[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
EXAMINING PREPAREDNESS AND COORDINATION EFFORTS OF FIRST RESPONDERS
ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS,
PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 31, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-13
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California PETER T. KING, New York
JANE HARMAN, California LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
Columbia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Mississippi
LAURA RICHARDSON, California PETE OLSON, Texas
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas
JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
MARY JO KILROY, Ohio
ERIE J.J. MASSA, New York
DINA TITUS, Nevada
VACANCY
Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Conner, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairman
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia PETE OLSON, Texas
LAURA RICHARDSON, California ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri PETER T. KING, New York (ex
DINA TITUS, Nevada officio)
VACANCY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi,
(ex officio)
Veronique Pluviose-Fenton, Staff Director
Stephen Vina, Staff Director
Daniel Wilkins, Clerk
Amanda Halpern, Minority Subcommittee Lead
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response..................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 38
The Honorable Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana.................................... 43
The Honorable Emmanuel Cleaver, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri.......................................... 43
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas........................................ 45
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California........................................ 48
The Honorable Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada................................................ 53
Witnesses
Ms. Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, Immigration and Department of Homeland
security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
MG Peter Aylward, Director of the Joint Staff, National Guard
Bureau:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Dr. Richard C. Barth, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of
Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Sheriff Larry A. Dever, Cochise County, Arizona:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr., Zapata County, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
For the Record
The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security--Press Release............................... 6
Letter to Hon. Janet Napolitano.................................. 52
Appendix
Letter:
To Hon. Henry Cuellar.......................................... 57
Questions and Responses:
Responses from Dr. Richard C. Barth............................ 58
EXAMINING PREPAREDNESS AND COORDINATION EFFORTS OF FIRST RESPONDERS
ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
----------
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications,
Preparedness, and Response,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:59 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson, Richardson,
Cleaver, Titus, Rogers, Cao, and McCaul.
Mr. Cuellar. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee of Emergency
Communications and Preparedness and Response will come to
order. The subcommittee meeting today is to receive testimony
regarding examining preparedness and coordination efforts of
first responders along the Southwest border.
Mr. Rogers? As you know, there is another meeting right
now. There is a caucus meeting on Afghanistan and Pakistan. So
we will get some of the other members to come and join us after
a while, but we will go ahead and get started for the witnesses
so they can go ahead and go on with their day.
But on behalf of the members of the ubcommittee and the
chairman also, I mean, the ranking member, let me welcome the
witnesses from the Office on Policy of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE; the Department of Homeland Security; the
National Guard Bureau, and the sheriffs from my home state of
Texas and Arizona.
Today's hearing entitled, ``Examining Preparedness and
Coordination Efforts of First Responders Along the Southwest
Border'' is designed to assess the unique challenges that the
federal, state, local, and tribal first responders face in
border communities in light of the escalation of the drug
cartel-related violence along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Specifically, this hearing is an opportunity to discuss the
emergency preparedness and response needs specific to the
Southwest border states including cross-border communications
and information sharing capabilities and multi-jurisdiction
partnerships.
Additionally, this hearing is an opportunity to examine the
coordination and planning among international, federal, state,
local, and tribal governments to prevent drug cartels-related
crimes from spreading into the U.S.
By now, we have all heard the media reports that describe
the heinous and brutal violence of the drug cartels in Mexico,
who have been competing for the control of trafficking routes
into the United States.
In the past few years, we have learned of the
assassinations of high-level government and law enforcement
officials, horrific murders including beheadings, violent
kidnappings, use of a growing and varied arsenal of high-power
weapons, and the indiscriminate killing of civilians.
What is more disturbing is that in 2008, more than 5,600
people in Mexico were killed in drug trafficking violence, a
110 percent increase over 2007. Of that number, 550 of the
killed were law enforcement officials.
Although we have been baffled by the battles of the Mexican
drug cartel, there is a ever-growing concern of a spillover
into the United States. As a member whose district includes the
border city of Laredo, Texas, I can tell you that just last
year, the city of Nuevo Laredo, which lies just across my
district was gripped in terror at the hands of the cartels.
Again, you know, working with the local sheriffs, worked
with the state law enforcement, the Texas National Guard, the
federal agencies, and of course, we have Janice Ayala and some
of the folks that worked very hard to establish the BEST
organization.
DHS, as you know, got first started on Laredo BEST then
from there it spread over to the concept across the nation. The
Laredo does focus on the disruption of cross-border criminal
activity related to narcotics smuggling, money laundering,
human and weapons smuggling, transnational gangs and cross-
border violence.
As a result of this collaboration and coordination, the
Laredo BEST helped stem the encroaching violence and protect
our community. Unfortunately, the Mexican drug cartels moved
their aggressiveness to our other border communities that could
provide them with access routes to the United States.
First responders from border communities tell me that the
demand for drugs from this country, coupled with the illegal
weapons going into Mexico, fuels the strength of the drug
cartels in Mexico. But I remain convinced that a collective
commitment to combat the efforts of those cartels will prevail.
This is why we must support our first responders, who are
the nation's first line of defense. Thus coordinating policies
and procedures at all levels of government to address border
security and emergency preparedness as complementary--may
expedite emergency response while improving homeland security
on both sides of the border.
That is why I have issued my support for the Merida
Initiative and the president's major Southwest Security
Initiative that was announced last week. Our first responders
need and deserve additional personnel, increased intelligence
capacity, better coordination and the strategic redeployment of
the 360 additional officers and agents at the border and in
Mexico City.
But I must also state that the only way we can address
against the greed and the violence of drug cartels is by
working together as a team. I am disturbed by the reports of
turf battle among federal agencies that now seek to threaten
the success of the first responders at the state, local, and
tribal communities.
As the great Henry Ford stated, ``Coming together is the
beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is
success.'' As the chairman of this subcommittee, I will use my
authority to conduct aggressive oversight that we can stamp out
this unnecessary turf battles. Simply put, we cannot fight the
turf battles of Mexican drug cartels if we are distracted by
the turf battles of our own agencies.
First responders must put their lives on the line everyday.
So to them I say, one team, one fight.
With that, I will look forward to hearing from Dr. Richard
Barth, the acting assistant secretary from the Office of Policy
of DHS. Dr. Barth will tell us how DHS is coordinating with
other federal agencies, state, local, tribal communities, to
increase the security of our homeland.
Ms. Janice Ayala, the deputy assistant director of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, will discuss the
success of the BEST program and the other efforts of ICE toward
a collective effort with its multi-jurisdictional partners.
Major General Peter Aylward, who serves as the director of
the Joint Staff at the National Guard Bureau will discuss the
support of the Guard at the Southwest border to carry out
border security initiatives.
First witnesses, or the first responders, should I say, our
final witnesses are our first responders, Sheriff Sigi Gonzalez
of Zapata County and Sheriff Larry Dever of Cochise County in
Arizona who will give the committee their perspectives of the
first responders community along the Southwest border.
And I certainly want to thank all the witnesses, the
sheriffs, the National Guard, ICE and, of course, DHS for being
here with us.
I look forward to a robust discussion and the exchange of
specific recommendations on these most-pressing issues, and
that is one thing that as you all do your 5-minute
presentations and answer some of the questions, one of the
things that we will be asking is for suggestions on how we can
go ahead and coordinate.
We just finished a classified briefing just, I guess, about
an hour ago with all the federal agencies, and, you know, they
are doing a great job, but one of the big questions we had is,
how do we coordinate first among ourselves the federal
agencies?
And then how do we coordinate with the state, and how do
the four states that we have in the Southwest area, and then
how do we coordinate with all the sheriffs' departments that we
have on the border, all the police departments that we have on
the border?
And it is a very simple concept, but it is an extremely
difficult concept to implement.
But at this time, the chair now recognizes the ranking
member of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, the
gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for an opening statement.
Opening Remarks of Chairman Henry Cuellar
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response
Examining Preparedness and Coordination Efforts of First Responders
Along the Southwest Border
March 31, 2009, 10:00 a.m.--311 Cannon House Office Building
Good morning. On behalf of the Members of the Subcommittee, let me
welcome the witnesses from the Office and Policy and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the National Guard Bureau, and the sheriffs of my home state of Texas,
and Arizona.
Today's hearing, entitled ``Examining Preparedness and
Coordination Efforts of First Responders along the Southwest Border,''
is designed to assess the unique challenges that Federal, State, local,
and Tribal first responders face in border communities in light of the
escalation of drug-cartel related violence along the U.S.-Mexico
border.
Specifically, this hearing is an opportunity to discuss the
emergency preparedness and response needs specific to southwest border
States, including cross-border communications and information sharing
capabilities, and multi-jurisdictional partnerships.
Additionally, this hearing is an opportunity to examine the
coordination and planning among international, Federal, State, local,
and tribal governments to prevent drug-cartel related crimes from
spreading to the United States. By now, we have all heard the media
reports that describe the heinous and brutal violence of the drug
cartels in Mexico who have been competing for the control of
trafficking routes in the United States.
So in the past couple of years, we have learned of the
assassinations of high-level government and law enforcement officials,
horrific murders including beheadings, violent kidnappings, use of a
growing and varied arsenal of high-powered weapons and the
indiscriminate killing of civilians.
What is most disturbing is that in 2008, more than 5,600
people in Mexico were killed in drug trafficking violence, a 110%
increase over 2007. Of that number, 550 of the killed were law
enforcement officers.
Although we have been buffered by the battles of the
Mexican drug cartel, there is ever-growing concern of a spillover into
the United States.
As a member whose district includes the border city of
Laredo, Texas, I can tell you just last year the city of Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico--which lies just across my district – was gripped in
terror at the hands of the cartels.
But my local sheriff worked with the State law
enforcement, the Texas National Guard, and Federal agencies as part
first Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) established by DHS
in Laredo, TX.
The Laredo BEST focused on the disruption of cross-border
criminal activity related to narcotics smuggling; money laundering;
human and weapons smuggling; transnational gangs; and cross-border
violence.
As a result of this collaboration and coordination, the
Laredo BEST helped to stem the encroaching violence and protect our
community.
Unfortunately, the Mexican drug-cartel moved their
aggression toward other border communities that could provide them with
access routes to the United States.
First responders from border communities tell me that the
demand for drugs from this country, coupled with the illegal weapons
going into Mexico, fuels the strength of the drug-cartels in Mexico.
But I remain convinced that our collective commitment to
combat the efforts of the cartels can prevail.
That is why we must support our first responders who are
the Nation's first line of defense.
Thus, coordinating policies and procedures at all levels
of government to address border security and emergency preparedness as
complementary concepts may expedite emergency response while improving
homeland security on both sides of the border.
That is why I have issued my support for the Merida
Initiative and the President's ``Major Southwest Border Security
Initiative'' announced last week.
Our first reporters need and deserve the additional
personnel, increased intelligence capacity, better coordination and the
strategic redeployment of 360 additional officers and agents at the
border and in Mexico City.
But I must state emphatically that the only way we can
address against the greed and violence of the drug cartels is by
working together as a team.
I am disturbed by reports of turf battles among Federal
agencies that now seek to threaten the successes of first responders at
the State, local, and tribal communities.
As the great Henry Ford stated, ``Coming together is a
beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is success.''
As Chairman of this Subcommittee, I will use my authority
to conduct aggressive oversight to that we can stamp out these
unnecessary turf battles.
Simply put, we cannot fight the turf battles of the
Mexican drug cartels if we are distracted by the turf battles of the
Federal agencies.
Our first responders put their lives on the line everyday.
So to them I say, ``One team, one fight!''
With that, I look forward to hearing from Dr. Richard C.
Barth, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy at DHS.
Dr. Barth will tell us how DHS is coordinating with other Federal
agencies, State, local, and Tribal communities to increase the security
of the homeland.
Ms. Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director at the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), will discuss the success of
the BEST program and other efforts at ICE to work collective with its
multi-jurisdictional partners.
Major General Peter Aylward, who serves as the Director of
the Joint Staff at the National Guard Bureau will discuss the support
of the Guard at the southwestern border to carry out the border
security initiatives.
Our final witnesses are our first responders Sheriff
Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr. of Zapata County, Texas and Sheriff Larry A.
Dever, Cochise County, AZ who will give the Committee the perspective
of the first responder community along the southwestern border.
With that, I thank the witnesses for coming today and I
look forward to a robust discussion and the exchange of specific
recommendations to address this most pressing issue.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too want to join
the chairman thanking each and every one of you for taking the
time out of your busy schedules to be here. It really does help
us as policymakers to make better policy to have the
information and the expertise that you are able to share with
us.
As the chairman said, today's hearing is to look at
emergency preparedness from among first responders along the
Southwest borders with their unique challenges.
As we all know, drug-related violence along the Southwest
border is certainly not a new phenomenon, but the intense drug
war now taking place among the cartels in Mexico demands a
higher level of awareness and preparedness among federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies along the border and
throughout the United States.
If drug violence continues to spill over into the U.S. as
we have seen with murders, home invasions and kidnappings in
cities like Tucson, Phoenix, Atlanta, and Birmingham, the
consequences could be devastating to our communities.
We need to make sure that our first responders have the
tools they need to deal with these issues. We also need to make
sure they receive adequate support from the federal government,
not just in words, but in action.
During the last Congress, the Committee on Homeland
Security did not pass a single piece of border security
legislation, although over 40 bills dealing with border
security were referred out of this committee, or referred to
this committee.
It is important to look at what more Congress can do to
ensure that agencies charged with this important mission have
enough resources and authority to gain control of the border
and combat rising threats.
Last week Secretary Napolitano announced the Department of
Homeland Security's new strategy to combat drug violence and
crack down on Mexican cartels. While it is an important first
step, there are many unanswered questions. For example, when
the secretary testified before our committee in February, I
talked with her about the need to increase the number of ICE
agents.
[Information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Unfortunately, under the new Southwest Border Strategy, the
Department is not planning to hire new ICE personnel in order
to deal with the rising drug violence. Instead, the Department
wants to realign funds from ``less urgent activities.''
It has not been made clear which offices or programs will
be affected, and I am concerned that the Administration's
approach will pull agents and officers away from other
important assignments.
I look forward to hearing today from Rich Barth and Janice
Ayala. I hope I pronounced that right on the Department's
efforts to partner with State and Local enforcement along the
border to achieve common goals and how these relationships can
be improved.
I also look forward to testimony by Major General Aylward
on the National Guard's counterdrug operations throughout the
States, and finally, I want to hear from Sheriff Gonzalez and
Sheriff Dever on the threats and challenges you face and how
the Federal government can be a stronger partner in combating
the escalating drug violence along our border.
And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. And again, to all
members of the subcommittee is a reminder that under the
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
At this time, I would welcome the panel of witnesses, and
our first witness will be Dr. Richard Barth, who is the acting
assistant secretary for the Office of Policy at the Department
of Homeland Security.
So, Mr. Barth?
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD C. BARTH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Barth. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar and Ranking Member
Rogers and members of the committee.
On behalf of the Obama administration and Department of
Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you about the preparedness and
coordination efforts with first responders along the Southwest
border.
As you all know, the Department of Homeland Security and
the Obama administration are greatly concerned about the
increased level of cartel-related violence in Mexico and its
impact on communities on both sides of the border. That is why
the U.S.-Mexico relationship is getting sustained, high-level,
and comprehensive attention.
Our department has undertaken a proactive response on both
sides of the border to fully support the Mexican government's
campaign against the violent cartels and reduce the flow of
contraband across the border in both directions.
State, local, and tribal first responders along the
Southwest border have significant roles to play both in dealing
with the current violence and preparing for scenarios where
violence in Mexico could directly impact the United States in
the future.
First responders have dealt with border crime and related
issues for their entire careers. The successful mitigation of a
complex and multi-faceted threat like border violence means
that DHS and other federal agencies must constantly collaborate
and coordinate with our state, local and tribal allies in an
effort to share resources and information.
The Department's Office for State and Local Law Enforcement
led by Assistant Secretary Ted Sexton coordinates DHS policies
with more than 730,000 first responders across the nation.
Assistant Secretary Sexton has been directed by Secretary
Napolitano to ensure that the state, local and tribal
enforcement officials have a seat at the table when it comes to
the development and implementation of programs and policies
like those currently impacting the Southwest border.
The capabilities of state, local and tribal first
responders to deal with cartel-related violence are
substantial, and DHS works collaboratively with both state and
local governments in a number of ways. The Department created
the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces. We call them
``BEST teams,'' which are led by ICE.
The 12 BESTs that currently exist, of which eight are
located on the Southwest border, include the participation of
DHS and other federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement
agencies. These law enforcement participants play a critical
role in the BEST model by providing boots-on-the-ground
intelligence and operational knowledge on a daily basis.
In terms of grant funding, last week Secretary Napolitano
announced that DHS would change the grant guidance for our
remaining balances in the Operation Stonegarden Grant Pool. We
modified the program to focus up to 59 million still available
in Operation Stonegarden funding to enhance the operational
readiness and asset capabilities of law enforcement along the
Southwest border.
We will also expand the use of Stonegarden funds to pay for
additional law enforcement personnel overtime. Travel and other
related expenses for deployment of state, local, and tribal
officials to the border.
DHS is participating in numerous initiatives that will
increase the capability of first responders to communicate
effectively both along the Southwest border and with their
counterparts across the border in Mexico.
The DHS Office of Emergency Communications is in the
process of developing the congressionally mandated Border
Interoperability Demonstration Projects, which seek to improve
interoperable communications in no fewer than six border
communities.
DHS is working tirelessly to create open lines of
communication and information sharing along the Southwest
border. DHS assistant secretary for state, local and law
enforcement, Ted Sexton, recently traveled from Brownsville,
Texas to San Diego, California over 11 days to meet with
Southwest border first responders and discuss their concerns
about border violence and related DHS programs and policies.
During the course of this trip, Assistant Secretary Sexton
met with over two dozen border police chiefs and sheriffs, all
of which indicated they are willing to fully cooperate and
collaborate to respond to ongoing border violence and crime.
The secretary's office is also coordinating regular
conference calls with Southwest border law enforcement
officials including members of the Southwest Border Sheriff's
Coalition and representatives of DHS components including ICE.
These conference calls create a two-way flow of border-
related intelligence by providing state, local and tribal
officials with the opportunity to discuss critical Southwest
border issues and receive briefings from department components
on relevant programs and policies.
Finally, I would close with a few brief words on the highly
successful El Paso Intelligence Center referred to as EPIC.
EPIC is a fully coordinated tactical intelligence center
supported by databases and resources from member agencies,
which include Homeland Security, the El Paso Sheriff's Office,
the Texas Department of Homeland Security, the ICE and other
components of DHS.
The state and local first responders embedded within EPIC
make tremendous contributions to the many intelligence-led
operational initiatives that EPIC facilitates along the
Southwest border. In closing, DHS is fully engaged and focused
on ensuring that the local, state, and tribal first responders
have the necessary resources to respond to crime and violence.
Clearly, no single entity can defeat this threat alone. As
spillover violence from Mexico ultimately occurs, state, local
and tribal first responders will be our first line of defense.
