[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FEMA'S GULF COAST REBUILDING EFFORTS:
THE PATH FORWARD
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS,
AND RESPONSE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 3, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-2
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-472 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California PETER T. KING, New York
JANE HARMAN, California LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
Columbia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Mississippi
LAURA RICHARDSON, California PETE OLSON, Texas
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas
JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
MARY JO KILROY, Ohio
ERIE J.J. MASSA, New York
DINA TITUS, Nevada
VACANCY
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Conner, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS,AND RESPONSE
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairman
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia PETE OLSON, Texas
LAURA RICHARDSON, California ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri PETER T. KING, New York (ex
DINA TITUS, Nevada officio)
VACANCY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi,
(ex officio)
Veronique Pluviose-Fenton, Staff Director
Stephen Vina, Staff Director
Daniel Wilkins, Clerk
Amanda Halpern, Minority Subcommittee Lead
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response..................... 1
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response..................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 4
The Honorable Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana.................................... 44
The Honorable Emmanuel Cleaver, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri:
Oral Statement................................................. 42
Prepared Opening Statement..................................... 42
The Honorable Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas................................................. 50
The Honorable Pete Olson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Opening Statement..................................... 40
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California........................................ 46
The Honorable Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Nevada................................................ 49
Witnesses
Mr. David Garratt, Acting Deputy Administrator, FEMA's Disaster
Assistance Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Accompanied by,
Mr. James Walke, Acting Assistant Administrator, FEMA's Disaster
Assistance Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Mr. Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Ms. Amy Liu, Deputy Director, Brookings Metropolitan Policy
Program, Brookings Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Ms. Lyda Ann Tomas, Mayor, City of Galveston:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
FEMA'S GULF COAST REBUILDING
EFFORTS: THE PATH FORWARD
----------
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications,
Preparedness and Response,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 311, Cannon, Hon. Henry Cuellar [chairman of the
subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson, Norton,
Richardson, Cleaver, Titus, Rogers, Olson, and Cao.
Also present: Representative Jackson-Lee.
Mr. Cuellar. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness and Response will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony
regarding ``FEMA's Gulf Coast Rebuilding Efforts: The Path
Forward.''
Good morning, on behalf of the committee, on behalf of the
members of this subcommittee. Let me welcome the witnesses from
the Government Accountability Office, the GAO; the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, FEMA; the city of Galveston,
mayor; the Brookings Institution, also.
And please let me note from the very beginning, members,
that David Garratt, FEMA's acting deputy administrator, will
testify in the place of James Stark of the FEMA's Gulf Coast
Recovery Office. This is in light of an investigation into the
recent allegations of fraud, nepotism and sexual abuse at
FEMA's Recovery Office in Louisiana.
Mr. Garratt is accompanied by Mr. James Walke, FEMA's
acting assistant administrator of the Disaster Assistant
Directory.
I have been also made aware of the troubling allegations of
keen interest to one of our newest members of the subcommittee,
Mr. Cao--I believe he is on the way--weather-related--like we
have other members, also. Mr. Cao--we know that the allegations
are disturbing to all of us. And we can tell that to Mr. Cao--
to all of us, and the members of the subcommittee and the full
committee, also.
As such, I will inform the committee staff--is looking into
this matter. Furthermore, Secretary Napolitano committed at
last week's full-committee hearing, to the chairman, that she
was looking into the matter and will report back to the
committee on the department's finding.
Now, on to the matter of the day. Today's hearing is
entitled ``FEMA's Gulf Coast Rebuilding Efforts: The Path
Forward.'' It is an opportunity to examine how the lessons
learned from the past incidents can be leveraged to help state
and local governments navigate the Federal maze to enhance our
capacity to recover from future large-scale incidents.
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina barreled toward the
Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, and resulted
in one of the largest natural-disaster relief-and-recovery
operations in United States history.
The public-health concerns, the environmental challenges,
and communications failure have been well documented. But what
is more seared in our minds, of the public, was the lack of
preparation and response to assist the survivors of Hurricane
Katrina, and the slowness of the recovery.
Less than 1 month later, on September 24, 2005, Hurricane
Rita slammed through parts of Louisiana and southeast Texas,
and destroyed some coastal communities, and cost more than $10
billion in damages, while leaving more than 2 million people
without power and electricity. Several tornadoes on the
Hurricane Rita's outer bands also damaged the state of
Mississippi.
More than 3 years after the 2005 hurricanes, the Gulf Coast
embarked upon another recovery effort in the wake of the 2008
Hurricane Gustav and Ike.
With all of the storms, President George W. Bush issued a
``major disaster'' declaration in accordance with the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistant Act,
triggering assistance from the Federal Government.
Today's hearing will provide members the opportunity to
learn about the importance of the following: One, the need for
creating a clear, implementable and timely recovery plan. Two,
the application of public assistance to enhance state and local
government capacity. Three, the benefit of implementing
strategies for business recover. And, four, the importance of
adopting a comprehensive approach to combating fraud, waste and
abuse.
Let me welcome Mr. Stanley Czerwinski, director of the
Strategic Issues at GAO, who will explain how his examination
of six of these major incidents, from 1989 through 2005--
ranging from Loma Prieta earthquake in northern California to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in the Gulf Coast--offer recovery
lessons for the Gulf Coast region affected by Hurricane Ike and
Gustav, and future disasters, in general.
Next, the subcommittee will hear from Mr. David Garratt,
acting deputy administrator of FEMA. Mr. Garratt will explain
the public-assistance process, specifically as it relates to
recent storms that have impacted the Gulf Coast. FEMA will also
discuss how and why states differ in their drawing-down of
public-assistance funds. And I believe there is a handout,
members. You all should have a handout about the different
states and how they are drawn down from those public-assistance
funds.
FEMA will also discuss the possible impediments, as well as
opportunities for improvement in the recovery process.
Our third witness is Ms. Lyda Ann Thomas, the mayor of the
city of Galveston, in Texas. Mayor Thomas will detail to this
committee the lessons that her city learned from the Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, as it struggles to recover from the
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav.
She will offer her experience with the public-assistance
process, and her recommendations to FEMA and other
jurisdictions which may face the major disaster in the future.
Our final witness is Ms. Amy Liu, the deputy director of
the Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brookings Institute. As
someone who has been avidly monitoring the recovery of the Gulf
Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Ms. Liu will
explain what she learned from her assessment of the Katrina
recovery process and the lessons they hold for other
jurisdictions.
As the committee receives testimony from the panel, I want
to note that I am very much looking forward for the proposal
from the witnesses that will help to eliminate the culture of
``us versus them,'' and it is something we have been
emphasizing. It all goes together. But there is--in the past,
it has seemed it is us versus them. And we want to make sure
that we eliminate that culture and work together as a team.
The reality is that the impact of a terrorist attack or a
major disaster is felt by all, regardless of one's political
party, or whatever you are--a Federal official versus a state
or local official. It is one team together.
Therefore, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses
that highlight how we can work together--work together--I
emphasize--to improve the recovery process, not finger-
pointing.
The people of the Gulf Coast region have been badly served.
We can do better. I know there has been instances how we have
served well. But we can do better as a team. We should not
allow the inefficiency, the bureaucracy or the scandals to
further deprive the people of this region from a timely and
effective recovery process.
With that, I want to thank the witnesses for coming here
today. And I look forward to a robust discussion centered on
sound governance that promotes creative solutions and
coordinated planning to rebuild the resilient Gulf Coast.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the
Subcommittee of the Emergency Communications, Preparedness and
Response, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, first, I would like to thank all the witnesses for
taking the time out of your schedules to be with us today. It
is very helpful and important, and it is very much appreciated
by us.
As the chairman said, the hearing is being held today to
discuss FEMA's efforts to facilitate Gulf Coast recovery and
rebuilding after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the need to
continue applying lessons learned from them, as well as Ike and
Gustav, to future recovery efforts.
I look forward to testimony from David Garratt, from the
Office of Gulf Coast Recover, as well as Stan Czerwinski, from
the GAO. I hope you will discuss the progress that FEMA has
made in developing a strong Emergency Management System,
particularly in the areas of disaster recovery and mitigation.
We also look forward to hearing from Ms. Liu and Mayor
Thomas, who can provide insight into the details of recovery
underway, as well as the need to strengthen information sharing
and coordination between FEMA and state and local governments.
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast,
emergency-management officials in my home state of Alabama
helped Alabama residents and displaced victims from Louisiana
and Mississippi find emergency housing.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and more recently, Ike and
Gustav, have taught us all to appreciate the state and local
partnerships that become crucial during times of disaster
response and recovery.
I feel strongly that while more work remains to be done,
FEMA has made significant progress in the last 2 years and
would lose valuable resources and suffer a major setback if it
was pulled out of DHS.
We all know that this nation cannot afford to be distracted
or unprepared to respond when a natural disaster or terrorist
attack occurs on our soil. This hearing presents an opportunity
to look at what should be done to improve response and recovery
efforts in going forward.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. OK, Mr. Rogers.
And, again, just for the record, Mr. Rogers and I have sat
down before. And we have talked about how we can work this
committee in a bipartisan way. And I appreciate his input--his
vast input, working with our committee staff, also.
At this time, the chair now recognizes the chairman of the
Committee of Homeland Security, the gentlemen from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement.
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairman Cuellar.
First, let me thank our panel for being here today. We all
are aware of the destructions caused by Hurricane Katrina and
Rita in 2005, and Gustav and Ike in 2008. What we need to
understand, though, is how we move ahead with the recovery
process.
As you know, I have been very vocal with my displeasure
with the pace in which the Gulf States are drawing down and
spending disaster-relief funds provided by FEMA and other
Federal agencies. In particular, I am bothered by the lethargic
pace that FEMA, Mississippi and Louisiana are spending the
public-assistance grants from Katrina and Rita. These funds,
which are intended to restore critical infrastructure in the
region, are vital to a full recovery.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See committee file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We cannot afford to fail in effectively leveraging these
funds. Mississippi has been awarded $2.9 billion by FEMA. But
about $1.3 billion of these funds still have not been spent.
Louisiana was awarded $7.5 billion, but the state has yet to
disperse $3.4 billion.
We are 31/2 years removed from the 2005 hurricanes, and we
still have nearly $5 billion sitting there, waiting to be used.
Meanwhile, as of February 1st, Texas has roughly 85 percent of
the funds FEMA has obligated to them as a result of 2005 and
2008 hurricanes.
And I am concerned that the governors of Mississippi and
Louisiana are going to develop a reputation for being poor
stewards of taxpayers' money. Let me be clear, though. I don't
think it is entirely a problem with the states.
FEMA's inflexible funding structure and a lack of quick
resolution during disputes is also delaying the speed of
recovery. I hope we can get someone here today to agree on what
the problems are and hopefully start a conversation that will
help streamline these funds to get them to the people who need
them.
At a full-committee hearing last week, Homeland Security
Secretary Napolitano agreed that post-disaster funds need to be
streamlined. However, I was concerned to find out that Mr.
Garratt was testifying at the same time, before another
committee, that the public-assistance appeal process is meant
to be a thoughtful, deliberative process, not a quick
resolution.
I understand Mr. Garratt's position of protecting
taxpayers' funds from fraud, waste and abuse. But I am
convinced that we can improve accountability of the funds and
streamlines to build credit where it is safe.
It is important that FEMA and the states work together to
find a quick and effective way to distribute these funds.
Unfortunately, most of the stories we are hearing are about
disagreements between FEMA and the states.
For example, after Katrina, New Orleans claimed that the
majority of damage to the city's sewer system was from the
storm, but FEMA claimed that most of the damage was due to poor
maintenance. Because of this dispute, FEMA did not even begin
an in-depth damage assessment of the sewer system until July
2007, nearly 2 years after the storm--just an example of the
``us versus them'' mentality that has greatly hampered the
recovery in the Gulf.
I am hoping today that we can find common ground, that we
can put the ``us versus them'' mentality behind us and find a
way for all parties to work together toward the common goals of
a complete recovery in the Gulf.
To accomplish this, we must identify and learn from our
past mistakes. I look forward to your testimony. And, again,
thank you for being here.void
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
All the members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
the committee rules, opening statements may--may be submitted
for the record.
At this time, we will go ahead and move on to the
witnesses' statements. Again, I certainly want to welcome the
panels and, again, members. I have given you the names of the
first witnesses.
Our first witness will be Mr. Stanley Czerwinski, the
director of Strategic Issues of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Our second witness will be Mr. David
Garratt, who is the acting deputy administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
Our third witness is Ms. Lyda Ann Thomas, the mayor of
Galveston, Texas. And our final witness is Amy Liu, from the
Brookings Institute--deputy director there.
Again, we appreciate it. And without objection, the
witnesses' full statements will be inserted into the record.
And I will ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Garratt.
Members--I am sorry. Before we get started--I handed a copy
to members. They should be in your notebook--hand it over--that
has the assistance. And the grants have gone down to the poor
states--and what has been obligated, what has been drawn down.
So that will give you an idea of the overall picture, per
state.
So at this time, we can start off with the first witness.
STATEMENT OF DAVID GARRATT, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEMA'S
DISASTER ASSISTANCE DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Garratt. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman Cuellar,
Ranking Member Rogers and other distinguished members of the
committee.
It is a privilege to appear before you today on behalf of
the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. As always, we welcome your interest in, and
appreciate your continued support of the challenging Emergency
Management mission.
I am joined at the table today by James Walke, the acting
assistant administrator of the Disaster Assistance Directorate
at FEMA. Mr. Walke is the agency's premier authority on public
assistance. And we look forward to some productive dialogue on
the subject.
FEMA's public-assistance program is, with rare exceptions,
a fundamentally critical element of any major disaster
recovery. Through public assistance, grants are provided to
states, local governments, and certain private nonprofits to
reimburse for the removal of debris, for emergency protective
measures and temporary relocation of certain services or
functions, and the repair and replacement of infrastructure
damaged or destroyed by a disaster event.
The repair or replacement of infrastructure can include
public roads, bridges, drainage structures, water-control
facilities, public buildings, public utilities, parks and other
facilities.
Though funded through FEMA, the public-assistance program
is administered and managed by states. Local governments and
other eligible applicants receive their funding through the
states. The state controls the pace of such disbursements.
Federal regulations authorize states to disperse funds for
small projects up-front, if state regulations allow such
payment. For large projects, Federal regulations authorize
states to disperse funds to applicants on a reimbursable basis.
However, in an effort to meet the financial challenges of local
applicants, the states of Louisiana and Mississippi have both
established policies to provide advanced funding to begin
design work and construction.
To date, the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness has dispersed $4.1 billion
of the $7.5 billion FEMA has obligated to applicants.
The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency has dispersed
$1.6 billion of the $2.9 billion FEMA has obligated to
applicants.
There are, sometimes, disagreements between FEMA and
applicants about the extent of disaster-related damages to
facilities that were not well maintained prior to the disaster.
The Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to reimburse applicants to
repair disaster-related damages, but not damage attributed to
deferred maintenance, neglect or other causes.
Applicants who disagree with the FEMA determination have
the right to appeal, and have 60 days from the written
determination to file a first appeal with the appropriate FEMA
regional office. If the regional administrator denies the first
appeal, the applicant has 60 days to file a second appeal to
FEMA headquarters.
The recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 contains a provision that directs the president to
establish an arbitration panel to expedite recover efforts in
the Gulf Coast for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and FEMA and
the department are developing procedures to implement this new
requirement.
In the meantime, FEMA will continue to work with the states
and applicants to resolve disputes.
Recognizing that the scale of devastation demanded maximum
flexibility within the public-assistance program, FEMA
developed a number of innovative strategies consistent with the
authorities of the Stafford Act, and designed to address some
of the unique challenges of recovering from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita.
FEMA will continue to adapt its policies wherever possible
to expedite the recovery process.
We have made, I believe, significant progress in promoting
recovery in the Gulf Coast. To date, FEMA has obligated over
$10.5 billion in public-assistance funding to the Gulf Coast
states. FEMA has taken aggressive steps to speed the provision
of funds to the states, and to encourage the states to provide
funds to local applicants.
While FEMA has obligated the majority of public-assistance
funds to the states, it is important to recognize that the
approval of projects and the obligation of funds is just the
beginning of the rebuilding process. Local jurisdictions
continue to confront a lengthy and challenging rebuilding
period.
Nevertheless, FEMA will remain on the ground, shoulder-to-
shoulder with our state and local partners, as they undertake
these major repair and construction projects to the roads,
bridges, schools, utilities and other public facilities.
As brick-and-mortar projects are begun, we will continue to
identify additional eligible work as it emerges or is
identified, and continue to reimburse actual costs for any
eligible work.
Repairing and rebuilding damaged and destroyed
infrastructure has been, and will continue to be, a challenge.
But FEMA's public-assistance presence and support can be
counted on until that challenge is met.
Thank you. We are prepared to address any questions you may
have.
[The joint statement of Mr. Garratt and Mr. Walke follows:]
Statement of
David Garratt
Acting Deputy Administrator
and
James Walke
Acting Assistant Administrator
Disaster Assistance Directorate
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of Homeland Security
``FEMA's Gulf Coast Rebuilding Efforts:
The Path Forward''
Before theHouse Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC
March 3, 2009
Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers and other
distinguished members of the Committee. It is a privilege to appear
before you today on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As always, we
appreciate your interest in, and continued support of emergency
management, specifically FEMA's response and recovery efforts in the
wake of disaster events.
I am joined today by James Walke, Acting Assistant Administrator
for the Disaster Assistance Directorate at FEMA. We are pleased to be
here with you today to update you on our Public Assistance (PA) efforts
from hurricanes Katrina and Rita throughout the Gulf Coast.
Public Assistance Overview
FEMA's PA program is a vital and visible part of the recovery
process. FEMA has been extremely active in working with the States and
local governments to repair, restore, or rebuild public services and
facilities. FEMA's PA program provides grants to States, local
governments and certain private non-profits to reimburse for the
removal of debris, for emergency protective measures and temporary
relocation of certain services or functions, and the repair and
replacement of infrastructure damaged or destroyed by a disaster event.
The repair or replacement of infrastructure can include public roads,
bridges, drainage structures, water control facilities, public
buildings, public utilities, parks and other facilities.
Though funded by FEMA, the State administers the PA program. Local
governments and other eligible applicants receive their funding through
the States. When State and local governments identify eligible
projects, FEMA, along with the State and applicant, prepares a project
worksheet to document the disaster damage to the facility and estimate
the cost to repair the damage. FEMA enters the completed project
worksheet into NEMIS, our management information system, to begin the
funding process. A project worksheet has been prepared for every
project that the State and local governments have identified to FEMA.
There are occasions when the PW has to amend an obligated project
worksheet to adjust the eligible scope of work or cost estimate for a
project to ensure that funding is provided to eligible applicants, for
eligible work and for eligible costs.
FEMA staff works very closely with the State and the eligible
applicant to complete the project worksheets and obligate the federal
share of assistance. FEMA, State and public/private nonprofit
applicants jointly prepare project worksheets. Preparing project
worksheets and reaching agreement on the eligible scope of work and
cost estimates is a collaborative process that takes time to complete.
