[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
STATUS REPORT ON FEDERAL AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO SECURE RADIOLOGICAL
SOURCES
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS, CYBERSECURITY,
AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-34
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
Yvette D. Clarke, New York, Chairwoman
Loretta Sanchez, California Daniel E. Lungren, California
Laura Richardson, California Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Jacob Olcott, Staff Director
Dr. Chris Beck, Senior Advisor for Science and Technology
Daniel Wilkins, Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Yvette D. Clark, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology............. 1
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology. 3
Witnesses
Mr. Craig Conklin, Director, Sector-Specific Agency Executive
Management Officer, Officer of Infrastructure Protection,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Mr. Kenneth Sheely, Associate Assistant Deputy Administrator for
Global Threat Reduction, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Robert J. Lewis, Director, Division of Materials Safety and
State Agreements (MSSA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Captain Michael Riggio, Counterterrorism Division, New York
Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Gene Miskin, Director, Office of Radiological Health, New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Dr. Bonnie Arquilla, Director of Disaster Preparedness, SUNY
Downstate Medical Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, National Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
For The Record
Submitted for the Record by Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke:
Statement of IP Radiation Security Associates.................. 62
STATUS REPORT ON FEDERAL AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO SECURE RADIOLOGICAL
SOURCES
----------
Monday, September 14, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science and Technology,
Brooklyn, NY.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:55 a.m., in
the SUNY Downstate Alumni Auditorium, Brooklyn, New York, Hon.
Yvette D. Clarke presiding.
Present: Representatives Clarke, Sanchez, Richardson, and
Lungren.
Ms. Clarke. The subcommittee will come to order.
Good morning. I would like to welcome you all to Brooklyn
this morning and thank the Members of the subcommittee--Mr.
Lungren, the Ranking Member; Ms. Sanchez; and Ms. Richardson--
for travelling from your own districts to participate in
today's hearing.
Today's hearing is entitled, ``Status Report on Federal and
Local Efforts to Secure Radiological Sources.'' Radiological
source security is essential in preventing a radiological
dispersed device, or RDD, often called a ``dirty bomb.'' To put
it simply: No radiological material, no dirty bomb.
Two years ago, this subcommittee, along with members of the
New York City delegation, came to New York to observe some of
the early efforts to secure radiological sources, specifically
those cesium chloride sources found in hospital blood
irradiators.
At that time, those early efforts were spearheaded by a
partnership effort between New York City and the Brookhaven
National Laboratory. Security measures, such as closed-circuit
television cameras, keypad locking systems with alarms, and
other access controls, were being put in place.
Over the next 2 years, three Federal agencies--the
Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, DNDO; the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration, NNSA; and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, NRC--continued this idea by looking at the risk
posed by the cesium chloride sources and proposing some
solutions.
These efforts became a little more sophisticated and
brought the security focus closer to the source. The three
agencies decided to take three actions to better secure
radiological sources: No. 1, harden blood irradiators to make
it more difficult to remove the CSCL sources called
``engineering upgrades''; examine whether alternate sources
besides cesium chloride could be used; and, No. 3, improve the
licensing and tracking system for sources.
So today we are here to get an update on these efforts, and
we have an exceptional panel of witnesses to help us in our
efforts.
From the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Craig Conklin
is the director of the Sector-Specific Agency Executive
Management Office, Office of Infrastructure Protection.
Welcome.
From the Department of Energy, Mr. Kenneth Sheely is the
associate assistant deputy director for global threat
reduction, National Nuclear Security Administration.
Welcome.
From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mr. Robert Lewis is
the director of the Division of Materials Safety and State
Agreements, MSSA.
Welcome.
These three Federal witnesses will tell us about their
current efforts, what has worked, what hasn't, and their future
plans.
Next we have Captain Michael Riggio, the director of
counterterrorism at the New York Police Department.
Welcome.
We also have Mr. Gene Miskin, the director of the Office of
Radiological Health for the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene.
Welcome.
The New York Police Department and public health
departments have been forward-thinking and aggressive in their
efforts to secure these sources. They have also shown us that
police and public health, two entities who don't see eye-to-eye
very often, can work together to achieve a common goal. We are
also interested in hearing from them how the various Federal
agencies have worked with them.
Also from New York is Dr. Bonnie Arquilla, who is the
director of disaster preparedness here at SUNY Downstate
Medical Center.
Thank you for being here, and thank you to SUNY Downstate
for allowing us to hold this hearing here.
Finally, from the Government Accountability Office is Mr.
Gene Aloise, the director of the Natural Resources and
Environment Division.
Dr. Arquilla and Mr. Aloise will not speak directly to the
source security efforts specifically but will provide helpful
context. Dr. Arquilla will explain the kinds of efforts and
activities that would be necessary to respond to an RDD event.
Mr. Aloise will discuss the activities that would be involved
in recovering from such events.
I think we will all see that both response and recovery are
quite difficult and expensive. We should be doubly motivated to
ensure that the radiological sources are as well-protected as
possible.
I believe in this mission. After the trip I mentioned 2
years ago, I introduced the Radiological Materials Security
Act, which was reintroduced in April of this year. The
provisions of the bill provide for the three Federal agencies
here to carry out the activities that they have been and
continue to carry out in their trilateral efforts.
Although the bill has not yet been passed, it has helped me
to push for the appropriations to keep radiological source
security and detection efforts going. I hope that the bill and
this field hearing make it clear to the witnesses here today,
as well as the agencies and departments that you represent,
that Congress has an interest in your efforts. We will support
you, and we want to see progress.
Thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony
and the following discussion.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, Dan Lungren of
California, for an opening statement.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman.
In the interest of time, I would ask unanimous consent that
my prepared opening statement be included in the record.
Ms. Clarke. So ordered.
Mr. Lungren. With that, I would just say, thank you, all of
you, for being here. I appreciate it. One thing I have learned
already is that, on the Federal level, we obviously have the
corner on longer titles than the rest of the Government. It is
a mouthful.
I realize this is an extremely important issue. I thank all
of you for being here. I particularly am interested not only in
the prevention and the recovery, but also that we do a better
job of getting information out to the public exactly what a
dirty bomb is, so that we might be able to understand how to
respond to that and also diminish some of the panic that seems
to ensue with every discussion of dirty bombs.
Not that they are not important, but that we understand
what they can do and what they cannot do will help us to be
able to respond in a far better way than I think we are
prepared to do right now.
With that, I would yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Clarke. I now recognize the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California, for an opening statement.
Ms. Sanchez. Madam Chairwoman, in the interest of time, we
will submit something for the record.
I just wanted to let you know that you have three
Californians joining you today here in New York City, and that
is because we share so much interest in this, as major
metropolitan areas, both on the East and the West Coast.
We look forward to the testimony. We think it is an
important issue. So I thank you.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
I now recognize the gentlelady from California, Laura
Richardson of California, for an opening statement.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
First of all, I would like to take this opportunity to
thank you for convening this hearing. This is a very important
subject that we need to stay diligent on. We do appreciate your
leadership on this matter.
I would like to briefly share with you, in addition to
being on the committee, the reason why I found it of importance
and wanted to participate. I represent the area of Long Beach,
California, where one block out of my district is the entire
port complex which is the port of Long Beach and the Port of
Los Angeles, which is the largest port in the United States.
When we consider this discussion, it is of much concern to
us, of all the people, 16 million people, who live within a
certain radius who could be very inevitably affected if we were
to have a situation such as we are discussing this morning.
But I just want to say thank you in advance to all the
witnesses for coming and preparing and providing us with the
information that we need so we can legislate in a more
effective way.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
In the interest of time, I will ask that each of you
provide a brief biography of your work. Without objection, the
witnesses' full statements will be entered into the record.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
I now ask each witness to introduce yourself and summarize
your statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Conklin.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG CONKLIN, DIRECTOR, SECTOR-SPECIFIC AGENCY
EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT OFFICER, OFFICER OF INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Conklin. Thank you. My name is Craig Conklin. I am
director of the Sector-Specific Agency Executive Management
Office within the Department of Homeland Security.
Good morning, Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security's
and the Federal Government's efforts to enhance the security of
radiological sources and ensure that they are not used in a
manner that is hostile to the United States.
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, the
Office of Infrastructure Protection leads a coordinated
national program to reduce risk to the Nation's critical
infrastructure and key resources and to strengthen National
preparedness, timely response, and a rapid recovery of these
assets in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other
emergency.
These risk-mitigation efforts are accomplished using the
partnership framework established in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. This plan brings together all
levels of government, the private sector, nongovernmental
organizations, and international partners to enhance sector
security resiliency.
My office was assigned sector-specific agency
responsibilities for six of the 18 critical infrastructure
sectors, including the nuclear sector. The nuclear sector-
specific agency facilitates and implements programs that help
achieve security by effectively reducing vulnerabilities and
consequences of attack using risk-based assessments, industry
best practices, protective measures, resiliency strategies, and
comprehensively sharing information between industry and all
levels of government.
Our government partners include, among others, the National
Nuclear Security Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as
officials from the States of Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Texas.
Our private-sector partners include representatives from
the commercial nuclear power industry, producers and users of
radioactive sources, universities that operate research and
test reactors, and radioactive material shippers.
While our efforts run the gamut of the nuclear sector,
today I will briefly describe four efforts to protect portable
radioactive sources.
First, in 2007, we formed a Radioisotope Subcouncil to
address radioactive source security concerns. The purpose of
the subcouncil is to identify and recommend measures to prevent
sources of concern from being stolen and used as a radiological
dispersal device or a radiological exposure device.
In late 2008, the subcouncil conducted a radioactive source
security workshop, which identified three issues for further
examination: First, the potential risk presented by limited
commercial disposition of sealed sources; second, the use of
commercial, off-the-shelf technologies to track conveyances,
packages, and sources during transport; and, third,
reconciliation of the sometimes confusing regulations covering
the transportation of radioactive sources.
A focus group has been created to address each of these
issues. The removal and disposal focus group will develop a
concise message on the potential national security concerns
caused by the lack of commercial disposition options for these
sealed sources and will investigate immediate and long-term
options to address that concern.
The tracking focus group will develop a position paper on
the pros and cons and cost-effectiveness of the identified
tracking technologies. The transportation focus group will
establish an approved definition for ``transit'' and
``transshipments'' and develop an action plan for addressing
any regulatory gaps and/or inconsistencies in the
transportation regulations.
Second, the Nuclear Sector-Specific Agency, in close
coordination with its Federal partners, maintains and regularly
updates a matrix of Federal programs and initiatives that are
being implemented to enhance source security. The purpose of
this matrix is to help reduce duplication of efforts, maximize
the use of limited Federal resources, and identify gaps in
Federal activities. The matrix currently tracks 26 Federal
initiatives.
Third, the Department of Homeland Security's Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office is also actively engaged in a number
of source security initiatives. DNDO is leading the Securing
the Cities Initiative effort to design and implement
architecture for a coordinated and integrated preventive
detection and interdiction of illicit radiological materials
that may be used a weapon within a high-risk urban area.
It is also chairing the Public Education Subgroup of the
NRC-led Radioactive Source Task Force designed to enhance the
general knowledge of the public concerning radiological
dispersal devices.
Finally, DNDO is leading a small-business initiative
research program to promote the design and production of non-
nuclear alternatives for industrial devices that use
radioactive sources.
The last effort I would like to describe is our information
sharing through the trilateral meetings. The Department of
Homeland Security, the NRC, and NSA participate in these
meetings. The trilateral meetings provide an informal forum to
discuss on-going projects regarding radioactive source
security. The purpose is to avoid and minimize surprises with
other agencies' activities and provide an efficient and
effective path forward to enhance source security. We hold
these meetings on a quarterly basis.
In closing, the Office of Infrastructure Protection works
closely with its Federal, State, local, territorial, and Tribal
and private-sector partners within the nuclear sector to ensure
the protection and resiliency of the sector.
I will be glad to respond to any questions the subcommittee
may have.
[The statement of Mr. Conklin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Craig Conklin
September 14, 2009
Good morning Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As Director of the Sector-
Specific Agency Executive Management Office (SSA EMO) in the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS') Office of Infrastructure Protection, I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Federal Government's
coordinated effort to secure radioactive sources and ensure that they
are not used in a manner hostile to the United States. I will also
highlight how the Federal Government continues to work with our State,
local, Tribal, and private sector partners to execute this important
mission.
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, the DHS
Office of Infrastructure Protection leads a coordinated National
program that aims both to reduce risks to the Nation's critical
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) as well as to strengthen the
preparedness, response, and recovery of these assets in the event of an
attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. These risk mitigation
efforts are accomplished through the collaborative framework
established in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP),
which brings together all levels of government, the private sector,
non-governmental organizations, and international partners in support
of this CIKR protection and response mission.
In the context of the NIPP, CIKR protection includes actions to
deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize the
consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other man-made or
natural disaster. Protection can include a wide range of activities
such as:
improving security protocols;
hardening facilities;
building resiliency and redundancy;
incorporating hazard resistance into facility design;
initiating active or passive countermeasures;
installing security systems;
leveraging ``self-healing'' technologies;
promoting workforce surety programs;
implementing cybersecurity measures;
training and exercises; and
business continuity planning.
Recognizing that each CIKR sector possesses its own unique
characteristics, HSPD-7 designates Federal Government Sector-Specific
Agencies (SSAs) for each of the 18 CIKR Sectors. The SSAs are
responsible for: Implementing the NIPP sector partnership model and
risk management framework; developing protective programs and
resiliency strategies; and providing sector-level CIKR protection
guidance in line with the overarching NIPP framework established by DHS
pursuant to HSPD-7.
The SSA EMO was assigned SSA responsibilities for six of the 18
CIKR Sectors: Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Critical Manufacturing;
Dams; Emergency Services; and Nuclear Reactors, Material, and Waste.
The SSA facilitates and implements programs that help achieve security
by reducing vulnerabilities and consequences of attack through risk-
based assessments, industry best practices, protective measures, and
comprehensive information sharing between industry and all levels of
government. The remainder of this testimony will focus on the Nuclear
Reactors, Material, and Waste Sector.
The Nuclear Reactors, Material, and Waste Sector is comprised of:
Nuclear Power Plants--104 power reactors at 65 sites;
Research and Test Reactors--32 reactors in 22 States;
Radioisotopes--portable sources primarily for medical and
industrial use;
Twenty-eight irradiation facilities;
Twelve major manufacturers/distributors of radioactive
sources;
Eight major fuel fabrication and production facilities;
Six spent fuel storage facilities;
Four mixed-waste facilities; and
One uranium hexafluoride production facility.
As the lead Federal coordinator, the role of the Nuclear SSA within
the Nuclear Reactors, Material, and Waste Sector (herein referred to as
the Nuclear Sector) is to build and sustain relationships with
Government and private sector security partners to coordinate the
identification, prioritization, and protection of Nuclear Sector CIKR.
HSPD-7 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to ``continue to work
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and, as appropriate, the
Department of Energy in order to ensure the necessary protection [of
the Nuclear Sector].'' This entails: Maintaining the Sector Specific
Plans for CIKR Protection in the Nuclear Sector and submitting the
corresponding Annual Sector CIKR Protection Report for the Nuclear
Sector; assessing sector-level performance to enable protection-program
gap assessments; identifying protection priorities; coordinating and
supporting risk assessments and management programs for high-value
CIKR; and supplying sector-specific CIKR information for incident
response, among other responsibilities.
Critical infrastructure protection and resiliency are the shared
responsibilities of Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments, regional coalitions, and the private sector owners and
operators of the Nation's CIKR. The NIPP relies on a partnership model
as the primary organizational structure for coordinating CIKR efforts
and activities, encouraging the formation of Sector Coordinating
Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs). The SCCs
and corresponding GCCs work in tandem to create a coordinated National
framework for CIKR protection and resiliency within and across sectors.
As Director of the SSA EMO, I chair the Nuclear Sector's Nuclear
Government Coordinating Council (NGCC). The NGCC is the Principal
Federal interagency body responsible for working with public and
private partners to coordinate and implement civilian nuclear security
strategies, activities, and policies; facilitate relevant
communications across the Government and between the Government and the
private sector; and coordinate with the emergency management and public
health and safety communities regarding response and recovery issues
associated with a terrorist act. The NGCC's membership consists of
representatives from DHS, National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of State,
Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, along
with officials from the radiation-control programs in the States of
Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The NGCC's
work encompasses CIKR protection activities at the full range of
Nuclear Sector assets.
The role of the Nuclear Sector's Nuclear Sector Coordinating
Council (NSCC) is to provide a mechanism through which the nuclear
industry may provide input into nuclear CIKR protection policy
development and implementation; further, it provides a forum for
companies and key organizations involved in nuclear security issues to
cooperate with Government on nuclear CIKR protection. The NSCC is
comprised of representatives from nuclear power reactor operators, fuel
manufacturing facilities, nuclear reactor manufacturers, nuclear waste
management/transportation companies, nuclear trade associations, the
Nuclear Energy Institute and the National Organization of Test,
Research, and Training Reactors.
The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC)
directly supports the sector partnership model by providing a legal
framework that enables members of the NSCC and NGCC to engage in joint
CIKR protection-related discussions. DHS published a Federal Register
Notice on March 24, 2006, announcing the establishment of CIPAC as a
Federal Advisory Committee Act-exempt body, pursuant to Section 871 of
the Homeland Security Act.
The Nuclear Sector's mission statement declares that ``the Nuclear
Sector will support national security, public health and safety, public
confidence, and economic stability by enhancing, where necessary and
reasonably achievable, its existing high level of readiness to promote
the security of the Nuclear Sector, and to lead by example to improve
the Nation's overall critical infrastructure readiness.'' In
furtherance of this mission, the Nuclear CIPAC agreed on eight security
goals for the partnership to pursue above and beyond existing
regulation:
Awareness
Goal 1.--Establish permanent and robust collaboration and
communication among all stakeholders having security and
emergency response responsibilities for the Nuclear Sector.
Goal 2.--Obtain information related to other CIKR assets'
dependencies and interdependencies with the Nuclear Sector and
share it with sector security partners.
Goal 3.--Increase public awareness of sector protective
measures, consequences, and proper actions following a release
of radioactive material.
Prevention
Goal 4.--Improve security, tracking, and detection of
nuclear and radioactive material in order to prevent it from
being used for malevolent purposes.
Goal 5.--Coordinate with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies to develop protective measures and tactics
to deter, detect, and prevent terrorist attacks on nuclear
facilities and other Nuclear Sector assets.
Protection, Response, and Recovery
Goal 6.--Protect against exploitation of the Nuclear
Sector's cyber assets, systems, networks, and the functions
they support.
Goal 7.--Use a risk-informed approach that includes security
considerations to make budgeting, funding, and grant decisions
on all identified potential protection and emergency response
enhancements.
Goal 8.--Enhance the ability of Federal, State, territorial,
local, and Tribal governments and the private sector to
effectively respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies
that result from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or other
incidents.
DHS formed three Sub-councils within the NIPP Framework, meeting
under the CIPAC, which are the Cyber, Research and Test Reactor, and
Radioisotopes Sub-councils. I would like to take the opportunity to
highlight a few examples of the public-private partnership under the
NIPP.
Comprehensive Reviews
Comprehensive Reviews (CRs) were security assessments conducted at
all 65 nuclear power sites between May 2005 and September 2007, with
the Final Integrated Protective Measures Analysis Report issued in
March 2008. The process provided a vehicle for discussion with
stakeholders on potential enhancements to security in and around the
sites. This framework assisted in reducing vulnerabilities,
implementing appropriate protective measures, and mitigating the
potential consequences of a successful attack. The Office of
Infrastructure Protection's Protective Security Coordination Division
and the SSA EMO led the CR teams, which included representation from
Federal agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard (which participated in
the 49 CRs that had a water nexus), Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), FBI, Transportation Security Administration, DHS National Cyber
Security Division, and NRC. The Federal teams worked cooperatively with
the State Homeland Security Advisor; State, county, and local emergency
managers and planners and emergency response agencies; and private
representatives and associations. Following each visit, the CR team
analyzed the information and shared it with appropriate stakeholders,
which included Federal agencies, State and local law enforcement,
emergency management organizations, and facility owners and operators.
Comprehensive Review Outcomes Working Network
The Comprehensive Review Outcomes Working Network (CROWN) project
was established to systematically follow up on the approximately 1,800
potential enhancements identified during Nuclear Sector CRs. The
process has resulted in tangible security improvements and has also
enabled the Nuclear Sector partners to cultivate and sustain strong
working relationships with the Office for Bombing Prevention, the
Office of Emergency Communications, the Office of Interoperability and
Capability, and FEMA's National Integration Center.
Research and Test Reactor Security Enhancement Project
The Research of Test Reactor (RTR) Security Enhancement Project is
a voluntary, cooperative initiative at the request of the RTR community
to explore opportunities to perform security upgrades at RTR
facilities. Physical security enhancements have been completed at the
Universities of Missouri--Columbia and Oregon State nuclear research
and test reactors. The security enhancement program originated in the
NSCC and was implemented through partnership among the NRC, NNSA, DHS,
and the RTR community. Improvements include installing new alarm
communication systems, displays with closed-circuit television
recording capability, airlock door enhancements, and hardened entry
gates and access points. Due to the success of these first two pilot
projects, the program will be expanded to include approximately eight
additional facilities.
Blood Irradiator In-Device Delay Program
The Blood Irradiator In-Device Delay (IDD) Program is an initiative
to significantly increase the time needed for unauthorized removal of
the radioactive source from blood irradiators, which represent
significant sources of radioactive material. The scope of this
initiative includes 843 of an estimated 1,000 cesium irradiators in the
United States, with NNSA overseeing the IDD effort for all three major
irradiator manufacturers (Best Theratronics, Ltd. (BTL)--GC40, GC1000,
GC3000; Pharmalucence/CIS--IBL 437; and JL Shepherd & Associates
(JLSA)--JL Mark 1). This initiative has been endorsed by the
Organization of Agreement States, NRC, and DHS. National implementation
of the IDD Program is presently under way. As of June 2009, 25 kits
have been installed, with installations for existing devices projected
through 2016. New blood irradiators will have the security enhancements
installed at the factory before customer delivery.
The Radioisotopes Sub-council specifically addresses radioactive
source security concerns by developing and recommending policies,
strategies, plans, and measures to enhance the physical security and
emergency preparedness of the Nation's radioisotope sector. The
Radioisotopes Sub-council focuses in particular on identifying and
recommending measures to prevent radioisotopes of concern from being
stolen, diverted, and used in Radiological Dispersal Devices, Radiation
Exposure Devices, or for other malicious purposes. At the request of
the NSCC Chair, the NGCC held a Radioactive Source Security Workshop
Sept. 16-17, 2008, to prioritize and identify areas on which to focus
the energy and resources of the Radioisotopes Sub-council. The
facilitated workshop included over 50 public and private-sector
attendees. Workshop participants identified three source security
issues which warranted further examination:
1. Potential national security concerns presented by the lack of
commercial disposition options for sealed radiation sources
(e.g., radiography sources).