I thank you for your continued support of DHS programs and
policies, and I would be happy to answer your questions after
the opening presentations.
[The statement of Dr. Barth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Richard C. Barth
Introduction
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members
of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today about the preparedness and coordination efforts of first
responders along the Southwest Border (SWB).
As you all know, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Obama Administration as a whole are greatly concerned about the
increased level of cartel-related violence in Mexico and its impact on
communities on both sides of the border. That's why the U.S.-Mexico
relationship is receiving sustained, high-level and comprehensive
attention. Prior to his inauguration, President Obama met with
President Calderon. Admiral Mullen visited Mexico on March 5th and 6th.
Secretary of State Clinton visited Mexico last week, and Secretary
Napolitano will visit at the end of this week with Attorney General
Holder, all ahead of the President's trip to Mexico on April 16th and
17th.
The daily reporting on drug-related violence in Mexico may make us
feel familiar with the situation, but we will not let familiarity breed
complacency. The magnitude and severity of the violence in places like
Ciudad Juarez has overwhelmed local police forces and spurred President
Calderon to deploy over 7,000 Mexican troops to this city that sits
just a stone's throw away from El Paso, Texas. Our Department has
undertaken a proactive and comprehensive response on both sides of the
border to fully support the Mexican government's campaign against the
violent cartels and reduce the flow of contraband across the border in
both directions.
State and Local First Responders: The Need for Partnership
In order for this comprehensive response to be successful in the
long run, the United States government must support the efforts of
State, local, and tribal first responders along the Southwest Border.
They have significant roles to play both in dealing with the current
violence and preparing for scenarios where violence in Mexico could
directly impact the United States homeland in the future.
While violence in the Southwest United States has not increased
markedly since the brutal drug wars began in Mexico, other border-
related criminal activity continues to confront State, local, and
tribal first responders in the region, who remain concerned about the
potential for spillover violence in the future. First responders at the
State, local and tribal level have dealt with border crime and related
issues for their entire careers. They are the ``boots on the ground''
that possess deep operational knowledge of the border region and its
unique social, cultural and geographical intricacies. The successful
mitigation of such a complex and multifaceted threat like border
violence means that DHS and other Federal agencies must constantly
collaborate and coordinate with our State, local, and tribal allies in
an effort to share resources and information whenever necessary.
DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement
The Department's Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, led by
Assistant Secretary Ted Sexton, coordinates DHS policies with the more
than 730,000 State and local first responders across the nation.
Assistant Secretary Sexton has been directed by Secretary Napolitano to
ensure that State and local law enforcement officials have a seat at
the table when it comes to the development and implementation of
programs and policies like those currently impacting the Southwest
Border.
State and Local First Responders: Capabilities
The capabilities of State, local and tribal first responders to
deal with cartel-related violence along the Southwest Border are
substantial and DHS will continue to support these vital assets. I will
discuss several of these capabilities and associated DHS support in
greater detail.
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)
Although I understand that my colleague, Deputy Assistant Director
Ayala, will be focusing on BESTs in her testimony, I would still like
to take a moment to touch on the critical role that State, local, and
tribal first responders play in these task forces. As you know, BEST is
not just a program, it is also an innovative model for collaborative
law enforcement that has delivered substantial results. The BEST
program coordinates with the Department of Justice and its initiatives
such as Project Gunrunner and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Drug
Task Force to ensure a unified approach to the problems along the
border. Since July 2005, the BESTs have been responsible for a number
of criminal and administrative arrests, indictments and convictions.
BESTs utilize a comprehensive approach towards dismantling the cross-
border criminal organizations that exploit our border and utilize that
information to eliminate the top leadership and the supporting
infrastructure that sustains these often violent organizations. The 12
BESTs that currently exist (of which eight are located on the Southwest
Border) include the participation of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast
Guard, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and State, local, and tribal
law enforcement agencies. These State, local, and tribal law
enforcement participants play a critical role in the BEST model by
providing essential ``boots on the ground'' intelligence and
operational knowledge on a daily basis. Additionally, my colleague,
Deputy Assistant Director Ayala will discuss Operation Armas Cruzadas,
which is an important complement to the BEST initiative.
We at DHS firmly believe that reinforcing the highly successful
BEST model will greatly enhance our ability to deal with the root
causes of cartel-related violence along the Southwest Border. Just last
week, Secretary Napolitano announced that DHS would be doubling the
number of BEST teams that incorporate Federal, State, local and tribal
law enforcement and intelligence officers. This will greatly expand our
capacity to collaborate with State, local, and tribal law enforcement
to combat cartel-related crime that occurs on the U.S. side of the
border.
Operation Stonegarden
In terms of grant funding, last week, Secretary Napolitano also
announced that DHS will change the grant guidance for our remaining
balances in the Operation Stonegarden grant pool. We modified the
program last week to focus $59 million available in Operation
Stonegarden funding to enhance the operational readiness and asset
capabilities of State, local and tribal law enforcement along the
Southwest Border.
And we will expand the scope of Operation Stonegarden funds to pay
for additional law enforcement personnel overtime, travel and other
related expenses for deployment of State, local, and tribal officials
to the border.
Started in 2004, Operation Stonegarden supports U.S. border States
and territories in increasing their capability to prevent, protect
against, and respond to border security issues. The program has made
funds available to more than 200 agencies in areas adjacent to either
the Canadian and Mexican borders to enhance their border security
operations. In the past, funds have been used to support overtime and
per diem costs, and to purchase equipment such as night vision
technology and observation equipment to enhance security operations on
the border in areas close to Border Patrol operations. Participation in
the program allows agencies to enhance their traditional law
enforcement missions. The recently-announced funding flexibilities will
ensure that State, local, and tribal first responders are equipped with
the resources they need to confront the complex and dynamic challenges
that exist along the Southwest Border.
In addition, we are engaging State, local, and tribal law
enforcement in ways that haven't been done previously. DHS is
coordinating regular conference calls with Southwest Border law
enforcement officials and representatives from DHS components. These
conference calls create a two-way flow of border-related intelligence
by providing State, local, and tribal officials with the opportunity to
discuss critical Southwest Border issues and receive briefings from
Departmental components on relevant programs and policies. This
increased engagement will help arm State and local first responders
with the best information available.
Emergency Communications with Mexico
DHS is currently participating in numerous initiatives that will
increase the capability of State, local, and tribal first responders to
communicate effectively both along the Southwest Border and with their
counterparts across the border in Mexico. Specifically, the DHS Office
of Emergency Communications (OEC) is in the process of developing the
Congressionally-mandated Border Interoperability Demonstration Project
(BIDP). The BIDP seeks to improve interoperable communications in no
fewer than six U.S. border communities, at least three of which will be
located on the southern border. Although still in the planning phases,
the Demonstration Project will ultimately function as a competitive
selection grant program for State, local, and tribal communities in
border areas to improve their communications capabilities.
Additionally, OEC co-chairs the Security Communications Task Group
(SCTG) for the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Consultative Commission (HLCC) on
Telecommunications. The SCTG is a joint U.S.-Mexico effort to address
cross border communications among emergency responders. In May 2008,
HLCC principals agreed to an Action Plan which directs OEC to lead the
U.S. development and implementation of a Cross Border Security
Communications network. This network will enable emergency responders
to share video surveillance streams, conduct joint operations
teleconferencing and securely exchange fingerprints and photographs.
OEC is also leading a domestic working group of first responders that
is examining different communications equipment that may be effective
along the Southwest Border. The successful implementation of these
initiatives will help ensure that State and local first responders have
the ability to communicate with one another during critical incidents
along the Southwest Border.
Increased Engagement with Southwest Border State, Local, Tribal Law
Enforcement
DHS is also working tirelessly to create open lines of
communication and information sharing with our State, local, and tribal
partners along the Southwest Border. In fact, DHS Assistant Secretary
for State and Local Law Enforcement Ted Sexton recently traveled from
Brownsville, Texas to San Diego, California to meet with Southwest
Border first responders and discuss their concerns about border
violence and related DHS programs and policies. During the course of
his two-week trip, Assistant Secretary Sexton met with over two dozen
border police chiefs and sheriffs, all of whom indicated that they are
willing to fully cooperate and collaborate to respond to ongoing
border-related crime and violence.
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
Located in El Paso, Texas, EPIC was established in 1974 in an
effort to improve drug-and border-enforcement operations along the
Southwest Border. Initially comprised of representatives from the U.S.
Customs Service, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (now
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and Border
Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement) and the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), EPIC is now staffed with over 300 personnel
and liaison staff from 15 Federal, State and local agencies. The State
and local agencies embedded at EPIC include the El Paso Sheriff's
Office and Texas Department of Homeland Security. Through the years,
EPIC has evolved into a fully coordinated, tactical intelligence center
supported by databases and resources from its member agencies. The
State and local first responders embedded within EPIC make tremendous
contributions to the numerous intelligence-led operational initiatives
that EPIC helps to facilitate along the Southwest Border. Additionally,
EPIC disseminates tactical bulletins (including officer safety alerts)
to first responders along the Southwest Border and across the country.
The intelligence center is also home to a State and local liaison group
that organizes criminal interdiction training. To further assist State,
local, and tribal law enforcement along the Southwest Border, DHS
created the Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST) at EPIC in 2007.
The goal of the HIST is to improve information sharing among Federal
agencies and with State, local, and tribal partners.
Conclusion
In closing, DHS is fully engaged and focused on ensuring that our
State, local, and tribal first responders have the necessary resources
to successfully respond to border-related crime and violence along the
Southwest Border. These officials have unequivocally indicated their
willingness to partner with each other and DHS. Clearly, no single
entity can defeat this threat alone. If spillover violence from Mexico
ultimately occurs, State, local, and tribal first responders will be,
as the name suggests, our first line of defense. As indicated in my
testimony, our State and local partners have existing capacity to
respond effectively along the Southwest Border. The recent increases in
funding, personnel and programmatic support to the Southwest Border
will reinforce this capacity in vital way. I remain confident that DHS
and the Federal family can successfully confront the cartel-related
violence through a successful partnership with these brave men and
women who risk their lives on a daily basis to secure our homeland.
Thank you for your continued support of DHS programs and policies.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have at this time.
Mr. Cuellar. Without objection, the witness's full
statement will be inserted into the record. And, of course,
each of you all are summarizing your statements. I want to
thank Dr. Barth.
At this time, our second witness is Ms. Janice Ayala,
deputy assistant director of the Office of Investigations at
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the
Department of Homeland Security.
Welcome, Ms. Ayala.
STATEMENT OF JANICE AYALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE),
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Ayala. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Cuellar,
Ranking Member Rogers and distinguished members of the
subcommittee.
On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Acting Assistant
Secretary Torres, I would like to thank you for the opportunity
to discuss ICE's longstanding relationship with their law
enforcement partners and our collective response to cross-
border crimes.
Recognizing that partnerships are essential, ICE works
closely across agency and international boundaries to provide
effective cross-border communications, information sharing and
emergency preparedness.
ICE augments first responder assets on the Southwest border
by deploying the largest force the Department of Homeland
Security investigators. To ensure we are prepared to support
first responders, ICE established a national incident response
unit, which ensures ICE law enforcement programs coordinate
their response during civil emergencies.
Last week, Secretary Napolitano announced several Southwest
border initiatives aimed at cracking down on Mexican drug
cartels. The administration's plan starts with additional
personnel, increased intelligence capability and increased
coordination with state, local, and Mexican law enforcement
authorities.
Specifically, ICE will double assignments to the Border
Enforcement Security Task forces known as BEST, and increase
its Mexico attache personnel by 50 percent. Moreover, ICE will
quadruple the number of designated border liaison officers and
continue Operation Armas Cruzadas aimed at thwarting the export
of arms from the Mexico into United States.
BEST task forces are the DHS platforms that provide the
most direct support to state and local first responders. In
July of 2005, in response to increased violence in Nuevo
Laredo, Mexico and Laredo, Texas area, ICE, CBP, Mexican,
federal and other law enforcement entities created an
international multi-agency initiative dubbed Operation
Blackjack. This successful concept was later formalized to
create the BEST.
I would like to share with you an example of a recent
support to law enforcement by BEST. On February 6, 2009, two
Department of Public Safety officers stopped a vehicle for a
traffic violation near Laredo, Texas. While one of the troopers
approached the vehicle, the driver accelerated in reverse and
attempted to run him over.
A high-speed chase ensued and ended in the Rio Grande River
where the driver waded across the border to Mexico. Texas DPS
requested the assistance of Laredo BEST in locating the driver,
whose vehicle contained nearly 900 pounds of marijuana. The
BEST coordinated with Mexican officials to locate the driver,
and within hours, the driver, a U.S. citizen, was detained by
Mexican officials and turned over to Laredo BEST and to Texas
DPS officers.
Through BEST, we have dismantled arms trafficking, human
trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, arms and narcotics smuggling
organizations and their hostage taking and murder and
kidnapping cells in the United States and Mexico.
Since July of 2005, BESTs have been responsible for over
2,034 criminal arrests, and in addition, they seized over
169,000 pounds of narcotics, 515 weapons, 341,000 rounds of
ammunition and nearly $23 million in U.S. currency and monetary
instruments.
The magnitude of violence surrounding these transnational
smuggling organizations necessitated the merging of legal
authorities and expertise in multiple law enforcement and
intelligence entities through task forces such as the BEST and
outbound operations such as our weapons Outbound Operations
Initiative, Operation Amas Cruzadas, and our bulk cash
smuggling initiative Operation Firewall.
In June of 2008, ICE officially launched Operation Amas
Cruzadas to combat criminal networks smuggling weapons from the
United States into Mexico. To that end, the U.S. and Mexico
synchronize interdiction, investigation, and intelligence
sharing activities aimed at dismantling weapons smuggling
networks on both sides of the border.
Since 2008 Operation Amas Cruzadas has resulted in over 112
arrests and the seizure of over 1,400 weapons and 116,000
rounds of ammunition. One of the most effective methods to deal
with violent transnational criminal organizations is attacking
the criminal proceeds of--operations.
ICE targets individuals and organizations that exploit
vulnerabilities and financial systems to launder a list of
proceeds. The combination of successful investigations, banking
regulations, and stringent laws has forced criminal
organizations to seek other means to transport their list of
funds across our borders.
One of the means is a smuggling of bulk cash currency out
of the United States, specifically, along Southwest border.
ICE's Operation Firewall, in which we partner with CBP, Office
of International Affairs, and state and local officers combats
this threat, and since inception has resulted in over 423
arrests, seized over $183 million, 62 million of that has been
seized overseas and, specifically 38 million in Mexico.
ICE is committed to effective cross-border communications
and information sharing to standby national criminal activity
and its associated violence through the deployment of BEST,
Operation Amas Cruzadas and Operation Firewall.
By partnering with other law enforcement agencies, we are
able to use a broad range of authorities including the more
sophisticated and investigative tools to respond to and conduct
our investigation.
I would like to thank the subcommittee for its confirmed
support of ICE, its continued support of ICE and our law
enforcement missions and would be happy to answer any questions
that you may have at this time.
[The statement of Ms. Ayala follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janice Ayala
Introduction
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee:
On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Acting Assistant Secretary
Torres, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) long-standing partnerships
with our state and local law enforcement partners who, along with other
federal agencies, respond to cross-border crimes. Recognizing that
partnerships are essential, ICE works closely across agency and
international boundaries with our law enforcement partners to create a
multi-layered law enforcement network, which provides effective cross-
border communication, information sharing, and emergency preparedness.
While ICE does not traditionally perform the functions of a state or
local police officer, who responds to a myriad of crimes on a daily
basis, ICE materially augments first responder resources on the
Southwest Border by deploying the largest force of investigators in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These investigators utilize
expansive investigative authority to target criminal organizations
engaged in the bi-lateral smuggling of people, narcotics, bulk cash,
and weapons that threaten the well-being of the United States.
To ensure ICE is prepared to support first responders, ICE
established the National Incident Response Unit (NIRU). This unit,
working in conjunction with the National Response Framework, Emergency
Support Function (ESF)--13, responds in an efficient and coordinated
way that addresses preparedness, prevention, and recovery during civil
emergencies. NIRU develops, enhances, and oversees programs, policies
and initiatives to focus ICE's emergency preparedness, management and
response efforts and continuity of operations planning.This includes
ICE's support to ESF-13 and our law enforcement partners who respond to
unexpected disasters such as avian and pandemic influenza and
hurricanes. In 2008, ICE supported response and recovery efforts during
the hurricanes that struck New Orleans and Houston. ICE also provided
law enforcement support for National Special Security Events, such as
the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. In addition, ICE partners with the
Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) personnel who are often first responders themselves. ICE's
investigative mission is directly linked to CBP's border protection and
interdiction mission, and ICE augments CBP's effort through
investigative, transportation, and public safety support. Another
example of ICE's support of first responders is ICE's Law Enforcement
Agency Response (LEAR) program. Established in September 2006 to
provide a more comprehensive response to Arizona law enforcement
agencies seeking assistance from ICE during encounters with suspected
illegal aliens, the LEAR unit received 1,283 calls for assistance and
arrested 6,235 illegal aliens last year.
As you may know, on March 24, 2009, the Administration announced
several Southwest Border initiatives aimed at cracking down on Mexican
drug cartels through enhanced border security. The Administration's
comprehensive plan calls for additional personnel, increased
intelligence capability, and increased coordination with state, local
and Mexican law enforcement authorities. Specifically, Secretary
Napolitano announced that ICE will double assignments to ICE's Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) from 95 agents to 190. ICE is
also increasing ICE AttachE personnel in support of Mexican law
enforcement efforts and ICE's BEST efforts from 24 to 36 agents.
Moreover, ICE will quadruple the number of agents designated as Border
Liaison Officers, from 10 to 40 personnel who work to create
cooperative relationships between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement
authorities. In addition, DHS will continue Operation Armas Cruzadas,
an ICE-led bi-lateral law enforcement and intelligence-sharing
operation to thwart export of arms from the U.S. into Mexico. These DHS
task forces include important partners such as Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and
other foreign, federal, state and local task force offices. When it
comes to countering the illicit weapons trade in particular, we closely
coordinate our efforts with ATF, as they possess long-standing
expertise in gun trafficking investigations and in engagement with
Federal Firearms Licensees.
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)
While ICE is generally not a first responder, the BEST task forces
are the DHS operational platform that provides the most direct support
to state and local first responders. In July 2005, in response to
increased violence in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico and Laredo, Texas, ICE, CBP,
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies, including Mexican agencies,
expanded the ongoing Border Crimes Initiative by creating an
international, multi-agency initiative called Operation Black Jack.
This initiative used the respective authorities and resources of its
members to dismantle cross-border criminal organizations. In its first
six months, its target-driven focus led to the dismantling of a murder/
kidnapping cell operating on both sides of the border, including the
seizure of high-powered fully automatic weapons and live grenades; the
components to make over 100 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), such
as pipe bombs and grenades; and over $1 million in U.S. currency.