Once FEMA approves and obligates a project worksheet, the State
receives the funds to disburse to the applicant. As of February 20,
2009, FEMA has obligated over $10.5 billion in public assistance
funding to the Gulf Coast states (including $7.5 billion to Louisiana
and $2.9 billion to Mississippi).
The State controls the pace of such disbursements. Federal
regulations authorize States to disburse funds for small projects
(projects that cost less than $55,500) to applicants up front, if state
regulations allow such payment. For large projects (projects that cost
more than $55,500), Federal regulations authorize States to disburse
funds to applicants on a reimbursement basis. In other words,
applicants must have incurred costs before they can request funds from
the State. However, in an effort to meet the financial challenges of
local applicants, the States of Louisiana and Mississippi have both
established policies to provide advance funding to begin design work
and construction. To date, the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) has disbursed $4.1 billion
of the $7.5 billion FEMA has obligated to applicants. The Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) has disbursed $1.6 billion of the
$2.9 billion FEMA has obligated to applicants.
In some cases, FEMA must amend or prepare an alternate version of a
PW to revise the scope of work to reflect newly identified damage, or
revise the cost estimate after the applicant finalizes design of the
project or awards construction contracts. FEMA estimates that
approximately 1,400 project worksheets in Louisiana may require an
amendment or version update. While we have had many challenges, we
believe that FEMA and the State of Louisiana have developed a process
to systematically and efficiently evaluate applicants' requests to
amend project worksheets.
In Mississippi, there have been significantly fewer requests to
amend or prepare alternate versions to obligated project worksheets.
Typically, FEMA has amended or prepared versions of project worksheets
after the applicant completes the work and FEMA and the State reconcile
project costs.
There are sometimes disagreements between FEMA and applicants about
the extent of disaster-related damages to facilities that were not
well-maintained prior to the disaster. The Stafford Act authorizes FEMA
to reimburse applicants to repair disaster-related damages. Based on
assessments by FEMA Public Assistance staff, some of the facilities
damaged by Katrina and Rita also suffered from deferred maintenance.
Although FEMA has prepared project worksheets to document what we
believe to be the disaster-related damages, applicants have not
initiated repairs to the facilities or submitted formal appeals. If an
applicant does not agree with a scope of work in an approved PW, FEMA
regulations (44 CFR 206.206) provide an applicant 60 days to file a
first appeal with the appropriate FEMA regional office. If the Regional
Administrator denies the first appeal, the applicant has 60 days to
file a second appeal with the Assistant Administrator at FEMA
Headquarters.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 contains a
provision that directs the President to establish an arbitration panel
to expedite recovery efforts in the Gulf Coast for Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. The Administration is developing procedures to implement this
new requirement. In the meantime, FEMA will continue to work with the
States and applicants to resolve disputes.
Public Assistance Innovations
We have made, I believe, significant progress in promoting recovery
in the Gulf Coast. As of February 13, 2009, FEMA has obligated over
$10.5 billion in public assistance funding to the Gulf Coast states
(Louisiana and Mississippi). In recognition of the extraordinary level
of devastation to the area, FEMA developed innovative strategies,
within the authorities of the Stafford Act, to help Louisiana deal with
the challenges of recovering from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These
innovations included:
Alternative arrangements: All FEMA funded projects
must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act.
Traditionally, FEMA would assess the environmental impact of
each new facility. To accelerate the environmental review
process, FEMA developed a process to evaluate environmental
impacts that decreases the amount of time usually required for
environmental reviews, approvals, and comment periods, but
still meets the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act. This has allowed us to approve and obligate funds
for new projects quicker.
Building contents: Traditionally, FEMA requires
applicants to use their reimbursements to replace damaged
contents on a piece-by-piece basis. Following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, FEMA provided applicants with the flexibility
to combine all of their grant monies for contents into one
grant and use that money toward broad contents categories, such
as furniture, publications, and information technology. This
flexibility allows applicants to maximize their funding and
adjust it to their specific content needs instead of forcing
them to purchase pencil-for-pencil or book-for-book.
Consolidation projects: FEMA has allowed applicants the option
of combining multiple facilities and their functions into one
facility or multiple facilities at one location without a
reduction in eligible funding. This initiative is called
project consolidation. This allows applicants the flexibility
to use monies to rebuild smarter in implementing their recovery
plans. For example, a county/parish may decide it needs fewer
fire stations in one area but bigger fire stations in another
area to best serve population shifts. The county/parish can
make that decision without losing any FEMA funding.
Project management fees: Applicants have the option to
receive project management fees upfront and lumped together in
one project worksheet for all of their projects, so they can
use those funds to employ architectural and engineering (A&E)
firms to begin designs for facility repair/rebuilding. This
allows applicants the flexibility to begin work on priority
projects and funnel monies toward the design of those projects
so rebuilding can begin.
Vehicle replacement: Traditionally, FEMA reimburses an
applicant for each damaged or destroyed vehicle and require
applicants to replace them in-kind. FEMA has adjusted its
policy for the replacement of vehicles. Applicants have the
flexibility to take funds for the replacement of storm-damaged
vehicles and use them to purchase a smaller number of alternate
vehicles with the same function.
FEMA continues to adapt its policies, where possible, on other
issues that will expedite the recovery process.
Public Assistance Challenges
While progress has been made in streamlining and expediting funds
to the State and local governments, a number of unique and significant
hurdles remain facing the State and local governments.
Grant funds are limited to actual costs and applicants
are struggling with funding shortfalls as they address real
needs in repairing and replacing facilities. These issues
include both cash flow problems and the applicants' efforts to
address non-disaster related improvements and expansions not
eligible for PA funding.
Louisiana and Mississippi still have not made
decisions regarding accepting the current level of funding
proposed by FEMA, and subsequently, this has hindered decisions
regarding what building projects they intend to repair,
rebuild, consolidate or relocate. This is reflected in the
small number of construction projects actually underway. This
indecision on the part of the States has not hindered FEMA,
however, from obligating these funds to the State to begin work
on these projects. Additionally, because states have not drawn
down these funds, and not filed formal appeals to request
additional funding, funds remain unspent in the State's
account.
FEMA accommodated the State of Louisiana's request to
create updated project worksheet versions each time a
significant change was made to the scope of work, costs, etc,
during the life of the project. However, this accommodation has
significantly increased the number of project worksheet
versions in Louisiana and disputes.
FEMA anticipates working closely with State and local governments
to resolve these issues.
Looking Ahead
FEMA has taken aggressive steps to speed the provision of funds to
the States and to encourage the States to provide funds to local
applicants. While FEMA has obligated the majority of public assistance
funds to the States, it is important to recognize that the approval of
projects and the obligation of funds is just the beginning of the
rebuilding process. Local jurisdictions are now entering what will be a
lengthy and challenging rebuilding effort. A construction project for
just one school is a significant undertaking for a local community--the
repair and rebuilding of entire communities will continue to challenge
and stretch local capabilities.
FEMA will remain on the ground, committed to supporting our State
and local partners, as they undertake major repair and construction
projects to their roads, bridges, schools, utilities, and other public
facilities. As the brick and mortar projects are executed, we will
continue to identify additional eligible work that was not originally
anticipated. The PA program is a reimbursements program and FEMA will
pay actual costs for eligible work.
Conclusion
Throughout the Gulf Coast, we have piloted many new initiatives
that have contributed not only to the recovery of the Gulf Coast but
have also contributed to the retooling and improvement of FEMA. These
initiatives and our lessons learned will help to improve the
effectiveness of FEMA's programs in future disasters.
While repairing damaged and destroyed infrastructure has been, and
will continue to be a challenge, FEMA remains committed to providing
and coordinating continued assistance to the victims of hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Thank you again. We are prepared to address any questions you may
have.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. James Walke, who is FEMA's acting
assistant administrator for the Disaster Assistant Director, is
also present to answer any particular questions that you all
might have.
At this time, I would like to recognize Mr. Czerwinski to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY J. CZERWINSKI, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Czerwinski. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for inviting us here today to testify on lessons
about better rebuilding after disasters, particularly in the
Gulf Coast.
And I need to thank you, Mr. Chairman, because you actually
summarized part of my statement, including my overriding
message. And that is, ``We are all in it together--Federal,
state and local governments.'' And they have to be partners for
this to work.
And as Mr. Garratt pointed out, in the Stafford Act, the
primary responsibility for doing the rebuilding is at the state
and local level--at--but the money, the paper building, is from
the Federal Government.
And this works best when the state and local governments
are empowered and capable to do the work, and the Federal
Government delivers the funds as simply as possible.
As you know, there are several phases to disaster
assistance. There is preparedness. There is responding to the
emergency needs and immediate aftermath, and there are
rebuilding after disasters.
Frankly, the disaster community tends to focus on the
preparedness and on the immediate response. You have exercises
to enhance capacity, to be prepared. You have a national
response plan that has been around for years that lays out
detailed roles and responsibilities for the Federal, state and
local level.
We don't have the structure for rebuilding. So in the wake
of hurricanes Katrina, Ivan and Gustav, and the Midwest floods,
we felt that--that state and local governments, and the Federal
Government, could benefit from some lessons that we learned
from looking at past disasters.
And as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we went back and
visited sites and talked to people involved in the response and
the rebuilding, from Katrina and Rita in the Gulf Coast,
Andrew, in Florida, the Red River floods in North Dakota and
Minnesota, the earthquakes in California--both Northridge and
Loma Prieta--and we even sent a team to Japan to look at how
they did things after Kobe.
And we also did a review of the public-assistance program.
And, as Mr. Garratt points out, public assistance is a very
procedural-process intensive program. And we have some ideas
about how it might go better.
Today, I want to share a few simple lessons for you. And we
got these from our examples. The first lesson that we have is
you have got to have a plan, and you have to have that plan as
soon as possible. I will give you an example.
After Loma Prieta, in northern California, there were two
communities that were nearby, similarly affected--Santa Cruz
and Watsonville. And in Santa Cruz, they had a vision. They had
a strategy for what they wanted to do. They wanted to maintain
their local businesses.
In the immediate aftermath of disaster, they set up
pavilions where their businesses, right next to downtown, were
able to reconstitute. They kept their businesses open. The Loma
Prieta earthquake was in late October. It was going into the
Christmas season--Vital to small businesses. These people
stayed in business. And they went through the holiday season.
And when they rebuilt, they were back in Santa Cruz.
Watsonville did not have a plan. It did not have a
strategy. And their businesses went. They went out to the strip
malls around the area. They never did come back.
And, today, if you look at Santa Cruz, they have a thriving
downtown. If you look at Watsonville, just about 10-15 miles
away, they are struggling with unemployment, and they have a
stagnant economy that goes beyond the current recession.
The second lesson that I want to talk about is that it
takes money to spend money. And a good example of that is that
the FEMA public-assistance program requires state and local
governments to front the money for their projects.
There is a reason for this. The idea is if they wanted to
stay--go--they have to have skin in the game. They want to have
some accountability--that we are not going to projects that are
too expensive, or that we don't want to do. It also has a
choking effect.
You are talking about local governments and state
governments that have been devastated--just had a disaster.
Their infrastructure has been torn apart. Their lives have been
torn apart. And on top of that, their finances are decimated.
They don't have the revenue streams. They don't have the
economic basis. And, yet, they have to come up with the up-
front money.
There have been some creative ways that we have seen to
handle this. One was in Mississippi. The state went out and
quoted a $200 billion--a $200 million--and in this current
environment today, with the stimulus, we could have millions
and billions all mixed up. This is $200 million bond issue.
This was, then, used for the three Gulf Coast communities
to provide the money up front. And downside to not having the
money up front is that it does two things to local governments.
And I am sure the mayor can talk about this much better than I
can.
But it inhibits the ability to do the up-front planning and
the up-front design work that you need for your projects. What
it also does is it limits who you can contract with. You can
only contract with contractors who can wait to be paid. And if
you are waiting to be paid, well, that is going to close on a
lot of the smaller businesses.
What it is also going to do is it puts the contractor in
the position of strength in the negotiation, because they know
you need them. And they will wait for the money. And, believe
me, there will be a carrying cost when that contract is
actually consummated.
The final lesson that I want to talk a little bit about--
and this is the GAO--we wouldn't be here if we didn't talk
about fraud, waste and abuse--and that is there is a
vulnerability that is inherent in a disaster area after it
occurs. And it is a vulnerability to fraud, waste and abuse.
There is a lot of money flowing in. There are people in
need. And sometimes the people in need don't know who the good
contractors are and who the bad contractors are.
We saw a really good example of how to deal with this up
in--after the Red River floods in North Dakota. The city of
Grand Forks brought together what they called the ``one-stop
shopping'' credentialing operation.
Any contractor who wanted to do business there had to go in
there. And they were covered by the Bureau of Licensing, the
Criminal Investigations inside their state. They did background
checks. They did criminal checks. They did financial checks.
They, then, looked at bonding and licensing, and issued
photo IDs that these contractors had to carry with them.
Therefore, if you were a homeowner and looking to have your
home rebuilt, if that contractor did not have that kind of
licensing approval, you didn't want to deal with them.
So that was as simple idea. And what we saw was after the
recent Midwest floods, the city of Cedar Rapids, Iowa adopted
that same idea.
With that, what I would like to do is just close off by
saying there is a lot of other lessons that we have learned.
And we would be happy to talk to you about them during the
question-and-answer, if you are interested.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
asking us to testify.
[The statement of Mr. Czerwinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Recovery from major disasters is a complex undertaking that
involves the combined efforts of all levels of government in order to
succeed. While the federal government provides a significant amount of
financial and technical assistance for recovery, state and local
jurisdictions work closely with federal agencies to secure and make use
of those resources. With this in mind and as requested, my testimony
today describes a number of lessons and insights that we have
identified from our work on past disasters that may be useful to inform
the actions of federal, state, and local government as they work to
meet the challenging process of recovering after Hurricanes Ike and
Gustav as well as other disasters yet to come.
My statement is primarily based on two recently released reports
that are part of a body of work GAO has developed regarding disaster
recovery.\1\ In September 2008, we identified lessons from the
experiences of communities that have recovered from previous major
disasters in order to help inform recovery efforts in the wake of
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav as well as the 2008 Midwest floods.\2\ This
past December, we examined the implementation of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's (FEMA) Public Assistance grant program after the
2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes \3\ and identified several actions that the
Department of Homeland Security can take to improve the operations of
the program.\4\ In commenting on a draft of that report, the department
generally agreed with our recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See app. I of GAO, Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer
Insights for Recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent
Natural Disasters, GAO-08-1120 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008) for a
partial listing of GAO products on disaster recovery.
\2\ See GAO-08-1120. For this review, we examined recovery
experiences following these six major disaster events: (1) the 1989
Loma Prieta earthquake in northern California; (2) Hurricane Andrew,
which struck southern Florida in 1992; (3) the 1994 Northridge
earthquake in Los Angeles, California; (4) the 1995 Kobe earthquake in
Japan; (5) the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood in North Dakota and
Minnesota; and (6) the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.
\3\ For the purposes of this testimony, ``2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes'' refers to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and is treated
collectively as a single disaster event.
\4\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program
Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, GAO-09-129
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We conducted our reviews in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Past Disasters Offer Recovery Insights for State and Local
Governments
While the federal government provides significant financial
assistance after major disasters, state and local governments play the
lead role in disaster recovery. Experiences from past disasters can
provide states and local communities with potential good practices to
consider. These practices are creating a recovery plan; building state
and local capacity to use federal disaster assistance programs;
supporting business recovery; and combating fraud, waste, and abuse of
government programs. Because each disaster is distinctive and the
resources and capacities of every community differ, each jurisdiction
will need to consider whether and how to apply these insights to its
own specific circumstances.
Create a Clear, Implementable, and Timely Recovery Plan
A recovery plan can provide state and local governments with a
valuable tool to document and communicate recovery goals, decisions,
and priorities--in effect, they can provide a roadmap for the recovery
process. Just as important, the very process of developing these plans
provides an opportunity for recovering jurisdictions to involve the
community in identifying recovery goals and priorities. In our review
of recovery plans created after past disasters, we have identified
certain characteristics that facilitated the recovery process.
Identify clear goals for recovery. A plan containing clear goals
can provide direction and specific objectives for a recovering
community to focus on and strive for. Clear goals can also help state
and local governments prioritize projects, allocate resources, and
establish a basis for subsequent evaluations about the recovery. After
the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, jurisdictions identified specific
recovery goals in their plans, such as the rebuilding of all damaged
housing units in 3 years and removing all temporary housing within 5
years. These goals were critical for helping to coordinate the wide
range of participants involved in recovery. Additionally, these goals
allowed the government to communicate its recovery progress with the
public. Each month, information on progress made toward achieving those
goals was provided to the public online and to the media at press
conferences. Finally, these goals provided a basis for evaluations
conducted by local governments, which enabled policymakers to measure
the region's progress toward recovery, identify needed changes to
existing policies, and learn lessons for future disasters.
Include detailed information to facilitate implementation.
Including detailed implementation information in recovery plans can
help communities realize recovery goals. Implementable recovery plans
specify objectives and tasks, clarify roles and responsibilities, and
identify potential funding sources. Accordingly, the recovery plan
created by the City of Grand Forks, North Dakota, after the 1997 Red
River flood contained these elements. First, the plan outlined broad
recovery goals, which were linked to a number of objectives and tasks
that would help to realize those broad goals. The plan also identified
a target completion date for each task so the city could better manage
related activities. Second, Grand Fork's plan assigned personnel to
each task to carry out that activity. By clarifying the roles and
responsibilities for those who would be involved in accomplishing
specific tasks, the plan provided detailed information to facilitate
implementation. Third, the Grand Forks plan identified funding sources
for each recovery task. It also included a financing matrix, which
presented various funding sources for each task along with target
completion dates. A city evaluation found that these plan
characteristics allowed the city to conceive and formulate projects in
collaboration with the city council and other governmental
representatives. It also helped Grand Forks meet its recovery goals as
well as adhere to federal and state disaster assistance funding laws
and regulations.
Establish plans in a timely manner. The prompt completion of
recovery plans help to facilitate the ensuing recovery process by
providing a clear framework early on. Creating plans in a timely manner
can be a challenge after disasters, as was the case in New Orleans
after the 2005 hurricanes. However, jurisdictions affected by the Kobe
earthquake devised a strategy to ensure that recovery plans were
finalized promptly after the 1995 earthquake. These local jurisdictions
had a relatively short amount of time in which to submit proposals for
the national budget that would be considered for the coming year.
Facing this deadline, officials developed a two-phase planning
strategy. First, they completed a plan within 2 months of the
earthquake that identified broad recovery goals to provide a basis for
budget requests. Second, six months after the earthquake, local
Japanese officials collaborated with citizens to develop more detailed
recovery plans. This two-phase planning process enabled the
jurisdictions to meet their tight national budget submission deadline
while allowing additional time for communities to develop specific
recovery strategies.
