30/09
Option 1 10/01/09-9/
30/10
Option 2 10/01/10-9/
30/11
Option 3 10/01/11-9/
30/12
Option 4 10/01/12-9/
30/13
2................................ GS-07F-0504N........ Alante Security Guard Services $24,000,000 $4,800,000 Initial yr: 12/01/08-
Group. (Queens, NY). 11/30/09
Option 1 12/01/09-11/
30/10
Option 2 12/01/10-11/
30/11
Option 3 12/01/11-11/
30/12
Option 4 12/01/12-11/
30/13
2................................ HSCEE2-09-A-00006... Wackenhut Corp...... Guard Services FBI $4,500,000 $900,000 Option 1 10/01/09-9/
Facilities in 30/10
upstate NY. Option 2 10/01/10-9/
30/11
Option 3 10/01/11-9/
30/12
Option 4 10/01/12-9/
30/13
2................................ HSCEE2-08-R-0001.... MVM, INC............ Guard Services..... $30,000,000 $6,000,000 Option 1 7/01/09-6/
30/10
Option 2 7/01/10-6/
30/11
Option 3 7/01/11-6/
30/12
Option 4 7/01/12-6/
30/13
2................................ HSCEE2-08-R-00005... FJC Security........ Guard service $12,000,000 $2,400,000 Initial yr: 12/01/08-
(Brooklyn, NY). 11/30/09
Option 1 12/01/09-11/
30/10
Option 2 12/01/10-11/
30/11
Option 3 12/01/11-11/
30/12
Option 4 12/01/12-11/
30/13
2................................ HSCEE2-08-R-00001... Alutiiq, Inc........ Guard Services..... $10,586,000 $2,117,200 Initial yr: 1/01/09-
12/31/10
Option 1 1/01/11-12/
31/11
Option 2 1/01/12-12/
31/12
Option 3 1/01/13-12/
31/13
Option 4 1/01/14-12/
31/14
3................................ HSCEGI-05-CF00004... BSA/LB&B............ Guard Services for $25,606,626 $5,121,325 Contract expires 3/
CMS, Baltimore, MD. 31/10
3................................ HSCEGI-07-A-00006... C & D Security...... Guard Svc./Metro. $42,226,387 $8,445,277 Option 2 (4/1/09-3/
Phila. 31/10)
Option 3 (4/1/10-3/
31/11)
Option 4 (4/1/11-3/
31/12)
3................................ HSCEGI-07-D-00006... T & W Company, Inc.. Guard Services WV $32,854,663 $6,570,933 Option 3 (11/1/10-10/
Panhandle. 30/11)
Option 4 (11/1/11-10/
30/12)
3................................ HSCEE3-09-A-00005... DECO................ Guard Services $3,252,244 $650,449 Award (12/1/08-11/30/
Delaware State. 09)
Option 1 (12/1/09-11/
30/10)
Option 2 (12/1/10-11/
30/11)
Option 3 (12/1/11-11/
30/12)
Option 4 (12/1/12-11/
30/13)
3................................ HSCEE3-08-A-00003... ARES................ Guard Services New $11,106,450 $2,221,290 Award (12/1/08-11/30/
Jersey State. 09)
Option 1 (12/1/09-11/
30/10)
Option 2 (12/1/10-11/
30/11)
Option 3 (12/1/11-11/
30/12)
Option 4 (12/1/12-11/
30/13)
3................................ HSCEE3-08-A-00002... Paragon Systems..... Guard Services $42,388,500 $8,477,700 Award (4-1-2009-3-31-
Virginia. 2010)
Option 1 (4-1-2010-3-
31-2011)
Option 2 (4-1-2011-3-
31-2012)
Option 3 (4-1-2012-
32-31-2013)
Option 4 (4-1-2013-3-
31-2014)
3................................ HSCEE3-08-A-00001... Knight Protective Guard Services/PA.. $25,563,532 $5,112,706 Option 1 (10/1/09-9/
Services. 30/10)
Option 2 (10/1/10-9/
30/11)
Option 3 (10/1/11-9/
30/12)
Option 4 (10/1/12-9/
30/13)
3................................ HSCEGI-05-CF00005... SANTE FE............ Guard Services/NDIC $3,260,218 $652,044 Contract expires 3/
31/10
3................................ GS-07F-02676L....... Security Consultants Guard Services West $15,858,609 $3,171,722 Contract expires 3/
Group. Virginia. 31/10
3................................ HSCEGI-05-D-F00006.. ARES................ Guard Services $49,731,853 $9,946,371 Option 4 (7/1/09-5/
Maryland State. 31/10)
3................................ HSCEE3-09-A-00006... Eagle Technologies Guard Services Ft $11,197,548 $2,239,510 Award (4-8-2009-4-7-
Inc. Detrick, MD. 2010)
Option 1 (4-8-2010-4-
7-2011)
Option 2 (4-8-2011-4-
7-2012)
Option 3 (4-8-2012-4-
7-2013)
Option 4 (2-8-2013-4-
7-2014)
3................................ HSCEE3-09-D-00001... Action Facilities CBP, Harpers Ferry $6,869,630 $1,373,926 Award (3-1-09-2-28-
Mgmt. WV. 2010)
Option 1 (3-1-2010-2-
28-2011)
Option 2 (3-1-2011-2-
28-2012)
Option 3 (3-1-2012-2-
28-2013)
Option 4 (3-1-2013-2-
28-2014)
4................................ HSCEG1-07-A-00010... SCG, INC............ Guard Services $42,980,920 $8,596,184 Opt 3 10/1/2010-9/30/
State of Alabama. 2011
Opt 4 10/1/2011-9/30/
2012
4................................ HSCEG1-07-A-00009... SCG, INC............ GUARD SERVICES $41,949,771 $8,389,954 Opt 3 8/1/2010-7/31/
STATE OF TENNESSEE. 2011
Opt 4 8/1/2011-7/31/
2012
4................................ HSCEGI-07-A-00013... Paragon Systems, Inc Guard Svc.--SC..... $29,465,229 $5,893,046 Opt 2 11/1/2009-10/
31/2010
Opt 3 11/1/2010-10/
31/2011
Opt 4 11/1/2011-10/
31/2012
4................................ HSCEE4-08-A-0001.... PARAGON SYSTEMS..... Guard Service...... $87,871,580 $17,574,316 Opt 2 4/1/2010-3/31/
2011
Opt 3 4/1/2011-3/31/
2012
Opt 4 4/1/2012-3/31/
2013
4................................ HSCEE4-08-a-00008... SCG................. SECURITY GUARD SVC- $29,460,845 $5,892,169 Opt 2 10/1/2010-9/30/
KENTUCKY. 2011
Opt 3 10/1/2011-9/30/
2012
Opt 4 10/1/2012-9/30/
2013
4................................ HSCEE4-08-A-00002... SCG................. GUARD SERVICES, MS. $19,656,437 $3,931,287 4/1/2010-3/31/2011
4/1/2011-3/31/2012
4/1/2012-3/31/2013
4................................ HSCEE4-08-A-0004.... SCG................. GUARD SERVICES, NC. $18,249,165 $3,649,833 Opt 2 8/1/2010-7/31/
2011
Opt 3 8/1/2011-7/31/
2012
Opt 4 8/1/2012-7/31/
2013
4................................ HSCEE4-09-D-00001... ALUTIIQ-MELE, LLC... SECURITY GUARD SVC, $75,000,000 $15,000,000 10/1/09-9/30-2014
Southern FL.
