[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
BORDER VIOLENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF DHS STRATEGIES AND RESOURCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER,
MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 12, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-7
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California PETER T. KING, New York
JANE HARMAN, California LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
Columbia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Mississippi
LAURA RICHARDSON, California PETE OLSON, Texas
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas
JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
MARY JO KILROY, Ohio
ERIE J.J. MASSA, New York
DINA TITUS, Nevada
VACANCY
I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director
ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel
MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
ROBERT O'CONNER, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARTIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona CANDICE S. MILLER, Michichgan
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
AL GREEN, Texas Officio)
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Alison Northop, Staff Director
Denise Krepp Counsel
Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
Mandy Bowers Minority Subcommittee Lead
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida........................................... 47
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas............................................. 43
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas................................................. 47
The Honorable Ann Kirkpatrick, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Arizona........................................... 51
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas........................................ 39
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California............................................ 49
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas........................................ 41
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey................................... 53
WITNESSES
Mr. Robert Rufe, Director, Office of Operations Coordination and
Planning, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Alonzo Pena, Department of Homeland Security Attache, U.S.
Embassy, Mexico City, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. John Leech, Acting Director, Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Salvador Nieto, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Intelligence
and Operations Coordination, Customs and Border protection,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. Kuma Kibble, Deputy Director, Office of Investigations,
Immigration and customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement.............................................
APPENDIX
Additional Questions and Responses:
Questions from Hon. Bennie G. Thompson:
Responses from Mr. Kuma Kibble............................... 61
Responses from Mr. John Leech................................ 59
Responses from Mr. Alonzo Pena............................... 60
Responses from V/Adm Roger T. Rufe, Jr....................... 61
BORDER VIOLENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF DHS STRATEGIES AND RESOURCES
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Thursday, March 12, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Harman,
Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Kirkpatrick, Pascrell, Green,
Massa, Souder, McCaul, and Bilirakis.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony
on border violence, an examination of Department of Homeland
Security strategies and resources.
Good morning and welcome to today's hearing on border
violence. Our panel today consists of witnesses from various
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security who are
familiar with the situation on the ground at the border. I am
hopeful that this hearing will be a forum for an open and
honest dialogue on the resources and the strategies that DHS
has in place to address the growing violence in the U.S.-
Mexican border.
This hearing is very timely in light of the fact that last
week Mexico sent an additional 3,200 soldiers to the border.
This increases the total number of Mexican soldiers combating
drug cartels to more than 45,000. That is about the equivalent
of the troops that we have in Afghanistan.
With the Mexican government engaged in a violent struggle
against these well-armed drug cartels, frequently resembling
advanced military units, the United States and this Congress
cannot ignore our role in assisting our neighbor and ally in
this fight and, of course, in preventing that violence from
slipping into the United States.
A recent report by our former drug czar, General Barry
McCaffrey, said that there is a terrible tragedy that could
take place in the coming decade if we don't develop a
resourced, strategic, appropriate response for the dangers that
we face related to the drug trafficking in Mexico. And I would
like to submit his report for the record.
In developing a strategy to assist and deal with the drug
cartel war in Mexico, there are several key issues, I believe,
that must be addressed. For example, how will we as a nation
address the fact that it is estimated by the ATF, the Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms Agency, that 90 percent of the guns found
in Mexico come from our streets and our stores?
What role do we have in training and preparing and
providing assistance to the Mexican government? How will we
ensure that our shared trade and commerce routes that supply
our country with many essential products are safe from
disruption in Mexico and across the border? And how can we
ensure that a variety of United States departments and agencies
are working together effectively with the limited resources
that we have?
Furthermore, we must clearly assess whether or not the
violence is actually spilling over into our border cities on a
daily basis. Is it affecting innocent bystanders? We must not
hype the dangers in our cities, such as El Paso, which actually
has declining crime rates.
However, we do know that cartel members are present in over
230 cities in the United States. And some of them masquerade as
local gang members who engage in drug-related kidnappings and
home invasions. In addition, we should note that there are over
200 United States citizens that have been killed in this drug
war, most of them involved in the cartels, and a few--very few,
but still--some innocent bystanders.
And with those concerns in mind, it is essential that the
Department of Homeland Security, along with other departments,
continue to pursue a contingency plan to address any spillover
into our country.
So I look forward to a constructive dialogue with the panel
today. We need to gain further insight into the situation at
the border, so that we can have a clear understanding of the
challenges, the resources it is going to take, the strategies
that we can develop.
And since this is one of the lead committees with respect
to strategy and policy at the border, I think it is important.
This is actually the first subcommittee hearing that we hold
this year. We have had several briefings, obviously, on this
issue. But this is the first public one that we have. And I
assume that we will probably have some more in the coming weeks
and months.
And now, I would like to yield some time to my ranking
member, Mr. Souder, on this, because he has been working on
these issues quite a few years, actually probably decades now.
I hate to--you have been in Congress at least that long. And so
I would yield to my ranking member for his opening statement.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Sanchez follows:]
Prepared opening Statement of the Honorable Loretta Sanchez, Chair,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism
Our panel today consists of witnesses from various agencies within
the Department of Homeland Security who are familiar with the situation
on the ground at the border.
I am hopeful that this hearing will be a forum for an open and
honest dialogue on the resources and strategies DHS has in place to
address the growing violence on the U.S.-Mexico border.
This hearing is very timely in light of the fact that last week
Mexico sent an additional 3,200 soldiers to the border, increasing the
total number of Mexican soldiers combating drug cartels to more than
45,000.
To put that into perspective, that is roughly the same, if not more
than, the number of troops the United States currently has fighting in
Afghanistan.
With the Mexican government engaged in a violent struggle against
well armed drug cartels that frequently resemble advanced military
units, the United States and this Congress cannot ignore our role in
assisting our neighbor and ally in this fight, and preventing this
violence from spending across our border.
A recent report by the former drug czar General Barry McCaffrey,
which I would like to submit for the record, warned that ``a terrible
tragedy is going to take place in the coming decade if we don't. .
.develop a resource strategy appropriate for the dangers we face''
related to drug trafficking in Mexico.
I couldn't agree more.
In developing a strategy to assist and deal with the drug cartel
war in Mexico there are several key issues that must be addressed:
How will we as a nation address the fact that 90
percent of guns found in Mexico come from our streets and
stores?
Waht role do we have in training, preparing and
providing assistance to the Mexican government?
How will we ensure that our shared trade and commerce
routes that supply our country with many essentials products
are safe from disruption in Mexico?
And, how can we ensure that a variety of U.S.
Departments and agencies work together efficiently and
effectively to respond to this threat?
Furthermore, we must clearly assess whether or not the violence is
spilling over to our border cities on a daily basis.
We must not over hype the dangers in border cities, such as El
Paso, which has seen declining crime rates.
However, we know that cartel members are present in some 230 U.S.
cities, often times masquerading as local gang members who engage in
drug related kidnappings and home invasions.
In addition, it should be noted that over 200 U.S. citizens have
been killed in this drug war, either because they were involved in the
cartels or were innocent bystanders.
With those concerns in mind, it is essential that the Department of
Homeland Security, along with other relevant Departments, continue to
pursue a contingency plan to address ``spillover'' violence along our
border.
I look forward to a constructive dialogue with the panel today and
hope to gain further insight into the situation at the border, a clear
understanding of the challenges facing the Department of Homeland
Security in coordinating a response with other U.S. agencies, and a
vision of the path forward so that this Subcommittee can ensure that
all necessary resources are available in counteracting this threat of
border violence.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you for
having this be our first hearing and for our excellent
briefings we have had already this year. We have all seen the
news reports about the massive number of deaths and violence in
Mexico with numbers exceeding 7,000 since January 2007. That is
more than 10 deaths every single day for the past 2 years
linked to drug violence.
These are brutal murders, often accompanied with torture as
the drug trafficking organizations battle each other and the
government of Mexico. Most of these violent acts have occurred
in public places and otherwise brought attention of the public
in an attempt to send a message. We have seen some of this
violence come into the U.S. with reports that Phoenix is the
kidnapping capital of America, as cartels across the border
carry out violence against their rivals and associates
operating in the U.S.
U.S. Justice Department recently said that Mexican gangs
are the biggest organized crime threat to the United States
operating in at least 230 cities and towns. In February, I had
the opportunity to travel with Congressman Cuellar and some
other members to Mexico where we met with President Calderon.
His message was clear and direct. His government needs
immediate help and assistance to quell the violence.
It is important that we recognize the sacrifices Mexicans--
Mexico's law enforcement officers, military personnel and the
citizens of Mexico, who continue to be targeted by the ruthless
drug trafficking organizations. Under President Calderon's
leadership, there are 45,000 Mexican military deployed to try
and break the hold of the drug cartels over all the parts of
Mexico. He has established a new police force and is seeking to
root out corruption.
I think it is important to include this in the record to
demonstrate that, while we are very concerned about the
violence and the threat posed to the United States, we
recognize that the government of Mexico is making tremendous
efforts. In many ways, the increase in violence shows that
security efforts, both in the U.S. and Mexico are working and
are in fact threatening the cartels.
That being said, the reality is that there is a crisis at
our borders that could spread to U.S. communities, if Congress
doesn't act. It is critical that the United States move forward
with haste to gain control over our borders. The consequences
of the continued vulnerability along the border are clearly
evident in the violent crime and drug-related death rates
throughout the United States.
I find it very troubling that, during the 110th Congress,
while we worked together on hearings and site visits, the
Committee on Homeland Security did not pass a single piece of
border security legislation, and this subcommittee didn't hold
a markup.
The Department of Homeland Security will play a critical
role in stopping this violence and providing important support
and training to the counterparts in Mexico. It is important
that this committee does what is necessary to help these men
and women succeed in their mission by enacting legislation to
enhance the resources staffing and authority.
Madam Chair, I hope that we can work in a bipartisan
manner, as we have done thus far, to craft such legislation
that will address these critical areas soon.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today. I
look forward to hearing from the Department of Homeland
Security on what we hope to do to help quell the violence that
plagues both of our countries, especially at a time when
violence directed at law enforcement is at an all-time high
with over 1,000 assaults on border patrol agents along the
border last year.
I am equally interested in finding out how funding under
the Merida Initiative will help, and where the southwest border
counternarcotics strategy is in development.
I would especially like to welcome Al Pena, the Department
of Homeland Security attache from Mexico City. We appreciate
your willingness to come to Washington to participate in this
hearing. I think the subcommittee will gain a much better
understanding of what is happening on the ground in Mexico, and
how different initiatives are working from your first-hand
experience. Thank you again for being here.
I thank all the witnesses and look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank my ranking member. I will just remind
him we may not have passed some legislation. But we certainly
increased the resources in the last 2 or 3 years. I know CVP
probably went from about 8,000 people to almost 20,000 people.
So, you know, we have been working very hard at this.
I will now recognize the chair of the full committee, the
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, if he has an opening
statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I
appreciate you calling this hearing to look at what obviously
is a significant issue for a lot of us as well as this country.
And I also would like to thank our witnesses for being here
today to discuss this issue of violence across our border with
Mexico.
Fueled in part by a demand for narcotics in the U.S., drug
traffickers have crossed our nation's southwest border for
decades with a business-as-usual mentality. Sometimes they are
caught. Sometimes they are not. But the reality remains the
same. The drug cartels are making billions of dollars.
Mexican President Felipe Calderon has taken unprecedented
steps to quash the drug cartels and root out crime in Mexico.
His efforts have coincided with increased border security
efforts in the U.S. In response, the cartels have resorted to
extraordinary violence and gruesome tactics to protect their
turf and profits.
Last year alone, violence related to the drug trade claimed
the lives of about 6,000 individuals, a number that can only be
described as shocking. Unfortunately, the violence has shown
little sign of stopping, causing President Calderon to send
thousands more troops to Mexican border towns.
Mexico is not alone in this fight, however. In December,
the first $197 million of the Merida Initiative provided by
Congress was released. Secretary Napolitano has already made it
clear that she will be giving the situation in Mexico her
utmost attention.
I can assure you, Madam Chair and other committee members,
that the Committee on Homeland Security will give it our
undivided attention also.
Madam Chair, because we have five witnesses, I will just
submit the rest of my statement for the record. And I look
forward to their testimony.
The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Fueled in large part by demand for narcotics in the U.S., drug
traffickers have crossed our Nation's southwest border for decades with
a ``business as usual'' mentality.
Sometimes they are caught, sometimes they are not, but the reality
remains the same--the drug cartels are making billions of dollars.
Mexican President Felipe Calderon has taken unprecedented steps to
quash the drug cartels and root out corruption in Mexico.
His efforts have coincided with increased border security efforts
in the United States.
In response, the cartels have resorted to extraordinary violence
and gruesome tactics to protect their turf and profits.
Last year alone, violence related to the drug trade claimed the
lives of about 6,000 individuals--a number that can only be described
as shocking.
Unfortunately, the violence has shown little sign of stopping,
causing President Calderon to send thousands more troops to Mexican
border towns in turmoil.
Mexico is not alone in this fight, however.
In December, the first $197 million of the Merida Initiative
provided by Congress was released.
Secretary Janet Napolitano has already made it clear that she will
be giving the situation in Mexico her ``utmost attention.''
I can assure you that this issue has the Committee on Homeland
Security's attention as well.
The violence is in America own backyard and cannot be ignored.
At the same time, we must be careful about predictions that Mexico
is at risk of becoming a failed state'' or implying that U.S. border
communities are in a similar state as their Mexican counterparts.
Instead, we need thoughtful planning and decisive action where
appropriate to respond to the potential threat to the U.S. and to help
Mexico respond to this very serious problem.
The Department of Homeland Security is uniquely positioned both to
help curb the violence and to respond should the violence ``spill
over'' into the U.S.
Thousands of Border Patrol agents, Customs and Border Protection
officers, ICE special agents, and other Department personnel work the
southwest border every day.
With the right resources, they may assist with interdicting the
southbound shipments of weapons and cash that help feed the violence.
They would also be our first line of defense should violence spill
over the border.
Given its integral role, it is vital that the Department of
Homeland Security have a sound strategy in place to deal with the
situation in Mexico.
Despite some of the dire predictions, we hope never to need to put
such a plan into action.
Howver, we do need to make sure DHS has all the resources and
authorities it needs to carry out such a plan if necessary.
As Chairman of this Committee, I will do everything in my power to
ensure that happens.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the Department's
plans to utilize its assets to prevent and, if necessary, respond to
border violence or other incidents along our shared border with Mexico.
Ms. Sanchez. I think our chairman and our--ranking member
of the full committee is not here to submit his statement. But
I will remind other members of the subcommittee that, under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
So I welcome our panel of witnesses. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being with us this morning.
Our first witness, Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr. from the
United States Coast Guard, retired, was appointed director of
the Department of Homeland Security's Operations Directorate in
July 2006. As director, he is responsible for integrating
operations across the department's component agencies as well
as coordinating with state, local, tribal and other federal
departments. The admiral returned to public service after
having served 34 years in the Coast Guard.
Our second witness, Mr. Alonzo Pena, became the Department
of Homeland Security's attache in Mexico City in July of 2008.
In this capacity, he serves as the department's senior diplomat
and primary contact with the Mexican government. Prior to his
appointment Mr. Pena served as special agent in charge of ICE's
Office of Investigations in Phoenix, Arizona. Welcome, Mr.
Pena.
Our third witness, Mr. John Leech, is the acting director
for the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement at the
Department of Homeland Security. He serves as the primary
policy advisor to the secretary for department-wide
counternarcotics issues. And he came to the Department of
Homeland Security from the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy, where he served as the secretary of defense's
counternarcotics license. Welcome.
Our fourth witness, Mr. Salvador Nieto, was appointed to
the CBP Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination as
the deputy assistant commissioner in November of 2008. In this
capacity, Mr. Nieto leverages the skills of intelligence,
operations and targeting expert to maximize CBP's enforcement
efforts. Mr. Nieto started his career with the border patrol in
1988. Welcome.
And then our final witness, Mr. Kumar Kibble, is deputy
director of the Office of Investigations for ICE. In this
capacity, he serves as the chief operating officer for the
largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland
Security. Mr. Kibble began his federal law enforcement career
as a special agent with the United States Customs Service, of
course, in Los Angeles, California. So welcome.
And without objection, we will take the witness' full
statements. They will be inserted into the record. I now ask
each of you to summarize your statement in 5 minutes or less.
And we will start with Admiral Rufe.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL ROGER T. RUFE, JR., USCG, RET.,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Rufe. Good morning, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Souder, Chairman Thompson and members of the subcommittee. I am
Roger Rufe, director of operations, coordination and planning
at the Department of Homeland Security.
I am pleased to appear today alongside my distinguished
colleagues to discuss how the Office of Operations Coordination
and Planning has coordinated the development of a departmental
southwest border violence contingency plan to prevent or
respond to a significant escalation of violence along the
United States southwest border and adjacent maritime domain.
I welcome this opportunity to discuss how this ongoing
contingency planning effort facilitates the ability of the
secretary to respond to an escalation in violence along the
U.S. southwest border and to execute her incident management
responsibilities in accordance with Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5.
The trend of increasing drug cartel violence in Mexico is
alarming. Rival trafficking organizations vying for control and
against the government of Mexico's anti-drug efforts have
fueled increased levels of violence amongst the competing
traffickers and against those who seek to enforce Mexican law.
In June, 2008 DHS observed increases in violence in Mexico
and along the southwest border and began a contingency planning
effort to address southwest border violence at the direction of
former secretary Michael Chertoff. DHS activated an intra-
departmental operations planning team, with participation from
key interagency partners, to include the Department of Justice,
Department of Defense, and Department of State.
Our role, then, as operations role in the planning process,
was to coordinate the planned development in support of Customs
and Border Protection, who was the lead agency, and other DHS
components and our federal interagency partners.
The operations planning team developed a departmental
guidance statement and a department southwest border violence
operations plan. These two products provided the secretary a
scalable, tailored approach to address the myriad of threats
posed by a significant escalation of violence along the U.S.
southwest border.
Since current DHS resources along the southwest border have
not yet required augmentation, the OPLAN has not been
activated. This operations plan consists of a four-phase system
designed to scale the federal response to the level of violence
in the area of operations.
Phase 1 reflects steady-state operations, our current state
of operations. Field-level, CBP leaders are responding to
events within their area of operations using their organic
resources and plans, as in fact was done just a few weeks ago
when demonstrations on the Mexican side of the border briefly
impacted the flow of commerce at the POEs, at the ports of
entry.
Phase 2 addresses DHS response requirements for an
escalation of violence along the southwest border that is
beyond steady-state, but does not warrant a full federal
response. This phase is divided into two sub-phases to provide
flexibility based on the violence, based on the threat. Phase 2
reflects an escalation of violence that is within the organic
capability of CBP, ICE and the Coast Guard in the area of
operations.
Phase 2b addresses an escalation of violence that requires
a full departmental response, bringing in forces from elsewhere
to augment the existing VH resources in the area of operations.
If it becomes necessary to transition to Phase 2b, the CBP
commissioner will activate a southwest border interagency task
force and appoint a director. This task force will serve as the
field-level hub for coordinating with all state and local
authorities in response to the escalating violence.
In the event that DHS resources are unable to effectively
respond to the situation, or if special operation or if special
response capabilities are required that are not organic to DHS,
the secretary will initiate and coordinate the strategic
operations of a full federal response, that is using other
federal agency resources, in phase 3.
Once the response mission has restored security along the
southwest border and direction is given by the president or the
secretary, phase 4 will begin. In this phase, the task force
will begin demobilization.
Since Secretary Napolitano's arrival at DHS in January, she
has received numerous briefings from the department officials
on Mexican drug cartels, on violence along the southwest border
and the department's enforcement and prevention strategies.
During these briefings, the secretary provided additional
guidance about the scope and objectives of the existing
operations plan.
She directed my office, in coordination with CBP and other
key DHS components, to conduct a review of the operations plan
and to determine whether it will sufficiently address
contingencies on the border other than escalating levels of
violence. As we revise the OPLAN, we will conduct outreach
within the department critical state, local and tribal
stakeholders along the southwest border. This outreach will
ensure that our state and local partners are fully engaged in
southwest border planning.
Thank you for the opportunity to report on our progress
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Admiral Rufe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger Rufe
Good morning, Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder and Members
of the Subcommittee. I am Roger Rufe, Director of the Office of
Operations Coordination and Planning at the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). I am pleased to appear today alongside Deputy Assistant
Commissioner Nieto, Kumar Kibble, Al Pena and John Leech. Thank you for
inviting me to discuss how the Office of Operations Coordination and
Planning (OPS) has coordinated the development of a Departmental
Southwest Border Violence Plan to prevent or respond to a significant
escalation of violence along the United States' southwest border and
adjacent maritime domain. I welcome this opportunity to discuss how
this ongoing contingency planning effort facilitates the ability of the
Secretary of DHS (Secretary) to respond to an escalation in violence
along the U.S. southwest border (SWB) and to execute her incident
management responsibilities in accordance with Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5).
As the Committee is well aware, the trend of increasing drug cartel
violence in Mexico is alarming. As Secretary Napolitano stated in her
appearance before this Committee on February 25, ``Mexico right now has
issues of violence that are a different degree and level than we've
ever seen before.'' The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
is assessing and analyzing the threat Mexican Drug Trafficking
Organizations pose to the border. I&A is working closely with its
sister agencies within the Intelligence Community (IC), and other
Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners to share the most current
information and analysis.