Build State and Local Capacity for Implementing Federal Disaster
Programs
Given the lead role that state and local governments play in
disaster recovery, their ability to act effectively directly affects
recovery after a major disaster. While the federal government plays a
key supporting role by providing financial assistance through a range
of programs, state and local governments may need certain capacities--
such as having financial resources and technical know--how--to
effectively take advantage of that assistance.
Enhance financial capacity. The widespread destruction caused by
major disasters can impose significant financial burdens on the state
and local governments, such as creating unbudgeted expenses while at
the same time decimating the local tax base. In addition, federal
disaster programs often require state and local governments to match a
portion of the assistance they receive. In the past, affected
jurisdictions have used loans from a variety of sources to enhance
local financial capacity. For example, after the 1997 Red River flood,
the Bank of North Dakota provided a line of credit of over $44 million
to the City of Grand Forks. The city used this loan to meet FEMA
matching requirements, provide cash flow for the city government's
operating expenses, and fund recovery projects that commenced before
the arrival of financial assistance.
Strengthen technical capacity. State and local governments face the
challenge of implementing the wide range of federal disaster programs.
Some of these federal programs require a certain amount of technical
know-how to navigate. For example, FEMA's Public Assistance grant
program has complicated paperwork requirements and multistage
application processes that can place considerable demands on
applicants. To strengthen their technical capacity to implement this
program after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA and Mississippi
state officials used federal funding to obtain an online accounting
system that tracked and facilitated the sharing of operational
documents. In doing so, FEMA and the state reduced the burden on
applicants of meeting Public Assistance grant program requirements,
gained immediate access to key documents that helped officials make
project approvals, and relieved the documentation and resulting human
capital responsibilities that applicants faced during project
development.
Implement Strategies for Business Recovery
Business recovery is a key element of a community's recovery after
a major disaster. Small businesses are vital to a community's economic
health, yet are especially vulnerable to disasters because they often
lack resources to sustain financial loss and have less capacity to
withstand market changes. Federal, state, and local governments have
developed strategies to facilitate business recovery, including several
targeted at small businesses.
Provide technical assistance to help businesses adapt to
postdisaster market conditions. Major disasters can change communities
in ways that require businesses to adapt. The ability of business
owners to recognize change and adapt to the postdisaster market for
goods and services can help those firms attain long-term viability
after a disaster. Recognizing this after the 1994 Northridge
earthquake, Los Angeles officials assisted neighborhood businesses in
adapting to short--and long-term changes, using a combination of
federal, state, and local funds. Specifically, a local nonprofit
provided direct technical assistance to affected businesses such as
counseling them on how to obtain government assistance and providing
strategies for how to adapt to the changed business environment. This
information was disseminated through door-to-door canvassing in
affected areas to reach out to business owners and conferences to teach
owners how to market their businesses given the changed demographics.
Create strategies to minimize business relocation and the loss of
customer base. Widespread business relocations after a disaster can
hinder recovery. Local governments have devised strategies to retain
businesses after past disasters. For example, after the Red River
flood, the City of Grand Forks used the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's Community Development Block Grant funds to provide $1.75
million in loans to businesses. A feature of this program was that it
forgave 40 percent of the loan principle of businesses that were still
operating in the community for 3 years. According to a local official,
over 70 percent of businesses that received this loan stayed in Grand
Forks for 3 years. Another local strategy taken to minimize business
relocation was implemented after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. The
City of Santa Cruz constructed large aluminum and fabric pavilions
where local businesses that suffered damage relocated. City officials
stated that these pavilions helped to mitigate the impact of the
earthquake on small businesses by enabling them to continue operations
and thereby maintain their customer base.
Adopt a Comprehensive Approach to Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
A persistent challenge facing government at all levels is the risk
of fraud, waste, and abuse of funds targeted for disaster assistance.
The influx of financial assistance available after a major disaster
provides increased opportunities for such activities. Both disaster
victims and public funds are at risk. We identified two actions that
state and local governments can take after major disasters to combat
the issue of fraud, waste, and abuse.
Create credentialing program to minimize instances of contractor
fraud. Many disaster victims hire contractors to repair or rebuild
their homes using government assistance. Residents are potential
targets for fraud by unscrupulous contractors. To help protect its
residents from contractor fraud after the 1997 Red River flood, the
City of Grand Forks established a required credentialing program for
contractors. This included a ``one-stop shop'' that served as a
mandatory clearinghouse for contractors that wanted to do business with
recovering residents. State and local officials staffing the
clearinghouse carried out a variety of functions, including checking
that contractors had appropriate licenses and insurance and did not
have criminal records. After passing these checks and completing all
the required applications, contractors were issued photo identification
cards that they were required to carry at all times while working
within city limits. In about 2 months, the city issued approximately
500 new contractor licenses and 2,000 contractor identification cards
through the one-stop shop. During that same period, officials arrested
more than 20 individuals who had outstanding warrants. In an effort to
minimize instances of contractor fraud after the 2008 Midwest floods,
the City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa created a similar contractor
certification program modeled after Grand Forks' program.
Create comprehensive state framework to minimize fraud, waste, and
abuse of federal programs. The need to quickly provide assistance to
victims puts assistance payments at risk to fraudulent applicants who
try to obtain benefits they are not entitled to. Our prior work on
FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) payments and the
Department of Homeland Security's purchase card program showed
significant instances of fraud, waste, and abuse in the wake of the
2005 hurricanes. We previously estimated improper and potentially
fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be
approximately $1 billion of the first $6 billion provided.
Additionally, FEMA provided nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to
individuals who registered and received assistance twice by using the
same Social Security numbers and addresses.\5\ Because of the role
state governments play in distributing and allocating this federal
assistance, these known vulnerabilities call for states to establish
effective controls to minimize opportunities for individual to defraud
the government. We have previously testified on the need for fraud
prevention controls, fraud detection, monitoring adherence to controls
throughout the entire program life, collection of improper payments,
and aggressive prosecution of individuals committing fraud.\6\ Without
the creation of such a fraud protection framework--especially the
adoption of fraud prevention controls--federal programs can end up
losing millions or potentially billions of dollars to fraud, waste, and
abuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is
the Key to Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts, GAO-
07-418T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2007).
\6\ GAO-07-418T.
Challenges with FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program After the
2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes Provide Potential Lessons
The Public Assistance grant program, administered by FEMA, is one
of two key programs the federal government has used to provide federal
rebuilding assistance to Gulf Coast states after the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes. Under this program the federal government provides funds on
a project-by-project basis. We have previously reported that federal,
state, and local officials reported experiencing a wide range of
operational challenges, many of which were magnified because of the
large number of rebuilding projects following the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes. Today, I would like to focus on two broad challenges we
identified in that report--those associated with developing Public
Assistance projects and those involving information sharing.
Challenges Experienced in Developing Public Assistance Projects
In our recent review of the Public Assistance grant program, we
identified several challenges involving the process of developing
projects that at times contributed to delays and increased costs,
particularly for many large permanent work projects. These included
using program flexibilities to rebuild to the postdisaster needs of
grant applicants and determining the scope of projects.
Limitations in using Public Assistance to rebuild to the
postdisaster needs of grant applicants. Localities experienced
difficulties using the Public Assistance grant program to rebuild in a
way that met their postdisaster needs and conditions. This is because
the program typically provides funds to restore buildings, equipment,
or infrastructure back to the way they were before the disaster.\7\ For
example when a community that was in the process of making
infrastructure upgrades prior to the storms wanted to rebuild according
to its updated plans, it experienced challenges using the program.
Prior to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, local officials in St. Bernard
Parish were beginning the process of consolidating the jurisdiction's
seven separate wastewater and sewer treatment plants into a single
facility in order to meet EPA compliance rules, among other things. The
parish had already begun construction of the consolidated facilities
and had issued a $50 million bond to fund the project. However, the
storms flooded the entire sewer system and destroyed equipment in all
seven treatment plants. When parish officials applied for Public
Assistance funding to repair the facilities, they sought to structure
the project to accomplish their previous construction goals rather than
building a system that they planned to decommission. These officials
reported experiencing challenges obtaining agreement from FEMA to build
their project as a consolidated wastewater treatment plant instead of
seven separate facilities. This challenge, along with other challenges
in obtaining agreement on the scope and cost of the project, led to
over 2 years of delays in starting rebuilding. During that time, heavy
trucks were used to pump and haul sewage as an interim measure,
resulting in a considerable cost as well as damage to the parish's
roads. According to St. Bernard Parish officials, the temporary
measures have cost the federal government more than $60 million. These
officials estimated that had they been able to move ahead with their
original plans, it would have taken about 11/2 years for the new
consolidated facility to become operational. However, more than 2 years
after the project was proposed, rebuilding had not yet begun.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The program contains provisions--through the use of alternate
or improved projects--that allow some changes, but this typically
results in restrictions in funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local governments in the Gulf Coast also needed flexibility in
rebuilding to address postdisaster needs when the population of their
neighborhoods changed significantly from pre-Katrina levels.
Consequently, it was important for their rebuilding projects to take
into account new conditions. For example, in light of postdisaster
population changes, Louisiana's Recovery School District sought
flexibility in the size and location of the schools to be rebuilt.
However, they experienced challenges with using the Public Assistance
grant program to do this because the program is designed to restore
infrastructure back to the condition, location, and function that
existed before the disaster. FEMA and school district officials
ultimately were able to work together to resolve their differences by
moving toward a more flexible approach to rebuilding.
Difficulties in accurately determining scope of projects. Federal,
state, and local officials also experienced challenges with developing
the scope of work of Gulf Coast recovery projects. During the process
of developing the scope of Gulf Coast projects, officials had
difficulty determining which damage was disaster related and therefore
potentially eligible for coverage under the program. For example, in
St. Bernard Parish, roughly 2 years passed before FEMA and parish field
inspection teams completed identification of eligible damage to
approximately 2,500 blocks of local streets. The parish had no records
to document the condition of its streets prior to the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes, so according to state officials, FEMA conducted inspections
of each street in an attempt to distinguish predisaster damage from
what was caused directly as a result of the hurricanes. In contrast,
nearby Jefferson Parish did not encounter similar challenges with
distinguishing predisaster damage from damage directly related to the
hurricanes. This is because the parish maintained a road repair-
management information system (including a road-maintenance plan) prior
to the disaster that enabled the parish to identify preexisting road
conditions to FEMA officials, thereby helping to expedite its road-
repair projects.
FEMA plans to incorporate some project development flexibilities
into its regular practices. For example, FEMA's Public Assistance
Catastrophic Disaster Recovery Concept Plan, finalized in May 2008,
recognizes the need for regulations to allow applicants to more easily
tailor projects to meet postdisaster needs. In September 2008, FEMA
officials informed us that policies to address this issue as well as a
range of other initiatives related to the plan are in development and
are expected to be complete by March 2009.
Challenges with, and Lessons for, Information Sharing
Because the Public Assistance grant program is complex and requires
collaboration among federal, state, and local officials, effective
sharing of project information is especially important. We identified
challenges to sharing project information among intergovernmental
participants during project development. Federal, state, and local
officials involved in the program in Louisiana reported facing
challenges in effectively sharing critical operational information
about projects including documents used to support scope and cost
estimates, such as receipts, invoices, and facility assessments. For
example, some applicants in Louisiana told us of the need to repeatedly
resubmit key project documents because of the lack of an effective
system to share such documentation. This situation was made worse
because key federal and state officials responsible for reviewing and
approving documentation were not primarily located in the same place.
Although FEMA typically colocates with state grantees in order to
facilitate information sharing, FEMA and Louisiana state officials
conducted their work primarily from different cities--approximately 80
miles away.
In Mississippi, federal, state, and local officials adopted
strategies that helped to facilitate the sharing of project
information. For example, following the disaster, FEMA's Mississippi
Transitional Recovery Office and the state grantee were located in the
same office complex in Biloxi, Mississippi, and officials from these
agencies were are also positioned together throughout the state. They
told us that this colocation had multiple benefits for information
sharing and exchange, including the timely sharing of critical
documents and facilitation of daily meetings on project-development
issues. Further, as previously mentioned, FEMA and Mississippi state
officials used Public Assistance funding to secure an online accounting
system that made operational documents associated with projects readily
available to all parties. As a result, FEMA and the state had immediate
access to key documents that helped them to make project approval
decisions and relieve the documentation and resulting human capital
burdens that applicants faced during project development.
To help the Department of Homeland Security improve the operation
of the Public Assistance grant program and build on some of the actions
it has taken, our December 2008 report contained a number of
recommendations, including that FEMA improve collaboration and
information sharing within the Public Assistance process by identifying
and disseminating practices that facilitate more effective
communication among federal, state, and local entities communicating
and tracking project information.\8\ In commenting on a draft of our
report, the department generally agreed with our recommendations and
noted that FEMA is making efforts to improve collaboration and
information sharing within the Public Assistance process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO-09-129.
Conclusions
The insights and lessons gained from the recovery experiences of
past major disasters provide a potentially valuable source to all
levels of government as they seek to meet the many challenges and
complexities of recovering from a major disaster. While there is no one
right way for state and local jurisdictions to manage recovery, the
practices I have presented today provide a basic set of considerations
and approaches for communities recovering from Hurricanes Ike and
Gustav as well as disasters yet to come. For its part, the federal
government has been an active partner in disaster recovery, spending
tens of billions of dollars on efforts to recover from disasters over
the last several years. Our work on one key federal recovery program--
FEMA's Public Assistance grant program--has identified several specific
actions that can be taken to address the operational challenges that
the program faced in the wake of the 2005 hurricanes. Opportunities
exist for the federal government to take steps in the future to
continue to refine this program to better address these challenges that
could be faced again by Gulf Coast states recovering from Hurricanes
Ike and Gustav, and in advance of future disasters.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at
this time.
Mr. Cuellar. Let me ask you before I move on: Could you
provide us a little checklist of the lessons learned? I am sure
you have got a report----
Mr. Czerwinski. Oh, sure.
Mr. Cuellar. ----but if we could have a checklist, we would
appreciate it.
Mr. Czerwinski. We would be delighted to.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
All right; thanks again for your testimony.
At this time, I would like to recognize Mayor Thomas to
summarize her statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF LYDA ANN THOMAS, MAYOR, CITY OF GALVESTON, TEXAS
Ms. Thomas. Thank you--the subject of the hearing is
``FEMA's Gulf Coast Rebuilding Efforts: The Path Forward.''
Response and recovery from a devastating--the most
devastating a hurricane as Ike, with its catastrophic 12 to 20-
foot surge--has presented not only challenges, but
opportunities for positive changes as Galveston rebuilds and
moves into the future.
Galveston was as prepared as we could be for Ike. We had
Katrina and Rita in our rear-view mirror, and the state and
FEMA by our side. Using our own resources, having built a
reserve to support city operations for 3 months out, partnering
with the state to care for our citizens through pre-conditioned
contracts and inter-local agreements, securing legislation and
enabling the cities to borrow emergency funds, and arranging
that with local banks, partnering with the University of Texas
Medical Branch to swiftly and safely evacuate citizens
dependent on medical assistance and public transportation, the
city was prepared.
So was the business community, having arranged, in advance,
for loan capacity for our businesses. Had it not been for our
sea wall, Galveston would have looked, after Ike, like it did
after the 1900 storm, which killed 8,000 Galvestonians.
Ike flooded over 75 percent of our homes and businesses,
displaced and dispossessed an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 of our
residents, reducing our population almost a third. Galveston
was in shambles.
We, literally, looked to FEMA as our lifeline. FEMA
personnel were positive and helpful, meeting high standards of
performance.
However, the blanket practice of reassigning personnel
every 4 to 6 weeks is disconcerting and discouraging for our
city staff, our citizens, as well as myself. From top to
bottom, and all sections in between, there often seems to be a
willingness, but an inability to act positively.
Precious time is lost as inquiries flow up all the way to
Washington, and wait for instructions to flow down. This can
take weeks. Deadlines for assistance and temporary housing were
set and then routinely changed at the last minute.
As much as FEMA made itself available to the public, the
inherent difficulties met within the application process for
assistance were then compounded by requirements for citizens to
reapply for their housing vouchers every 2 weeks. A month to 90
days would be far more humane, considering the upheaval in
people's lives.
A sense of urgency must continue to motivate as weeks
stretch into months and months stretch into years. FEMA must
reevaluate the funding process. We need to have pre-assessment
tools and personnel, as well as advanced funding mechanisms
that the state can activate as soon as the governor and the
city declare a major disaster.
For pre-qualified cities, 100 percent reimbursement, or 50
percent prepayment is not out of the question. I definitely
think that FEMA's path forward leaves through Galveston; that
lessons learned and experience shared along the way from New
Orleans to my historic city should be heeded, and
recommendations implemented where possible, as soon as
possible.
Some changes may take time. But the time to start is now.
My greatest hope is shoreline protection for my city, our
entire Gulf Coast region, including the ports of Galveston,
Houston, Texas City, Freeport, Port Arthur, the Houston Ship
Channel, Galveston Bay, the Intracoastal Waterway; a region
embracing major fishing, petrochemical industries, ecologically
significant wetlands and millions of people, representing a
healthy chunk of the gross national product.
My request is a personal response to the legacy left by my
grandfather, Isaac H. Kempner, called ``Ike,'' when he helped
Galveston recover from the 1900 storm, and led in funding for
the sea wall to protect the island from future storms.
Certainly, I, his granddaughter, in response to a hurricane
ironically called Ike, could do no less than seek to save our
city and distinguished institutions as the University of Texas
Medical Branch and Shriners' Burns Hospital for Children, by
asking Congress and FEMA to begin this long-term solution to an
age-old problem.
I ask FEMA, working with other Federal and state agencies,
to take the necessary steps to build a front line of defense,
behind which an entire region can move forward with greater
confidence.
FEMA is efficient when it comes to supplying generators and
heavy equipment. Its PODs did help people boost their morale.
But they are gone. And, soon, the hotels will be empty of our
citizens. And Galveston will need to find homes on the island
for them. And we will need to find jobs so they can feed their
families.
The path forward, ladies and gentlemen, may not be rosy.
But with FEMA's assistance and your help, and that of the
Congress, Galveston and all communities that have been
destroyed by these horrific events, will reclaim their future.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Thomas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mayor Lyda Ann Thomas
City of Galveston Finance and Cash Flow Challenges
Immediately after Hurricane Ike hit Galveston, revenues to operate
the city plummeted. Citizens were not on the island and therefore water
consumption dropped dramatically. Five months after the storm water
consumption has somewhat stabilized to a level that is 40% less than
pre-storm levels, a level that could remain relatively constant for
many years. Additionally, almost every business in town was closed, and
5 months after the storm only 35% of the businesses have reopened.
Sales tax revenue took a significant dive. Although sales tax has
rebounded with the rebuilding effort, long term our projections are for
such revenues to remain at far less than pre-storm levels for an
extended period of time.
Despite these challenges, the city must continue meeting payroll
and operational expenses after the storm. On top of that we are
expected to pay in advance for the clean up, response and repairs of
all our systems and then seek reimbursement from FEMA that will not
come for many months, and as experience has taught us in the past it
can sometimes be years.