4................................ HSCEGI-07-A-00012... ARES GROUP.......... GUARD SERVICE...... $62,099,576 $12,419,915 Opt 3 10/1/2010-9/30/
2011
Opt 4 10/1/2011-9/30/
2012
4................................ HSCEE4-08-A-00007... SCG................. GUARD SERVICE...... $7,987,200 $1,597,440 Opt 2 10/1/2010-9/30/
2011
Opt 3 10/1/2011-9/30/
2012
Opt 4 10/1/2012-9/30/
2013
5................................ HSCEC509A00005...... DECO Security Svcs.. Two State (2) State $61,433,991 $12,286,798 Base 9/1/09-8/31/10
Armed Security Option 1 9/1/10-8/31/
Guard Services for 11
MN & WI. Option 2 9/1/11-8/31/
12
Option 3 9/1/12-8/31/
13
Option 4 9/1/13-8/31/
14
5................................ HSCEC509A00004...... DECO Security Svcs.. Armed Security $57,656,711 $11,531,342 Base 7/1/09-3/31/10
Guard Services for Option 1 4/1/10-3/31/
State of MI. 11
Option 2 4/1/11-3/31/
12
Option 3 4/1/12-3/31/
13
Option 4 4/1/13-3/31/
14
5................................ HSCEC509A00002...... DECO Security Svcs.. Armed Security $60,970,831 $12,194,166 Base 4/1/09-3/31/10
Guard Services for Option 1 4/1/10-3/31/
State of OH. 11
Option 2 4/1/11-3/31/
12
Option 3 4/1/12-3/31/
13
Option 4 4/1/13-3/31/
14
5................................ HSCEC509A00006...... Security Consultants Armed Security $79,715,583 $15,943,117 Base 7/1/09-6/30/10
Group (SCG). Guard Services for Option 1 7/1/10-6/30/
State of IL. 11
Option 2 7/1/11-6/30/
12
Option 3 7/1/12-6/30/
13
Option 4 7/11/13-6/
30/14
5................................ HSCEC509A00003...... DECO Security Svcs.. Armed Security $37,633,216 $7,526,643 Base 6/1/09-5/31/10
Guard Services for Option 1 6/1/10-5/31/
State of IN. 11
Option 2 6/1/11-5/31/
12
Option 3 6/1/12-5/31/
13
Option 4 6/1/13-5/31/
14
6................................ HSCEC608D00001...... MVM................. Guard Services..... $224,000,000 $44,800,000 Base Year 3/1/09-9/
30/09
1st yr option 10/1/
09-9/30/10
2nd yr option 10/10-
9/30/11
3rd yr option 10/1/
11-9/30/12
4th yr option 10/1/
12-9/30/13
7................................ GS-07F-0306L........ Southwestern Tyler, Texas Area.. $462,356 $92,471 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00082... Security Services, 28/10
Inc.
7................................ GS-07F-0306L........ Southwestern West Texas, $901,192 $180,238 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00088... Security Services, Lubbock, Permian 28/10
Inc. Basin, Big
Springs, etc.
7................................ GS-07F-0305L........ The J Diamond Group, New Mexico--Texas $8,920,693 $1,784,139 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00081... Inc. Cities Only. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0305L........ The J Diamond Group, Denton, Texas Area. $2,453,084 $490,617 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-00084..... Inc. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0306L........ Southwestern Northern Louisiana-- $2,249,745 $449,949 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00079... Security Services, Texas Cities Only. 28/10
Inc.
7................................ GS-07F-5426R........ Mike Garcia Merchant El Paso Bridges, TX $3,280,334 $656,067 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00085... Security. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0306L........ Southwestern Brownsville, $2,686,850 $537,370 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00043... Security Services, Harlingen, Laredo, 28/10
Inc. Texas.
7................................ GS-07F-0266K........ Knight Protective Oklahoma State..... $11,186,496 $2,237,299 Contract Expires 1/
HSCEC7-08-F-00078... Services, Inc. 31/10
7................................ GS-07F-0266K........ Knight Protective Houston, Texas..... $6,840,400 $1,368,080 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00075... Services, Inc. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0305L........ The J Diamond Group, Corpus Christi/ $1,473,684 $294,737 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00041... Inc. Victoria, TX. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0267L........ Security Consultants Dallas, Texas...... $16,488,320 $3,297,664 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00086... Group. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0305L........ The J Diamond Group, San Antonio/ $3,442,318 $688,464 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00040... Inc. Kerrville, TX. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0305L........ The J Diamond Group, El Paso-FOB, TX.... $3,909,159 $781,832 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00076... Inc. 28/10
7................................ GS-07F-0306L........ Southwestern Guard Services..... $504,584 $100,917 Contract Expires 2/
HSCEC7-08-F-00048... Security Services, 28/10
Inc.
7................................ GS-07F-0605N........ Superior Protection Brownsville, $2,916,477 $583,295 Contract Expires 12/
HSCEC7-08-F-00120... Services, Inc. Harlingen, 28/10
McAllen, Texas.