The primary threats along the U.S. SWB are border violence,
southbound gun smuggling, northbound drug trafficking, and illegal
immigration. Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations constitute the
greatest organized crime threat to the United States.\1\ The Sinaloa
and Gulf cartels remain the most powerful in Mexico. Rival trafficking
organizations vying for control against the government of Mexico's
anti-drug efforts have fueled increasing levels of violence amongst the
competing traffickers and against those that seek to enforce Mexican
law. There were approximately 6,000 drug-related murders in Mexico in
2008; that number was more than double the previous year's record. Most
drug-related murders on both sides of the border are limited to people
who are either directly or indirectly (through family members)
connected to the drug trade as traffickers or enforcement officers.
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\1\ (U) National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009 National Drug
Threat Assessment, December 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June, 2008 DHS observed increases in violence along the SWB,
resulting in several incidents where DHS employees, American citizens,
and Government of Mexico (GOM) officials were placed at greater risk.
At that time, contingency planning to address Southwest Border Violence
(SWB-V) was initiated at the direction of former Secretary Chertoff.
DHS activated an intra-departmental Operations Planning Team (OPT),
with participation from key interagency partners (e.g., DOJ, DoD, DOS).
OPS' role in the planning process was to coordinate the plan in support
of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), other DHS components, and our
Federal interagency partners. The Operations Planning Team developed
two DHS SWB-V planning products: a Department Guidance Statement (DGS)
\2\ and a Department SWB-V Operations Plan (OPLAN). These two products
provided the Secretary a scalable/tailored approach to address the
myriad of threats posed by a significant escalation of violence along
the US SWB. Secretary Chertoff approved the SWB-V DGS on November 5,
2008 and the SWB-V OPLAN on January 16, 2009. Since current DHS
resources along the southwest border have not yet required
augmentation, the OPLAN has not been activated.
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\2\ A DGS is a directive from the Secretary to develop a department
level plan with specific guidance on roles, responsibilities, and
associated issues.
The Existing Border Plan
I'd like to share with you details from the current plan. Under the
current iteration of the plan which is based on cross border violence,
DHS developed a four phase system to execute this OPLAN designed to
scale the Federal response to the level of violence in the area of
operations. Phase 1 reflects steady-state operations, our current state
of operations. CBP Headquarters and field offices are coordinating with
the IC, other Federal, State, local, and tribal partners, and the GOM,
to maintain situational awareness along the U.S. SWB. Field-level CBP
leaders are responding to events within the area of operations using
their organic resources and plans. CBP Headquarters is monitoring
events and providing situational awareness to DHS Headquarters through
existing channels. DHS Components, Directorates, and Offices are
modifying and evaluating the Department OPLAN. Response assets have
been identified, and deployment and resource plans are being developed.
Phase 1 will end with the direction of the President or the DHS
Secretary to move to Phase 2a, 2b, or 3.
Phase 2 addresses DHS response requirements for an escalation of
violence along the SWB that is beyond steady-state, but does not
warrant a full Federal response. This phase is divided into two sub-
phases to provide greater flexibility based on the threat. Phase 2a
reflects an escalation of violence that is within the organic
capability of CBP, ICE, and USCG in the area of operations. Phase 2b
addresses an escalation of violence that requires a full Department
response to augment the existing CBP, ICE, and USCG resources in the
area of operations.
Phase 2a, reflecting an enhanced border response, will begin when
directed by the President, the DHS Secretary, or the CBP Commissioner.
This decision will be based either on intelligence indicators and
warnings or on an escalation in violence resulting in the CBP field
leadership's inability to adequately respond using local CBP resources
in the SWB area of operations. CBP field leaders will maintain tactical
lead and continue to coordinate with local DHS and interagency
partners, as well as GOM representatives. CBP Headquarters will assume
the lead to coordinate operations, activate the CBP Crisis Action Team,
and designate a CBP National Incident Manager. CBP Headquarters will
provide situational awareness to DHS leadership, via the DHS National
Operations Center (NOC), with greater frequency.
The CBP Commissioner will request permission from the DHS Secretary
to transition to Phase 2b in the event that full CBP national resources
are unable to effectively respond to the situation, or if specialized
non-organic response capability is needed. Upon approval, the CBP
Commissioner will activate the SWB Interagency Task Force (SWB-ITF) and
appoint a Director. The SWB-ITF will serve as the field-level hub for
coordinating with all State and local authorities. The task force,
which will provide situational awareness to DHS leadership via the NOC,
will be staffed with personnel from selected Departments and Agencies
to facilitate rapid coordination of prevent, protect, and response
activities in the affected areas. Organization, operating hours and
size of the task force will be dependent upon the events occurring on
the ground. My office will activate a SWB Crisis Action Team to monitor
the situation, maintain situational awareness and coordinate Department
and Federal support, on an as needed basis.
In the event that DHS resources are unable to effectively respond
to the situation--or if special response capabilities are required that
are not organic to DHS--the Secretary, under the authority granted by
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPD-5, will initiate and
coordinate the strategic operations of a full Federal response in Phase
3. A tactical response lead will remain with local field leadership
within their respective areas of responsibility, while the SWB-ITF will
assume overall operations coordination. Other Federal Departments and
Agencies providing support may also activate coordination centers,
consistent with their existing authorities.
Once the response mission has restored security along the U.S. SWB
and direction is given by the President or DHS Secretary, phase 4 will
begin. In this phase, the SWB-ITF will develop a demobilization plan.
Demobilization may not occur immediately as it would depend upon
conditions in the field. High levels of violence along the southwest
border may result in a requirement for long-term recovery, such as
housing and care for displaced persons, or to restore damaged
infrastructure. Federal Agencies with authority and responsibility for
recovery may be called upon to activate appropriate coordination
mechanisms. The SWB-ITF will remain activated with the addition of a
recovery coordination cell until such coordination is appropriately
handed off to another coordination entity.
While the Federal response to a significant escalation in violence
may proceed in stages, nothing prevents the President, the Attorney
General or the DHS Secretary, from immediately initiating a higher
level response at any time.
Key Department Roles and Responsibilities
The plan will further clarify Department roles and
responsibilities, including those for U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard,
Transportation and Security Administration, Federal Emergency
Management Administration, Office of Operations Coordination and
Planning, the Office of Intelligence & Analysis, and the Office of
Infrastructure Protection. Because of their predominant role at the
border, CBP will serve as the lead DHS Component responsible for the
effort to prevent and respond to a significant escalation of violence
along the SWB. CBP would also be responsible for coordinating Federal
operations through an organization specifically created by the OPLAN--
the SWB-ITF. The task force is organized to ensure seamless integration
with other Federal, State, local and Tribal partners.
Department of Defense Support to DHS SWB Planning
The Department of Defense (DOD) is involved with our ongoing SWB
planning efforts, and they were part of the OPT activated by DHS in
June 2008. Any DOD support provided in response to a significant
escalation in violence or other significant threat along the U.S. SWB
will fall under the category of Defense Support of Civil Authorities,
where DOD is in a supporting role. Requests for DOD capabilities to
support the interagency response are nested in the well-established
existing Federal request for assistance process (utilizing Title 10 and
Title 32 forces when approved by the Secretary of Defense) and internal
State emergency management procedures (National Guard in State Active
Duty or Title 32 status). DOD support would be requested only if DHS
Components are overwhelmed or do not have the resident capabilities to
fulfill the mission. Areas of potential DOD support include SWB-ITF
staffing, where DOD planning expertise can be used, as well as other
military-unique capabilities, executed either by the National Guard (in
State Active Duty or Title 32 status) or by Title 10 DOD forces. In
accordance with section 377 of Title 10, U.S. Code, such support would
be provided by DOD on a reimbursable basis.
The Next Steps in SWB Planning
It is important to note that since Secretary Napolitano's arrival
at DHS in January, she has received numerous briefings from Department
officials on Mexican drug cartels, violence near the southwest border
and the Department's enforcement and prevention operations. In
addition, OPS, CBP, and other DHS components have briefed the Secretary
about the Department's contingency plans to address increased levels of
violence at the southwest border. During these briefings, the Secretary
provided additional guidance about the scope and objectives of the
existing OPLAN. She directed my office, in coordination with CBP and
other key DHS components, to conduct a review of the OPLAN to determine
whether it will sufficiently address contingencies on the border other
than escalating levels of violence. For example, we should consider how
the Department would change its operational posture in response to
political instability, or a land-based mass migration on the border
that does not necessarily result in violence. To that end, my office
has initiated a revision process for the OPLAN that will result in key
changes to its critical considerations, assumptions, mission statement,
and essential tasks. Additionally, we will work with the DHS Offices
for Intergovernmental Programs and State and Local Law Enforcement to
conduct outreach with the Department's critical State, local, and
tribal stakeholders along the southwest border. This outreach will
ensure that our State and local partners are fully engaged in southwest
border plans.
Conclusion
I am very pleased to report on the progress DHS and the interagency
community are making in expanding the existing contingency plan into a
broader plan that addresses current and emerging security issues along
the U.S. SWB. This broader plan provides the DHS Secretary a graduated,
flexible, and scalable response, using fully integrated Department and
interagency resources, to address the myriad of threats and events that
could occur along the U.S. SWB. Thank you for the opportunity to report
to the Committee on our ongoing efforts. I request that you place this
testimony in the permanent record and would be pleased to answer any
questions at this time.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Admiral.
Our next witness will be Mr. Pena. If you would please
summarize your statement in 5 minutes or less.
STATEMENT OF ALONZO PENA, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
ATTACHE, U.S. EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Pena. Thank you very much. Chairman Sanchez,
Congressman Souder, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
Chairman Thompson, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today in order to discuss the department's role in
addressing border violence and the strategies and resources
that we can bring to this vitally important mission.
The United States and Mexico are bound together by
significant cultural, social and economic ties. We share the
determination to protect our region from transnational threats
such as terrorism and organized crime. As the DHS attache at
the U.S. embassy in Mexico City, I am directly involved in our
efforts to foster cooperation with the government of Mexico. I
am deeply honored that you would invite me to share my
perspectives.
The relationship with Mexico is a priority for DHS. I am
one of only a small handful of DHS headquarters-level attaches
deployed worldwide. And the U.S. embassy in Mexico City is the
only one with six of the seven DHS operational components
represented.
As a DHS attache, I am Secretary Napolitano's
representative in Mexico. I advise the chief of mission on
policy matters related to DHS' work. And I ensure that DHS is
proactively engaged with U.S. government interagency partners
and our Mexican counterparts. I bring with me 25 years of
experience in federal law enforcement in California, Texas,
Arizona and in Mexico.
Nearly every day, the media reports on the violence that
results from transnational criminal organizations operating
within Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border. Addressing
this situation during a 60 Minutes interview, Secretary
Napolitano said: Mexico right now has issues of violence that
are a different degree and level than we have ever seen before.
From my position on the ground in Mexico, I can attest that
the violence has increased. The violence along the southern
border is a result of transnational organizations that wage war
against each other and those who attempt to stop them. Many
innocent people, including brave judges, soldiers and police,
have been murdered. The cartels clearly recognize that the
routes used to traffic narcotics and people northward offer
opportunities to traffic guns and bulk cash southwards.
DHS considers the risk that these cross-border smuggling
routes could be used by terrorist organizations to be a very
high priority. Mexican president Calderon has taken decisive
and historic steps. He has not only directed the federal and
local law agencies to focus their resources fighting
transnational criminal organizations, but he has even drawn on
the Mexican military.
President Calderon has also taken monumental steps to
eliminate corruption, modernize Mexican institutions and to
professionalize staff. The Calderon administration has spent
billions of dollars on these efforts. And thousands of Mexicans
have lost their lives as a result of the cartel's violent
reaction to the fight.
While there is violence in Mexico, it is not, and I repeat
not, an indication of the government of Mexico's inability to
maintain control. Rather, it is an indication of President
Calderon's success in confronting transnational criminal
organizations in Mexico. The violence and lawlessness along the
border represents challenges for Mexico. But the swift and
unrelenting resolve of the Calderon administration should put
to rest any doubts about the Mexican government's ability to
respond to the challenges it faces.
In support of the Calderon administration's historic
efforts, the U.S. government has taken extraordinary steps. DHS
participates in these efforts with significant expertise and
authorities that assist Mexico in identifying, interdicting and
investigating criminal activity at and with a nexus to our
border. DHS has undertaken a number of successful cooperative
efforts and initiatives to assist in confronting drug violence
on the U.S. and Mexican border. These efforts are outlined in
my written testimony.
In closing, I assure you that the efforts being undertaken
by DHS and Mexico are worthwhile and will pay dividends for
both the United States and Mexico. I believe this work must
continue for the national security of both countries. I want to
assure you that Mexico is committed. And we must remain
engaged.
Chairwoman Sanchez, Representative Souder, Chairman
Thompson, again thank you for giving me--inviting me--the
opportunity to testify. It has been a great honor. And I would
be happy to take your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Pena follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. Pena
Chairwoman Sanchez, Congressman Souder and Distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and provide
testimony on the role that DHS is playing in addressing border
violence, and the strategies and resources that the Department can
bring to this important mission. The United States and our Mexican
neighbors are bound together by cultural ties, social and economic
links, a shared tradition of democracy, and a mutual respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual states. We are
further joined together by a determination to protect our region from
trans-national threats, such as terrorism and organized crime. As the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Attache at the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico City, I am directly involved in the Department's efforts to
cooperate with the Government of Mexico (GOM) on a number of homeland
security issues. This issue is especially important to me because I am
originally from Texas and have spent much of my career in Texas and
Arizona. It is an honor to be invited to come before you and share my
perspective on what is happening in Mexico.
Role of the DHS Attache
First, I would like to take a moment to discuss my basic
responsibilities in Mexico City. I arrived in-country on July 9,2008,
and am the first ever DHS headquarters-level Attache deployed in Mexico
and one of a small handful of DHS headquarters-level Attache deployed
worldwide. DHS is also represented by component Attache offices from
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Mexico City is the only Embassy with
six of the seven operational components of DHS represented. In total,
DHS has over 50 personnel in Mexico.
As the DHS Attache, I am Secretary Napolitano's direct
representative at the Embassy in Mexico. I advise the State Department
Chief of Mission on policy matters related to DHS's mission work with
relevant Mexican institutions, and promote DHS goals and objectives
related to border, port and transportation security, civil emergency
preparedness, critical infrastructure protection, information sharing,
immigration and customs enforcement, law enforcement training, and the
security applications of science and technology. I am a member of the
Senior Leadership of the Embassy and the Counter-Terrorism Information
Group and I participate in weekly Law Enforcement and Border Working
Group meetings. I also accompany Senior DHS leadership during their
visits to Mexico.
In short, I am the point of intersection between DHS headquarters
in Washington DC, DHS components in Mexico City, our US interagency
partners residing at the Embassy and officials in the Government of
Mexico. I serve to ensure that all these pieces are connected,
providing policy and strategic guidance so that DHS is integrated into
broader US Government engagement in Mexico.
The Current Situation in Mexico
Nearly every day media outlets report on the violence that results
from transnational criminal organizations operating along the U.S.-
Mexican border. Some of you may have watched Secretary Napolitano's
recent interview with Anderson Cooper on `60 Minutes' which addressed
this very topic. As Secretary Napolitano told the Homeland Security
Committee on February 25th ``Mexico right now has issues of violence
that are a different degree and level than we've ever seen before.''
The violence we observe along the southwestern border is the result
of transnational criminal organizations that wage war against each
other and those who attempt to stop their illicit activities. These
trafficking groups execute with impunity; killing not only members of
competing organizations, but also police officers and soldiers who are
attempting to protect Mexican citizens crime and ensure a strong and
economically viable Mexico. The Administration of Felipe Calderon has
taken serious and courageous steps to combat this violence and to stem
the drug trade which fuels it, but in many cases the drug cartels are
better-financed and better-armed than law enforcement and security
agencies.
It is also the case that cross-border criminal organizations
recognize that routes used to traffic narcotics and people northward
offer opportunities to traffic guns and bulk cash southward. DHS
considers the risk that these cross-border smuggling routes could be
used by terrorist organizations to be a high priority. In the near
term, the drug violence along the U.S. southwestern border challenges
our own law enforcement agencies to ensure the integrity of the border
and to protect American towns and cities while ensuring the legitimate
flow of goods and people across the border.
Neither this criminal phenomenon, nor the violence that follows,
recognize borders. In February, 2009, 755 criminals living in the
United States who are allegedly tied to a major Mexican drug
trafficking organization were arrested. Defeating this transnational
challenge requires a commitment by both Mexico and the United States to
take historic steps to fight our common threat.
Mexican Efforts
President Calderon has taken decisive and historic steps against
transnational criminal organizations. He has not only directed federal
and local enforcement agencies to focus their resources fighting
transnational criminal organizations, but has even drawn on the Mexican
Military to assist civil enforcement efforts. Calderon has also taken
monumental steps to eliminate corruption, modernize Mexican
institutions, and professionalize staff. Additionally, the Government
of Mexico is running joint military-law enforcement anti-drug
operations in ten states, and some 27,000 troops are specifically
involved in counter drug activities, including eradication and
interdiction. His national security team has seized record amounts of
cash, drugs and guns--but the battle intensifies. The Calderon
administration has spent billions of dollars on these efforts and yet,
according to media reports, thousands of Mexican nationals have lost
their lives as a result of the cartel's violent reaction to Calderon's
fight against dangerous criminal groups.
The violence in Mexico appears to be directly tied to Calderon's
success in confronting the transnational criminal organizations in
Mexico, rather than an indication of the Government of Mexico's
inability to maintain control over its territory. While the violence
and lawlessness along the border represent a challenge to Mexican
security, the swift and unrelenting resolve of the Calderon
Administration should put to rest any doubts about the Mexican
government's ability to respond to the challenges it faces.
Mexico is a multi-party democracy, where political power changes in
accordance with internationally-recognized election results. Along with
many other countries, Mexico is facing the challenges posed by
transnational criminal organizations. President Calderon and senior
members of his government recognize that some of Mexico's institutions,
including law enforcement and the judiciary, will need to modernize to
meet these challenges and the United States is committed to support
them.
DHS Effort
In her hearing before the Homeland Security Committee on February
25th, Secretary Napolitano outlined the four actions we must take to
address border violence. First, she stated that, ``interaction with
Mexican law enforcement, particularly the federal government of
Mexico'' is vital to address the drug war. Secondly the Secretary said
we must look ``government-wide at what we can do to stop the southbound
export of weaponry.'' While this effort must certainly focus on the
trafficking of small arms, which accounts for the majority of the
illicit weapons trafficked, the Secretary went on to say we must also
seek to stop the trafficking of ``assault-type weapons and grenades
that are being used in that war.'' Third, Secretary Napolitano
emphasized the need for cooperative efforts and constant interaction
with local law enforcement. And finally, the Secretary noted the need
for a contingency plan for worst-case scenarios.
In support of the Calderon Administration's historic efforts, and
in recognition of our own responsibilities for confronting
transnational organized crime, the United States Government is also
taking extraordinary steps to fight this scourge. DHS' statutory
customs and immigration authorities, its operational capabilities and
expertise, and its strategic placement along the border make DHS a key
part of identifying, interdicting and investigating criminal activity.
With this mission set, DHS has undertaken a number of successful
cooperative efforts and initiatives with the GOM to assist in
confronting drug violence on the U.S.-Mexican border.
I would like to take this time now to highlight a few of our DHS
efforts to strengthen the integrity of the U.S.-border. While most of
these programs are not solely aimed at decreasing border violence, they
all aim to stop the criminality at the border which is the precursor to
much of the violence we are now seeing:
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)
DHS initiated the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)
program in 2006 as a key DHS approach to combat cross-border criminal
activity and violence along our southern border with Mexico. DHS
adopted the initiative to bring together federal, state, local and
foreign law enforcement resources in an effort to identify, disrupt,
and dismantle organizations seeking to exploit vulnerabilities along
the southern border and threaten the overall safety and security of the
American public. A variety of U. S. enforcement agencies participate in
these task forces: ICE (as the lead agency); CBP; DHS' Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF);
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG);
the U.S. Attorney's Office; and federal, state, local and foreign law
enforcement. The result is a cooperative and comprehensive approach
towards combating criminal organizations involved in cross-border
crimes. The Government of Mexico has agreed to assign full-time
representatives to each of the BESTs along the southern border.
DHS now has 12 BESTs: eight on the southwest border; two on the
northern border; and two at seaports. Through the BEST model, DHS has
dismantled arms trafficking, human trafficking, bulk-cash, alien and
narcotics smuggling organizations and their hostage-taking and murder/
kidnapping cells in the United States and Mexico. Since July 2005, the
BESTs have been responsible for 2,034 criminal arrests, 2,796
administrative arrests, 885 indictments, and 734 convictions. In
addition, BESTs have seized approximately 7,704 pounds of cocaine,
159,832 pounds of marijuana, 558 pounds of methamphetamine, 39 pounds
of methamphetamine, 1,023 pounds of ecstasy, 213 pounds of heroin, 97
pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 515 weapons, 745 vehicles, six
properties, and $22.7 million in U.S. currency and monetary
instruments.
Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team (HIST)
The DHS Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team (HIST) was
established in the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) in the Fall of
2007 to ensure the application of national intelligence capabilities to
support border operations, to strengthen intelligence and information
sharing among federal, state and local partners, and to help ensure
that front-line operators have access to the intelligence they need to
efficiently perform their duties. In addition to the deployment of DHS
intelligence professionals to EPIC, DHS I&A is deploying reports
officers and classified computer networks to key locations along the
southwest border. The purpose is to enhance DHS' ability to rapidly and
efficiently share critical intelligence with those who need it most,
and significantly increase our analytic focus on border security
issues.
Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS)
Since August 2005, CBP has worked closely with Mexican officials in
a bilateral alien smuggler prosecutions program called Operation
Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS). OASISS is
a joint initiative between the United States and Mexico that enables
both governments to share information and prosecute smugglers for
crimes committed in the border region. Through OASISS, both governments
are able to track and record prosecution efforts on each side of the
border and work together to make the strongest case against these
criminals. The OASISS program has had a significant and positive impact
on operations, and has furthered smuggling investigations both in the
United States and Mexico.
During the first full fiscal year (FY06-07) of the OASISS program,
the number of alien smuggling cases generated decreased 12% as well as
the number of smugglers prosecuted, which also decreased 70% during the
same time period. This decrease is a direct reflection of the success
of the OASISS program as a tool to prevent and, especially, to deter
human smuggling along the southwest border.
Bulk Cash
Secretary Napolitano stressed the importance of money in reining in
the activity of organized criminal elements along the border, telling
the Homeland Security Committee, ``You have got to go after the money.
You have to interrupt that chain of money that goes in the millions of
dollars back and forth with these cartels.'' ICE has a number of
programs to address the problem of bulk cash smuggling. One of these--
``Operation Firewall''--addresses the threat of bulk cash smuggling via
commercial and private passenger vehicles, commercial airline
shipments, airline passengers, and pedestrians transiting to Mexico
along the southern border. ICE and CBP have conducted various Operation
Firewall operations with Mexican counterparts. ICE is working to expand
existing Operation Firewall operations to designated locations in the
near future, including additional border crossing locations along the
southern border with Mexico. All significant Operation seizures result
in criminal investigations with the goal of identifying the source of
the funds and the responsible organizations.
ICE has also recently established a Trade Transparency Unit (TTU)
with Mexico, located in Mexico City. The mission of the TTU is to
identify cross-border trade anomalies, which are indicative of trade-
based money laundering. Under this initiative, ICE and law enforcement
agencies in cooperating countries work to facilitate the exchange of
import/export data and financial information. The establishment of our
TTU with Mexico was completed in May 2008. ICE has provided, and will
continue to provide, Mexico TTU representatives with in-depth training
on the Data Analysis and Research for Trade Transparency System
(DARTTS). ICE has already installed the system, has provided expert
technical support, and will continue to do so as needed. Mexican TTU
representatives have identified potential criminal targets involved in
crimes such as tax evasion, customs fraud, and trade-based money
laundering. The establishment of the TTU in Mexico City will benefit
both Mexico and the United States in their efforts to combat criminal
organizations.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, ICE's efforts through these programs
resulted in 16 arrests, and 24 seizures resulting in $53,097,485.00. On
January 29,2009, ICE Attache Mexico City agents and the Mexican Customs
Vetted Unit trained in Operation seized approximately $2.4 million in
U.S. currency from an Ecuadorian citizen at the Benito Juarez
International Airport in Mexico City.
Firearms Trafficking
ICE and CBP have the authority to enforce export provisions of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) as specifically designated within 22 CFR
127.4 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). ICE's
investigative priority is to prevent violent trasnationanal criminal
organizations--terrorist groups, drug cartels, and other criminal
entities--from illegally obtaining U.S. origin munitions and related
technology. CBP is charged with ensuring-through inspection,
interdiction, and other enforcement actions-that weapons and munitions
do not cross the border illegally.
CBP, ICE, ATF, and the DEA have developed a joint strategy referred
to as the Southwest Border Trafficking Initiative, which is aimed at
identifying and disrupting the illicit cross border trafficking of
firearms and ammunition. As part of this strategy, the interagency
group has agreed upon broad principles to identify, investigate, and
interdict the illicit cross-border trafficking of firearms and
ammunition into Mexico. Discussions are ongoing to address more
detailed procedures regarding the coordination of multi-agency
operations and information sharing. The initiative's strategy is based
on three pillars: analysis of firearms-related data, information
sharing, and coordinated operations.
In June 2008, ICE formally launched Operation Armas Cruzadas to
combat transnational criminal networks smuggling weapons into Mexico
from the United States. As part of this initiative, the United States
and the Government of Mexico agreed to bi-lateral interdiction,
investigation and intelligence-sharing activities to identify, disrupt,
and dismantle networks engaged in weapons smuggling. ICE has provided
training in appropriate weapons laws and methods used to combat
transnational smuggling; used its Project Shield America outreach
program and made presentations to groups involved in the manufacture,
sale, or shipment of firearms and ammunition along the southwest
border; and used a Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC). The
initiation of Operation Armas Cruzadas has resulted in 104 criminal
arrests, 30 administrative arrests, 58 criminal indictments, 42
convictions and in the seizure of 420 weapons and 110,894 rounds of
ammunition.
ICE has also created a Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF), a
cyberspace task force comprised of the vetted Arms Trafficking Group,
BVIC, ICE Field Intelligence Groups (FIG), and BEST teams, which will
post daily investigative information through the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN). The WVTF will leverage the capability to
communicate and share critical information regarding criminal
conspiracies involving financing, acquisition, and smuggling of weapons
across the common U.S.-Mexico border. HSIN will allow online real-time
access to information on daily firearms seizures and arrests conducted
by ICE, CBP and the GOM, and will create virtual communities where law
enforcement officers can share intelligence and communicate in a secure
environment.
In September 2008, CBP partnered with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) in a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) regarding eTrace, ATF's internet-based paperless
firearm trace submission system and trace analysis module. This
application provides CBP with the ability to electronically submit
firearms trace requests to ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC). It also
provides CBP with the ability to analyze trace results using NTC data.
Information acquired through the firearm tracing process can be
utilized to solve individual cases, to maximize the information
available for use in identifying potential illegal firearms
traffickers, and to supplement the analysis of criminal gun trends and
trafficking patterns.
Drug Trafficking
Both CBP and ICE have significant responsibility in the
interdiction of illicit drugs and contraband that cross U.S. borders,
whether at or between ports of entry. DHS also has the authorities and
expertise to investigate these international smuggling organizations,
while working with our foreign counterparts and U.S. partners such as
DEA and ATF. DHS equities support multi-agency U. S. efforts via Joint
Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) operations to interdict the flow
of cocaine from South America to the United States.
DHS continues to work with the Mexican Government in the
development of increased law enforcement surveillance and interdiction
capabilities. Of particular note is the work being accomplished by the
CBP Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, California.
Information is fed to the AMOC through a network of airborne early
warning, aerostat, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar, and
ground based radar systems. Personnel at the AMOC detect aircraft
``short landings'' and border penetrations and coordinate CBP Air and
Marine and Mexican interdiction assets to intercept, track, and
apprehend smugglers as they transverse the U.S.-border.
Bilateral Strategic Plan
In August 2007, Mexican Customs, ICE and CBP signed a Bilateral
Strategic Plan to fight tans-border crime. The Bilateral Strategic Plan
strengthens cooperation in matters related to law enforcement by
expanding existing institutional cooperation mechanisms and
establishing new programs of collaboration designed to fight
trafficking and smuggling of prohibited goods, fraud, and related
crimes. The plan establishes four working groups addressing capacity
building, border management, customs security, and law enforcement. All
four working groups were formally launched in November 2007. The
working groups will expand on existing cooperation to coordinate and
implement joint security initiatives, efficient border management,
integrity and capacity building assistance and joint enforcement and
interdiction initiatives. The goal of these efforts is to enhance the
security of our southern border with Mexico.
Border Violence Protocols (BVP)
On March 3,2006, a bi-national action plan to combat border
violence and improve public safety was signed by Secretary Chertoff and
his counterpart in Mexico. This action plan set forth goals and
objectives to ensure the appropriate law enforcement agencies of the
respective governments work together to provide an effective,
comprehensive joint response to incidents of cross-border violence and
crime. In response to this plan, CBP created a headquarters bi-national
working group to oversee the development and implementation of Border
Violence Protocols (BVPs) along the southwest border. The BVPs have now
been instituted along the entire U.S.-Mexico border and are working
effectively. At the local level, the BVPs have instituted monthly
meetings between the U.S. Government, the GOM, as well as state and
local law enforcement officials to further develop the working
relationships between both countries. The Border Violence Protocols are
another example of how the United States and Mexico are working closely
together to create a safer and more secure border region.
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology (NII)
CBP employs Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology (NII) at all land
ports of entry and Border Patrol Checkpoints. This technology ensures a
large percentage of conveyances are examined for contraband, in a non-
intrusive manner, while permitting the smooth flow of legitimate trade
and travel. While it would require four officers approximately four
hours to unload and thoroughly examine a commercial conveyance full of
cargo for contraband, a large-scale NII system can produce x-ray images
of the conveyance and cargo permitting two officers to conduct an
examination for contraband in a matter of three to five minutes. This
technology also prevents unnecessary damage to conveyances and cargo
caused by manual methods of inspection and allows the officers
utilizing the technology to see into areas that otherwise cannot be
examined. This technology not only helps to ensure that illegal
contraband does not cross the border but also assists us in keeping our
country safe from weapons of mass destruction. Under the Merida
Initiative, we are hoping to expand the use of this equipment by the
GOM in order to expand both countries' interdiction efforts and ensure
that our border is not the only line of defense against illicit
materials.
Maritime Security
The USCG has a number of cooperative programs with Mexico,
including maritime law enforcement, port security, search and rescue,
environmental response, and other programs that often involve the
Mexican Navy. Cooperation in these areas was formalized through a
Letter of Intent signed by the Secretary of the Mexican Navy, the
Commander of NORTHCOM, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In recent
months the Coast Guard has seen a significant increase in the level of
cooperation with the Government of Mexico in obtaining authority to
stop, board, and search Mexican flagged vessels (or vessels claiming
Mexican nationality) suspected of drug smuggling. This includes recent
cases in which the Mexican Government authorized a boarding in less
than two hours after the ships were encountered. The efforts of our
Coast Guard Attache in Mexico City, in working with his Mexican
counterparts, have greatly contributed to the enhanced cooperation and
the establishment of a stronger working relationship with Mexico on
countering drug smuggling. The United States and Mexico's participation
in summits with other regional partners, agreement on Standard
Operating Procedures, exchanges of information about each nation's
respective laws applicable to maritime drug smuggling, and sharing of
experiences in maritime counterdrug operations continue to strengthen
further the working relationship between our two countries.
Southwest Border Violence (SWB-V) Operations Plan (OPLAN)
In her testimony on February 25th, Secretary Napolitano noted the
need to prepare for worst-case scenarios of border violence escalation.
For such events, DHS has its Southwest Border Violence (SWB-V)
Operations Plan (OPLAN). The OPLAN, which will be addressed by my
colleague in more detail, is the result of an extensive interagency
planning effort. In a crisis situation, the Department may have to
augment the capacity of its component agencies. As Secretary Napolitano
told the Homeland Security Committee, in the event that spillover
violence occurs, ``we do have contingency plans to deal with it. But it
begins with state and local law enforcement on our side of the border.
We support them as the first step in that contingency plan, should we
see that kind of major spillover.''
The OPLAN provides a layered response capacity to provide the
appropriate level of intra-departmental and/or interagency support to
DHS components. The plan builds on the existing plans that rely on
federal, state, local, and tribal coordination.
The list above is not exhaustive. Even if I could provide an
exhaustive list of DHS programs which impact border integrity and
mitigate border violence, no list could fully capture the day-to-day
efforts of the DHS heroes who put their lives in jeopardy every day to
ensure the security of our homeland. Their efforts to stop crime and
violence along the borders of the United States are laudable.
The Merida Initiative
The U.S. Government tailored the Department of State-led Merida
Initiative to provide our foreign partners with the specific tools they
each need to fight transnational organized crime and work cooperatively
with the United States. Through an interagency working group led by the
State Department--which facilitated discussions with Mexico and Central
American officials and coordination with United States Government
officials in those countries--interagency subject matter experts
assessed the needs of each country and proposed specific items to aid
efforts against cross-border criminals.
DHS views the Merida Initiative as a crucial vehicle to facilitate
cooperation and capacity building between the U.S. Government and our
partners in the Western Hemisphere. From the DHS perspective, the
Merida Initiative is an opportunity to more fully engage our regional
counterparts and more cooperatively work together to deter and
dismantle cross-border criminal organizations and the threats they
pose. By working with both regional and U.S. partners on regional
initiatives, DHS multiplies the effectiveness of its own border
security efforts and helps the United States, over the long-term,
develop sustainable security partnerships.
In this sense, DHS sees the Merida Initiative as a step forward in
homeland security and a significant piece of a comprehensive national
security plan. DHS recognizes that a regional effort--which involves
multi-national cooperation--is ultimately required to ensure the
security of our homeland. The United States will be most secure when
the entire region is secure. Our support for the State-led Merida
Initiative builds capability, provides equipment, and facilitates
interoperability so we can work fast and lean, both separately and
together, to detect, apprehend and prosecute members of these
transnational criminal organizations.
The DHS Office of International Affairs works hand in hand with DHS
components such as CBP, ICE and the Coast Guard, to support
implementation of appropriated funds and to determine how they can be
most effectively spent. We also work closely with the Department of
State to enhance Mexican law enforcement capabilities and DHS's ability
to secure the border in cooperation with Mexican agencies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the United States and Mexico must continue to work
together to stem the tide of violence and crime that threatens the
security of both our countries. Our countries have a common goal and
both need accept their respective responsibilities: Mexico will
continue to directly confront internal corruption and criminal
organizations dedicated to trafficking narcotics and other forms of
contraband, which they have done with dramatic results so far; and the
U.S. will have to provide even greater attention to demand reduction,
interdiction, criminal investigations, capacity building, money
laundering flows, and southbound arms trafficking. I believe our
current relationship with Mexico--which is already quite close--will be
further enhanced by the Merida Initiative. I look forward to continuing
my role in Mexico by furthering this important relationship.
Thank you for your invitation to speak before the committee on this
timely and important issue.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Pena.
We will now recognize Mr. Leech to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes or less.
STATEMENT OF JOHN LEECH, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Leech. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Souder,
Chairman Thompson and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to brief you on our work on the 2009 Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy and the Department's efforts
to protect the United States against the growing threat of
violence.
As you know, DHS' Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement is
statutorily charged with coordinating the department's policy
and operations with respect to stopping the entry of illegal
drugs into the United States. Mexico is the transit point for
approximately 90 percent of all cocaine consumed in the United
States. And it is the largest foreign supplier of marijuana and
methamphetamine to the U.S. My staff works closely with the
department's components to strengthen the counternarcotics
capabilities along the border in order to improve our ability
to stop the entry of illegal drugs.
One of CNE's most important objectives is to support policy
and operations coordination and to ensure that DHS components
have the resources they need to execute the department's
counternarcotics efforts along the border. The vast geography
and sparse population make this a difficult task for law
enforcement and make the southwest border a prime environment
that can be exploited for cross-border criminal activity.
The drug trafficking organizations are extremely powerful.
They are multifaceted smuggling organizations involved in other
criminal activities, among them human, bulk-cash and arms
smuggling. Drug trafficking organizations increasingly rely on
severe violence to conduct illegal activities. The confluence
of these activities requires a strategic approach to best
leverage U.S. law enforcement efforts in order to dismantle
drug trafficking organizations and their criminal networks.
Working closely with the Department of Justice's Office of
Deputy Attorney General, my office is currently leading
interagency efforts to develop the 2009 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy. This effort is being conducted
pursuant to the Office of National Drug Control Policy
Reauthorization Act of 2006, mandating a biennial strategy
update and pursuant to ONDCP's request for DHS and DOJ to serve
as the executive agent for this effort.
ONDCP announced the first iteration of the National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy in October 2007. The
current update will provide a more comprehensive and
coordinated approach for recommended actions.
Currently, there are 10 interagency groups carrying out a
detailed evaluation and assessment of recommendations for
improved counternarcotics capabilities. The current process
integrates increased consultation with state, local and tribal
partners, and with the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area and Fusion Centers.
Our consultations with Congress have resulted in the
inclusion of a chapter in the strategy to address southbound
weapons smuggling. Another primary consideration is updating
the Mexico chapter to ensure that the 2009 strategy is aligned
with the Merida Initiative and expands cooperation with Mexico,
in line with our ongoing relationship and discussions.
The primary parameters of this strategy, as provided in
Public Law R-2-1 set forth the U.S. Government's strategy for
preventing the illegal trafficking of drugs across the
international border between the U.S. and Mexico. Two, the
state-specific roles and responsibilities of the relevant
national drug control program agencies for implementing the
strategy. And three, to identify the specific resources
required to enable the national drug control program agencies
to implement the strategy.
In accomplishing these objectives, the 2009 strategy will
provide recommendations for improvements in the following
areas: intelligence and information sharing; interdiction at
the ports and between the ports of entry; air and marine
operations; investigations and prosecutions; countering
financial crime; combating southbound weapons smuggling; a new
chapter on technology; and cooperation with Mexico.
The 2009 strategy will be focused on substantially reducing
the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds and associated
instruments of violence across the U.S.-Mexico border. This
broad strategic goal recognizes the interconnectedness of
various threats and that the relationship between U.S.
government's counterdrug and other law enforcement missions
range from complimentary to interdependent.
Drug traffickers exploit the border in two directions,
smuggling drugs from Mexico into the United States, and moving
weapons and billions of dollars in illicit drug profits from
the United States into Mexico. To achieve the goal, the 2009
strategy will include six cross-cutting strategic objectives.
These are: one, to enhance intelligence capability
associated with the southwest border; two, to interdict illicit
drugs, drug proceeds and associated instruments of violence in
the air, at the ports of entry and between the ports of entry;
three, to ensure prosecution of all significant drug
trafficking, money laundering, bulk currency and firearms and
weapons cases; four, to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking
organizations; five, to enhance counterdrug technologies for
drug detection and interdiction; and six, to enhance U.S.-
Mexico cooperation regarding joint counterdrug efforts.
To get at the root of the problem causing the violence
along the southwest border, it is imperative that we enhance
our counternarcotics capabilities. The 2009 strategy will
provide detailed interagency recommendations aimed at
supporting its strategic objectives and its overarching goal.
The forward vision of the 5-year planning period of the 2009
strategy is one of document's key strengths.
In conclusion, as the violence and instability created by
the drug press ever harder at our southwest border, it is clear
that national attention and a national response are required.
We are fortunate to have the backing of our interagency
partners, support of Congress and a willing partner in Mexico
to fight this battle aggressively.
I would like to close with these last few remarks. I want
to extend a great thanks and appreciation to all of you for
your attention to this effort at this point in time.
I also want to extend my thanks to the Office of National
Drug Control Policy. There is a new team in town, and we look
forward to getting a lot of things done with this team. The
current team they have in place over there, Ed Jurith, Mark
Kumer, Pat Ward and others were simply the best in the
business. Congress made a wise decision to require a biannual
update of this strategy.
And ONDCP has entrusted my office to serve as the executive
agents and lead this process. It is right that we do so, since
our office oversees, within DHS, 88 percent of all counterdrug
interdiction funding and resources for the nation.
Last week, I returned from a trip to Mexico in order to
become better familiar with the drug threat faced by the
government of Mexico in my new role as the acting director. The
government of Mexico's federal and state agency are hungry for
change. They are weary of proliferation of drugs and violence.
More importantly, they want to work with us at all echelons of
our federal government, from our GS-13s to our most senior
government employees.
I would like to close by reading just a very, very short
line or two from an e-mail. My team visited the Financial
Intelligence Unit while we were in Mexico. And I asked what we
could do, what the U.S. government could do to help their
efforts. She wrote back, Regina Martha Gonzales.
She says: Mr. Leech, it was a great pleasure meeting you at
the offices of the Financial Intelligence Unit of Mexico.
Thanks to you and your colleagues for your kind visit. Please
know that we are overwhelmed by the openness of your proposals.
We really want to thank you in advance for your interest in
enhancing the cooperation among the FIU and the our
counterparts in the U.S.
And I heard this from every agency that I visited: the SST,
the SRE, the FIU, their customs. They are hungry and eager to
work with us. We have a Congress that wants to move things
forward. And we have a White House and a secretary that want to
do the same. So we are at a point in time to where we can
really make a difference in this effort. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Leech follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Leech
Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Souder and Members of the
Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to brief you on our work on the 2009
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and the Department's efforts
to protect the United States against the growing threat of violence. It
is an honor to testify as part of a discussion on the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) strategies that could help address the
violence along the U.S. southwest border. California, Arizona, New
Mexico and Texas are in a precarious situation. Tragically, just across
our southern border, Mexico suffered over 6,000 narco-related murders
last year as the drug trafficking organizations battled for control of
drug trafficking routes to the United States. As violence south of the
border continues to grow, we have begun to see disturbing increases in
kidnappings, gang activity, illicit smuggling, and other drug-related
crimes in U.S. communities and States on the northern side of the
border. The violence has also prompted a rise in asylum requests from
Mexican citizens. I welcome the Committee's attention to this homeland
security threat. More importantly, I look forward to your thoughts and
ideas as we work to seek a solution. Your input has already been
helpful as we work to develop the 2009 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy.
As you know, DHS' Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) is
statutorily charged with coordinating the Department's policy and
operations with respect to stopping the entry of illegal drugs into the
United States. Mexico is the transit point for approximately 90 percent
of all cocaine consumed in the United States and it is the largest
foreign supplier of marijuana and methamphetamine to the United States.
My staff works closely with the Department's components to strengthen
the counternarcotics capabilities along the U.S.--Mexico border in
order to improve our ability to stop the entry of illegal drugs into
the United States.