2. The capacity for existing commercially available off-the-shelf
technologies to physically track conveyances, packages, and
sources during transport.
3. Reconciliation of the myriad, and sometimes confusing, relevant
regulatory authorities and associated security regulations
integral to the transport, transportation, and transshipment of
Category 1 and 2 sources as defined by the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
Federal and State officials are now working through the
Radioisotopes Sub-council and its private-sector equivalent to better
understand the scope and scale of these issues. As a result, three
Focus Groups have been created to address these three issues.
The Removal and Disposal of Disused Sources Focus Group identifies
removal and disposition options for disused sources. Currently, the
limited number of commercial disposal pathways and recycling options
could lead to sites stockpiling disused sources. The Focus Group will
develop a concise message on the potential national security concern
caused by the lack of commercial disposition options for disused sealed
sources and investigate immediate and long-term options to address the
concern (e.g., incentives to open commercial facilities to waste not
generated within the boundaries of their waste compacts and incentives
for consolidated interim storage) by October 2009.
The Tracking of Radioactive Sources Focus Group compiles technical
specifications of commercially available passive and active tracking
systems and subsequently evaluates the identified technology relevant
to its capability for tracking conveyances, packages, or sources. The
Focus Group will culminate its initial efforts with a position paper by
November 2009 on the pros, cons, and cost-effectiveness of each
identified technology.
The Transportation of Radioactive Sources Focus Group identifies
relevant regulatory authorities and associated transportation security
regulations to reconcile and analyze the overlaps, gaps, and potential
inconsistencies in those Federal transportation security regulations.
Additionally, this Focus Group will seek to establish an inter-
governmentally approved definition for transit and transshipment, to
include an action plan with a set of recommendations for addressing any
regulatory gaps and/or inconsistencies by December 2009.
The Nuclear SSA, in close coordination with its Federal partners,
maintains and regularly updates a matrix of Federal programs and
initiatives to promote the security of radiation sources. The ``Source
Security Matrix'' tracks dozens of Federal programs and initiatives to
address the risk that domestic U.S. radioactive sources poses; it is
updated monthly, issued quarterly, and remains a continuing agenda item
at the Nuclear Sector's quarterly meeting. The purpose of this matrix
is to help reduce duplication of effort, maximize the use of limited
Federal resources, and identify gaps in Federal activities.
In addition to the efforts described above, DHS' Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) is actively engaged in a myriad of initiatives
with the Nuclear Sector. The Mission of DNDO is to improve the Nation's
capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import,
possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material
for use against the United States.
DNDO addresses source security through its Securing the Cities
Initiative, which designs and implements architecture for coordinated
and integrated preventative detection and interdiction of illicit
radiological materials that may be used as a weapon within a high-risk
urban area. The New York City (NYC) Tri-State Region Source Security
Subgroup, chartered as part of the NYC Securing The Cities pilot
effort, is focused on developing an effective, risk-based approach to
increase the security of industrial and medical sources in NYC and the
surrounding areas of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The sub-
group is:
Developing a best practices in source security report;
Performing security reviews of high-risk materials
licensees; and
Evaluating the current notification and tracking system for
the movement of sources in the NYC Tri-State area.
DNDO also chaired the Public Education Subgroup as part of the NRC-
chaired Radiation Source Security and Protection Task Force to enhance
the general knowledge of the public concerning Radioactive Dispersal
Devices (RDDs). The subgroup developed an action plan that, when
implemented across the Nation, will raise public awareness of the
effects of an RDD. It is hoped that this increased public awareness
will lower the public panic in response to an actual or perceived RDD
event. By mitigating fear and panic of RDDs, it is hoped that either
RDDs will become a less attractive weapon of choice for terrorists, or,
in the case of an RDD attack, will limit social and economic damage due
to an informed public response.
DNDO's Small Business Innovative Research Program (SBIR),
implemented in coordination with the DHS Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency, is an effort to promote the design and
production of non-nuclear alternatives for industrial devices that use
radioactive sources. This program gives seed money to companies who
have shown promising designs through a Nation-wide competition.
Currently, DNDO has three SBIR contracts.
DNDO's State and Local Stakeholder Working Group supports non-
Federal members of the preventative radiological and nuclear detection
(PRND) community. DNDO has developed a PRND Program Management
Handbook, and over 7,400 law enforcement, first responder personnel,
and public officials have completed the agency's five-course training
curriculum.
In an effort to share information on source security issues of
mutual interest, DHS, NRC, and NNSA participate in what is known as
Tri-Lateral Meetings. Tri-Lateral Meetings seek to:
Discuss issues of mutual interest to participating agencies
regarding radiological and nuclear material;
Avoid or minimize surprises about other agencies'
activities;
Develop an efficient and effective path forward to enhance
efforts on source security; and
Speak with one Federal voice, especially for Congressional
and media inquiries.
The Tri-lateral Meetings are held on a quarterly basis, for 2
hours, to share information and discuss agency programs on radiological
source security and preparedness matters. The Tri-Lateral Meetings
provide an informal information-sharing forum for DHS, NNSA and the NRC
to synchronize radiological source security efforts that are not
already covered through other established public-private and inter-
agency auspices (e.g., NGCC/CIPAC, Radiation Source Protection and
Security Task Force). Both DNDO and Infrastructure Protection represent
DHS at the Tri-Lateral Meetings, where each participating agency
alternates chairing and coordinating the periodic meetings to include
logistics and agenda development.
In closing, the Office of Infrastructure Protection works closely
with its Federal, State, local, territorial, and Tribal and private-
sector partners within the Nuclear Sector to ensure the protection and
resiliency of the sector. I would be glad to respond to any questions
the subcommittee may have.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Conklin.
Mr. Sheely.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH SHEELY, ASSOCIATE ASSISTANT DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Sheely. Yes, hi. My name is Ken Sheely, from the U.S.
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration.
Chairwoman Clarke and Members of the subcommittee, thank
you for giving me this opportunity to testify today on the role
that the NNSA Global Threat Reduction Initiative plays in
improving security on high-risk radioactive sources.
The GTRI mission is to reduce and protect vulnerable
nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites
world-wide. To achieve this mission, GTRI is working in over
100 countries to convert, remove, and protect nuclear and
radiological materials. For today's hearing, I will focus my
remarks on our efforts to enhance security of radioactive
sources in the United States.
To better understand the potential RDD risk, GTRI has
completed three studies: One on the economic impacts of an RDD;
one to determine the isotopes of concern in the threshold
quantities of an RDD of national significance; and the third,
co-sponsored with DNDO, to look at the vulnerabilities of
cesium chloride irradiators.
These findings, coupled with the open environments of
hospitals and universities, make the security at these
facilities challenging. To address these challenges, GTRI and
the DOE laboratories provide technical expertised based on
implementing security best practices at over 600 buildings
world-wide.
The GTRI voluntary secure enhancements complement and do
not replace NRC's increased controls. In fact, NRC has issued
regulatory information summaries to their licensees describing
and endorsing GTRI's efforts. GTRI has also been endorsed by
DHS, FBI, and the Agreement States.
The first element of GTRI's voluntary security efforts are
source recoveries. Since 1997, GTRI's Offsite Source Recovery
Project has removed more than 22,000 unwanted sources,
totalling more than 700,000 curies in the United States.
The second component of GTRI's security efforts are delay
enhancements. For example, as a result of the cesium chloride
irradiator vulnerability study, GTRI, DNDO, and NRC, along with
manufacturers, developed the in-device delay hardening kits. In
August 2008, a pilot program was launched, and the first
volunteers included the sites in New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. In May 2009, DNDO transferred their portion of
the project to GTRI in order to consolidate all activities
under one Federal agency for national implementation since many
of these sites have irradiators from more than one of the three
vendors. To date, kits have been installed on 32 irradiators.
In addition, the vendors have agreed that new kits coming off
the production line will have the kits already installed.
In addition to these hardening kits, GTRI enhancements also
include other delay devices, such as tie-downs, locks, and
hardened doors.
Another component is detection, and the most important
element of GTRI's detection features is remote monitoring. This
is because, at many hospitals and universities, the alarms
would be handled by 9-1-1 operators who would have lesser
understanding of why a cesium irradiator warrants an emergency
response. GTRI's remote monitoring addresses this by
simultaneously sending prioritized alarms directly to multiple
locations, such as the local law enforcement, to ensure timely
response.
GTRI security upgrades also include response training. GTRI
has developed a unique training course to provide local law
enforcement with hands-on training in a realistic setting with
actual radioactive sources. To date, we have conducted over six
training courses for 175 responders.
As a capstone to our support, NNSA has partnered with the
FBI to provide tabletop exercises. The purpose of these
exercises is to provide a no-fault site-specific scenario to
promote team building and to prepare integrated response plans
with Federal, State, local, and private-sector partners. To
date, four tabletop exercises have been conducted.
The ultimate risk reduction would be to replace radioactive
sources with nonradioactive alternatives. NNSA is currently
funding research into technologies such as X-rays for blood
irradiation.
Through our security efforts world-wide, we have learned
several important lessons. Paramount among them is that a well-
trained, well-equipped, and timely response is one of the most
important elements in ensuring security. That is why GTRI has
concentrated the majority of our voluntary security
enhancements on helping these dedicated first responders, from
our remote monitoring systems which ensure they receive timely
alarms, to the realistic training which ensures they are
prepared. In addition, GTRI serves as a conduit to share
lessons learned from site to site, city to city, and State to
State.
In closing, I am proud to report that GTRI, working in
concert with our Federal, State, local, and private-sector
partners, has helped to further enhance the security of
radioactive sources.
[The statement of Mr. Sheely follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth Sheely
September 14, 2009
i. introduction
Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify on the
role that the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) plays in further improving the
security on high-risk radioactive sources. GTRI's mission is to reduce
and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at
civilian sites world-wide. These efforts are focused on the first line
of defense, namely securing or removing vulnerable nuclear and
radiological material at their source. GTRI has three goals that
provide a comprehensive approach to achieving its mission and denying
terrorists access to nuclear and radiological materials:
1. CONVERT research reactors and isotope production facilities from
the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched
uranium (LEU);
2. REMOVE and dispose of excess nuclear and radiological materials;
3. PROTECT high-priority nuclear and radiological material from
theft and sabotage.
To achieve its mission, GTRI is working in over 100 countries. For
today's hearing I will focus my remarks on GTRI's efforts that are
aimed at further enhancing the security of radioactive sources located
in the United States that could potentially be used in a radiological
dispersal device (RDD) or ``dirty bomb.'' I will begin by describing
our approach to defining and prioritizing the risks from radiological
materials. From there I will describe the programs GTRI is leading to
mitigate these risks, our efforts to coordinate with Federal, State,
and local agencies and the private sector, and lessons we have learned
to improve radiological security.
ii. radiological risks
The attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened the Nation's concerns
regarding the potential use of radioactive materials in a terrorist
act. The possibility of such an attack has been of particular concern
because of the widespread use and availability of radioactive materials
in the United States and abroad by industry, hospitals, and academic
institutions. Loss or theft of such materials, in risk-significant
quantities, could lead to their diversion for malicious use in an RDD.
An RDD is a device or mechanism that is intended to spread
radioactive material from the detonation of conventional explosives or
other means. An RDD detonation would likely result in a few deaths
(mainly from the explosion), but significant social and economic
impacts could result from public panic, decontamination costs, and
denial of access to the area for extended periods of time.
To better understand the potential consequences of malevolent use
of radiological materials, the specific isotopes of concern, and the
vulnerabilities of devices using these materials, GTRI commissioned
three key studies to examine these issues in depth. These studies
formed the basis for GTRI's voluntary security enhancement efforts and
have been shared with our Federal partners.
II.A Economic Impacts
GTRI commissioned an economic impact study to better understand the
likely economic disruption were an RDD to be detonated in a major
metropolitan area. A joint study by Los Alamos National Laboratory and
Sandia National Laboratory prepared for GTRI modeled the impacts of
four specific radioactive sources in amounts normally found in devices
commonly used in their respective industry. Even without weaponization
of the radioactive materials or optimization of the device the study
found that the economic cost to the Nation could be in the billions of
dollars.\1\ Costs included evacuation, relocation, clean-up, and lost
wages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Economic Impacts of Detonating Radiological Dispersion Devices,
Los Alamos National Laboratory, February 15, 2008, LA-CP-08-00973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II.B Material of Concern
Although any amount of radioactive material could cause public
panic, GTRI's focus is on radiation sources that could be used by a
terrorist to cause a significant impact. A second GTRI study tasked
Sandia National Laboratories with developing a down-selection
methodology that used a rigorous and reproducible process to identify,
prioritize, and determine threshold quantities of radioactive materials
that could be used in a RDD of national significance.
This ``down-selection study'' \2\ began by examining the
comprehensive list of nuclides to ensure all were considered. The first
step was to eliminate all stable, i.e., nonradioactive, nuclides. The
list was then culled according to half-life and specific activity.
Shorter-lived nuclides likely would not be effectively used in an RDD
because they would decay away too quickly. Nuclides with half-lives
greater than 100,000 years were also not of concern because the mass of
material required for a significant RDD would be excessively large,
making use and dispersion of these materials very difficult. The final
step was to identify radionuclides that are commercially available to
end-users world-wide or may be available in bulk quantities to a
limited number of suppliers and manufacturers in quantities greater
than 0.1 curie (alpha emitters) and 1 curie (beta/gamma emitters). The
final result was 14 radionuclides and spent fuel that GTRI determined
could be used to make a significant RDD and were candidates for
voluntary security enhancements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Radioactive Material Downselection and Source Prioritization
Methodology, Sandia National Laboratory, November 21, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 14 radionuclides documented in the down-selection report
include isotopes in wide commercial and medical use in the United
States. The GTRI-funded study was subsequently used by the Radiation
Source Protection and Security Task Force, Chaired by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), to develop the interagency cleared report
of July 8, 2009, Reevaluation of the List of Radioactive Sources That
Warrant Enhanced Security and Protection and Quantities of Radioactive
Material Sufficient to Create a Significant Radiological Dispersal
Device or Radiation Exposure Device. In addition, a study by the
National Academy of Sciences identified Cesium Chloride (CsCl) as
posing a greater concern than the other radionuclides because it is
widely used in significant quantities and is soluble and
dispersible.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Radiation Source Use and Replacement, National Academy of
Sciences (February 20, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II.C Cesium Irradiator Vulnerabilities
The third study sponsored by GTRI and co-sponsored by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) and conducted by Sandia National Laboratory and the Southwest
Research Institute looked at the specific vulnerabilities to devices
commonly found in research and medical settings. These include blood
and research irradiators which use Cs-137 and gamma knifes which use
Co-60. These reviews improved our understanding of device vulnerability
to theft or sabotage in the absence of any NRC security-increased
controls or GTRI voluntary security enhancements.
The key finding of this study was that the radioactive sources
within self-shielded cesium irradiators could be extracted more quickly
than initially thought. GTRI, DNDO, and NRC agreed that adding
additional hardening to cesium irradiators was prudent. This study led
to the cesium chloride In-Device Delay (IDD) effort that will be
described in section III.B below.
II.D Multiple Open Sites
Radiological sources are located at thousands of civilian sites
across the United States and around the world. Medical, university, and
research facilities are, by nature and design, ``open'' environments
that allow a larger set of people access to these materials. These
types of facilities are more difficult to secure than isolated military
installations or nuclear power plants which are designed to be closed
to all but a very limited number of personnel.
II.E Insider Threat
It is important to not focus solely on attacks from outside
terrorists attempting to penetrate and steal material. GTRI also looked
at threats from the insider, i.e., someone who works at a facility and
likely has intimate knowledge of security procedures and
vulnerabilities. The possibility and probability of a passive insider,
e.g., one who simply arranges access to the facility for the adversary,
or an active insider, one who participates in the theft, diversion, or
sabotage of radiological material, is greater given the ``open''
environment of a university campus or city hospital in which many
radiological devices are used.
iii. gtri's role in mitigation of risks
GTRI works very closely with its Federal partners, each of which
has a unique role ensuring a comprehensive system of oversight,
prevention, and protection of civilian radiological sources. DHS's
mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and,
minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from any terrorist
attacks that do occur within the United States across multiple sectors
(e.g. nuclear, chemical, etc.), leading the Government Coordinating
Council(s) (GCC) and collaborating with the industry-led Sector
Coordinating Council(s) (SCC) to protect critical infrastructure and
key resources. NRC's mission is to license and regulate the Nation's
civilian use of by-product, source, and special nuclear materials to
ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the
common defense and security, and protect the environment. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead Federal law enforcement
agency and plays a significant role preventing, interdicting, and
investigating potential acts of nuclear and radioactive theft,
sabotage, or terrorism. NNSA brings the science and expertise of our
National Laboratories to create innovative solutions to prevent the
acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials for use in weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and other acts of terrorism. Specifically, GTRI
and the DOE laboratories provide unique expertise to evaluate
radiological issues and threats because of our significant work both
internationally and domestically which allows us to identify ``best
practices'' available in each circumstance.
To address the risks outlined above, GTRI, in cooperation with its
Federal partners, has initiated a number of voluntary security efforts
to further mitigate these potential threats. These include eliminating
unwanted sources, hardening kits for specific irradiators, facility-
wide voluntary security enhancements, specialized training courses for
security and law enforcement personnel, and table top exercises for
first responders. GTRI's voluntary security enhancements complement and
do not replace NRC's increased controls requirements. When requested by
the licensee, GTRI works to assess existing security conditions,
provide recommendations on security enhancements, and when warranted,
fund the procurement and installation of jointly agreed-upon security
best practices. GTRI considers all 14 isotopes of concern above
threshold quantities (10 Ci or greater), and addresses several areas of
security including Deterrence, Control, Detection, Delay, Response, and
Sustainability.
GTRI's voluntary security enhancement efforts have been endorsed by
the NRC, DHS, FBI, Organization of Agreement States (OAS), and
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, Inc. (CRCPD). NRC
has issued Regulatory Information Summaries (RIS) describing both the
IDD and voluntary security enhancement efforts of GTRI and recommends
that licensees volunteer for these GTRI efforts.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ RIS 2008-17, July 18, 2008, ``Voluntary Security Enhancements
for Self-Contained Irradiators Containing Cesium Chloride Sources'',
and RIS 2008-23, October 3, 2008, ``The Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) Domestic Threat Reduction Program & Federally Funded
Voluntary Security Enhancements For High-Risk Radiological Material''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III.A Elimination--Removing Unwanted Sources
Since 1997 GTRI's Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) operated
by Los Alamos National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and the
CRCPD has reduced the radiological risk by recovering and eliminating
disused and unwanted sealed sources. GTRI, in coordination with NRC,
developed recovery prioritization criteria based on risk reduction. As
of August 31, 2009, GTRI has recovered over 22,700 sources (totaling
more than 720,000 curies) in 12 years.
At present, only 14 States in the United States have access to
commercial disposal for sealed sources (with the exception of Ra-226
sources which have a commercial disposal pathway in all 50 States).
With the decline in commercial disposal options, GTRI has seen an
increase in the number of sources being registered as excess and
unwanted. GTRI has found that without disposal access, source owners
have no option other than long-term storage, which increases the
vulnerability of becoming lost or forgotten.
III.B Delay--CsCl Irradiator In-Device Delay (IDD)
A fundamental component of GTRI's voluntary security enhancements
is delay. By increasing delay (the amount of time needed by the
adversary to gain access to the radioactive sources) we give more time
for law enforcement to interrupt the adversary before they can steal
the radioactive source. As a result of the GTRI/DNDO cesium irradiator
vulnerability study, NNSA, DNDO, and NRC along with cesium irradiator
manufacturers developed In-Device Delay (IDD) hardening kits for the
most widely used models of CsCl blood and research irradiators. The IDD
kits make it orders of magnitude more difficult for an adversary to
illicitly access and steal the radiological source.
In cooperation with the three principal manufactures (Best
Theratronics, LTD., JL Shepherd and Associates, Pharmalucence) and the
NRC, GTRI, and DNDO developed these kits and in August 2008 launched a
voluntary pilot program to install them. Some of the first sites to
volunteer for the IDD kits included New York's Sloan-Kettering
Institute for Cancer Research, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, St.
Vincent's Hospital and Medical Center, University of Pennsylvania,
University of Rutgers, Wake Forest University, Baylor College of
Medicine, University of Miami--Miller School of Medicine, and Geisinger
Health System.
The installation of these kits is often carried out in extremely
sensitive and very busy research and hospital environments. This
requires the installers to use special measures (e.g. sound dampening,
exhaust and fume hoods, etc.) and that coordinate installation
schedules in order to minimize the impact on these facilities.
Installations generally take 8 to 16 hours depending on the type of
device, and are usually scheduled during evening hours to minimize the
impact on research or medical operations. In May 2009, DNDO transferred
their portion of the IDD project to GTRI in order to streamline the IDD
effort and consolidate all relevant voluntary source security
activities under one Federal agency (many licensees have irradiators
from more than one manufacturer at their site). This transfer of scope
has allowed GTRI to standardize processes and procedures across all
three manufacturers, and ensures that the project is coordinated with
other GTRI source security efforts. The pilot project has been deemed a
success and GTRI has initiated a national rollout plan to outfit all
qualifying irradiators in the United States.
The total number of cesium devices in the United States is about
1,100. Nearly 260 of these devices are small calibration units or self-
contained irradiators located at nuclear power plants or other secure
locations. The remaining 840 devices are self-contained irradiators
located at universities, hospitals, and research institutes. Each one
of these 840 CsCl irradiators has enough material that could be used in
several RDDs of national significance.
As of August 31, 2009 IDD kits have been installed on 32
irradiators. The remaining 808 irradiators can be hardened by fiscal
year 2016. The implementation schedule is primarily constrained by
human resource needs, scheduling complexities, and budget. Each
manufacturer has a limited staff of trained employees that are approved
to work on these devices. Locating, hiring, and training additional
staff to supplement this effort is a lengthy process. Scheduling the
installations is also a rate-limiting factor. Critical research
schedules and blood bank operations cannot be disrupted. Simply finding
a time when both manufacturer and facility can accommodate the
installation adds time to the process. Each kit costs between $4,000-
$8,000 in hardware and about $25,000 in installation labor and travel.
The total estimated cost for 840 irradiators is $26 million. In
addition, the manufacturers have agreed that starting in 2010 all new
CsCl irradiators will have the IDD kits installed prior to sale and
delivery.
In addition to the IDD hardening kits for CsCl irradiators, GTRI
voluntary security enhancements also include other delay elements such
as device tie-downs, locks, hardened doors/windows, walls, cages, and
safes. All of these elements increase the time it takes the adversary
to gain access to and steal the radioactive source.
III.C Detection--Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS)
A second fundamental component of GTRI's voluntary security
enhancements is detection. Thirty minutes of delay with detection that
allows responders to arrive in 20 minutes is considered to be
effective. Thirty minutes of delay without detection that could allow
the adversary to attack the source/device all weekend is considered to
be not effective.