7................................ GS-07F-0363M........ ARES Group Inc...... State of Arkansas.. $14,174,484 $2,834,897 Base 09/01/09-09/30/
HSCEC7-09-A-00001... 10
Option I 10/01/10-09/
30/11
Option II 10/01/11-
09/30/12
Option III 10/01/12-
09/30/13
Option IV 10/01/13-
09/30/14
7................................ GS-07F-0305L........ The J Diamond Group, State of New Mexico $26,630,140 $5,326,028 Base 10/01/09-09/30/
HSCEC7-09-A-00002... Inc. 10
Option I 10/01/10-09/
30/11
Option II 10/01/11-
09/30/12
Option III 10/01/12-
09/30/13
Option IV 10/01/13-
09/30/14
7................................ GS-07F-0305L........ The J Diamond Group, Fort Worth/Austin, $33,182,677 $6,636,535 Base 12/01/09-11/30/
HSCEC7-10-A-00001... Inc. Texas. 10
Option I 12/01/10-11/
30/11
Option II 12/01/11-
11/30/12
Option III 12/01/12-
11/30/13
Option IV 12/01/13-
11/30/14
7................................ GS-07F-5576R........ Inter-Con........... State of Louisiana. $49,104,558 $9,820,912 Base 12/01/09-11/30/
HSCEC7-10-A-00002... 10
Option I 12/01/10-11/
30/11
Option II 12/01/11-
11/30/12
Option III 12/01/12-
11/30/13
Option IV 12/01/13-
11/30/14
7................................ GS-07F-0103M........ DECO................ State of Oklahoma.. $36,809,787 $7,361,957 Base 2/01/10-1/31/11
HSCEC7-09-A-00003... Option I 2/01/11-1/
31/12
Option II 2/01/12-1/
30/13
Option III 2/01/13-
01/31/14
Option IV 2/01/14-1/
31/15
8................................ HSCEW8-09-A-00001... DECO, Inc........... Guard Services $57,094,725 $11,418,945 Option 1 (01/01/2010-
Colorado. 12/31/2010)
Option 2 (01/01/2011-
12/31/2011)
Option 3 (01/01/2012-
12/31/2012)
Option 4 (01/01/2013-
12/31/2013)
8................................ HSCECA-07-A-70006... SCG, INC............ GUARD SVC SOUTH $2,932,916 $586,583 Option 2 (04/01/2009-
DAKOTA. 03/31/2010)
Option 3 (04/01/2011-
03/31/2012)
Option 4 (04/01/2012-
03/31/2013)
8................................ HSCECA-07-A-70008... SCG, INC............ GUARD SVC WYOMING.. $3,824,187 $764,837 Option 2 (04/01/2009-
03/31/2010)
Option 3 (04/01/2011-
03/31/2012)
Option 4 (04/01/2012-
03/31/2013)
8................................ HSCECA-07-A-70004... SCG, INC............ GUARD SVC MONTANA.. $8,658,009 $1,731,602 Option 2 (04/01/2009-
03/31/2010)
Option 3 (04/01/2011-
03/31/2012)
Option 4 (04/01/2012-
03/31/2013)
8................................ HSCECA-07-A-70005... SCG, INC............ GUARD SVC NORTH $2,479,996 $495,999 Option 2 (04/01/2009-
DAKOTA. 03/31/2010)
Option 3 (04/01/2011-
03/31/2012)
Option 4 (04/01/2012-
03/31/2013)
8................................ HSCECA-07-A-70007... SCG, INC............ GUARD SVC UTAH..... $15,189,018 $3,037,804 Option 2 (04/01/2009-
03/31/2010)
Option 3 (04/01/2011-
03/31/2012)
Option 4 (04/01/2012-
03/31/2013)
9................................ HSCECA-07-F-00046... TRINITY PROTECTION Guard Services< $58,998,706 $11,799,741 Option 3 10/1/09-9/
SERVICES, INC. Northern CA. 30-10
Option 4 10/1/2010-9/
30/2011
9................................ HSCECA-07-F-00047... SECURITY CONSULTANTS Guard Services< $55,220,811 $11,044,162 Option 3 10/1/09-9/
GROUP INC. Central CA. 30/10
Option 4 10/1/2010-9/
30/2011
9................................ HSCEW9-08-F- 00002.. SECURITY CONSULTANTS Guard Services, NV. $19,753,663 $3,950,733 Option 3-10/1/10-9/
(FSS No. GS07F0267L) GROUP. 30/11
Option 4-10/1/11-9/
30/12
9................................ HSCEW9-09-A-00002... Security Consultants Arizona Guard $24,962,312 $4,992,462 Option 2 (10/1/10-09/
Group. Contract. 30/11)
Option 3 (10/1/11-09/
30/12)
Option 4 (10/1/12-09/
30/13)
9................................ BPA No. HSCEW9-09-A- Paragon Systems, Inc Armed Guard Service- $99,396,497 $19,879,299 Option 1 (10/1/09-09/
00003. Los Angeles, CA. 30/10)
(FSS No. GS07F0418K) Option 2 (10/1/10-09/
30/11)
Option 3 (10/1/11-09/
30/12)
Option 4 (10/1/12-09/
30/13)
9................................ BPA No. HSCEW9-09-A- Paragon Systems, Inc Armed Guard Service- $49,205,673 $9,841,135 Option 1 (10/1/09-09/
00004. San Diego, CA. 30/10)
(FSS No. GS07F0418K) Option 2 (10/1/10-09/
30/11)
Option 3 (10/1/11-09/
30/12)
Option 4 (10/1/12-09/
30/13)
10............................... HSCECA-07-A-70010... PARAGON SYSTEMS..... ARMED GUARD $28,698,099 $5,739,620 Option 4 (5/16/2010-
SERVICES FOR 5/15/2011)
NORTHERN Option 5 (5/16/2011-
WASHINGTON. 5/15/2012)
10............................... HSCECA-07-A-70009... PARAGON SYSTEMS..... ARMED GUARD $20,133,234 $4,026,647 Option 4 (7/1/2010-6/
SERVICES FOR 30/2011)
OREGON STATEWIDE Option 5 (7/1/2011-6/
AND SOUTH 30/2012)
WASHINGTON.
10............................... HSCEXP06CF00004..... PARAGON SYSTEMS..... ARMED GUARD $5,284,105 $1,056,821 Option 4 (4/1/2010-3/
SERVICES FOR 31/2011)
SOUTHWESTERN
WASHINGTON.
10............................... HSCECA07A70000...... GUARDIAN SECURITY ARMED GUARD $238,907 $47,781 Option 3 (10/1/2009-
SYSTEMS, INC. SERVICES FOR 9/30/2010)
KETCHIKAN. Option 4 (10/1/2010-
9/30/2011)
10............................... HSCEWA09A00003...... SCG................. ARMED GUARD $2,945,145 $2,945,145 Contract Expires 2/
SERVICES FOR IDAHO 28/10
AND EASTERN
WASHINGTON.