One of CNE's most important objectives is to support policy and
operations coordination and to ensure that DHS Components have the
resources they need to support the Department's counternarcotics
efforts along the southwest border. The vast geography and sparse
population make this a difficult task for law enforcement and make the
southwest border a prime environment that can be exploited for cross-
border criminal activity. The drug trafficking organizations are
extremely powerful. They are multifaceted smuggling organizations
involved in other criminal activities, among them human, bulk-cash, and
arms smuggling. Drug trafficking organizations increasingly rely on
violence and terrorist type tactics to conduct illegal activities. The
confluence of these activities requires a strategic approach to best
leverage U.S. law enforcement's efforts in order to dismantle drug
trafficking organizations and their criminal networks.
Working closely with the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of
the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), my office is currently leading
interagency efforts to develop the 2009 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy. This effort is being conducted pursuant to
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Reauthorization Act
of 2006 (Public Law 109-469), mandating a biennial strategy update, and
pursuant to ONDCP's request for DHS and DOJ to serve as the ``Executive
Agents'' for this effort.
ONDCP announced the first iteration of the National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy in October 2007. The current update
will provide a more comprehensive and coordinated approach for
recommended actions. I'm very proud of the robust interagency effort
involved in developing the 2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics
Strategy. We are relying on the subject matter experts to identify the
best and most appropriate actions to support interagency agreed-upon
objectives.
Currently, there are ten interagency groups carrying out a detailed
evaluation of recommendations for improved counternarcotics
capabilities. The current process also integrates increased
consultation with State, local and tribal partners, and with the
Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and
Fusion Centers. Our consultations with Congress will result in the
inclusion of a chapter in the Strategy to address southbound weapons
smuggling. Another primary consideration is updating the Mexico chapter
to ensure that the 2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy is
aligned with the Merida Initiative and expands cooperation with Mexico;
in line with our ongoing relationship and discussions.
The primary parameters of the 2009 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy, as provided in Public Law 109-469, are to:
Set forth the U.S. Government's strategy for
preventing the illegal trafficking of drugs across the
international border between the United States and Mexico,
including through ports of entry and between ports of entry on
that border;
State the specific roles and responsibilities of the
relevant National Drug Control Program agencies for
implementing the Strategy; and
Identify the specific resources required to enable the
National Drug Control Program agencies to implement the Strategy.
In accomplishing these objectives, we anticipate that the 2009
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy will provide recommendations
for improvements in: intelligence and information sharing; interdiction
at ports of entry; interdiction between ports of entry; air and marine
operations; investigations and prosecutions; countering financial
crime; combating southbound weapons smuggling, technology; and
cooperation with Mexico. While tunnels are addressed throughout the
document, we anticipate the document will include an appendix that
provides: (1) a strategy to significantly reduce the construction and
use of tunnels and subterranean passages that cross the international
border between the United States and Mexico for the purpose of illegal
trafficking of drugs across such border; and (2) recommendations for
criminal penalties for persons who construct or use a tunnel or
subterranean passage for such purpose.
The 2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy will be focused
on substantially reducing the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and
associated instruments of violence across the U.S.-Mexico border. This
broad strategic goal recognizes the interconnectedness of various
threats and that the relationship between U.S. Government's counterdrug
and other law enforcement missions range from complimentary to
interdependent. Drug traffickers exploit the border in two directions,
smuggling drugs from Mexico into the United States, and moving weapons
and billions of dollars in illicit drug profits from the United States
into Mexico.
To achieve the goal, we anticipate that the 2009 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy will include six cross-cutting strategic
objectives. Those are:
1. Enhance intelligence capabilities associated with the
southwest border;
2. Interdict drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments
of violence in the air, at the ports-of-entry, and between the
ports-of-entry along the southwest border;
3. Ensure the prosecution of all significant drug trafficking,
money laundering, bulk currency smuggling and firearms and
weapons cases;
4. Disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations;
5. Enhance counterdrug technologies for drug detection and
interdiction along the southwest border; and
6. Enhance U.S.--Mexico cooperation regarding joint counterdrug
efforts.
To get at the root of the problem causing the violence along the
southwest border, it is imperative that we enhance our counternarcotics
capabilities. The 2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy will
provide detailed interagency recommendations aimed at supporting its
strategic objectives and overarching goal. The forward vision of the
five-year planning period of the 2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics
Strategy is one of document's key strengths.
During my recent visit to Mexico, I had the opportunity to meet
with our various law enforcement attache at our Embassy and with
Mexican government officials. I was impressed first by Mexico's
commitment to combat the drug cartels and root out corruption. I was
greatly impressed by the strides made in Mexico's use of information
technology to strategically attack the problems caused by organized
crime and the drug trafficking organizations. DHS components have a
long-standing history of cooperation with their Mexican counterparts.
Advancing that relationship will be an important component on efforts
to further strengthen U.S. border security. We hope to encourage
increased cooperation with the Government of Mexico and we will ensure
that the U.S. Government's activities in the 2009 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy complement the coordination and information
sharing facilitated through the Merida Initiative.
The current violence along our southwest border is only symptomatic
of a highly sophisticated, multi-billion dollar, well-armed
transnational criminal system built on around the production,
transportation, and sale of dangerous illicit narcotics. Further,
narcotics smuggling and related criminal activities are localized
problems along the border. The damage to our Nation is tremendous.
Illicit drugs are responsible for the death of more than 20,000
Americans each year. The social costs of the drug trade are well in
excess of $100 billion annually. And more than $30 billion in illegal
drug proceeds are estimated to exit this country to support drug
trafficking and other illicit activities. The 2009 Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy will address immediate vulnerabilities along
our border, but it will also address the threat to homeland security
posed by the drug trade.
As the violence and instability created by the drug trade press
ever harder at our southwest border, it is clear that national
attention and a national response are required. We are fortunate to
have the backing of our interagency partners, the support of Congress,
and a willing partner in Mexico to fight this battle aggressively.
Thank you for your time and I will be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Leech. Thank you for your
testimony.
Mr. Nieto, I now recognize you for 5 minutes or less to
summarize your testimony.
STATEMENT OF SALVADOR NIETO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, DHS
Mr. Nieto. Thank you and good morning. Chairwoman Sanchez,
Ranking Member Souder, Chairman Thompson, members of the
subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before
you today to discuss the work of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, otherwise known as CBP.
CBP is the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency
in the country. We station over 20,000 CBP officers at access
points around the nation, at air, land and seaports. By the end
of fiscal year 2009, we will have deployed over 20,000 border
patrol agents between the ports of entry. These forces are
supplemented by 980 air and marine agents, 2,260 agricultural
specialists and other professionals.
A key and growing area of emphasis for CBP involves
interdiction of weapons and currency. Escalating violence in
the border regions and interior of Mexico poses a significant
threat to both the United States and Mexico. Secretary
Napolitano has tasked all DHS components, including CBP, to
examine how we can increase our enforcement activities in an
effort to mitigate southbound weapon and currency smuggling to
the extent that resources and infrastructure currently allow.
We have ongoing initiatives by way of short-term plus-ups,
operations plans that call for enhanced resources that include
state and local law enforcement agencies, the mobility of CBP
resources from outside the immediate area, and national level
tactical teams such as the border patrol tactical team and
field operations special response teams. We continue enhancing
our plans to address all threats and all hazards at the border.
A majority of these illegal drugs consumed in the United
States originate from or pass through Mexican territory or
territorial seas. Huge illicit trafficking profits flow back to
Mexico drug trafficking organizations across our common border.
The Mexican government's ability to confront its drug
trafficking industry and its willingness to cooperate with U.S.
efforts directly affect the impact of any southwest border
initiative.
CBP has established positions at the El Paso Intelligence
Center, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion
Center and the DEA Special Operations Division, to name a few.
These initiatives enhance interaction with the intelligence
community and law enforcement agencies. Additionally, CBP's
Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination established
a national post-seizure analysis team and is in the process of
establishing intelligence operations coordination centers in
the field.
The IOCCs will make CBP a more fully integrated,
intelligence-driven organization by linking intelligence
efforts and products to operations and interdictions. CBP works
with other agencies to provide actionable intelligence to the
Joint Interagency Task Force South, otherwise known as JIATF
South. This intelligence is used to interdict the flow of
cocaine from northern South America to the United States at the
transit zone.
Detection of border air incursions is essential to
effective interdiction operations along our borders with
Mexico. The primary means of detection is a large radar network
monitored by the Air and Marine Operations Center, otherwise
known as AMOC, in Riverside, California. Personnel at the AMOC
detect aircraft short landings and border penetrations and
coordinate CBP and Mexican interdiction assets to intercept,
track and apprehend smugglers as they transverse the U.S.-
Mexico border.
CBP continues its evolution to become a more integrated,
intelligence-driven organization. And we are in the process of
enhancing field-level intelligence and information sharing.
Intelligence gathering and predictive analysis require new
collection and processing capabilities.
CBP is also developing the analytical framework for
intelligence, a set of data processing tools that will improve
the effectiveness of CBP and other DHS analysts in detecting,
locating and analyzing terrorist networks, drug trafficking
networks and other similar threats. These intelligence and
operational coordination initiatives complement the secure
border initiatives technology programs.
Thank you for the opportunity to describe our plans for
border security and to highlight some of our progress to date.
With your continued support of DHS, CBP and ICE, I am confident
that we will continue to make a tremendous stride in increasing
control of our borders. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Nieto follows:]
Prepared Statement of Salvador Nieto
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, Members of the
Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today
to discuss the work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
particularly the tremendous dedication of our men and women in the
field both at and between our ports of entry.
CBP is the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency in the
country. We station over 20,000 CBP officers at access points around
the nation--air, land, and sea ports. By the end of FY 2009, we will
have deployed over 20,000 Border Patrol agents between the ports of
entry. These forces are supplemented with 980 Air and Marine agents,
2,260 agricultural specialists, and other professionals.
I am pleased to report that CBP continues to achieve success in
performing our traditional missions, which include stemming the flow of
illegal drugs and contraband, protecting our agricultural and economic
interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American
businesses from theft of their intellectual property, enforcing
violations of textile agreements, tracking import safety violations,
protecting the economy from monopolistic practices, regulating and
facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and
enforcing United States trade laws. At the same time, our employees
maintain a vigilant watch for terrorist threats. In FY 2008, CBP
processed more than 396 million pedestrians and passengers, 122 million
conveyances, 29 million trade entries, examined 5.6 million sea, rail,
and truck containers, performed over 25 million agriculture
inspections, apprehended over 720 thousand illegal aliens between our
ports of entry, encountered over 220 thousand inadmissible aliens at
the ports of entry, and seized more than 2.8 million pounds of
narcotics.
We must perform our important security and trade enforcement work
without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so
important to our nation's economy. These are our twin goals: border
security and facilitation of legitimate trade and travel.
Border Security Between the Ports of Entry
The primary goal of our strategy between the ports of entry is to
gain effective control of our nation's borders. Effective control is
achieved when a Chief Border Patrol Agent determines that agents
deployed in any given area are consistently able to: detect an illegal
entry into the United States between the ports of entry; identify and
classify the threat level associated with that illegal entry; respond
to the area of the illegal entry; and bring the situation to a law
enforcement resolution.
During Secretary Napolitano's congressional hearing a few weeks
ago, she explained the importance of having a border security strategy
that incorporates the elements of effective control. Effective control
is established through the proper mix of technology, personnel, and
infrastructure that will allow CBP personnel to confront the criminal
element before they can get away. Secretary Napolitano often refers to
this strategy as the ``three-legged stool.'' One of these legs cannot,
in and of itself, provide effective control. However, the mix of these
three components will vary depending on the challenges of the focus
area. Technology is the baseline requirement for any area of
operations. It allows us to detect the entries and to identify and
classify the threat. Personnel provide the response to confront the
criminal element. Tactical Infrastructure supports the response by
either providing access, or extending the time needed for the response
by deterring or slowing the criminal element's ability to easily cross
the border and escape.
Essentially, two basic conditions must exist to ensure that our
agents can safely and effectively secure our borders between the ports
of entry. First, we must have situational awareness--that is, we must
have knowledge about what is happening between the ports of entry. The
knowledge must be precise and timely enough for us to react to the
knowledge. Second, we must have the capability to react to the
knowledge at a time, place, and manner of our choosing.
As of the end of fiscal year 2008, we determined 757 miles of
border were under effective control. Of that total, 625 miles were on
the southwest border between the United States and Mexico, which is
where a majority of illicit, cross-border activity occurs. Where we do
not yet have control on the southwest border, we have made significant
strides in increasing our situational awareness and tactical advantage
over those seeking to violate our laws. With increased situational
awareness, we can better understand where we have the highest threats
and vulnerabilities, and assess where we need to apply our resources.
The ability to have situational awareness also enables our agents and
officers to perform their jobs more safely and more effectively. This
is especially critical during times such as these where we are
experiencing high levels of violence at our nation's borders.
Between the ports of entry, CBP personnel involved in border
security include Border Patrol Agents, Air Interdiction Agents, and
Marine Interdiction Agents. Personnel in adequate number are highly
effective resources. They can observe and therefore provide for the
type of situational awareness that is necessary for effective control.
Unique among the elements of the three-legged stool, personnel also
have the capacity to respond. Personnel are highly effective and
flexible, but the number of personnel required to perform the entire
border security mission would be prohibitive if they were not properly
augmented by tactical infrastructure and technology.
Tactical infrastructure includes--among other things--pedestrian
fence, vehicle fence, roads, and lighting. Tactical infrastructure
supports CBP's ability to respond in several ways. Fence, for example,
is a fixed resource that provides a constant and continuous effect. I
wish to be very clear--fence alone does not and cannot, in and of
itself, provide effective control of the border. It does, however,
deter and delay illicit cross-border incursions. This continuous and
constant ability to deter or delay is what we refer to as ``persistent
impedance.'' There are areas of the border where we have concluded that
we must have persistent impedance in order to achieve effective
control, because we must at least delay attempted illicit incursions.
These delays buy time for our agents to respond. This is critical in
areas near cities, for example, where illicit border crossers could
blend into the population before we could interdict them. It is also
critical in areas where vehicles could reach nearby roads faster than
we could respond without persistent impedance.
Technology is an important leg of the stool. Although some refer to
technology as a ``virtual fence,'' technology does not have the
persistent impedance capability of a real fence. It does, however,
provide timely and accurate information that physical infrastructure
could not. Between the ports of entry, technology includes sensors,
command and control systems, and communications. Technology is a
powerful force multiplier because it has tremendous capability to
provide the situational awareness that is a precursor to effective
control. Sensors can ``watch'' the border continuously, guided by
appropriate command and control systems. These command and control
systems can also help sort the data coming from the sensors so that our
responders have very quick access to the most critical information.
Technology also supports response capability. With accurate information
to identify and classify illicit incursions, agents have many more
options about how and when they will respond to the incursion. Improved
communications capability also supports response by ensuring our
response forces can be properly directed and coordinated.
Over the past year, we have made significant strides in
strengthening all three legs of our three-legged stool. As of February
14, 2009, we had 18,566 Border Patrol Agents on-board. We have
identified 661 miles of southwest border where persistent impedance was
a requirement and 610 miles of fence is already constructed along the
southwest border. Most of the remaining mileage is under construction
and will be complete this Spring. With respect to technology, we have
purchased 40 mobile surveillance systems (MSSs) and deployed them to
the southwest border. These MSSs provide radar and camera coverage and
serve as a gap-filler while we deploy more permanent technology
solutions. Later on in the testimony, I will provide more detail about
our vision for those more permanent solutions.
Support of U.S./Mexican Counter-Drug and Counter-Terrorism Initiatives
A key and growing area of emphasis involves interdiction of weapons
and currency. Escalating violence in the border regions and interior of
Mexico poses a significant threat to both the United States and Mexico.
Secretary Napolitano has tasked all DHS components, including CBP to
examine how we can increase our enforcement activities in an effort to
mitigate southbound weapon and currency smuggling to the extent that
resources and infrastructure allow.
A majority of the illegal drugs consumed in the United States
originate from or pass through Mexican territory and territorial seas.
Huge, illicit trafficking profits flow back to Mexican drug trafficking
organizations across our common border. The Mexican government's
ability to confront its drug trafficking industry and its willingness
to cooperate with U.S. efforts directly affect the impact of any
southwest border initiative.
CBP has established positions at the El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion
Center, and the DEA Special Operations Division. These initiatives
enhance interaction with the Intelligence Community (IC) and law
enforcement agencies to more effectively facilitate the collection,
analysis, and dissemination of actionable drug-related intelligence.
Additionally, CBP's Office of Intelligence and Operations
Coordination established a National Post Seizure Analysis Team (PSAT)
at the National Targeting Center-Cargo and is in the process of
establishing Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (IOCC) with
the first one under construction in Tucson, Arizona. The IOCCs will
make CBP a more fully integrated, intelligence driven organization by
linking intelligence efforts and products to operations and
interdictions. Reciprocal benefits will be a greater capability to
expeditiously move feedback from the end users back to the originator.
Operation Panama Express is a multi-agency international drug flow
investigation that combines detection and monitoring, investigative,
and intelligence resources to provide actionable intelligence to Joint
Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) operations to interdict the flow
of cocaine from northern South America to the United States. JIATF-S
interdiction operations in the transit zone supported by CBP P-3
Airborne Early Warning, Coast Guard HC-130, Coast Guard vessels, and
CBP P-3 Tracker aircraft interdict large, sometimes multi-ton,
shipments before they can be split into smaller loads for movement
across the southwest border over multiple routes and distributed to
U.S. cities, towns, and small communities.
CBP continues to work with the Mexican Government in the
development of increased law enforcement surveillance and interdiction
capabilities. Detection of U.S./Mexican border air intrusions is
essential to effective interdiction operations along our borders with
Mexico. The primary means of detection is a large radar network,
monitored at the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside,
California. Information is fed to the AMOC through a network of
airborne early warning, aerostat, Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), and ground based radar systems. Personnel at the AMOC detect
aircraft ``short landings'' and border penetrations and coordinate CBP
Air and Marine and Mexican interdiction assets to intercept, track, and
apprehend smugglers as they transverse the U.S./Mexico border.
The Government of Mexico sustains a strong commitment to
interdiction. CBP will continue to assist the government of Mexico in
maintaining its counterdrug effort, including Command, Control,
Communications, and Information support.
Intelligence and Operational Coordination
CBP continues its evolution to become a more integrated,
intelligence-driven organization and we are in the process of
establishing a robust field organization. The CBP Office Intelligence
and Operations Coordination is in the process of developing
capabilities which will integrate CBP intelligence and operational
elements for more effective command and control, mission deployment,
and allocation of resources.
Intelligence gathering and predictive analysis require new
collection and processing capabilities. CBP is also developing the
Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI), a set of data processing
tools that will improve the effectiveness of CBP and other DHS analysts
in detecting, locating, and analyzing terrorist networks, drug
trafficking networks, and similar threats. These intelligence and
operational coordination initiatives complement SBI's technology
programs.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to describe our plans for border
security and to highlight some of our progress to date. With your
continued support of DHS, CBP and ICE, I am confident that we will
continue to make tremendous strides in increasing control of our
borders.
I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Sanchez. Perfect, exactly 5 minutes, Mr. Nieto.
Mr. Nieto. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you for your testimony.
I will now recognize Mr. Kibble to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes or less.
STATEMENT OF KUMAR KIBBLE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Kibble. Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder,
Chairman Thompson and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Acting
Assistant Secretary Torres, I thank you for the opportunity to
discuss ICE's efforts to combat cross-border crime and the
related violence.
ICE has the most expansive investigative authority and the
largest force of investigators in DHS. But this challenge can't
be addressed by one agency. Partnerships are essential. And ICE
works closely with foreign, federal, tribal, state and local
agencies to secure our borders.
DHS recognizes that southbound weapons smuggling is a grave
concern amid the growing violence along the border with Mexico.
This violence requires a comprehensive bilateral effort. And on
January 30, Secretary Napolitano responded by issuing a border
security action directive which focused the wide-ranging
authorities of the department on the violence along our
southern border. The secretary emphasized the necessity of a
broad, multi-agency response to attack the flow of weapons and
money that continues to fuel the violence.
ICE contributes to that fight principally through two
bilateral initiatives: Operation Firewall to counter bulk-cash
smuggling, and Operation Armas Cruzadas to counter weapons
smuggling. The ICE-led Border Enforcement Security Task Forces,
or the BEST, provide a comprehensive, multi-agency platform to
fight these particular threats.
Under Armas Cruzadas, U.S. and Mexican investigators
synchronize bilateral law enforcement and intelligence sharing
activities to detect, disrupt and dismantle these weapons-
smuggling networks. Key supporting actions include use of ICE's
long-standing export authorities under the Arms Export Control
Act, as well as newly acquired export authority that is
particularly useful in targeting weapons smuggling.
To more seamlessly investigate these networks that span our
common border, BEST, ICE attache offices, a U.S.-vetted Mexican
arms trafficking group and the ICE border violence intelligence
cell exchange weapons-related intelligence.
For example, in August of 2008, an ICE investigation
developed information that was rapidly shared with Mexican
investigators regarding a safehouse in Nogales, Sonora operated
by hitmen for the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes drug trafficking
organization. A subsequent search warrant at the residence
resulted in six arrests, the seizure of police uniforms, a
large amount of U.S. currency, 12 weapons and four stolen U.S.
vehicles.
Intelligence stemming from actions like this are analyzed
on a routine basis by the border violence intelligence cell.
And in December of last year, this cell, in conjunction with
other DHS intelligence components, produced a strategic
assessment of southbound gun smuggling that informed our
current operations along the southwest border.
Let me share another example of how ICE partners with
others, such as ATF and local investigators, in combating
weapons smuggling. ICE, ATF and the San Antonio Police
Department initiated an investigation of Ernesto Olvera-Garza,
a Mexican national that, at the time of his arrest in October
of 2007, trafficked in high-powered, high-capacity hand guns
and assault rifles. He LED a gun-smuggling conspiracy that
included at least nine straw purchasers who purchased firearms
on his behalf.