Crucial to our success is the cooperation of our international
partners. The BESTs on the Southwest Border have secured the
participation of the Mexican law enforcement agency, Secretaria de
Seguridad Publica (SSP). Through the interaction and coordination of
all the member agencies, BESTs provide for immediate and international
enhanced information sharing on border violence due to geographic
proximity to the U.S. borders.
Through BESTs, we have dismantled arms trafficking, human
trafficking, bulk-cash, alien and narcotics smuggling organizations and
their hostage-taking and murder/kidnapping cells in the United States
and Mexico. Since July 2005, BESTs' efforts have resulted in 2,034
criminal arrests and 2,796 civil immigration arrests. The U.S.
Attorneys Offices have worked with ICE to secure more than 800
indictments, and more than 700 convictions. In addition, BESTs have
seized approximately 7,704 pounds of cocaine, 159,832 pounds of
marijuana, 558 pounds of methamphetamine, 39 pounds of crystal
methamphetamine, 1,023 pounds of ecstasy, 213 pounds of heroin, 97
pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 515 weapons, 341,345 rounds
ammunition, 745 vehicles, six properties, and $22.7 million in U.S.
currency and monetary instruments.
I would like to share a few of our successes with you: the
discovery and repatriation by the El Paso BEST of one of Mexico's top
ten most wanted fugitives; the arrest by the Laredo BEST of a weapons
trafficker who supplied cartels with assault rifles used to murder
Mexican Police Officer Navarro Rincon and others; and the arrest by the
Los Angeles Seaport BEST of an arms trafficker and seizure of 38
military style weapons. These cases clearly illustrate the violence
that results from narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, alien
smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering at our borders.
BESTs provide a unified and international response to securing our
borders, stemming the violence, and assisting first responders.
I would also like to share with you an example of how our foreign
partnerships and information sharing benefits ICE, as well as front
line officers from the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). On
February 6, 2009, a Texas DPS trooper conducted what he thought was a
routine vehicle stop of a Ford F-250 truck near Laredo, Texas. When the
trooper stepped out of his patrol car and began walking towards the
truck, the driver, Lino ZAMORA, placed the truck in reverse and
attempted to run the trooper over. Fortunately, the trooper was not
injured, and a high speed chase ensued ending by the Rio Grande river
banks near the World Trade Bridge where ZAMORA waded into the river and
into Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico. Texas DPS officers requested
immediate assistance from the Laredo BEST indicating they had
discovered 897 pounds of marijuana hidden inside the truck and that the
driver, ZAMORA, absconded to Mexico.
The Laredo BEST, which has a Mexican law enforcement officer
embedded in the task force, coordinated with the Mexican Military and
Immigration Officials to locate ZAMORA, who was hiding in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico. Mexican military officers located ZAMORA, a United States
Citizen, and turned him over to Mexican Immigration officials. These
officials then turned ZAMORA over to Laredo BEST agents without
incident. Texas DPS officers arrested ZAMORA for possession of
marijuana and assault on a peace officer. Just after 10:00 a.m., ZAMORA
fled from the Texas DPS officer, and at 3:30 p.m. he returned and was
arrested in the United States.
Although we have had significant success in dismantling
transnational smuggling organizations, they have proven to be flexible,
wealthy, well-organized, and intelligent. While the contraband the
organizations smuggle may vary, these organizations use the same
smuggling corridors to further their enterprise. Cartels invest
significant resources in gaining and maintaining control of these
lucrative smuggling corridors, expecting a considerable financial
return from smuggling ventures and from user fees paid by other
transnational smuggling organizations. To protect these lucrative
corridors, cartels hire assassins to kidnap, torture and murder
competitors that they perceive to infringe upon their territory.
The magnitude of violence surrounding these transnational smuggling
organizations in recent years necessitated expertise of multiple law
enforcement and intelligence entities through task forces such as the
ICE-led BEST, and law enforcement outbound operations such as our
weapons smuggling initiative, Operation Armas Cruzadas, and our bulk
cash smuggling initiative, Operation Firewall.
As I have noted, ICE plays several roles varying from assisting
federal, state, and local front line officers in emergency situations
to coordinate bi-national efforts beyond our borders. ICE has agents in
attaché offices in embassies and consulates worldwide, as well
as foreign law enforcement officers such as Mexico's Secretaria de
Seguridad Publica, co-located within our Border Enforcement Security
Task Forces in the United States.
Armas Cruzadas
As I mentioned previously, ICE is focused on the illicit flows of
weapons and bulk cash to reduce border violence through our ``Armas
Cruzadas'' initiative.
In June 2008, ICE, in partnership with CBP, formally launched
Operation Armas Cruzadas to combat transnational criminal networks
smuggling weapons into Mexico from the United States. As part of this
initiative, the United States and the Government of Mexico (GoM) agreed
to bi-lateral interdiction, investigation, and intelligence-sharing
activities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle these networks engaged
in weapons smuggling. This initiative has resulted in actionable
intelligence leading to arrests, as well as the seizure of firearms and
ammunition on both sides of the border. ICE has provided training in
appropriate export and other weapons' laws and methods used to combat
transnational smuggling; used its Project Shield America outreach
program and made presentations to groups involved in the manufacture,
sale or shipment of firearms and ammunition along the Southwest Border;
reinvigorated the ICE Border Liaison Program to sustain an open and
cooperative working relationship with foreign and domestic government
entities; initiated a Weapons Virtual Task Force to create virtual
communities where law enforcement can rapidly share intelligence and
communicate in a secure environment; created a U.S.-vetted GoM Arms
Trafficking Group; and used the ICE Border Violence Intelligence Cell.
In addition, ICE recognizes the need to coordinate with ATF, the agency
with principal firearms enforcement responsibility, in its efforts to
slow the flow of firearms into Mexico. On this front, ICE will
coordinate its Armas Cruzadas Initiative with ATF's Project Gunrunner.
Since June 2008, Operation Armas Cruzadas has resulted in 112
criminal arrests, 40 administrative arrests, 80 criminal indictments,
43 convictions and in the seizure of 1,417 weapons and 116,478 rounds
of ammunition.
Operation Firewall
One of the most effective methods to deal with violent,
transnational criminal organizations is attacking the criminal proceeds
that fund their operations. Well financed criminal organizations
present a threat to all law enforcement as their use of high-powered
firearms presents a real danger to first responders. ICE targets those
individuals and organizations that exploit vulnerabilities in financial
systems to launder illicit proceeds, and ICE pursues the financial
component of every cross-border criminal investigation. The combination
of successful financial investigations, Bank Secrecy Act reporting
requirements, and Anti-Money Laundering compliance efforts by
traditional and non-traditional financial institutions has forced
criminal organizations to seek other means to transport illicit funds
across our borders. Currently, the smuggling of bulk currency out of
the United States, especially along the Southwest Border, is the
prevailing method. ICE is the primary investigative agency with
jurisdiction over bulk cash smuggling crimes. Since its inception,
Operation Firewall has resulted in the seizure of over $183 million,
including $62 million seized overseas, and 423 arrests.
Conclusion
ICE is committed to effective cross-border communication and
information sharing to stem bi-national criminal activity and
associated violence through the deployment of the BESTs, Operation
Armas Cruzadas and Operation Firewall. By partnering with other law
enforcement agencies, we are able to use a broad range of authorities,
including the most sophisticated investigative tools available, such as
certified undercover operations and electronic surveillance operations
to respond to and conduct our investigations.
Once again, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its
continued support of ICE and our law enforcement mission. I would be
happy to answer any questions that you may have at this time.
ATTACHMENT
Operation Armas Cruzadas Fact Sheet
The mission of Armas Cruzadas is for U.S. and Mexican government
agencies to synchronize bi-lateral law enforcement and intelligence-
sharing operations in order to comprehensively identify, disrupt and
dismantle trans-border weapons smuggling networks. The goals include:
Establishing a bilateral program to stop weapons smuggling
Coordinating operations
Developing intelligence about arms trafficking networks
Strengthening interagency cooperation
Promoting intelligence information exchange
Implementing points of contact for information exchange
Partnership Roles and Responsibilities
In order for Operation Armas Cruzadas to succeed, ICE has
incorporated the following key components:
Training Stakeholders
ICE will train stakeholders in appropriate laws, resources and
methods used to combat trans-border smuggling as well as how to
input and retrieve database information on active cases.
Creating a Border Violence Intelligence Cell
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) generates arrests,
seizures and significant events raw data. ICE Field Intelligence Groups
compile the raw data for reports, and the Border Violence Intelligence
Cell (BVIC) analyzes the information.
Developing a Vetted Arms Trafficking Group
Receives and analyzes investigative information for exploitation in
Mexico and provides investigative information from Mexican weapons
seizures and arrests for exploitation by BEST.
Implementing a Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF)
The WVTF facilitates real-time online access to actionable
information on daily firearms seizures, arrests and other intelligence
generated by ICE, CBP, the Mexican government and other agencies as
appropriate.
Reinvigorating the ICE Border Liaison Program
The Border Liaison Program establishes an official ICE point of
contact for CBP, ICE representatives in Mexico, state and local law
enforcement agencies, as well as Mexican law enforcement agencies along
the U.S. and Mexican border.
Border Enforcement Security Team (BEST) FACT SHEET
In January 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Secretary adopted the Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST)
initiative as a DHS task force in order to leverage federal, state,
local, tribal and foreign law enforcement and intelligence resources in
an effort to identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations that seek
to exploit vulnerabilities in the border and threaten the overall
safety and security of the American public. The task forces are
designed to increase information sharing and collaboration among the
participating agencies focusing toward the identification,
prioritization, and investigation of emerging or existing threats.
BESTs incorporate personnel from ICE; Customs and Border Protection
(CBP); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI); U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); and the U.S. Attorney's Office along
with other key federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement
agencies.
A key element of the BEST program is the coordination between U.S.
and foreign law enforcement agencies. This collaboration better enables
our governments' ability to attack organizations in a more unified way.
BESTs on the Southwest border have the participation of the Mexican law
enforcement agency, Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP). On the
Northern border, Canadian law enforcement agencies participating in the
BESTs include the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP), Ontario Provincial Police, Niagara Regional
Police Service, and Toronto Police Service. Argentina Customs
participates in the Miami seaport BEST.
There are currently 12 BESTs; 8 on the Southwest border, 2 on the
Northern border, and 2 in seaports.
The BEST concept was first implemented in Laredo, Texas in January
2006. BESTs were subsequently established in Tucson, Arizona (March
2006); El Paso, Texas (October 2006); San Diego, California (November
2006); and Rio Grande Valley (Harlingen, Brownsville, McAllen), Texas
(March 2007).
In fiscal year 2008, BESTs were established in Phoenix, Arizona
(March 2008); Yuma, Arizona (March 2008); and Imperial Valley,
California (June 2008).
The first Northern border BEST initiated operations in Blaine,
Washington (February 2008) and was followed in Buffalo, New York (March
2008).
In fiscal year 2009, BESTs were also established in the seaports of
Los Angeles/Long Beach, California (October 2008), and Miami, Florida
(November 2008). The seaport BESTs will address threats that encompass
the entire maritime operating environment, including ports of entry and
areas between the ports.
LAREDO BEST
In January 2006, the BEST concept was first implemented in
Laredo.
The Laredo BEST focuses on the disruption of cross-border
criminal activity related to the following: narcotics
smuggling; money laundering; human smuggling; weapons
smuggling; transnational gangs; and cross-border violence.
The Laredo BEST members are co-located at the ICE DSAC office
in Laredo, Texas.
The Laredo BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; ICE DRO; ICE Intel; CBP; ATF; DEA; Texas
Department of Public Safety; Texas National Guard; the Laredo
Police Department, and the Government of Mexico--SSP.
TUCSON BEST
Tucson BEST initiated operations in March of 2006.
Tucson BEST targets major criminal organizations involved in
the following: narcotics smuggling; human smuggling; weapons
smuggling; money laundering/bulk cash smuggling; and
transnational criminal gangs.
Full-time members of the Arizona BEST are co-located at the
ICE DSAC office in Tucson, Arizona.
The Tucson BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; ICE Intel; CBP; Arizona Department of Public
Safety; Pima County Sheriff's Department; Arizona National
Guard--Joint Counter Narco-Terrorism Task Force; Government of
Mexico--SSP; with assistance from the DHS Office of the
Inspector General; DHS Field Intelligence Group; and the U.S.
Attorney's Office.
EL PASO BEST
In October 2006, the El Paso BEST initiated operations.
El Paso BEST concentrates on the following major threats:
human smuggling; narcotics smuggling; money laundering/bulk
cash smuggling; and weapons smuggling.
Full-time members of the El Paso BEST are co-located in the
ICE SAC office in El Paso, Texas and the ICE RAC office Alpine,
Texas.
The El Paso BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; ICE Intel; ICE DRO; CBP; U.S. State
Department--Diplomatic Security Service, El Paso Police
Department; and the El Paso Sheriff's Office. DEA is a part
time participant.
SAN DIEGO BEST
In November 2006, the San Diego BEST initiated operations.
The major threats that the San Diego BEST concentrate on are
the following: cross-border tunnels; narcotics smuggling-
specifically methamphetamine and methamphetamine precursors;
human smuggling; and weapons smuggling.
Full-time members of the San Diego BEST are co-located at the
DSAC San Ysidro office in San Diego, California and the DSAC
San Diego Operation Alliance office in San Diego, California.
The San Diego BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; ICE Intel; CBP; FBI; Naval Criminal
Investigative Service; ATF; Chula Vista Police Department; and
Government of Mexico - SSP.
RIO GRANDE VALLEY BEST
In March 2007, the Rio Grande Valley BEST initiated
operations.
The Rio Grande Valley BEST focuses on cross-border criminal
activity related to: weapons smuggling; human smuggling; and
money laundering
Full-time members of the Rio Grande Valley BEST are co-
located at the RAC Harlingen office, in Harlingen, Texas.
The Rio Grande Valley BEST is comprised of members from the
following agencies: ICE OI; ICE Intel; ICE DRO; CBP; with
assistance from ATF; Social Security Administration; and the
United States Marshals Service.
BLAINE BEST
The Blaine BEST initiated operations in February of 2008.
Blaine BEST focuses on the following: Port of Entry (POE)
smuggling events (both inbound and outbound); contraband
smuggling via commercial truck; human smuggling and
trafficking; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; tunnels;
and other vulnerabilities that threaten public safety or
national security. Blaine BEST also acts as the investigative
arm of the Integrated Border Enforcement Team, when requested.
Full-time members of the Blaine BEST are co-located at the
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Office in Blaine,
Washington.
The Blaine BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; ICE Intel; CBP; DEA; RCMP; and National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
BUFFALO BEST
In March 2008, the Buffalo BEST initiated operations.
The Buffalo BEST is focused on the development of
investigations of international criminal organizations
exploiting the Buffalo Ports of Entry. Initial investigative
focus includes: narcotics smuggling; money laundering/bulk cash
smuggling; weapons smuggling; and alien smuggling/human
trafficking.
The Buffalo BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; CBP; ATF; DEA; New York State Police; Niagara
Falls Police Department; Buffalo Police Department; CBSA; RCMP;
Ontario Provincial Police; Niagara Regional Police Service
(NRPS); and Toronto Police Service (TPS).
The Buffalo BEST also receives additional support from the
following: USCG; FBI; United States Postal Investigative
Service; and the Internal Revenue Service.
The Buffalo BEST also receives support from the following:
USCG; FBI; United States Postal Investigative Service; and the
Internal Revenue Service.
YUMA BEST
The Yuma BEST officially initiated operations in March of
2008.
Yuma BEST focuses on the following areas: cross-border
violence; human smuggling and trafficking; cross-border
subterranean tunnels; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling;
contraband smuggling; transnational criminal gangs; weapons
smuggling; and travel document-related identity theft and
benefit fraud.
Yuma BEST personnel are co-located in the ASAC Yuma office,
in Yuma, Arizona.
The Yuma BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; CBP; and the Government of Mexico - SSP. Part
time support also comes from FBI, DEA and the Arizona
Department of Public Safety, State Gang Task Force.
PHOENIX BEST
The Phoenix BEST initiated operations in March of 2008.
Phoenix BEST focuses on three main investigative areas:
narcotics smuggling; violent alien smuggling organizations; and
weapon smuggling.
Full time participants in the Phoenix BEST are co-located in
office space leased by the DEA Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix
Office, in Phoenix, Arizona.
The Phoenix BEST is comprised of representatives from the
following agencies: ICE OI; CBP; Mesa Police Department; and
the Government of Mexico--SSP; with additional assistance
provided by ICE DRO; ICE Intel; Maricopa County Sheriff's
Department; and the Phoenix Police Department.
IMPERIAL VALLEY BEST
The Imperial Valley BEST initiated operations on June 2,
2008.
The Imperial Valley BEST focuses operations on cross-border
criminal activity related to: weapons smuggling; contraband
smuggling; human smuggling; and violent `Bandit' activity.
Participants work primarily out of their own offices. ICE is
located at the Calexico, CA East Port of Entry. Border Patrol
is in El Centro. DEA, BLM and FBI have their separate offices
in Imperial.
The Imperial Valley BEST is comprised of members from the
following agencies: ICE OI; CBP; FBI; DEA; Imperial Police
Department; and Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST
The Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST initiated the first seaport
operations on October 30, 2008.
The Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST focuses operations on threats
that encompass the entire seaport environment. Specifically,
the Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST concentrate on the following
investigative areas: the importation of illicit contraband;
trade fraud; cargo theft; unlawful exportation of controlled
commodities and munitions; stolen property; alien smuggling;
and exportation of illicit proceeds.
Full time participants in the Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST are
co-located in office space within the Los Angeles seaport that
has been acquired and outfitted to house the BEST.
The Los Angeles/Long Beach BEST is comprised of members from
the following agencies: ICE OI; CBP; U.S. Coast Guard
Investigative Service; U.S. Secret Service; Federal Air Marshal
Service; ATF; Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department;
California Highway Patrol; and Los Angeles Port Police.
Miami BEST
The Miami BEST initiated seaport BEST operations on November
24, 2008.
Miami BEST will address a number of criminal activities with
a nexus to U.S. seaports, and focus on threats that encompass
the entire maritime operating environment. Specifically, the
Miami BEST will concentrate on the following primary
investigative areas: the importation of illicit contraband;
trade fraud; cargo theft; unlawful exportation of controlled
commodities and munitions; stolen property; alien smuggling;
and exportation of illicit proceeds.
Full time participants in the Miami BEST are co-located at
the SAC Miami office in Miami, Florida.
The Miami BEST is comprised of members from the following
agencies: ICE OI; CBP; Broward County Sheriff's Department;
Miami-Dade Police Department; and the Argentine Customs
Service.
STATISTICS
Since inception, the BESTs have been responsible for 2,034 criminal
arrests, 2,796 administrative arrests, 885 indictments, and 734
convictions, and have seized approximately 7,703 pounds of cocaine,
159,831 pounds of marijuana, 557 pounds of methamphetamine, 39 pounds
of crystal methamphetamine, 1,022 pounds of ecstasy, 212 pounds of
heroin, 97 pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 515 weapons, 745
vehicles, 6 properties and $22,678,550 million in U.S. currency and
monetary instruments.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Ms. Ayala, for your testimony.