11............................... HSCEEC-10-A-00001... Coastal Guard Services, NCR $116,000,000 $23,200,000 BPA through 12/3/
International 2014
Security.
11............................... GS11P04MPC0037...... Kingdom Security Guard Services, NCR $1,516,933 $303,387 Expires 2/28/10
Services.
11............................... HSCEEC08A00001...... USEC Services Corp.. Guard Services, NCR $19,000,000 $3,800,000 BPA through 11/30/
2012
11............................... HSCEEC08A00004...... SecTek.............. Guard Services, NCR $7,324,629 $1,464,926 BPA through 1/3/2012
11............................... HSCEEC08A00005...... DTM Corporation..... Guard Services, NCR $21,700,000 $4,340,000 BPA through 1/3/2012
11............................... HSCEEC08A00006...... Allied Barton Guard Services, NCR $11,196,000 $2,239,200 BPA through 1/13/13
Security.
11............................... HSCEEC08A00007...... Ares Protective Guard Services, NCR $2,093,000 $418,600 BPA through 01/11/
Service. 113
11............................... HSCEEC08A00008...... DTM Corporation..... Guard Services, NCR $2,700,000 $540,000 BPA through 1/11/
2013
11............................... HSCEEC08A00009...... SecTek.............. Guard Services, NCR $29,200,000 $5,840,000 BPA through 3/31/
2013
11............................... HSCEEC08A00015...... Paragon Systems..... Guard Services, NCR $52,000,000 $10,400,000 BPA through 5/31/
2013
11............................... HSCEEC08A00016...... Coastal Guard Services, NCR $32,000,000 $6,400,000 BPA through 5/31/
International 2013
Security.
11............................... HSCEEC08A00017...... Jenkins Security Guard Services, NCR $5,000,000 $1,000,000 BPA through 5/31/
Consultants. 2013
11............................... HSCEEC08A00019...... MVM................. Guard Services, NCR $41,500,000 $8,300,000 BPA through 9/30/
2014
11............................... HSCEEC08A00020...... Elite Protective Guard Services, NCR $43,000,000 $8,600,000 BPA through 5/31/
Services. 2013
11............................... HSCEEC08A00021...... Frontier Systems Guard Services, NCR $7,898,216 $1,579,643 BPA through 8/17/
Integrators. 2013
11............................... HSCEEC08A00022...... Coastal Guard Services, NCR $14,628,434 $2,925,687 BPA through 9/30/
International 2013
Security.
11............................... HSCEEC08C00001...... Jenkins Security Guard Services, NCR $5,811,748 $1,162,350 Option II 10/1/2009-
Consultants. 9/30/2010
Option III 10/1/2010-
9/30/2011
Option IV 10/1/2011-
9/30/2012
Option V 10/1/2012-7/
31/2013
11............................... HSCEEC08D00001...... DTM Corporation..... Guard Services, NCR $481,632 $96,326 Option I 12/1/2008-
11/30/2009
Option II 12/1/2009-
11/30/2010
Option III 12/1/2010-
11/30/2011
11............................... HSCEEC08D00002...... Special Operations Guard Services, NCR $6,623,493 $1,324,699 Option I 12/1/2008-
Group. 11/30/2009
Option II 12/1/2009-
11/30/2010
Option III 12/1/2010-
11/30/2011
Option IV 12/1/2011-
11/30/2012
11............................... HSCEEC08D00003...... Jenkins Security Guard Services, NCR $8,227,876 $1,645,575 Option I 12/1/2008-
Consultants. 11/30/2009
Option II 12/1/2009-
11/30/2010
Option III 12/1/2010-
11/30/2011
Option IV 12/1/2011-
11/30/2012
11............................... HSCEEC08D00004...... Master Security..... Guard Services, NCR $21,155,585 $4,231,117 Option I 12/1/2008-
11/30/2009
Option II 12/1/2009-
11/30/2010
Option III 12/1/2010-
11/30/2011
Option IV 12/1/2011-
11/30/2012
11............................... HSCEEC08D00005...... Jenkins Security Guard Services, NCR $23,889,389 $4,777,878 Base Period 8/1/2008-
Consultants. 7/31/2009
Option I 8/1/2009-7/
31/2010
Option II 8/1/2010-7/
31/2011
Option III 8/1/2011-
7/31/2012
Option IV 8/1/2012-7/
31/2013
11............................... HSCEEC08D00006...... DTM Corporation..... Guard Services, NCR $3,489,230 $697,846 Base Period 9/1/2008-
8/31/2009
Option I 9/1/2009-8/
31/2010
Option II 9/1/2010-8/
31/2011
Option III 9/1/2011-
8/31/2012
Option IV 9/1/2012-8/
31/2013
11............................... HSCEEC08D00007...... Jenkins Security Guard Services, NCR $10,324,000 $2,064,800 Base Period 11/1/
Consultants. 2008-10/31/2009
Option I 11/1/2009-
10/31/2010
Option II 11/1/2010-
10/31/2011
Option III 11/1/2011-
10/31/2012
Option IV 11/1/2012-
10/31/2013
11............................... HSCEEC08D00008...... Jenkins Security Guard Services, NCR $7,873,830 $1,574,766 Base Period 10/1/
Consultants. 2008-9/30/2009
Option I 10/1/2009-9/
30/2010
Option II 10/1/2010-
9/30/2011
Option III 10/1/2011-
9/30/2012
Option IV 10/1/2012-
9/30/2013
11............................... HSCEEC09A00001...... Coastal Guard Services, NCR $34,533,841 $6,906,768 BPA through 9/30/
International 2013
Security.
11............................... HSCEEC09A00002...... Master Security..... Guard Services, NCR $872,445 $174,489 BPA through 12/31/
2009
11............................... HSCEEC09A00004...... Sectek.............. Guard Services, NCR $15,300,000 $3,060,000 BPA through 3/31/
2014
11............................... HSCEEC09A00005...... Coastal Guard Services, NCR $9,637,499 $1,927,500 BPA through 8/31/
International 2014
Security.