More than 50 weapons were purchased and smuggled to Mexico
as part of this ring. One of these weapons was recovered in
Mexico after it was used in a gun battle where two Mexican
soldiers were killed. Olvera-Garza has pleaded guilty and is
pending sentencing.
All together, since the initiation of Armas Cruzadas, DHS
has seized 420 weapons, more than 110,000 rounds of ammunition
and arrested 104 individuals on criminal charges.
Another and one of the most effective methods to deal with
violent transnational organizations is to attack the criminal
proceeds that fund their operations. As we have hardened formal
financial systems throughout the country, we see bulk-cash
smuggling, particularly along the southwest border, on the
rise. And ICE investigates bulk-cash smuggling as part of its
cross-border portfolio.
We conducted numerous Firewall operations with our Mexican
counterparts using millions and millions of dollars, over $178
million, $62 million of which was seized overseas.
The BEST, as I mentioned before, these are the principal
investigative platform for both Armas Cruzadas and Firewall.
They are raided along the border in high-threat smuggling
corridors. And they concentrate on the top threats in their
areas of responsibility. They have been responsible for more
than 2,000 criminal arrests, the seizure of almost 170,000
pounds of narcotics, 515 weapons and almost $23 million in U.S.
currency.
ICE is committed to stemming cross-border crime and
associated violence, throughout the deployment of BEST, Armas
Cruzadas and Firewall. Partnering with others, we are using a
broad range of authorities to disrupt and dismantle these
networks.
I thank the subcommittee for its support and look forward
to answering any questions that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Kibble follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kumar C. Kibble
INTRODUCTION
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and
Acting Assistant Secretary Torres, I would like to thank you for the
opportunity to discuss U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE)
efforts to combat cross-border smuggling organizations and the violence
related to their enterprises. ICE has the most expansive investigative
authority and largest force of investigators in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and we protect national security and uphold
public safety by targeting transnational criminal networks and
terrorist organizations that seek to exploit vulnerabilities at our
borders. Recognizing that partnerships are essential, ICE works closely
across agency and international boundaries with our law enforcement
partners at the foreign, federal, tribal, state and local level
creating a transparent border and united front to disrupt and dismantle
criminal organizations.
ICE's expertise in combating smuggling organizations that exploit
vulnerabilities in the sea, air, and land environments has proven
essential in countering the bi-lateral smuggling of narcotics, illicit
money, and other dangerous goods, people, and materials that threaten
the well- being of the United States. Our law enforcement presence
extends beyond our borders. ICE has agents in attache offices in
embassies and consulates worldwide. I am proud of these agents who work
with their foreign counterparts to combat crime that originates
overseas but may eventually cross the Nation's borders.
Let me share with you an example of the mutual security benefits we
continue to derive through our partnerships with Mexican law
enforcement agencies such as Secretaria de Seguridad (SSP). In August
2008, ICE agents provided cofidential information to SSP through our
Assistant Attache in Hermosillo, Mexico about a residence allegedly
used to store weapons and narcotics and which was believed to be a safe
house for security personnel (``hit men'') for the Vicente Carrillo
Fuentes drug trafficking organization (DTO) operating in Nogales,
Sonora. SSP executed a search warrant at this residence that resulted
in six arrests, the seizure of police uniforms, a large amount of U.S.
currency, 12 weapons, and four stolen U.S. vehicles. The six people
arrested are suspected of being involved in two separate crimes: first,
an armed confrontation on August 5,2008, in Nogales, Sonora where a
civilian was injured after a grenade was detonated during a between two
DTOs, and second, the murder of two Mexican nationals whose bodies were
found with threatening messages from rival narcotics traffickers.
DHS recognizes that southbound weapons smuggling is a grave concern
amid the growing violence along our border with Mexico. This violence
requires a comprehensive, bilateral effort and on January 30, 2009,
Secretary Napolitano responded by issuing a Border Security Action
Directive which focused the wide-ranging authorities of the Department
on the rampant violence along our southern border. The Secretary
emphasized the necessity of a broad, multi-agency response to attack
the flow of weapons and money that continues to fuel the violence. ICE
contributes to that fight through two principal bilateral initiatives:
Operation Firewall to address bulk cash smuggling; and Operation Armas
Cruzadas, to detect, disrupt and dismantle weapons smuggling networks.
Particularly in Armas Cruzadas, ICE-led Border Enforcement Security
Task Forces (BESTs) function as critical enablers in coordinating a
comprehensive, multi-agency approach to fighting weapons smuggling.
These DHS task forces include important partners such as Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) and other foreign, federal, state and local task force officers.
When it comes to countering the illicit weapons trade in particular, we
closely coordinate our efforts with ATF, as they possess long-standing
expertise in gun trafficking investigations and in engagement with
Federal Firearms Licensees.
Armas Cruzadas:
The rampant border violence along the United States/Mexico border
is a direct result of criminal organizations attempting to exert their
control over not only the democratically elected officials of the
Mexican government but also rival criminal organizations. For instance,
many of the instruments of this violence are weapons smuggled from the
United States into Mexico.
Criminal organizations commonly use straw purchasers with clean
criminal histories to purchase firearms and turn them over to
smugglers. The challenge in countering the smuggling activity is
compounded by the reliance on the technique called ``ant trafficking,''
where small numbers of weapons are smuggled through multiple ports-of-
entry, on a continued basis.
In June 2008, ICE formally launched Operation Armas Cruzadas to
combat transnational criminal networks smuggling weapons into Mexico
from the United States. As part of this initiative, the United States
and the Government of Mexico (GoM) synchronize bilateral interdiction,
investigation and intelligence-sharing activities to identify, disrupt,
and dismantle these networks engaged in weapons smuggling. Key
components of Armas Cruzadas include training for BEST task force
officers and our partners in ICE's long-standing authorities under the
Arms Export Control Act, as well as acquired export authority under
Title 18, United States Code, Section 554 (Smuggling goods from the
United States). This statute augments the broad arsenal of cross-border
criminal authorities available to ICE investigators, and is
particularly useful in targeting weapons smuggling. Another important
Armas Cruzadas component is industry outreach, including presentations
to groups involved in the manufacture, sale, or shipment of firearms
and ammunition along the southwest border. This industry outreach
includes a collaborative initiative between ICE and Mexico's
Procuraduria General de La Republica (PGR) prosecutors to produce
bilingual posters identifying potential penalties for weapons smugglers
under U.S. export and Mexican gun trafficking laws. The posters solicit
the public for information related to these schemes, and are displayed
in shops and agencies in the border region, including ports-of-entry.
The Government of Mexico has also distributed these posters within
Mexico.
In addition to outreach, more rapid exchange of information is
essential to success in confronting the southbound weapons flow. Armas
Cruzada strengthens bilateral communication through deployment of ICE
Border Liaisons to sustain cooperative working relationships with
foreign and domestic government entities; and also through a Weapons
Virtual Task Force, comprised of a virtual online community where U.S.
and Mexican investigators can share intelligence and communicate in a
secure environment. In order to more seamlessly investigate the
networks that span our common border, BESTs, ICE attache offices, a
U.S.-vetted GoM Arms Trafficking Group, and the Border Violence
Intelligence Cell exchange cross-border weapons-related intelligence.
The Border Violence Intelligence Cell, housed at the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), along with the ATF weapons desk, serves as
ICE's central point for analyzing all-source intelligence and trends in
firearms smuggling. In December of last year, this cell, in conjunction
with DHS intelligence components, produced a strategic assessment of
southbound weapons smuggling that guided increased weapons
investigation and interdiction operations along the Southwest Border.
Let me share an example of how ICE partners with others, such as
ATF and local investigators, in combating weapons smuggling. ICE, ATF,
and the San Antonio Police Department initiated an investigation of
Ernesto Tornel Olvera-Garza of Monterrey, Mexico who first began
trafficking in hunting rifles in June 2005. During the course of the
investigation, agents learned that between 2006 and the time of his
arrest in October 2007, he trafficked in high-powered, high-capacity
handguns and assault rifles. Since his temporary visa did not allow him
to legally buy guns in the United States, Mr. Olvera-Garza instead paid
people in the United States to buy guns for him and lied about who the
guns were for. Mr. Olvera-Garza organized and led the gun-smuggling
conspiracy, which included at least nine ``straw purchasers'' who
purchased firearms on his behalf. More than 50 weapons were purchased
and smuggled to Mexico as part of this ring. One of Mr. Olvera-Garza's
smuggled pistols was recovered in Mexico after it was used in a running
gun battle where two Mexican soldiers were killed. Mr. Olvera-Garza has
pleaded guilty and is pending sentencing.
Since the initiation of Operations Armas Cruzadas, DHS has seized
420 weapons, 110,894 rounds of ammunition and arrested 104 individuals
on criminal charges, resulting in 58 criminal indictments and 42
convictions to date.
Operation Firewall:
Another, and one of the most effective methods to deal with
violent, transnational criminal organizations is to attack the criminal
proceeds that fund their operations. ICE targets those individuals and
organizations exploiting vulnerabilities in financial systems to
launder illicit proceeds and pursue the financial component of every
cross-border criminal investigation. The combination of financial
investigations, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting requirements, and
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) compliance efforts by traditional and non-
traditional financial institutions has forced criminal organizations to
seek other means to transport illicit funds across our borders. As we
have hardened these formal financial systems, the smuggling of bulk
currency out of the United States, especially along the Southwest
Border, has continued to rise. ICE, as the investigative agency with
jurisdiction over all border crimes, can investigate bulk cash
smuggling (BCS) crimes, which are predicated on the failure to file a
Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR).
The ICE Office of Investigations (0I), along with the ICE Office of
International Affairs (OIA) and CBP. coordinates with our state, local,
and foreign partners on BCS operations. These operations disrupt the
flow of bulk cash that can be used by terrorist groups, drug
traffickers, and other criminal organizations. ICE, in concert with
CBP, also provides money laundering training and BCS interdiction
equipment to our law enforcement partners in the United States and
abroad.
ICE has a number of initiatives to address BCS. Operation Firewall
focuses on the threat of BCS via commercial and private passenger
vehicles, commercial airline shipments, airline passengers, and
pedestrians. Since 2005, Operation Firewall efforts have been enhanced
to include jump team surge operations targeting the movement of bulk
cash destined for the southwest border for smuggling into Mexico. ICE
and CBP have conducted various Operation Firewall operations with
Mexican customs and the ICE-trained Mexican Money Laundering Vetted
Unit. Many Operation seizures result in criminal investigations to
identify the source of the funds and the responsible organizations.
ICE's experience in conducting international money laundering
investigations has identified numerous smuggling routes and
methodologies used by criminal organizations to launder illicit
proceeds. This experience enables ICE, CBP, and our domestic and
international partners to concentrate resources. Initially, Firewall
operations in Mexico focused on the targeting of commercial flights
from Mexico City to Central and South America. In 2008, based on our
experience, we expanded Mexico Firewall operations to target shipments
in containers departing from the seaport of Manzanillo and the airports
of Tuluca, Mexicali, Cancun, and Guadalajara. Throughout operations in
Mexico, ICE and CBP personnel have trained our Mexican law enforcement
partners on passenger analysis and investigative techniques proven
effective in the United States.
Operation Firewall produced immediate results. On the first day of
operations in 2005 at the Benito Juarez International Airport in Mexico
City, Mexican authorities seized $7.8 million en route to Cali,
Colombia concealed inside deep fryers, rotisseries, and voltage
regulators. Other notable seizures include $7.3 million seized inside
rolls of fabric and plastic and $4.7 million concealed inside air
conditioning equipment and metal piping destined for Colombia. Since
its inception, Operation Firewall has resulted in the seizure of over
$178 million including over $62 million seized overseas, and 416
arrests.
On June 26,2008, Rafael Ravelo, a member of a Mexican based
narcotics trafficking organization, was sentenced to 126 months of
incarceration and the forfeiture of $1,147,000. This sentence was the
result of the ICE-led Operation Doughboy, an investigation that was
initiated prior to Operation Firewall, based on a bulk cash smuggling
interdiction. This joint U.S./Mexico investigation involved the
monitoring of 18 phone lines of the heads of a Mexican narcotics
trafficking organization and began when ICE agents in 2003 successfully
linked a $149,000 bulk cash seizure by the Texas Department of Public
Safety to the narcotics trafficking organization.
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST):
As I mentioned before, the principal investigative platform for
both Operations Armas Cruzadas and Firewall are the Border Enforcement
Security Task Forces (BESTs). These task forces were specifically
created to address border violence.
In July 2005, in response to increased violence in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico and Texas, ICE, CBP and other federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies, including Mexican agencies, expanded the ongoing
Border Crimes Initiative by creating an international, multi-agency
initiative, Operation Black Jack. This initiative used the respective
authorities and resources of its members to dismantle cross-border
criminal organizations. In its first six months, its target-driven
focus led to the dismantling of a murder/kidnapping cell operating on
both sides of the border, including the seizure of high-powered fully
automatic weapons and live grenades; the components to make over 100
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) such as pipe bombs and grenades;
and over $1 million in U.S. currency.
Based on the success of Operation Black Jack, DHS established the
first BEST in Laredo, Texas in January 2006. Since that time, we have
established 12 BESTs: eight on the Southwest Border; two on the
Northern Border; and two at seaports. BEST participants include: ICE
(as the lead agency); CBP; ATF; the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Coast Guard;
the U.S. Attorney's Office; and other federal, state, local and foreign
law enforcement.
The BESTs are arrayed along the Southwest Border in high-threat
smuggling corridors in: Arizona--Tucson (March 2006), Phoenix (March
2008); and Yuma (March 2008); Texas--El (October 2006) and Rio Grande
Valley (March 2007); and California--San Diego (November 2006) and
Imperial Valley (June 2008). In early 2008, the first Northern Border
BESTs initiated operations in Blaine, Washington (February 2008) and
Buffalo, New York (March 2008). Each BEST concentrates on the prevalent
threat in its geographic area, including: cross-border violence;
weapons smuggling and trafficking; illegal drug and other contraband
smuggling; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; human smuggling
and trafficking; transnational criminal gangs; and tunnel detection.
Recently, we established BESTs at the seaports of Los Angeles,
California (October 2008), and Miami, Florida (November 2008) to focus
on maritime threats including the importation of contraband; commercial
fraud; cargo theft; unlawful exportation of controlled commodities and
munitions; stolen property; alien smuggling; and exportation of illicit
proceeds. These BESTs will target internal conspiracies of corrupt
transportation employees who participate in the smuggling of contraband
and humans. Crucial to our success is the cooperation of our
international partners. At BESTs on the Southwest Border, we have the
participation of the Mexican law enforcement agency, SSP. On the
Northern Border and in the northern BESTs, we have Canadian law
enforcement agencies such as the Canada Border Services Agency, the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the
Niagara Regional Police Service, and the Toronto Metropolitan Police
Service. In addition, we have the participation of the Argentinean
customs agency at our Miami BEST. Through the interaction and
coordination of all the member agencies, BESTs provide for immediate
and international enhanced information sharing on border violence due
to geographic proximity to the U.S. borders.
Through BESTs, we have dismantled arms trafficking, bulk-cash,
alien and narcotics smuggling organizations and their hostage-taking
and murder/kidnapping cells in the United States and Mexico. Since July
2005, the BESTs have been responsible for 2,034 criminal arrests, 2,796
administrative arrests, 885 indictments, and 734 convictions. In
addition, BESTs have seized approximately 7,704 pounds of cocaine,
159,832 pounds of marijuana, 558 pounds of methamphetamine, 39 pounds
of crystal methamphetamine, 1,023 pounds of ecstasy, 213 pounds of
heroin, 97 pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 5 15 weapons, 745
vehicles, six properties, and $22.7 million in U.S. currency and
monetary instruments.
I would like to share a few of our successes with you: the
discovery and repatriation by the El Paso BEST of one of Mexico's top
ten most wanted fugitives; the arrest by the Laredo BEST of a weapons
trafficker supplying cartels with assault rifles used to murder Mexican
police officer Navarro Rincon and others; the arrest by the Laredo BEST
of a member of the Mexican Mafia in possession of approximately 897
pounds of smuggled marijuana after he attempted to run over a Texas
Department of Public Safety officer; and the arrest by the LA Seaport
BEST of an arms trafficker and seizure of 38 military style weapons.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, ICE is committed to stemming the cross-border
criminal activity and associated violence through the deployment of the
BESTs, Operation Armas Cruzadas, and Operation Firewall. Partnering
with others, we are using a broad range of authorities, including the
most sophisticated investigative tools available, such as certified
undercover operations and electronic surveillance operations, to
disrupt and dismantle these networks.
I thank the Subcommittee for its support of ICE, CBP, DHS and our
law enforcement mission. I would be happy to answer any questions that
you may have at this time.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank all of the witnesses for your
testimony. And under the committee rules, each member will have
5 minutes to ask questions of our witnesses. And I will begin
by asking the questions.
Mr. Kibble, there have been several other hearings,
especially this week, with respect to the violence at the
border. And you just talked about Armas Cruzadas. I would like
to know how that differs from the gunrunner program that the
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agency has.
More importantly, I would like you to talk a little bit
about what you believe are the different roles of the ATF
versus the role that DHS and specifically your agency might
have at the border, and how you work together or don't work
together, or what you need. What message do you need either
sent to the secretary or to the president? Or is there a need
to do legislation or clarify roles from the Congress so that
the two agencies, if they are not working well, can ensure that
we do a good job?
Mr. Kibble. Chairwoman Sanchez, thank you for the question.
We actually are working very well together. I review the daily
Armas Cruzadas reporting. And I would say more than 90 percent
of those investigations that I follow are joint investigations
with ATF in the field. And we complement one another, because
ICE, through the Arms Export Control Act and with the
implementing regulations under the ITAR, is designated as the
sole investigative agency to deal with exports of weapons to
Mexico.
However, ATF brings their expertise to the sources of these
weapons, the gun shows, the federal firearms licensees over
which ATF has sole jurisdiction. And working together, we
really are starting to put together some great investigations.
They will uncover, for example, a straw purchasing scheme
associated with a particular gun dealership. And we will bring
our cross-border smuggling expertise to identifying the network
that is moving those weapons from the interior of our country
into Mexico.
We have been served for decades now with a previous MOU
that governed the former agencies that composed ICE when the
Department of Homeland Security was created. And that MOU made
it very clear that ATF handled the inbound weapons trafficking
as well as domestic trafficking violations. And ICE focuses on
the outbound smuggling of weapons.
We have been working together and engaging with ATF at the
headquarters level. Just last week, I was meeting with my
counterpart over there. And what we are looking to do is
basically update the memorandum of understanding and not
looking to--I assured him that ICE has no interest in trying to
insert ourselves into their area of expertise, having to do
with the federal firearms licensees. And he assured me that ATF
has no interest in trying to get into the illegal export aspect
of those weapons.
So I think the roles are very clear, certainly by statute.
And we are going to update this memorandum of understanding so
it is clear to----
Ms. Sanchez. When will that memorandum be updated and
signed?
Mr. Kibble. It is in process ma'am. We expect feedback from
ATF. It resides with them right now. We expect feedback from
them very soon. He assured me that we would be able to--
Ms. Sanchez. How many personnel from ICE work in this area
of guns moving from the U.S. to Mexico?
Mr. Kibble. We have several hundred that will address this
issue in one way or another. I think the important distinction
to make here is that these cross-border criminal networks don't
just deal in the weapons. And that is one the advantages that
ICE brings, is that we have a comprehensive cross-border
criminal authority that can help us to attack the inbound drugs
and the outbound flow of guns and money that, in some respects,
can be moved by some of the same layers that belong to a
particular network.
So directly, we have several hundred that are addressing
the outbound flow of weapons. But we have the largest
investigative footprint along the southwest border, more than
1,000 agents. And all of those agents are potentially available
to surge their efforts to address threats as they emerge.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Nieto, following up with the questions that I just
asked Mr. Kibble, why is it--people ask me all the time. Why is
it so easy to cross from the United States into Mexico and so
hard to cross from Mexico back into the United States?
And with respect to this issue of gun trafficking and
currency trafficking, what do you believe--what happens now and
what do you believe needs to happen as people are headed south
into Mexico? Should we be checking them? Should Mexico be
checking them? Should we both be checking them? Are we checking
them? What can we do to spot and particularly these arms?
Mr. Nieto. I think it is a shared responsibility. I mean,
they should be checking people going into their country. And we
should have some kind of impact on what is leaving our country.
And we do that in a surge capacity at this point. We don't have
the personnel or the infrastructure to do full outbound
inspections. The ports of entry are not set up for that right
now. There are officer safety issues, because as vehicles go
south, there are seconds to minutes before they are in Mexico.
So there is an officer safety issue.
But we are looking at what those needs are going forward
and identify them. And then looking for the adequate resources
to make sure that we can do that in a more sustained effort.
Ms. Sanchez. Have you seen a bigger effort by Mexico with
respect to checking vehicles as they come across? I know for
example, and I haven't been across for a while. But when I go
from California into the TJ/Ensenada area, there really isn't
an American officer. You just kind of go through most of the
time. Sometimes you are just kind of waved through.
And then to the Mexican officers, the main, you are either
like designated to pull over. Or you are just sort of waved
through. And there is really no barriers. There is no security
for the officers. Have they changed that at any of the
crossings? Are they doing more inspection?
Mr. Nieto. They are looking at doing that. They are looking
at using license plate readers as well. And part of the Merida
Initiative will assist them in that. I think right now what you
get is either a red light or a green light that determines
whether you are going to be inspected or not.