The City has to cover the 25% non-federal cost-share for FEMA
assistance. Unto themselves these cost-share expenses are far greater
than our normal annual operating budget, at a time when revenues are
significantly depressed and both workload and other expenses that must
be borne by the City are far greater than before the storm. The City of
Galveston was very well prepared financially going into this storm with
all of our reserves above target levels as well as a pre-negotiated
loan agreement in place. We have reduced our budget by 15% which
included reducing salary's to every employee as well. We have lost
about 10% of the workforce and are still faced with having to layoff
employees at a time when we need their help. These financial
challenges, and the loss of critical personnel that result, threaten
the pace and success of our recovery.
Recommendations:
FEMA needs to develop a funding mechanism based upon a community's
fiscal responsibility and typical operating budget and advance an
appropriate level of funding to help to carry them for a sustained
period of time to allow for adequate recovery and rebuilding. Galveston
was the only community to receive a cash advance for debris only, which
was appreciated but only scratches the surface of what is needed.
FEMA should also work with Congress to develop the ability to
provide upward adjustments for cost-share for catastrophically-impacted
areas like Galveston, irrespective of the situation and resources
available elsewhere in the state. For areas hurt as badly as Galveston,
the normal rules for recovery are often insufficient, and the resource
needs that can be absorbed by communities experiencing ``garden
variety'' disasters can cripple a catastrophically-impacted
jurisdiction like ours.
Extensions of Funding Assistance Challenges
Category A (Debris) 100% funding was extended in advance through
October 26, 2008. It was not until a few weeks after the expiration of
100% Category A funding that the City received an extension through
April 26, 2009. This time of uncertainty of whether we could get 100%
reimbursement or just 75% reimbursement caused the City to have a great
deal of stress due to the extreme cost of debris removal relative to
our city's budget. We appreciate the extension of Category A at 100%
through April 26th; however, we need another extension, and we need to
know whether we will get it or not, sooner rather than later.
Unlike essentially every other storm we have studied, Category B
(Emergency Protective Measures) 100% funding has not been extended and
we have only been assured of 75% reimbursement for the bulk of our
recovery. We need extension of Category B work at 100% to be granted
and to be extended as requested for Category A. We are experiencing
continual latent defects in our infrastructure that require continual
expansion of Category B work.
Recommendation:
Categories A and B should be set for an extended period of time
immediately after the storm based upon the severity of the event. Every
community should have enough time to properly recover without having to
worry about these two most critical areas of recovery. Again, this
should be somehow codified in the Stafford Act or in regulation, to
provide communities like Galveston predictability and surety of
resources for their recovery.
Additional After Storm Assistance Challenges
The FEMA first responders did very well in their assistance to us.
Where we could have used additional help is from FEMA Public Assistance
Staff immediately after the storm to proactively assist the city is
making certain the paperwork the city is creating to substantiate its
reimbursement claims will be satisfactory months later, rather than
have to argue with staff members regarding documentation exceptions.
FEMA rules indicate that if another Federal Agency has funding
responsibility for a particular item, a city must work with that agency
for assistance. In many instances, the other agency has a totally
separate set of rules and timelines for assistance, and may not even
have any funding available under the responsible program to fund the
project. An example is traffic signals. Of our 116 traffic signals, it
turns out that FEMA can only assist us with 1. The Federal Highway
Administration must assist with the other 115.
Recommendations:
Provide more public assistance help immediately after the storm so
that we are ahead of the game, instead of behind.
FEMA's Rule of Other Federal Agencies funding first needs
modification to be more inclusive. An integrated approach through FEMA
would be helpful and would lessen the confusion. It would be helpful if
FEMA could fund the repair effort when another agency's programs have
insufficient funding or cannot provide the assistance within normal
recovery timelines, and then seek reimbursement from the responsible
agency as appropriate.
Sheltering and Transitional Housing Challenges
More than 75% of the housing stock in the City of Galveston
sustained damages resulting from hurricane Ike. Residents either
evacuated prior to the storm or were evacuated after the storm. In
order for citizens to return to their jobs, check on their
uninhabitable homes, cleanout their houses, pack their belongings, and
meet with FEMA representatives and/or insurance agents, citizens needed
to be able to stay close to the City. Hotel accommodations were scarce
and where there were accommodations, they were often filled with Red
Cross, Salvation Army, or FEMA representatives.
As much as FEMA made itself available to the public, the
difficulties met with in the application process for assistance were
compounded by requirements for citizens to reapply for their vouchers
every two weeks.
Also, FEMA's rule that prohibits the placement of temporary housing
in coastal V-zones has made it nearly impossible to place sufficient
housing stock to meet community and business needs.
Recommendations:
It would be helpful if these major national entities came with self
contained living accommodations, or committed to stay in housing and
hotels away from catastrophically impacted areas like Galveston, in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster until such time sufficient housing is
available to serve both displaced residents and others.
Vouchers should be issued for no less than 30 days.
FEMA should consider providing waivers to their policies related to
the placement of temporary housing in V-zones when there are
insufficient options available to get people back to their communities.
Said housing, however, should be engineered to withstand strong winds
and elevated on temporary foundations, to better protect from loss in
future events, and require evacuation planning (and resident
commitments to evacuate when orders are given) in the event another
hurricane approaches during the temporary housing period.
Shelter Operations Challenges
The City has a contract with the Red Cross to operate a shelter
following a disaster. However, the Red Cross came prepared only to
operate a shelter in one of several schools. There were no undamaged
schools that could house a shelter. There was confusion between FEMA
and the Red Cross as to who could authorize a tent shelter. After a
week of debate, the Red Cross hired the contractor then was told by
FEMA that they would not be reimbursed and that the City needed to
contract with the Vendor. In the end, the City signed the agreement
with the Vendor after the vendor had been here for six weeks. The
vendor took all directions from the Red Cross who were operating the
shelter. However, the City holds a bill for $3 million with supporting
documentation held by the Red Cross and no clear solution as to how to
get this bill paid.
Recommendation:
That the Red Cross negotiate with vendors in advance, so that when
this type of facility is required and that FEMA reimburse the Red Cross
directly. Further, FEMA should utilize the flexibility it has in the
Stafford Act to address unique situations like this quickly and to
simply pay the bill because it was necessary, is allowable and is the
right thing to do.
FEMA Program for Homeowners vs. Renters Challenges
Galveston has a large (over 60%) population of renters. FEMA has
very good programs set up for homeowners with adequate insurance and
also for homeowners with no insurance. Although the process is very
tedious, if you follow all the steps the program works. However, there
is minimal assistance for renters. It would be helpful, if there were
assistance for owners of rental property to get them back in operation.
In addition, when apartments were placed back in operation, FEMA set a
rental rate which created an increase in the cost of living for
renters. FEMA rental rates were in many cases 10--30% higher than was
being charged for the same property prior to the storm.
When insufficient housing exists to handle displaced residents, the
pace of recovery for rental properties directly impacts how quickly
people can return to Galveston and support both their personal as well
as community recovery efforts. This creates a public-sector imperative
to assist rental property owners, so that people can get out of FEMA
trailers and government-provided housing and back into their
communities.
Recommendation:
Develop FEMA's pilot program that assists apartment owners to fix
their property for the purpose of housing displaced homeowners and
renters. Look at variable rental rate schedule. Not a flat rate based
on the number in the household.
Volunteer Housing Challenges
We had many faith based volunteer groups and also many civic groups
from around the country that came to assist with the cleanup of
community. There were no churches in Galveston able to house volunteers
after the storm since most had been seriously damaged. We finally
arranged to use a vacant school to house volunteers, however, the city
was asked on numerous occasions to assist with operating costs and also
staffing costs of the facility which is being run by volunteers. We
were told on several occasions that there was funding available through
FEMA for this type of operation. However, by going through the chain of
command that was necessary, none of the intermediary levels knew
anything about the program. Volunteer efforts have been and will
continue to be a key to clean up the community and also to restore
homeowner property to its pre-IKE state. This is particularly true with
senior citizens, handicapped, and single parent families many of whom
were underinsured or had no insurance.
Recommendation:
Develop or make available through FEMA some type of funding for
volunteer housing, as was done in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina.
The availability of this assistance should be codified, so that delays
and disagreements do not impact communities impacted by future
disasters.
Individual Assistance/Federal Assistance Challenges
FEMA assessments process leaves homeowners in limbo. Despite
repeated requests by the City, the FEMA Assessment Team did not come to
the City until 4 to 6 weeks after Ike, causing citizens to pay rent and
mortgages, simultaneously when they could have been in their homes.
Assessment Team members were poorly trained, inexperienced and
inconsistent in their assessments. Homeowners did not know for weeks
whether their homes had to be demolished, rehabilitated or elevated.
Some are still waiting for a final decision. FEMA seems to have an
unwritten policy that a large number of people are initially turned
down and then told to reapply or appeal, not once but two or three
times.
The Residential Substantial Damage Estimate (RSDE) process
(determination of 50% or more damage, triggering elevation of
structures) is an entirely separate process from the National Flood
Insurance Program estimates of damage through Flood Insurance. In
several instances, this yielded very different results to the property
owner's detriment. An example would be a situation where the RSDE
process caused a home to be considered substantially damaged; where the
NFIP process indicated it was not. This split process does not make
much sense to the homeowner.
Similarly, the estimates of whether a structure that's eligible for
assistance under the Public Assistance Program is 50% or more damaged
(and thus eligible for replacement) is not done consistently with
substantial damage determinations under the NFIP. This again can result
in serious problems, with some buildings being required to be elevated
under NFIP (thus increasing reconstruction costs dramatically), but
those costs are not considered when determining whether the damages are
sufficient to allow for building replacement.
Recommendations:
Federal Assistance needs a more integrated approach through FEMA as
the overall coordinator.
This entire program needs to be revamped so that FEMA can come in
immediately after the storm with a much simpler, less cumbersome
program that will give citizens and communities answers to their
personnel situation so that they can determine what they should do.
Consistency should be the goal for determining damage estimates or in
the evaluation of whether the 50% threshold is met.
In addition, RSDE teams that are trained in advance, in adequate
numbers to handle a regional disaster, should be pre-positioned.
FEMA VOAID Program Challenges
The FEMA VOAID representative was only authorized to communicate
with public service agencies. Unfortunately, the local public service
agencies--Salvation Army, Red Cross, Food Bank, Catholic Charities,
Family Services, and local agencies were unable to function after the
storm due to loss of facilities, lack of communication, and undefined
roles. The City took on this operation because of the large number of
volunteers coming into the area and also the amount of donations. The
City was coordinating volunteers, donations, and citizen concerns with
assistance from Americorp volunteers who were under the direction of
the FEMA VOAID.
Recommendation:
The City would have willingly released the responsibility for these
programs to another agency; however, there was none. It would have been
helpful if the VOAID had been a little more flexible to recognize all
parties participating in the process to initiate recovery of the
community.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) Funds (Section 404) Challenges
for Coastal Communities:
The rules for use of HMGP funds typically require the calculation
of a benefit/cost analysis in strict accordance with FEMA guidelines.
One available program is for buying homes. The guidelines are such as
to promote the removal of homes from river or creek floodplains and
floodways, and actually provide a waiver of the need for benefit/cost
calculation if the home is determined through the RSDE process to be
Substantially Damaged. Such a waiver does not exist in coastal
communities such as Galveston, which have coastal floodplains and not
riverine floodplains, and have no floodways at all.
Given the high costs to coastal communities nationwide from severe
storms and hurricanes, this makes no sense. The only way to break the
cycle of damage is to encourage the elevation of homes along the coast
when future storms are predicted, as in the case of Galveston.
Unfortunately, the normal benefit-cost calculations do not help a
community like Galveston, which faces significant future risk but which
has experienced few storms of any consequence over the past 50+ years.
Because of the extremely limited flooding history during that period,
coastal community homes that are Substantially Damaged need to be
elevated but cannot meet the b/c calculation. In our case, none of our
Substantially Damaged neighborhood homes qualify for elevation, which
has left over 1,000 of our homes ineligible for funding under this
program. The City was left with a choice of assisting the individual
citizen with the buyout and destroying the neighborhood, or by refusing
the individual citizen access to a program that would relieve their
burden.
Recommendations:
Modify the HMGP program so that it will benefit coastal
communities, in light of their actual risk. Past losses can certainly
be a good indicator of risk, but it is not the only one. Coastal V zone
properties should be included in the FEMA waiver of benefit/cost
analysis, in recognition of their significant risk.
FEMA Operational Challenges following a catastrophic event
Continual staff changes (every 4--6 weeks) create an unstable arena
in which local planners, elected officials and residents constantly
have to re-explain their situation. Also, institutional learning is
lost on the processes.
Recovery resources need to be developed which are consistently
applied from one event to another and from one geographic area to
another. Frustration grows when one area learns that the rules are not
the same or that other areas received greater benefit than theirs.
Similarly, every time staff rotates in or out, many decisions and
directions already agreed-to by prior FEMA staff are re-evaluated, and
new decisions are made related to project eligibility, funding, and
policy interpretation. This causes significant confusion and delays,
resulting in a delayed recovery.
Recommendation:
Provide consistent, stable and long-term very knowledgeable staff,
especially the key personnel, to help guide the community out of the
disaster and through the recovery process. And if personnel do change,
increased efforts should be made to ensure adequate transition time to
avoid the confusion, delays, re-evaluation of prior decisions and
problem resolutions, and loss of documentation that has characterized
the recovery efforts in Galveston when personnel rotated out.
Business support Challenges following a catastrophic event
There is no clear direction on the role of FEMA and the Small
Business Administration as it relates to the private sector in
recovery/rebuilding stages. There are too many different stories and
rumors relating to what the private sector hears on how to do business
with FEMA and SBA, how to become a part of the rebuilding process and
what assistance might be available to the business community, and not
enough answers that can be relied upon. This lack of transparency and
inability to get reliable information has confused and lengthened the
recovery period, and causes many businesses to not seek or obtain help
available to them.
Recommendation:
Do a better job of communicating with the business community, both
directly and by leveraging local resources (communities, chambers of
commerce, business leaders, elected officials, media, and others). In
addition, information provided should be in writing, be more
comprehensive, and by be reliable--statements by inadequately or
incompletely trained FEMA program staff, Community Relations personnel,
and tell-registration staff is not sufficient.
Galveston Public Housing Challenges
Public housing is essential. Four large project units were so
heavily damaged they need to be replaced. Keeping track of our
displaced citizens and assisting them with proper documentation to
fulfill eligibility requirements for FEMA assistance has been a
challenge.
Recommendations:
There needs to be a pre-existing IAA (Inter Agency Agreement)
between FEMA and HUD. HUD is the appropriate federal government entity
with its sub-contracting Housing Authorities to respond to Public
Housing Issues after a disaster. FEMA/HUD needs to have the local
housing data, population data ahead of time or at the time of the storm
to respond to a disaster. FEMA/HUD must explore options to deal with
the tenants and landlords rather than dealing with just the landlords
after a disaster.
FEMA's Rental Repair PILOT program worked well after hurricane IKE
and this needs to be part of the housing solution after a disaster.
This is a program in which FEMA works with the landlord directly to fix
their damaged units in exchange for landlords to allow eligible
families to live in those units after a disaster. This program should
be expanded, however, to also include assistance for owners of single-
family rental properties when other housing resources are insufficient,
to further enhance the pace of restoration of housing after a disaster
occurs.
FEMA must explore pre-fabricated housing options to replace some of
the housing stock as part of the long-term housing solution.
FEMA needs to have better operating procedure to educate the local
media and publish its own newsletters to better provide proper news
rather than fabrication of stories by the local media and
misinformation.
FEMA needs to re-evaluate its policy to only allow temporary
housing outside of coastal V zones when there is insufficient ability
to place needed easily be used for temporary housing (including some
with infrastructure in place), and options to elevate said units above
anticipated flood levels and protect them against high winds exist, but
FEMA's policy interpretations won't allow them to place such housing on
Galveston Island due to the V-zone problem.
Closing Summary: The Need for Cooperative Pre-planning and Long-term
Continuity for Business/Community Recovery
Currently programs are initiated only following a catastrophic
event. In areas like Galveston where Hurricanes are likely to occur, it
would be beneficial if communities/businesses could be pre-planning or
proactively working with FEMA to improve contingency planning efforts,
application forms, contact information, pre-event educational outreach,
etc. . .In addition, if federal policy following a natural disaster
came in post-event with a longer time-frame for planning and response
activities, and included up-front funding to support local efforts so
that seriously impacted communities can assume greater responsibility
and leadership in their own recovery planning and implementation
efforts, this would be most helpful. The continual rush for a pre-set
time line, of which the deadlines continue being extended, is
frustrating and psychologically exhausting for residents and those
affected on a routine basis.
Recommendation:
Our nation's emergency management system needs to place greater
value, and dedicate greater resourcing, to the encouragement of pre-
event planning for response and recovery efforts. A grant program for
states, designated to support community efforts in this regard, would
be critical to making this happen, as would increased development of
planning tools and guidance that can be used in support of the
expenditure of said funds. In addition, in the post-disaster
environment, it is not enough for the federal government to provide a
handful of technicians to support long-term recovery planning and
implementation efforts. Particularly for catastrophically-impacted
communities like the City of Galveston, resourcing is needed to allow
the community to take ownership for its recovery and lead its own
recovery planning process. And that planning process (to include both
funding and technical support) should not be arbitrarily limited to
impossibly short timelines; they should be provided for a duration
deemed appropriate given the magnitude of the disaster in question, as
determined in consultation with State and local officials. Lastly,
shoreline protection is the long-range answer to coastal security.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, mayor.
At this time, I will recognize Ms. Amy Liu, to summarize
her statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF AMY LIU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BROOKINGS METROPOLITAN
POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE
Ms. Liu. Good morning, chairman and members of the
committee. I am pleased to appear before you this morning, and
very much appreciate your invitation.
I do want to preface my remarks by saying that I am not an
expert on FEMA or emergency preparedness, as are some of my
colleagues here today. I am primarily an expert on the role of
the Federal, state and local governments' play to create
healthy and prosperous cities in metropolitan areas large and
small. And I hope that unique perspective will be of value to
you today.
In general, I have three observations. But before I do
that, I want to affirm what you started off by saying today,
which is that any post-disaster recovery effort requires a
well-greased Federal, state and local partnership, with the
stress on ``partner,'' or, as you said, ``team.''
Hurricane Katrina brought into sharp focus the reality that
there is no one single level of government that has the
resources and know-how to address the scale of post-disaster
recovery alone. If any one of those levels of government is not
performing their role well in rebuilding impacted communities,
the whole system is ineffective.
But in this Federalist system, it is incumbent for the
Federal Government to not simply push massive amounts of money
out the door, and then adopt a wait-and-see mode with states
and localities, or even over-regulate with distrust.
Instead, the Federal Government has a shared stake in
recovery success, and must be a proactive partner with states
and localities, by giving the tools and the flexibilities to
succeed, which brings me to my three main points.