11............................... HSCEEC09A00006...... Elite Protective Guard Services, NCR $10,559,593 $2,111,919 BPA through 11/30/
Services. 2014
11............................... HSCEEC09D00004...... Jenkins Security.... Guard Services, NCR $13,387,895 $2,677,579 Base Period 12/1/08-
11/30/09
Option 1 12/1/09-11/
30/10
Option 2 12/1/10-11/
30/11
Option 3 12/1/11-11/
30/12
Option 4 12/1/12-11/
30/13
11............................... HSCEEC09D00005...... AmPro International. Guard Services, NCR $10,295,260 $2,059,052 Base Period 1/1/2009-
12/31/2009
Option Period I 1/1/
2010-12/31/2010
Option Period II 1/1/
2011-12/31/2011
Option Period III 1/
1/2012-12/31/2012
Option Period IV 1/1/
2013-12/31/2013
11............................... HSCEEC09D00006...... The Whitestone Group Guard Services, NCR $13,709,585 $2,741,917 Base Period 2/1/2009-
1/31/2010
Option Period I 2/1/
2010-1/31/2011
Option Period II 2/1/
2011-1/31/2012
Option Period III 2/
1/2012-1/31/2013
Option Period IV 2/1/
2013-1/31/2014
11............................... HSCEEC09D00007...... Knight Protective Guard Services, NCR $49,573,882 $9,914,776 Base Period 4/1/2009-
Service. 11/30/2009
Option Period I 12/1/
2009-11/30/2010
Option Period II 12/
1/2010-11/30/2011
Option Period III 12/
1/2011-11/30/2012
Option Period IV 12/
1/2012-11/30/2013
11............................... HSCEEC09D00008...... American Security Guard Services, NCR $17,070,918 $3,414,184 Base Period 2/1/2009-
Programs. 1/31/2010
Option Period I 2/1/
2010-1/31/2011
Option Period II 2/1/
2011-1/31/2012
Option Period III 2/
1/2012-1/31/2013
Option Period IV 2/1/
2013-1/31/2014
11............................... HSCEEC09D00009...... C&D Security........ Guard Services, NCR $24,539,905 $4,907,981 Base Period 6/1/2009-
5/31/2010
Option Period I 6/1/
2010-5/31/2011
Option Period II 6/1/
2011-5/30/2012
Option Period III 6/
1/2012-5/31/2013
Option Period IV 6/1/
2013-5/30/2014
11............................... HSCEEC09D00010...... Master Security..... Guard Services, NCR $3,212,715 $642,543 Base Period 5/1/2009-
4/30/2010
Option Period I 5/1/
2010-4/30/2011
Option Period II 5/1/
2011-4/30/2012
Option Period III 5/
1/2012-4/30/2013
Option Period IV 5/1/
2013-4/30/2014
11............................... HSCEEC09D00011...... Master Security..... Guard Services, NCR $3,707,607 $741,521 Base Period 5/1/2009-
4/30/2010
Option Period I 5/1/
2010-4/30/2011
Option Period II 5/1/
2011-4/30/2012
Option Period III 5/
1/2012-4/30/2013
Option Period IV 5/1/
2013-4/30/2014
11............................... HSCEEC09D00012...... C&D Security........ Guard Services, NCR $12,816,165 $2,563,233 Base Period 6/1/2009-
5/31/2010
Option Period I 6/1/
2010-5/31/2011
Option Period II 6/1/
2011-5/30/2012
Option Period III 6/
1/2012-5/31/2013
Option Period IV 6/1/
2013-5/30/2014
11............................... HSCEEC09D00013...... Knight Protective Guard Services, NCR $34,720,713 $6,944,143 Base Period 12/1/08-
Service. 11/30/09
Option 1 12/1/09-11/
30/10
Option 2 12/1/10-11/
30/11
Option 3 12/1/11-11/
30/12
Option 4 12/1/12-11/
30/13
11............................... HSCEEC10A00001...... Coastal Guard Services, NCR $65,410,402 $13,082,080 BPA Through 9/30/
International 2014
Security.
11............................... HSCEEC10D00001...... Master Security..... Guard Services, NCR $3,738,474 $747,695 Base Period 1/1/10-
12/31/10
Option 1 1/1/11-12/
31/11
Option 2 1/1/12-12/
31/12
Option 3 1/1/13-12/
31/13
Option 4 1/1/14-12/
31/14
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 10a. GAO has provided the committee a list of all
recommendations GAO has made to FPS since FPS was transferred to DHS.
For each recommendation, GAO noted whether FPS has fully addressed the
issue, or whether the issue remains open. For each open GAO
recommendation, please provide the following information:
Where the agency concurs with the recommendation, but has not
completed actions to address the recommendation, please provide a
listing of tasks remaining, the title of the individual overseeing
completion of the recommendation and the expected completion date.
Question 10b. Where the agency does not concur with the
recommendation, please provide a narrative explanation stating the
reasons for the failure to concur.
Answer. Please see the attached spreadsheet, GAO/OIG Status Report.
GAO/OIG STATUS REPORT
Recommended Performance Reporting for Period [Enter Current Period's Dates Here]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report Number Report Title Schedule Status
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OIG 09-51 Federal Protective Service Contract Guard Procurement and Oversight Process On Track
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FPS Est. Start FPS Est. Due
Milestones Description Date Date Percent Complete Assignee
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0................................. Refine and complete standardized 6/12/2008 4/30/2009 100 Division Director
procedures and templates to ensure
that the Federal Protective Service
consistently solicits and awards
guard contracts in the Government's
best interests.
2.0................................. Allocate sufficient Consolidated 6/5/2008 9/22/2009 100 Division Director
Contracting Group and regional
program office staff to perform
thorough technical evaluations and
award timely follow-on guard
contracts that are in the
Government's best interests.
3.0................................. Provide training to the regional 2/5/2009 4/30/2009 100 Division Director
program office personnel who
participate in technical
evaluations so that they can
successfully evaluate contractor
technical proposals to award best
value guard contracts.
4.0................................. Develop standardized policies and 4/30/2009 10/1/2009 100 Division Directors
procedures to ensure that FPS
personnel provide effective
contract oversight. At a minimum,
policies and procedures need to
include performing and documenting
inspections, reviewing invoices,
assessing monetary deductions,
evaluating contractor performance,
and testing quality control plans.
5.0................................. Develop an agency-wide information 8/1/2008 11/16/2009 100 Division Director
system to collect and report the
frequency of all inspections and
their results to provide Nation-
wide FPS managers with the
necessary information to evaluate
building security and contractor
performance.
6.0................................. Increase staffing and resources at 3/10/2008 12/30/2009 97 Asst. Director
the regional program offices to
perform the necessary contract
administration and oversight
function over guard services.