So part of the training in the Merida Initiative as well is
for us to give them some of that training for inspections as
they have vehicles going to their country.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
And Mr. Pena, I have one question before I turn the time
over to Mr. Souder. You have a unique perspective, because you
are inside of Mexico. You get to see what is going on. You get
updates from the different pieces of the department. You talk
to people.
There have been various travel alerts from the Department
of State with respect to Americans going to Mexico. And one of
the things I worry about being a Californian is that there is
so much commerce and tourism and--you know, I mean, sometimes
you can go into some places in Baja, California. And you would
think that you were in America, because there are so many
Americans there now. There are so many people who travel back
and forth and second homes and vacation homes and all.
And all of a sudden, we keep reading and hearing that there
is so much violence, people are afraid to go now. And that
could cause some real economic concerns and some even bigger
problems for us with respect to Mexican natives along the
border area and working with the narco trafficking people.
Can you tell me, you know, if somebody asks me should they
go down to Ensenada to their weekend home, you know, what is
the response? Because, you know, I travel a lot. And I always
think you need to be alert wherever you go. Is it the same
thing? Or are innocent bystanders really, you know, just
getting picked up and slaughtered down there? What is going on?
Mr. Pena. Thank you, Chairwoman, for the opportunity to
address that question. Maybe I can answer it in this way first
is that my two sons just came to visit me for their spring
break then to Mexico City. They flew into Mexico City for the
start. We went to Guadalajara. We interacted with quite a few
people I have met in Mexico City. And none of the conversations
that took place have anything to do with the violence and the
security situation that is going on.
That is very much in isolated pockets of the country. I
think there is a lot of attention being brought to it. But it
is in very isolated areas. And it is dealing with people that
are involved in criminal activity, the majority of this
activity that takes place, that we read about are in areas that
involve people that are involved--criminal element.
Certainly there has been. I can't minimize the fact that
some innocent people have been affected. But it is not the
climate that I believe is being portrayed. Again, my son left
Guadalajara and went to South Padre Island. I am a little bit
more concerned what trouble he might get into on South Padre
Island hanging out there.
Mexico is, I believe--again, my family is there. I interact
with Mexicans all the time. There is not this alarmist that
they see, believe that the country is unsafe to be in.
Ms. Sanchez. So if my 70-year-old mother wants to go down
to her second home in Ensenada. And she is driving her 1992 GM
and just staying on Highway 1 all the way down and not calling
attention to herself, she is probably going to make it without
any problems?
Mr. Nieto. Yes, ma'am. She certainly would. And if she ever
did, please feel free to contact me. See I am just happy to
help in any way I could.
But no, honestly ma'am, I think, Chairwoman, it is not to
the degree that is being publicized. I think what has happened
is that the cartels have saw what happened.
And I will maybe give the example of when Daniel Pearl was
executed or some--the decapitation. They saw that the fear that
that can place in individuals. And that they are sending
messages. These people, these cartels, operate strategically.
They have tactics that they are using to intimidate and to put
fear.
But it is not affecting U.S. citizens. It is not affecting
Mexican citizens to the degree that I would say--everybody
needs to be cautious. You have to know your environment where
you are going. But to say that people shouldn't be coming into
Mexico and traveling and enjoying themselves, I think it is not
to that degree at all, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Pena.
I will recognize my ranking member, Mr. Souder, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Wouldn't you say that most of the murders are occurring
right along the border?
Mr. Nieto. Yes. The high percentage of the murders, sir,
are in border cities where they are trying to control the
lucrative transit route into the U.S.
Mr. Souder. Because there are so many areas, and we have
lots of members who want to question. And it is going to be
ongoing as it has gotten national attention. But I want to make
a couple of points.
First with Mr. Leech and the counternarcotics office. If
there was a ever a reason that--or let us say it is more
evident now than was ever apparent at the beginning of the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security why Speaker
Hastert, I and others pushed to get a counternarcotics office
in the Department of Homeland Security.
It has been a little like the debate regarding Afghanistan.
Oh, we are fighting terrorism. We don't have to worry about
heroin. Well, what do you think your opponents are arming
themselves with? They aren't making computers there. They
aren't making all sorts of other things. In Afghanistan, they
are using heroin with which to cash fund the terrorism.
The same thing is true with the narcotics here. Those
products may change. But counternarcotics is such a big
business. Whether or not you change laws on marijuana or
whatever, it is not like oh, well, we will fold now. The
cartels are funded by whichever narcotics happen to work. If it
happens to be prescription drugs, cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine, marijuana, whatever gets them money. And if we
don't track them, we are not going to be able to secure our
borders.
And I want to thank you and the counternarcotics office.
Hopefully we can keep that strong, because the evidence in the
relationship in the cartels, and the drug violence, and how
that can spread to the United States, I think, is more clear
than ever why narcotics and terrorism can't be separated.
I also want to raise to Mr. Nieto, one of the big
challenges--and Mr. Kibble was addressing this too. And that is
that we have, in the Justice Department, when we look at
narcotics, when we look at financing, we run into the Treasury
Department, we run into the narcotics department. This is not
new to the Department of Homeland Security. Customs had this
challenge when it was over in Treasury. DEA was in Justice;
border patrol, immigration, that no--there isn't going to be
such a thing as a clean division between authorities.
That is why the IBET teams, the--those type of things are
critical. And we need to look at--when we have violence threats
to the proportion we do, is where are your specific financial
requests? What regulation changes you need to push that
collaboration.
But Mr. Nieto, one of my concerns--and this is that the
challenges in the Department of Homeland Security are, whether
it is the Coast Guard having to do sailboats the tipped over
and fisheries as their day-to-day. But they are watching for
terrorists and then counternarcotics; whether it is the border
patrol, where mostly they are dealing with illegal immigration
then narcotics and hunting for the occasional terrorist threat
that comes through; whether it is ICE.
You are different missions. You have day-to-day. And then
you have the kind of the highest priority type of things. But
we put you all in the Department of Homeland Security in a
hierarchy. You have your day-to-day. And then the high-risk
things to the country.
One of my concerns--and don't mistake this. I don't want
anybody to fall over when I make this statement. But that in
the legacy customs division, partly there you had the financial
tracking. And you had an experience level. And by blending it
with immigration, because I believe we need more enforcement.
And you are the only agency to do enforcement on illegal
immigration, which would include terrorism.
But by not getting additional agents, and by putting and
diverting some of the ICE personnel to immigration, all of a
sudden I am concerned that we are losing some of the people who
can do the financial tracking and the organizational tracking.
And that is going to be one line of questioning that I will be
pursuing during the next 2 years, because we have to do both
strategies. And they are not necessarily the same strategy. But
often they are the same people. Is that----
Mr. Pena, I wanted to--and would welcome anybody else to
address this. That this is the broader question. There is a lot
of misunderstanding that drug cartels are just drug cartels.
And this is a brand new phenomenon in Mexico. In fact, since
the DO and even before that in the earlier presidents, we saw
these cartels strengthening their control, buying governors
throughout Mexico and so on. And what we see now is President
Calderon taking them on.
I want to see how you feel about this example. To me, it is
very much like the movie Godfather, that you have different
groups. The violence comes when one dies or one gets taken out.
They fight for the turf. That they aren't--while they may start
in narcotics, the fact is that once they gain control in a
region, they smuggle and handle whatever it is. If there is a
high-level terrorist, they can do that. If it is shaking down
local businesses.
Yet the reason President Calderon is taking them on is not
just because of narcotics. He sees a counter-government form, a
sub-government with an enforcement personnel that can out-shoot
and overpower his local law enforcement in every zone. And this
isn't just about narcotics. These cartels become the
alternative form of police state. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Pena. Congressman Souder, certainly I will agree with
the fact that these criminal elements do not stay unique to one
set of crimes. They are multi-faceted criminals. They will move
aliens. They will move money. They are involved in
prostitution. They are involved in extortion. They are involved
in kidnapping. And they are fighting for lucrative roots that
they want to control.
That involves corruption. It involves murders,
intimidation. And certainly, there has been cases where they
will attempt to compromise political officials, mostly at the
lower levels. We are not seeing it at the higher level
position.
Recently, John Leech and I went down to the southern border
with Guatemala. And we met with the governor of the state of
Chapa. And he was telling us that his big concern is weapons
also coming in from the Guatemalan area into Mexico.
But the illegal alien trafficking that takes place through
the southern border of Mexico, it is eventually going to
transit through Mexico into the United States. And that the
Zetas, one of the Gulf cartel's enforcement arm, is heavily
involved in making millions of dollars in the flow of illegal
aliens in that region, sir.
So I would agree that they are involved in just--they are
organized crime. They are just, as you clearly stated----
Mr. Souder. The narcotics is a method of getting the cash.
Mr. Pena. Yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Next person would be Ms. Jackson Lee for 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairwoman very much. And I
appreciate very much each and every one of the witnesses. And
frankly, I think that we are at a point of major calamity with
the recognition that you all are extensively spreading your
efforts. And we appreciate it.
But I believe that this is a crisis of major proportion.
And I do think it is a crisis. And I do respect the work that
President Calderon is doing. And one of the things that I think
should be important is the friendship and relationship with
Mexico stand, that the government and the people of Mexico no
more want this kind of violence than we would like it.
But it is important to note that, since 2007, 7,500 people,
almost double the number of U.S. troops killed in Iraq since
2003, have died; that there have been bribes and cruelty and
beheading; that in spite of the suggestion of a 2,000-mile
border wall, this kind of havoc has continued.
The amount of money that is being made, $39 billion from
the sale of methamphetamine and other drugs in the United
States alone. And so any business like that causes anyone
engaged to lose all of their morality. No one cares about any
form of human life.
And frankly, what the real crux of the issue is is how this
drug war at the border can create such havoc that all of a
sudden, the terrorists of the world begin to spotlight and see
opportunities for engaging and being involved unseen, the focus
being on drugs and narcotics, the big money that is needed to
fuel terrorist activities around the world.
Some years ago in this committee, we were thinking or
talking about OTM, that they were the crux of what we needed to
fear in terms of those who might walk across the border and do
havoc. Well now, the OTMs may be subordinate to drug cartels
and drug actors, but individuals who would be carrying that
kind of armor, if you will, terrorist intent, but involved in
the drug cartel.
So let me ask these questions very quickly. One, Mr. Nieto,
were you talking--who was talking about the agreement between
ATF and--it was Mr. Kibble?
First let me say this. Unless we as Americans recognize the
role that we play with the free flow of weapons of guns, we are
in trouble. Frankly, ATF and your office, obviously, every day
faces up to individuals with illegal weapons. And we cover this
up with the Second Amendment.
And I frankly believe that there has to be legislative
initiative, which will be a tough thing to pass in this
Congress, on dealing with the increasing numbers of weapons
that we are providing for the gang wars on the border, which
can also be provided for terrorists.
So I wasn't understanding what you were saying very
quickly. And I just need a quick answer. You were talking about
overlapping jurisdiction. Is there a jurisdictional fight
between ICE and ATF?
Mr. Kibble. No, ma'am. There isn't. I mean ATF focuses on
the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand what they focus on. But what
are you agreeing about or not agreeing about? As far as I am
concerned, your jurisdictions should just merge. Get the
illegal weapons out of here. So what is the agreement that you
are talking about?
Mr. Kibble. It is just to clarify roles and
responsibilities.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. I will try to meet with you in my
office. I just think that we need to expand roles and
responsibilities and have people working together. And wherever
you find a gun, if it is ICE, get it off the street. If it is
ATF, get it off the street. I am on Judiciary.
Let me ask the gentleman--and thank you for that.
Let me ask the gentleman with Customs and Border Protection
and ask whether the border patrol agents are getting any extra
training on drug interdiction or drug fighting or drug wars,
because I understand that they have a certain bend to them. Are
they getting any extra training, or you have any people
relating to that expertise?
Mr. Nieto. Thank you, ma'am, for that question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And while you are doing that, since my
time is running out, would you--because I am getting ready to
offer legislation in any event. The power boats, helicopters,
more boots on the ground in terms of Custom and Border Patrol.
I know you had a big push, if you will, a couple years ago. But
I think you need more. So can you talk to the needs please of
your agency as it relates to these drug wars.
Mr. Nieto. Sure thing, ma'am. Thank you. The training that
you asked about initially, yes we do train our agents. And we
train them in a fashion that they encounter and an all threats,
all hazards, not necessarily for just narcotics, terrorists,
illegal immigration, aliens from special interest country.
Whatever it is, they are trained to interdict anything that
is coming across that border--very tough academy to go through
initially. And they go through training as they progress
through their initial 2-year intern time period, probationary
period. And training never ends. I mean, in-service training
continues.
In regards to the amount of agents, we currently have the
personnel to adequately address any threat that may present
itself to us along the border. We also have plans in case, for
some reason, we have to draw from resources from outside of
that area, or from DHS and plans to also have the military come
in, I that is the case.
I mean, we have been working with the military for over 20
years through the Joint Task Force North that is currently
located in El Paso. That is not new to them. It is not new to
us. They have helped us in a non-enforcement role. You may
remember Operation Jumpstart a couple of years ago.
So that relationship exists. A lot of their people know the
areas already. Do we have the personnel to adequately address
threats that we are seeing out there right now? Yes, ma'am, we
do.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Madam Chair and thank the witnesses.
The numbers are staggering in terms of the violence
occurring in Mexico. I do commend President Calderon for his
courageous efforts. I think most in the Congress recognize
that.
There are over 6,000 deaths associated with organized crime
in Mexico. Last year more than the Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts combined. The Department of Justice said that 230
cities in the United States are now impacted by what it
considers the number one organized crime threat. That is the
Mexican gang element. It is of serious concern to the American
people.
Just in my state, just south of the border, we have a map
depicting the violence occurring south of the Texas border. In
Juarez, Chihuahua, you can see the escalation of violence. I
know all of you are familiar with what is happening there in
the escalation of troops that are being sent there by President
Calderon. It has gotten so bad that the police chief resigned
because of the killings of police officers. And then the mayor
of Juarez sent his family to El Paso.
These are real concerns to us. Just the other day, the
governor of my state asked for an additional 1,000 troops. Just
yesterday, the governor of Arizona asked for National Guard.
Just yesterday, President Obama actually mentioned the use of
the National Guard down at the border. And he referred to a
tipping point. Wasn't sure where the tipping point was going to
be.
That is my first question to you, Admiral. When are we
going to hit the tipping point where we do need the use of the
National Guard and the military down at the border?
Admiral Rufe. Well, first let me talk about the violence on
the border, because you certainly characterized it accurately
as to the level of violence, which is indeed falling in Mexico,
right on the border. And we are very concerned about that, and
certainly concerned about the spillover.
That said, I think the chairwoman and the ranking member
characterized it pretty well in their opening remarks about
what the level of violence is on our side of the border. It is
a bit of a mixed picture. Certainly kidnappings are up. And
that is of great concern in Phoenix and other places. But along
the border, actually the border cities are experiencing a lower
crime rate, violent crime rate, than they have in the past.
So that, to a certain extent, is a good news story on that
score. And the Board of Mayors just emphasized that just in the
past week. So we are not so concerned, at least at this point,
about that violence spilling over into our cities. El Paso, in
fact, has one of the lowest crime rates in the United States.
And it is right across from Ciudad Juarez.
That said, our contingency plan is designed to address
escalating levels of violence should that happen. And as Sal
mentioned a moment ago, the way the plan is set up is that we
would phase through, where we would exhaust all of the
resources of the federal government, short of DOD and National
Guard troops before we would reach that tipping point.
There is no real bright line as to what that tipping point
would be, because scenarios are so different. But within the
planning process, we have identified the capabilities that we
would need if that was required. And we are working very
closely in the planning process right now with our brethren in
the National Guard and the Department of Defense to make sure
we are ready when the time comes.
But as the president said yesterday, we very much do not
want to militarize our border. So that is essentially a last
resort. But we are planning for it if it becomes necessary.
Mr. McCaul. I believe Secretary Napolitano used that
wording, last resort. I have tremendous respect for her being a
former U.S. attorney, attorney general for a state and governor
of a border state. I think she understands this issue very
well.
I am a ranking member on the intelligence subcommittee. And
I know there has been some discussion about intelligence
sharing. I know it is sometimes difficult with Mexico, given
the corruption issues. I know CSEN has been very reliable in
the past. It is their sort of CIA equivalent.
Can you, anybody on the panel who can answer this, discuss
the intelligence sharing and how well it is being shared.
Obviously, the better intelligence we have on these drug
cartels in conjunction with the Merida Initiative, the more
capability we are going to have to eradicate these drug
cartels.
Mr. Pena. Well, the El Paso Intelligence Center is located
right on the border and is our primary location for sharing
information with state and locals and across the federal
government on the border for this particular mission. What I
ask the--Sal maybe to add more to that if he would like to.
Mr. Nieto. Thank you, sir.
I guess as a matter of fact, we have in EPIC, 29 CBP
personnel. We saw it as a place to really expand it. At the
true fusion center, there is 17 different agencies there
already. They already have the mechanisms in place. They have
been there for over 35 years. Granted initially it was based on
narcotics. We are looking at it as an all threats, all hazards
again. So the mechanisms are in place. We are capitalizing on
what is there already, to ensure that that information flow is
back----
Mr. McCaul. My time is running. I know what EPIC is all
about. What I am asking is are we giving--sharing intelligence
with the Mexican military to take out the drug cartels?
Mr. Nieto. Yes. Yes, sir, we are. And----
Mr. McCaul. And is that effective?
Mr. Nieto. Yes. And what I can tell you, the relationship
with CSEN, with the Mexican agencies, with the Mexican
government, has never been better as it is now. And I would
defer to Mr. Pena who I actually in Mexico to further.
Mr. Pena. Congressman McCaul, thank you for the opportunity
to answer that question. I would start off by saying that
currently, based on the relationship that was established in
2004 with CSEN when it was then headed through the current
attorney general Medina Mora, CSEN agents were assigned to
border enforcement security task forces in the United States.
The first one was in Representative Cuellar's district.
When the violence was escalated in Nuevo Laredo. So there are
now 12 of these border enforcement task forces. And they are
staffed by security, seguridad publica officers. That is the
federal police. They are in the U.S., embedded with federal,
state and local officers from the U.S. And that is an important
exchange of intelligence, very timely and also many times
operationally and tactical.
The Office of Intelligence--that the Department of Homeland
Security has here and has the border security branch, has a
direct relationship with CSEN, whether it is in an interchange
of intelligence and information, almost on a daily basis.
The mission in Mexico City, the embassy, our U.S.
intelligence agency works directly with-and some of the things
I can't speak about, classified exchange of information in
Mexico.
CSEN recently visited the ACTIC, which is the Arizona
Counterterrorism Center, looking to see, to build a fusion cell
in Mexico similar to what exists in Arizona. And they were
funded by the Department of Homeland Security. I forgot how
many right not there are throughout the United States. So they
could better see how we exchange information within our
agencies here domestically, and then also internationally.
Mr. McCaul. That is encouraging. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. Gentleman from Laredo, Mr. Cuellar, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
To the members of the panel, I thank you. I appreciate the
work you do in law enforcement. You know, I have got three
brothers that are peace officers. In fact, one of them is a
border sheriff. So I do understand and appreciate the work that
you do.
We are dealing with an issue that, on the border--as you
know, I am from the border. And the border is very important to
me. I have a vested interest. My family is there. I grew up
there on the border.
We have a 2,000-mile border with Mexico. And every day we
trade legitimate business, about $1 billion a day of trade. You
know, you include trade, tourism, retail. It is a very
important partner that we have.
But we have this issue with drugs. And it is not a new
phenomenon. In fact, if you looked at history, we have had
large infusions of drugs coming in from Mexico from 1917 to
1933. We had it even during the Civil War. We had it during
World War I, World War II. There are areas with times in our
history that it has come in.
But now, we have a different type of situation, because the
border violence or the violence has now popped up. In fact, you
know, when people say well, that is a border issue, it is not.
If you look at the drug presence that the drug cartels have,
there are about 230 cities. Name the state that you are from,
and you will see the cities in your particular states where the
drug cartels have a presence in.
Everybody has a plan. In fact, the admiral I asked a while
ago, you know, our governor has a plan. You know, yes, sir he
was with us with the Texas delegation. I had asked you if you
had seen it. You have said no. And this is one of the things
that I want to emphasize to all the members of the panel is
what are we doing to coordinate our efforts?
For example, can somebody--this is open to anybody. How
many cities do we have? How many city departments, police
departments, do we have on the 2,000-mile border? Anybody know?
How many sheriff's departments do we have on the 2,000-mile
border? Anybody know? How many states? That should be a lot
easier. And the governors have their own plans also.
And then if you go even on the federal level, you have FBI,
you have DEA, you have ICE, you have ATF, you have Custom
Border Protection, you have border patrol. And there are
different levels on that. And one of the things I have been
talking about is how do we coordinate the effort?
Mr. Leech, I heard you say, and it is very encouraging,
that we are starting to coordinate. But I would ask you not
only coordinate across the level with federal agencies, but
also go up and down with the states and the local officials. I
know there have been some efforts. And I appreciate the work
that you are all doing.
But we need to have a way to coordinate and communicate.
You know, just even in our other subcommittee that we have,
communications. You know, police can communicate with other
police. But they can't communicate with the state or the
federal or local. And even on that part of it is something that
I would ask you and encourage you to emphasize and focus on
that.
And I know there is--I know you have got both. Somebody
mentioned you have someone in Austin. You have got somebody.
But is there a coordinated effort to say if there is an
incident, this is how we can bring everybody in?
I know that the best program is probably a good model that
we can implement, not only those cities that you have them, but
across the border, across the 2,000-mile border, and even into
the northern side also. But I think that is a good model,
because you do bring in the state, the federal, the local and
the Mexican side also into the process.