I now recognize Major Peter Aylward to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL PETER AYLWARD, DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT
STAFF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
Gen. Aylward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rogers,
and committee members for allowing me to come and testify
before you today. I think it is really appropriate the seating
you gave me, first of all, here.
Historical constitutional role and Article 1, section 8,
clause 15 and 16 is available to the governor and available to
the president. So putting us in between the local and state
folks and the federal government is the appropriate role of the
National Guard has always played.
Historically, the National Guard has provided support along
the borders under two programs: Narcotic Drug Program under
Title 32, Section 112, which is our congressionally mandated
program, which has authorizations up to 4,000 by law and is
currently funded at approximately 2,500.
The other program is under our Innovative Readiness
Training Program. That program uses existing training funds as
a training benefit to the units that are getting ready to do
global deployments.
And then finally, what I would ask is that the integration
of the efforts between the two is kind of where we are in the
whole process of the defining requirements based upon
capability gaps at the local and state level and at the
corporate federal government level.
In fact, later on today, I will be a member of the
integrated planning committee over at the Eisenhower Executive
Office building to work with the community as a team to
discover what those capability gaps are so we can provide the
appropriate technical advice and assistance and military
capabilities to complement those.
So, gentlemen, subject to your questions, I am looking
forward to the question and answer period later on. Thank you.
[The statement of General Aylward follows:]
Prepared Statement of MG Peter M. Aylward
Opening Remarks
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of
the subcommittee; I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the activities of the National Guard (NG) in helping
to secure our Nation's borders. National Guard support to border
security today is provided through the National Guard Counterdrug
program and through our use of Innovative Readiness Training.
The National Guard Counterdrug Program
The National Guard Counterdrug Program is governed by Section 112
of Title 32 of the United States Code. This authority is the foundation
for the National Guard Counterdrug Program that has operated in the 54
States and Territories for nearly twenty years. The law limits the
program to 4,000 personnel on full-time counter-drug program duties. At
present it is funded and staffed for just over 2,500 Army and Air
National Guard personnel. These federally funded programs are developed
by the respective governors and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
They are developed within the context of the National Counterdrug
Strategy of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy
with supporting direction from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics, Counter-proliferation, and Global
Threats.
I am pleased to inform you that these federally funded state
centric programs are built in response to Federal, State and local law
enforcement agency counterdrug operational requirements. They fully
consider State and local threats and vulnerabilities. At all times
National Guard counterdrug resources are employed in support of law
enforcement counterdrug operational requirements or community based
organizations focused on drug demand reduction programs.
Our efforts in market disruption support law enforcement agency
operations in marijuana suppression and eradication, enhance
information sharing networks, provide linguistic support, and conduct
ground and aerial reconnaissance, among others. Community based
organizations benefit from our drug demand reduction programs such as
``Stay on Track''. Our criminal analysts work closely with the
Directors of the 28 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) and
other information fusion centers to develop drug case-related
information that continues to facilitate law enforcement operations. An
example of such continuing support can be found in the HIDTA supported
Denver Colorado Metro Gang Task Force where NG Counterdrug Program
assets provide full time criminal analysts and regularly conduct aerial
reconnaissance missions for this Federal, State and local LEA endeavor
In Fiscal Year 2008, our contributions can be measured through data
provided by law enforcement agencies and community based organizations.
Law enforcement agencies attribute the seizure of 21,603 weapons and
$382.4 million in United States currency to our support efforts. The
seizure of over 5.3 million cultivated marijuana plants and 903,000
pounds of processed marijuana are directly attributed to National Guard
support of marijuana eradication operations. In Fiscal Year 2008,
nearly 530,000 pounds of cocaine were seized in state operations with
National Guard support of law enforcement agencies. Community based
organizations report that we have provided demand reduction programs
for 6.2 million students, and nearly 60,000 participated in the Stay on
Track Program in Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008. We project 120,000
students by the end of Fiscal 2009. Our Counterdrug Program also
provided nearly 40,000 flying hours supporting various law enforcement
counterdrug operations over public lands, border missions, and
extensive marijuana eradication operations.
The National Guard Counterdrug Program has made similar impacts
over the last twenty years. The credit for these accomplishments goes
to the Governors and the Adjutants General for an efficient and focused
application of authorized and appropriated funds. But we must remain
vigilant in the application of those resources as threats and
vulnerabilities change. Our program accomplishments do not go unnoticed
by drug trafficking organizations. They shift and adjust their tactics
and trafficking networks to counter our strengths and those of law
enforcement. The Mexican drug cartels are in conflict over control of
production and distribution within their own country as well as the
market place in the United States. Their conflicts as we know have
developed into intense violence in northern Mexico near the U.S.
border. Each of the four Southwest Border states are experiencing
increased drug-related violence and are concerned with the potential
``spill-over'' of that violence from Mexico into our sovereign States
and Nation.
For the last twenty years we have supported law enforcement
operations along the Southwest Border with National Guard Counterdrug
personnel and equipment. We have long-standing operational and
interagency models employed every day in ground and aerial observation,
information sharing, and linguistics. Today, we have over 300 National
Guard Counterdrug personnel on duty in Arizona, California, New Mexico
and Texas working in direct support of Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug operations along the
border. The majority of our support efforts are focused on ground and
aerial observation, case analysis, engineer work and communications
support.
Innovative Readiness Training
Recently, we have successfully employed the use of ``Innovative
Readiness Training'' (IRT) with specialty units such as engineers and
aviation, among others. IRT is a Department of Defense (DOD) program
governed by Section 2012 of USC Title 10 and DOD Directive 1100.20. The
program's objective is to train soldiers and simultaneously provide a
benefit to the community. Missions supported by IRT are based on
requests from thirteen pre-approved organizations, or a Federal, State,
and local government agency. We are currently supporting the Department
of Homeland Security's United States Customs and Border Protection with
engineering work on border roads and vehicle maintenance. The National
Guard has conducted IRT events along the Southwest Border in support of
CBP's Border Patrol, which includes activities such as engineering,
medical/dental, and transportation support. Annual IRT events along the
Southwest Border have involved an average of 3,250 Guardsmen. Recent
IRT events from July 2006 to July 2008 provided support through Entry
Identification Teams, aviation and ground observation, medical, and
engineering in support of the ``Operation Jump Start'' (OJS)
initiative. We are capable of assisting through other support to civil
authorities based on situational needs.
Recent Activity of National Guard Bureau
In regards to possible National Guard support along the Southwest
Border, we, through the Department of Defense, are working with the
Southwest Border states and with the Department of Homeland Security to
determine if any new requirements exist and whether enhanced National
Guard support is appropriate.
The Strategic Context
Mr. Chairman and members of committee, I would close by saying
that, in addition to accomplishing its federal mission to be a reliable
reserve component to the Army and the Air Force in combating America's
enemies overseas, the National Guard has also been the first military
responder to nearly every public disaster, manmade or otherwise here
inside the homeland, providing vital capabilities in support of and
alongside civilian first responders. We have exemplary citizen-soldiers
and airmen who are in touch with the communities in which they live and
work. The resultant networks only enhance our ability to provide
immediate and thoughtful responses to a myriad of challenges. The
Southwest Border challenge is no different. We have and will continue
to serve those in need; our communities, our States and our Nation.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Major General, for your testimony.
At this time, I will recognize Sheriff Gonzalez to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
Sheriff?
STATEMENT OF SHERIFF SIGIFREDO GONZALEZ, JR., ZAPATA COUNTY,
TEXAS; SHERIFF LARRY A. DEVER, COCHISE COUNTY, ARIZONA
Sheriff Gonzalez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning
committee members, Ranking Member Rogers, members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor and a privilege to be here with
you today to discuss and examine preparedness coordination and
response efforts of first responders along the Southwest border
and how unique some of those challenges are to us as local law
enforcement.
I would like to briefly explain to you how we formed our
coalition. In May of 2005, 16 sheriffs in Texas, whose counties
border the Republic of Mexico, formed the Texas Border
Sheriff's Coalition. In 2007, also because of their
frustrations, sheriffs from New Mexico, Arizona and California
joined the Texas Coalition, and we formed the Southwestern
Borders Sheriff's Coalition.
These coalitions were formed because of our frustration
with this. Us 31 sheriffs along the Southwest border dealt with
inadequacy and a lot of times the inability of our federal
government to be able to protect our borders. We felt then, and
still do, that the 2,000 miles of Southwest border of this
great country of ours needs protection and some type of
immediate attention.
We are ready to work as a team, and we have been ready to
work as a team for a long, long time. One of the many matters
that concern us along the border is the cross-border violence
that at times terrorizes the more than 5 million people that
live along the Southwest border of our country.
After all this border shares, we are responsible for over
2,000 miles of border with Mexico and 98,480 square miles,
which encompasses the 31 counties along the Southwestern
border. This violence that we see spilling over from Mexico, we
refer to it as Narco Terrorism.
People are always living in fear. People that live along
the border live in fear a lot of times because of this
spillover violence.
Now what is Narco Terrorism? As far as we are concerned, it
is the threats that our officers have to deal with along the
border on a daily basis.
And they include but are not limited to kidnappings,
carjackings, home invasions, extortions, shooting of law
enforcement officers on the U.S. side from Mexico, armed
individuals escorting humans and narcotics into this great
country of ours, members of drug trafficking organizations that
visit law enforcement officers' homes on the U.S. side and
threaten them and their families at times.
We all see many deportable or people that have been
deported, previously deported from our country coming back into
the United States, individuals that have been deported because
of convictions for murders, for child sex assaults, and we are
seeing them come back into the country. We are seeing an
increase in auto thefts, not only in the area of the border but
in Dallas and Houston and San Antonio, Texas.
Those vehicles come back to the border to Mexico used for
smuggling of narcotics and humans. Now these criminal
violations or spillover violence from Mexico and violence along
the Southwest border, as far as we are concerned, has
intensified in most areas since at least 2004.
Now working as a team and working into an interoperable
communications along the Southwest border, more and more, we
are seeing individuals, armed individuals, coming into out
country or to our counties. We feel that it is a matter of time
before a shootout will occur, and in the event that that were
to happen, we are very definitely outgunned and outmanned along
the border.
The federal government must provide some type of funding
for local law enforcement in order to assist us in securing the
borders of this country. In Texas, because of our efforts, our
governor has opened the Texas Border Security Operations
Center. The Center along with six others along the Texas-Mexico
border houses peace officers and enlists intelligence officers,
and most of them are officed at Border Pro-sector offices.
We then formed the Joint Operations Intelligence Center,
the JOICs, where we have local officers, state officers, and
federal officers working together in obtaining intelligence
information and then giving it back to the officers in the
field. This is done on a daily basis.
Now it is my understanding that this subcommittee wants to
evaluate the level of coordination of emergency communications
between federal, state and local officers and how we can
effectively exchange information in real time in the event of
an overwhelming emergency.
Interoperability, I am sad to say, is not always working
along the Southwest border. We are trying to meet those
challenges and be able to effectively communicate among first
responders first in other agencies. Information sharing,
however, is still a very long ways off. I really want to talk
about is of course the----
What we are doing in Texas with some of the programs we
have, Operation Linebacker, Operation Stonegarden, Operation
Border Stories Deterrence, if we had as many officers on the
border as we are doing in Texas now, we are preventing an
incident from happening in this country. We are preventing
spillover violence from Mexico.
And, again, we are very, very concerned of what is
happening on the Southwest border. We, as sheriffs, are ready
to proceed. We, as sheriffs, at this time.
Some of the solutions we talked about, again, is funding to
be able to properly address the situations for local law
enforcement. Now, Dr. Barth briefly touched a little while ago
regarding Sheriff Ted Sexton from Tuscaloosa County, Alabama,
who has been to the border. This is the first time that we have
seen the cooperation from the federal government with local law
enforcement.
We have attended hearings before here in D.C. and
elsewhere. With Sheriff Sexton's visit though, we are finally
able to see something from the federal government where the
federal government is finally listening to local law
enforcement.
We hope that Secretary Napolitano continues with his
program with the state and local law enforcement, and we hope,
of course, that Sheriff Sexton continues to visit us in the
future--the border.
With this, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for what you
do for our district, the 20th district, and I want to thank the
committee members for what you do for this great country of
ours.
Chairman Cuellar, this concludes my statement, and I would
be happy to answer any questions the committee members may
have. Thank you.
[The statement of Sheriff Gonzalez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr.
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, Members of the
Subcommittee, it is an honor and a privilege to be invited to appear
before this subcommittee to discuss and examine preparedness and
coordination efforts of first responders along the southwest border.
In May of 2005 sixteen Texas sheriffs whose counties border the
Republic of Mexico formed the Texas Border Sheriff's Coalition. This
coalition was formed out of frustration in what we felt was the
inadequacy of our federal government to protect our border in
preventing a potential terrorist and their weapons of mass destruction
from entering our country. We felt then, and still do, that the 1,276-
mile Texas border with the Republic of Mexico is very much unprotected,
wide-open, and extremely porous. In late March 2007, also because of
their frustration, sheriffs from New Mexico, Arizona, and California
joined the Texas coalition in our efforts and we formed the
Southwestern Border Sheriff's Coalition. The 2,000 miles of
southwestern border of this great country of ours needs protection and
immediate attention. Some of the goals of these coalitions are
interoperability in the event of an emergency, a border area records
management system, and information sharing. We continue to believe that
terrorists have expressed an interest and a desire to exploit the
existing vulnerabilities in our border security to enter or attack the
United States.
Although some of the matters of which I offer testimony today may
seem as if I criticize federal agencies, I want to make sure that we
understand that neither I nor our coalitions blame the agents of the
United States Border Patrol, ICE, or any other federal agency, but,
rather, we sometimes criticize the policies that they have to adhere
to. In most areas of the southwest border we do not know what we would
do without CBP/USBP presence.
One other matter that concerns us along the border is the cross-
border violence that at times terrorizes the more than 5 million people
that live along the southwest border of our country. After all, as
border sheriffs we are responsible for 98,480 square miles of land
along the border.
The one thing that border sheriffs deal with on an almost daily
basis is ``narco-terrorism'', or better yet: Domestic Terrorism--
Defined--Code of Federal Regulations-``. . .the unlawful use of force
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives.'' \1\ For the exception
of the last seven words of this definition, people living along the
border, and other areas in the United States, have, at one time or
another, and are presently experiencing ``domestic terrorism''. Whether
or not they are involved in drug trafficking, innocent bystanders,
including family members, stand to suffer for the actions of
individuals that may have crossed, knowingly or not, a member of a drug
cartel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 28C.F.R. Section 0.85 and http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
terror/terror2000_2001.htm
Emergency Preparedness and Readiness
Violence along the southwest border has intensified along some
areas since the latter part of 2004. More and more, we learn of
abductions, kidnappings, carjackings, home invasions, murders, and
large-scale incidents. These violations of law are attributed to
spillover violence from Mexico.
Through intelligence information and investigations it has been
learned that several murders along the Texas--Mexico border have been
orchestrated by members of drug cartels operating on both sides of the
border. These drug cartel enforcers cross our international border,
some illegally in areas other than a designated port of entry, commit
their murders in the United States, then go back to Mexico. They are
very well armed and are very accurate in what their assignment is.
The cartels operating in Mexico and the United States have
demonstrated that the weapons they posses can and will be used in
protecting their caches. One informant familiar with the operations of
these cartels mentioned to us that the weapons we use are water guns
compared to what we will have to come up against if we ever have to.
These cartels, known to frequently cross into the United States,
possess and use automatic weapons, grenades, and grenade launchers.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In confirming the above, the National Drug Intelligence Center has
stated that ``drug traffickers in the South Texas HIDTA region use
sophisticated surveillance, counter-surveillance, and communication
techniques to aid their trafficking operations. Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organizations maintain cells that monitor law enforcement
activities and the smuggling operations of rival traffickers.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Drug Intelligence Center, U. S. Department Of Justice,
Drug Market Analysis, South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area,
2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In late January 2006, Immigration and Customs Enforcements' Border
Enforcement and Security (BEST) Task Force confiscated components of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Laredo, Texas. It is believed
that these components were to be sent to Mexico for use by the cartels
or possibly to be used against us at the appropriate time.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Testimony of Ms. Marcy M. Forman, Director of Office of
Investigations, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security, March 1st , 2006, before the U. S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security and Citizenship and Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland
Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 28, 2005, and for the next three days, a sniper in
Mexico shot at Border Patrol agents that were working along the banks
of the river in the area of the cities of Rio Bravo/El Cenizo, which
are located a few miles south of Laredo, Texas. This continued,
sporadically, for three days. Agents reported seeing several
individuals wearing military style uniforms on a hill on the Mexican
side. One of them was using what was believed to be a high-powered
rifle with scope.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
On July 12th, 2006, deputy sheriffs of the Hidalgo County, Texas,
Sheriff's Office and Border Patrol agents were fired upon from Mexico
after they tried to rescue two individuals. This incident happened
south of Donna, Texas. Hidalgo County Sheriff Guadalupe ``Lupe''
Trevino was quoted as saying that 300 to 400 continuous rounds were
fired from automatic weapons from the Mexican side of the Rio Grande.
It was also reported that shots were also fired at the officers from
the east, the United States side. The FBI has indicated that this was
the third incident of shootings from Mexico at local or federal
officers in the first seven months of 2006 between Laredo and
Brownsville, Texas.
Cameron, Hidalgo, and Starr Counties in Texas have continuous
problems with pseudo-cops coming from Mexico to extort and kidnap
citizens in these counties. This area is the fastest growing area in
the nation. They have seen their share of terrorist activity as it
relates to the migration of many members of ruthless gangs that come
into this country for reasons other than legitimate employment.
In my county, Zapata County, as well as in other counties along the
border, we get reports from informants of kidnappings in our counties.
Individuals are kidnapped and taken to Mexico for ransom. Family
members seldom file official reports due to fear of further
retaliation.
As previously submitted to this legislative body, on February 10th,
2005, a high-ranking member of the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, was
apprehended in Brooks County, Texas. He had been previously deported at
least four times. This MS-13 gang member is believed to have been
responsible for the killing of 28 persons, including six children, and
the wounding of 14 others, in a bus explosion in his native country.
These people, as many others, find it very easy to come into our
country through a very porous, wide-open, and unprotected border.
According to the 2008 report of the National Drug Intelligence
Center, drug traffickers and gang members involved in drug smuggling
frequently commit assault, automobile theft, burglary, extortion, and
murder throughout the South Texas border area to facilitate smuggling
activities and to protect their operations from rival trafficking
organizations and gangs.