First is after a mega-disaster, I do think that the Federal
Government needs to get its own house in order by creating a
White House-based office in disaster recovery that is focused
on results.
Many state and local leaders have certainly praised the
current Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast
Rebuilding, which is situated in the Department of Homeland
Security. In practice, though, the office does not have the
independence or sufficient authorities to deliver optimal
impact on the ground.
In short, what we need is a lean White House-based,
outcome-oriented operation. It should be placed in the White
House, with direct report to the president to demonstrate that
long-term recovery success is a priority, and, then, to
effectively mediate conflicts between two Federal agencies that
are stifling state and local implementation, such as the
conflicts that we are seeing between the use of FEMA and CDBG
funds on a single project.
But most importantly, such an office should be given the
mandate to identify explicit goals and outcomes for post-
disaster recovery, working with state and local leaders. What
does this mean?
For instance, this office should set such critical goals
and targets such as showing 100 percent spend-down of fiscal
year 2006 and 2007 Federal appropriations at the end of a date
certain; for instance, ensuring on-time quality delivery of
federally led initiatives, such as the public-housing
redevelopment and levee modernization; and, in showing that, by
a date certain, all dislocated families will be in safe,
affordable, longer-term housing.
The office should then be given the authorities and the
accountability to work across these key Federal agencies to
meet these goals and benchmarks. It is not sufficient to merely
coordinate. Instead, the situation we have today is that we are
not organized around goals and we are not organized to deliver
results. And if there are goals, they are certainly buried
within a sea of other goals in each of the different agencies.
Second, the Federal leaders should then, in turn, reward
state and local leaders for achieving a clear set of recovery
outcomes, not just critique them on slow spend-down or only
play ``gotcha'' with regulations of fraud and prevention.
Now, most philanthropists ask their grantees today, ``What
are your indicators of success?'' Most private investors ask,
``What is my return on investment?''
When it comes to Gulf Coast recovery, I think far too
often, Federal leaders, and even the media, tend to ask, ``How
fast is the money going out the door, and how responsibly are
you spending those funds?''
Now, don't doubt it is important to spend down funds
efficiently. And we all certainly applaud efforts to prevent
fraud, waste and abuse. However, at the end of the day, when
people ask me, ``Is New Orleans coming back?'' the question
about speed and responsible spending does not answer that
question.
Imagine what we could have accomplished if the Federal
Government, instead, helped and rewarded state and local
leaders for achieving explicit recovery goals with benchmarks.
For instance, that, ``In 2 years, we will restore 75 percent of
the jobs lost in the city of New Orleans; in 2 years, we will
repair or replace 20 percent of all the damaged small-unit
apartment rentals in the Gulf Coast; that we will ensure that
at least 20 percent of existing residents will benefit from
new-skills training from the jobs that are being created by all
the housing repairs and reconstruction in the region.''
By doing this, we will ensure that taxpayers are getting a
return on their investment by, in the case of New Orleans, not
replicating the same city and metropolitan area as before, but
ensuring that our taxpayer funds are helping create a New
Orleans that rebounds as a better version of itself.
To do this, the Federal Government can consider providing
planning grants to states and localities to develop unified
plans with community goals and concrete performance outcomes,
so that will help guide and prioritize Federal spending and
activities.
It can also help evaluate the impact of fraud prevention
and increased economy goals to make sure they don't hamper
state and local achievements of these goals and outcomes.
And, then, finally, the Federal Government needs to provide
better data and transparency to help Federal, state, and local
leaders track recovery progress and get these key goals and
outcomes.
To hold each level of government accountable for outcomes
assumes that we can quantify and keep track of these outcomes.
It is not true.
Since the fall of 2005, the Brookings Institute
Metropolitan Policy Program has been tracking over 40
indicators of trends in New Orleans and in Louisiana called--in
the New Orleans Index. Despite all the data, we do not know the
following: If our goal is to ensure that New Orleans remains a
diverse city, homes, and many original residents, we don't
know--home to many original residents--we don't know how many
residents today are returning, how many are newcomers, and
their characteristics.
We don't even know the status and location of all the
city's former federally assisted housing residents.
If a goal is to save the small mom-and-pop shops that are
at the heart of many tourist communities and others in the Gulf
Coast, there is no good data on the health and vitality of
small businesses. Even if the goal is to help accelerate the
spend-down of existing funds, we don't have the status of
Federal spending by state, by parish or county, in the
aggregate, or by spending type, beyond the FEMA public
assistance and temporary housing assistance. And, as we know,
we get a lot of questions about spending and where it is going.
So, for future mega-disasters, I think the Federal
Government should consider mandating the reporting of all
Federal short and long-term recovery spending across the
agencies at the project and at the geography level. We should
set aside appropriations and staffing for the center's bureau
to conduct special population and housing estimates for
disaster-impacted areas.
And we should create a Federal one-stop shop for all the
population, labor, economic and housing statistics for
disaster-impacted areas, for easy access for reporters, for
decision-makers and researchers, so that we can make sure that
we are reaching the kind of outcomes we need in the Gulf Coast.
Thank you very much. And I very much appreciate any--I
welcome any questions that I can help you with.
[The statement of Ms. Liu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amy Liu
Chairman Thompson and members of the Committee, I am pleased to
appear before you this morning and very much appreciate your
invitation.
The purpose of my testimony today will be to provide you with some
observations about the Gulf Coast recovery efforts and how that can
help inform future approaches to the way the federal government works
with state and local governments to rebuild in the aftermath of a major
catastrophe.
In general, I have four observations:
1. Any short-and long-term post-disaster recovery effort
requires a well-greased federal-state-local partnership, with
the federal government actively providing tools and
flexibilities to states and localities to succeed.
2. In a major disaster like Hurricane Katrina, the federal
government needs to get its own house in order by creating an
independent ``office of disaster recovery,'' that has the
authority to promote integrated approaches, facilitate state
and local implementation, and achieve results.
3. Federal leaders should then reward state and local leaders
for achieving a clear set of recovery outcomes that go beyond
just speed and fraud prevention to goals of sustainability,
inclusion, and economic prosperity.
4. Finally, the federal government needs to provide better data
and transparency to help federal, state and local leaders track
recovery progress against key goals and outcomes.
I do want to preface that I am not an expert on FEMA or emergency
preparedness, as are some my colleagues here at this hearing. I have
also spent the bulk of my work on tracking the post-Katrina recovery of
greater New Orleans and unfortunately have spent less time in Texas,
Mississippi, and Alabama. Finally, I am primarily an expert on ways to
create healthy and prosperous cities and metropolitan areas, large and
small, and the role that federal, state, and local governments play in
that, with their private sector and nonprofit partners. There is
nothing like a massive, unprecedented natural disaster to test what one
knows about the effectiveness of the federal-state-local relationship
in rebuilding communities. I hope it is that broader perspective that
can bring some unique value to you today.
Let me walk through each of these observations.
1. Any short-and long-term post-disaster recovery effort
requires a well-greased federal-state-local partnership, with
the federal government actively providing tools and
flexibilities to states and localities to succeed.
Hurricane Katrina brought into sharp focus the reality that no one
single level of government has the resources and knowledge to address
the scale of post-disaster recovery alone. We live in a federalist
democracy. To restore the physical, economic, social, and civic fabric
of New Orleans, Biloxi, and other Gulf Coast communities requires
effective federal-state-local partnerships--and public-private sector
collaborations. And each level of government has a unique role to play
in post-disaster recovery.
The federal government needs to take the lead right after a major
disaster because, as we witnessed with Hurricane Katrina, states and
localities are often completely incapacitated with no resources or
capacity to respond to the disaster. Three years after Hurricane
Katrina, the federal government remains the primary agent for funding
and facilitating recovery, with many of those dollars still requiring
federal approval and oversight. For instance, the federal government
has awarded $17 billion in supplemental Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG) funds to each of the impacted Gulf States to primarily
rebuild housing and support other community redevelopment. Nearly $20
billion is specifically dedicated to state and local infrastructure
repairs, the rebuilding of the levees, and coastal restoration. And
another $13.8 billion in tax credits and tax relief have been provided
in the Gulf Opportunity Zone (Go Zone) for businesses, housing, and
economic development.
Meanwhile, the states are critical because they ultimately set the
rules for redevelopment. They apply for and set the programmatic vision
for how to spend the federal recovery dollars, such as with CDBG. By
their very nature, states also govern how funds are spent on
transportation, land use planning, economic development, higher
education, and the system of levees, wetlands and the overall coastal
restoration. Further, states can leverage or match federal dollars with
their own funds, which they often do. Finally, the feds cannot bypass
the states and go directly to localities because large-scale disasters
hit multiple cities and counties in a state.
Finally, local leadership is absolutely critical. Cities or
counties are the largest champions for articulating a vision and
priorities for state and federal funds. And there recovery
responsibilities that are wholly local, such as addressing blight and
vacant properties, zoning and land use to accommodate future growth and
housing, and providing key public service delivery, such as schools,
public safety/crime, code enforcement and issuing a smooth permit
process for accelerating housing renovations.
As much as the media have tried, there is not a single level of
government to blame for a lack of progress in the Gulf Coast. The
federal government, states, and localities are inextricably linked and
if any one of those is not performing well, the whole system is
ineffective. For their success, communities in Mississippi want
Washington to streamline regulations to speed up the pace of spending
in FEMA public assistance and CDBG funds. For their part, Washington
needs local leaders to be strategic yet responsible with their dollars
and not succumb to wasteful, fraudulent spending. Local homeowners in
Louisiana want a state to develop a well-conceived housing repair
program. As a nation, we need all three levels of government--federal,
state, and local--to be capable, coordinated, and accountable to the
successful recovery of a region.
Finally, it is incumbent for the federal government to be an active
partner to states and localities in this federalist system. It is not
enough to push massive amounts of monies out the door and then merely
hold states and localities accountable for their spending, as President
Obama recently declared before governors and mayors regarding the
economic recovery plan. Instead, the federal government must give
states and localities the tools and flexibilities to succeed.
Which brings me to the next point.
2. In a major disaster like Hurricane Katrina, the federal
government needs to get its own house in order by creating an
independent ``office of disaster recovery,'' that has the authority to
promote integrated approaches, facilitate state and local
implementation, and achieve results.
Many state and local leaders have praised the Office of the Federal
Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding, which is situated in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In practice, the office did not
have the independence or sufficient authorities to deliver optimal
impacts on the ground.
First, such an office should ideally be placed in the White House
with direct report to the president. This is important for state and
local leaders for several reasons: (1) it demonstrates that long-term
recovery is a priority; (2) it removes a direct report to a cabinet
secretary (e.g. the Department of Homeland Security), facilitating
decision-making; (3) it better enables the true cross-agency vision and
collaboration that is needed to facilitate short-and long-term
recovery, especially between FEMA/DHS, HUD, HHS, Education, and DOJ;
and (4) it allows a neutral, independent ability to mediate issues that
arise between two agencies that stifle state and local implementation.
For instance, if rebuilding a specific piece of state or local
infrastructure is delayed due to conflicting regulations between the
use of FEMA funds and CDBG funds, then there is a concern that, under
the current model, FEMA would always fare better in such disputes.
Second, such an office should identify explicit goals and outcomes
for post-disaster recovery and then be given the powers and authorities
to help realize those outcomes. It is not sufficient to merely
``coordinate.'' Such an office should be given the mandate to work with
key federal agencies to identify a unified set of goals and benchmarks
for Gulf Coast recovery, that reflect shared objectives with state and
local leaders in the region. The office should then be given the
leadership and broad authorities to ensure that key federal agencies
are working independently and collectively to meet these goals and
benchmarks. Such authorities could include the powers to lead, convene,
and manage interagency initiatives, help guide and facilitate specific
Gulf Coast-related decisions and activities at individual agencies, and
review and approve (or ``certify'') the budgets of select agencies
prior to their submission to OMB. As of now, the federal coordinator is
merely a coordinator, with the force of personality and the reliance of
good relationships to bring about results. To be sure, these are
important qualities, but the coordinator should also have the
structural support to ensure that FEMA, HUD, SBA, the Army Corps of
Engineers and other agencies work towards a shared plan and vision for
bringing about results in the Gulf Coast, rather than be individually
caught in the whims of other priorities within their federal ``silos.''
What would be such outcomes? For instance, this office could set
such critical goals and targets as: (1) ensuring 100 percent spend-down
of existing federal dollars at the end of a date certain; (2) ensuring
on-time delivery of federally-led initiatives, such as public housing
redevelopments and levee modernization; and (3) increasing the capacity
of local governments, nonprofits, and private actors so they can
implement key parts of long-term recovery, such as housing, public
school reform, health care reform, and economic development. As such,
this office should also work with state and local officials to identify
other quantifiable objectives that ensure that New Orleans and other
Gulf Coast communities emerge as more competitive, inclusive, and
sustainable communities.
By having a powerful, outcome-oriented partner, states and
localities would benefit from collaborating with a more effective,
unified, rather than fragmented, federal government.
Finally, the office should be charged with collecting ``lessons
learned'' to continually inform the laws, regulations, policies and
approaches regarding future disaster recovery responses.
3. Federal leaders should then reward state and local leaders for
achieving a clear set of recovery outcomes that go beyond just speed
and fraud prevention to goals of sustainability, inclusion, and
economic prosperity.
Most philanthropists today ask their grantees: What are your
indicators of success? Most private investors ask: What is my return on
investment?
When it comes to Gulf Coast recovery, federal leaders tend to hold
state and local leaders accountable for two outcomes: how fast they are
spending down existing monies (regardless of whether those funds are
spent wisely or strategically) and how responsibly they are in spending
those funds?
No doubt, it is important to spend down existing funds before one
seeks new funds. And we all want to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.
But, imagine what we could accomplish if federal, state, and local
leaders worked together on mutually determined, grounds-up indicators
of success in a post-disaster context? The Army Corp of Engineer has
set a goal to rebuild a 100-year flood protection levee system in the
Gulf Coast by 2011. Imagine identifying other social and economic
goals:
In two years, all dislocated homeowners will be in
safe, affordable more long-term housing so they can have the
platform for family stability, job security, and stronger
mental health.
In two years, repair or replace 20 percent of all of
the damaged small-unit rental apartments in the Gulf Coast.
Twenty percent of new jobs from housing repairs,
reconstruction, landscaping and other housing-related
occupations will be set-aside to train and upgrade the skills
of existing residents
As we all know, prior to the storm, New Orleans was plagued with
high concentrations of poverty, a stagnant economy with a weak
workforce, and a region that was growing in unsustainable ways.
No doubt, the city had enormous assets. But federal investments,
taxpayer dollars, and even philanthropic dollars must not replicate the
same city and metro area as before. These efforts must help greater New
Orleans rebound from Katrina as a better version of itself: safe,
economically robust, with opportunities for all.
To do this, the federal government can consider providing planning
grants to states or localities to develop unified plans with community
goals and concrete performance outcomes that help guide and prioritize
federal and state spending.
It can evaluate the impact of fraud prevention and increased
accountability rules and policies on state and local achievement of
their programmatic and larger outcomes.
The bottom line: Federal rules and regulations need to move beyond
a ``gotcha'' mentality on states and localities, and instead help state
and local leaders affirmatively create a more prosperous community for
the nation in the long-run.
4. Finally, the federal government needs to provide better data and
transparency to help federal, state and local leaders track recovery
progress against key goals and outcomes.
The best federal-state-local partnership is one that supports
outcome-oriented decision-making. To hold each level of government
accountable for outcomes assumes that we can quantify and keep track of
those outcomes.
Not really.
Since the fall of 2005, the Brookings Institution Metropolitan
Policy Program has been tracking the recovery trends in New Orleans and
Louisiana, as well as related federal, state and local policy
developments.
The main resource we provided was a publication called The Katrina
Index, which relied on 40 indicators to track the population, housing,
and economic recovery of the New Orleans region. For two years, we
issued The Katrina Index on a monthly basis to members of the media,
key decision makers, nonprofit and private sector groups, and
researchers. The Index served as an independent, fact-based, one-stop
resource to monitor and evaluate the progress of on-the-ground recovery
in New Orleans, Louisiana and some of Mississippi.
In 2007, The Katrina Index was renamed The New Orleans Index and is
now a joint collaboration between the Greater New Orleans Community
Data Center and the Brookings Institution in order to bring an even
better, more tailored assessment of recovery of the New Orleans region.
The value of the New Orleans Index is that it helps decision-makers
understand the progress of recovery and help identify where the
outstanding needs are and thus policy priorities. For instance, the
last New Orleans Index, released in January 2009, found that:
the population of New Orleans is climbing up again
after months of stagnation;
the New Orleans region gained jobs this past quarter
while the nation continued to shed them;
there are approximately 79,000 blighted and abandoned
properties in the city of New Orleans; and
rent prices continued to climb, now reaching 52
percent higher than before the storm.
Despite all of our data, which are primarily collected at the state
and local level, we do not know the following:
If a goal is ensure that New Orleans remains a diverse city, home
to many original residents, we don't know how many residents today are
returnees and how many are newcomers and their characteristics. We
don't even have the status and location of all former federally-
assisted housing residents in the city.
If a goal is to help accelerate the spend-down of existing funds,
we don't have the status of federal spending by state, parish or
county, in the aggregate or by funding type, beyond the FEMA public
assistance dollars and temporary housing assistance.
If a goal is to help save the small mom and pop stores that are at
the heart of many tourist communities and others in the Gulf Coast,
there is no good data on small businesses (opening, closures, etc.)
Finally, federal population estimates are often more difficult to
obtain at smaller geographies, which hampers the ability to track
trends or progress in low-population density communities such as
Mississippi, where the best data we can get is at the metro area level
(e.g., Gulfport-Biloxi) rather than at the county or city level.
The Department of Homeland Security has made important inroads in
making federal spending of FEMA funds transparent at the local level.
However, as data become more available, so should transparency
initiatives.
For future mega-disasters, the federal government should consider:
Mandating the reporting of all federal short-and long-
term recovery spending across the agencies at the project and
geographic level
Setting aside appropriations and staffing for the
Census Bureau to do special population or housing estimate
counts for disaster-impacted areas (for instance, the American
Housing Survey, which is conducted every two years, has not
been done for New Orleans since before the storm, and we need
critical assessment of housing market, housing quality, and
demographics there).
Creating a federal one-stop shop of all population,
labor, economic, and housing statistics for disaster-impacted
areas for easy access for reporters, researchers, and decision-
makers
In short, I believe that the three years since Hurricane Katrina
has taught us the importance of a strong and sustained federal-state-
local partnership in post-disaster recovery. We remain at the beginning
of a long-term rebuilding effort and I believe there is still time to
apply more concrete goals and outcomes in the Gulf Coast such that
three years from now, New Orleans and other Gulf communities will be on
a stronger path towards lasting prosperity.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you, and
would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you again, to you, Ms. Liu, and to all
the witnesses for your testimony. I remind each member that he
or she will have 5 minutes to question the panel.
I, now, will recognize myself for questions.