So I would highly encourage you to follow that process
across the board.
Mr. Leech. That is an excellent point, Congressman. Let me
say this about that. Several issues here. We just recently sent
out about 150 letters to our state and local partners,
Congress. We also sent some letters up to Congress to ask for
your input and what we could do to be more effective on the
border. And we got a lot of really good input from our state
and local partners working with the--working with the fusion
centers that you have mentioned.
But here is a very important point. And I want to keep
going back to that. And that is the strategy. The counter-drug
strategy that we are developing addresses several various
areas. We are looking at intel. We are looking at the ports,
between the ports. We are looking at our air assets, our
relationship with Mexico, money, prosecutions, investigations.
And most recently, as a result of your input, southbound flow
of arms.
And the strategy is an effective strategy. It will work if
executed. An important point to keep in mind is this is a very
holistic approach to trying to solve this problem. And we have
to understand what we are trying to do, what the U.S.
government is trying to do.
Admiral Rufe has the Southwest Border Violence Plan. That
is a plan that is built on either escalating contingencies or
explosive contingencies. Our office, the Office of
Counternarcotics and Enforcement, we build a southwest border
strategy plan. It is a methodical 5-year plan, updated every 2
years. And it is a good plan. It is a damn good plan.
Al works the Merida Initiative. These three plans together
can secure our border. They have to be implemented. Oversight
has to be provided. And we have to stay committed.
But to get back to your issue of the state and local, this
strategy, which is right here, this is just the basic strategy.
It is roughly 35, 37 pages. When we put the implementation plan
to it, here is 2007, it will grow to around 200. And this one
is 237, 235 pages.
Now, a question might be well, you have had this since
2007. What has been going on? A lot of things are going on. And
it is really not important at this point in time. What is
important is we now have a Congress who is very serious about
this. We have a secretary who is very serious about this. And
we have a president who is very serious about this. If we
execute these plans as planned, we will see results.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you to the gentleman who has worked very
hard on many of the border issues being from the border area.
The next member will be Mr. Bilirakis from Florida for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it
very much.
Commissioner Nieto, Customs and Border Protection has
reported that, since the beginning of fiscal year 2009, there
have been 338 acts of violence against border patrol agents and
123 acts of violence against Custom and Border Protection
officers at the ports of entry.
I am concerned with reports that CBPOs do not have
sufficient resources and equipment to protect themselves
against the increasing violence occurring in Mexico. And there
may be similar issues among the border patrol agents.
What resources do the CBPOs currently have, such as body
armor, weapons, et cetera? What resource do the border patrol
agents have? And has the department provided additional
protective equipment to personnel on the border? And lastly,
can the CBPOs obtain better body armor and more appropriate
weapons to protect themselves and do their jobs more
effectively than what is currently the standard issue to them?
Mr. Nieto. Thank you, sir, for that question. The current
armor that is provided to the agents has certain levels. It is
a level 3--certain levels of protection for an agent. We are
looking at up armor, armor that would provide more protection
for them throughout the border.
And I would like to go ahead and restate the numbers that
you just mentioned on assaults. I think we are looking at, for
the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, there was a total of
327, 204 for agents, 123 for CBPOs. I think the number that you
have of 338 for the agents----
Mr. Bilirakis. Right.
Mr. Nieto. --is up to the 28th of February. So we are
looking at two different dates here.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Nieto. Just to clarify.
Mr. Bilirakis. No, thanks for updating us.
Mr. Nieto. Yes, sir. And we are looking at applying more
armor for them, giving them the ability to have that in order
for officer safety. Officer safety is paramount for us right
now, which is another reason why we don't do sustained outbound
operations right now as the infrastructure is not there at the
ports of entry. So mainly an officer's the only thing that may
be between the perpetrator, the individual trying to go south
with whatever they may have, and Mexico. And then they are a
minute apart.
So we try to keep our agents out of that peril to make sure
that, you know, officer safety is our primary and paramount
concern.
Mr. Bilirakis. When do you anticipate them getting the
upgraded body armor?
Mr. Nieto. The upgraded--the up-armor, as we call it right
now, is going through testing phases. It has been in the works.
We have five different contractors that came to the table with
certain versions of them. I would have to get back to you on a
firm date as to when it is going to be actually available for
purchase for our officers and agents in the field.
Mr. Bilirakis. But this year?
Mr. Nieto. I would imagine so, sir. But----
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. If you can get back to me, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Nieto. I sure will.
Mr. Bilirakis. Do you believe, Commissioner Nieto, that
there is a disconnect between CBP leadership and CBPOs
themselves about whether they have the training and resources
to do their job safely and effectively? Is there a process by
CBPOs and border patrol agents can share any concerns they may
have about inadequate training or resources with their
superiors or CBP leadership without fear of retribution, which
is important?
Mr. Nieto. Yes. Yes, they do, sir. Of course, there is
chain of command. They have got supervisors. They have got
people. They have got training officers at their locales, local
areas. Plus, for example, border patrol has what they call a
field coordination division or a field communication division.
They provide a Web site to ask headquarters or ask the
commissioner questions. They send those questions. That team of
personnel do research, find the answers and send it back out
and put it out for everybody in case someone else has that same
question.
So the flow of information is there. The concerns that they
may have are heard and are addressed as they come in.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
appreciate it very much.
Mr. Nieto. Yes, sir.
Ms. Sanchez. Thanks to the gentleman from Florida.
We now have Mr. Green of Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony. And I can
candidly say that I am encouraged. Much of what you have said
has given me reason to believe that we are making progress.
However, while I am encouraged, I must also consider the
magnitude of the problem and realistically conclude that a bad
problem has a potential to become a worse problem. That is what
we are dealing with.
And my concern for this emanates from the notion that drug
trafficking and drug running, these are not American problems.
They are not Mexican problems. They are transnational problems.
And transnational problems of this magnitude require a
comprehensive transnational solution.
I appreciate what has been said about securing the border.
I think that a fence can circumvent. I am not sure that it can
prevent. And my concerns are as follows.
One, will constructing the fence to specification--and I am
convinced that many of you are aware of what I mean by
specification. That is intended to be constructive. Will this
prevent the violence that we see in Mexico? And will it prevent
the violence from spreading to America? Will the fence do this?
And I will allow you to elect which will speak first. But I do
ask that you be as terse and laconic as possible.
Mr. Leech. I would like to make a comment on that. Will the
fence--probably to some degree. But again, I would like to make
a point and make the point----
Mr. Green. If your answer is no, let me make sure that I
understand this first, because sometimes when people finish,
candidly, I don't know if they have said yes or no. So is your
answer no, that it will not prevent?
Mr. Leech. Well, 100 percent? No, I don't believe so.
Personally I do not believe that it will prevent.
Mr. Green. Okay. Let us have Mr. Kibble.
Mr. Kibble, will a fence prevent what we are trying to stop
here, this violence in Mexico and the violence that may spread
to the United States?
Mr. Kibble. Sir, I would defer to Deputy Assistant
Commissioner He really--
Mr. Green. All right, you have been deferred to.
Mr. Nieto. No, great question, sir. And thank you. The
fencing is part of a comprehensive strategy. By itself, no.
Mr. Green. Okay. If the fence won't prevent, let me ask my
follow-up question, because time is of the essence. We have
growth industries. We have drug growth and we have a growth in
gun running. With these two growth industries, and
understanding that a fence won't prevent it, have we had any
recommendations made to us as to how we can prevent the growth,
the proliferation of drug in this country, not just stopping at
gun shows.?
But how do we fashion law that will prevent the
proliferation of the growth industry? Because every year we get
more and more of our side of the growth industry to increase.
The drug problem is one on Mexican side. And we have got the
gun problem on our side. And the gun problem grows. It is not
something that is in any way dissipating.
So the question becomes do you have the laws that you need
to impact the growth of guns in this country, which are really
the manufacture and the allowance of them on the street.
Mr. Nieto. Sir, I believe the laws are there. We are
looking at beefing ourselves up for outbound inspections, as I
mentioned earlier. The fencing, as I mentioned that it is not
the silver bullet for this. But along with the technology, the
right resources, that three-legged stool that we talk about, it
does have an effect on interdiction of those coming into the
United States.
Mr. Green. Let me quickly ask the follow up, if I may. With
reference to guns that are readily available in this country,
is it your position that we have enough laws to curtail the
readily availability of guns in this country? You don't have to
go to a gun show to buy guns. They are everywhere.
Do we have enough to circumvent the sale of guns in this
country, such that they can cross the border?
Yes, sir.
Admiral Rufe. Mr. Green, yes. I will just give you a
personal opinion. First of all, I think the fact that we allow
assault weapons to be sold freely on the streets is--there is
no recreational use for them. And I think the argument that it
is a Second Amendment assault is, in my personal view, just
doesn't pass the smell test.
So I think we could tighten up our gun laws. That is a
personal opinion from me.
Mr. Green. I thank you for your courage. I thank you for
your courage.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Pena. Congressman Green, I would just like to point out
that this coming March 31 through April 3, the attorney general
of Mexico will be hosting a binational firearms conference to
come up with a comprehensive strategy between the United
States--a binational strategy to deal with the highest level.
He has invited the attorney general from the United States.
Mr. Green. I appreciate that response. But I have to get
you to focus now. Let us talk about guns on the streets of the
United States of America that are making their way across the
border into Mexico. That is what we need to focus on now. What
about that?
Mr. Leech. Sir, I could speak to the cross-border component
of that, because we gained new authority----
Mr. Green. I am talking about laws that allow this. Do we
need to do more to circumvent. If you stop the growth of
marijuana, you don't have to worry about it being sold. We have
to approach guns the same way. Do we have the law to circumvent
the sale of guns, so that we can stop this?
These guns are everywhere. They are destroying communities.
The drugs are a problem. But the guns are a problem too. And I
have gone beyond my allotted time.
I thank you, Madam Chair. And I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. You are welcome, Mr. Green.
We will now hear from Ms. Lofgren of California for 5
minutes.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I have been concerned about the flow of guns south for some
time. I remember I met with the attorney general of Mexico and
Mexico City almost 2 years ago. And this was the thing he
wanted to talk about most. I remember him saying I understand
you have got a second amendment. We, in Mexico, respect your
Constitution. But surely you can do something about the machine
guns and surface-to-air missiles and things that are coming
down, and really just causing them tremendous problems.
And I was pleased when the secretary was here 2 weeks ago.
She indicated that she had requested an assessment of ICE and
CBP's efforts to stem the flow of guns from the United States
into Mexico. And I understand that assessment was due to her on
February 20. Can you tell us what the findings--anyone who
knows--what the findings of the assessment were, and then what
the implementation plan is?
Mr. Nieto. Thank you, ma'am, for that question. I know that
we have a comprehensive strategy for outbounds. However, in
order to sustain, as I said earlier, it is going to take
infrastructure----
Ms. Lofgren. I know. But the question is, this was a new
assessment she asked for.
Mr. Nieto. Correct.
Ms. Lofgren. Do you know what was in that assessment? If
you don't, you could just say you don't know.
Mr. Nieto. From our portion, that was the assessment that
we gave.
Ms. Lofgren. Okay. So no one has the--well, then we can
follow up with the secretary on the comprehensive assessment.
Let me ask you this. ICE has a very important role in
stemming--actually the primary role in stemming the flow of
guns south. And you mentioned, Mr. Kibble, that there are
several hundred personnel, ICE personnel, assigned to this
task.
What is the number of ICE personnel total?
Mr. Kibble. Ma'am, as far as special criminal----
Ms. Lofgren. No, all the ICE personnel. How many are in the
agency?
Mr. Kibble. Roughly 20,000.
Ms. Lofgren. So we have got 20,000 employees and a couple
hundred assigned to guns going south.
Mr. Kibble. I would only clarify, ma'am, that within the
Office of Investigations, which is the component of ICE that is
charged with this, we have a smaller number. It is roughly
6,500 investigators that are addressing the full spectrum of
cross-border crime.
Ms. Lofgren. Okay. So that is a pretty small percentage of
the total, in my judgment. You don't have to agree.
Mr. Kibble. May I add one more thing, ma'am?
Ms. Lofgren. Of course.
Mr. Kibble. Just to add some context, again these networks
are not necessarily just dedicated weapons smuggling networks.
So it is through the border enforcement security task forces
and other mechanisms, we are addressing all facets of these
organizations that are moving, not only guns, but money south
and also drugs north. So there really is a comprehensive push
on trying to deal with that full threat spectrum presenting us
across the border. And that extends to the thousand-plus agents
along the southwest border.
Ms. Lofgren. So we have an additional maybe 1,000 agents
who are also doing task force work on this. Now, do you have
dedicated agents working on the flow of--the other thing the
Mexican attorney general brought to my attention, and the
Mexican legislate--who I have met with. I meet with them, you
know, every three or 4 months. And although they politically
still have a broad spectrum, they are united that they have got
to get on top of this, which is very encouraging.
The other thing they want us to do is a much better job of
following the money, which is all being laundered here in the
United States. How many agents do you have assigned to
following up on that aspect of this?
Mr. Kibble. Ma'am, I don't have a specific number available
to me. But I can tell you a substantial--we look for the
financial component of every cross-border----
Ms. Lofgren. Could you follow up and tell me the number
later? Because it occurs to me that the government of Mexico
has taken on a tremendous task. And we are involved with them,
because we are consuming, for the most part, the drugs that are
the business of these cartels. The violence that is underway in
Mexico now has the potential--I am not saying that it is going
to succeed. But if the Mexicans do not succeed, has the
potential of completely destabilizing that country, right on
our southern border.
Can you imagine the refugee crisis that would create for
the United States and other countries in the Western
Hemisphere, in addition to just the nightmare scenario that
that provides for our closest neighbor other than Canada? So I
think we have a very substantial obligation to support the
efforts of the Mexican government to get control of this.
They are losing people in this war. They have lost more
people than even we have in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the two
things that they have asked us to do, which is to stop the
weapons, we haven't done; and to follow the money and shut it
down, which we also haven't done.
And I am not criticizing your efforts. I know you work
hard, you know. But it is a matter of priorities. The
government lacks priorities. Where are we going to put our
resources for one of the most important challenges that we face
as a nation. And I will just give you my point of view, and we
will follow up with the secretary, that our priorities are
mistaken here.
The biggest threat we face here is the collapse of civil
order in the nation to the south. And it is our obligation to
do everything we can to support them to get control of this
situation.
And I yield back to the gentle lady. I have gone slightly
over my time.
Ms. Sanchez. They are good questions to my colleague from
California.
The next one up will be Ms. Kilpatrick for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Congresswoman. And Chairman
Sanchez, I appreciate very much our distinguished panel today,
and especially your written testimony. There is so much good
information in it, that I am going to re-reading it tomorrow on
my long flight back to Arizona.
I am especially concerned about border security, because I
represent a vast sprawling district in Arizona; many, many
small towns. And I am recently hearing that there is an
increase in heroin trafficking in some small places, even
overtaking methamphetamines. So securing the border is a huge
issue for my district.
Yesterday, President Obama weighed in. And he said we are
going to examine whether and if National Guard deployment would
make sense, and under what circumstances they would make sense.
And as a former prosecutor working with law enforcement, I
quickly learned that there is a delicate balance in responding
to violence between stabilizing the situation, stopping the
violence, but not overreacting in such a way that it actually
escalates.
And so my question is for the admiral, what checks and
balances are in place in the phases you described to make sure
that our response is appropriate. And then my second question
deals with the National Guard specifically. We have asked a lot
of our National Guard in the past few years. And I want to know
if there is an evaluation in place right now to make sure that
we have the National Guard units that we need to respond, and
that they have the resources.
I would like to see an ongoing evaluation to make sure that
they have exactly what they need if we are going to be calling
on them for this very important response. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Rufe. Okay, thank you, Congresswoman. I appreciate
the question.
First of all, on the checks and balances within the plan
itself, yes we do. It is a measured plan that is meant to ramp
up as the threat ramps up. And there are triggers within that
to alert leadership as to when the violence or other threat has
reached a level where the forces in place can't address it, and
then bring any additional forces as needed to address it.
And of course, as I mentioned earlier, the most extreme
measure would be calling upon significant DOD support, which we
don't foresee at the present time, but nevertheless is there if
we need to call on it.
The secretary has met recently with the secretary of
defense and will meet again with him. We have actively engaged
within our planning process both the National Guard, the
Department of Defense and NORCOM, Northern Command out of
Colorado Springs, actively involved in all the planning
process, so that we know fully what capabilities would be
needed, and how we could access those capability if they were
needed.
With respect to the National Guard specifically, there here
are various ways obviously of activating the National Guard. As
you know, the governor can call upon his own National Guard
without further reference to anybody, us included. So that
certainly is an option the governor can call on at any time.
But in terms of using the National Guard on a sustained
basis, we are not contemplating that at the present time. But
that is certainly an option if the situation demands it.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Admiral. Do you know if there is
an evaluation in place to determine whether the National Guard
has the resources they need?
Admiral Rufe. Yes, that is a--you know, as you point out,
the National Guard has been stretched with all the activity
overseas and Iraq and Afghanistan. And I know within the
National Guard itself, yes, they are constantly evaluating. And
I think, through the Department of Defense channels, putting in
appropriate resource request to restore the National Guard
where it is necessary.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
I have another question, and that is for Mr. Pena. I know
that from your years in Phoenix, you appreciate the Native
American component of Arizona and the tribes along the border.
And we actually have tribes that span the border into Mexico--
one tribe in two countries.
And I am just wondering what kind of outreach Mexico is
using to just tie those two communities together in terms of
securing the border and responding to the violence that is
unified across tribal land, but actually spans two countries.
Mr. Pena. Congresswoman, I really don't have the specific
answer for that. But I can just tell you that Mexico certainly,
just like the U.S. and in Arizona, has a tremendous amount of
respect for the Native American in their country. They describe
many times as the indigenous tribes that exist there,
especially along their southern frontier. And I don't really
have an answer for that.
But I can tell you that DHS, through its program with the
Shadow Wolves that you may be familiar with is the Native
American from the--that are assigned to ICE investigations and
patrol the trafficking routes along the Arizona-Sonora border--
very, very involved in that activity with the Native Americans.
But specifically I don't have the answer to your question.
I am sorry.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And I certainly didn't mean to put you on
the spot. But at some point, maybe we can visit a little bit in
more detail. I have been meeting with those tribes about the
challenges that they are experiencing crossing the border for
ceremonial purposes. So we can follow up again.
And again, thank you very much. And I yield back my time.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentle lady and I will next
recognize Mr. Pascrell, of New Jersey, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
You know, just because these people don't have Middle
Eastern names, Madam Chair, and the violence isn't happening
halfway across the world doesn't mean that this isn't
terrorism. What we are witnessing in Mexico is the worst kind
of domestic terrorism. And it is happening right on our border.
So if anyone thinks that this shouldn't be a homeland security
priority, then they just haven't been paying attention.
Now, the chairman and I went to Mexico, not that long ago,
went into the belly of the beast. That will do for now. And we
found that the top echelon in the Mexican police who handle
drug interdiction had to take polygraph tests, because there
was so much corruption going on.
This is a very serious, serious, serious problem. At that
time, we were told that the only real interdiction that was
going on were the UAVs that we had had or some planes, two
planes, two drones, that were assisting the Mexican police and
officials from our DEA in tracking down those who are involved
in the trade of death. Let us not romanticize this.
I want to know--first question to you, Mr. Leech is are
those planes still in operation?
Mr. Leech. Admiral, I think those UAVs are CBP-owned. Are
they not?
Admiral Rufe. More appropriate for CBP to answer that.
Mr. Nieto. I think what you are referring to, sir, is
Operation Helicon.
Mr. Pascrell. That is correct.
Mr. Nieto. Okay. Both governments, U.S. and government of
Mexico are currently in negotiations to get that thing started
again, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. I want you to listen to this, Madam
Chairwoman, because the last administration--and this was a
very successful operation, very successful--decided that we did
not have enough money to fund the most effective way of
tracking down these drug dealers and their menace. And we still
do not have an operation. And that, I would venture to say, is
at least 20 months we have not had that operation now.
So Mr. Leech, I have a long been talking about the
escalating violence. A lot of us have talked about drugs and
guns. We don't really, really want to stop the guns from going
into Mexico. Do we?
We would be naive and certainly in denial to act as if this
is a problem that has just emerged from our neighbor Mexico and
has nothing to do with us or our own policy and our own
enforcement decisions. Plain and simple fact is that most of
the drugs coming from Mexico are destined for our country, as
many of you pointed out. And the most dangerous weapons fueling
the violence come from the United States.
So the first step to fixing something is recognizing the
problem. The previous administration seemed intent on ignoring
the connections between drug trafficking organizations and the
increasing levels of violence in Mexico, especially right at
our southern border.
So Mr. Leech, let me ask you, is this administration ready
to recognize the problem for what it is, a threat caused by a
failed drug and weapons smuggling policy that allowed cartels
to flourish just south of our border? I would like to get an
answer to that question. Would you put your microphone on
please? Thank you.
Mr. Leech. DHS is keenly aware of the connection between
border violence and drug trafficking organizations. And I think
there may be an--Congressman Lofgren posed sort of the same
sort of question about arms and money, weapons and money. And
this is what the DTOs need to continue doing what they are
doing. We have to attack arms and money.
And I think the impression may have been given that the
administration and DHS is not addressing that issue. Well, I
can sure assure you all that it is being addressed. And you
will be privy to it at the end of April. We are working
jointly. ICE and ATF currently are working together on
developing an arms chapter for this strategy that will address
the southbound flow of arms. This strategy right here, which
you already have access to, was provided to you earlier this
year or late last year, has a chapter on prosecutions, money
and investigations, which address the whole money issue.