On July 1st, 2006, twenty-six year old Starr County, Texas,
Detention Officer Gilberto Hernandez, Jr. went across the river from
his hometown of Roma to visit his girlfriend. The detention officer
failed to return and his parents reported him missing the following
day. On July 3rd his badly beaten body was found in Mexico several
miles from the border. His hands had been tied behind his back and his
eyes had been bandaged. It is believed that he was tortured before
being shot through the head, from behind, the bullet exiting through
his forehead. During his funeral services a kidnapping was taking place
across the street from the funeral home. One of the kidnappers was a
Mexican National who had an outstanding warrant for a murder that he
had committed a year before in the same county.
Other threats that our offices have to deal with along the border
on a daily basis include, but are not limited to, the following:
Kidnappings
Carjackings
Home Invasions
Extortions
Shooting from Mexico at law enforcement officers.
Armed individuals escorting drug and human loads into
the United States.
Members of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations
(DTO's) visiting the homes of U. S. officers to threaten them
and their families.
Drug/Prison/Gang members working for Mexican DTO's.
Documented/Deported criminals re-entering the United
States, including murderers and child sex molesters.
Auto theft (vehicles are used for smuggling of humans
and drugs).
These criminal violations are spill-over violence from Mexico.
Cross-Border Communications and Information-Sharing Capabilities /
Emergency Response Resources and Personnel
We have always maintained that if you don't live on the border you
don't know how vulnerable this country is for a terrorist attack.
Persons living 50 miles or more away from the border have the
impression that this border is very well protected. This is a farce.
The border is not protected. It is known that many of the operatives of
cartels in Mexico live in the United States. Information received by
our respective agencies indicates these criminals are living in our
communities. They come to our cities and towns when things get too hot
in Mexico. They come here to escape the possibility of apprehension in
Mexico. Information received is that they are living along the border
on the United States side.
Employees of our offices have also seen incursions into this
country of persons seeming to be members of the military of Mexico. On
March 3rd, 2005, several officers assigned to do surveillance by the
Rio Grande River by the Zapata/Webb County line in Texas observed
approximately 20-25 persons walking on a gravel road, coming from the
area of the riverbanks, marching in a cadence. These individuals were
dressed in battle dress uniforms (BDUs), carrying what officers believe
to be automatic weapons, very clean cut, and in very good physical
condition. They were carrying backpacks and large duffle bags and
walking two abreast.
More and more we are seeing armed individuals entering our country
through our counties. We feel that it is a matter of time before a
shootout will occur. In the unfortunate event of a shootout, federal,
state, and local officers along the southwest border are not adequately
armed. Compared to the ruthless and brazen and open behavior of the
cartels we face, we are most certainly outmanned. In the event of a
shootout, many casualties will likely occur. Federal, state, and local
officers all along the southwest border of the United States are
outgunned and outmanned.
The federal government must provide funding to local law
enforcement agencies in order to assist in securing the borders of this
country.
In Texas, because of the efforts of the Texas Border Sheriff's
Coalition, Texas Governor Rick Perry has opened up the Border Security
Operation Center. This center, along with six other ones along the
Texas/Mexico border, houses analysts and intelligence officers. Most
are officed at Border Patrol sector headquarters. Every day all law
enforcement agencies that participate in Operation Border Star, the
border security initiative presently being used, send in their
intelligence information. At least once a day these centers, called
Joint Operations Intelligence Centers (JOIC's) disseminate the
collected information back to the field officers.
SUMMARY
The 31 member sheriffs (20 from Texas, 5 from New Mexico, 4 from
Arizona, and 2 from California) of the Southwestern Border Sheriff's
Coalition are very concerned with the very unique problems along our
border. Border Patrol is doing the best they can with the resources
that are available to them. Immediate help is needed for them and for
southwestern border sheriffs for the protection of our country.
We are seeing more and more persons coming across our southwestern
border than ever before. From what we are seeing, we feel that most of
these persons are not coming into the country to look for legitimate
employment. We feel that terrorists are already here and continue to
enter our country on a daily basis. Our border is wide open; it is very
porous and definitely unprotected and vulnerable.
Putting pressure on the Mexican government to enforce drug laws and
provide the assistance mandated by the Merida Initiative is like
filling up a balloon with air and then starting to squeeze it a little
bit at a time. After squeezing it much, the balloon will burst. It is
better that this balloon burst towards the southern border of Mexico
and not toward the United States.
It has been almost eight years since the worst terrorist attack in
this country and we are still as vulnerable, if not worst, that before
September 11, 2001. We have seen no funding for any projects along the
southwest border. On the contrary, as time goes by we see less funding
opportunities.
In five years we have seen broken promises of protecting our great
nation. September 11, 2001, was a dark day in American history and the
protection of a great nation. What has changed since that day along the
border and in my backyard? Nothing. As I speak before you today,
funding aimed at border security along the southwest border didn't come
from Washington, DC, it came from Austin, Texas.
The governor of Texas is in the same position we in law enforcement
have been in for years. We are fed up and tired of failed policies and
promises. Texas is the can do state and Governor Perry has decided to
fund a border security initiative that has literally shut down criminal
enterprises in several Texas counties.
We did this with state funds and working with federal partners on
an initiative that puts law enforcement in the driver's seat instead of
the carters, smugglers, and border crossing criminal entrepreneurs.
This should have been done on September 12, 2001, by our federal
government. Washington, DC didn't just fail me and my law enforcement
comrades. . . .it has failed Americans. Just shy of eight years from
that day and the border remains open to smuggling operatives, criminal
organizations and people aimed at destroying this nation.
On the southwest border you left us no choice; we have had to pick
up the fight to save our counties. We didn't ask for this battle on the
border. . . . . .but we refuse to lose to criminals!
POSSIBLE SOLUTION
In Texas, we have implemented Operation Linebacker, a second line
of defense in the protection of our country. The United States Border
Patrol being the first line of defense. The problems along the border
are federal problems. Our governor, the Honorable Rick Perry, could not
wait for a peace officer to get killed along the border. He, just as
we, is very much concerned. The Texas Legislature appropriated $110
million as seed money for us to start Operation Border Star. Operation
Border Star is an operation that partially funds Operation Linebacker
and makes available all state resources for the protection of the
border. Operation Linebacker and Operation Border Star have proven to
be successful. Deterrence has been very successful. These are proven
operations that should be funded by the federal government.
CONCLUSION
Committee Members, there cannot be homeland security without border
security. Border Security, the prevention of spillover violence from
Mexico, and information sharing is not a blue issue or a red issue. It
is a red, white, and blue issue. Our southwest border needs immediate
attention. Local officers, sheriffs, not federal officers, answer
emergency calls for assistance made by our constituents. We are the
first responders! Must we wait for another terrorist act or until an
officer gets killed before we act?
I want to express my most sincere appreciation for allowing me the
opportunity to appear before you and thank you for the work you do for
our country, the United States of America.
Chairman Cuellar, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to
answer any questions that you or Members of the Sub-Committee may have.
Mr. Cuellar. On the cameras, just make sure there is no
flash photography, just on that.
Sheriff Gonzalez, I always appreciate, actually he is from
my district. Janice also is in Laredo, also. I want to thank
them because they do have a lot of experience on the border.
As the next sheriff, Sheriff Dever, who will now summarize
his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SHERIFF LARRY A. DEVER, COCHISE COUNTY, ARIZONA
Sheriff Dever. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers,
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today.
I sit here not only representing my constituents in Cochise
County and fellow law enforcement officers in Arizona but also
the National Sheriff's Association, where I sit on the board of
directors and chair the Immigration Subcommittee, and it is
with their support that I am here today.
Just to give you a brief history, kind of put in
perspective where we have been and where we are: I have in my
hand a magazine published by Arizona Sheriffs and County
Attorney's Association that quotes then Border Patrol Sector
Chief John Gall as saying this, ``Within the last year, we have
been mandated by Congress to gain control of the border, and we
are going to do that on our southern border, whether it is
narcotics, illegal aliens, terrorists, criminals or whatever.''
Now, what I find remarkable about this publication is that
it was published in 1987, and the word ``terrorist'' is
mentioned here. So this is nothing new. Criminal aliens on the
border is nothing new, and this was also 1987, 1 year post
Reagan Amnesty. And obviously, that program did not work at
that time and is likely not to work again in terms of securing
our border.
Also, in 1997, I was invited before a body of Congress to
testify about border violence on the Southwest border. That was
12 years ago, and here we sit today holding a hearing regarding
the same thing. I only say that to help us to not continue the
same path that has led us here today and that 12 years hence,
we are holding these hearings over the same matter.
Violence comes in many forms on the border, and it starts,
frankly, south of the border with the smuggling organizations
competing for the corridors that they work in and competing for
illegal aliens to smuggle, and it continues as they cross the
border.
It is estimated that over 80 percent of the women who cross
the border illegally have been subjected to sexual assault
somewhere on their journey prior to ever crossing the border.
We deal with homicides, sexual assault, physical assault,
robbery, and all of those crimes have to be investigated by
state and local law enforcement on this side of the border.
When people are arrested and charged with those crimes,
they are housed in our jails at tremendous expense. Their stay
is long because they can't post bond. Most of them are
indigent, so they are assigned an attorney to represent them by
the county, by the state, at the state's expense, and many of
them have serious medical problems that also require, since
they are now wards of the state, require the state and counties
to foot that bill. That is some of the bad news.
Also, another portion of the bad news is that people who
die crossing the border as a consequence of natural causes,
those cases have to be investigated fully as homicides until
cause of death is determined. And so those are very expensive
as well.
Moving quickly along, the physical impact over the years
has suggested that as much as 37 percent of local budgets are
being expended on matters illegal-alien related. If you had to
spend 37 percent of your business profit, all of a sudden,
overnight were diverted to something you hadn't planned or
prepared for, you would probably be out of business.
SCAAP was an important program, State Criminal Alien
Assistance Program, that in 1995 resulted in a reimbursement to
localities for incarcerating illegal aliens of approximately 33
percent. Today, that fund accounts for 9 cents on the dollar in
reimbursement to localities. It needs to be restored.
How better to coordinate my friend and colleague, Sheriff
Gonzalez, has suggested some things. We have seen an improved
outreach by DHS in the last few months. It is greatly
appreciated. Important thing to remember that I can't emphasize
enough, is that every federal initiative, every federal
strategy and tactical planning opportunity needs state and
local input because they have local consequences. And if those
aren't considered up front, we will continue to suffer
tremendously under this great burden.
Thanks for having us here today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The statement of Sheriff Dever follows:]
Prepared Statement of Larry A. Dever
INTRODUCTION:
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to this hearing. The matters
being heard here today regarding security of our Country's southern
border are of great concern for me and should be at the top of the list
of concerns for the welfare and protection of our great nation. I was
born and raised in the border environment. That along with over 33
years of law enforcement work in this arena offers, I believe, a
perspective unknown or experienced by most officials who sit in
decision making positions that so profoundly affect our nation's
security.
BACKGROUND:
The region of the U.S./Mexico border identified in the Federal
border enforcement scheme of things is the Tucson Sector of the Border
Patrol. It encompasses three counties and covers over 200 miles of the
border. This portion of the 2200 mile border accounts for almost half
of the people captured illegally crossing our border and almost half of
the marijuana seized being smuggled into this country.
The Arizona Sheriffs and County Attorney's Association once
published a quarterly magazine. The United States Border Patrol was
featured in one of its editions. Then Border Patrol Tucson Sector Chief
Jondal is quoted as saying this: ``Congress has mandated that we get
control of our border. And that is exactly what we are going to do.
Whether it is illegal aliens, drugs, terrorists, or whatever, we are
going to get control of our border.'' That publication was issued in
the fall of 1987. There are four remarkable points to note in this
statement: That ``Congress mandated'' control; that this was post
Reagan amnesty (and I emphasize the word ``amnesty'' which is widely
discussed today): that the idea that a terrorist threat existed even
then; and that we sit here 20 years later still discussing the same
stuff.
Then, June 1997 I was invited to testify before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. The focus of the hearing--Border Violence. And
now, 12 years later, we see this sudden flurry of activity and concern
over the need to reign in this wave of terror on the border.
WHAT WE KNOW:
Violence associated with drug and people smuggling is increasing.
It comes in many ways. People attempting to enter this country
illegally are regularly subjected to robbery, assault, rape, kidnapping
and all other kinds of atrocities. Much of this occurs before they ever
cross the border. Competing organizations rob, steal and murder, also
on both sides of the border. In Arizona, the transportation hub cities,
Tucson and Phoenix experience these events daily. Kidnappings and
murders south of the border are occurring at an alarming rate and some
of it is migrating north as vulnerable groups move their families out
of Mexico.
Smugglers working on the U.S. side of the border are more inclined
to fight than to flee, have better telecommunications than many border
law enforcement agencies, and have extremely sophisticated networks
that challenge the best we have to offer in response.
RESPONSE AND INTEROPERABILITY:
In today's border environment there is a multitude of federal,
state and local law enforcement personnel, firefighters and medical
providers who play a role in the response scheme of things. And then
there are others--Red Cross, F.M.A., Search and Rescue, Medics,
Hospitals, etc., etc., etc. While we hold meetings, hold simulation
exercises and do lots of other things to bring all these assets
together, the greatest obstacle to success is the inability to
communicate on a common network. While there are jurisdictional and
financial obstacles to achieving complete operability, the biggest
challenge is the building of infrastructure and having manpower to
staff communication centers. This will require the construction of
physical communication facilities and funding to hire support
personnel.
The good news is that cooperation, communication and planning
activities are more common today than ever before. A recognition and
emphasis of these activities should remain a priority.
The bad news is that last year Congress swept $480M from BYRNE/JAG
funding for joint narcotics task force funding, severely crippling
coordinated drug enforcement efforts across the nation, most
particularly along the border. These funds need to be restored.
A meaningful federally funded effort to enhance border enforcement
is what is known as ``Operation Stonegarden.'' This pays overtime and
operational costs for local law enforcement officers to support and
enhance Homeland Security efforts to interdict illegal border
crossings. An expansion of this project, to include the permanent
hiring of additional officers would help to significantly mitigate the
impact of crime committed by illegal aliens.
FISCAL IMPACTS:
Over the past ten years, as much as 37% of local jurisdiction
criminal justice system resources have been diverted to matters illegal
alien related. We have always had to deal with the dynamics of drug
smuggling in this area, but alien smuggling has presented a whole new
dimension of challenges. Property damage, theft, burglary and the trail
of garbage and human waste left behind by countless numbers of illegal
border crossers are the order of the day. People who commit these
crimes and who are housed in county jails and state prisons add to the
cost. Since they cannot pay bond, declare indigency and often have
serious medical problems, all of this expense is shifted to the local
jurisdiction.
In 1995, Congress authorized reimbursement to state and local
jurisdictions (S.C.A.A.P. State Criminal Alien Assistance Program) to
assist with these costs. Then, we recovered approximately 33% of actual
expenses, minus medical costs. Today, that fund only reimburses about 9
cents on every dollar.
BOTTOM LINE:
There are some good things that are working. Operation Stonegarden,
which provides funding to local jurisdictions to support Federal border
enforcement efforts, has proved to be effective. Sheriffs on the border
have no interest in becoming border enforcement agents. We do, however,
have a significant role to play in preventing and investigating crime
related to drug and people smuggling in our respective counties. Until
our Federal Government achieves its mandate to secure our borders, we
will be plagued with the consequences. We do not have the resources to
successfully meet our obligations, and therefore require some relief.
Expansion of existing federal programs that adequately reimburse and
enable local criminal justice agencies to employ necessary resources
are imperative.
Mr. Cuellar. Sheriff Dever, I thank you very much for your
testimony, and I want to thank all the witnesses for their
testimony.
I would like to recognize, of course, the chairman of the
full committee, Chairman Thompson, who is here present and
thank him for the leadership that he has provided on this
issue.
I would like to remind each member that he or she will have
5 minutes to question the panel. I will now recognize myself
for 5 minutes on the questions.
As a proponent of team work that produces measurable
results, I introduced the Southwest Border Security Task Force
Act of 2009, that is H.R. 1439. That will coordinate the
efforts at the federal and the state and the local folks are
doing and to work together, not only on this side, but also
with our counterparts across the river.
I know that those specific instances where we have BEST and
other programs where they are working together, but I am
talking about a coordinated effort across the Southwest border.
Taking that in consideration, I was also disturbed, you
know, to read that the March 25th edition of The Wall Street
Journal said that those federal agencies are refusing to work
together on task forces that the administration has established
to fight drug cartels.
The article cites an example, for example, one of the
federal agencies that refuses to allow its agents to
participate in the special task force groups established by DHS
in Arizona, which is a major corridor for gun trafficking.
They are participating in Texas but they are not
participating in Arizona, and this is one of the reasons why I
am a big proponent of coordinated--it is a very simple concept,
but it is hard to implement, but I think we need to have that
coordination.
I guess, Dr. Barth, my question to you is, does DHS have
the authority to compel participation of DHS components and
other federal agencies to work collectively to deter the
encroaching drug cartel related violence?
Dr. Barth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that I am not
aware of the exact incident that you are referring to that The
Wall Street Journal reported on.
Mr. Cuellar. ATF.
Dr. Barth. ATF? Okay. I am not aware of that precise case,
for example. DHS does not have, indeed, the authority to compel
other agencies to participate in various operations; however,
DHS does have a leadership role in the Southwest border that I
think you will see being very effectively managed
collaboratively among the agencies.
For example, Secretary Napolitano, has met both with
Secretary Clinton and the Attorney General Holder to ensure at
the very highest levels of the administration that there is a
commitment to work collaboratively on all of the issues across
the board that affect the Southwest border.
That goes to north of the border, collaboration on guns
moving south and money moving south to interdict drugs that are
moving north and to work with the Mexican government on the
violence that is south of the border, particularly through the
Merida Initiative and other collaborative work that is done by
ICE and other components of all the agencies of government.
As we speak here today, there is intensive work going on
that involves, indeed, all of the components of DHS as well as
representatives of other agencies to ensure that the level of
collaboration going forward is unlike that we have ever seen
before.
And from what I can tell from where I sit working both with
the White House and other agencies, through the White House
coordination process, I would add that the White House and the
Obama administration is fully committed to making sure that the
collaboration exists going forward.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. What about working with the local
offices? I know you had the gentleman Sexton go out to specific
areas, but that is a time-specific, time-certain time that you
have an individual, but is there more of a coordinated effort
that you are reaching out to the local folks?
Dr. Barth. Yes, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that Secretary
Napolitano as a former border governor, will focus on those
relationships like no one ever has before. She realizes the
critical nature of that kind of collaboration. I think that you
will see frequent visits by her and her senior staff to the
northern border and to Mexico until we get ahead of the curve
here.
Mr. Cuellar. Secretary Napolitano will be in Laredo this
Friday. I don't know exactly what her schedule is. I have a
general idea what it is, but can you make sure that she meets
with the local state and local law enforcement?
Because my understanding is that, you know, without going
to her agenda, but I just want to make sure that two things are
said: one, that we include the state and local folks, and we
will be happy to coordinate with you, number one.
And number two, that we bring some of the business
community leaders, because one of the things--for example,
Laredo's the largest inland port in the U.S., and we want to
make sure that we have strong border security, and I think
Janice and--you know that in that area.