GTRI detection upgrades include biometric access control devices,
door alarms, motion sensors, cameras, wireless electronic tamper
indicating seals, and area radiation monitors. Each of these
technologies provides a specific deterrence, control, and/or detection
function that, when integrated together and with delay, provides a
significant security enhancement in a holistic manner.
However, the most important feature of GTRI's detection
enhancements is the remote monitoring system. This is because the
remote monitoring system directly mitigates the two greatest
vulnerabilities in securing an open civilian facility like a hospital
or university: Which are (1) reliable transmission of alarms to the
responders and (2) the insider threat.
Reliable transmission of alarms to the responders.--At military
facilities and nuclear power plans, there are highly-trained operators
who are located in hardened central alarm stations (CAS) who monitor
the detection devices 24/7. These detection alarms are hardwired into
the CAS and if an alarm goes off or the power is turned off, there is
nearly 100 percent probability that the CAS operator will receive the
alarm and immediately notify the large, well-trained, well-armed on-
site response team as to the exact location and condition causing the
alarm. In comparison, at many hospitals or universities, the alarms are
not monitored by well-trained CAS operators sitting in a secure
location. The alarms are instead sent to normal facility employees or
unarmed guards on-site. Assuming the adversary hasn't already
neutralized these lightly-armed on-site personnel, the emergency call
will be handled by a 9-1-1 operator who will have little understanding
of what an irradiator is or why cesium warrants an emergency response.
The chances that a large, well-trained, well-armed off-site response
will arrive in time from local law enforce under these conditions is
greatly reduced due to the limited amount of reliable transmission of
alarms.
Insider threat.--The greatest potential threat at hospitals and
universities is that an insider could be the guard or employee who is
on duty during off-hours an merely turns off or ignores the alarms. No
one will know the source is gone until the next shift begins perhaps 12
hours or more later.
The GTRI remote monitoring system directly mitigates both of these
threats by:
Integrating alarms from multiple detection sensors and
prioritizing alarms to ensure that critical alarms receive
immediate attention even if the operator is not an expert in
alarm assessment. The GTRI remote monitoring system includes
statement of health and power level reports so external
responders know immediately if the system is turned off.
Alarms are simultaneously sent to multiple on-site and off-
site locations such as ADT, local police departments, or
regional fusion/operation centers. This ensures a timely
response by sending a reliable transmission of alarms directly
to trained off-site experts and responders. It also prevents
against a single-point failure if the insider is the on-site
alarm monitor or guard.
To address the sustainability portion of our security enhancement
concept, GTRI provides a 3- to 5-year maintenance and warranty contract
for each security enhancement device, contacts each site quarterly to
follow-up on the status of the enhanced security system, and re-visits
each site annually to determine if changes to the operating or threat
environment warrant additional system enhancements.
GTRI prioritizes which sites receive voluntary security
enhancements by assessing the attractiveness of the site's materials
for possible use in an RDD, the site's proximity to DHS Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) locations, and the site's proximity to other
volunteer sites. GTRI estimates that there are about 2,200 buildings in
the United States that house IAEA Category I or II levels of
radiological materials. As of August 31, 2009, 37 buildings have been
completed with the remaining buildings to be complete by fiscal year
2016.
GTRI also provide responders with radios, repeaters, and personal
detection devices.
III.D Response--Alarm Response Training
The most important aspect of any security system is a timely, well-
equipped, well-trained response team of appropriate size to interrupt
and neutralize the adversary before they gain access to the radioactive
source. GTRI has therefore made a focused effort to provide security
personnel and local law enforcement with the tools and training needed
to adequately respond to a security incident.
Most on-site guards at facilities with radioactive sources are not
armed or large enough force strength to neutralize the threat.
Therefore, the key responders are often off-site local law enforcement.
Unfortunately, many local law enforcement officials are not made aware
of the nature of the material which is in use at hospitals, blood
banks, universities, oil fields, and manufacturing plants in their
jurisdiction. It is important for their safety, and the safety of their
communities, that they receive proper training about radiological
sources. To ensure that both on-site and off-site responders understand
how to respond to enhanced security system alarms, GTRI has developed
an alarm response training course run by the Y-12 National Security
Complex in Oak Ridge, TN.
This alarm response training prepares responders to protect
themselves and the public when responding to events involving
radiological materials. The participants conduct hands-on training in a
realistic setting using actual protection equipment and real
radioactive sources. The courses include operational exercise scenarios
that build on classroom instructions and allow response forces to
exercise their own procedures during realistic alarm scenarios.
As of August 31, 2009 we have conducted 6 training courses for 175
responders from 7 cities.
III.E Table Top Exercises (TTX)
As the capstone of GTRI's voluntary security enhancement support,
GTRI has partnered with NNSA's Office of the Under Secretary for
Counterterrorism and the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate
to provide table top exercises at select nuclear and radiological
sites. The purpose is to provide a no-fault, site-specific scenario
where senior managers from various Federal, State, and municipal
organizations can exercise their crisis management and consequence
management skills in response to a terrorist incident. The overall
objectives are:
Promote cross-sector communication, cooperation, and team-
building among Federal, State, local, and private sector first
responders;
Exercise FBI lead responsibility for criminal investigation;
Examine newly developed tactics, techniques, and procedures
resulting from GTRI voluntary security enhancements;
Promote attack prevention through intelligence sharing and
coordinated approach to neutralize the threat;
Prepare site-specific integrated response plan with Federal,
State, local, and private sector partners.
As of August 31, 2009 we have conducted 3 TTXs at facilities
located in Honolulu, HI, Philadelphia, PA, and Manhattan, KS. A fourth
TTX was recently completed in Houston, TX in early September.
III.F Transportation
Radioactive sealed sources may be at their most vulnerable when in
transit. Recognizing this, GTRI has begun to implement security
upgrades beyond regulatory requirements on our own source recovery
shipments. GTRI has undertaken a number of pilot projects testing
existing security devices/systems and has found that there is not a
commercially available system that meets all our needs. Therefore, we
are putting the best available compatible equipment on our vehicles and
will continue to improve our system as additional technology advances
are made. Because we are looking for a system(s) that private industry
can adopt, we are working with the DHS-lead interagency group and
directly with some in industry to demonstrate a prototype system using
the best available devices. GTRI is offering industry a test bed to
evaluate their devices for compatibility and capability to operate in
the harsh transit environment, (e.g., heat, cold, jarring, etc).
III.G Alternative Technologies
The ultimate risk reduction would be to replace radioactive sources
with non-radioactive alternative technologies. NNSA's Office of
Nonproliferation Research and Development is currently funding research
into technologies such as is X-ray for blood irradiation, which uses
electricity to create X-rays and cannot be used in a dirty bomb.
There have been recommendations to replace some radionuclides,
particularly cesium chloride, with another form or radionuclide, e.g.,
cesium ceramic or cobalt. Caution must be given to ensure the new form
will result in enough risk reduction to off-set the cost of developing
the alternative and retrofitting/replacing current irradiators. GTRI is
working with Sandia National Laboratories and Federal partners to
perform a relative material risk reduction study to evaluate the amount
of risk reduction that may be derived from an alternate form or
alternate radionuclide to cesium chloride.
iv. coordination and cooperation
In implementing these voluntary security enhancements, GTRI has
maintained close coordination and cooperation with Federal, State, and
local agencies and the private sector. In particular, we have
established strong working relationships with the NRC, DHS, and the
FBI.
To coordinate these complementary efforts, GTRI participates
regularly in meetings of the DHS-chaired Nuclear Sector Government
Coordinating Council, the NRC-led Radiation Source Protection and
Security Task Force, Tri-lateral meetings comprised of senior
representatives from NNSA, DHS, and NRC, and many additional working
level meetings. These coordination venues have helped ensure that
officials throughout the Government are aware of new initiatives, on-
going implementation efforts, and challenges encountered with enhancing
radiological source security.
v. conclusion
I am proud to report that GTRI, working in concert with our
Federal, State, local, and private sector partners, has helped to
further enhance security on radioactive sources and reduce the risk of
a dirty bomb.
V.A Lessons Learned
Through our security efforts in the United States and overseas, we
have learned several important lessons, paramount of which is that a
well-trained, well-equipped, and timely response force is the single
most important element in ensuring security. All the delay and
detection in the world does not defeat the ``bad guys''--the response
team does. Since most non-power plant commercial sites do not have
armed, 24-hour, on-site security personnel, it is the off-site local
law enforcement that becomes the defacto 24/7 response to an incident
of radiological theft or sabotage. Local law enforcement officers are
not full-time radiological police, they have much broader duties to
serve and protect the public, and they are not regulated by a Federal
agency for radiological response effectiveness. It is for these reasons
that GTRI has concentrated the vast majority of our voluntary security
enhancements on helping these dedicated first responders. From our
remote monitoring (which ensures they receive timely alarms and
knowledge of the threat environment they will face) to personal
protection equipment (radios and radiation pagers) to the realistic
training and exercises. In addition, GTRI serves as a conduit to share
lessons learned because we learn as much from local law enforcement as
they learn from us. GTRI is able to share these lessons from site to
site, city to city, and State to State to improve the collective
security preparedness.
V.B Should Voluntary Efforts Be Mandated?
One of the most frequent questions we are asked is should these
voluntary security enhancement be required? And if so when? These are
very difficult questions to give specific answers to given the myriad
of complex and interdependent risks that must be considered. For
example:
Which approach results in the faster implementation of
effective security practices and risk reduction?
How flexible will regulations be to take into account
different industry sectors and the uniqueness of each site?
How would you regulate local law enforcement or other off-
site response team?
What will be the cost burden imposed upon licensees and will
it impact their ability to provide other critical services?
How sustainable are voluntary upgrades that are not enforced
through inspections?
How do we encourage the licensees to ask security questions
and push for best practices?
Our experience has shown that in most cases the fastest, most
effective, and lasting way to improve security is to: (1) Fully engage
the private sector, local law enforcement and the States in helping to
create the appropriate security culture/program, and (2) by combining
voluntary best practices to quickly and cost-effectively improve
security at most sites and then follow that up in a few years with a
new regulation to close the gaps.
In closing, Madame Chairwoman, thank you for inviting us to
participate in today's important hearing. The Department of Energy has
a dedicated team focused on reducing domestic and foreign radiological
threats. GTRI's voluntary program has had an effective beginning, and
we believe is well-positioned to bring about comprehensive solutions in
a timely manner to the potential threat posed by radiological sources
used in vital civilian applications.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lewis.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. LEWIS, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF MATERIALS
SAFETY AND STATE AGREEMENTS (MSSA), NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Mr. Lewis. Good morning. Madame Chairwoman, Members of the
subcommittee, my name is Robert Lewis, and I am NRC's director
of Materials Safety and State Agreements. I thank you on behalf
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for holding this hearing
on the important subject of securing radioactive sources. The
NRC recognizes the direct role that radioactive source security
plays in the agency's mission to protect public health, safety,
and the environment.
On a personal level, I am a native New Yorker and a
graduate of the SUNY system, so this venue I thank you for. It
has particular significance to me.
I will now highlight some of the regulatory programs and
recent accomplishments to tighten security of radioactive
sources. My written testimony provides additional details.
The focus of Federal and State efforts to put in place
tighter controls for security has been on radioactive sources
that contain larger quantities, so-called Category 1 and 2
quantities, of key radionuclides of concern used in civilian
applications across America, nuclides such as cobalt-60,
cesium-137, iridium-192, and americium-241.
The civilian applications they are used for include food
and medical equipment sterilization, medical research, cancer
treatment, oil and gas exploration, and inspecting materials
for hidden flaws during construction. Nation-wide, there are
approximately 22,000 materials licensees, 1,300 of which
possess Category 1 or 2 sources--approximately 1,300.
In conducting its mission, NRC partners with 36 Agreement
States that regulate the possession and use of certain
radioactive material within their States. Under these
agreements, NRC relinquishes all of its regulatory authority
over most radioactive materials in the State. However, we do
work closely with the States to implement consistent and
compatible National programs.
In addition, NRC oversees the Agreement State programs
through periodic performance evaluations. New York is an
Agreement State, and regulators for source licensing are the
State health department and the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene.
A key piece of legislation that has enabled regulatory
enhancements on radioactive material security was the Energy
Policy Act of 2005. Consistent with that law, NRC and Agreement
States have employed a variety of tools to strengthen the U.S.
systems for regulatory controls. I will use the rest of my time
to highlight four of these: Increased controls in
fingerprinting; cesium chloride studies; the National Source
Tracking System; and enhanced interagency communications.
New security requirements, called increased controls, that
were already mentioned have been issued in 2005 through 2006 by
the NRC and the Agreement State regulators. Among other things,
these require licensees to upgrade facilities and procedures to
prevent and ensure detection of any unauthorized access to
radioactive material. They also require advanced coordination
with local law enforcement on security issues.
In 2007 to 2008, these controls were supplemented by
requirements for fingerprinting and Federal criminal history
background checks of anyone with unescorted access to Category
1 or 2 quantities of material. Licensees must establish and
implement trustworthiness and reliability standards for such
unescorted access.
A first round of increased controls inspections for
compliance has been completed by NRC and all the Agreement
States. The increased controls and fingerprinting requirements
have been implemented for all Category 1 and 2 quantities of
radioactive material, including approximately 550 licensees in
the United States that possess about 1,100 self-contained
cesium chloride irradiators. These are used to irradiate blood,
conduct research, and calibrate emergency response radiation
detection equipment.
They have long received--cesium chloride has long received
increased attention from both a safety and security perspective
because of its dispersible nature. Several studies, most
recently and notably a 2008 National Academies report on source
use and replacement, emphasize replacement technologies to be
considered for cesium chloride, but also caution that any
implementation consider preserving the essential functions of
these devices.
NRC hosted a widely attended workshop in September 2008 to
obtain input on the use and potential phaseout of cesium
chloride. From this outreach and its own analysis, NRC
concluded that near-term replacement of cesium chloride in
existing blood research and calibration irradiators is not
practicable and would disproportionately be detrimental to
medical care, continuity of research, and the provisions for
emergency response capability.
NRC believes it is imperative to develop a viable
alternative technology and a disposal option for these sources
before considering a phaseout. We are cooperating with the
National Nuclear Security Administration program in which
licensees voluntarily receive hardware improvements to the
irradiators to enhance security beyond requirements.
The Energy Policy Act also included a provision for the
National Source Tracking System, a Web-based database to ensure
and enhance accountability of radioactive sources. Since it was
deployed in January of this year, all transactions including
Category 1 and 2 sources have been reported into the system,
and over 55,000 sources are currently tracked. This greater
accountability directly strengthens the national security
framework.
Finally, I would like to mention that the level of
interagency coordination on source security issues, from our
perspective, has never been higher. This is the result of the
Government-wide Radiation Source Protection and Security Task
Force, established by the Energy Policy Act and chaired by the
NRC; the Government coordinating councils that have been
mentioned by DHS; and the trilateral meetings that have already
been mentioned.
That concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today at this hearing, and I look
forward to responding to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert J. Lewis
September 14, 2009
Chairwoman Clarke, Members of the subcommittee, Members of the
House from the New York City area, I am here today representing the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to provide a status report
that describes our approach to improving safety and security of
radioactive sources and our recent accomplishments in this important
area. Thank you for the opportunity to provide you with an overview of
the Nation's regulatory programs to tighten security requirements for
the highest risk radioactive sources.
background
To put the radioactive source security improvement efforts into
context, it is important to first provide some background on the 2003
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety
and Security of Radioactive Sources, which Congress, in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, directed NRC to implement. The NRC's program to
tighten security and controls on the highest risk radioactive sources
is founded in and consistent with the United States Government's
commitment to the Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct identifies 16
radionuclides of concern, along with a categorization by radioactivity
levels for each radionuclide, based upon the relative health hazards
each radionuclide would present if not kept under adequate controls.
Sources and devices containing Category 1 and 2 quantities of these
materials are the most dangerous, and have been the focus of Federal
and State efforts to put in place tighter controls for security. Of the
16 radionuclides, only four are widely used in civilian applications in
this country: Cobalt-60, cesium-137, iridium-192, and americium-241.
Civilian applications include food and medical equipment sterilization,
medical research, cancer treatment, oil and gas exploration, and
inspecting materials for hidden flaws.
NRC has been a world leader in applying the Code of Conduct through
strengthening the U.S. system of regulatory controls, including:
Imposing enhanced import/export controls in 2005; requiring users of
the sources to upgrade their facilities, information controls, and
control of personnel access to the radioactive sources since 2005;
establishing and using an Interim Inventory of Nationally Tracked
Sources since 2004, and upgrading the Interim Inventory via the
deployment of the National Source Tracking System in 2009. In these
initiatives, however, NRC coordinates in partnership with the 36
Agreement States that regulate the possession and use of certain
radioactive material in their States pursuant to agreements between the
NRC and the Governor of each State. These agreements are provided for
by section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. Under these
agreements, NRC relinquishes its regulatory authority over radioactive
materials in that State; NRC does retain responsibility for nuclear
reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, as well as for Federal
facilities' material licensees, such as military and veterans
hospitals. NRC and the Agreement States work very closely to implement
consistent and compatible programs for regulating radioactive materials
safety and security across the country. In addition, NRC provides
oversight of each Agreement State program through a periodic
performance evaluation program. New York is an Agreement State, and the
regulators are the State Health Department and the New York City Health
Department.
Nation-wide, there are a total of 22,000 U.S. materials licenses.
Of these, less than 10 percent (approximately 1,300 licensees) possess
IAEA Category 1 or 2 sources. There are also an estimated 30,000 active
general licenses that permit possession of smaller quantities of
radioactive material in devices (e.g. industrial gauges), which do not
require a specific license application or regulatory review process
because of the inherent safety of the devices and resulting low risk of
an accident.
A key piece of legislation that has enabled regulatory enhancements
to radioactive materials security is the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
This law included provisions that expanded NRC's fingerprinting and
background check authority, required study of radiation source use and
replacement, mandated the creation of a National source tracking
system, and created an interagency Radiation Source Protection and
Security Task Force. I will use the remainder of my statement to
address the progress made and continuing work in each of these areas.
increased controls and fingerprinting
The licensees that possess Category 1 or 2 materials as defined by
the IAEA Code of Conduct have all had to comply with new requirements
called ``increased controls,'' which were issued in 2005-2006 by the
NRC or Agreement State regulators. The increased controls have required
licensees to upgrade their facilities and procedures to ensure
detection and prevention of unauthorized access to radioactive
material, advance coordination with local law enforcement, enhanced
security during transportation, and enhanced and frequent accounting of
sources. These measures also require licensees to establish and
implement trustworthiness and reliability standards to determine who
will have unescorted access to the radioactive material. Those that are
not approved to have unescorted access must be within line of sight of
an approved individual when accessing the material. NRC and Agreement
States verify compliance through inspections of licensees. The first
round of increased controls inspections for all licensees has been
completed and compliance issues corrected.
From 2007-2008, the increased controls were supplemented by
additional requirements for fingerprinting and Federal criminal history
records checks of all individuals with unescorted access to Category 1
or 2 quantities of radioactive material to further improve the tools
available to determine trustworthiness and reliability. The NRC and all
of the Agreement States are now in the process of verifying compliance
through the inspection process. Since December 2007, an estimated
90,000 fingerprint forms have been submitted and processed.
The NRC and Agreement States are jointly developing new materials
security regulatory requirements that reflect the experience gained
through implementation of the increased controls and fingerprinting
requirements. Draft regulatory text was made available for public
review on Regulations.gov and we expect a proposed rule to be published
in the Federal Register for public comment by early 2010.
strategy for the security and use of cesium chloride sources
In 2006, the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force
provided the President and Congress a report, as mandated by the Energy
Policy Act of 2005. One of the key recommendations in the report
focuses on the security of radioactive sources containing cesium
chloride in a highly dispersible form. Since that time, there have been
a number of recent Federal studies to assess options for the continued
use of cesium chloride as the chemical form for radioactive cesium-137
sources. Cesium chloride is a salt that is sealed into a welded, doubly
encapsulated stainless steel capsule, and used to irradiate blood and
tissue, conduct bio-medical and materials science research, and
calibrate emergency response radiation detection equipment. Cesium
chloride has long received increased attention from both a safety and
security perspective because of its potential dispersibility if removed
from the irradiator and the source capsule, which could spread
radioactivity. Approximately 550 licensees in the United States possess
about 1,100 self-contained cesium chloride irradiators. These devices
contain a Category 1 or 2 quantity of cesium-137 as defined by the IAEA
Code of Conduct. The NRC's and Agreement States' increased controls and
fingerprinting requirements have been implemented for all of these
devices.
In February 2008, the National Academies issued a report on Source
Use and Replacement that emphasized replacement technologies should be
considered for cesium chloride because the National Academies
considered this radioactive source a greater concern under certain
attack scenarios than others based on its dispersibility, solubility,
penetrating radiation, source activity, and presence in population
centers across the country. In light of multiple views on alternative
technologies and replacement, NRC convened a public workshop on
September 29-30, 2008, to obtain input on the use and potential phase-
out of cesium chloride. The workshop had 210 participants and we
received 141 written comments after the workshop. We also asked NRC's
Advisory Committee on Medical Uses of Isotopes (ACMUI) to complete a
study comparing cesium chloride blood irradiation to other
technologies, particularly X-ray irradiation.
In light of the various stakeholder comments, the ACMUI study, and
its own analyses, NRC concluded that near-term replacement of cesium
chloride sources or devices in existing blood, research, and
calibration irradiators is not practicable and would be
disproportionately detrimental to the delivery of medical care, the
continuity of longstanding research, and the provision of emergency
response capabilities. Therefore, NRC believes it is imperative to
develop a viable alternative technology and a disposal option for these
sources before considering a phase-out.
Research to develop an alternative chemical form for large activity
cesium-137 sealed sources could provide a pathway to long-term phase-
out of these sources in favor of those with diminished utility in a
radiation dispersal device. While it is not the NRC's role to conduct
such research, we are engaging our Federal partners in efforts to
identify a lead agency or agencies to conduct research and/or to
provide incentives to facilitate development of alternative chemical
forms for cesium-137. Because all cesium-137 chloride is currently
produced at one facility overseas and given the extensive use of
irradiators outside of the United States, international engagement and
cooperative efforts towards exploring new international standards for
such sources are a necessary part of any long-term solution.
The NRC and Agreement States, along with the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, are working in
close cooperation with the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration's (NNSA) voluntary program to install hardware
improvements that are retrofitted to existing irradiators and
incorporated into the designs of newly manufactured irradiators. These
modifications to enhance security extend beyond current regulatory
requirements. Also, these efforts are often complemented by expert
security guidance to licensees (called assist visits) and table-top
exercises with a view towards sharing best practices.
The NRC is continuing to work with Federal, State, and
international partners to assess the risk environment and to encourage
further technological developments for alternative forms of cesium-137.