Let me do a ``what if?'' scenario. What if I would ask each
of you all to get together? Because I think all of you all had
some good points. Could I ask you, Mr. Czerwinski, to take the
lead on this--with all due respect to FEMA--with everybody
else--ask you to come up with a plan on--tell us what we are
doing for preparedness?
We spend a lot of time on preparedness. Tell us what we do
for the immediate response, because we spend a lot of time. I
think the weakness here is the long-term recovery. You know,
what are we prepared--what are we doing, what are the goals,
what are the measurements that we are looking at?
I would ask you to take the leap--and I am going to ask Mr.
Rogers if you can assign one of your staff persons along with
our committee clerk, also, to work with you--within 2 weeks--
and, Mr. Garratt, you--I don't want to hear, with all due
respect, that you have got to get that cleared up with some of
the folks.
But I think that we are asking you to work with us to get a
plan on adding the measurements, the results, the ideas that
the mayor had, that Ms. Liu had, Mr. Czerwinski--the plans that
we talked about--and Mr. Walke--I will ask you to work with us
on this, and just ask as a put-it plan.
And you can consult with anybody else. Ask anybody else you
want to bring in. That said--but I want it within 2 weeks. Tell
us what we are doing on the preparedness part. I think we know
what the stats--strengths and weaknesses in the immediate
response. But more importantly, of course, is the recovery,
which we are emphasizing right now. What are the weaknesses?
What are the strengths? What do we need to do to make this work
better?
Because, apparently, there are some disconnects here. Mr.
Chairman, I think, you know, when we talk to our constituents--
I think the bottom line is they don't want to know about
process. They just want to know, ``When are we going to get our
assistance?'' You know, ``When are we going to get''--and if we
started explaining the processes, frankly, they are just not
interested in that. They want to know when they are going to
get the assistance--as soon as possible.
Does everybody know what the assignment is?
Mr. Czerwinski. Yes, Mr. Cuellar.
And, of course, as far as asking us to do that, we work for
you. So we don't--you don't have to------
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, and I am--and, Mr. Garratt, I just want
to make sure--I want you to tell us if there is a problem with
you getting involved in this.
Mr. Garratt. I don't think there is a problem, Chairman
Cuellar.
The timeline might be a little aggressive in terms of
pulling together the sort of comprehensive plan, if what you
are looking for is a plan as opposed to an outline--that you
are asking for. But we will throw our whole support behind this
effort.
Mr. Cuellar. Why don't we do this? Thirty days from today--
that should be more than sufficient time to get a
comprehensive--tell us what we need to do to improve this.
And, Ms. Liu, definitely get involved, because I do want to
see some of the results-oriented outcomes there. And, again, it
is not trying to ``got you,'' here. We are just trying to say,
``How do we make this work better?''
And, again, I am--Mr. Rogers will assign one of his staff
persons. We will assign our clerk also. She will be the lead,
working with Mr. Czerwinski. And if there is a problem, would
you let us know way before, not afterwards. I just want to make
sure we are all in agreement. I just want to see this
comprehensive--because, I mean, there is a lot of ideas. And we
want to come up with this meeting with something concrete that
we can work with.
And if there is any legislative solutions, then, you know,
the chairman, here, will take the lead on any changes that we
need to make. But tell us if there is s anything structural,
because, I mean, if it is people problems, then we need to
replace people. But if it is a structural issue, a deficiency,
then we need to know what the structural issue is there.
So, Ms. Liu, can you do that?
Ms. Liu. I would be happy to participate.
Mr. Cuellar. Mayor Thomas?
Ms. Thomas. Yes.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Czerwinski?
Mr. Czerwinski. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Walke?
Mr. Walke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Garratt, no issues. We are not going to
hear that there is a problem later on?
Mr. Garratt. We are right with you, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. OK, all right.
At this time, I will recognize Mr. Rogers, for his 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last week, we had Secretary Napolitano with our committee.
And I brought to her attention my concern that there has been
some discussion that FEMA may be pulled out of the department.
And I am adamantly opposed to that.
I think that we have gone through a growing phase at the
department over the last several years that is starting to--we
are starting to see some synergies and some coordination. And I
think FEMA is a perfect example.
The last couple of years, we have seen FEMA perform
exceptionally well in several incidents, in concert with the
department.
But for Mr. Garratt, I would like to know, if FEMA were
pulled out of the department, what do you think would be the
kind of impact that you would anticipate?
Mr. Garratt. Sir, I would like to think that FEMA,
regardless of where we are located, is going to continue to
press ahead and do our job as well and as successfully as we
can.
I know there has been a lot of discussion about this
subject. I suspect if you asked any Federal agency if they
would like to be a direct report to the president, the answer
is very likely going to be, ``Yes.''
But, quite frankly, where we sit in an organizational chart
should, in no way, affect our ability to be successful. So I
think FEMA would be successful either way. And I think FEMA
will be successful either way.
Mr. Rogers. Do you not believe--or do you believe--I guess
a better way--I won't be leading in my question. Do you believe
that there would be some adverse consequences to FEMA being
able--prepared to respond to a natural or manmade disaster,
while undergoing another major reorganization?
Mr. Garratt. Sir, I believe that a reorganization is likely
to have some disruptive impacts on FEMA--or would likely have
some disruptive impacts on FEMA during that transitional
period. So it is entirely possible that there could be some
adverse effects from separation.
Mr. Rogers. Are there some resources that you currently, as
a department, have available to you as a member of the DHS
department or team, that you would--that just jump to mind,
that are beneficial, that you would lose, were you to put away
and be a stand-alone department?
Mr. Garratt. No, sir. Under the Stafford Act, the president
is authorized to direct any Federal agency, with or without
reimbursement--to provide any form of assistance necessary to
support state and local governments. That authority is
delegated to the secretary to FEMA. So we have that authority,
under the Stafford Act.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
I want to go to Mayor Thomas.
Mayor, you made reference a little while ago about the
slowness with which you found FEMA able to respond to your
inquiries. Has that been a consistency? Have you seen any
improvement over time?
Ms. Thomas. In the beginning, after the storm, they were--
the answers came very quickly. But after about 30 days, the
whole system slowed down.
I can speak to you, for instance--just to give you an
example, FEMA's rule is that after a catastrophic event, a
school would be opened as a Red Cross shelter. However, there
were no schools that we could open in Galveston. They all went
under water. The Red Cross, then, had to hire a vendor to come
and put up tents and supply those tents with food and blankets
and bedding and so on.
We are 6 months out, and FEMA is still questioning whether
or not it should pay the vendor or the city of Galveston. And
it is about a $3 million price tag.
Mr. Rogers. Because Galveston, obviously, is in a position
where they have been through these natural disasters in the
past--there has been no coordination between your city and
FEMA, and your state agencies, as to pre-positioning of
resources and contracting for services, to anticipate these
kind of decisions that had to be made?
Ms. Thomas. The state has done a good job of pre-
positioning things, because of Rita and Katrina--pre-
positioning high-water vehicles and supplies. The state has
done that in various locations around the state.
The slowness is when those--and that has all been done, and
a lot of it came in. But the argument continues as to who is
going to pay for these pre-position materials, and when they
are going to get paid. When are the vendors going to get paid?
When are the contractors going to get paid, because FEMA has a
difficulty, and decided who owes what to whom?
On the other hand, the states and the cities go forward as
quickly as they can in restoration and recovery, feeling secure
that FEMA will pay the bill, but FEMA does not pay the bill in
a timely manner.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mayor. And I look forward to my next
round of questions so I can ask Mr. Garratt and Mr. Walke to
respond as to why that has happened.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, sir.
The chair now will recognize other members for questions
that they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our
committee rules and practice, I will recognize the members who
were present at the start of the hearing, based on seniority on
the subcommittee, alternating between the majority and the
minority.
Those members coming in later will be recognized in the
order of their arrival.
The chair now recognizes, for 5 minutes, the gentlemen from
Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, Chairman Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar.
Let me pronounce that--indicate that the men and women of
FEMA respond heroically to all the natural disasters that we
have suffered with. One of the issues that we now face is: How
do we provide an orderly recovery process? And that is still
one of the reasons for this hearing.
Mayor, I am going to try to help you on two issues today. I
was a mayor in the 1970's, and I understand, clearly, what you
are going through. Your phone rings constantly.
Mr. Walke, are you familiar with that reimbursement issue
that the mayor just outlined?
Mr. Walke. I am not, sir.
Mr. Thompson. All right. I am going to ask you, as your
responsibility, that, if, in fact, the school was nonexistent,
that whatever the regulation is--if the school is not there,
and if we can show pictures of the tents, and prove within a
reasonable doubt, that this activity did occur, can we get that
vendor paid?
Mr. Walke. We will look into that, sir, and report back on
the situation. But----
Mr. Thompson. How much time do you need?
Mr. Walke. Well, I can make a call this afternoon.
Mr. Thompson. I will give you until Thursday.
Mr. Walke. Fair enough.
Mr. Thompson. Mayor, you happy with that?
Ms. Thomas. You bet. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walke. I will need to get more specifics from the mayor
on that so I can----
Ms. Thomas. I will be glad to give them to you.
Mr. Thompson. Let us talk a little bit more, because part
of the recovery process is the city is either having difficulty
with FEMA or the state, or what have you.
You have a sea wall in Galveston that you have had some
difficulty--I want you to tell me a little bit about the sea
wall. And I am going to try to help you with the sea wall, too.
Ms. Thomas. Well, after the 1900 storm and--the sea wall--
money was found by the leadership of the city, using their own
personal good names and credit to go to New York and other
places in order to secure bond money to pay for the sea wall.
It was designed by the Dutch. It is about 15 miles long. It
is 17 feet high. It was completed in 1904. And it has withstood
every storm since.
Now----
Mr. Thompson. What is your problem right now?
Ms. Thomas. The problem is that the island of Galveston is
32 miles long. Because of the surge that was caused by Ike, the
water came very close to coming over the sea wall. It rose
about 15 feet. And you have some documentation and some
pictures in front of you that show the waves in part of the--
coming over that sea wall during Ike.
The island is not totally protected by the sea wall, and it
needs to have that protection, as I explained in my narration.
Mr. Thompson. What has FEMA said?
Ms. Thomas. We have not formally talked to FEMA. The city
hasn't. There is a committee getting ready to go to FEMA. We
hope that there will be Corps of Engineer money and hazard-
mitigation money that can be used to protect our shoreline all
the way to Sabine Pass.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Garratt, are you aware of mitigation
efforts that have been utilized in the past for similar kinds
of issues the mayor is talking about now?
Mr. Garratt. Negative, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I am going to ask you, Mr. Walke, since
you are the expert.
Do we consider mitigation as a fundable issue, with respect
to the--what we are talking about?
Mr. Walke. Sir, FEMA funds two types of mitigation: One
under the 406 program, which is a public-assistance program,
and one under the 404, which is a stand-alone program.
Under our program, the public assistance, we have not
funded sea walls as a mitigation measure, because our
mitigation is limited to repairing the damaged facility into
better shape than it was before.
Mr. Thompson. So to say that if you put it back in the
present form, even though all the research says that it is just
a matter of time before something worse happens, if you don't
do something else----
Mr. Walke. Again, the statue authorizes us, under the P.A.
program--and I want to be clear what I am talking about.
Under the program, we pay for damaged structures. Now, the
mayor is requesting funding to repair--or to construct--a sea
wall for the remaining 15 miles or so. Under the public-
assistance program, we would not fund that.
Now, under the----
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. And we will work with
the mayor.
If I might, Mr. Chairman, I have one other question.
Mr. Czerwinski, you have--and Ms. Liu--both talked about
the need for coordination. And did you give--did you look at
why Texas is doing such a good job at spending public-
assistance money, and Louisiana and Mississippi is not?
Mr. Czerwinski. We didn't look, specifically, at the
comparison of Texas and Louisiana, although we did look at
characteristics, in general, in the public-assistance program.
One of the things to think about is the scope of the
projects and the overall scale of the disaster. And the spend-
out rates will be quicker in the smaller devastation. I think
Texas is around about $1 billion. Whereas, you are talking
about a lot more money, a lot bigger projects, in Louisiana and
Mississippi.
And given the nature of the public-assistance program,
which is very procedural, it is iterative. There is a lot of
cost estimating. What that does--it magnifies the difficulties
in handling the larger projects.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Walke, if a community has a dispute with the
reimbursement, like we have heard before, who is the final
arbiter in this issue?
Mr. Walke. Sir, may I add to his response on your previous
question?
First, you talked about the payout versus Texas versus
Louisiana. I think there is a fundamental difference for the
rate of payout. When you look at Texas and Ike, 80 percent of
the funding there is for debris removal and emergency
protective measures. And these are costs that the states and
local communities already incurred.
If you look at Louisiana, we are looking at, perhaps, about
35 percent or 40 percent of a cost in debris removal and
emergency protective measures.
So in communities that have a large share of permanent
rebuilding, then that process is much slower, as evidenced by
the situation in Louisiana versus Texas.
Now, to your question about who the final arbiter on the
P.A. projects--well, there are several levels. Initially, we
have a P.A. manager in the joint field office, near the
disaster site, who makes a decision on a particular project.
If, in fact, there is a dispute at that point, then there
is a first-level appeal to the region administrator, who has
the authority. And then, subsequently to that, if there is a
second appeal submitted, then it comes up to our office, and
the assistant administrator for disaster assistance make the
decision.
Mr. Thompson. So it is strictly within the department?
There is no independent judge or some--it is a FEMA employee
who makes the final decision?
Mr. Walke. It is a FEMA employee who has not been
previously involved in the determination, sir. But, you are
right. It is----
Mr. Thompson. It is a FEMA employee that settles the
dispute.
Mr. Walke. That is correct.
Mr. Garratt. Sir, I would like to pipe in on this one.
In fact, it is a FEMA employee who makes the final decision
on the appeals process. And there has been concern in the field
that, perhaps, they are not going to get a fair shake from FEMA
because, in fact, FEMA continues to render appeals on decisions
in the field.
But I would like to point out that, in fact, across the
Gulf Coast, for Mississippi and Louisiana, the rate of success
of appeal is approaching 50 percent for those states, combined.
In other words, of the appeals that they have submitted,
close to 50 percent of those appeals are being found in favor
of the appellant, either in whole or in part.
And I think that speaks volumes about how objective and
flexible the appeals process is.
Mr. Thompson. Well, if you are on the positive side of the
appeal, it does. But if you are on the short end of the appeal,
then those individuals would say, ``Well, the same people
turned me down at the final appeal who rendered the decision.
They are all FEMA employees.''
What I am talking is--we, probably, as a committee, Mr.
Chair, ought to look at some independent entity to settle
disputes when FEMA and local governments are at odds with each
other.
The last item--and I apologize for this--I have heard so
much from mayors and other elected officials that we rotate
employees too many times during recovery efforts.
Mr. Garratt, do we require any written transfer of data to
that next employee coming in, so that the continuity of
information and everything flows?
Mr. Garratt. Yes, sir. That is a standard part of a
transitional process--is that the incoming employee--or, excuse
me-the employee that is going to be replaced is required to do
a full transition briefing, transition-management overview,
with the incoming employee.
And, typically, they will spend at least a week together,
managing that transfer of information and corporate
understanding of what has transpired to that point--standard
operating procedure, sir.
Mr. Thompson. OK.
Well, then, I wonder why Mr. Czerwinski would say just the
opposite in his report--``developing protocols to improve the
information in documenting--sharing among FEMA staff, such as
requiring that staff maintain a record of project decisions to
share with rotating staff.''
Now, Mr. Czerwinski, can you help me out on that?
Mr. Czerwinski. Yes, Mr. Chair.
I think there is actually two things that go on here. One,
in terms of rebuilding, it takes a long time. And it is not
reasonable to keep the staff there that time. So, then, you
have to build in a system where you have the transfer of
information.
And when we looked at examples in the Gulf Coast, we found
that was not happening the way we wanted. And that is where our
recommendation came from. And, frankly, this goes back to your
other point about the appeals process.
This problem was exacerbating the appeals process, and--
with FEMA decisions--where a subsequent employee would come in
and give a different determination.
And the way the process is set up, all the burden is on the
state and local government. So even if FEMA approved something
up front, and later on changed it, that is not FEMA's
responsibility. That is the state's responsibility.
And what the state and local officials told us is this ham-
strung them from some things they wanted to do, because they
weren't sure how it would play out.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
And then I would ask you, on that comprehensive plan, if
you can add the point that the chairman asked about--``What
happens if there is a, you know, dispute?'' And, I mean, how
long do we have to wait, and what is the procedure? What is the
time tables involved?
If you all can add that point also, so we can follow up on
that also, Mr. Czerwinski.
At this time, I would ask for unanimous consent from Ms.
Jackson-Lee, who is a member of the full committee of the
Homeland Security, permission to sit and to question at today's
hearing.
At this time, I would like to recognize the gentlemen from
Texas, Mr. Olson, for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank you and the ranking member for putting this important
hearing together.
I would like to welcome all the witnesses.
A special welcome to Mayor Thomas, coming up from
Galveston, and my good friend, Doug Matthews, in the back, from
the University of Texas Medical Branch.
Thank you all so much for coming up.
My questions, today, are for you, Mr. Garratt, and Mr.
Walke. And however you want to handle them, that is--I will
leave that between you.
But my questions focus on Hurricane Ike recovery. And from
what I have heard from local officials--and Mayor Thomas echoed
that today--FEMA's support on the ground has been much
improved. And one of the lingering problems we are having in
Texas are some discrepancies that exist between victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and victims of Hurricane Ike.
As all of you know, Ike was the third most expensive
hurricane to hit our country in U.S. history. And so I have a
couple questions on that.
As I mentioned earlier, the University of Texas Medical
Branch in Galveston was hit hard by the storm. It has been
nationally recognized as one of the finest medical schools and
medical facilities in the country. It suffered $670 million in
capital damages.
But unlike Hurricane Katrina victims, Ike victims can only
get 75 percent from FEMA for their capital damages and
mitigation. As a result, they have been forced to turn to state
and local agencies for millions of dollars that those agencies
simply don't have.
And my question to you is: Why is Texas victims of
Hurricane Ike not been treated like the victims of Hurricane
Katrina in receiving FEMA reimbursements at the 100 percent
rate for capital damages and mitigation?
[The statement of Mr. Olson follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement of Pete Olson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
Thank you Mr. chairman and thank you for holding this hearing.
I am pleased that the first hearing of this subcommittee is one on
the subject of FEMA and Gulf Coast recovery. Indeed, this subject is
first on the minds of my constituents and it is one of my biggest
priorities as a member of Congress.
I thank Mr. Garratt and Mr. Walke for representing FEMA today but I
want to extend a special welcome to the Mayor of Galveston, Texas, Ms.
Lyda Ann Thomas. It is wonderful to have you in Washington today and we
all look forward to your testimony.