6.1................................. Increase the number of Law 3/10/2008 5/1/2009 100 Division Director
Enforcement personnel to the 900
level to increase oversight of the
contract guard services.
6.2................................. Increase the number of Mission 3/10/2008 5/1/2009 100 Division Director
Support personnel to 300 to assist
in the administration of guard
support services.
6.3................................. Establish a Level III Program 1/14/2009 4/29/2009 100 Asst. Director
Manager in the FPS Operations
Directorate.
6.4................................. Establish positions for, and hire, 1/14/2009 12/30/2009 80 Asst. Director
Program Managers within each region
and at the FPS HQ for guard
contract administrative expertise.
6.5................................. Increase the number of trained 3/10/2008 12/30/2009 100 Asst. Director
Contracting Officer Technical
Representatives (COTRs) to ensure
qualified guard contract oversight.
6.6................................. Implement FPS Policy to ensure the 10/1/2008 8/1/2009 100 Division Director/
proper resourcing of Technical Regional Directors
evaluation teams. Note: Addressed
in section 6.6a of the Security
Guard Acquisition Planning and Pre-
Award policy.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Gary W.
Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection
Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Some have proposed moving away from a system where FPS
is reliant on funding from other agencies to support its staff. Have
you looked at the fee-funding system and are you satisfied that it best
supports FPS's needs?
Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) continues to be funded
through revenues and collections in the same manner that existed when
FPS was under the General Services Administration (GSA) prior to its
transfer to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
FPS has initiated a study of funding strategies that will support
the security and protection mission of FPS within DHS using the
preliminary data being obtained from the recently deployed ABC Model
and risk-based workforce performance metrics obtained from FPS subject-
matter experts. A preliminary report will be completed in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2010. Based on the preliminary findings, the
most promising fee methodologies, along with options that include
combinations of different fees with other funding sources, will be
presented to departmental management for further consideration.
Question 2. What is the benefit of a universal per square foot
approach, as opposed to a fee for service per building approach?
Answer. The method to assess and collect the basic security charge
is similar to a flat tax based on square feet, while the overhead
charges for building-specific and SWA services are based on the
additional security services delivered at the specific building or
requested by a specific tenant agency in the building.
This approach is not very different from the property taxes
assessed by State, local, and municipal authorities to establish
adequate levels of public safety services to protect the residents that
they serve. The majority of taxpayers will not require public safety
services during a tax year, but the jurisdiction must still maintain
sufficient resources to respond to all emergencies. Likewise, FPS is
required to maintain a sufficient force to provide law enforcement and
security services across the entire GSA real property inventory.
FPS will be looking at alternative funding methodologies that may
better support the FPS law enforcement and security mission.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Robert A.
Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services
Administration
Question 1. What role did GSA play in transition planning? What
input did you provide to NPPD to facilitate a successful transition?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. GAO reported that GSA and FPS have not completed
renegotiating the Memorandum of Agreement that governs the agencies'
relationship. This agreement also addresses information sharing. How
will you work with NPPD and FPS during the transition to ensure that
this renegotiation is completed in a timely manner?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Please provide a narrative of all security
countermeasure recommendations FPS issued to GSA or GSA tenants in the
past year, and the corresponding GSA or tenant agency response to each
FPS recommendation. For instances in which GSA or the tenant agency
declined to implement the recommended security countermeasure, specify
the basis for this decision.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Robert A.
Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services
Administration
Question. Has GSA examined altering the process by which FPS
recommendations are reviewed, appropriated and implemented?
Should building security committees be making security-related
decisions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Mark L.
Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government
Accountability Issues
Question 1. You recommended that FPS and GSA coordinate better on
sharing security and threat information. What steps should NPPD take
during the transition to improve information sharing between FPS and
GSA?
Answer. NPPD should ensure that FPS reaches consensus with GSA on
what information contained in facility security assessments are needed
for GSA to fulfill its responsibilities related to the protection of
Federal buildings and its occupants. In addition, NPPD should require
that FPS and GSA establish internal controls to ensure that shared
information is adequately safeguarded.
Question 2. In your opinion, how can NPPD best contribute its
knowledge and expertise to improve FPS physical protection of Federal
facilities?
Answer. While we have not conducted any reviews of NPPD, we think
that NPPD's knowledge and experience in securing the Nation's critical
infrastructure should help improve FPS's ability to protect Federal
facilities.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for David L.
Wright, President, American Federation of Government Employees--Local
918
Question 1. In your testimony, you recommend that FPS federalize
contract guard positions at high-risk facilities. How would this
improve the safety of Federal buildings?
Answer. A properly trained Federal Police Officer has a higher
level of qualifications and training than a contract security guard, is
held to a higher level of responsibility, is supervised by other
trained law enforcement officers, and typically has a lower turnover
rate than a contract guard. This substantially increases the likelihood
that they will recognize a threat and take appropriate enforcement
action when compared to a contract guard. Additionally, their basic
training is standardized through the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) and the FPS National training staff, where contractor
basic training is taught by each guard company and often has an undue
focus on avoiding liability to the company. Just as the use of Federal
Police Officers has improved the safety of Congressional facilities,
the White House, and the Pentagon, their use at our highest risk GSA
facilities would have the same result.
Question 2a. How much training do FPS inspectors receive on risk
assessment?
Answer. With the implementation of the new Risk Assessment
Management Program (RAMP) the assessment training has changed. Prior to
RAMP, all inspectors have received 4 weeks of Physical Security
Training, including the assessment process. Now inspectors and police
officers Nation-wide are receiving 2 weeks of instruction on RAMP and
all are expected to complete this training by the end of March. New
inspectors will now complete a 6-week initial Security Academy.
Additionally, one of the 30 areas trained and evaluated during the 12-
week field training and evaluation program is the risk assessment
process.
Question 2b. How much law enforcement training do FPS inspectors
receive?
Answer. New inspectors must successfully complete the 12-week
Uniformed Police Training Program at FLETC, 3 weeks of FPS orientation/
advanced FPS specific training, and a 12-week field training and
evaluation program.
Question 2c. What percentage of an FPS inspector's time is spent
performing risk assessment duties?
Answer. The percentage varies based on the number of inspectors and
the number and mix of facilities assigned to each. Many of our
inspectors have reported it was not unusual to spend 18 to 20 weeks of
the year (38 percent) conducting assessments.