The increased controls required by the NRC and Agreement States and
implemented by licensees, along with voluntary additional facility and
device hardening measures, have significantly improved the security of
these sources.
national source tracking system
NRC has maintained an Interim Inventory of Nationally Tracked
Sources since 2004, which was an annual accounting of licensees
authorized to possess Category 1 and 2 sources. The Energy Policy Act
of 2005 included a provision for the National Source Tracking System
(NSTS), which supersedes the interim inventory. The NSTS is a secure,
Web-based database that is readily accessible to appropriate personnel
and is designed to enhance the accountability for radioactive sources.
The NSTS directly enhances the ability of the NRC and Agreement States
to: (1) Verify legitimate ownership and use of nationally tracked
sources; (2) conduct inspections and investigations; and (3)
communicate information to other Government agencies. Since NSTS was
deployed in January of this year, all transactions involving Category 1
or 2 sources, such as manufacture, transfer, and disassembly, have been
required to be reported to this system. Over 55,000 sources are
currently tracked in the system. This greater accountability for these
sources helps strengthen the national security framework from initial
production through final disposition of these sources.
The NSTS also directly demonstrates our leadership to other
countries in applying the IAEA Code of Conduct by complying with its
recommendations to have a national registry of radioactive sources. In
the coming years, the NRC is planning to further improve the
functionality of the NSTS. We will integrate NSTS data with Nation-wide
licensing information to further enhance our capabilities to track
compliance and authorize transfers of radioactive material.
interagency cooperation and complementary efforts on radioactive source
security
The NRC has several major efforts underway with regard to U.S.
interagency coordination.
The Government-wide Radiation Source Protection and Security Task
Force, which was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, has been
one of the primary vehicles for discussing and addressing issues
relating to the security of radiation sources. This Task Force has
senior representatives from 14 Federal and State agencies that have a
role in radiation source security. In August 2006, the Task Force
delivered a report to the President and to Congress that included 10
recommendations and 18 actions, addressing areas such as alternative
technologies, cesium chloride, public communications, and the use of
better tools to identify sources of concern. Progress has been made on
each of these recommendations and actions. The next report is due to
the President and Congress in August 2010, and will provide an
integrated view of the various activities that have been completed
within the last 4 years or are underway.
DHS is responsible for convening Government Coordinating Councils
for critical infrastructure, including the nuclear sector. NRC
routinely coordinates with, and provides updates of agency activities
to, Federal partners through the Nuclear Government Coordinating
Council. Both the Agreement States and the non-Agreement States also
participate.
NRC also participates in periodic trilateral meetings with DHS and
NNSA to coordinate source security activities. These trilateral
meetings enhance coordination and awareness of each agency's activities
and initiatives regarding source security.
The activities described above demonstrate that there is a
coordinated U.S. Government approach to source security.
conclusion
The NRC recognizes the direct role that radioactive source security
plays in the agency's mission to protect public health, safety, and the
environment. NRC and Agreement State requirements serve as a firm
foundation for security that ensures that all licensees provide a
common baseline level of security that is adequate to protect public
health, safety, and the environment. The application of increased
controls, the deployment of the National Source Tracking System, and
the NRC's cooperative efforts across the Federal community have
comprehensively and significantly improved the security of radioactive
sources.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today at this hearing. I
look forward to responding to your questions.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
Captain Riggio, I would like to just ask your indulgence
and the rest of the panel and my colleagues. You know, when you
enter into someone's house, it is really important that they
welcome you there. I neglected to have the chief executive
officer, Debra Carey, greet us and would like to do so at this
time.
So, Ms. Carey, would you please join us here?
Ms. Carey. Good morning. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
So I just wanted to take a minute. You are already very
much into a very, very important topic, in terms of the
emerging threats, cybersecurity, and science and technology. It
was kind of a test to see if I could remember the subcommittee.
But I would also like to welcome the Honorable Congressman
Lungren, the Honorable Congresswoman Sanchez, and the Honorable
Congresswoman Richardson. Welcome so much to Brooklyn.
Definitely, we are so pleased to have you here at SUNY
Downstate Medical Center.
I will not take but a second, really, because it is a very
important topic here and I don't want to delay the subcommittee
hearing any longer, but we are so pleased that you have chosen
us to actually have the hearing here, because we are in a
unique position because not only are we an educational
institution, which many of you know us as a college of
medicine, but basically we are also a hospital, which is what I
run. So, therefore, we are a user of radiological materials. We
also clearly are responders. You have one of our outstanding
members of our faculty and the leader of our disaster
preparedness efforts here at the hospital and the campus, Dr.
Arquilla, who is one of the witnesses. But, also, we have a
special goal and mission of protecting the community.
So all of this is so relevant for us. What we want to thank
you for is coming and making us a partner in this. Anything
that we can do to facilitate and help, such as this, having
hearings, even having other public hearings, we are more than
happy to provide the location. So, again, thank you so much,
and I hope it is a wonderful hearing.
Thank you.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Ms. Carey. We appreciate your
hospitality and lending us of your faculty and facilities here.
We are going to return now to our proceedings with Captain
Riggio of the New York Police Department.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MICHAEL RIGGIO, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION,
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Riggio. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Lungren, Ms. Sanchez, Ms. Richardson. Good morning. Welcome to
Brooklyn.
As the Chairwoman said, my name is Michael Riggio. I am the
commanding officer of the NYPD's CBRNE--Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives--Countermeasures Section.
On behalf of Deputy Commissioner Richard Falkenrath, our
commissioner for counterterrorism, I thank you, and I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you this morning.
At the NYPD, as you probably know, we are proactively
engaged in a multifaceted approach to combating terrorism; that
being nuclear threats and radiological threats, as well. We
dedicate a variety of resources to combating those, which
include personnel, technology, training, and equipment. In
speaking of terms that we are here for, we do a variety of
things to combat the threat of an RDD and that of an IND as
well.
The Counterterrorism Division began conducting radioactive/
radiological source security assessments in 2003. Those efforts
quickly progressed as we were preparing for the Republican
National Convention here in the city in the summer of 2004.
The Department, the Counterterrorism Division, in
cooperation with the New York City Department of Health, the
NRC, and the Department of Energy, began conducting numerous
security vulnerability assessments at several facilities here
in New York City that contained high-consequence radioactive
sources. These assessments revealed to us that a large amount
of these sources were stored at medical facilities.
As a result of these assessments, recommendations were made
to enhance the security posture at each of these facilities.
After the Republican National Convention and as a result of the
NRC's increased controls imposed on Agreement States in 2005,
the Division began working with many of the city's medical and
industrial facilities to work on hardening and securing.
Today, the Division, as a stand-alone unit and in
partnership with the New York City Department of Health, we
conduct vulnerability assessments and do security
recommendations to approximately 100 facilities here in the
city.
In the summer of 2006, NYPD began working with the
Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection
Division on a multi-State program called Securing the Cities.
As was mentioned earlier, the goal of the Securing the Cities
program is to create an architectural framework, a foundation
in and around New York City and this region to interdict an RDD
or IND or the materials that are used to assemble such devices.
The NYPD has 12 principal partners in the Securing the
Cities program, which represents over 150 law enforcement
agencies across three States: New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut.
The Securing the Cities partners realize that, while New
York City remains the top terrorist target, planning,
preoperational surveillance, and bomb making will likely occur
outside of New York City in these partners' jurisdictions. For
this reason, the New York-area Securing the Cities program has
greatly enhanced the detection and interdiction capabilities of
the States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut by
providing local law enforcement agencies with several thousand
pieces of radiological interdiction/detection equipment, which
is deployed in the tri-State area daily.
To do its part, we, the New York City Police Department,
deploy over 1,000 radiological detection and interdiction
assets on a daily basis. They are deployed by routine patrol
officers, specialized patrol officers, and those on assignments
in strategic locations. They include the use of checkpoints,
chokepoints, mobile detection systems, handheld detection
systems, and personal radiological detection systems.
Within the Securing the Cities program, there are six
subcommittees that help run day-to-day operations, each of them
with a specific measure of how do we interdict a radiological
device.
One of those such subcommittees, the Source Security
Subcommittee, is specifically dedicated to ensuring that
facilities that use or store materials within the New York
region are visited and surveyed. The goal is to ensure that
source security is conducted regionally and that a consistent
security posture exists within the region for all locations
where radiological sources of concern are located.
Additionally, the NYPD ensures a high level of security for
those radioactive sources that are moving through or within the
city. Our Operations Division is tasked with making sure that
we have uniformed personnel assigned to cover these
deployments, which include vehicle escorts, plain-clothed and
uniformed officers on the scene.
The NYPD conducts several counterterrorism deployments on a
daily basis. These deployments all have a radiological
interdiction component to them. They include critical response
vehicles, Operation Hercules, Operation TORCH, and radiological
chokepoints. These deployments consist of multiple vehicles on
a daily basis, at least 75, that go to many of the city's
critical locations.
In addition, the Operation Hercules and the Operation TORCH
use ESU officers with heavy weapons and tactical gear, combined
with K-9 officers, to sensitive locations and transportation
hubs. Many of the personnel involved in these deployments have
personal radiation detection devices on them.
Additionally, we set up several radiological chokepoints
daily throughout locations in the city for the purpose of
choking traffic down to one lane and screening every vehicle
that goes by.
Recently, an industrial radiograph which possessed a
radioactive source was reported missing from an industrial
radiography company located in one of the city's five boroughs.
This type of device and others like it which are inside these
facilities are used to inspect metals and light alloys for
structural defects.
Members of the NYPD and the FBI conducted an investigation
into the missing device. The device, which was ultimately found
and returned, was found to be during the course of interviews
that were conducted--it was claimed by some employees in this
industry that these devices are often removed after-hours for
personal matters.
While the NYPD at this point cannot confirm how widespread
this practice is, it should be noted that the insider threat
poses a great risk to the security of this industry. The NYPD
is currently working with the New York State Department of
Health to investigate this matter further and remedy it.
Finally, the NYPD supports any efforts to increase and
toughen the NRC's regulation and oversight authority to ensure
that every facility in this great Nation that handles
radiological sources is as tightly monitored and secured as
those here in New York City.
While we, the New York City Police Department, never take a
moment off to prevent an attack here in New York City, we have
no ability to prevent the theft of dangerous radiological and
nuclear materials at facilities and locations that are outside
of our control. We hope that the NYPD's efforts will serve as a
model for other cities.
Members of the committee, I thank you for your time. I
apologize; the red light has been on for a little while.
[The statement of Mr. Riggio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Riggio
September 14, 2009
Good morning Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, and Members
of the House Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology. My name is Captain
Michael Riggio, and I am the Commanding Officer of the NYPD
Counterterrorism Bureau's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Section. On behalf of Dr. Richard Falkenrath, the New York City
Police Department's Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism, I am
grateful for this opportunity to address you.
The NYPD is proactively engaged in a multi-faceted approach to
protecting the city from terrorism, including radiological and nuclear
terrorism. The NYPD has dedicated a variety of resources to combating
the threat posed by radiological sources and radiological and nuclear
weapons, including: Personnel, technology, equipment, and training. We
are particularly concerned with two threats: Radiological dispersal
devices (RDD), such as ``dirty bombs'', and improvised nuclear devices
(IND).
background and beginnings
The NYPD's Counterterrorism Division began conducting radiological
source security assessments in 2003. Those efforts quickly progressed
as the city prepared for the Republican National Convention in the
summer of 2004. The NYPD, in partnership with the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the Department of Energy, and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), conducted security
vulnerability assessments of several facilities that contained high-
consequence radioactive sources. These assessments revealed that large
amounts of materials were stored in New York City hospitals and medical
research facilities. Most of these sources were in moderately secure
locations and were used for medical therapy (e.g., oncology, X-rays,
and sterilization of blood supplies, etc.). As a result of these
assessments, recommendations were made to enhance the security posture
of each facility.
After the Republican National Convention, and as a result of the
NRC's Increased Controls (IC) imposed on Agreement States in 2005, the
Counterterrorism Division began working with many of the city's medical
and industrial facilities that have radiological sources that meet the
IC's quantity threshold. Today, the Counterterrorism Division, as a
stand-alone unit and in partnership with the New York City Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene, conducts site surveys and provides
security recommendations to almost 100 facilities within the city of
New York. These security recommendations include, among other things:
Limiting access to rooms that contain equipment with radiological
sources by requiring a personal code or key card; and monitoring access
with CCTV cameras and other access-tracking technology.
securing the cities
In the summer of 2006, the NYPD began working with the Department
of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) on a
multi-state regional partnership called Securing the Cities. The goal
of the Securing the Cities program is to create a layered architectural
framework, or foundation, in and around the city of New York to detect
and interdict an RDD, an IND, or the radiological materials needed to
assemble such devices. The NYPD has 12 principle partners in this
effort, representing over 150 agencies, in three States--New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut.
The Securing the Cities partners realize that while New York City
remains a top target for terrorist groups, planning, pre-operational
surveillance, and bomb-making may occur outside of the city, in partner
jurisdictions.
For this reason, the New York Area Securing the Cities program has
greatly enhanced the detection and interdiction capabilities of the
States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, providing local law
enforcement agencies with thousands of pieces of radiological detection
and interdiction equipment. This equipment is deployed daily by
personnel in the tri-State area.
To do its part, the NYPD deploys over 1,000 radiological detection
and interdiction assets on a daily basis. These assets are deployed by
patrol officers performing routine duties, specialized duties, and
those on assignment at strategic locations. We use checkpoints,
chokepoints, mobile detection systems, and handheld detection.
Within the Securing the Cities program, there are six subcommittees
that help run day-to-day operations, each of which oversees an
important aspect of the radiological interdiction mission. The ``Source
Security Subcommittee'' is specifically dedicated to ensuring that
facilities that use or store radiological materials within the New York
region are visited and surveyed. The goal is to ensure that source
security is conducted regionally, and that a consistent security
posture exists within the region for all locations where radiological
sources of concern are located. This subcommittee is also preparing a
best-practices document to ensure that consistent and easily identified
standards are instituted and practiced within the region.
source movement
Additionally, the NYPD ensures that a high level of security is
maintained during the movement of sources of concern. The NYPD's
Operations Division is notified any time a radiological source is being
transported into or through New York City. The Operations Division
coordinates the Department's response and patrol deployments during
these transports. This may include vehicle escorts and uniformed and
plainclothes on-scene security.
counterterrorism strategic deployments
The NYPD conducts several counterterrorism deployments on a daily
basis. They include: Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) surges; Operation
Hercules; Operation Transit Operational Response Canine Heavy Weapons
(TORCH); and Radiological Chokepoints.
A CRV deployment consists of over 75 marked police cars on a single
tour of duty that deploy to sensitive locations based on daily
intelligence. This deployment is highly flexible so that personnel can
be redeployed during operations as events unfold locally and globally.
The supervisors who oversee these deployments are all equipped with
personal radiation detection devices.
Operation Hercules deploys Emergency Services Unit (ESU) officers
with heavy weapons and tactical gear, canine officers, highway patrol
officers, and detectives from the NYPD Intelligence Division, to
sensitive locations throughout the city on a daily basis. Similarly,
Operation TORCH deploys ESU officers with heavy weapons and tactical
gear, canine officers, and a counterterrorism liaison officer, to the
city's critical transportation hubs. Each of the ESU officers involved
in these deployments is equipped with a personal radiation detector,
and some are trained to use advanced radiation detection equipment.
Finally, radiological chokepoints are set up to interdict
radiological sources at several locations throughout the city each day.
At these chokepoints, uniformed personnel operate advanced detection
vehicles and equipment. They also scan each vehicle that passes through
a single lane of traffic at approximately 5 miles per hour. At all of
these deployments, all alarms are investigated and resolved.
recently discovered vulnerability
Recently, an industrial radiograph, which possessed a radioactive
source, was reported missing from an industrial radiography company
located in one of the city's five boroughs. This type of device is used
to inspect metals and light alloys for structural defects. Members of
the NYPD and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force conducted an
investigation into the missing device. The device was ultimately
returned to the company. In the course of interviews conducted during
the investigation, it was claimed that some employees in this industry
remove these devices after hours.
While the NYPD cannot confirm how widespread this practice is, it
should be noted that the insider threat presents a security risk to the
industry. The NYPD is currently working with the New York State
Department of Health to investigate this incident and to develop
strategies that will help prevent this from happening again.
conclusion
Finally, the New York City Police Department supports any efforts
to increase and toughen the NRC's regulations and oversight authority
to ensure that every facility in the United States that handles
radioactive sources is as tightly monitored and secure as those in New
York City. While we never stop working to prevent an attack within New
York City, we have no ability to prevent the theft of dangerous
radiological and nuclear materials at facilities and locations that are
outside of our jurisdiction. We hope that the NYPD's efforts to secure
radiological sources will serve as a model for other cities.
Members of the Committee on Homeland Security and the Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, I thank
you for your time this morning and I look forward to working with you
to protect our country from radiological and nuclear threats. Thank
you.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. You had a very compelling testimony.
We appreciate that, Captain.
Mr. Miskin.
STATEMENT OF GENE MISKIN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RADIOLOGICAL
HEALTH, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE
Mr. Miskin. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman and distinguished
Members of the committee. I am pleased to have this opportunity
to discuss the efforts the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene in conjunction with its Federal, State, and
local partners have made to ensure the security of radioactive
materials in the city.
As mentioned, New York State is an Agreement State, but it
is unique in that there are three regulatory agencies in the
State that are responsible for the agreement, one of which is
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in the city.
The department's regulatory oversight of radioactive
materials allows it to expand upon Federal security
requirements and foster on-going working relationships among
the regulative community, the NYPD, and other first-responder
agencies. This collaboration could serve as a National model
for how to approach radioactive material security.
The department has taken a comprehensive approach to
improving security for both large and small quantities of
radioactive material. We work cooperatively with the NYPD to
address law enforcement aspects of security, along with the
public health and safety issues involved.
The department also works with the regulative community,
providing information on best practices for security by
bringing in highly trained experts from outside of the
regulatory environment. This approach takes general security
requirements and makes them specific to individual licensed
facilities.
I will highlight now the department's oversight of
compliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission initiatives
and our efforts to augment and support Federal regulatory
framework.
We instituted the Increased Control Program in 2005 by
issuing commissioner's orders to facilities that met the
criteria for increased controls. We did our first round of IC
inspections, completed by 2007, and currently are on our third
round of IC inspections, almost completed.
For the fingerprinting requirement under section 652 of the
Energy Policy Act, we informed our licensees, our IC licensees,
that we would be making rulemaking and including that language
in our health code for the city and gave them a heads-up, told
them it was coming. By October 2008, the Board of Health had
approved that language, and it is now sitting in our
regulations.
In December 2008, we issued 39 license amendments to those
facilities that had sources that fit reporting requirements for
the National Source Tracking System.
So the department has had substantial and timely compliance
with these Federal regulatory mandates dealing with security of
radioactive materials, but we have developed several important
local initiatives that support and augment these requirements.
Using Department of Homeland Security Urban Area Security
Initiatives and CDCBT grants, plus using city tax levy funds,
the department has developed and is in the testing phase of its
New York City Radiation Data System, or NYCRADDS. The system
serves as a single data repository for all activities dealing
with ionizing radiation in the city. One part of NYCRADDS is an
almost real-time inventory of all radioactive material located
at our various licensees' facilities. Licensees report using a
secure website and include radionuclides on hand, the
activities of these radionuclides, and their specific location
on-site.
In 2004, the department, with the assistance of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, visited seven large licensees
to assess security programs in place and then to make
recommendations for security updates. The effort was well-
received by our licensees and indicated the value of expanding
these reviews to other licensees. The Department of Homeland
Security then provided a grant to the department to widen the
security assessment visits, and we contracted with Brookhaven
National Laboratory to support our efforts.
The review team itself was comprised of a department staff
person, an NYPD officer from the counterterrorism bureau, a
private security specialist, and a health physicist from
Brookhaven. This project has provided detailed security
assessments to 80 licensed facilities in the city. Twenty of
these facilities included increased control facilities, and 60
that did not meet the IC radioactive requirements but had
various amounts of radioactive material on-site.
All licensees received radioactive material security self-
audit checklists, training materials for security staff, and
guidance representing radioactive material security best
practices. The department is working with Brookhaven to
complete a written guidance document, ``Best Practices for the
Security of Radioactive Materials,'' and will distribute it to
most of our 360 licensed facilities.
In 2007, the department conducted a training session for
the radiation safety officers of our large facilities on the
use of the NYCRADDS radioactive material inventory website.
Testing of this system is almost complete, and the final
training package is being prepared for the remainder of our
licensees.
In 2008, the department participated in a pilot project
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security in which three
of our hospital licensees had security enhancements made to
their cesium-137 irradiators. On April 1, 2008, the department
hosted a symposium entitled, ``Radiation Security: Preventing
Radioactive Materials from Getting Out and Preventing
Radioactive Contamination from Getting In.'' There were 110
attendees, including radiation safety officers, security
personnel, the NYPD, and FDNY.
In conclusion, the department has made and continues to
make the security of all radioactive materials in the city a
high priority. The regulatory and nonregulatory approaches we
have taken have resulted in improved security at all of our
licensed facilities and have reduced the probability, we feel,
of domestic radiological threat from materials that are used in
this city.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to let you know what
we are doing, and I will be happy to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Miskin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gene Miskin
September 14, 2009
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the efforts the
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (the department),
in conjunction with its Federal, State, and local partner agencies, has
made to ensure the security of radiological materials.
The department plays a unique role in regulating radiological
sources. New York City is one of only a few cities that have direct
regulatory oversight of nearly all radiological sources. New York State
is an Agreement State, which means that the State and the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have entered into an agreement
under the former Atomic Energy Act to delegate authority to New York
State (NYS) to regulate radioactive material at non-reactor sites
within its jurisdiction. The New York State Agreement comprises three
regulatory programs--administered by the New York State Department of
Health, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, and
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Under this
structure, the department, through the Office of Radiological Health
(ORH), regulates radioactive material for medical, research, and
academic purposes within the five boroughs of the city. The
department's regulatory requirements for radioactive material are
contained in Article 175 of the New York City Health Code.
The department has taken a comprehensive approach to improving
security for both large and small quantities of radioactive materials.
First, the department is responsible for regulating the public health
and safety aspects related to the use of radioactive materials. This
includes all non-exempt radioactive materials, not just materials in
quantities of concern. Second, the department works cooperatively with
the New York Police Department (NYPD) to address law enforcement
aspects of security and public safety. Third, the department works
cooperatively with the regulated community, providing information on
best practices and facilitating access to highly-trained experts
outside the regulatory environment.
The department's regulatory oversight of radiological materials
allows it to expand upon Federal requirements and foster on-going
working relationships among the regulated community, the NYPD, and
other first responders; this collaboration could serve as a National
model for how to approach radioactive materials security. While placing
appropriate priority upon resources and efforts to secure the
facilities with the highest-risk materials, New York City's approach
has been to take a more expansive view of potential risks and provide
multiple avenues to help the regulated community to understand the
measures it can take to properly secure radioactive material.