Months after Hurricane IKE ravaged the Gulf Coast of Texas,
communities still struggle to return to the way they were and much work
remains to be done. From what I have heard from state and local
officials, the assistance they have received from the FEMA officials on
the ground has been much improved. The problem seems to lie in some
decisions made on the federal level and some unfortunate discrepancies
that exist between the victims of Hurricane IKE and Hurricane IKE and
Hurricane Katrina.
For instance, the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston,
nationally recognized as one of the finest medical schools and medical
facilities in the country, suffered $670 million in capital damages.
Unlike Katrina victims, however, they can only get 75% reimbursement
from FEMA for capital damages and mitigation. As a result, they are
forced to turn to state and local agencies for millions of dollars they
simply do not have.
In addition, Louisiana and the City of New Orleans received many
full reimbursement deadline extensions that stretched over a period of
years when it came to expenses for debris removal and Emergency
Protective Measures. However, for IKE victims, the deadlines have
either passed or are fast approaching. These cities and towns are just
now beginning to recover from this storm and they desperately need a
deadline extension.
I hope in the coming weeks and months FEMA and the Department of
Homeland Security will remedy these inequities and we can proceed with
our recovery efforts in a fair and efficient manner.
I thank the witnesses for their time today and I yield back the
balance of may time.
Mr. Garratt. Sir, the determination of the cost share that
a state receives following a disaster is made by the president.
The president is authorized by the Stafford Act to provide no
less than 75 percent Federal support.
Under the regulations that FEMA operates by when we make a
recommendation for above 75 percent, is a requirement that a
state meet a certain per-capita threshold. When a state reaches
that threshold, FEMA is required to make a recommendation to
the president to increase the cost share to 90 percent.
And Texas has not reached the threshold that would--Texas
has not reached that threshold yet. And, therefore, FEMA has
not recommended a 90 percent cost-share bump-up as a result of
that.
Mr. Olson. OK. Thank you.
Do you know if Texas made that threshold when Hurricane
Rita hit in 2005?
Mr. Garratt. I do not know if they made that threshold when
Hurricane Rita hit. However, for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, I
believe that Congress, per legislation, directed that those
states affected by Katrina and Rita receive 100 percent funding
for those disasters.
Mr. Olson. OK. Thank you very much.
And one more question, if I have time. And it looks like I
do.
And I am not--this is not to be interpreted as anything
against my fellow colleagues from Louisiana and Mississippi. We
are just looking for some equitable treatment here, in Texas,
as my colleagues from Texas know.
But Louisiana and the city of New Orleans received full-
imbursement deadline extensions that stretched over a period of
years, when it came to Category-A and Category-B expenses.
However, Ike victims--the deadline for Category-B reimbursement
passed last October. And the Category-A deadline is rapidly
approaching.
Cities and towns are just now beginning to hit their
strides on their path to recovery from Hurricane Ike, and they
desperately need a deadline extension. And why is FEMA not--
hasn't authorized--or refusing to extend the deadlines, like it
did for our fellow citizens in New Orleans?
Mr. Walke. The state of Texas had requested an extensive
100 percent funding. And a decision was made that--the
president made the decision that, for Category A--that would be
extended through April. And, at the time, given the pace of--or
debris removal--there was a consensus that that would allow a
sufficient time for most of the communities to remove mostly
all of their debris. And that is the decision that--the reason
that decision was made.
Conversely, the decided was to extend the 100 percent for
Category B until whatever the date was. I think it was 44 dates
from the date of declaration, at which time, I think most of
the Category-B cost would have been incurred by the local
governments.
Mr. Olson. OK. Well, thank you for that answer.
And I appreciate your time today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
At this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman from
Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for his 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Cleaver. Chairman Cuellar, Chairman Thompson, and
Ranking Member Rogers, thank you for this opportunity.
[The opening statement of Mr. Cleaver follows:]
PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT
U.S. Representative Emanuel Cleaver, II
5th District--Missouri
Statement
House Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response
``FEMA's Gulf Coast Rebuilding Efforts: The Path Forward.''
Subcommittee Hearing--March 3, 2009
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Rogers; I am looking forward to
hearing testimony today on FEMA's Gulf Coast Rebuilding Effort. In
2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the lives of nearly half a million
people in three states on our Gulf Coast. Just one month later,
Hurricane Rita hit Texas and Louisiana, ruining lives, and causing
billions of dollars in damage. Three years later, Hurricanes Gustav and
Ike made landfall in the Gulf Coast, causing yet more damage and
disarray.
In the wake of these disasters, President George W. Bush issued a
major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, thereby allowing federal funds to flow
into these areas of catastrophe. It is our job today to assess various
aspects of the federal response to these disasters, including the
effectiveness of the Public Assistance grant program, which provides
states and localities with funding for the removal of debris and the
replacement of critical infrastructure destroyed in a disaster.
Billions of dollars in federal funds have been obligated in Public
Assistance grants, yet recovery has been slow. States have not drawn
down on the full amount of funding that has been obligated to them, and
challenges to the Public Assistance program have limited recovery
efforts. As a member of this subcommittee, I am hopeful to hear
testimony today on why the recovery has been so slow, and anxious to
hear recommendations that FEMA can implement to remedy inefficiencies
of the past.
Mr. Cleaver. I want to kind of see--lean on some things
that have already been raised and, perhaps, take them a little
further.
Mr. Garratt--you or Mr. Walke--who appoints the FCO?
Mr. Garratt. FCO is appointed by the president.
Mr. Cleaver. Now, is the FCO an FCO-in-waiting? Or is he or
she appointed after the event?
Mr. Garratt. FCO acts--both. Our FCOs are part of a cadre
of FCOs that FEMA maintains in--either in advance of an event
or after an event, when a declaration is made--emergency or
major-disaster declaration. At that time, the FCO is named and
appointed by the president, who will be responsible for that
particular emergency or disaster.
Mr. Cleaver. OK. I raise the question because the GAO
report speaks about inexperienced staff. They talk about the
inability of the staff sent into these areas to be in
sufficient numbers.
So I am wondering how much expectation there is, and what
preparation is made, realizing that there will be another
event. I mean, if the FCO is appointed after the event, then it
stands to reason that the staff is, then, assembled after the
event. Am I right about that?
Mr. Garratt. Depends on how much notice we have for that
event, sir.
In fact, if we see an event coming, we will begin
assembling the staff to support that event before it hits. In
addition, we can send out one of our incident-management
assistance teams, who are also led by an experienced FCO. They,
typically, are designed to arrive and provide that initial
assistance to the state.
Mr. Cleaver. OK. Thank you.
Now, I only have 5 minutes, so I have to--then, that is a
trained staff available and ready to go, as soon as the event
occurs?
Mr. Garratt. We have teams, incident-management assistance
teams, who are on active alert around the clock, that Congress
mandated. We stand up these teams, and we have done that. Yes,
sir, we do.
Mr. Cleaver. OK, Ms. Liu--excuse me. Thank you.
Ms. Liu, the GAO report talked about ``inexperienced,'' and
staff shortages. Is that something that you have also
concluded--that we have insufficient staff and----
Ms. Liu. I apologize, but I have not reviewed FEMA staffing
capacity in the work that I have.
Mr. Cleaver. Mayor, was that something you recognized after
the event?
Ms. Thomas. Could you clarify your question?
Mr. Cleaver. Well, after the hurricane hit, did you
experience that FEMA had sufficient staff, and--in terms of
numbers and people who were knowledgeable, who were able to
come into Galveston immediately?
Ms. Thomas. They did have sufficient numbers. And they were
very well trained, very experienced.
Mr. Cleaver. Is there a simulation that goes on in terms of
the training, Mr. Walke?
Mr. Walke. Sir, regarding the public assistance, we do have
contractors at our disposal. We have a reserve for folks who
are experienced in managing the public-assistance program.
But when one has a disaster the size of Katrina, for
example, that required us to supply about 1,500 public-
assistance employees, that requires bringing in folks who have
technical knowledge, but, perhaps, may not be as well versed in
public-assistance doctrine. And that is what we experienced in
Katrina; to some lesser extent, in Texas. So there is a
requirement for counselor training once we deploy people to the
field.
Mr. Cleaver. OK.
Let us chance direction for just a minute.
I have some concern about the lack of spending the dollars.
I know you don't just spend it because you have it. But, you
know, we borrowed that money. And we owe China, give or take,
$1.9 trillion. And, Japan, we owe more.
And the third leading expenditure in the U.S. budget is the
interest on the debt--the interest, not the principle--the
interest on the debt. And so when we see money laying around
like that, I am not sure the taxpayers are going to be very
happy.
Look, when I go home, if somebody raises that question,
what should I tell them that makes sense and won't force them
to curse me out?
Mr. Walke. I am not a----
Mr. Cleaver. That won't curse me out, now.
Mr. Walke. No, no, no. I am not a budgeteer, but I said I
don't think the money is just lying there. I mean we actually
obligate monies to the state, which really is just a bill--I
know. The money is there, and it is not really put on the books
until they draw it down.
So----
Mr. Cleaver. So it is just laying there?
Mr. Walke. No, no. The promise to pay is there. The money
is not in the bank. When the states submit their request------
Mr. Cleaver. Well, that makes it even worse.
Mr. Walke. Well, let me----
Mr. Cleaver. That makes it even worse.
Mr. Walke. How so?
Mr. Cleaver. You wouldn't have money under your mattress? I
mean, you would want to put it some place. Right now, probably
only thing is Treasury notes. But, I mean, I want it to trouble
you that we are in a financial crisis, and we have money that
was appropriated for a crisis, and that it is not doing
anything. And the third-leading expenditure in the U.S. budget
is interest.
Your answer would have got me cursed out.
Mr. Garratt?
Mr. Garratt. I think the point Mr. Walke was trying to make
is that this funding comes from the disaster-relief fund. Once
we obligate funding, take a chunk of that money and provide it
to the state, what we do is notify the state, now, that ``You
are eligible to begin pulling this money.''
So that money is not sitting in the bank at the state. What
the state knows is that, ``We can now draw that money down to
support this approved project.''
Mr. Cleaver. OK. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
At this time, I would like to recognize, for 5 minutes, the
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cao.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member,
for holding this meeting.
And, first of all, I would just like to express my
appreciation and gratitude to the FEMA personnel who are
working in New Orleans, because we all owe a great debt of
gratitude to them.
With respect to Mr. Garratt and Mr. Walke, I have two
questions, but, possibly, three. First and foremost, the
criteria for the loan--Community Loan Forgiveness Program--is
already late. When do you expect those criteria to come out?
Mr. Walke. We have prepared regulations to implement that
providing of the law that contains the forgiveness provision.
And that is working its way through the process.
I don't have a date determinative that I can share with you
as to when it is coming out, other than the fact that it is in
process.
I would add, though, that the loans for those communities
don't become due until 2010. And we should have these
regulations in place well before then.
Mr. Cao. And then, with respect to the arbitration language
in the stimulus bill, and based on the report of Mr. Garratt
that you are developing procedures to implement this new
requirement, when do you expect these procedures to be
finished? And whether or not we could look into--I believe that
we spoke several times before about a possible lump-sum
settlement--whether or not we could work on a lump-sum
settlement through this arbitration process.
Mr. Garratt. Sir, I don't recall a discussion on the lump-
sum settlement. However, I can assure you that the work to
develop that arbitration protocol is under way. In fact, we
worked over that, back and forth, over the weekend.
I don't know when we are going to have a final version of
that. I do know that our secretary is very committed and very
interested in fielding that protocol as soon as possible. And I
can, again, assure you that it will be fielded very soon.
Mr. Cao. And with respect to money that had been obligated
versus the money that has been drawn down, is it the reason why
the money has not been drawn out--is because of this space
between FEMA versus state and local government with respect to
damage evaluations?
Is that one of the problems why the money has not been--
they have been drawn down?
Mr. Walke. That could very well be, sir. But I don't have
any stats on that.
The project worksheets that the state has said the
communities are not happy with the scope of work and estimates
on those. Perhaps that is a subset of the money that has
already been obligated.
Mr. Cao. The money already obligated cannot be drawn down
unless FEMA approves of the amount that is being drawn. Is that
correct?
Mr. Walke. The mere fact that FEMA has obligated the
project worksheet is, in fact, an approval for that scope of
work. So if the applicant plans to accomplish the scope of work
that we approve, they can draw the money down.
Mr. Cao. So, basically, based on the amount you have given,
the $7.5 billion--that has already been obligated in response
to all the projects that FEMA has already approved?
Mr. Walke. That is correct.
Mr. Cao. OK.
And I have one last question to Ms. Liu.
You said that the goals are--I am sorry. This whole
Federal, state and local process is not organized around goals
and objectives. What do you see, presently, as the
organization? Is there any organization around FEMA, state and
the local governments?
Ms. Liu. Well, I think what is--well, I tend to look at
long-term recovery efforts from the ground up. And I know that,
as a local leader--and the folks who have been working very
hard in New Orleans to recover--and for many of the communities
in the Gulf Coast--it isn't just FEMA.
What they need is the levees to be repaired, the housing
recovery to happen. All kinds of aid is important. And so it
cuts across multiple Federal agencies. And at this point, when
you wake up every day, there is not one single person in the
Federal apparatus who has made the recovery a priority in terms
of unifying and accelerating the efforts of the independent
agencies.
And at the same time, I--this is not just a Federal issue.
The fact that it is taking--I still ask folks locally if there
is a plan in New Orleans that governs Federal and state
spending, ``How are you prioritizing? What are your goals?''
You know, the Federal Government should respond in service
of local and state priorities and goals. And there has,
obviously, been three different planning efforts, at least in
the New Orleans area.
When you talk to folks who implement recovery, they don't
really--there isn't a path forward, except for at the project--
individual project level--making sure that individual paper
project gets funded.
So I think it is not--I think the hard part is that these
are not efforts that are unified towards a direction. They are
being leveraged with private-sector funding. We are not scaling
up the Federal investment in a way that could be optimized. It
is a lot of very small, independent efforts that I think are--
represent a lot of missed opportunities.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cuellar. But, Ms. Liu, you are going to get an
opportunity to put that path forward.
Thank you, Mr. Cao.
At this time, I would like to recognize the gentlewoman
from California, Ms. Richardson, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to be as brief as I can in asking the questions.
And I am going to ask that you do the same in answering,
because we have got less than 5 minutes to get them through.
I am going to focus my questions on Hurricane Katrina and
the impact in New Orleans and Louisiana, because we have heard
much discussion, so far, about Texas.
How many current staff members are located in New Orleans
with FEMA?
Mr. Garratt. Approximately 800, total, in Louisiana.
Ms. Richardson. OK.
And do these folks actually go out into the lower Ninth
Ward, St. Bernard Parish, et cetera? Are they walking around,
or are they just in an office, doing paperwork?
Mr. Garratt. Both, Congresswoman. In fact, we have teams
that do nothing except specialize in interacting with their
counterparts at the jurisdictional and local level.
Ms. Richardson. OK.
I participated in a congressional trip with Majority Whip,
Mr. Clyburn, and Speaker Pelosi, that--July 19th through the
22nd. So I personally went there and observed some of the
progress and some of the lack of progress.
So, therefore, my questions are--I had an opportunity--I
went into--one person--they were currently renovating their
home. They were living in a trailer--about eight people in one
trailer. They were clearly, I would say, 75 percent--80 percent
done. And, yet, even though they were almost done, FEMA was
saying, ``Hey, you got to get out of this trailer, you know,
Sunday.''
And there was a clear--had someone just walked out there
and seen this situation, as opposed to pushing paper and
accepting and denying, they would have clearly seen that by
giving them another, you know, 2 weeks, 30 days, whatever, it
could have resolved the issue.
Do you have a process in place to actually talk to people,
where people can come in and talk to someone once their request
has been denied?
Mr. Garratt. Yes, ma'am, we certainly do.
And I would like to just explore this issue. Was this a
trailer that was on somebody's private property----
Ms. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Garratt. ----of a home that they were repairing?
Ms. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Garratt. FEMA has not required that anyone turn in
their trailers. What may have happened is that a local
jurisdiction has an ordinance in place that they are enforcing
which requires those trailers to be removed. But FEMA has not
required, to this point, that anybody's trailer on private
property be removed.
Ms. Richardson. OK. I will get you the contact of the
individual. Because it is my understanding it is FEMA.
My next question is: It seems quite clear that people say
time and time again that FEMA is underestimating and
undervaluing the damages of what has occurred to people's
homes. Is there any process in place to have someone look at
that process and the inspectors who are doing the job?
Mr. Garratt. Any applicant who believes that their home was
not accurately valued, or it was undervalued, can appeal that
decision, and can get another inspector to come out and
reevaluate their home.
Ms. Richardson. But, again, as our chairman said, if you
have the same group of people who are all working together, and
Suzie said, ``Oh, you know, the value was only $50,000,'' and
then Johnny goes out--Johnny doesn't want to make Suzie angry
by going in and saying, ``You know what? Suzie was wrong. It is
actually $200,000.'' So you have got the fox watching the hen,
and it is not working.
So have you thought of a process, or are you doing
something in place, based upon what the chairman said, to
possibly reconsider that maybe that system is not working?
Mr. Garratt. I would challenge that that system, in fact,
is not working.
And what I have, in fact, seen, is that, on a routine
basis, when a housing evaluation is challenged, and we send in
another inspector who doesn't know the other inspector to go in
and revisit that, they will very often find that there are
additional damages, and that they will write that up.
So we have not seen, at least from my perspective----
Ms. Richardson. Excuse me one----
Mr. Garratt. --any systemic problem is this regard.
Ms. Richardson. Excuse me. Excuse me. I have only got 50
seconds.
We have a mayor here who is chomping at the bit, I think.
Would you like to join in, and assist me in this?
Ms. Thomas. The issue is the change in personnel. One
inspector puts the house at a certain value. Another one comes
and changes it by appeal. And another appeal can take place.
And what we are talking about is time. People are out of
their houses. They are renting off the island or out of their
cities. They are paying mortgages and rent. And FEMA takes too
much time to make the assessments. They should be done
immediately. We are still in the assessment stage 6 months
after the hurricane in Galveston.
Ms. Richardson. OK.
So, Mr. Garratt, I am going to--I am new on the committee,
so I am looking forward to working with all of you. And I am
going to supply you with some information that I think might,
hopefully cause you, as well as what the chairman has said,
maybe reevaluate and reconsider.
My last question--housing supplement in New Orleans--what
is the status? I know of folks who have been paying $1,300 a
month on their own, with no assistance from FEMA. And, you
know, although we had tremendous goals of how quickly we wanted
to resolve things, it wasn't quite as easy as, maybe, we had
hoped it would be.
So what is the status?
Mr. Garratt. I am sorry, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Is there no longer any housing supplement
for folks who were impacted by Hurricane Katrina?
Mr. Garratt. No. In fact, HUD is extending--what they are
doing is transitioning from DHAP, which ended at the beginning
of March, to a additional assistance period. And they are
providing continued assistance until June 1st to DHAP
participants.
And those individuals who were in the Disaster Housing
Assistance Program that HUD is managing are either being
transitioned into the Housing Choice Voucher program, or they
are being transitioned into Section-8 programs, or they--if
they are eligible or able to take care of themselves--are being
transitioned out of the program.