Our office recently completed a bulk-cash currency study,
which I will be more than happy to share with you at some point
in time. So we are not neglecting the two key components that
keep these DTOs alive. And that is weapons and money. We
recognize that as a problem. The interagency is working hard to
address the issue. And we will keep moving forward with greater
and greater measures until that issue is solved. Thank you.
Mr. Pascrell. Madam Chair, can I ask one more question. Or
I will go for the second round, whatever you choose.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Pascrell, I don't believe we are going to
have a second round. So I will let you ask your last question.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Thank you very much. Oh, this is
my last question?
Ms. Sanchez. Your last question, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. All right.
Ms. Sanchez. And any other questions you might have, you
can always submit for the record.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. In writing.
Mr. Pascrell. Here is my question.
Mr. Leech----
Ms. Sanchez. And no two-pronged questions, okay?
Mr. Pascrell. Oh, I never ask two-pronged questions, Ms.
Chair.
Mr. Leech, this is in my bone marrow, I want you to know,
this issue. And I mean business. And I know you do, too. I am
not a proponent of legalization of drugs. But let me ask this
question.
I have listened to a lot of people in that seat over the
last 4 years, 5 years. And they said similar things. And they
help up similar reports and strategies. I like the word
strategy. Every problem has got a strategy in Washington.
But I want to ask you a real straight question. And I hope
you give me a straight answer. Do you think that the
legalization of the drugs we are talking about today,
particularly cocaine or marijuana--do you think that helps us
in the war or in the fight against--in our attempts to stop
drugs? Or do you think that it would make matters worse? Or do
you think it wouldn't make a difference?
Mr. Leech. I don't think it would make a difference.
Mr. Pascrell. You don't think it would.
Mr. Leech. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Pascrell. Well that is interesting. And we have come a
long way in 10 years.
Mr. Leech. That is a personal opinion.
Mr. Pascrell. Yes.
Mr. Leech. It doesn't represent the administration or the
department.
Mr. Pascrell. I understand that. I didn't ask you to----
Mr. Leech. I don't think it would make a difference.
Mr. Pascrell. I didn't ask you to catch. I asked you for
your honest opinion. Of course, I am beginning to think that
what we have done so far isn't working. And good intentions
have been in front of us engining the strategies that we come
up with.
This is a dreadful thing that has happened. The Mexican
people deserve better. Mexican-Americans deserve better. And
Americans deserve--the rest of the Americans deserve better.
And I just am not comfortable with what I am hearing from this
administration. And I have a tremendous amount of confidence in
Secretary Napolitano. I really do. And if I didn't, I wouldn't
say that.
But I don't see an appreciable change. I see spurts of
arrests. We had that from our own attorney generals in our own
states. And yet the drug problem gets worse in our own states.
Just a thought.
Mr. Leech. Sir, let me say this though about that issue. I
do believe that the issue becomes irrelevant if--and you
mentioned a second ago, you have seen a lot of people hold up
documents. And I will hold it up again.
If we can execute and are serious about executing the
strategies and implementation of plans that we are developing
right now, and that is the Merida, the Southwest Border
Strategy and what Admiral Rufe is working on. We now have an
alignment of Congress, the president, the secretary that I
think it would be a very, very effective execution of these
strategies.
I have been in the drug business for a long time. I spent
28 years as an Air Force officer. I worked drug issues very,
very early as a young captain. And I have stayed with it most
of my careers in between flying assignments. I have been with
this particular office, counternarcotics, for the last 5 years.
I think this Congress has always been serious about the issue.
But other factors have to line up in order to make it happen.
I think everything is lined up right now. Certainly my
visit along with Al Pena down in Mexico, I know they are eager
to be a part of this, to team up with us to try to stop this
terrible thing that is going on in terms of drug and violence.
I know all the interagencies players right now are working
together at a level that I haven't seen since post-9/11, that
short period after 9/11 where we all just came together.
I can see that beginning to happen now within the
interagency. And I can certainly see, just by this hearing,
that Congress is serious about this. Secretary Napolitano is a
boarded governor. She understands the issue. And I think now is
the time that we can make things happen if we collectively work
as a team to move this whole effort forward. Thank you.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Pascrell, you have even exceeded the time
I had.
Mr. Pascrell. I am going to ask you a question.
Ms. Sanchez. Go ahead.
Mr. Pascrell. Madam Chair, it has been alluded to by a few
folks. I would like to know for the committee, and maybe you
could, through your authority and influence, find out how the
cartels are exploiting U.S. laws in the purchase of weapons to
be used in Mexico. Would you find that out for us?
Ms. Sanchez. In fact, that was one of the questions I was
going to ask in parting from this group, what do they need from
us to be revised in order for this Department of Homeland and
other agency to carry out what we need. Before I ask that
question, however, I am going to give my ranking member the
opportunity to ask one question.
Mr. Souder. I wanted to make sure for the record, my good
friend Mr. Pascrell asked a question in a different form. And I
think your interpretation and some people's interpretation may
be slightly different from it.
The way the question on legalization usually works is if we
legalize it, then we will be able to reduce law enforcement,
because--but what the answer was is it wouldn't make any
difference. The cartels would just switch to other things. It
would have no impact on law enforcement. It would have a
terrible impact on individuals, because we would see an
increase in the use of marijuana, an increase in the use of
cocaine. And you would see treatment programs and other things.
But you ask a law enforcement question, not a drug. Every
country that has backed off on law enforcement has seen an
increase in usage and--
Mr. Souder. Yes, yes. And I realize that. But this issue is
The Economist Magazine just came out, lots of others, saying
oh, we wouldn't have to do all this law enforcement if we
legalized. And I don't think that is the case.
I just wanted to--do you agree with that, Mr. Leech?
Mr. Leech. Yes, sir, I do. Thank you, Congressman.
Ms. Sanchez. Obviously not from California. Well, of
course, our electorate has voted various times with respect to
loosening the laws on marijuana. I do have a question on the
last question, which would be, legislatively, what changes
could you use to make your job, make the people who are working
with you, more effective in curtailing money and guns going
south, people and trafficking and drugs going north and the
violence.
Are there any pieces of legislation, any pieces of laws,
any tweaking that needs to happen in order for you to have the
authority to do a better job of getting a handle on this
violence at the border?
Admiral Rufe. Madam Chairman. I will answer for the panel--
Ms. Sanchez. Yes, Admiral.
Admiral Rufe. If anybody else wants to chime in, I would
say as well. That is a big and very important question. But it
is one that we need to answer for the record. So I would ask
your indulgence so we can get back to you with specific
comments.
Ms. Sanchez. Absolutely, we need to know. We need to know.
And whatever you think that you need, so that we can talk about
what we can get done out of this committee, because this
committee has the primary jurisdiction of security at the
border.
Anybody else want to add anything? Or you all want to think
about it and come back in writing to the record.
Mr. Leech. Congresswoman, I would like to raise one issue.
And that is the issue of Title 21 for ICE. I think you may be
familiar with that. It has been an ongoing issue for some time
now. There are a lot of reasons that the other agency is
reluctant to see to it that ICE has Title 20, some of them very
legitimate. Some may not be so legitimate.
But the point is we are facing something we have never
faced before at a level we have never seen before--the level of
drugs and violence and arms. I, for the life of me, cannot
understand--and I am a very simple guy. I spent many, many
years in the military. And I am just trying to serve my
commander in chief now. But I, for the life of me, cannot
understand why my colleagues at ICE do not have Title 21
authority, which is the authority to investigate drugs.
They have very limited authority at this point. I think
that issue needs to be looked at at your level. I ask that you
look at it at your level. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Leech.
I thank all of the gentlemen, all the witnesses before us.
Thank you for your testimony. And as you know, those members
who still have questions, those who were not here might have
some questions in writing to submit for the record. We will get
them to you. We hope that you will turn them around as quickly
as possible as----
I am sorry, Mr. Nieto are you indicating something to me?
Mr. Nieto. Ma'am, if I can have a couple of minutes just to
clarify a couple of things.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
Mr. Nieto. Whenever I may.
Ms. Sanchez. Why don't you do it now, because I am about to
close the hearing.
Mr. Nieto. Okay. Okay. When I mentioned about outbound
operations and the sustainability of it, when I said we have
the personnel to adequately address the threat right now with
spillover violence, should it come, I just want to clarify that
we are not saying that we have all the people we need, okay,
for that, because there are other issues. And I did mention
that for outbound sustained operations, it is going to take
more infrastructure, more equipment and more personnel
obviously.
Ms. Sanchez. So by that answer, I am assuming you are
saying if something happens, you are able to react to it. But
in the long term, we need to assess what resources need to do
if it is going to be a sustained battle.
Mr. Nieto. And we have a plan for that. So we have 19,000
officers, gun-carrying officers at the borders. So if spillover
occurs, we will be the first ones to know. And we do have
organic resources and the Southwest Border Violence Plan to
mitigate it at that point. I just wanted to make sure that that
is--because we have other issues that I didn't want it to come
out as we have all the people we need.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
Mr. Nieto. I mean, especially not now.
Ms. Sanchez. And then you had a second point you wanted to
make?
Mr. Nieto. Yes. And the question that Congressman Pascrell
asked regarding the--it is manned aircraft that was Helicon. It
wasn't UAVs, sir. Just with the Helicon.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
Mr. Pascrell. Can I respond to that?
Ms. Sanchez. Let me have Mr. Souder. He had a response to
the first piece.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. And then we will get back to you, Mr.
Pascrell.
Mr. Souder. If I can say, Mr. Pascrell, maybe we ought to
do, in classified, what you are asking.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay.
Ms. Sanchez. Exactly. I believe that is where it belongs,
to my colleague.
Mr. Pascrell. For a good reason.
Mr. Souder. And I am concerned about your comment on
personnel. Are you saying--because that is a change in earlier.
In other words, if we want more IBET teams, if we change our
strategy to do more outbound, if we say there are new tasks for
homeland security, you are not maintaining you have enough
people to do that.
Mr. Nieto. Correct. For sustained outbound inspections, we
do not have the proper amount of personnel right now.
Mr. Souder. Or if we add more teams. There were more BEST.
Mr. Nieto. Correct.
Ms. Sanchez. And Mr. Pascrell, I think your questions are
probably better handled in a classified briefing of some type.
And we will try to set that up.
Okay. Again, thank you to the witnesses for your valuable
testimony. Members and subcommittee members who were not here
will submit to the record some questions for the witnesses.
Please respond to them as quickly as you can. And hearing no
further business, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
----------
Additional Questions and Responses
Questions from the Honorable Bennie G, Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Responses from John Leech
Question 1.: Studies indicate that nearly 90% of the cocaine
available in the U.S. crosses the southwest border. As we cut off
routes through Mexico and Central America, I am concerned that we may
begin to see new routes emerge or old routes put back into use. As
Chairman, I have consistently called for a comprehensive border
security strategy that would address threats at all our borders--
northern, southern, and maritime. How will the Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy fit into a comprehensive border security
strategy to help address all threats at all our borders?
Answer: The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy is
one piece of a broader and comprehensive border security strategy.
While successful counternarcotics efforts along the southwest border
may drive traffickers to alternate smuggling corridors, other
strategies are in place to guide counternarcotics and border security
activities in other regions. While we cannot prevent the smuggling
organizations from adapting to the tightened border, these contingency
plans will allow our law enforcement officers to identify and shut down
the ever-changing trafficking routes.
In 2008, the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) submitted
to Congress the Department's counternarcotics strategies for the
northern and maritime borders of the United States, to include the drug
transit zone. These strategies help integrate and synchronize the
Department's overall ability to respond to changes in drug trafficking
routes.
In 2009, CNE has been co-chairing an interagency effort to update
the 2007 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. The 2009
edition, which will update the challenges specific to countering
illicit drugs and related threats along the southwest border, will
include new sections that address weapons smuggling and the use of
tunnels to circumvent law enforcement. It will also identify priority
actions to address cross-border smuggling threats and describe each
agency's role along the southwest border.
Reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. is best achieved
through a layered, defense-in-depth approach of deterrence, denial, and
interdiction and investigation. By using the appropriate mix of
personnel, technology, infrastructure, and response platforms to
achieve maximum tactical and strategic advantage, and through
appropriate coordination with other departments, the Department of
Homeland Security will be better postured to respond to shifting
threats along our borders. Put simply, the Department is committed to
bringing all of its available resources to bear when combating threats
on our borders.
Question 2.: Over the years, we have spent hundreds of millions of
dollars on the ``war on drugs''. With this war now right in our own
backyard, it is essential that funding provided to Mexico under the
Merida Initiative be used effectively. How long do you believe it will
be before we can expect to see indicators that the Merida Initiative is
achieving its intended purpose? What can be done to speed up this
process? What are your performance measures for the Merida Initiative?
How will we know whether it is a success?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is closely
collaborating with the U.S. lead agency--the Department of State--to
ensure that Merida Initiative programs are effectively implemented in a
calculated sequence to maximize support to Mexico's efforts against
organized crime and improve Mexico's law enforcement and judicial
capabilities. Also, over the past year, the State Department has led an
interagency effort with the Government of Mexico on developing an array
of measures and indicators of effectiveness. DHS defers to State
Department on the progress of finalizing those measures.
Currently, Merida Initiative funding will provide our Mexican
counterparts approximately $700 million in equipment and training to
support President Calderon's campaign against drug trafficking
organizations and organized crime in Mexico. Even as the assistance has
started to flow, Mexico has already made advances in cracking down on
drug trafficking organizations, including most recently capturing a key
leader, Vicente Carrillo Leyva, aka ``El Ingeniero'' (``The
Engineer''), of the Juarez Cartel.
The Merida Initiative complements U.S. efforts to execute a
defense-in-depth approach to safeguarding the southwest border (SWB)
and the Department is taking additional steps to improve security along
the SWB. On March 24, 2009, Secretary Napolitano announced that DHS
will:
Double Border Enforcement Security Task Force teams
that incorporate foreign, federal, state, and local law
enforcement and intelligence officers;
Triple the number of DHS intelligence analysts working
along the U.S. SWB;
Increase U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
attache staff in Mexico in support of Mexican law enforcement
efforts;
Double Violent Criminal Alien teams located in SWB
Field Offices;
Quadruple the number of Border Liaison Officers
working with Mexican law enforcement entities;
Bolster Secure Communities Biometric Identification
capabilities;
Implement 100% southbound rail examinations;
Enhance the use of technology at ports of entry,
including use of mobile x-ray systems;
Increase the number of CBP Weapons/Currency canine
units operating on the SWB;
Increase engagement with State and local SWB law
enforcement;
Make available up to $59 million in current Operation
Stonegarden funding to enhance state, local, and tribal law
enforcement operations and assets along the SWB;
Increase the use of mobile license plate readers for
southbound traffic on the SWB;* Continue Armas Cruzadas--a DHS-
led bilateral law enforcement and intelligence-sharing
operation to thwart export of arms from the United States into
Mexico; and
Continue Operation Firewall--a DHS-led comprehensive
law enforcement operation targeting criminal organizations
involved in the smuggling of large quantities of U.S. currency.
These actions, along with Merida Initiative programs, will provide
critical additional capabilities needed to apprehend dangerous cartel
leaders, disrupt their operations, improve border security measures,
and reduce the cross-border smuggling of illicit drugs, bulk cash, and
weapons. We defer to the Department of State with regard to performance
measures directly related to Merida Initiative programs.
Responses from Alonzo Pena
Question 3.: Under the Merida Initiative, DHS and its components
would provide a significant amount of assets and technical expertise to
Mexican law enforcement. It is my understanding that much of this
training will be done by CBP and ICE personnel located in Mexico. I am
concerned, however, that we may not have the necessary resources abroad
to combat the growing surge in violence or to implement the Merida
Initiative.
Question: How would the Merida Initiative impact DHS personnel and
resources in Mexico?
Answer: Merida is a Department of State led initiative and has no
direct impact on DHS personnel and resources in Mexico. Merida is
funded primarily from State Department appropriations for use in Mexico
and other partner nations in the Caribbean and Central America. Merida
funding is allocated to partner nations for equipment, training and
information technology infrastructure. Merida funding is not used to
augment United States law enforcement agencies. However, increased
resources for Mexican law enforcement may benefit other initiatives
involving cooperation between DHS and Mexico, such as the Border
Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC), the Border Enforcement Security
Taskforces (BESTs), Armadas Cruzadas and Global Trafficking in Persons.
Question: Has DHS provided any additional resources for your
operations in Mexico to implement Merida and to combat the surge in
violence?
Answer: As Merida has no direct impact on DHS personnel and
resources, DHS has not been provided with additional resources to
implement Merida. However, we are working with the Department of State
in implementing several Merida projects, including providing a detailee
to assist in the procurement of advanced inspection equipment,
providing technical assistance for several other projects.
Respsonses from Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe Jr. (USCG Ret)
Question 4.: On March 24, 2009, Secretary Napolitano announced a
strong initiative to address potential spillover violence along our
border and the need to conduct more outbound inspections for arms and
bulk cash smuggling.
How does the recently announced initiative fit within the surge
plan that you described at the hearing? Under what specific
circumstances would the plan call for National Guard to be sent to the
border?
Answer: The initiatives announced by Secretary Napolitano on March
24, 2009 are only one part of our revised SWB Operations Plan (OPLAN)
which will be finalized as soon as possible. The OPLAN elaborates on
coordination and execution of the initiatives between DHS components.
This portion of the OPLAN reflects the newly strengthened DHS steady-
state operations. Additionally, the OPLAN addresses DHS coordination of
activities if SWB conditions were to exceed the capabilities of DHS
assets. Should DHS assets require augmentation, other Federal
Departments and Agencies would be called upon to add support to the
existing effort. Finally, the SWB OPLAN provides guidance on the
transition to long-term recovery following the escalated Federal
response.
Under what specific circumstances would the plan call for National
Guard to be sent to the border?
Answer: The President has publicly made it clear that the current
situation does not require the militarization of the border. He has
also made it clear that he and the federal, state, and local agencies
responsible for border security will continue to monitor the situation
at the border carefully and will take additional steps if necessary to
ensure the border remains secure. This has benefits for communities on
both sides of the border. The $250 million in contingent DOD funding is
a prudent measure to ensure that adequate resources are available, on
short notice, if circumstances require ramping up efforts to augment
civilian law enforcement activities along the southwest border. The
funds could be used to augment existing DOD counter narcotics missions
and to supplement civilian law enforcement efforts along the border if
the President determines that such steps are warranted by the facts on
the ground.
Responses from Kumar Kibble
Question: It is my understanding that under some outdated MOUs, DHS
can only investigate narcotics smuggling with the concurrence of the
Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration, despite the
fact that DHS accounts for the largest amount of narcotics seizures in
the war on drugs along our borders. Do you believe DHS should play a
greater role in these narcotics investigations? What authorities does
DHS need to conduct investigations related to drugs seized at the
border by CBP and ICE?
Answer: Currently, DHS has limited Title 21 authority: CBP through
a legacy INS MOU with DEA for Border Patrol interdictions; and ICE
through a 1994 legacy Customs MOU with DEA that allows for DEA
designation of up to 1,475 ICE Agents.
The 1994 MOU applicable to ICE requires ICE to seek permission from
DEA, request participation by DEA, and work under the general
supervision of DEA in any drug-related investigation. Through the
existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), fully a fourth of ICE's
criminal investigators are cross-designated which allows the ICE
investigators to work closely with DEA on drug investigations. The
current MOU permits ICE to investigate transnational drug cases. ICE is
required to coordinate and de-conflict their investigations with DEA,
allowing DEA to participate in drug smuggling investigations and to
coordinate domestic enforcement activities.
DOJ and DHS believe that it is important to revise the 1994 MOU
between DEA and the United States Customs Service (now ICE) to meet
present day challenges. By removing the limit on the number of cross-
designations and by strengthening the communication and coordination
provisions, an updated MOU would enhance ICE's ability to perform its
primary mission of protecting our Nation's borders and further support
DEA's mission of enforcing Title 21 worldwide. The revised MOU would
also enhance close coordination of efforts between our agencies,
thereby preventing dangerous, confrontational, or duplicative
activities. Now, more than ever, a cooperative and unified approach to
drug law enforcement is a fundamental and necessary element of a
successful national drug control strategy.
Question 6.: As many reports have indicated, the violence in Mexico
is fueled in part by the guns and currency smuggled into the country
from the U.S. Some government officials have stated that nearly 90% of
all firearms used by Mexican criminals and drug cartels come from the
U.S. What percentage of the weapons recovered in Mexico, including
untraceable weapons, do you believe are smuggled through the border
between the US and Mexico? What percentage of weapons enter through
Mexico's southern border? What percentage are U.S. weapons purchased
from third party vendors, perhaps transnational criminal organizations
outside the U.S.? By what means are these weapons smuggled into Mexico?
Answer: According to ATF's tracing center, 90 percent of the
firearms recovered in Mexico and subsequently traced have a nexus to
the United States meaning that they were originally manufactured or
imported into the United States. Further, we understand that in fiscal
year 2008, the Mexican Government submitted approximately 7,700 trace
requests to ATF's National Tracing Center. The Mexican Government has
been unclear as the exact number of arms it recovered in fiscal year
2008 but we have consistently seen the Mexican Government use the
figure 29,000.
It is unacceptable that any weapons are smuggled unlawfully into
Mexico from the United States--no matter how large or small the number.
Therefore, DHS is working with our federal, state, local, tribal, and
foreign law enforcement partners to aggressively pursue weapons
smuggling violations as delineated in the southwest border
Counternarcotics Strategy.
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