In addition to inspecting the regulated communities for compliance
with Federal standards, the department has developed new systems to
track the location, quantities, and types of radiological materials
located in New York City; provided local facilities with access to
security experts to evaluate their security measures; and sponsored
symposia and educational forums for the regulated community and first
responders. By ensuring regulatory compliance as well as augmenting the
best industry practices for physical security, we can reduce the risk
of criminal activity involving any amount of radioactive material.
I will now highlight critical aspects of the department's oversight
of compliance with NRC-required security initiatives and efforts to
augment and support the Federal regulatory framework:
nrc required security initiatives
Increased Control
In 2005, the NRC required that Agreement States initiate the
Increased Control (IC) requirements for their licensees that have
certain radionuclides in quantities of concern. The department
identified 32 facilities representing 47 licenses that met this
criterion or could meet the criterion based on the limits on
radiological materials in their licenses. On October 20, 2005, the
department held a meeting to educate and inform its largest licensees
about IC requirements. This meeting was also attended by the NYPD.
In December 2005, the department issued a Commissioner's Order to
those licensees meeting the NRC's criterion to institute the Increased
Controls (IC) by June of 2006. Since that time, the number of licensees
subject to the IC requirements has been reduced to 20 facilities
because some either legally disposed of radioactive materials or
amended their licenses to reduce their possession limits for the
radionuclides of concern.
In preparation for the expanded inspection of IC facilities, three
department staff members attended an NRC-sponsored IC training in 2006.
In compliance with NRC inspection mandates, the department inspected
all of the facilities required to meet the IC requirements. These
inspections, performed jointly with the NYPD Counter Terrorism
Division, were completed by March 2007. The second round of joint IC
inspections was completed by August 2008, and the NYPD also
participated in these inspections. The third round of IC inspections is
under way, and the department is well ahead of NRC time frames.
The department's inspections indicated that while all facilities
inspected were in substantial compliance with the NRC's IC
requirements, violations--either of rules and regulations or of
security requirements in need of upgrading--were found in about 25
percent of inspected facilities.
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Check Requirements
The NRC also requires fingerprinting and criminal background checks
for all individuals with unescorted access to radioactive materials in
quantities of concern, under authority granted by Section 652 of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct). Criminal histories obtained from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation are used, along with other factors, to
determine whether these individuals should continue to have such
access. The NRC has imposed this fingerprinting requirement upon all
licensees who are subject to Increased Controls, including Agreement
State Licensees. Background checks were to be completed by June 2,
2008.
On April 25, 2008 the department's Office of Radiological Health
advised its IC licensees of this requirement, and that we would be
initiating appropriate rule-making to include it in Article 175 of the
New York City Health Code. In September, 2008, the NYC Board of Health
approved the addition of the fingerprinting language to Article 175,
and it became effective in October, 2008.
While the department's inspections have found that all facilities
have made substantial progress toward compliance with the
fingerprinting requirements, many facilities require improvement in
documentation.
National Source Tracking System
NRC initially deployed the National Source Tracking System (NSTS)
in December 2008 to track the deployment of Category 1 and 2 sealed
sources from cradle to grave. Category 1 and 2 sealed sources are
listed in 10 CFR 20 Appendix E. Agreement State licensees are required
to use the system to report inventories of these sealed sources
directly to NRC and to update the inventories as needed. The department
issued 39 license amendments to licensees that possessed these
categories of sealed sources, requiring them to use the NSTS for
reporting purposes, between March and June 2009.
Overall, we find substantial compliance with Federal regulatory
mandates, but we have developed several important local initiatives
that support and augment the Federal regulatory framework, which I will
now describe.
new york city department of health and mental hygiene security
initiatives
The department has initiated a series of efforts that support and
augment the Federal regulatory framework for ensuring the security of
radioactive materials, as briefly described at the opening of my
statement. I will highlight several of these efforts.
NYCRADDS
Using Federal grant monies from the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention and city tax levy funds, the department is developing the
New York City Radiation Data System (NYCRADDS). The system serves as a
single repository of all licensing, permitting, inspectional activity
and radioactive materials inventory in New York City. Included in
NYCRADDS is the ability for a facility, through a secure website, to
report radionuclides on hand, their activities, and specific on-site
locations of the material. Facilities are requested to make quarterly
reports so that it is a near real-time inventory of radioactive
material in New York City that can be shared with our partner local,
State, and Federal agencies as needed.
Grant-funded Security Reviews of New York City Hospitals
In 2004, with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the department visited seven IC facilities in New York
City, and made recommendations for security upgrades to the licensees.
The results of these visits indicated the value of expanding these
reviews to other licensees. DHS provided a grant to the department to
widen the security assessment visits and we contracted with Brookhaven
National Laboratory to support our efforts. A security review team
consisting of a staff person from the department, an NYPD officer from
the Counter Terrorism Bureau, a private security specialist, and a
health physicist from Brookhaven National Laboratory, visited licensed
facilities. This project provided detailed security assessments to 80
facilities, including 20 licenses that are required to comply with the
Increased Controls. In addition to the on-site consultations performed,
licensees were also given a Radioactive Materials Self Audit Checklist
to use for self audits, training materials for security staff, and
written guidance representing radioactive materials security best
practices. The department is presently working with Brookhaven National
Laboratory to complete a written guidance document Best Practices for
the Security of Radioactive Materials, and will distribute this
guidance to all or most of the approximately 360 licensed facilities in
New York City.
DOHMH Sponsored Meetings and Symposia
In September 2007, the department conducted a training session for
the radiation safety officers of our larger facilities on use of the
NYCRADDS Radioactive Materials Inventory website. Testing of this
system is almost complete, and a final training package is being
prepared for the remainder of our licensees.
In 2008, the department participated in a pilot project sponsored
by DHS in which three of our hospital licensees had security
enhancements made to their Cesium-137 irradiators.
On April 1, 2008, the department hosted a symposium entitled
``Radiation Security: Preventing Radioactive Materials from Getting Out
and Preventing Radioactive Contamination from Getting In.'' There were
110 attendees, including radiation safety officers, security personnel,
NYPD, and FDNY. The purpose of the symposium, funded by the DHS Urban
Areas Security Initiative, was twofold: (1) To reiterate the security
requirements for those institutions subject to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's Increased Controls Program; and, (2) to provide
an update and highlight best practices of a department grant-funded
program that provided participating hospitals with area monitors
capable of detecting radioactively-contaminated persons entering their
facilities. NYPD's Counter Terrorism Bureau discussed protocols to be
followed in the event of equipment alarms going off. The department
plans to pursue additional Federal funding for future programs dealing
with security and detection of radioactive materials in the city.
Non-regulatory Approaches To Augment Federal Regulatory Efforts
The department has initiated non-regulatory reviews of security
efforts at IC and non-IC facilities, providing facilities with access
to a team made up of a regulator, a physical security expert, an NYPD
officer, and a specialist in radiation protection. This effort has
provided direct assistance and educational materials to foster the
development of best practices among facilities managing smaller
quantities of radiological materials of concern, such as research labs
that are not required to meet enhanced Federal security mandates. The
department believes that the incorporation of non-IC facilities into
its security efforts is critically important to ensure the security of
radioactive materials in New York City.
By conducting these visits outside the regulatory process, the
department gained voluntary access to these facilities, and could
facilitate improvements at many IC and non-IC facilities in New York
City. These detailed on-site evaluations employed a graded approach to
security for these materials, which helped facilities identify
typically inexpensive physical security upgrades and/or changes to
administrative procedures. For example, the department has developed a
best practices manual that provides easy-to-follow security check-
lists, which facilities can use to evaluate their own security measures
and to self-identify enhancements.
The department has emphasized reducing vulnerabilities by
increasing controls and administrative improvements, such as improved
access control, background checks, enhanced material control and
accountability, coordination with local law enforcement agencies,
proper display of picture identification badges, background checks for
unescorted access to materials, key control and accountability, and
discontinued dual use of space for radioactive sources. The
department's approach has resulted in documented improvements in
controls, and has had a positive influence on facilities with both
high-activity and low-activity radioactive sources.
In conclusion, the department believes that its strategic vision,
employing an asystematic approach, has reduced the probability of
domestic radiological threat from materials used in New York City.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the department's
radioactive materials security initiatives. I will be pleased to answer
any questions you may have.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Miskin.
Dr. Arquilla.
STATEMENT OF BONNIE ARQUILLA, DIRECTOR OF DISASTER
PREPAREDNESS, SUNY DOWNSTATE MEDICAL CENTER
Dr. Arquilla. I would like to thank the committee for
inviting me to speak. My background is in emergency medicine,
with an emphasis on disaster preparedness at SUNY Downstate
Medical Center. We have created a number of guidelines and
full-scale exercise drills to examine disaster preparedness. As
an emergency medicine physician, I do clinical work at
University Hospital-Brooklyn and Kings County Medical Center.
The two hospital facilities I mentioned on Clarkson Avenue
see the majority of patients in central Brooklyn. We have a
special research interest in vulnerable populations, such as
pediatrics and geriatrics. Obviously, my primary viewpoint is
around the preparations that hospitals can make to provide
better care for the neighborhoods they serve in addition to
hospital care of the sick or injured.
We are also acutely aware that we are the safety net for
disaster relief in central Brooklyn and New York City. So what
would happen if there were a dirty bomb, a nuclear explosion or
covert release of radiological material? Database and exercises
we at SUNY have conducted in collaboration with other
organizations tell us that we are not adequately prepared to
respond to the expected overwhelming influx of patients seeking
medical evaluation and assurances. However, it must be noted
that most of these patients would not be at immediate medical
risk.
For the purposes of this testimony I have been asked to
address the following issues: A basic review of radiation; a
few scenarios where the population might be exposed to
radiation; acute medical issues around radiation exposure; the
response framework established at SUNY, while identifying
important gaps; and the necessity of securing potential
radiation sources.
For the interest of time, although I submitted it in
writing, the basic review of radiation I will skip at this
time.
Scenarios where the population might be exposed to
radiation: While most us are familiar with dirty bombs, another
type of attack, the ``I-cubed''--for ingestion, inhalation, and
immersion--these attacks are not accompanied with a flash and
bang.
Fortunately, it is hard to kill a lot of people with an
ingestion attack. Contaminating a reservoir or even a water
main is ineffective because radioactivity is quickly diluted.
However, the population knowing that an attempt has been made
may be enough to create a disaster. This is an important issue
that should have Government attention. Training and education
and risk communication must be better to help our population
better cope with their fears.
An inhalation attack, sometimes called a smoky bomb, uses
radioisotopes that can be burned, vaporized, or aerosolized in
a confined space to contaminate the air. The subway, for
example, is an ideal location. The population inhales the
contaminated air, with the effect of either killing quickly by
radiation poisoning or slowly by causing cancer.
Obviously, this type of event detection is an area of
importance, but it is not enough simply to detect and measure;
we need a health care workforce that is trained to manage this
type of exposure. I refer to Dr. Steven Becker's work. He shows
a lack of understanding by many emergency department physicians
of radiologic events and effects.
An immersion attack, or radioactive spray of hazardous
material, is also very dangerous, because people wipe their
faces and transfer the isotope to their mouth.
In a dirty bomb attack, health care workers are more
concerned about the actual explosion rather than the
radioactive effects of the blast. Blast injuries themselves
kill more people and cause greater morbidity than the release
of a nuclear agent.
Delays brought about by the need for screening of a
hysterical population seeking to see if they are okay can wreak
havoc on the system. Look at last spring with the flu. Many
people presented for evaluation to either their private
physician's offices or hospitals just wanted to be sure that
they either had the swine flu or not. Under regular
circumstances, they would not have sought medical attention,
and especially not emergency care. The hospitals in New York
City were overwhelmed with ambulatory patients seeking
reassurances.
The most important indicator of exposure of a patient is
the time of onset of symptoms following irradiation. Vomiting
within 2 to 4 hours is an indication of high-dose radiation.
This is an emergency consideration. The greatest potential
morbidity can be determined by the symptoms, where the patient
was, the time of onset of symptoms, the point or source of
contamination, what is the isotope--alpha, beta, or gamma--and
length of exposure, external, and/or internal contamination.
The initial symptoms of acute radiation sickness include
redness of skin, nausea, vomiting, and depressed white blood
cell count. These are the effects we worry about predominantly
for first responders and in major accidents with very high
levels of radiation.
The prodromal phase is the phase after exposure to
radiation with several vague, nonspecific symptoms. The latent
phase: Patients appear asymptomatic typically for 2 to 4 weeks;
then patients begin to develop infections. Usually, they
require prophylactic antibiotics, antiviral, or antifungal
agents. The illness phase is expressed by the damage to the
specific organ system and depends on the level of whole-body
exposure received by the patient.
Other effects of dirty bombs include traumatic injuries.
This is thought to be a bigger killer in the short-term. The
associated trauma that accompanies a dirty bomb attack presents
the greatest risk to our emergency departments. Prolonged
mental health problems are also an issue: Fear and panic,
demand for medical resources, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and stigmatization of those who are exposed. Often, these
mental health after-effects of an event go untreated. This is a
critical area for the Government to provide aid, focusing on
first aid, mental first aid, screening, and long-term
treatment.
The response framework established at SUNY Downstate:
Preventing unnecessary exposure is the best defense, as my
esteemed colleagues have already described. This is achieved
also after the event by personal protective equipment such as
gloves, over-garments, and respirators. Additional important
safety measures include time, limiting the time of exposure;
distance, maintaining a distance from the radioactive sources,
which in our case would be contaminated patients or their
clothing; and shielding, the use of PPE. Patients should be
screened, stripped of all clothes that may hold radiation,
showered, and rescreened.
Let me bring to your attention that I am not aware of any
hospital that has a fully trained decontamination team in
place, available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This type of
specialized work is beyond the scope of the average health care
worker. Currently, most decontamination teams are made up of
volunteers, yet most health care workers are afraid to
volunteer because they lack training.
Ideally, what is needed to rectify this situation is:
Education of radiologic events and practices for health care
workers; decontamination training for health care workers,
staff, and professionals, and with regular practice and
recertification--many of our health care workers were trained
4, 5, 6 years ago and have not had retraining since then;
Government support of the above, which includes funding.
Facility preparation and planning. I only have a second
more. Important areas every facility should really look at is,
where should the screening be done? Who should do the
screening? Who needs to be screened? Noninjured, injured, and
dead, personnel working in and around the event. Where should
the radiation screening be done? The emergency department, the
operating room, the decontamination area, the dressout areas,
and any other area where contamination might occur. Radiation
screening should also be done for personal belongings of
victims, medical instruments, equipment, and waste.
Ms. Clarke. Dr. Arquilla, can you summarize at this point?
Dr. Arquilla. Yes, that is why I turned the 3 pages.
Thanks. Sorry.
In conclusion, National Opinion Research shows from the
University of Chicago that, if a dirty bomb goes off, 65
percent of an urban population will self-evacuate without being
informed to do so by the Government. They plan on going to
emergency departments. This is 25 times the amount that we
normally see, and we are already at 100 percent of our
capacity.
As I mentioned earlier, risk communication training would
be very important. Disaster preparedness training for emergency
responders, emergency departments, and hospitals are also of
vital importance.
Thank you. I am sorry I went over.
[The statement of Dr. Arquilla follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bonnie Arquilla
assessment of preparedness in the event of a radioactive disaster
I would like to thank the committee for inviting me to speak. My
background is in Emergency Medicine with an emphasis in Disaster
Preparedness at SUNY Downstate Medical Center. We have created a number
of guidelines and full-scale exercise drills to examine disaster
preparedness. As an Emergency Medicine physician, I do clinical work at
University Hospital, Brooklyn and Kings County Hospital Center. I have
been the Director of Emergency Preparedness for both institutions since
2001. When I took over this post, it was chiefly a ``regulatory
position'' to help the hospitals with JOINT commission inspections.
With the September 11 and the anthrax terrorists attacks, that all
changed.
Globally, we saw a critical need for preparedness. Medical
professionals went about changing the culture of their hospitals;
indeed all institutions and organizations address the need for a higher
level of preparedness. It takes a generation to change cultural
attitudes and so far, with regard to disaster preparedness, we've made
good progress, but as with any ambitious goal or cultural shift,
there's still more work to be done.
The two hospital facilities I mentioned earlier on Clarkson Avenue,
see a majority of the patients in central Brooklyn. We have a special
research interest in vulnerable populations such as pediatrics and
geriatrics. Obviously, my primary viewpoint is around the preparations
that hospitals can make to provide better care for the neighborhoods
they serve, in addition to hospital care of the sick or injured. We are
also acutely aware that we are the safety net for disaster relief in
central Brooklyn and New York City . . . So what would happen if there
were a dirty bomb, a nuclear explosion, or covert release of
radioactive material?
Data based on exercises that we at SUNY have conducted in
collaboration with other organizations, tells us that we are not
adequately prepared to respond to the expected overwhelming influx of
patients seeking medical evaluation and assurances. However, it must be
noted that most of these patients would not be at immediate medical
risk!
For the purposes of this testimony I've been asked to address the
following issues and concerns:
A basic review radiation;
A few scenarios where populations might be exposed to
radiation;
Acute medical issues around radiation exposure;
The response framework established at SUNY, while
identifying important gaps;
The necessity to secure potential radiation resources.
a basic review of radiation
The following are types of non-ionizing, harmless, radiation:
Microwaves; Radio waves; Infra-red rays; Laser.
For the purposes of this inquiry, let's take a closer look at
Ionizing Radiation.
What Is Ionizing Radiation? It is the spontaneous emission of
``fragments'' or ``bundles'' of energy from unstable nuclei creating
more stable nuclei.
Ionizing radiation can rip off electrons from other atoms. It then
attacks the atoms in living cells creating free radicals that damage
our DNA. This is how it damages our cells. ``The Cell/DNA itself is
directly ionized by the radiation.'' This attack causes genetic
mutation and the cells die from necrosis.
Following are Forms of Ionizing Radiation: Alpha particles; Beta
particles; Gamma photons or gamma rays.
Alpha Particles are made up of two protons and two neutrons.
It's a helium nucleus, only with lots of kinetic energy. They are
positively charged, physically large on the atomic scale--the heaviest
and most highly charged.
Alpha Particles can normally be stopped by the dead layer of skin
on the body or a sheet of paper.
Beta Particles are high-speed electrons stripped free from their
atomic parent and sent off with kinetic energy. They are smaller and
travel much faster than Alpha Particles. They may be positively or
negatively charged.
Beta Particles can be stopped by 1 cm of plastic, wood, or paper.
Like Alpha Particles, Beta Particles can cause damage to skin and other
cells.
However, beta particles are not typically involved in acute
radiological events.
Gamma Rays are packets of energy in the form of Photons, much like
the visible light in this room, forming Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR)
of high energy. Their interaction with materials is energy dependent.
They can travel up to 1 mile in open air.
Gamma Rays are very penetrating and can pass right through the
body. They are stopped best with lead or concrete. In high
concentrations, they can penetrate to the bones and marrow and depress
production of red blood cells. This is usually the type of radiation of
most concern in disasters.
scenarios where populations might be exposed to radiation
While most of us are familiar with dirty bombs, another type of
attack is the I-cubed (for ingestion, inhalation and emersion) these
attacks are not accompanied with a flash and bang. Fortunately, it is
hard to kill a lot of people with an ingestion attack. Contaminating a
reservoir or even a water main is ineffective because the radioactivity
is quickly diluted. However, the population knowing that the attempt
has been made may be enough to create a disaster. This is an important
area that should have Government attention. Training and education in
``risk communication'' must be better, to help our population better
cope with their fears.
An inhalation attack, sometimes called a smoky bob, uses
radioisotopes that can be burned, vaporized, or aerosolized in a
confined space to contaminate the air. The subway, for example, is an
ideal location. The population inhales the contaminated air, the effect
either killing quickly by radiation poisoning, or slowly by causing
cancer. Obviously, in this type of event detection is an area of
importance, but it is not enough to simply detect and measure, we need
a health care workforce that is trained to manage this type of
exposure. Refer to Dr. Steve Becker's work. He shows a lack of
understanding by many emergency department physicians of radiological
events and effects.
An immersion attack, or radioactive spray, is hazardous because
people wipe their face and then transfer isotope to the mouth.
In a Dirty Bomb attack health workers are more concerned about the
actual explosion, rather that the radioactive effects of the blast.
Blast injuries themselves will kill more people and cause greater
morbidity than the release of the nuclear agent. Delays brought about
by the need for screening of a hysterical population, seeking to know
if they are OKAY, and wreak havoc on the system! Look at last spring
with the flu, many people who presented for evaluation to either
private physician's offices or hospitals, just wanted to be sure that
they had swine flu or did not. Under regular circumstances, they would
not have sought medical attention and especially not emergency care.
The hospitals in New York City were overwhelmed with ambulatory patents
seeing reassurances.
acute medical issues around radiation exposure
The most likely radioactive materials to be used in a terrorist
attack are cobalt, strontium, cesium, and americium. All are poorly
protected and readily available in medical, military, research, and
industrial resources.
Cobalt is used in food irradiators and americium in used in smoke
detectors and oil exploration.
Emergency Considerations
THE MOST IMPORTANT INDICATOR TO EXPOSURE OF A PATIENT IS THE TIME
OF ONSET OF VOMITING FOLLOWING IRRADIATION. Vomiting within 2 to 4
hours is an indication of a high dose of radiation.
The greatest potential morbidity can be determined by:
Symptoms?
What are they?
Time of onset?
Point Source or Contamination?
What is the isotope (alpha, beta, or gamma)?
Length of exposure?
External and/or internal contamination?
The initial symptoms to Acute Radiation Sickness include; skin
redness, nausea, vomiting, and depressed white blood cell counts. These
are the effects we worry about predominantly for first responders and
in major accidents with very high levels of radiation.
The Prodromal Phase, is the phase after exposure to radiation with
several vague, nonspecific symptoms.
In the Latent Phase patients appear asymptomatic typically for 2 to
4 weeks. Then patients begin to develop infections, usually require
prophylactic antibiotics, antiviral agents, or antifungal agents.
The Illness Phase is expressed by damage to the specific organ
system and depends on the level of ``whole body'' exposure received by
the patient.
Other effects of Dirty Bombs include Traumatic injuries. This is
thought to be a bigger killer in the short term. The associated trauma
that accompanies a Dirty Bomb attack, presents the greatest risk.
Prolonged mental health problems:
Fear/Panic;
Demand for medical resources;
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder;
Stigmatization.
Often these mental ``after effects'' of an event go untreated. This
is a critical area for the Government to provide aide, focusing on
first aid, screening, and long-term treatment.
the response framework established at suny
Preventing unnecessary exposure is the best defense! This is
achieved through Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as:
Gloves;
Over garments;
Respirators.
Additional important safety measures include:
Time--limiting the time of exposure;
Distance--maintaining a distance from radioactive sources;
Shielding--the use of PPE.
Patients should be screened, stripped of all clothes (they hold
radiation), showered, and re-screened.
Let me bring to your attention, that I am not aware of any hospital
that has a fully trained decontamination team in place and available 24
hours per day, 7 days per week. This type of specialized work is beyond
the scope of the average health care worker. Currently, most
decontamination teams are made up of volunteers. Yet, most health care
workers are afraid to volunteer, because they lack training! Ideally,
what is needed to rectify this situation is:
Education--of radiological events and practices for health
care workers;
Decontamination training for health care staff and
professionals as a regular part of their job;
Government support of the above, including funding.