This year the ISC changed the interval between assessments for
high-risk (Level 4) buildings from every 2 to every 3 years; and low-
risk (Level 1 & 2) buildings from every 4 years to every 5 years,
reducing the number of assessments required each year. However, with
the advent of RAMP and its highly detailed risk evaluation process, the
time required to complete the average assessment will increase. Our
inspectors estimate at the current staffing level they will spend an
average of 13 to 15 weeks a year (25 percent) conducting assessments.
On average an inspector should spend no more than 6 weeks (12
percent) spread over the year on assessments, which is ultimately only
a planning document. In order to implement the security plan from the
assessment, provide law enforcement response and proactive patrol;
ensure human, electronic, physical, and procedural countermeasures work
as intended; and monitor and mentor contract guard performance,
significant proactive time and effort is absolutely necessary for
success. As GAO has reported FPS does not have sufficient inspectors
and police officers to provide proactive patrol, ensure its
countermeasures are working, and monitor to ensure guards and guard
companies are complying with their contractual obligations.
Question 2d. How does this compare to the amount of time spent on
law enforcement duties?
Answer. At current inadequate staffing levels, our inspectors are
severely challenged to allocate sufficient time for law enforcement
duties, including proactive patrol, while meeting mandates for
assessments and guard monitoring. Estimates on the amount of time spent
on law enforcement duties from our field staff in many locations range
from 10 percent to 25 percent, even with overtime use for some guard
training monitoring and off-hour inspections.
Question 2e. Since FPS inspectors are primarily trained in law
enforcement, what steps would you recommend NPPD take to ensure
inspectors are able to devote more time to law enforcement duties?
Answer. First, recognize that inspectors are essentially community
police officers by increasing FPS field staff so sufficient inspectors
and police officers are available, to provide necessary service. This
increase in staff will reduce the number of buildings assigned to each
inspector to a level where they can successfully complete their duties
while reducing the documented risk to facilities inherent in an
understaffed FPS. Recommend Congress confer law enforcement retirement
benefits on FPS law enforcement personnel on the same basis as Customs
and Border Protection officers.
Second, extend service hours in the largest cities to include night
and weekend service--criminals and terrorists don't work only during
business hours, and neither should FPS. Authorize administratively
uncontrollable overtime for inspectors and officers to ensure they
accomplish the myriad of tasks inherent in their community police
officer role.
Third, increase staffing in smaller cities to provide minimum
service to urban communities and border stations. These three steps
would increase resources in our highest-risk cities and provide minimal
service coincident to risk for facilities located in lower-risk cities/
rural areas.
In order to accomplish these steps Congressional mandates will be
necessary to encourage OMB approval of the necessary funding, when
requested by DHS.
Question 3. NPPD chairs the operations of the Interagency Security
Committee, which has responsibility for establishing Government-wide
security policies for Federal facilities. In your opinion, how will FPS
benefit from becoming a part of the agency that chairs this committee?
Answer. FPS will undoubtedly benefit from the synergy of being in
the same organization as the ISC Secretariat. However, FPS is still not
a member of the committee as they were prior to transfer to DHS, nor do
they have the honest broker compliance monitoring role they had prior
to the 2003 revisions to the ISC Executive Order. Additionally, the ISC
was formed by an Executive Order that predates the establishment of DHS
and the Secretary's mandate to be primarily responsible for the
protection of Federal facilities. The overall security of all
facilities will be improved if Congress codifies the role, functions,
and mission of the ISC as part of DHS under the supervision of the
Secretary, to help her accomplish the facilities protection mission
mandated by the Homeland Security Act. The ISC as currently managed and
structured, has in some ways increased risk to Federal facilities
through its practice of placing the non-professional Facility Security
Committees in charge of determining which security measures, weapons
screening and access control measures they will accept. Additionally,
the ISC promulgates standards and guidelines based on the consensus of
its members. Under this concept neither the DHS Secretary nor FPS can
even mandate minimum access control and weapons screening standards for
any facilities. The ISC, as presently constituted, is broken and needs
to be fixed by Congress.
Question 4. FPS is developing a new risk assessment tool called the
Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP). In your opinion, will RAMP
streamline and improve the risk assessment process?
Answer. RAMP improves the risk assessment process by considering
all aspects of the facility and its buffer zone to determine threats,
vulnerability, and consequence. It will streamline the management of
countermeasures, the overall assessment process, and bring together
legacy GSA systems. RAMP will not save time since it incorporates many
assessment best practices that require additional effort by our
inspectors to properly conduct assessments and validate countermeasure
effectiveness. While RAMP may greatly improve our ability to
standardize and document risks to each facility, right now FPS simply
does not have enough inspectors to do this critical job right, without
creating vulnerabilities in other areas.
Question 5. Did NPPD consult with AFGE when preparing its
transition plan, specifically with regard to their plans for managing
human capital at FPS?
Answer. Neither ICE nor NPPD consulted with AFGE while preparing
its transition plan, and did not share any element of the plan with
AFGE. I became aware of the ``plans'' for managing human capital when
they were publically announced after the transfer. Additionally, we
understand the transition plan requires FPS to pay NPPD over $25
million, from its security charge revenue, for services previously
provided by ICE from its appropriation without cost to FPS. It seems to
me that if ICE paid for the service from its appropriation the
Secretary should be directed to reprogram these oversight and
administration funds from ICE to NPPD. Paying these costs from FPS
security collections effectively reduces FPS direct services and
capital investment to the detriment of the security of Federal
employees and facilities, as well as the FPS field force.
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for David L.
Wright, President, American Federation of Government Employees--Local
918
Question 1. In your testimony you cite inadequate staffing levels
as a reason for some of the problems we discussed. Please estimate how
many additional FPS staff would be needed to meet its current mandates?
Answer. To meet the current FPS mandate to protect only GSA owned
and leased facilities (about half of the Non-DOD Federal facilities) at
least 490 additional non-supervisory inspectors and police officers are
required. I estimate this increase in direct service staff would also
require about 120 more supervisors, managers, and mission support
staff. The total additional staff requirement would be approximately
610. Under the current security charge funding scheme, this could be
achieved while maintaining only a pennies basic per square foot law
enforcement and security charge of .88, coupled with an administrative
charge of 10 percent (which was 8 percent in 2009 and 15 percent in
2007) on guard services to pay for the contract guard monitoring
functions.