Ms. Richardson. OK.
If you could supply my office and the committee some of
that information, it would be helpful.
And, as I close, Ms. Liu, it would just like to say, in
your statements, you said, ``We need not to focus so much on
how much has been expended, but, in fact, what are the goals.''
With all due respect, ma'am, what I would say to you is we
just passed a recovery act of over $700 billion. And you know
why some of these areas didn't get more money? It is because
some of what they already have has not been spent.
So when you make those comments, you may want to keep that
in mind, because others would argue that we could use not only
the money that we have, but more. Thank you.
Mr. Cleaver. [Presiding.] The chair recognizes the
gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to change
direction a little bit. I would address this question to Mr.
Czerwinski, and ask the two representatives from FEMA to also
comment.
My district includes parts of Las Vegas. So you can imagine
that it is very important to us, for business, to be able to
recover after a disaster, which is not likely to be a
hurricane, but could be equally catastrophic.
But as I look at the suggestions that you offer--and they
would be good to help our small businesses. You talk about
technical assistance and relocation and a tent where businesses
can operate. That is really not going to apply to us very much,
because we have several things in place that are very
different.
I mean, if you look at it, our major business is tied to
tourists, not to local patrons. And so being able to get in and
out of the city--those transportation routes are going to be
what is very, very important.
You talk about coordination among the different levels of
government. We also have an incredible private security system
in place, with all the major hotels, with manpower and
technology, that probably should be part of this coordination,
because I think they can offer some valuable services.
We can't relocate the MGM Grand into a tent somewhere and
let it keep operating. And, finally, there is a certain bias
against gaming when it comes to the use of public dollars, to
help it, even though that is a source of many jobs, and the
kind of golden goose of the state's economy.
So I worry about what I am hearing. And it seems to be kind
of a one-size-fits-all when it comes to setting priorities,
drawing up plans, determining who is eligible for grants and
loans. So I would ask you, is there any room for flexibility
here? And how can we design some things that would accommodate
more tourist industry, or some things like Las Vegas might
have?
Mr. Czerwinski. Sure. You make very good points.
And the key that we want to talk about is the importance of
considering the business sector in whatever rebuilding plans
you develop.
Ms. Titus. I agree with that.
Mr. Czerwinski. Particularly, small business, because they
are the most vulnerable, and they can also provide good start-
up.
So what we would suggest is exactly what you are saying. It
is not a one-size-fits-all. It is actually tailoring the
business recovery plan to the specifics of that disaster, and
of that area.
And the two areas that we think that do cover anything,
regardless of what the specifics are, are the idea of financial
and technical assistance. But they would play out very
differently in very different circumstances.
You would want your businesses to be given the assistance
they need in terms of the money they need to keep operating.
But, also, it is a changing environment.
There is an example that we had from Los Angeles, where
there was a fish market that was in business. And the whole
landscape of their neighborhood changed. And the business got
money. They came back. But they were selling the exact same
kind of product. But their whole clientele had changed.
So that points at your idea about being flexible. By
putting a one-size, one idea out there, it no longer worked in
the new environment. So we would agree 100 percent what you are
saying.
Ms. Titus. Gentlemen?
Mr. Garratt. We would also agree.
One of the things I would like to do is follow on on the
remarks of Ms. Liu and the gentleman at my left. And that is to
talk a little bit about the Emergency Support Function 14.
Emergency Support Function 14 is long-term community
recovery. It is a relatively young emergency support function.
It first appeared with the National Response Plan. It was
developed a couple of years ago. The purpose of that function
is to facilitate a comprehensive recovery strategy at the
community level.
They are designed to bring in Federal, state, local,
private sector, voluntary agencies--into the discussion, and
into helping develop what is a comprehensive approach for that
community's recovery.
In many respects, that function is designed to help
facilitate the sorts of things that we are talking about here.
Can they do that better? Yes, they can. It requires everyone to
come aboard, everyone to be willing to play. But that function
is designed to help kick-start that process, and help move that
process forward.
Ms. Titus. I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. [Presiding.] Thank you, Ms. Titus.
At this time, I would like to recognize Ms. Jackson-Lee,
gentlewoman from Texas, for 5--I mean, for 5 minutes of
questions.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Might I
thank you and the ranking member for your indulgence and your
kindness, which speaks to the collaboration of this committee--
the Homeland Security Committee--and the committee chairs?
I look forward to joining with Chairman Cuellar for a
hearing in the region. And I am very grateful for his--or the
acquiescence, rather--for this idea. And we look forward to
doing so, where we can reflect on what happened, but then,
also, look forward to the hurricane season.
We are about 3 months away from the hurricane season. And I
want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for a very
vital hearing, and their indulgence, again.
Let me also add my appreciation, overall, to the
hardworking FEMA employees who leave their families in the cold
of winter or the heat of summer, to come to give aid to those
who are suffering. I have experienced their great and diligent
work. Those are the ones that are on the ground, that are
sleeping on the ground, that are sleeping in tents through
Hurricane Katrina and Rita.
As a member of this committee, I have been in places as the
winds have lifted. I was in east Texas as we were trying to get
water trucks and ice trucks in to the region, as we were
speaking to county commissioners who were living in conditions
much less desirable than they would want to have.
I visited Mayor Thomas, who has a long legacy of
philanthropic work, in a building that was--days of sewage. I
am aware of her work--that she did not cease throughout the
storm.
As we met with the president of the United States, the
sewage seeped into our meeting. Mayor Thomas continued her
work. And I think we owe a great deal of debt of gratitude to
local leaders, such as herself.
Mr. Garratt, let me try to be quick. And I need to have you
be quick as well.
Are you familiar with UTMB? Have you heard of that?
Mr. Garratt. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. All right.
I would like a full report as the amount of money that is
either in the hands of FEMA or in the state, and the status and
position of FEMA with respect to UTMB. I want an urgency put on
that. I would prefer it at the end of the day.
But if tomorrow morning is necessary--I want you to tell
me: What are the obstacles for the full, complete operation of
UTMB? I know the mayor may have some answers, but I am really
going to direct this to FEMA.
I have spoken to the state legislature in Texas. I am aware
of their attempt and efforts to turn around what had been a
dastardly decision to close it. This reminds me of the charity
hospital in Galveston that is not closed--so, a full report on
UTMB.
The second is that there is a contract--there is a funding
for disaster housing that I helped secure in Texas 3 years ago.
The contractor is Heston House. Could you give me a full report
as to why houses are not on the ground with respect to that
contract?
I visited, over the weekend, a warehouse full of modular
homes, ready to go; 60, in fact. And they are being stalled by
FEMA dilatory tactics. And I would like to know when we will
get that housing on the ground, including the housing in
Houston, Texas.
I also need to ask you--and I would like an answer on
this--there are 30,000 cases that social workers are dealing
with, between a contract--because of Hurricane Ike and a
contract between Texas and HHS. There are nonprofits who are
ready with their caseworkers to work on these cases; 16,000 of
them in Harris County.
FEMA will not engage in a contract until April. These
agencies are now laying off workers, quite contrary to the
president's intent. And by the way, I want to thank the
president for his commitment to Homeland Security. And they are
not able to do their work because FEMA will not even indicate
to them, ``We will reimburse you for those cases that are tied
to Hurricane Ike.''
Can you tell me why FEMA is still standing in the way of
Hurricane Ike victims getting relief?
Mr. Garratt. Ma'am, first thing--I need a clarification.
And that is the second issue that you mentioned that is
regarding the Heston Homes. Are you referring to the contract
that was--or the competitive grant that was awarded to Texas as
part of the Alternative Housing Pilot Project?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Yes, because those are the houses that
they are now using to help east Texas, and also Harris County.
Mr. Garratt. OK.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garratt. In terms of our commitment to the citizens and
residents of Texas, I think we are very committed to that. And
I think we have demonstrated that.
Regarding the issue, specifically, of case management--we
have a couple of case-management efforts under way in Texas.
One of them is being managed by HUD under the DHAP-Ike program
that they manage in their case-managing--the individuals and
households that are part of that.
We have another case-management program that, as you
indicated, is part of a pilot effort that we are working with
the Department of Health and Human Services.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And can I stop you a moment, sir? And I do
appreciate you. The time runs on members, and I am asking for--
if chairman could yield me an additional 3 minutes.
I ask unanimous consent. I have been yielded an additional
3 minutes to pursue the questioning.
I think what will be helpful is--and I understand the DHAP
program. This is specifically the HHS. And it is a specific
question. And what I am asking you to do is to pull it out of
the ashes.
The question is: FEMA indicated that they will not engage
in a contract until April. The question is: You have social
workers that are being laid off. You have cases that are not
being handled. And the answer that I would hope, as you review
it--that you would expedite either the contract, or that you
would engage with the social-work agencies that you have
already confirmed--that they could continue their work and be
reimbursed.
What I am saying is you have people who are not being
helped, waiting and languishing because FEMA is not engaging in
a contract. That money is already in place. So I think that
requires you to go and investigate, and to give me an answer as
to how we can work together to jump-start that contract. That
is the HHS one.
Mr. Garratt. I would agree with that.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. All right, sir.
And I thank you very much.
I am sorry. Did you want to finish? No. All right, so I
will be back in touch with you.
Ms. Liu, let me thank you for your recommendations. But
what I would like to get on the record is the difficulty of
doing anything with FEMA, with an antiquated Stafford Act.
Would you agree that we need to either overhaul or have an
extensive review of a Stafford Act that provides the match--
that does not take into consideration Mayor Thomas' predicament
of having, literally, no income?
She is celebrating the fact that 65 percent of businesses
are in. But I know her economy; 35 percent businesses out hurts
Galveston. Can you asses that through your further studies--the
review of the Stafford Act as antiquated and needing some
revisions and-or total reconstruction?
Ms. Liu?
Ms. Liu. I agree with that. And I believe there have been a
lot of really good studies and reports done, including those by
GAO, that reviewed and makes recommendations to the Stafford
Act. I think that the most important thing at this point,
because we know that disasters are going to continue to happen,
and happen in a more frequent rate--is that we need to--not
only do we need to streamline the emergency response and find a
much more human way of dealing with the emergency response, but
we don't really have a policy on longer-term recovery.
And I know that there are concerns and recommendations
about whether or not longer-term recovery is really the
providence of FEMA. And in the past, historically, FEMA does
short-term emergency response. The longer-term recovery is done
by others.
And when I think about, again, from the ground up, what is
needed for longer-term recovery, FEMA has really good systems
in place----
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Right.
Ms. Liu. --for emergency response. But they are not waking
up every day, thinking about community development, economic
development, the mental health of the people who are there.
That is a different set of responsibilities; requires a
different kind of interagency response. And, in fact, it is a
different kind of set of outcomes.
So I do think that those are things that need to be
visited, certainly, by this committee.
I wanted to even respond a little bit, when--to some of
Congressman Richardson's comment about case management and----
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Well, I will yield to you. So that means I
will have----
Ms. Liu. I am sorry.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. --just a little bit more time.
I will let you answer----
Ms. Liu. Oh, I am sorry.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. ----that question.
Mr. Chairman?
Ms. Liu. I was going to say--respond a little bit to your
question about FEMA----
Ms. Jackson-Lee. No, that is all right. I am yield to you--
and respond to that question.
Ms. Liu. Thank you very much.
I do think there is certainly case management on all kinds
of temporary housing, whether it is the DHAP vouchers or the
trailers--families in trailers.
I think that if we went back and talked about outcomes,
there are certainly concerns raised by me that the case
management that is being done right now is mostly about
collecting people's income, data, demographics,
characteristics. But the goal of case management isn't to make
sure that they have a place to live at the end of the term of
expired assistance--not like the way we do case management for
welfare reform or TANF, where we actually actively work to find
placement of jobs; even temporary jobs. That is a Federal
mandate on TANF recipients.
So I think that, again, when we think about temporary
housing and the people who get temporary housing--we should not
treat them as paperwork, but as humans. And there should be a
case-management process that really thinks about, ``what are
the different kinds of services, whether it is mental health or
housing assistance or employment assistance?'' and get them
into stable situations.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me thank you for that answer.
And, Mr. Chairman, if I could have the last question to
Mayor Thomas--I think you have made a very valid point.
Mayor Thomas, I have studied your statement. And I want to
thank your city manager and others, who are here. And I would
like to ask on the record, Mr. Garratt, if you would--I realize
the work. And your deputy, who is here, Mr. Walke--would you
take the memorandum, or the statement, of Mayor Thomas?
She has 14 recommendations. I know those answers cannot
come to me tomorrow. But I want to engage you. I am going to
use that document. I want to engage you. I would like to have
you in my office. But I would like a response to those 14
recommendations that she is given.
I, frankly, believe that they are a peephole into
hurricanes to come.
Let me ask Mayor Thomas: What was the most difficult aspect
of dealing with FEMA? I would argue that the Stafford Act needs
to be completely overhauled. I think there are instances where
money should come directly to the jurisdiction, where there is
a crisis, as long as capacity is there. If the city fathers and
mothers are no longer there, the devastation is so bad that
everybody has completely left the area, then that is a
different story.
But if there are local governments trying to function--if
they are trying to deal with renters, which you have indicated
is a big issue--they are trying to deal with public housing.
And I, frankly, believe those dollars should come directly to
the local jurisdiction.
Would you comment? And you might also comment on how north
Galveston is doing. I will also mention Harris County. I think
all these things impact the Hurricane Ike victims all over. And
they also speak to Hurricane Rita and Katrina victims. We are
not leaving them out.
It is a complete continuity, because these people are still
suffering as well.
Mayor?
Ms. Thomas. Yes, ma'am. I would be happy to answer.
Number one, our most difficult issue was and is housing. As
far as FEMA is concerned, regarding housing, Galveston is an
island. FEMA has a rule that no FEMA trailer or modular house
will be built on land that is not--I think it is six feet above
sea level. So we have been--again, 6 months out, and finally
getting some temporary housing.
I also feel that Galveston has a very clean record of
dealing with Federal money, because of the millions of CDBG
money that we have had since 1974. And I would ask that FEMA
pay in advance certain millions of dollars to the local
communities on the ground, who can get our people into
temporary housing. And they don't have to wait 6 and 7 months,
as we are now doing that.
So housing is a huge problem. And it is further complicated
by the delays--by the requests for leases, for insurance, for
school records, for medical records that have been drowned in
the flood. And our residents--nor could they in New Orleans--
come up with these unending requests for paperwork.
The people who live in Galveston know who their people are.
And we know whether they had been a resident in Federal
housing, or whether they are renters. And we can get them under
cover if we have the funds in advance to do it.
The other issue, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to just
remind this group of--and it has to do with shoreline
protection. It has to do with the fact that Galveston Bay rose.
So when we talk about funding for shoreline protection, we
want our fair share, as has been given to New Orleans. New
Orleans had to rebuild its levees. We need to build levees on
the north side of town, which is a side of town that we are
talking about, here, that went under water first. And that is
where our low-to-moderate-income population is.
So we need levee protection--the same kind of
reimbursement, the same kind of 100 percent funding that has
been given to New Orleans, Louisiana and Mississippi. And we
need to cut out the unending paperwork that FEMA requires for
our folks, our people, to get shelter. Those are our main
concerns--housing, too much paperwork, shoreline protection for
an entire region.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I may speak to the chairman--I would hope that the FEMA
witness could give a response to those questions that the mayor
has asked, because they are now still in the midst of fighting
the battle of recovery. And I would hope that it would not be
perceived as a Hurricane Ike gift; that we could begin to look
at how we relate, overall, to hurricanes.
Because I do believe the money trail is stalled when it
goes to the state. And I do believe the Stafford Act is an
obstruction to long-term recovery. And I believe this
committee, with your leadership, and this full committee, can,
during this term, really look at how we help those who are
suffering and experiencing disasters.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you again.
And I just want to just clarify--the materials and the
questions--or the responses--that have been requested by
Congresswoman Jackson-Lee and, of course, going also to the
mayors--I would ask that you send the originals to us, to the
committee, so they can become part of the record, copied to Ms.
Jackson-Lee. But just make sure they come to our committee.
Also, I would like to ask unanimous consent to insert the
following document from Mayor Thomas, that includes a pictorial
description of the city damages,\1\ an index of Hurricane Ike
orders from the city of Galveston, Hurricane Ike response-and-
recovery statewide-activity report, and, of course, FEMA's
rental repair pilot program--ask that to be part of the record
also.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See committee file, ``Focusing on the Future'', Mayor Lyda Ann
Thomas, City of Galveston, U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response,
Washington, DC, March 3, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Cuellar. Before we close, I would ask also'the
witnesses, before you take off--ask you to meet with Denton
Herring--gentleman right here--before you leave, so you can
organize the report on the recovery recommendations that I
asked for.
The only thing is--I was telling Denton that one of the
things that I want is--I don't want to have five different--or
five reports--should I say ``four different reports.'' I just
want to have one, which means that you all have to sit down and
talk about it on that.
And if there is a difference on one recommendation, just
add, ``And this recommendation was not agreed upon.'' But I
really would like to have consensus as much as possible on the
one report, not four different reports.
So before you leave, I would ask you to sit down and take
note. I know I have had--a couple members have asked me that
they want their committee staffs to be involved. So any
committee member that wants to get involved with their staff on
the reports--and the first report will be this Friday at 12
noon.
I have asked for every--at least a status report, not the
full report--a status report. Everybody, 12 noon--you will all
be talking to Mr. Herring, here, to give us a report on this,
because I don't want to be surprised at the end of 30 days--
and, ``Guess what? We haven't even got started on it.''
So I would ask you to go ahead and do that. Make sure you
all share phone numbers, get to know who is who here, because
you are going to be spending a little bit of time together for
the next 30 days.
Any questions from anybody?
Ms. Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure that when you
say that we are going to work together every Friday, you are
talking about by conference?
Mr. Cuellar. Yes. It is up to you.
Ms. Thomas. I mean, I don't think I can come to
Washington----
Mr. Cuellar. No, no, I am not--I know. I am not asking
that.
Ms. Thomas. --especially when it is this cold.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes. No. If I had my way, we would be going
down to Galveston. I was asking the chairwoman--``We will go
down to Galveston, but make sure it is warm when we go down
there.
Ms. Thomas. And so when we meet today, after this, because
we all have other places to go, it is simply to exchange
information.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes.
Ms. Thomas. And then Mr. Czerwinski will set up conference
calls in order to pursue your request? Is that----
Mr. Cuellar. Right, under the direction of the committee.
And I think you all met the committee staff person who will
be in charge.
If you want to, wave and make sure everybody sees you.
Just make sure that it will be under the committee staff.
The lead person will be Mr. Czerwinski, but they will be under
the committee supervision.
Ms. Thomas. Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. OK.
All right, I thank all the witnesses for their valuable
testimony, and the members for their questions. The members of
the subcommittee may have additional questions for the
witnesses, and we ask you to respond to those as soon as
possible, in writing, to those questions.
Hearing no further business, the hearing is adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