Facility Preparation & Planning
Important questions every facility should ask when responding are:
Who should get radiation screening?
Patients that require monitoring and or admission to
hospital.
Non-injured, injured, dead.
Personnel working in and around the event.
Where should radiation screening be done?
ED, OR, decontamination area, dress out areas.
Any other area where contamination might occur.
What other radiation screening should be done?
Personal belongings of victims.
Medical instruments, equipment.
Waste.
How should radiation screening be handled? Or, what is the
hospital's disaster procedure?
Who will do screening?
How will screening be done?
How much equipment/PPE is needed to fulfill this mission?
Additional planning considerations:
Pressure on normal ER staff;
Press coverage;
Psychological reaction of patients, public, and hospital
staff;
Prioritize areas, facilities, and equipment to be recovered:
What is needed ASAP?
What can wait?
Establish a checklist for recovery.
the necessity to secure potential radiation resources
Once radioactive materials are no longer needed and the costs of
appropriate disposal are high, security measures become lax, and the
likelihood of abandonment or theft increases. We need to allocate funds
for the safe disposal and storage of our radioactive materials.
In conclusion, the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago reports that, ``In the event of a dirty bomb
explosion 65 percent of urban residents expect that they would evacuate
after learning from the media that a dirty bomb has exploded, but
without receiving any directive or information regarding the event from
local government officials.'' Alarmingly, current guidelines say that
people who received more that 25 times the threshold dose for
evacuation would have to be taken into medical supervision. This would
be an overwhelming number of people to evaluate and then follow for at
least 25 years.
As I mentioned earlier, most medical facilities are simply not
equipped to handle the large influx of ``potential'' patients who
require reassurances. Our best defense against the effects of an I-
cubed attack is to inform and educate the populace regarding their risk
as soon after the attack as possible. Additionally, medical personnel
and facilities should be prepared to deal with the specifics of such an
attack. Currently, they are not. This can only be achieved through
disaster preparedness training, the need for which cannot be
overemphasized. It is my hope that the Homeland Security committee
considers disaster preparedness training as part of their defense
strategy in managing our country's safety against terrorists' attacks.
Thank you.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Mr. Aloise from GAO.
STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Aloise. Gene Aloise from GAO. Thank you, Madame
Chairwoman.
Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lungren, and Members of
the subcommittee, we are pleased to be here today to discuss
how well-prepared we are as a Nation to recover from attacks
using dirty bombs or an improvised nuclear device, otherwise
known as an IND.
A terrorist's use of a dirty bomb or IND could have
devastating consequences. Responding to such attacks is
different than recovering from them. Response would include
immediate actions as evacuations and providing medical
treatment. Recovery includes cleaning up radioactive
contamination from an attack so that people can return to their
homes and businesses. Importantly, being prepared to recover
from these attacks may even provide an element of deterrence if
an adversary perceives less potential for lasting harm.
My remarks today will focus on Federal planning and clean-
up capabilities and suggestions to improve our ability to
recover from an attack. I will also discuss the United
Kingdom's handling of the 2006 polonium incident and how that
event has helped the United Kingdom better prepare for an
attack.
Our work shows that most cities and States would be so
overwhelmed by a dirty bomb or IND attack that they would rely
on the Federal Government to conduct almost all clean-up
activities that are an essential first step to recovery.
FEMA is responsible for developing a system to respond to
and recover from terrorist attacks. However, planning by FEMA
and other Federal agencies for recovering from such attacks is
lacking. FEMA has not issued a national disaster recovery plan
for dirty bomb or IND attacks. Also, existing Federal guidance
provides little direction for agencies to develop their own
recovery activities and test how well-prepared they are to
implement recovery efforts. In fact, out of the 70 dirty bomb
and IND exercises conducted over the last 5 years, only three
have included a recovery component.
Regarding clean-up of radiation-contaminated areas,
although research is under way, not much is known about how
available technologies could be applied to an attack. The lack
of guidance for identifying cost-effective clean-up methods in
the event of an attack might mean that the clean-up approach
taken could increase recovery costs. Experience has shown that
using the wrong approach can generate waste types more
difficult to remove than the original material.
In addition, limitations in testing thousands of material
samples during clean-up after an attack and uncertainty about
where to dispose of radioactive waste could also slow recovery.
About two-thirds of the city, State, and Federal officials we
surveyed expressed concern about the capability to provide the
necessary clean-up actions to recover from an attack.
Furthermore, nearly all the cities and States we surveyed
stated the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to
address gaps in Federal guidance. Additional Federal guidance
is needed in such areas as monitoring radiation levels, clean-
up standards, and management of radioactive waste. In addition,
most cities and States wanted more interaction with Federal
agencies to test recovery preparedness.
Cities and States also expressed the need for intelligence
information on dirty bomb and IND threats. They said that
sharing information with law enforcement agencies is vital to
planning. Only about one-half of the officials from States
considered at risk of an attack felt that they were getting
sufficient intel information.
As part of our work, we also met with U.K. officials to
discuss their handling of the 2006 polonium incident resulting
from the murder of Alexander Litvinenko. While more limited in
scope than what is envisioned by a dirty bomb, it had many of
the characteristics of such an attack. Specifically, 47 sites
across London had to be checked for radiological contamination,
and about 20 were contaminated. Nine hundred people might have
been exposed, and 20 showed signs of contamination, some
significant. All of this from a gram of polonium-210 the size
of a grain of salt.
According to U.K. officials, this incident proved the value
of recovery planning. In particular, through this incident,
U.K. officials gained an appreciation for the need to have an
established clean-up plan, including a process for determining
clean-up levels, sufficient laboratory capacity to analyze
large quantities of samples for radiation, and procedures for
handling radioactive debris. Furthermore, they found that the
action taken as a result of this incident and other actions
they have taken has better prepared the United Kingdom for
dirty bomb or IND attacks.
Madame Chairwoman, that concludes my remarks. I would be
happy to address any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gene Aloise
September 14, 2009
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-09-996T, a testimony to Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
A terrorist's use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or
improvised nuclear device (IND) to release radioactive materials into
the environment could have devastating consequences. The timely clean-
up of contaminated areas, however, could speed the restoration of
normal operations, thus reducing the adverse consequences from an
incident.
This testimony examines: (1) The extent to which Federal agencies
are planning to fulfill their responsibilities to assist cities and
their States in cleaning up areas contaminated with radioactive
materials from RDD and IND incidents; (2) what is known about the
Federal Government's capability to effectively clean up areas
contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents, and
(3) suggestions from Government emergency management officials on ways
to improve Federal preparedness to provide assistance to recover from
RDD and IND incidents. We also discuss recovery activities in the
United Kingdom. This testimony is based on our on-going review of
recovery preparedness issues for which we examined applicable Federal
laws and guidance; interviewed officials from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Department of Energy (DOE), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);
and surveyed emergency management officials from 13 large cities and
their States, as well as FEMA and EPA regional office officials.
combating nuclear terrorism.--preliminary observations on preparedness
to recover from possible attacks using radiological or nuclear
materials
What GAO Found
DHS, through FEMA, is responsible for developing a comprehensive
emergency management system to respond to and recover from natural
disasters and terrorists attacks, including RDD and IND attacks. The
response phase would involve evacuations and providing medical
treatment to those who were injured; the recovery phase would include
cleaning up the radioactive contamination from an attack in order to
permit people to return to their homes and businesses. To date, much
Federal attention has been given to developing a response framework,
with less attention to recovery. Our survey found that almost all
cities and States would be so overwhelmed by an RDD or IND incident
that they would rely on the Federal Government to conduct almost all
analysis and clean-up activities that are essential first steps towards
recovery. However, we found that the Federal Government has not
sufficiently planned to undertake these activities. For example, FEMA
has not issued a national disaster recovery strategy or plans for RDD
and IND incidents as required by law. Existing Federal guidance
provides only limited direction for Federal agencies to develop their
own recovery plans and conduct exercises to test preparedness. Out of
over 70 RDD and IND exercises conducted in the last 5 years, only three
have included interagency recovery discussions following a response
exercise.
Although DOE and EPA have experience in the clean-up of small-scale
radiation-contaminated areas, their lack of knowledge and capability to
apply approaches to address the magnitude of an RDD or an IND incident
could increase recovery costs and delay completion. According to an
expert at Idaho National Laboratory, experience has shown that not
selecting the appropriate decontamination technologies can generate
waste types that are more difficult to remove than the original
material and can create more debris requiring disposal-leading to
increased costs. Limitations in laboratory capacity to rapidly test
thousands of material samples during clean-up, and uncertainty
regarding where to dispose of radioactive debris could also slow the
recovery process. At least two-thirds of the city, State, and Federal
respondents expressed concern about Federal capability to provide the
necessary analysis and clean-up actions to promote recovery after these
incidents.
Nearly all survey respondents had suggestions to improve Federal
recovery preparedness for RDD and IND incidents. For example, almost
all the cities and States identified the need for a national disaster
recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in Federal guidance. All
but three cities wanted additional guidance, for example, on monitoring
radioactivity levels, clean-up standards, and management of radioactive
waste. Most cities wanted more interaction with Federal agencies and
joint exercising to test recovery preparedness. Finally, our review of
the United Kingdom's preparedness to recover from radiological
terrorism showed that that country has already taken actions similar to
those suggested by our survey respondents, such as issuing national
recovery guidance, conducting a full-scale recovery exercise, and
publishing a national handbook for radiation incidents.
Madame Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to
be here today to discuss preliminary observations from our on-going
work reviewing the Federal Government's preparedness to assist
localities in recovering from a terrorist attack involving either a
radiological dispersal device (RDD)--frequently referred to as a dirty
bomb--or an improvised nuclear device (IND). Responding to such an
attack would involve evacuations, providing medical treatment to those
who were injured, and protecting property; recovery would include
cleaning up the radioactive contamination from an attack in order to
permit people to return to their homes and businesses.\1\ A terrorist's
use of an RDD or IND to release radioactive materials into the
environment could have devastating consequences. However, quickly
analyzing and cleaning up contaminated areas after a deliberate release
of radioactive materials could speed the recovery from such an attack
by restoring normal operations of critical infrastructure, services,
businesses, and public activities, and thus reducing the many adverse
consequences from an attack. According to a recent report of the
National Science and Technology Council, which coordinates science and
technology policy within the Executive Office of the President, the
ability of Government to quickly and decisively respond to and recover
from an RDD or IND incident is key to national resiliency.\2\
Importantly, the Council noted that being prepared to recover from
these incidents may even provide an element of deterrence if the
adversary perceives less potential for long-lasting harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For the purpose of this testimony, analysis activities include
efforts to sample and analyze affected areas to determine the type and
location of contamination, and clean-up activities include efforts to
contain radioactive materials, decontaminate affected areas, and manage
the radioactive waste.
\2\ National Science and Technology Council, Roadmap for Nuclear
Defense Research and Development: Fiscal Years 2010-2014 (Washington,
DC: July 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The consequences of a terrorist attack using an RDD or IND would
not only include loss of life but also enormous psychological and
economic impacts. An RDD would disperse radioactive materials into the
environment through a conventional explosive or through other means.
Depending on the type of RDD, the area contaminated could be as small
as part of a building or city block or as large as several square
miles. An IND would create a nuclear explosion producing extreme heat,
powerful shockwaves, and intense radiation that would be immediately
lethal to individuals within miles of the explosion, as well as
radioactive fallout over thousands of square miles. Thus, the
consequences of RDD and IND incidents would vary in magnitude, with an
RDD expected to cause few deaths but produce significant economic and
psychological impacts, and an IND causing thousands of deaths and more
extensive destruction. An RDD is thought to be a more likely terrorist
weapon than an IND given the prevalent commercial use of radioactive
source material--for example, in some medical and industrial
equipment--and the relatively uncomplicated way in which this material
could be dispersed. In contrast, detonating an IND would require a
terrorist group to obtain nuclear weapons material--which is generally
heavily secured--and have highly sophisticated expertise and equipment
to fabricate this material into a weapon.
If an RDD or IND incident occurred, a number of Federal, State, and
local government departments and agencies would be involved in the
analysis and clean-up of areas contaminated with radioactive material
as part of the recovery process.\3\ Generally, State and local
governments have primary responsibility for recovering from disasters,
but the Federal Government may provide assistance when an incident
exceeds State and local resources or when an incident is managed by
Federal agencies under their own authorities. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is the principal Federal agency for domestic
incident management. The primary mission of its Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is to develop a comprehensive emergency
management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation. For an RDD or IND incident, DHS would be the lead agency in
coordinating Federal assistance to State and local governments. For
these incidents, DHS would rely on other Federal agencies that have
more experience with the analysis and cleanup of areas contaminated
with radioactive materials. For example, in certain circumstances, the
Department of Energy (DOE) would have primary responsibilities for the
initial analysis of areas contaminated with radioactive materials, and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would have primary
responsibility for cleaning up the radiation-contaminated areas.\4\ The
Department of Defense (DOD) would act in support of the primary Federal
agencies. Federal agencies, including EPA, DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, as well as State regulatory agencies have set various
clean-up standards for decontaminating affected areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act primarily establishes the programs and processes for the Federal
Government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to State
and local governments, as well as to Tribal nations, individuals, and
qualified non-profit organizations. Pub. L. No. 100-107, 102 Stat. 4689
(1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5121 et. seq.).
\4\ The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC) is a DOE-led interagency asset that is available on request to
respond to an RDD or IND incident. The FRMAC is responsible for
coordinating all environmental radiological monitoring, sampling, and
assessment activities for the response. DOE leads the FRMAC for the
initial response phase and EPA assumes leadership for the clean-up
phase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The risk of terrorists using an RDD or IND is, in large part,
determined by their ability to gain access to the materials needed to
construct these devices. Over the past few years, we have issued a
number of reports on the security of nuclear and radiological
materials, and facilities that house them. Overall, our work has shown
that despite investing billions of dollars in new technology to upgrade
security procedures, gaps continue to exist in our Nation's ability to
prevent terrorists from accessing or smuggling dangerous quantities of
radioactive material into the country. For example, in 2007, we
testified before Congress that our own investigators were able to set
up phony businesses and obtain a legitimate NRC license that would have
permitted us to obtain dangerous quantities of radioactive material.\5\
Our investigators were able to obtain this NRC license just months
after NRC had completed a lengthy process to strengthen its licensing
procedures. In 2008, we reported that NRC, in developing its security
requirements for research reactors, had not fully considered the risks
associated with terrorists attacking these facilities--many of which
are located on college campuses.\6\ Such an attack could involve
terrorists sabotaging a reactor in order to disperse radioactive
material over neighboring communities--similar to an RDD. We have also
reported on DHS's and FEMA's preparedness for, response to, and
recovery from disasters in 2007, 2008, and 2009.\7\
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\5\ GAO, Nuclear Security: Actions Taken by NRC to Strengthen Its
Licensing Process for Sealed Radioactive Sources Are Not Effective,
GAO-07-1038T (Washington, DC: July 12, 2007).
\6\ GAO, Nuclear Security: Action May be Needed to Reassess the
Security of NRC-Licensed Research Reactors, GAO-08-403 (Washington, DC:
Jan. 31, 2008).
\7\ GAO, Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and
Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation, GAO-07-1143T (Washington, DC: July 31,
2007); Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006, GAO-09-59R (Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2008); and
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete
and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts, GAO-09-369
(Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2009).
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Our testimony today presents preliminary observations from our on-
going effort to examine: (1) The extent to which Federal agencies are
planning to fulfill their responsibilities to assist cities and their
States in cleaning up areas contaminated with radioactive material from
RDD and IND incidents; (2) what is known about the Federal Government's
capability to effectively clean up areas contaminated with radioactive
material from RDD and IND incidents; and (3) suggestions from
Government emergency management officials on ways to improve Federal
preparedness to assist State and local governments in recovering from
RDD and IND incidents. In addition, we are providing information on our
review of actions taken in the United Kingdom to prepare for recovering
from RDD and IND incidents. We expect to issue our final report on this
topic in November 2009.
To address these objectives, we examined pertinent Federal law,
Presidential directives, and other executive guidance; interviewed
cognizant officials from DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NRC, and National
laboratories; and conducted a survey of emergency management officials
in 13 cities considered to be at high or medium risk of such attacks,
officials in these cities' States, and similar officials in all Federal
FEMA and EPA regional offices.\8\ We also reviewed information on the
number and type of RDD and IND response and recovery exercises that
have been conducted in the last 5 years. Finally, we visited the United
Kingdom to review its preparedness to recover from RDD and IND
incidents at the suggestion of EPA officials and because it has
addressed a fairly recent radiological release incident in a large
urban area.
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\8\ The high- and medium-risk cities are Boston, Chicago, Dallas,
Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia,
San Francisco, Seattle, and St. Louis. While Washington, DC, is
considered a high-risk city, we excluded it from our survey because it
is unlike other cities in its reliance on the Federal Government and
the Federal agencies that would take over analysis and clean-up
activities.
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background
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern
that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials
into the United States. These materials could be used to produce either
an IND or an RDD. An IND is a crude nuclear bomb made with highly
enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts estimate that a
successful IND could have a yield in the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the
equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT). An IND with a 20-kiloton
yield would have the same force as the equivalent of the yield of the
bomb that destroyed Nagasaki; it could devastate the heart of a medium-
sized U.S. city and result in thousands of casualties and radiation
contamination over a wide area.
Security experts have also raised concerns that terrorists could
obtain radioactive material used in medicine, research, agriculture,
and industry to construct an RDD, or dirty bomb. This radioactive
material is encapsulated, or sealed in metal, such as stainless steel,
titanium, or platinum, to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called
a sealed radioactive source. These sealed sources are used throughout
the United States and other countries in equipment designed to, among
other things, diagnose and treat illnesses, preserve food, detect flaws
in pipeline welds, and determine the moisture content of soil.
Depending on their use, sealed sources contain different types of
radioactive material, such as strontium-90, cobalt-60, cesium-137,
plutonium-238, and plutonium-239. If these sealed sources fell into the
hands of terrorists, they could use them to produce a simple, but
potentially dangerous weapon, by packaging explosives, such as
dynamite, with the radioactive material, which would be dispersed when
the bomb went off. Depending on its type, amount, and form (powder or
solid), the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation
sickness in people nearby and produce serious economic costs and the
psychological and social disruption associated with the evacuation and
subsequent clean-up of the contaminated area. While no terrorists have
detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister
containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the
device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the
incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and
willingness to use radiological materials as weapons of terrorism.
Another form of nuclear terrorism occurred with the release of
radioactive materials in London. In November 2006, Alexander
Litvinenko, a former officer of the Russian Federal Security Service,
was poisoned with a gram of polonium-210--about the size of a grain of
salt.\9\ His poisoning was detected only after he was hospitalized for
a few weeks and tested for symptoms of radiation exposure because of
hair loss. Following the poisoning, forensic investigators identified,
with the help of the victim, 47 sites across London where he had been
during the few days between his poisoning and death. Of these
locations, about 20 showed signs of this radioactive material.
Investigators identified over 900 people who might have been exposed to
the polonium, including some who may have been exposed while aboard
airplanes. After a thorough examination, a few of these individuals
turned out to have significant exposure levels. The decontamination
activities at these sites, including a hotel room, spanned 19 days,
involved a number of methods and technologies, and cost in excess of
$200,000.
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\9\ Investigators believe that this pure polonium was probably
produced in a Russian research reactor.
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cities and states would likely request federal assistance for clean-up
of radiation-contaminated areas after rdd and ind incidents, but
limited federal planning exists for recovering from such incidents
While State and local government responders would be expected to
respond first to a terrorist incident within their jurisdiction, they
would also expect that the Federal Government would be prepared to
provide the necessary assistance for them to expedite the recovery from
such an incident. Emergency management officials from 13 cities and the
majority of their respective States indicated in our survey that they
would rely on the Federal Government to conduct and fund all or almost
all analysis and clean-up activities associated with recovering from an
RDD or IND incident of the magnitude described in the National Planning
Scenarios.\10\ However, when asked which Federal agencies they would
turn to for this assistance, city and State respondents replied
inconsistently and frequently listed several Federal agencies for the
same activity. In our view, these responses indicate that there is
confusion among city and State officials regarding Federal
responsibilities for these activities in the event of a terrorist
incident. This confusion, if not addressed, could hamper the timely
recovery from an RDD or IND incident. Emergency management officials
from all the cities and most of their respective States told us they
would rely on the Federal Government because their technical and
financial resources would be overwhelmed by a large RDD incident--and
certainly by an IND incident. Most of these officials believe they
could adequately address a smaller RDD incident, such as one that is
confined to a city block or inside a building.
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\10\ The National Preparedness Guidelines (Sept. 2007) developed 15
national planning scenarios, including scenarios for RDD and IND
incidents. The scenarios form the basis for coordinated Federal
planning, training, exercises, and grant investments to prepare for
emergencies of all types.
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Despite this anticipated reliance on the Federal Government, we
obtained mixed responses as to whether these RDD and IND recovery
activities should be primarily a Federal responsibility. Fewer than
half of the respondents from the cities (6 of 13), but most of those
from States (8 of 10) indicated that it should be primarily a Federal
responsibility. The others stressed the need for shared
responsibilities with the Federal Government. Despite the anticipated
reliance by city and State governments on the Federal Government for
analysis and clean-up activities following an RDD or IND incident, FEMA
has not developed a National disaster recovery strategy or related
plans to guide involvement of Federal agencies in these recovery
activities, as directed by Federal law and executive guidance.\11\ To
date, much Federal attention has been given to developing a response
framework, with less attention to recovery. The new FEMA coordinator
for the development of a National disaster recovery strategy told us
that while the previous administration had drafted a ``white paper''
addressing this strategy, the new administration has decided to rethink
the entire approach.\12\ She also told us that FEMA recognizes its
responsibility to prepare a National disaster recovery strategy but she
could not provide a time frame for its completion. However, she stated
that when a recovery strategy is issued it should provide guidance to
revise State, local, and other Federal agency operational plans to
fulfill their respective responsibilities. Moreover, the FEMA official
in charge of planning told us that the agency has put on hold issuing
component plans that describe how Federal capabilities would be
integrated to support State and local planning for response to and
recovery from RDD and IND incidents.
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\11\ The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act requires FEMA
to report back to the Congress within 270 days of enactment of this
2006 legislation describing the details of a national disaster recovery
strategy. Pub. L. No. 109-295, 682, 120 Stat. 1355, 1445-46 (2006).
In addition, the National Security Council, National Strategy for
Homeland Security (Washington, DC, Oct. 2007), states that the Federal
Government will prepare a framework for recovery.
\12\ In our November 21, 2008 report (GAO-09-59R), we found that
FEMA had drafted a national disaster recovery strategy but that it was
under review at the time with no time frame for completion.