We want to have strong border security, but at the same
time, you know, when we have 13,500 trucks a day coming across
the border, doesn't include rail, doesn't include air also. We
don't want to impede the trade.
We don't want to impede the truism, the retail, which is so
important to our border economy, and I would ask you to just
make sure you send that message that it is not just coming in
and meeting with federal ICE officials. You know, with all do
respect, but also to include our local and state officials
also.
Dr. Barth. I will transmit that message. I know she is
trying to meet with both private sector representatives as well
as state and local officials on all parts of her trips as she
travels around the country, and that message will be
transmitted for sure.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Dr. Barth.
Dr. Barth. You are welcome.
Mr. Cuellar. Major General Aylward, last month, Governor
Perry for the state of Texas requested the president provide
1,000 more guardsmen to support border security missions along
the Texas-Mexico border.
From your perspective, does Texas need more Title 32
resources, or do we have enough adequate resources to meet its
mission?
Gen. Aylward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my opening
remarks, I mentioned we are really at the preliminary stages,
the formative stages of developing requirements based upon
capability gaps that exist.
The appropriate role, and from a Guard Bureau view, is to
provide the technical advice and assistance on the capabilities
within the military portfolio that augment either state and
local requirements or requirements that we would get from the
Department of Homeland Security. And so, we are still in the
formative stages of that. We really don't have a complete list
of what the requirements would be.
But any requirement that we did get, we wouldneed that
increased funding in order to be able to accomplish those
missions and the range of activity that they are looking for us
to perform, without which that increased funding, then there
would be an impact on our readiness.
Mr. Cuellar. So you are answer is?
Gen. Aylward. I mean the view of the state and local folks
in terms of what the requirements are is, as you kind of
highlighted, is a combination of the local officials and the
state officials.
Do they have enough capacity and capability within those
different organizations and agencies to cover down on what the
governor asked for, I think, is still something that they are
working through. And so, until they complete that analysis, the
identification of any gaps that would exist that the Guard may
augment is still a work underway.
Until that work is done, I don't have a definitive answer
for you.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Thank you, sir.
One last question, and then I will pass this on to the
ranking member.
Ms. Ayala? That same article, the March 25th edition of The
Wall Street Journal, the former ICE director, Julie Myers said,
that the MOUs regarding who works on drug-related cases are
outdated and, ``the agents have their hands tied behind their
backs.''
Any comments on any MOUs that you all have among agencies,
federal agencies, and any opinions as to whether they are
outdated or whether they should be adjusted so you can go ahead
and meet the emerging threats that we have?
Ms. Ayala. Thank you. Yes, we are working on an MOU that
predates the establishment of ICE or DHS. It is a MOU from 1994
between Customs and DEA, and it does put a cap on the number of
cross-designated Customs agents, or ICE in this case. At that
time, we were working with about 3,000 agents, and now we are
up to T.O. of over 6,000 agents.
We are a border agency that deals with all cross-border
smuggling, and we would appreciate to have Title 21 concurrent
authorities that would help us to do our job better and avoid
delays.
Mr. Cuellar. So are you all working on updating that MOU?
Ms. Ayala. We have been working, yes, sir, with DEA on
updating that MOU.
Mr. Cuellar. Do you know when roughly you will have that
done?
Ms. Ayala. I am not sure, but I can get back to you on
that, or we can set up a briefing to give you more particulars
of all the details at this point.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. If you would just keep the committee
updated on that, and if we can assist you in any way, and try
to get you and DEA to get together and work this out, let us
know.
Ms. Ayala. Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. At this time, I would like to
recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rogers,
the gentleman from Alabama for questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I had planned to
go in a different direction with questions, but Sheriff Dever
really, I think, honed in on what this hearing's all about, and
that is referring to the 1987 article that talked about these
same things. And here we are dealing with them in a more of a
reactive fashion than a proactive fashion.
I would like to know, particularly from you and then
Sheriff Gonzalez, what are we at the federal level not doing
that we should be doing to make sure that you have what you
need at the first responder level to deal with these threats
that you described so well?
Sheriff Dever first.
Sheriff Dever. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers, thank
you. A couple of things come to mind. The federal government
has increased resources on the border significantly over the
past 10 years, but sadly still coming up very, very short. I
mentioned the SCAP funding program, which is really
significant.
I mean, most counties along the border are small and poor
and yet have a tremendous burden in terms of bearing the
financial hardship of the cost associated with crime committed
by people who cross the border illegally. And those----
Mr. Rogers. How much do you receive in Cochise County?
Sheriff Dever. Right now, we are getting about 9 percent on
every dollar that we spend.
Mr. Rogers. What do you need?
Sheriff Dever. One-hundred percent.
Mr. Rogers. Which is how much?
Sheriff Dever. Right now, we are incurring somewhere
between $400,000 and half million dollars a year in housing,
and keep in mind, we do not house people charged for federal
immigration violation or federal drug crimes. These are crimes
committed against the state where charges have been filed in
the county.
Mr. Rogers. So you need $1 million a year for SCAP funding?
Sheriff Dever. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. What else?
Sheriff Dever. Well, we were just talking about one county.
Mr. Rogers. I know. I am asking you what else do you need?
Sheriff Dever. Secondly, Operation Stonegarden has had some
success. Enhancement of that would be helpful. One of the
things that is lost in most funding mechanisms in programs,
Congressman, is costs for infrastructure to support.
We put a lot of boots--we talk about boots on the ground.
We talk about officers and patrol cars and costs associated
with all of that, but as that component grows and increases, so
does the need for supporting infrastructure.
Mr. Rogers. Such as?
Sheriff Dever. Communications, communications
infrastructure, giving us the ability to talk to each other
across----
Mr. Rogers. What else?
Sheriff Dever. --jurisdictional boundaries and lines. There
has been some improvement there and there is still a long way
to go. Personnel to man communications centers, money for brick
and mortar to build enhanced communications centers.
We are operating out of little cubby holes and corners, and
a place where we can co-locate and have a commonality for
communications, as well as the support staff in terms of
recordkeeping, you know, report and data retrieval,
intelligence gathering and dissemination.
All of those components are necessary.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. What about you, Sheriff Gonzalez?
Sheriff Gonzalez. Basically, about the same thing, Mr.
Rogers--we are looking at, for example, Ms. Ayala talks about
the BEST task forces, regular task forces. When you have small
counties, you cannot always contribute to those task forces
with personnel, because you don't have any personnel to
contribute with.
There is some counties in Texas that have a sheriff and two
deputy sheriffs cover 6,000 square miles. It is very, very
difficult to be able to have somebody or to participate.
Operation Stonegarden is good--also, how long can you work this
officers on overtime?
The COPS Programs, for example, that have been recently
reinitiated again, very good programs. Things we would like to
see is that perhaps at year 4 that the local agencies don't
have to continue to fund those positions as a requirement to
keep those officers.
What do we need on the border officer to assist in what is
happening on the borders is personnel for local agencies. This
Congress of the 107th, 108th Congress, I don't recall exactly
which one it is, but there was legislation filed that was also
sponsored or supported Congressman Cuellar, Congressman McCaul
and some other congressmen along the border.
Legislation was filed together with Congressman Culverson.
That was directed at specifically local law enforcement, and
that is where we need the funding. You can have all the ICE
agents or border patrol agents in the nation go to the border.
How long will they be there?
Mr. Rogers. Yes.
Sheriff Gonzalez. For one, and how many of those 95
percent, probably, are going to be lost. They don't know where
they are going to go. They don't know the local people. They
don't know who the local dealers are. They don't know those
things.
Mr. Rogers. Yes.
Sheriff Gonzalez. So, mostly, you go to the borders for
federal agents mostly what I call a hardship station. You get
there, you want to get out of there as quick as you can. We are
there. We live there. We know the people. We need----
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Sheriff Gonzalez. --the funding for local agencies.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Ms. Ayala? Has there been any communication between your
office or your department and these local law enforcement
agencies about specifically what they need from you or from the
Department, and that may be for Dr. Barth, I don't know.
And a way to kind of put this in a form of a request to
Congress to make sure that they are receiving what they need to
work in collaboration with you in an effective manner.
Ms. Ayala. Well, we work with them every day. Most of them
are on our task forces to look at what type of equipment needs
and what type of facility needs they have. We participate with
them on a daily basis as far as trying to get them cross
designated and providing some other means for them to have
asset-sharing opportunities.
Because they are on our task forces, any time we seize an
asset, they are entitled to put in for asset sharing----
Mr. Rogers. But my question is, have you put together an
inventory of what is needed along the Southwest border,
specifically, with regard to local first responders, local
assets so that you can come to us as the authorizing entity and
say what we need to do our job in collaboration with local law
enforcement is A, B, C, D, E. Do you have that assembled?
And that may be for Dr. Barth. It may not be a fair
question for you.
Dr. Barth. Thank you, yes. Let me at least give us two data
points for point of departure here. For the Operation
Stonegarden funding, in 2008, we have about $58 million to
award. We have 143 applications totaling $290 million. So that,
for example, gives you a highlight of the gap between what
might be required to help all of the 24 counties in the four
states along the Southwest border.
We will award that $58 million in the near future. We have
$60 million in the 2010 budget plan for Operation Stonegarden.
So clearly, more resources could be used along the Southwest
border. Our effort is to try to make sure that the resources we
do have are prioritized according to risk and, therefore,
allocated accordingly.
Mr. Rogers. I understand, and in fairness, I am not beating
up on you, because it is not your fault--$60 million along the
entire four states of the Southwest border is a miniscule
amount of money to deal with the problem we have got,
particularly, given the amount of money we are talking about
giving to the Mexican government to deal with this.
We need you all to come to us with some meaningful numbers
that you need from us to deal with this problem. You know, the
numbers that Secretary Napolitano's talking about redirecting
within her current budget, is not really a meaningful number,
in my view.
So that is the direction I would ask for from you.
I am sorry I went over my time, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. At this time, I will recognize other members
for questions that they may wish to ask the witnesses, and
accordance with our committee rules and practice, I will
recognize members who were present at the start of the hearing
based on their seniority of the subcommittee, alternating
between the majority and the minority. Those members coming in
later will be recognized in the order of their arrival.
At this time, I will recognize the chairman of the
committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
appreciate you holding this hearing.
I would like to ask both Sheriff Gonzalez and Sheriff Dever
prior to the announcement of this border initiative, did you
receive any communication from the Department. Yes or no? I
guess that is----
Sheriff Gonzalez. Very short answer, Mr. Chairman, you
talking about the Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Sheriff Gonzalez. No, sir.
Sheriff Dever. It would be the same answer here, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Are there some things in this initiative that
you think we could do better in line with what the ranking
member asked earlier, or are you satisfied in the present form?
Sheriff Gonzalez. Again, Mr. Chairman, there is really not
enough funding there. And let me just clear something up, and I
know I have said this many, many times in the several times
that I have testified before Congress. We don't want to be
border patrol agents. We are just concerned with what is coming
into the country on the criminal type of basis.
We need, again, funding for local law enforcement to be
able to do what we are supposed t be doing along the border,
sir.
Mr. Thompson. So in other words, you are looking for help
to help catch the bad guys. Am I correct?
Sheriff Gonzalez. We are looking for help in catching the
bad guys who are coming in, sir, and also protecting the
citizens and residents who are already living in our counties
so that they not get kidnapped and not get extorted, not have
their homes invaded, that they not get tortured and things like
this.
Mr. Thompson. Absolutely.
Sheriff Dever?
Sheriff Dever. Give you a ballpark number and actually it
is kind of a hard number. We beat this around National
Sheriff's Association for sometime about a year ago trying to
come up, for the Southwest border, a hard number that we
thought would be adequate--*$500 million a year for 5 years was
the figure that we looked at as being actually something
meaningful that would provide the resources Sheriff Gonzalez
and I mentioned here today.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Major General Aylward? You referenced in Chairman Cuellar's
question that you are not quite ready to address Governor
Perry's request for 1,000 people or you are still analyzing it,
and could you just kind of expand on your previous answer?
Gen. Aylward. Yes, sir. In fact, this afternoon I will be
attending a meeting over at the Eisenhower Executive Office
Building. We just got to take the requirements across the four-
state region marry it up against what the rest of the 22
agencies that make up the Department of Homeland Security and
make sure that we appropriately cover down on the gaps that
exist.
Military isn't the only solution to the gaps that exist out
there. So the appropriate role for us would be a result of that
more rigorous analysis in terms of what can be done across the
team here from local, state, through the federal government. We
have always bridged that gap within the National Guard program
on a counter-drug and an innovative and earnest training.
Any requirements that come out of that gap analysis will
require the additional funding for us to effectively perform
those missions.
Mr. Thompson. So I guess the answer I am looking for is
whether or not you presently possess the money and/or resources
to address this request for 1,000 personnel to go to the
border?
Gen. Aylward. For additional 1,000 people to go to the
border, as I mentioned a number of times, would be the
increased funding to pick up the incremental cost associated
with that deployment of the additional 1,000 folks.
Within our program at large, we believe that we have at
least up to 1,500 folks that could be available under the
counter drug program, which is the congressionally mandated
program that has a statutory cap of 4,000 and currently is at
approximately 2,500 folks at this point.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Maybe I will get you to tell me what
the answer. Thank you, General.
Dr. Barth?
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Mr. Chairman, can I just follow up? The
study that we have been talking about Governor Perry from the
state of Texas, but I guess, you all analyzing the four border
states, right, not just the state of Texas needs?
Gen. Aylward. Yes, sir. That is the way I understand is
that meeting this afternoon at the Eisenhower Executive Office
Building.
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Gen. Aylward. I understand Governor Perry has a requirement
on the table for 1,000, but that has to be vetted again, you
know, with the local, state folks and with our corporate
partners and the 22 agencies that make up the Department of
Homeland Security to make sure that we appropriately cover down
on what that request is all about.
Mr. Cuellar. And you said there are about 1,500 personnel
that could be available right now?
Gen. Aylward. Within our program, sir, we believe there is
a statutory cap on the counter drug program, Title 32, Section
112, of 4,000. I have approximately 2,500 people right now that
are funded.
Mr. Thompson. So you have 1,500 that are not funded.
Gen. Aylward. Correct.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. That is what I was trying to get to.
Gen. Aylward. Okay, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Dr. Barth? Who at DHS is responsible for the Southwest
Border Initiative?
Dr. Barth. Sir, by her active engagement on the issue, I
would have to say it is Secretary Napolitano. She is engaged on
this issue with respect to every aspect of it.
The use of the Merida funds south of the border to support
the Mexican government, the deployment of the specific agents
and inspectors from all of our component agencies, and takes a
lot of the responsibility for ensuring interagency coordination
with our sister department and agencies.
Mr. Thompson. Well I appreciate your putting the ultimate
burden on the secretary. Okay? But after secretary, I need you
to give me, and maybe you can just forward it to the committee,
the components that make up Southwest Border Initiative and the
staff persons who are responsible for either management or
oversight of each component. I mean, that is what I am trying
to get to.
Dr. Barth. We can provide you that, sir, very quickly after
today's hearing.
Mr. Thompson. One of the concerns is you heard two sheriffs
talk about some concerns that they have, but I want to make
sure that there is enough continuity of information and
individuals so that their job can be made easier in this whole
initiative process. It really doesn't matter which one, but as
long as they are clear as to who the individuals they relate
to.
One other question.
Ms. Ayala? Okay, good enough, I hope. What incentives do
we, from the department level, offer state, locals, and tribal
entities to participate in these programs, especially the BEST
program?
Ms. Ayala. Well, I think, first we provide a force
multiplier effect, as Sheriff Dever was saying that often times
we have a sheriff's office that have one or two people, and
they are trying to be involved in a complex investigation. They
may need more resources, more equipment.
We, in turn, need their expertise. So by being on a BEST,
we have multi-agency international, multi-disciplinary team
that provides that.
Number two, they are able to be cross designated in Title
19 and Title 8, which is Customs and Immigration Authorities,
at least be able to do their job and further those cases that
they are working in furtherance of the BEST.
We also have the asset sharing program so they can be paid
for overtime and share assets for other things that they may
need for their department, and because they are participating
in task forces such as a BEST, they also can apply for DHS
grants as specific to that.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Both sheriffs, other than overtime, you heard some other
opportunities that are available to you. Before the hearing and
what you heard, were you familiar with that?
Sheriff Dever. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Thompson, yes, to some
degree. We have a great, at least at the working field level,
great cooperative spirit with our federal partners on the
border.
Where communication generally breaks down and doesn't occur
is what I mentioned earlier, there is a lot of planning,
strategic planning, tactical planning and policy making that
goes on in this town that then gets pushed down to the SACs and
sector chiefs that have a local impact and are already in place
before we ever hear about them, and the consequences are
already developing.
And so, again, we have seen a recent improvement. We
welcome that with open arms. We hope that it continues. And
continuity, as you mentioned, earlier, sir, has been the
problem.
We have, you know, little spaces and points of time where
we sit down and we talk, and then it all goes off everybody's
radar screen for some reason. We don't get back together until
there is another crisis, and by then it is too late.
I would in response to your question, if you don't mind,
mention one other component here that is critical that isn't
represented here today. In the federal scheme of things, the
U.S. Attorney, and I don't know if this is at the Washington
level or state level, they established thresholds for
prosecution.
For instance, drug smuggling cases in our state, the
threshold for prosecution of marijuana smuggling cases, it is
500 pounds. Anything under 500 pounds, is dismissed or referred
to local and state prosecutors for dealing with, and we simply
don't have those resources.
And I know the U.S. Attorney is strapped for resources, but
that is another component needs some serious addressing, not
only for drug smuggling but people smuggling and the movement
to illegal weapons in both directions across the border.
Mr. Thompson. So when that happens, what burden does that
put on you? Do you have to house those individuals until they
are transported or what?
Sheriff Dever. The local prosecutor has to make a decision
on whether or not he has resources to prosecute. If he does,
then we house those individuals.
From a law enforcement perspective, what you will always
here is we think everybody ought to go to jail who is committed
a crime and that none of these people should walk and get off
free.
But they know they can come through a port of entry for
something less than 500 pounds of marijuana or a couple of
hundred kilos of cocaine, and within impunity.
They will lose the contraband. They may lose the mode of
transportation, but there is no criminal prosecution, and that
just makes an open announcement that, you know, come on in.
Nothing is gonna happen----
Mr. Thompson. And you think that is predicated because
there is no or there is limited resources available at the U.S.
Attorney's Office to prosecute?
Sheriff Dever. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Sheriff Gonzalez?
Sheriff Gonzalez. Yes, Mr. Chairman, in response to your
question, also, yes. We are very much familiar with Ms. Ayala's
talking about prior to today.
Thing is, again, we cannot dedicate resources on a full-
time basis unless they are paid for. And I have two deputy
sheriffs assigned to a HIDA task force. The deputy sheriffs are
paid through HIDA funds. I could not afford to pay them through
county funds. So we are familiar with the programs that are
there.
We are familiar with asset sharing. We are familiar with
these things here; however, we cannot commit to some type of
very long-term investigation. What I am talking about here
today, Mr. Chairman, is something that is needed immediately.