A total Nation-wide FPS staff of 1,860 would still be less than 75
percent of the 2,500 police officers the VA uses to police and secure
its medical centers, and barely 200 more than the Capitol Police use to
secure Congressional facilities in Washington, DC. With a total staff
of 1,860 there would be sufficient officers and inspectors in all major
cites with significant concentrations of Federal employees and high-
risk buildings, and minimal effective service for facilities in lower
risk rural communities.
Question 2. In your testimony you also raise the specter of
abolishing the fee-funding system, in which FPS charges tenant agencies
a flat rate of .66/square foot to protect buildings. What system would
you propose to generate revenues for FPS to adequately protect these
tenant agencies other than appropriations?
Answer. Security at GSA buildings is funded through four sources,
all of which are funds already appropriated to other Federal agencies,
so we really are not ``fee-funded''. Funding is currently billed on a
monthly basis based on annual security charges.
The .66/square foot is only for basic services. Those facilities
with complex security needs often pay an additional $3 to $4/square
foot for the cost of guards and other security countermeasures. Many
also pay additional square foot charges to GSA to amortize the cost of
security fixtures like vehicle barriers and window protection.
One simple alternative would be to transfer the basic, building
specific, and fixture charges to create a FPS appropriation, thus
providing Congress ready visibility on facility security costs and
allowing DHS to prioritize security measures where there is the highest
risk. Optional security services that are not required by an ISC
standard, such as guards at each Social Security Office, would continue
to be funded by agencies on a reimbursable basis through Security Work
Authorizations.
Other alternatives that maintain the fee-funded myth could include
an annual technical transfer of projected costs by OMB so FPS does not
have to bill each agency on a monthly basis; or a transfer from GSA at
the beginning of each year of all projected security costs with GSA
collecting the costs, as necessary, from their tenants. Both these and
other similar alternatives would require legislative direction.
Question 3. GAO has cited a lack of training and recertification by
FPS contract guards. Short of federalizing the FPS, what are ways to
improve security at Federal buildings, or is it possible to improve
oversight and training alone?
Answer. If Congress chooses to accept the inherent risks of using a
mix of 15,000 contract guards and approximately 1,250 Federal employees
in FPS, there are several ways to improve security. While contract
guards will never achieve the same effectiveness as the Federal Police
Officers used to protect the Capitol, White House, and Pentagon,
rigorous performance and training monitoring coupled with consistent
observation and mentoring by FPS inspectors and police officers can
mitigate some of this risk. However, there was no real mitigation of
these inherent risks when the number of guards increased from 5,000 to
15,000 while FPS was forced to significantly decrease its inspectors
and officers. Also there are numerous facilities where agencies procure
their own contract guards who do not operate under any FPS supervision,
DHS should revoke the delegations of authority for these facilities and
bring them fully under the FPS protective mantle. Additionally,
Congress could provide statutory procurement authorizations to ensure
guard companies are held accountable for their performance and to
streamline the acquisition process for these critical services. If FPS
is to continue using contract guards in their current roles a separate
part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation for FPS procured guard
services to implement the statutory procurement guidance would be
necessary.
The improvement of oversight, training, and acquisition procedures
are only a viable alternative with significant increases in FPS law
enforcement staff to function in a true community police role to
protect Federal facilities while using properly trained and monitored
contract guards as a force multiplier.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Stephen
D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National Association of
Security Companies
Question 1. Given the systemic problems GAO uncovered, are
companies changing their approach to hiring or oversight of contract
guards? Are companies working together to make industry-wide
improvements?
Answer. NASCO fully believes that FPS and contract security
companies with FPS contracts must address the hiring, certification,
and oversight problems uncovered by the GAO and make changes and
improvements where necessary. It is a core mission of NASCO and its
member companies to work together industry-wide to improve the hiring
and performance of contract security officers including efforts to
enact better licensing, training, and background checks standards.
NASCO has proactively discussed with FPS and made suggestions on
possible ways to improve FPS guard training and performance, as
mentioned in the written testimony.
Question 2. You testified that you are aware of FPS contracts that
require security guards to be trained as special police officers
(SPOs), and that SPOs have arrest power, unlike other security guards.
Please identify which FPS security guard contracts require contract
guards to be qualified or trained as SPOs. Include the name of the
company that holds each contract, and the locations where the guards
stand post.
Answer. NASCO does not have access to FPS contracting records that
would provide information on which FPS security guard contracts require
contract guards to be qualified or trained as SPO's. FPS has indicated
that SPO's currently are, or have been in the past, required in FPS
guard contracts. The committee should contact FPS for more information
on this issue.
Question 3. According to news reports, contract security guards at
private facilities have staged walk-outs to protest unfair pay. How
have contract guard companies resolved these labor issues?
Answer. NASCO does not monitor or involve itself in the resolution
of labor-management issues at contract security companies. Each
contract security company handles labor issues on their own and NASCO
is not in a position to generally characterize how companies have
resolved certain labor issues such as ``unfair pay.''
Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Stephen D.
Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National Association of Security
Companies
Question 1. What additional steps would improve security at FPS
buildings?
What are some of the challenges associated with doing so?
Answer. In the NASCO written testimony, several current efforts
underway at FPS to improve the contract guard program were highlighted
that NASCO believes can improve security at FPS building. In terms of
additional steps that could be taken to improve security, again, the
written testimony mentions better firearms training, better
communication between FPS offices and contractors, and the inclusion of
higher performance-related standards in contracts. One security-related
issue that remains problematic and requires attention and improvement
on the part of FPS is the need for written guidelines or standard
operating procedures providing security guards with clear instructions
and guidance regarding detention authority and related procedures.
NASCO also believes that steps should be taken to ensure that the
quality of a company's training, personnel, management, and operational
procedures--which result in a higher bid--are adequately considered
during the procurement process. The challenge is for FPS to be able to
have the resources to spend more money for better security officer
services.
Question 2. In your testimony you cite significant reductions in
the FPS inspector and law enforcement officer force having exacerbated
problems at FPS. Going forward, do you believe FPS has the resources it
needs to make strides and rectify the agency's problems?
If not, what increase in resources would you recommend?
Answer. NASCO does believe that the current initiatives under way
at FPS, in combination with the Congressionally-mandated FPS personnel
levels, can help to rectify the agency's problems. As mentioned above,
more resources could be utilized to provide for higher performance
standards in FPS security guard contracts and to account for better
management, training, and other company qualifications in the contract
award process. Resources are needed so that FPS contracts to be truly
awarded based on ``best value'' and not solely ``lowest cost'', which
would lead to better performance by security contractors and could
resolve problems in the FPS Contract Guard Program.
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