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Some existing Federal guidance documents addressing the assets and
responsibilities of Federal agencies for both response and to a lesser
extent recovery-related activities have been issued as annexes to the
National Response Framework and in other documents.\13\ For example,
there is a nuclear and radiological incident annex, which describes the
policies, situations, concept of operations, and responsibilities of
the Federal departments and agencies for the immediate response and
short-term recovery from incidents involving the release of
radiological materials. There are also emergency support function
annexes that provide a structure for coordinating Federal interagency
support in response to domestic incidents.
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\13\ DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, DC, Jan. 2008).
This document provides a guide for how the Nation should conduct all-
hazards response, including the roles and responsibilities of agencies
involved in response efforts. It does not address long-term recovery
issues, including cleaning up areas contaminated with radioactive
materials.
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In addition, two other sources of guidance have been issued that,
according to FEMA officials, represent stop-gap measures until it can
issue more integrated planning guidance. In 2008, FEMA issued updated
guidance for protection and recovery following RDD and IND
incidents.\14\ This guidance was to provide some direction to Federal,
State, and local emergency response officials in developing operational
plans and response protocols for protection of emergency workers after
such an incident. In regard to recovery, this document recommended a
process to involve the affected public, State and local officials, and
other important stakeholders in the identification of acceptable clean-
up criteria, given the specifics of the incident. The other document,
issued by the Homeland Security Council, pertains to responding to an
IND in the first few days prior to the arrival of other necessary
Federal resources. This document was prepared because the prior FEMA
guidance did not sufficiently prepare State and local emergency
response authorities for managing the catastrophic consequences of a
nuclear detonation.\15\ Moreover, DOE, EPA and DOD are developing more
detailed operational guidance on their own based on the existing
Federal guidance. For example, DOE has supported research on
operational guidelines for implementation of protective actions
described in the FEMA guidance,\16\ EPA has drafted guidance for the
optimization process following RDD and IND incidents,\17\ and DOD has
established operational plans for consequence management following
terrorist incidents, including RDD and IND attacks.\18\
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\14\ DHS, Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
Incidents, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,029 (Aug. 1, 2008).
\15\ Homeland Security Council, Planning Guidance for Response to a
Nuclear Detonation (Washington, DC: Jan. 16, 2009).
\16\ C. Yu, et al. Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines
Developed for Use in Emergency Preparedness and Response to a
Radiological Dispersal Device Incident, DOE/HS-0001 (Washington, DC:
DOE, Office of Health Safety, and Security, February 2009). This
document does not represent official policy, methods, or agency
guidance.
\17\ EPA, EPA Guidance on the Optimization Process Following a
Radiological Dispersal Device or Improvised Nuclear Device Incident
(Washington, DC: September 2009 Draft).
\18\ We provided testimony on this DOD initiative in GAO, Homeland
Defense: Preliminary Observations on Defense Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Explosive Consequence Management Plans
and Preparedness, GAO-09-927T (Washington, DC: July 28, 2009).
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Federal agencies and local jurisdictions have been using the
available guidance as a basis for planning RDD and IND exercises to
test the adequacy of their plans and skills in a real-time, realistic
environment to evaluate their level of preparedness. We identified more
than 70 RDD and IND response exercises planned and carried out by
Federal, State, and local agencies since mid-2003. However, officials
with FEMA's National Exercise Directorate told us that only three of
the RDD response exercises had a recovery component. According to these
officials, recovery discussions following an RDD or IND response
exercise have typically not occurred because of the time needed to
fully address the response objectives of the exercise, which are seen
as a higher priority. The most recent response exercise, based in
Albany, New York, and planned by DOE, set aside 2 days for Federal,
State, and local agencies to discuss operational recovery issues. One
unresolved operational issue discussed during this exercise pertained
to the transition of the leadership of the Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) from the initial analysis of
the contaminated area, led by DOE, to the later clean-up phase, led by
EPA. For example, there are remaining questions regarding the level and
quality of the monitoring data necessary for EPA to accept the
leadership of FRMAC. While we were told that this transitional issue
has been discussed in exercises dating back to the development of the
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan in 1984, it has only
recently been discussed in RDD or IND response exercises. Another
unresolved operational recovery issue pertains to the distribution of
responsibilities for the ownership, removal, and disposal of
radioactive debris from an RDD or IND incident. Both of these
operational issues are to be examined again in the first full-scale RDD
recovery exercise, planned and led by EPA, to take place April 2010.
insufficient knowledge and capability to use available approaches for
clean-up of radiation-contaminated areas could impede efforts to
recover from rdd and ind incidents
Although some Federal agencies, such as DOE and EPA, have
substantial experience using various clean-up methods and technologies
to address radiation-contaminated areas, little is known about how
these approaches might be applied in an RDD or IND incident. For
example, DOE has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in research,
development, and testing of methods and technologies for cleaning up
and decommissioning contaminated structures and soils--legacies of the
Cold War. In addition, since the passage of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980, which
established the Superfund program, EPA has undertaken significant
efforts to study, develop, and use technologies that can address
radioactive contamination. DOD has also played a major role in studying
potential applications for innovative technologies for its Superfund
sites.
Not much is known, however, about the application to RDD and IND
incidents of available clean-up methods and technologies because such
an incident has never occurred in this country, although research is
currently underway to gain a better understanding of potential
applications. According to decontamination experts at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, current research has focused on
predicting the effects of radiation release in urban settings through
simulation, small-scale testing, and theory. In addition, researchers
at EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center informed us that
while there are standard methods and technologies for cleaning up
radiation-contaminated areas, more research is needed to develop
standard National guidance for their application in urban environments.
The lack of guidance for identifying cost-effective clean-up methods
and technologies in the event of an RDD or IND incident might mean that
the clean-up approach taken could unnecessarily increase the cost of
recovery. According to a decontamination expert at Idaho National
Laboratory, for example, experience has shown that not selecting the
appropriate decontamination technologies can generate waste types that
are more difficult to remove than the original material and can create
more debris requiring disposal--leading to increased costs. Moreover,
he told us that without guidance and discussion early in the response
phase, a contractor might use an approach for no other reason than it
was used before in an unrelated situation. In addition, the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory decontamination experts told us that
decontamination costs can increase dramatically depending on the
selection of an initial approach and the length of time before
remediation actions are taken. For example, they said that the
conventional use of high pressure water hosing to decontaminate a
building is effective under normal conditions but could be the wrong
clean-up approach for an RDD using cesium-137 because the force of the
water would actually cause this radioactive isotope to penetrate even
further into porous surfaces. A senior EPA official with the Office of
Radiation and Indoor Air told us that studies are currently underway to
determine the efficacy of pressure-washing for removing contamination
from porous urban surfaces.
In addition to the lack of knowledge about the application of
clean-up methods and technologies for wide-area urban contamination
from an RDD or IND incident, there are also limitations in Federal
capabilities to handle in a timely manner the magnitude of tasks and
challenges that would be associated with these incidents. For example,
we found that limitations in Federal capabilities to complete some
analysis and clean-up activities might slow the recovery from an RDD or
IND incident, including: (1) Characterizing the full extent of areas
contaminated with radioactive materials; (2) completing laboratory
validation of contaminated areas and levels of clean-up after applying
decontamination approaches; and (3) removing and disposing of
radioactive debris and waste. Respondents representing most of the
cities (9 of 13) and States (7 of 10), and respondents from most FEMA
regional offices (6 of 9) and almost all EPA regional offices (9 of 10)
expressed concerns about the capabilities of Federal agencies to
provide the assistance needed to complete the necessary analysis and
clean-up activities in the event of an RDD or IND incident.
city, state, and federal emergency management officials have several
suggestions to improve federal recovery preparedness for rdd and ind
incidents
Respondents from nearly all the cities and States we surveyed
expressed the need for a National disaster recovery strategy to address
gaps and overlaps in current Federal guidance. According to one city
official, ``recovery is what it is all about.'' In developing such a
recovery strategy, respondents from the cities, like those from their
States, want the Federal Government to consult with them in the initial
formulation of a recovery strategy through working and focus groups,
perhaps organized on a regional basis. Respondents representing most
cities (10 of 13) and States (7 of 10) also provided specifics on the
type of planning guidance necessary, including integration and
clarification of responsibilities among Federal, State, and local
governments. For example, respondents from some of the cities sought
better guidance on monitoring radioactivity levels, acceptable clean-up
standards, and management of radioactive waste. Most respondents from
cities expressed the need for greater planning interactions with the
Federal Government and more exercises to test recovery plans. One city
respondent cited the need for recovery exercises on a regional basis so
the cities within the region might better exchange lessons learned.
Respondents from most cities (11 of 13) and their States (7 of 10) said
that they planned to conduct RDD and IND recovery exercises in the
future. Finally, emergency management officials representing almost all
cities and States in our survey offered some opinions on the need for
intelligence information on RDD and IND threats. They said that sharing
information with law enforcement agencies is necessary for appropriate
planning for an RDD or IND incident--which they generally consider as
low-level threats--but only half of the respondents indicated that they
were getting sufficient intelligence information. Emergency management
officials from FEMA and EPA regional offices generally concurred with
these observations and suggestions of the city and State respondents.
the united kingdom's handling of the 2006 polonium incident and
subsequent actions to better prepare for an rdd or ind incident
While it was more limited in scope than what is usually envisioned
as an RDD incident, the aftermath of the 2006 polonium poisoning
incident in London had many of the characteristics of an RDD including
testing hundreds of people who may have been exposed to radiation and a
clean-up of numerous radiation-contaminated areas. All this activity
resulted from an amount of radioactive material the size of a grain of
salt--many times smaller than the amount of radioactive material found
in certain common medical devices that could be used in an RDD. Because
of its experience in dealing with the clean-up from the 2006 polonium
incident and other actions the United Kingdom has taken to prepare for
an RDD or IND attack, we visited that country to examine its recovery
preparedness programs. United Kingdom officials told us that the
attention to recovery in their country is rooted in decades of
experience with the conflict in Northern Ireland, dealing with
widespread contamination from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
accident, and a national history of resilience--that is, the ability to
manage and recover from hardship. We found that actions the United
Kingdom reported taking to prepare for recovery from RDD and IND
incidents are similar to many of the suggestions for improvement in
Federal preparedness that we obtained through our survey of city,
State, and Federal regional office emergency management officials in
the United States. For example, we found that the United Kingdom
reported taking the following actions:
Enacted civil protection legislation in 2004, with
subsequent non-statutory emergency response and recovery
guidance to complement this emergency preparedness legislation.
The emergency response and recovery guidance describes the
generic framework for multi-agency response and recovery for
all levels of government. The guidance emphasizes that response
and recovery are not discrete activities and do not occur
sequentially, rather recovery should be an integral part of
response from the very beginning, as actions taken at all times
can influence longer-term outcomes of the communities.
Developed on-line, updatable national recovery guidance in
2007. This guidance reinforces and updates the early emergency
response and recovery guidance by establishing, among other
things, a recovery planning process during the response phase
so that the potential impacts of early advice and actions are
explored and understood for the future recovery of the affected
areas.
Issued a national handbook for radiation incidents in 2008.
This handbook provides scientific information, including
checklists for planning in advance of an incident, fact sheets
on decontamination approaches, and advice on how to select and
combine management of these approaches.
Conducted a full-scale RDD recovery exercise in 2008. This
exercise, involving several hundred participants, provided a
unique opportunity to examine and test the recovery planning
process within the urgency of a compressed time frame. The
lessons learned from this exercise were incorporated into the
United Kingdom's recovery strategy.
Issued updated nuclear recovery plan guidance in 2009. This
guidance provides direction on recovery from events involving a
radiological release from a civil or defense nuclear reactor,
as well as the malicious use of radiological or nuclear
materials. Among other things, it requires that all high-risk
cities in the United Kingdom prepare recovery plans for such
incidents.
In addition to these initiatives, in 2005, the United Kingdom
established a special Government Decontamination Service. This
organization was created out of recognition that it would not be cost-
effective for each entity--national, regional, and local government--to
maintain the level of expertise needed for cleaning up chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, given that such events
are rare.\19\
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\19\ The Government Decontamination Service is similar in size and
responsibilities to EPA's National Decontamination Team, which became
fully operational in August 2007.
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Finally, according to United Kingdom officials, the 2006 polonium
incident in London showed the value of recovery planning. In
particular, through this incident United Kingdom officials gained an
appreciation for the need to have an established clean-up plan,
including a process for determining clean-up levels, sufficient
laboratory capacity to analyze a large quantity of samples for
radiation, and procedures for handling the radioactive waste.
Furthermore, they found that implementing clean-up plans in the
polonium poisoning incident and testing plans in the November 2008
recovery exercise have helped the United Kingdom to better prepare for
a larger RDD or IND incident.
Madame Chairwoman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the
subcommittee may have at this time. For further information about this
testimony, please contact me.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Aloise.
We are going to break with the protocol. One of my
colleagues has to leave a bit earlier. I would like to then
recognize for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from California, Ms.
Laura Richardson, for her questions at this time.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and also
Ranking Member Lungren, for allowing me to kick off first. I
have a 1 o'clock flight, and I have to get to the airport, so I
appreciate it. Thank you.
You know, I am a relatively new Member on the Homeland
Security Committee, even though my district is very rich in
targets. When I first heard the initial testimony of Mr.
Conklin, when you said we need a coordinated Nation-wide
program, I was somewhat surprised, given, you know, how many
years now we have been working in this effort.
Would you like to expand further on what you would more
like to see? I thought Mr. Aloise's comments were excellent.
Mr. Conklin. Well, the program that I am talking about is a
program that was established by HSPD-7 for addressing the
security of the Nation's critical infrastructure and key
resources. That program was kicked off about 5 years ago in
formality with the HSPD-7, but it started well before that.
In the nuclear section, in particular, we have established
a partnership framework that involves what we call a Government
Coordinating Council of the Federal departments and agencies,
as well as State representation. We work with a private-sector
coordinating council, which has representatives from the power
plants, manufacturers of portable sources, the representatives
from the research and test reactors, from the universities and
things like that. So that is the framework that I am talking
about.
Now, if you are talking about a bigger framework, the
Federal Government has been involved in radiation protection
issues, emergency response issues for years. Following TMI, for
example, FEMA was assigned responsibilities to establish a
Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee. Their
initial focus was the commercial power plants, but over the
years they have expanded that focus into foreign accidents
involving radioactive material, lost or orphan sources of
radioactive material.
So there has been a fair amount of effort going on to
address these issues. Now, are we there yet? Do we have a
system in place that we can point to that says we can answer
all the questions and do everything that is going to be needed?
I would have to agree with the gentleman at the other end of
the table that that is not the case.
There are still significant areas that need improvement
with regard to risk communication, the ability to detect the
material once it has been used, and then the follow-on and
clean-up. It is going to be a massive effort to do that clean-
up and recovery; there is no question that.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Sheely, as I was listening to your testimony and also
reading the GTRI remote monitoring system, and when I looked
under the initiatives it said that, ``Upon request, perform
security assessments and upgrades.'' This is all to be done by
2016, which I thought was a little odd that it would be upon
request.
Then it had here that you estimate that 2,200 buildings in
the United States house Category 1 or 2 levels of materials. We
have only done 37 buildings so far.
Do you think we can really meet this goal by 2016? It is
almost like fixing infrastructure to me. By the time you get
there, it would seem like you would have to do it all over
again. So is this realistic, the way that we are doing it?
Mr. Sheely. Well, no, that is a very good question. As you
said, it is a very complex issue. But we feel pretty confident.
We have been doing security best practices overseas for many
years, as far as the GTRI program. It was actually a fairly
recent GAO study done by Mr. Aloise's group saying, who was
offering those same kinds of best practices to source holders
here in the United States? That just recently, within the last
year or so, that we have really been partnering with NRC and
DHS to offer such activities. Right now, we actually have more
volunteers than resources available to address those
volunteers.
Ms. Richardson. I am sorry. Here in Congress, we run pretty
tight on time frames. Mr. Conklin took a while. I have 1
minute.
My question is, right now you say we have 2,200 buildings
that need to be evaluated and only 37 have been done. Do you
think it is possible that we are going to achieve that?
I am sorry; I just want to respect my colleagues.
Mr. Sheely. Okay. I think it is possible to achieve it
because we have just begun the program, and it is expanding
quickly.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Will it have to be done again after
2016? Is it something that is done repeatedly?
Mr. Sheely. It should not have to be redone again, no.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Then, how many cities do we know have
participated in the Securing the Cities Initiative? Does anyone
know that?
Mr. Riggio. There are 150, approximately, maybe 154 law
enforcement agencies across those three States. It encompasses
approximately 60 counties. Because there is cross-jurisdiction
with sheriffs' offices and small townships, I couldn't give you
an exact number of cities.
Ms. Richardson. But that is just within the three cities
that you are working with. That is not all the cities in
general.
Mr. Riggio. No, the three States. New York----
Ms. Richardson. Three States, okay.
Mr. Riggio. Yes. Picture Manhattan as the focal point, and
expand in a radius, a circular radius, outside. You pick up
Long Island, Connecticut, upstate New York, and New Jersey all
around.
Ms. Richardson. But are other cities across the country
doing the same thing?
Mr. Riggio. To my knowledge, the New York-area Securing the
Cities Initiative is the first, and it has not been expanded at
this point.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Ms. Richardson.
I want to once again just thank our witnesses for their
testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel. I will now recognize myself for questions.
My first question is to Mr. Conklin. One issue we on the
committee struggle with is in protecting our infrastructure and
providing for security of privately held assets.
Were our voluntary efforts effective, or where do we need
to regulate? In the case of source security, have voluntary
efforts really been enough, or have you benefited from the fact
that the NRC is there to provide regulation when needed?
Mr. Levis, would you care to comment on that?
Mr. Lewis. Well, thank you for the question.
I think that these two programs do complement each other.
The NRC's increased controls set a baseline of safety. The
security assistance and the hardening that are done are
voluntary measures that go beyond the minimum requirements for
security that apply to everybody. Those requirements reflect
best practices for a particular type of licensee, geographical
issues such as what is specific to New York, and other factors.
I do think they complement.
We are undergoing a regulation change. In the spring of
next year, we expect to issue new regulations on materials
security. One of the things we will be seeking in the proposed
regulation is feedback on how the voluntary measures and the
increased controls, which are required measures, complement
each other or not and can be used to the same goal.
The voluntary measures have the advantage of being able to
be done more expeditiously than if NRC were to require them. We
would have to do a regulatory change, and then there is no
longer a central place dealing with the vendors to enact the
changes. It would be decentralized, where all the licensees
would do it themselves.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Conklin, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Conklin. I would definitely say that the voluntary
program has benefited from those regulations. Having a baseline
of activity that has preceded our coming into the program, if
you will, for years really helped identify where we stand and
established a good starting point from which to then elevate
the level of protection that we wanted for these sources.
Ms. Clarke. Very well.
Captain Riggio, in August, an iridium source was reported
missing here in New York. The source was recovered within 2
days.
Can you please tell us about the incident and please
indicate whether any of the enhanced security measures,
including updated tracking procedures, helped in recovering the
source, or did you have significant Federal and State
cooperation?
Mr. Riggio. Madame Chairwoman, with respect to that
incident, essentially what happened, on the morning of the
incident, the office manager came into the facility, did the
morning routine, the facility inspection, and noticed a piece
of equipment missing.
Nine-one-one was immediately called. Routine patrol
officers responded to the scene. When we realized what, in
fact, we were dealing with, obviously more enhanced and
specialized units were called: The counterterrorism division,
the joint terrorism task force.
To get to your question, some of the measures that were put
in absolutely helped in recovering it, because, without getting
into too much for operational security, certain codes had to be
put in to get into the facility. There were some cameras that
were working, and so we were able to figure out maybe which
individuals had come in in recent hours and get some sort of
picture from a videocamera afterwards.
So, yes, certain things did help in the recovery, yes, and
the quick identification of where it might be and leading us to
persons who may be of interest using other computer systems
that we have, where, in fact, they may be located and where to
put our resources to try to find them.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Mr. Sheely, we have been pleased to see the progress made
in getting the engineering upgrades placed on over 20 blood
irradiator machines. It is my impression that the fact that DOE
is providing these free of charge has been a big key to your
success.
Do you feel that providing these for free is essential,
even though the upgrades range from $5,000 to $20,000 a piece,
which seems like a very small investment for a major hospital?
Mr. Sheely. Yes, we do feel that, again, offering these
free of charge, as Mr. Lewis mentioned, is really accelerating
the ability to secure these cesium irradiators much more
quickly.
As I am sure other colleagues would atone, many of these
hospitals, especially the large hospitals, have on the order of
six or seven or even eight of these large irradiators. The
costs do add up when you have that many. It is always a trade-
off, whether it is a university setting, a hospital setting, or
in the case of the facility where we are now is both, there is
always a trade-off between patient care and security upgrades.
So we do feel that this is a very valuable service which
will ultimately result in the quickest security upgrades.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for his questions at
this time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony. I had an
enjoyable ride on the train up here and got to read it all, and
it was very, very helpful, and I appreciate it.
Mr. Conklin, Mr. Sheely, Mr. Lewis, how much, if at all, is
the problem that you have articulated exacerbated by nuclear
radiological waste at hospitals and other institutions?
Mr. Conklin. Well, I will kick it off.
I think the biggest concern we have is a small percentage
of the radiological waste, and that deals with the actually
sealed sources themselves that either through the use of their
lifetime they lose their strength and therefore they are not
suitable for doing the job they are doing.
The ability to dispose of those, the cost has gone up, the
options have gone down. So there is a tendency, or there could
be a tendency, to accumulate this waste and store it on-site
versus pay the cost for getting rid of it.
Mr. Lungren. You say there could be a tendency. Is there a
tendency?
Mr. Conklin. I believe there is, yes.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Sheely.
Mr. Sheely. Well, as Craig was mentioning, I think the main
issue is that approximately less than 1 percent of the overall
medical waste is useful in an RDD-type dispersion. So, in that
sense, from a security standpoint, the risk is manageable, and
the key is to separate those sources which are Category 1, 2
sources, which could be used in an RDD, from just other medical
radioactive waste.
Mr. Lewis. There is a lack of disposal access for these
sources. They are low-level waste. They are not nuclear waste
or high-level waste. But they are greater than Class C low-
level waste, which means they are not suitable for near-surface
disposal, and there is no facility that can take those at this
time.
Mr. Lungren. So where do they go? What do they do?
Mr. Lewis. They are stored or returned to vendors.
Fortunately, they are small in number and volume, so storage is
an option.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Arquilla, what do we need to do to bring
our country up to the level that you would like to see, with
respect to preparation of our hospitals for responding to an
event if it should happen, No. 1; and, No. 2, doing a better
job of informing people of exactly what a dirty bomb is and
what it is not?
As you say, 65 percent, I believe it was, of the people
would self-evacuate, which sounds good. But it is also bad
because, when they evacuate, they are going to go to the
hospital. As I understand your testimony, most would probably
need not go to the hospital, at least not go to the hospital
immediately.