In other words, when you have that 911 call that is made to
us, we have to respond now. It is not a long-term thing where
we can leave it for next week. We have to respond now.
So we are familiar with these programs. The things is, we
just cannot dedicate the personnel for this long amount of
time. For another one again is that this is something I love to
hear. We just heard it last week again, information for Mexico.
When you guys were working, which is us, we don't move our
loads.
To me, Mr. Chairman, I would much rather prevent a burglary
or prevent a murder than try to solve it later on. To me, sir,
deterrence is paramount. To me, deterrence is the best there
is, and that is what we do.
What Sheriff Dever was talking about also like the SCAP
funding. District attorney in our jurisdiction does not accept
any federal referrals at all. If you got 200 pounds of
marijuana, federal government, you take it. If you got an ounce
of marijuana, federal government, you take it. We do not accept
federal referrals.
We have to put these people in our jails again. We are not
getting funded through SCAP. President Bush cut SCAP funding to
zero, JAG funding to zero, Burn grants to zero. We cannot
continue to--I guess you cannot continue to subsidize the
federal government with local taxpayers when on April 15th,
here comes IRS wanting more money.
Our local taxpayers can just not afford these things. So
what Sheriff Dever's talking about, we don't accept federal
referrals, period.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Gentleman from state of Louisiana, Mr. Cao.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to ask you a
very quick question concerning communication between local
enforcement officers with federal agencies.
Is there a system for you all to communicate, because based
on the testimony of Sheriff Gonzalez, you were saying how the
local people understand the situation; they know who the people
are. Is there a communication system between the different
level that exists out there?
Sheriff Gonzalez. I am assuming you are talking information
sharing, Mr. Cao, I think, not radio communication, right?
Information sharing?
What we do for information sharing is that we do submit our
reports or intelligence information on a daily basis to our
JOICs, to our Joint Operations Intelligence Centers. Ours is
located in Laredo, Texas, and we have the main one in Austin,
Texas, our state capital.
There is communication, yes, sir. Just about a month-and-a-
half ago, as a matter of fact, I did call a meeting in my
office with federal agencies and state agencies asking them to
please participate a little bit more in information sharing and
in providing us improper not improper rather information
sharing. Is that what you are referring to, sir?
Mr. Cao. Correct. Thank you very much. That is all I have.
Mr. Cuellar. At this time, I would like to recognize Mr.
Cleaver from the state of Missouri.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the sheriffs, do either or both of you know who T.J.
Bonner is?
Sheriff Dever. Yes. I am acquainted with Mr. Bonner.
Sheriff Gonzalez. And I am also, sir.
Mr. Cleaver. Mr. Bonner, in an interview last week, said
that he was underwhelmed with the new emphasis that Secretary
Napolitano has put in place, that it does not in any real way
halt the flow of weapons going into Mexico.
Apparently, the drugs travel northward and the weapons
travel southward. Do you agree with Mr. Bonner, I mean, that
our efforts are weak and that little change is going to take
place?
Sheriff Dever. If I may, I probably have a little bit
different perspective on this, and I don't mean to be flippant.
So I will try to be careful in my remarks, but, you know, there
is a lot of talk about more southbound inspections, but I don't
know if you have ever traveled out of Mexico into the United
States.
Mr. Cleaver. Yes.
Sheriff Dever. Sometimes 2--, 2-1/2--,3-hour wait to cross
the border because of our inspection process, and even then,
only one out of, you know, a handful of vehicles is inspected.
You start doing that going south, now you can begin to imagine
what kind of infrastructure and personnel you are going to have
to put in place to make a meaningful effort there to inspect a
significant number of vehicles to make a difference in the flow
of any kind of contraband entering Mexico.
The other thing I would like to say I am a little puzzled
that it is our fault that drugs are coming into this country at
the same time it is our fault that weapons are flowing south,
and I think that the Mexican government has a greater
responsibility to step up to the plate and do their part on
their side of the border in order to secure the sovereignty of
their nation.
Sheriff Gonzalez. With that also, sir, and I am more
concerned, and I don't--this is not taken the wrong way, but I
am more concerned with what is coming into our country, sir,
than what is going out. Obviously, yes, I am concerned with
weapons going to Mexico, because some of those weapons are
going to be used against us in the near future, probably.
But I am more concerned with what is coming in. Now, also,
we are assuming here we are talking about ports of entry. The
illegal stuff that we are seeing is coming into the country or
going into Mexico in areas that are not ports of entry. In
other words, between the ports of entry, and that is what
concerns us.
Now, regarding, again, more funding to Mexico, I am not
saying that I am against the Merida Initiative by any way,
shape or form, but what I am saying, sir, is that I think a lot
of this money going into Mexico where you saw it pumping this
money, you start squeezing this balloon, that balloon's going
to burst somewhere.
And I think through the Merida Initiative also, we could
get some funding for local law enforcement on the U.S. side,
and we can try to hopefully prevent that balloon from exploding
into our country but rather maybe explodes at the southern
border of Mexico.
And I don't mean to say that in a bad way, but we also need
something for the weapons, for the drugs on our side of the
border also.
Mr. Cleaver. Well maybe Ms. Ayala? Is the program that has
been put in place, Operation Firewall, I mean, are we seeing
any successes?
Ms. Ayala. Yes, thank you. And as I answer that question to
also say that as far as the strategy that is going on today as
far as deploying agents to the border to help with the
situation, is something we saw in 2005 with the Mexican
government deployed federal and military and additional agents
to the Nuevo Laredo, and we in turn sent agents down to the
Laredo area to deal with increased border violence.
And we saw a drop of from 68 murder rate in 2004 up to 168
and then back down to 40 by 2007. So we did, by formulating
this initiative, Operation Blackjack, that was a border
enforcement security task force through international
commitment, and the multi-agency concept, we were able to
really make a difference in the area of border violence.
So this is something similar that we are dealing with now
when we think that we will be successful, and as far as
Operation Firewall, we have really been seeing lately as far as
prevailing smuggling methods along the border is the bulk cash
smuggling initiative, and it has been very successful.
It is a multi-prong initiative that looks at the domestic
international and international movement of bulk cash, and we
have been working with our partners in Domestic Highway
Interdiction and we have seized over $183 million since its
inception and 38 million of that has been seized in Mexico.
Mr. Cleaver. Is it common knowledge where the ant trails
are so-called ant trails? Is it common knowledge? Anyone,
sheriff? General Aylward? I mean----
Ms. Ayala. Are you referring to the weapons smuggling
south, the one-by-one?
Mr. Cleaver. Yes. The does this, I mean, they are called
the ant trails that the drugs follow these ant trails from
Mexico across the borders. There is apparently a number of
them, is that a term that you are familiar with?
Ms. Ayala. I am familiar with the term as far as weapons
smuggling----
Mr. Cleaver. Yes.
Ms. Ayala. --used outbound, and I think it has been
referred to in the context as to whether we are looking at
complex smuggling organizations or just following out one
weapon at a time, and we are doing both where we have seized
many weapons.
We are doing complex investigations and seized arsenals of
weapons that, sometimes dozens at a time, but we do regard the
one gun just as important as a, you know, magazine full of
bullets that could kill an innocent bystander.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back all the rest of my time.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. McCaul?
Mr. McCaul. I thank the chairman.
Clearly, the state of violence has increased exponentially
since the time we have come into office, the 6,000 killings,
more than Iraq and Afghanistan combined, the beheadings, the
torture, the killing. And I want to welcome the witnesses, and
particularly the sheriffs for being here and the role that you
play in the front lines.
Sheriff Gonzalez? I agree with you. I think one of the
criticisms of Merida was the fact that we didn't have a joint
strategy on this side and didn't provide adequate funding for
this side of the border. So my first question is to our DHS
witnesses, Dr. Barth and Ms. Ayala.
And that is, what is the new enhanced role for the
sheriffs, and will there be increased assets and resources for
them? I know the Secretary talked about a reallocation of the
resources that she has.
Dr. Barth. Thank you, sir. The primary resource change in
the new announcement that the secretary made a week ago is with
respect to the Stonegarden grants.
There are some $58-59 million in unexpended, unobligated
grants from 2006 and 2008 that we have expanded the use of that
money for various additional applications by the state and
local governments along the border states.
The amount of money is unchanged from what has already been
authorized and appropriated by Congress, but with the expanded
capability to deploy that money, for example, you could see the
state of Washington, which is facing significant bump up in
cross-border traffic with the Olympics coming up.
We could fund a 20-person state trooper team to go down and
work along the southern border as a training exercise for them
for what is coming in their future as well as helping out in
the southern California border to deal with the criminal export
of weapons and money, bulk cash, going south and drugs coming
north.
Beyond the Stonegarden money, at this time, we are not
prepared to announce any new funding for the state and local
partners, but I think you will see, as I already said, a
substantial reach out from this former southern governor,
Secretary Napolitano, to the state and locals to make sure that
that partnership is as strong as it has ever been.
Mr. McCaul. And let me say, I commend her for focusing on
the Southwest border, which we have been focused on for quite
some time--$60 million that sounds like a lot, but with the
threat that we face, I don't believe is nearly adequate enough.
If this is a major funding mechanism for the state and
locals, I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we take a look in
the Congress at increasing this funding for Stonegarden, which
is a very successful and a very good program.
And I think, Sheriff Dever, you mentioned $500 million was
the amount that was talked about at the National Association
level?
Sheriff Dever. Yes, sir. We spent a lot of time just
analyzing, talking to all the Southwest border sheriffs trying
to get a grasp on a good hard number of what would be something
meaningful, and that was the number that we came up with, $500
million, actually, a year appropriated for 5 consecutive years.
Mr. McCaul. I think in addition, the SCAP funding that you
mentioned is very important. Another issue out of this
committee's jurisdiction though as a former federal prosecutor,
we could never take all these cases at the border, and I think
more resources at Justice to handle the lower amounts, because
what they are really good con artists.
They are scamming us right now by bringing in shipments
that are below the federal guidelines. And they are doing that
at smaller quantities and getting around the system, and there
is not enough resources there to prosecute and lock them up.
And I think you all understand that as you live it day-to-day.
I want to focus next to the National Guard, as the chairman
mentioned, our governor has requested 1,000 National Guard. The
Counter Drug Program has been successful. We had the JTF Sexton
in El Paso out at EPIC, and it seems to me that we need to bear
all resources possible on this issue.
And it seems to me the Guard can play a very useful role
with respect to patrols and inspections at the border to choke
not only drugs and human trafficking coming in but to choke the
weapons and the cash going from this country back into Mexico,
which arm and fund these drug cartels, and I just wanted to get
the general's comments on that.
Gen. Aylward. As I have mentioned and as they go through
that requirements analysis, we take a look at each range of
activity, the troops, the task that they actually want us to
perform, we kind of vet it against six criteria: What is the
cost? Is it legal? Is lethal force going to be used? Is it
appropriate for DOD to actually perform that role? What is the
risk associated with it? And is their readiness impact?
So based upon that criteria, we try to really kind of--down
in terms of, you know, what is the image that we portray as
U.S. military augmenting local and federal agents along for
precisely the task that you described, sir.
You know, you have to look through it through the lens of,
you know, what is it going to look like in the media as well.
And so, we are very thoughtful about that, and we are very
deliberate working with our partners in terms of discovering
what is the most appropriate role and how can we actually make
sure that is sustainable, supportable, and affordable program.
Mr. McCaul. And I understand the thoughtful deliberation
you have to go through. How long of a time line are we talking
about before a decision may be made? You know, if you will
answer that, but--
Gen. Aylward. Well, sir, I wish I had the answer myself,
and frankly, you know, time sensitive planning or crisis action
planning, the reality is that there has to be the more
comprehensive, thoughtful--is this going to be something that
we are just going to do for the next 6 months, or is this part
of a corporate strategy that is going to span a number of
years, perhaps maybe 5 or 10 years.
And so, with that and then you really get, you know, what
is the most appropriate answer or option for the leadership to
consider? Is it, should it be a military thing or should it be
one of the 22 partners in the----
Mr. McCaul. No, I would submit that you look at the urgency
of the situation. We talk about a tipping point. I think we
have reached the tipping point. The spillover's pretty clear. I
just had a drug cartel-related style killing just outside of
Houston, in my district, just last week.
This is the United States. I mean, these cartels are
operating in the United States, moving their drugs through 230
cities in the United States. So this is not just south of the
border. And I think that we need to again bear every resource
we have to address this urgent situation.
Yes, sir?
Gen. Aylward. Sir, we hope to be part of that process with
our partners on the left and right of me.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. Can I indulge the chair in one
final?
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that. Sheriff Gonzalez, I am
ranking member on the Intelligence and Information Sharing
Subcommittee. You mentioned that information sharing has a long
way to go, and I just wanted to follow up with you on that.
And can you tell me and the committee what needs to be done
to make sure you do have the information you need?
Sheriff Gonzalez. Well, sir, the first thing, and I hope I
don't get in any trouble for saying this, the first thing we
need to do, sir, is learn to trust each other.
And there are many times where, at least that is the
impression that a lot of local agencies have that local
agencies are looked down at. In other words, you are not state,
you are not federal, you are local. The thing to remember, sir,
is that we know our areas. We know who we are dealing with in
our areas.
It is like the same as having somebody come down TDY for 6
months or so. They don't know the area. Texas is sending a lot
of DPS troopers, state police troopers to the border area to do
enforcement along the border. Many times they run into
situations where they need some help, and they get on the radio
and they can't talk to us, because we don't have any
communication with them, one.
In other words, sir, is that they don't know where they are
at. So I have to send a deputy sheriff from Zapata 32 miles
north and see if he is somewhere along the road going towards
Laredo, 28 miles south to see if he is along the road somewhere
south of us, or 32 miles east to see if he is somewhere out
there. He don't know where he is at; we don't know where he is
at.
The thing is, information sharing, sir, is very important.
We can talk about this all the time, every day. If local
agencies are not involved, then it is going to be very hard to
have that full cooperation from everybody. We need to work, as
Chairman Cuellar, mentioned during his opening statement here,
as a team.
And we are part of the team, whether anybody likes it or
not, we are part of the team. We are dealing with our turf. We
are dealing with our territory. We are dealing with our
counties.
Our counties go to the river bank, and we have to work as a
team. If we don't have that team effort, it is not going to
work, sir. Information sharing should be done immediately. It
is done in Texas. I am proud to say we, you know, we have the
Joint Operation Intelligence Centers, six of them in Texas.
Information is shared. Needs to go back out the same way.
We are working on it. I think we were successful in Texas. I
would hope that the nation would take this approach with what
we are doing in Texas. It is working.
Mr. McCaul. I agree with you, and you do need to be a part
of the team to be able to do that. You need to talk to each
other, and I commend the chairman for his great work. I know we
had the hearing in Laredo last year on interoperability at the
border, and I think the ability for you to talk to state and
federal law enforcement is very important.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
At this time, I recognize the gentlewoman from California,
Ms. Richardson, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have two questions. The first one is, currently, it
is my understanding there are 12 BEST teams, Border Enforcement
Security Teams, eight on the Southwest border, two on the
northern border, and two in the seaports.
At the request of the New Mexico's congressional
delegation, on March 18th, the president decided to establish
two BEST offices in that state. The question is: Should the
California delegation be considering the same?
Ms. Ayala. Ma'am, we have two of the eight Southwest border
BEST located in California, one in San Diego and one in the
Imperial Valley. And one of the maritime BESTs is in Long
Beach.
One of the ways that you or anyone can request to have a
BEST in their area is to speak to a DHS entity in the field or
at headquarters, and then what we do is we do a local threat
assessment, and that is then reviewed at the headquarters level
by ICE and CBP so that we can then prioritize where BEST should
be or in what order we are going to deploy them.
So that doesn't preclude any other citizen or someone in
the government or congressional member for requesting that we
send over BEST in their area.
Ms. Richardson. So you said San Diego, Long Beach, and what
was the second one?
Ms. Ayala. Imperial Valley.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Is it determined that the one in San
Diego is sufficient in your opinion?
Ms. Ayala. Well based on the assessment by the SAC office
there in CBP, right now, those are sufficient because of
distances between them, because the coverage that we have in
the border, the neighboring state of Arizona. So for right now,
based on the assessments, San Diego, Imperial Valley, and Los
Angeles or Long Beach are covering that area now.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you. My last question, we have heard
numbers such as only one in every four guns that is confiscated
by Mexican authorities is actually provided to the AFT for
tracing of its origin.
I realize that AFT is not on the panel today; however, I
would like to know if this is a symptomatic problem that we
feel we need better coordination, which has been talked about
today, or if, in fact, this is just individual law enforcement
agencies who are refusing to give up control over their
investigations.
Ms. Ayala. I am not sure of the figures on that. I do know
that we work very closely with the Mexican government and ATF
through their Project Gunrunner and our Project Amas Cruzada to
coordinate information and seizures of guns. So I can't speak
to the number that ATF is actually receiving from the Mexican
government to trace.
But we are working very closely with them on that
particular program.
Ms. Richardson. The key though would be, numbers aside,
would you agree that there is a turf battle going on in terms
of agencies withholding or keeping information?
Ms. Ayala. No, ma'am. The field agents work everyday
collaborating whether it be on individual cases or operations
or an ad hoc task forces or informal task forces. That is why
when we created the task force, Border Enforcement Security
Task Force, we made sure that anybody that came to the table
had an equal say in the targets that we were going to identify
and go after.
And that if they bought a case to the table that they would
lead it. That way they are equally invested and all of their
equities are protected.
Ms. Richardson. Would you followup with the AFT to verify
if, in fact, they are only receiving 25 percent and report back
to this committee?
Ms. Ayala. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Ms. Richardson. Before I move on to
Ms. Titus, let me just ask a couple questions.
I guess this would be more for ICE, Ms. Ayala. Can you all
have, do you all have the authority to when a foreign national
is deported from the United States to give a state that
information so they can then turn around and have their driver
license deported? These are a couple questions that Governor
Perry sent in a letter to Secretary Napolitano yesterday.
First question he is requesting when a foreign national
with a Texas driver license has been deported from the U.S.,
can the state of Texas be notified so then it can revoke his or
her Texas driver license? Because apparently, according to this
information, they get deported, then they will come back and
they will use their driver license again.
And, I guess, that would apply also to Arizona and any of
the other states also. Do you have the authority to do that
right now?
Ms. Ayala. I am not sure of that. That is not my particular
area. That belongs to another division. So I will get back to
you on that----
Mr. Cuellar. Would you get back to the committee on that
question? The second question, and I guess to Dr. Barth or Ms.
Ayala on this. The secured communities will use that electronic
fingerprint booking.
I think, for example, in the state of Texas, there is 19
state agencies that are currently participating, but they are
requesting to use those at the state prisons in Texas.
Again this thing, it can apply to Arizona and New Mexico,
you know, but have the other 233 agencies in Texas that
maintain jails also use--be part of this electronic
fingerprinting. Because according to the information that we
have to date, 37,733 individuals have been checked through this
system at just those 19 locations are participating.
Out of that, 8,844 or 23 percent have fingerprints on file
with ICE. So if we are getting such high numbers, it will only
make sense that we spread that out not only to the other
agencies in Texas or to Arizona and New Mexico, California. You
know, I think you would get a lot of hits there to identify
people that have those criminal records.
So I guess my question, Dr. Barth or Ms. Ayala, do you all
have the resources to extend that, and why has not been done
earlier?
Dr. Barth. Yes, sir. The Secure Communities Program is
relatively new and is expanding as we speak. I am not sure what
the president's budget will have for 2010 to continue that
expansion, but it has been the Department of Homeland
Security's view that, for some years, the fingerprint biometric
database expansion is an extremely useful tool for identifying
criminals early and dealing with them effectively.
The U.S. Visit Program is the repository of the
fingerprints collection, if you will, of DHS, and the
administration's very close to being able to collaboratively
share fingerprints across other agencies that also have
fingerprint databases to improve the effectiveness of that
program.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, and in other words, we have a databases
out there. And we have state, local officials that would like
to get that information, and I would like for you to get back
to me and see what we can do to expand that, because if it is
something that is working or even on the revoking of the
licenses, if you could let the states know.
And it all goes back to, I think, what Sheriff Gonzalez and
Sheriff Dever were talking about, it is sharing the
information, and this is another example that, I think, you
know, we can do a better job at sharing that information with
our local folks on that.
Dr. Barth. Yes, we will get back to you, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. At this time, I will ask the
subcommittee's unanimous consent to insert Governor Perry's
letter into the record. And there is another question that he
asked, but we will go ahead and submit it into the record also.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Cuellar. All right, at this time, I will recognize the
gentlewoman from the state of Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes
of questioning.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My district in southern Nevada's not directly on the
border, but I imagine that Las Vegas is a key stop along the
supply line of anything moving both north and south. And I
think it is very important that we address those supply lines
that we now learn are miles away from the border.
So what you are doing on the border is very important, but
I would ask you, what are you doing to work perhaps with state
and local officials further up that line to try to break the
line and in that way have some impact on the things that are
happening right on the border?
Maybe Dr. Barth or Ms. Ayala?
Ms. Ayala. We have 26 SAC offices throughout the nation
that are investigating crimes related to human smuggling, human
trafficking, drug smuggling, narcotics smuggling and other
cyber crimes, child pornography and money laundering crimes,
and they have offices that are located, sub offices, throughout
the nation.
And everyday, they work with state and locals just on those
specific issues including Las Vegas and other areas to make the
connection between the border and the supply lines and the
destination cities.
Ms. Titus. Is one of those 26 located in Las Vegas?
Ms. Ayala. We do have an office in Nevada. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. Okay. Well maybe I can get some more information
about what they are doing in that office?
Ms. Ayala. Yes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
As we get ready to close up, I certainly appreciate your
testimony and your answers to the questions, and I know our
ranking member, Mr. Rogers, had some questions so if there is
any other questions that are submitted in writing, I would ask
you to submit the answers to us as soon as possible.
But one of the things that I would ask, and I have done
this, I guess, for the last panels and I am going to followup
on what Mr. Rogers, Chairman Thompson mentioned, and something
that we have been doing with other panels, is that I would ask
you all within 30 days to submit some specific recommendations,
working together, working through your appropriate command
centers.???
But I would ask you, Dr. Barth, if you could include
somebody from city police association for some input here since
we have a sheriff's association.
But what I would ask is first, you know, the sheriffs, you
know, if you can provide a specific recommendations that would
assist you on your day-to-day to activities to provide security
in your respective border communities.
And all of you all together, I would ask you to come up
with some specific recommendations as to how we can have some
sort of coordination between the state, federal, local
officials.
Because one of the things that we are seeing is that, there
are instances in time that an individual will go out there and
do the efforts. For example, you all sent out, and I appreciate
Secretary Napolitano sending Mr. Sexton out there to specific
times. Well, you know, that is a specific time, what is the
follow up?
I mean, is there some sort of communication protocol or
process that we can continue this communicating with the local
folks. So what I would ask all of you all is to get together by
phone, by person, work through your appropriate command
structure and provide a report to the committee in 30 days.
And I mean 30 days from today, and tell us how we can--go
ahead and include the tribal community also in your
recommendations also--to give us some very specific
recommendations as to how we can coordinate and work together
on a day-to-day basis where we can have a structure that works
instead of saying well here is a new administration and they
are doing an effort and then another administration comes in
and then, you know, Dr. Barth, you are gone and, Ms. Ayala, you
are gone, or any of you all are gone, some new people come in,
I am gone, other people are gone.
So we need to have some sort of structure on how we can
coordinate on that and cover all the aspects of it. If there is
specific needs that you all need for--sheriffs, you know, tell
us exactly what specific needs that you have. I would ask you
just temper the request. No, you know, no huge wish lists but
just, you know, very specific things that you all need.
And then, of course, on the federal level, I will ask you
to do the same thing and reach out to our states also, the four
states that we have. But I would ask you to do that. I will ask
our committee to monitor this on a week-to-week basis, we would
like to have a report, because I don't want to come back in 30
days and say, you know, we need additional time.
So our committee will be working with both our counterpart,
Mr. Rogers, committee members also to make sure that you all
come up with very specific requests. And following on what Mr.
Rogers--the inventory, what we need, basically, that type of
concept on that.
Do you all have any questions as to what we are requesting
of?
Okay--30 days from today, without exception, I would ask
you to please provide that information.
Again, to all the members, I want to thank you for being
here.
To the witnesses, thank you for your valuable testimony. We
appreciate it. The members of the subcommittee, as I mentioned,
might have an additional questions. Please provide that to us
as soon as possible.
Having no further business, the hearing is adjourned. Thank
you very much and good day.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Responses from Dr. Richard C. Barth
Question: Secretary Napolitano has promised to increase personnel
and improve screening technology at the border to target the flow of
illegal guns, narcotics, and cash associated with the increased border
violence. We know from experience that one of the best ways to detect
such items is with detector dogs, and DHS announced that it would put
12 dogs toward the outbound inspection effort. But these dogs are being
pulled off of inbound inspection assignments: about half from the
Southwest border, and about half from other regions.
The border is already short-staffed when it comes to having enough
canines to screen incoming cargo, no less outgoing vehicles. We can ill
afford to move these resources away from their current mission areas.
What jobs will these 12 canines be taken from?
When will they be returned to their original posts?
Why was the number 12 chosen?
Response: In the mid 1990's the then U.S. Customs Service initiated
a program to train dogs in the detection of currency and firearms.
These teams were assigned with the intent to direct their enforcement
efforts primarily toward outbound inspection operations. The use of
specialized currency/firearm detector dog teams supplemented the
narcotic detector dog teams, which focus on inbound inspection
operations.
Currently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of
Field Operations (OFO) has 623 detector dog teams trained in several
detection disciplines. Of that number, 340 detector dog teams are
assigned to Ports of Entry (POE's along the Southwest Border (SWB).
Five of these teams, assigned to the SWB, are trained to detect
currency and firearms.
In order to enhance the outbound enforcement effort, directed at
interdicting smuggled firearms and currency, CBP increased the number
of currency/firearms detector dog teams to be trained and deployed in
fiscal year 2009. Training for the 21 new currency/firearms detector
dog teams began in April 2009 with a projected graduation and
deployment date of July 2009. Of these 21 teams, 14 are being assigned
to the SWB.
While the new teams are being trained, CBP deployed seven (7)
additional currency/firearms detector dog teams to the SWB in order to
augment the five (5) currency/firearms detector dog teams already
assigned to the SWB. These seven teams were deployed from airports and
seaports throughout the United States. It is anticipated that the seven
teams will be returned to their home ports once the teams undergoing
training have graduated and been deployed.
CBP currency/firearms detector dog teams are primarily focused on
outbound enforcement operations, so there is minimal impact on the
screening and inspection of incoming cargo, which is screened and
inspected by other detector dog disciplines (narcotics, concealed
humans, agriculture, and explosives).
Question: To counter the rising drug cartel violence, the United
States and Mexico announced the Merida Initiative--a multi-year
proposal for U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America. As part of
this initiative, DHS components, particularly CBP and ICE, will be
required to commit personnel to help train Mexican law enforcement and
customs officials.
Are resources going to be pulled from ongoing U.S. border security
operations to conduct these training missions?
With significant money going to Mexico under Merida, does DHS have
additional resources going to U.S. law enforcement - Federal, State,
and local--along the border?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to
meet recent increases of cartel violence in Mexico with strong action
and solidified coordination with U.S. federal, state, local, tribal and
Mexican authorities.
The Merida Initiative
Merida is funded through Department of State appropriations for use
in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Merida Funding will
support equipment purchases, training and information technology
infrastructure. Although DHS does not receive direct funding under
Merida, assisting and training our Mexican counterparts helps to
increase the effectiveness of U.S. security operations on both sides of
the border. Moreover, we carefully plan our engagement so as to ensure
that our Merida efforts will enhance, not detract from, U.S. border
security operations.
Southwest Border Initiative
On April 24, 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced a major
set of SWB initiatives designed to support Mexico's campaign against
violent drug cartels by limiting the flow of firearms and cash from the
United States to Mexico. These initiatives bring more personnel to the
SWB and place additional technology at strategic locations.
The initiatives will be budget-neutral to the Department, funded by
realigning from less urgent activities, tapping available fund
balances, and, in some cases, reprogramming to deploy resources where
they are currently needed the most.
The exact placement of these increased resources will be determined
by shared intelligence and coordinated with all relevant stakeholders:
federal, state, local, tribal and international. Specific deployment
location information is law enforcement sensitive and is not detailed
below to protect operational planning. Furthermore, resources will be
supplemented or moved based on continual changes in intelligence
information and operational needs. Finally, these deployments parallel
the Government of Mexico's (GOM's) Government's efforts to combat drug
trafficking and associated criminal activity.
Doubling Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) Staffing
DHS will double the number of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents assigned to BESTs--teams that bring
together federal, state, local and Mexican authorities in an
effort to increase cross-border crime investigations, arrests
and prosecutions at strategic locations along the SWB.
Doubling assignments of ICE special agents to BESTs from 95
to 190 will help to facilitate seamless cross-border
enforcement actions. The 95 additional ICE investigators will
augment BEST task forces at the following locations: San Diego
and Imperial Valley, California; Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona;
Deming and Las Cruces, New Mexico; and El Paso, Laredo, and Rio
Grande Valley, Texas. In addition, to further BEST efforts in
Mexico, the Department will assign an additional four agents to
the Mexico City Attache to help coordinate BEST investigations.
BEST details have already begun and the additional personnel
are currently in place.
Tripling DHS Intel Analysts on the SWB
DHS will triple the number of intelligence analysts working
at the SWB, providing a greater capability to develop pre-
operational intelligence reports, strategic intelligence
products and post-operational impact assessments to ensure DHS
resources have the maximum impact possible to protect public
safety.
Thirteen ICE analysts are currently assigned to SWB
operations. Eight are assigned to BESTs and five are assigned
to the Border Violence Intelligence Center (BVIC) in El Paso,
Texas.
ICE will detail 26 additional analysts to the SWB--16 will be
assigned to BESTs in Imperial Valley, Calif.; Phoenix, Tucson
and Yuma, Ariz.; and El Paso, Laredo and Rio Grande Valley,
Texas; five will go to the BVIC and five more to ICE Attache
offices in Hermosillo, Juarez, Mexico City, Monterrey, and
Tijuana, Mexico.
Intelligence analyst details have already begun and the
additional personnel are currently in place.
Increasing ICE Attache Personnel in Mexico by 50 percent
DHS will increase ICE Attache personnel in Mexico by 50
percent. This program supports the Mexican Government, as well
as domestic ICE offices, by pursuing investigations inside
Mexico involving money laundering, narcotics or human
trafficking, and weapons smuggling. With regard to narcotics
and its related activities, and in accordance with the current
Memorandum of Understanding, ICE will coordinate and deconflict
all narcotics trafficking related investigations and activities
related (as ICE does not have independent jurisdiction to
investigate narcotics trafficking inside Mexico) with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) which is designated as the
lead agency and single point of contact for foreign drug law
enforcement operations.
Twenty-four ICE Attache personnel are currently assigned in
Mexico. ICE will detail an additional twelve Office of
International Affairs personnel to Attache offices in
Hermosillo, Juarez, Mexico City, Monterrey, and Tijuana,
Mexico.
Doubling Violent Criminal Alien Sections Assignments
DHS will double the number of ICE Detention and Removal
Operations (DRO) personnel assigned to Violent Criminal Alien
Sections along the SWB. These sections work to expedite
identification, processing for removal, and prosecution of
recidivist criminal aliens.
Due to the large volume of cases of repeat offenders, namely
criminal aliens, doubling Violent Criminal Alien Sections
manpower will allow DHS to expand its ability to identify
perpetrators, develop casework and prosecute these violators.
Fifty DRO officers are currently assigned along the SWB; ICE
will detail an additional 50 officers to support ICE and CBP
operations in San Diego, Calif.; Phoenix, Ariz.; and El Paso,
San Antonio, and Houston, Texas.
Quadrupling the Number of Border Liaison Officers (BLOs)
DHS will quadruple the number of ICE Border Liaison Officers
(BLOs) assigned along the SWB. These officers work to identify
and combat cross-border criminal organizations with a focus on
coordination between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement
authorities.
Ten BLOs are currently deployed along the SWB: five are
assigned in San Diego, Calif., and five in San Antonio, Texas.
ICE will increase the number of BLOs by designating 30
additional special agents already deployed to the SWB to serve
in this capacity--resulting in a total of 40 BLOs operating at
the border. The additional assignments will be in San Diego,
Calif.; Phoenix, Ariz.; and El Paso and Laredo, Texas.
Existing positions are already in place.
Bolstering Secure Communities Biometric Identification Deployment
The Secure Communities program uses biometric identification
technology to share information between law enforcement
agencies in order to focus resources on assisting communities
in removal of high-risk criminal aliens.
Currently, 23 counties in the SWB States of Arizona and Texas
use the Secure Communities biometric identification technology.
Secure Communities plans to make this capability available to
an additional 26 SWB counties in Arizona, California, New
Mexico and Texas within 90 days.
ICE will also activate Secure Communities biometric
identification technology in Los Angeles County, Calif.,
Ventura County, Calif., and San Diego County, Calif.
Implementing 100% Southbound Rail Screening
Using non-intrusive inspections systems, CBP can screen 100
percent of southbound rail traffic to identify the presence of
any contraband, such as weapons or currency. In early March
2009, CBP launched 100 percent southbound rail screening at all
SWB rail crossings.
Increased Maritime Interdiction Operations
In response to numerous U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) reports of go-fast boats loitering
or moving north along California Baja, DHS began focused
interdiction operations. Additional operations over the past
year have successfully stopped drugs and undocumented migrants
from entering the U.S.
Operation Baja Oleada: This maritime operation, which began
in December 2005, cracks down on illegal migrant and drug
smuggling along California Baja to the arrival zone in northern
Baja and San Diego area. The Coast Guard maintains a twenty-
four hours a day, seven-days per week patrol boat presence and
frequently surges additional patrol boats, with air support as
available. In FY 2009, the operation has resulted in seizures
of four vessels and more than 50,000 pounds of marijuana.
Operation Red Zone: This highly successful interagency
operation to detect, deter and disrupt transnational smuggling
threats in the maritime approaches to southern California and
off Baja California ran from February 1 through March 31, 2009.
It involved USCG, CBP, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Navy, local
police and Mexican Navy (SEMAR).
Immediate Port of Entry (POE) Resources Enhancements
Mobile X-Rays. This technology enhances the ability of law
enforcement authorities to identify contraband in passenger
vehicles that may contain weapons and/or currency. Previously,
seven mobile x-ray units were deployed along the SWB--four in
San Diego, two in El Paso, Texas, and one in Laredo, Texas. Two
additional units have recently been moved to Tucson, Ariz., and
Laredo, Texas.
Border Patrol Agents. One hundred Border Patrol Agents
currently stationed in the area will be reassigned from non-
critical tasks to augment southbound vehicle and pedestrian
inspection operations. More than 16,400 CBP agents currently
work between POE's along the SWB. No personnel will be
transferred to implement this initiative as the initiative is
already in place.
Canine Detection Teams. CBP cross-trained canine teams, which
can recognize both currency and weapons, provide enhanced
detection capabilities in cargo and vehicles and on passengers.
CBP currently uses dual-detection teams along the SWB; 7
additional dual-detection canine teams have been deployed, for
a total of 12 teams in California, Arizona, and Texas. Up to 15
additional teams will be deployed to locations yet to be
determined.
Mobile Response Teams (MRT). Mobile Response Teams are
deployed for short operations along the SWB, providing
increased enforcement presence and personnel to conduct
additional inspections of southbound individuals and vehicles.
Three MRTs, consisting of 25 officers each, are currently
available for special deployments along the SWB. Twelve
additional MRT officers have already been deployed to Texas and
Arizona field offices; 24 more are scheduled to be deployed to
the California, Texas and Arizona field offices in early May.
Combined with the four existing teams, these 36 officers will
comprise eight additional teams for a total of 12. Additional
deployments will be determined operationally.
Operation Stonegarden Grants. DHS designed these grants to
enhance cooperation and coordination among federal, state,
local and tribal law enforcement agencies in a joint mission to
secure the border. On March 24, DHS distributed an
informational bulletin to all eligible state and local entities
outlining modified grant guidance for the remaining FY 2006-
2008 balances (totaling up to $59 million). The new guidance
does not take funding away from any states. Rather, it expands
the scope of how the remaining balances can be spent to enhance
current state, local and tribal law enforcement operations and
assets on the SWB. Eligible expenses include activating reserve
and part-time law enforcement personnel, deploying existing law
enforcement personnel, and covering overtime expenses, travel
or lodging for deployment to the SWB. Secretary Napolitano
waived the 50 percent cap on personnel and operational activity
costs for local eligible jurisdictions along the border to
provide additional resources where they are needed most.
License Plate Readers (LPR). License plate readers are
intended to automatically read vehicle license plates and
automate law enforcement queries. Southbound LPR information
provides valuable intelligence, enhances domestic and
international partnerships and supports (or enhances) current
weapon and currency southbound operations. CBP currently
operates 52 outbound LPR lanes at 16 SWB crossings. CBP has
initiated and expanded outbound operations and is moving
quickly to replace the 52 LPRs currently equipped in southbound
lanes to improve accuracy rates and enhance capability.
Periodic Evaluation and Review of the SWB Initiative
DHS will employ an iterative and risk-based decision making
process that will guide the nature and makeup of DHS operations
on the border. Key considerations will be threats and
priorities across all of the Department's missions. Actions and
deployments within this initiative will remain flexible in
order to respond quickly and effectively to the most current
information and intelligence.
Secretary Napolitano will be regularly briefed regarding DHS
operations on the SWB and will conduct quarterly reviews of DHS
enhancements.
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