Dr. Arquilla. Probably the most important, best thing is to
start with educating the population in general about, you know,
what radiation is. We have 70 years of ``You are all going to
get radiated and turned into a carrot.'' So I think that that
would be one step.
I mean, if you look at curriculums within nursing schools,
medical schools, there is very little in this kind of
education. Unless you going into radiation oncology, you really
don't know anything about it. So, to me, it would be to go from
both directions, it would need to be that.
I think that kind of risk communication is not that
difficult, but it is not happening. It is more hysteria
education than it is--you know, most physicists aren't worried
at all about this. They think we are kind of crazy to be so
upset, you know, if you actually sit down and speak with them.
Getting that across is a generational thing, but I think
that that would be the most important thing. We have nonfunded
mandates to do this education. We can't do it like that.
Mr. Lungren. Captain Riggio, your testimony is impressive
with respect to what the NYPD can do. It has often been
observed that you have many more officers per population than
just about any community in the United States. I reflect when I
used to represent the southern California area and when I was
attorney general, I remember the comparisons of LAPD versus
NYPD.
The reason why I bring that up is, you folks have done a
great job of coordinating and having your own special units and
so forth. Is that actually replicable in other parts of the
country? Are there lessons that can be learned from your
experience even though very few departments, if any, can
replicate your organization and the detail of your units and
subunits?
Mr. Riggio. I believe it can. I mean, obviously, having
personnel above and beyond what everyone else has is a great
advantage. But that being said, you know, we live in a time
where we can't use personnel resources as an excuse. So there
are absolutely lessons that--and that is kind of what the
Securing the Cities program has done.
Many of the departments that we work with are smaller in
size than us, but we pass along the lessons that we have
learned, whether it be source security, interdiction methods,
setting up chokepoints, how we run everything, all of our
terrorism, not just radiological, CBRNE, different trainings
and practice.
So it can be replicated, to answer your question. It is
difficult. I know, I am sure, that in this time, if you ask
many of these agencies, they will talk about fiscal
responsibility and fiscal crisis that we are in now and that
they would need help to do these things. But I do believe it is
absolutely replicable.
I mean, that is something that we like and we wish. Because
we see it as, yes, while New York City is the target, what
happens in Pennsylvania and Ohio affects us, because something
can happen there and they come over and bring it over to us.
So I hope I answered your question, sir.
Ms. Clarke. I now recognize the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Sanchez, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
Again, once again, thank you all. You seem to have a great
array of people here in New York, in the New York area, with
respect to this issue. I applaud both you, Ms. Clarke, for
holding this hearing, for having these types of experts here.
It has been very enlightening this morning.
I also want to thank, of course, our Federal people who
were here, who I know are on the front line every single day,
trying to figure out how we make all of this happen correctly.
I represent Orange County, California. That could be
Disneyland, Anaheim Stadium, the largest convention center west
of the Mississippi, the third venue in the Nation for concerts
being our Honda Center, Knotts Berry Farm. I am about 20
minutes away from the Long Beach and Los Angeles ports, which
Ms. Richardson has in her backyard, and aside some beautiful
beaches.
So you can imagine the type of concentration of people in
my area every single day of the year that don't necessarily
live there but who come in for the day or come in for the
week--much in the same way as we might see New York City, with
its influx of visitors. So we are very, very concerned about so
many of these issues.
In identifying--I have been in the Congress 13 years, when
this committee was set up. I am the vice chair of the Homeland
Security Committee. We identified our main venues. For example,
I will start with Disneyland, where they said if something goes
off in the park, maybe it affects 10,000 people in the vicinity
of the park, but 60,000 people who live within a mile of
Disneyland will be rushing to my emergency room at my hospital,
which of course might have two beds open, as we speak right
now, because there is such a crunch. So we started working with
UC-Irvine, in particular, which is my hospital there in trauma
and hospital of the vicinity, to work on these issues.
Doctor, you mentioned that you didn't think there was
anybody who had a decontamination, sort of, 24-hour process
going on. I might urge you to talk to them, because we just
built the new hospital. They don't have 24-hour, on-the-line
team, but they do have probably the best thing in the Nation
that one could have for that. So I would--I don't know if you
are talking to them.
Dr. Arquilla. I am talking about personnel, not about toys.
Ms. Sanchez. We are talking about personnel also. They
have----
Dr. Arquilla. I graduated from Irvine. I know it very well.
Ms. Sanchez. They have done a pretty good job over there,
so I just wanted to mention that.
But my big issue is this issue about, how do we talk to our
people? I mean, how do I tell my people who are living within a
mile of Disneyland--and I do--that if they hear something on
the radio happening at Disneyland, that they don't rush down to
the hospital? What do you think is the most effective way?
I also want to hear from Captain Riggio, because local law
enforcement are the ones who have to handle this herd mentality
of, ``Oh, my God, the world is ending. Let's get to the
place.''
How do you suggest we do that? Have you seen resources? How
are you dividing your resources and trying to communicate or
getting this information out to the general public?
Dr. Arquilla. One way that I see to do it is, prior to an
event, we really need to start look at the emergency care as
not an excuse for a clinic. That would be one thing on a
regular basis across the board for all CBRNEs. Remember ``B''
is ``biologic,'' and we are looking at a big flu season this
year.
So, to educate people as to what hospitals can and can't
do, prior to the event. I think that, within New York City
public schools, they are actually trying to pilot some ideas on
that, you know, when to go to the hospital, when not, for the
parents and those issues.
I don't think--I mean, it may be a health care issue, but I
can only say that, unless we create liaisons with other
organizations, be it news, first responder, which was fire,
police, whatever, to let them know about risk management and
really what the risks are, because they are very different
risks than what we think, then I don't have a perfect excuse.
But I do think education of our risks and understanding our
risks in this kind of a committee, where we are really
evaluating risk, I think is key.
Ms. Sanchez. Captain.
Mr. Riggio. To answer your question, our primary goal, our
mission, is to prevent, obviously, something from happening. In
the event that something would happen, then our goal becomes to
mitigate and save as many lives as possible on the scene.
As far as the question that I think you are asking----
Ms. Sanchez. How is your salary paid, for example? Is it
coming in from Federal grants? Is it coming in from a State
grant? Is it a body at the police station now that has to be
put over to this?
Mr. Riggio. No, I am--you know, we have a budget, the city
has a budget, that accounts for the personnel within the New
York City Police Department, and I am just one of them.
Ms. Sanchez. So every time that we pull you away from
crime-fighting because we need to do this, we need to ensure
that is moneys that you all are spending out of your own
pocket, that, you know, we expect you to be doing all this but
there is no real money in it?
Mr. Riggio. You know, Federal funding is an issue that
comes up. My duties are 100 percent solely to counterterrorism,
and so that is my function. Twice a month, I do go back to
patrol. But, essentially, my duties are strictly for
counterterrorism.
I apologize, I am not sure which question I am trying to
answer here.
Ms. Sanchez. I am trying to figure out, in a time of a lack
of resources, at a time when we don't have as many people as we
want on the beat, if you will, how we are going to fund pulling
people away from their basic mission, which is stop the bad
guys, to education, synergy, having plans in place and action
also. I am trying to figure out where you are getting the money
to do this.
Mr. Riggio. Well, like I said, we budget it through two
channels: Through the city's budget, which comes from taxes
right here within the city tax base, and, you know,
fortunately, we look to get a lot of Federal funding, as well.
I mean, we apply for grants just like everybody else, and we
push and we push and we push, because we know that it takes two
parts, it takes multi-jurisdictions to get this done.
We couldn't do it on our own. That is certainly for sure.
In this day and age, we can't. We know what the environment is
going to look like ever since September 11. Nothing is going to
change. The mentality that we have, as far as, ``work, work,
work, don't stop, you have to keep being on top of this,'' it
is not going to change. It is not going to change, as long as I
am going. So there needs to be a combination of city resources
and Federal resources, as well.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
I actually have one more question. May I ask it at this
point?
This has to do with--and I guess I would like to bring our
GAO specialist here. We just had a study done at the State
level in California with respect to where the homeland security
moneys are from the State. You know, pretty much, we send a lot
of the Federal moneys to the State, and the State gets it down,
supposedly, to the local levels. It was a pretty scathing
report about how jurisdictions are spending the money that is
given to them.
In particular, some say, well, you know, I mean, if you are
going to give me $90 because it is on a population-based
formula or something and so I am a little city, I am going to
get something, yes, I am going to buy, you know, ventilation
something or another that costs $89. I mean, it is not really
significant towards what we are really trying to do, in some
ways. This study basically said people are just spending money
because it is there, and they are spending it and they are not
really that strategic.
I am not saying all of them. I think I have, you know,
Mutual Aid and Sheriff Baca out there and everything that we
have going. But would it be more effective--I would like to ask
to our GAO specialist--have we seen this at Federal level? Have
we done a type of study recently that speaks to where the
moneys from the homeland security grants and things are going
to and how effective they have been?
One of the reasons that I hear from local agencies as to
why they are buying things is because, to a large extent, they
are not allowed to spend it on people, on personnel.
Can you talk a little to that? I don't know if it is your
area of expertise, if there is a study, if I just haven't seen
it or I have forgotten that I read it. Have we done it
recently? Do you have any comment with respect to this buying
things versus maybe putting the money more towards personnel?
Mr. Aloise. Let me try to answer that based on the work
that we have done in this area. There probably is a study; I
will check and get back to you if I find one.
What we found, talking to people at the Federal, State, and
local level, is that the State and local folks, when they get
this money, what they need is some guidance on what to buy,
what makes sense, and they are not getting that from the
Federal level. They need more help in terms of, what are we
supposed to defend against and what is the best equipment to
buy? Sometimes they just end up buying stuff because they don't
know what the right thing is to buy.
We have talked about this a lot in reports, that they need
more Federal guidance on what are the best ways, most efficient
ways to spend money, on what equipment. So there is a need to
get help to these people in terms of guidance at the State and
local levels.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. Thank you.
Thank you for your indulgence, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Clarke. We are going to do another round of
questioning. I hope that our witnesses will be able to just
hang in there with us. This is very intriguing, very important
information that this subcommittee needs.
I want to go to Mr. Miskin and ask for--can you give us an
update as to the installation of engineering upgrades in New
York City hospitals? Is New York complete as far as these
upgrades are concerned? If not, when you do anticipate that all
of the irradiators in the city will have these security
upgrades? Do you feel that Federal agencies have been effective
in working with you to achieve this goal?
Mr. Miskin. Madame Chairwoman, we have had three facilities
that were part of a pilot project in 2008 to have their cesium
chloride blood irradiators hardened. I understand that we will
be visited soon by NNSA to see if other facilities in the city
need to be upgraded and hardened, and we will be working with
them.
Ms. Clarke. So it is not quite complete as of yet?
Mr. Miskin. It is not.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. Okay.
Let me then turn to Mr. Aloise. I will ask you a question
about the challenges that cities would face with an RDD attack
using cesium chloride as a source and the medical response. I
think it is important for us to understand what we will be
dealing with should one of these sources be stolen and used as
a dirty bomb.
What are the critical challenges and difficulties in
recovering from an RDD attack, specifically using cesium
chloride as a source?
Mr. Aloise. Well, one of the problems with cesium--and this
is why recovery planning is so important, because recovery
planning starts in the response. We need to know how to clean
up some of these areas. Cesium, in particular, if you do it the
wrong way, it is going to end up costing you more money, and
you may have to demolish a building rather than just clean it
up. If you use a high-pressure hose on cesium, it actually
pushes it further into the building and makes the condition
worse.
So there has to be--in the response phase, there has to be
that recovery planning. After we have characterized what the
material is, determine the best way to clean it up, and let the
first responders know, ``On this particular building, you are
not supposed to use a high-pressure hose because that makes
things worse.''
Ms. Clarke. Very well. I think, you know, that, in
combination with the concern that Ms. Sanchez has about what we
are purchasing, what we are actually teaching or giving
guidance to with regard to jurisdictions around this Nation, it
compounds the problem.
Without the proper training and education and the
purchasing of just, you know, equipment for equipment's sake,
we are really building up a false sense of security in certain
jurisdictions around this Nation. I think it is really
important that DHS, sort of, gets on top of this.
Let me just ask that similar question. I see you are back,
Dr. Arquilla. What would you say are the most significant
challenges that the city would face if there were an RDD attack
using cesium chloride as a source, as far as the medical
response?
Dr. Arquilla. I mean, it is a really nasty radiation, so
there will be sick people. I think that is the No. 1 thing. If
I were to really boil it down, the greatest challenge is who is
sick and who is not and being able to tell. Also, looking at,
you know, who needs to be watched. If we were to, you know, use
something like a blood test, then that means we are testing
thousands and thousands of people and also waiting for the
results to get back.
So I think probably, from a medical point of view, the big
challenge is who is sick, who is not sick, who needs to be
watched and for how long. Some studies say you need to watch
people for 25 years. You know, that is a huge, a huge question
that you have to look at.
Just one other thing, too, is, if you were to, like, say,
``Okay, I don't know anything this, let me go to the CDC
website and look it up,'' there are probably, oh, hundreds of
documents on it. There is no easy, like, let me find it, this
is yes, this is no. I think that that--you know, it is like too
much knowledge is almost another part of what is going on.
Thank you.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
I now recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. Lungren from
California, for his questions at this time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
In terms of replicating things, you ought to contact the
people who manufacture your hand dryers in there. I went to the
restroom, and I thought that there was a high-pressure hose in
there. Either that or a jet engine. I have never heard so much
noise. It dried my hands completely. So talk to those folks.
Captain, when you talk about way of paying for these
things, I looked at my bill from the hotel, and we are doing
our part. We are paying the State $32, we are paying the city
$21, and then you have an occupancy tax of $3.50.
Mr. Riggio. We thank you for that.
Mr. Lungren. It may be helping your salary.
I think some people don't appreciate the Securing the
Cities program. That is a program that is specifically for this
three-State region. It is something that was supposed to be a
seed money program. It has discontinued, although I know a
number of people in the New York delegation are working hard
for it. Peter King and I have spoken out for it, because I do
think what you are doing here is important. But more than that,
I think it does give us some examples of what we must and can
do around the country.
Ms. Clarke. Will the gentleman yield just a minute?
Mr. Lungren. Yes, I would be happy to.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, we were successful in getting the funding
put into the appropriations bill. Hopefully it will remain
through the Senate reconciliation.
Mr. Lungren. So, I mean, it is important for us to
understand what you are doing with these funds and how it is
working in an effective way.
One of the things I noted in your testimony, you talked
about surveys and security recommendations, almost 100
facilities within the city of New York. Are those only medical
facilities, or are they industrial facilities?
If they are industrial facilities, was the industrial
facility in which you discovered that industrial radiograph
missing one of those that you have given special attention to?
Mr. Riggio. It was. The locations that I spoke about were
combined; it was medical and industrial facilities. That was a
facility that we had visited in the past. So we----
Mr. Lungren. Is it a concern of yours that it is one of
those that you visited in the past that had the understanding
that they should report something like this to you right away?
Or do you feel that that would be reported to your folks as a
theft or missing inventory with the dispatch that this was
reported to you?
Mr. Riggio. We were happy with the reporting here, that it
happened so quickly. Obviously, what we found out after the
investigation we were not happy with. This practice that we are
trying to uncover as to, is there more that happens with these
employees once they get off?
But as far as the reporting, I mean, they did exactly what
they should. They came in; they noticed this right away. They
called
9-1-1.
We handled it on two fronts: We handled internally within
our city and what we needed to do to try to locate is this.
But, also, the reason the Securing the Cities program exists is
for situations just like this. So we actually initiated a
Securing the Cities conference call and brought all our
partners into what was happening and had them stand up to a
certain level, as well.
Mr. Lungren. One of the reasons why it is important to have
this testimony from this panel is that, in the Congress, we
have done something over the last number of years since 9/11
which is a little different. We have tried to use homeland
security funds, programs, on a bipartisan basis that are risk-
based as opposed to strict population formula-based. That
debate continues to rage, and it is raised every single year.
Because you have to understand, oftentimes there is a
notion that funding ought to go fairly to everybody, no matter
what the risk is. It is important for us to remind ourselves
that risk-based funding is not only important from the
standpoint of those of us in Congress, but also the Executive
branch carrying that out, and then at the local and regional
levels, that they understand that is what the focus of these
programs are.
So, Mr. Aloise, you indicated in your testimony that the
GAO survey of agencies from these exercises that have occurred
on the State and municipal level has revealed, I believe your
language is, ``an overreliance on Federal help and the lack of
Federal planning in the event of an attack.''
Can you talk about that a little bit more?
Mr. Aloise. Yes, I am talking about recovery planning.
There has been lots of attention placed on response, not enough
on recovery yet. I think our first exercise won't be until 2010
on recovery. Most of the State and local people we surveyed see
the need for that, want the involvement of Federal Government,
want more interaction, including New York State, with the
Federal Government on planning.
As I mentioned earlier, part of a successful response is to
have your recovery planning into that, so you are not doing
things that are going to cause you problems in the long term.
Mr. Lungren. Here we are in New York. You were ground zero,
this city. We have just gone through the anniversary of 9/11.
One of the concerns that I have had and continue to have is the
lack of urgency we have, both on the Federal level and in local
levels. We haven't had an attack since 9/11 so we have let our
guard down. That would be the wrong message.
I hope what we are talking about here with this specific
problem is that we have to maintain or re-establish that
urgency, but do it in an intelligent way, as Dr. Arquilla says.
Let's understand what the threat is, not overhype it, not
underestimate it, but know what the facts are and then deal
with those facts.
So I thank you for your testimony. It has helped us very,
very much.
Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Sanchez. Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Madame Chairwoman, because of the time
constraints, I will be submitting some questions for the record
for the witnesses to answer, if that is okay with you.
Ms. Clarke. Before we conclude, I would just also like to
ask unanimous consent to submit a statement by the IP Radiation
Associates to the record.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of IP Radiation Security Associates
Dear Chairwoman Clarke and Members of the subcommittee: My name is
Keith Reynolds and I am the founder and principal of IP Radiation
Security Associates. I am also a co-founder of a company that develops
software to improve response procedures in the case of a radiological
event. I continue to work with Internet Protocol-based security and
radiation instrumentation companies to make our world safer from
criminal use of radiological materials. We are employing Internet
Protocol (IP) technologies to tie commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS)
security systems together with a variety of radiation detectors.
By networking radiation and various other COTS security systems we
can enhance the security of radiological sources, improve first
responder's ability to react to a radiological event and reduce costs
compared to proprietary detection systems. The implementation of IP
Radiation Security (IPRS) systems is especially important to the
programs like the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and those
considered under House Bill HR 2070, the Radiological Materials
Security Act introduced by Chairwoman Clarke. As taxpayers we will be
afforded greater protection for the money spent in this critical area.
The threat of terrorists abusing radioactive materials is grave.
The sheer availability of sources in facilities employing less than
optimal security programs creates a need for more public and private
investment in new security systems. We must also rethink how security
is implemented based on the improvements new technologies enable. Such
changes necessitate new knowledge and training to be sure. However, the
risk posed by the status quo is high. In my own work over the last
several years I have been in situations where I have had access to
significant amounts of radiological materials in facilities I would
consider less than secure.
I submit this statement for the record to highlight the threats
posed by radiological sources and offer a cost-effective solution for
Government and private efforts to secure them.
the threat posed by legitimate radiological materials
In the United States of America alone, there are nearly 23,000
licensees using radiological materials. These users are charged with
the security of roughly 2 million sources. There are some 10 million
sources worldwide.
Radiological materials can uniquely help solve the world's food,
energy, environmental, and cancer problems. However, growing use of
radiological material in these sectors, combined with the global threat
of terrorism, has increased the risk of unwanted radiation exposure.
Accordingly, radiation security has become as important, if not more
important, than the traditional Radiation Safety model, which has
existed for over 50 years.
A small amount of conventional explosives combined with stolen
radiological material is enough to create a ``dirty bomb'' (or RDD,
short for Radiological Dispersion Device). One thousand curies of
Cesium-137 (Cs-137) could fit in a soda can. Between 50 and 100 curies
of Cs-137 is enough to make a RDD that could shut a Grand Central
Station-sized building for a year or more as crews clean up the
facility to achieve Federally mandated background radiation levels.
A dirty bomb would not likely kill large numbers of people from
radiation poisoning. Such a device would certainly cause massive
economic disruption. Estimates are for up to $100 billion to clean up
dispersed material \1\ and as high as trillions in economic losses.\2\
A ``Radiological Emissions Device,'' where a relatively small amount of
radiological material is left in a public facility, presents a scenario
that could potentially injure or kill hundreds of people. Widespread
societal panic will surely ensue in both cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Public Still in the Dark When it Comes to Dirty Bomb
Threat'', by Stew Magnuson June 2008.
\2\ ``Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President Federation of
American Scientists before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations'',
March 6, 2002. On-line at: http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/
kelly_testimony_030602.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the problem of lost or stolen sources and illicit trafficking
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recorded 1,562
nuclear trafficking incidents from 1993 through 2008. Worldwide, the
number of reported cases of lost and stolen radiological materials has
been increasing according to the IAEA. These incidents range from
illegal efforts to dispose of radioactive materials, to discovery of
``orphaned'' nuclear material of unknown origin. In its 2008 annual
report released in August of this year, the IAEA received reports of 15
cases of clandestine nuclear possession, or related incidents and 16
cases involving theft or loss of sensitive substances. According to the
IAEA, these incidents are part of 119 events that were added to the
IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database in 2008, while this year to June,
the agency has received reports of 215 incidents. That is up from 85, 2
years prior, though the IAEA does have participation by additional
countries.
In an August 1, 2007 NY Times editorial entitled ``Seize the
Cesium'' by PETER D. ZIMMERMAN, JAMES M. ACTON and M. BROOKE ROGERS:
``In the United States, commercial users lose about one radioactive
source a Day . . . through theft, accidents or poor paperwork. One of
these is recovered perhaps every two days, either because the
radioactive materials are voluntarily returned or because of good
detective work.''
I have been studying the daily incident report activity posted on
the website of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Besides Cs-137,
of greatest concern to me is the number of incidents involving
significant amounts (30-100 Curies) of Iridium-192 (Ir-192) being
deployed in the field of radiography for applications such as verifying
pipeline welds. This survey of the NRC database of reported incidents
over the last several months show just how prone to human error
security is and highlights there is room for improvement. I submit for
the record one of these incidents where an improved security system
that integrates radiation detection, surveillance and communications
could have helped. More are posted with comments on our website,
www.IPradiationsecurity.com (with commentary) and at www.nrc.gov.
weapons of mass destruction
The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism's Report to U.S. Congress submitted
December 3, 2008, quoted Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) speaking to the United
Nations General Assembly on October 28, 2008: ``The possibility of
terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material remains a
grave threat . . . It is more likely than not that a weapon of mass
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world
by the end of 2013.'' In my own opinion, a RDD is probably the most
likely weapon to be used.
Programs to mitigate ``loose,'' or under-protected source materials
are growing at home and abroad. In the United States of America, we
have seen the NRC promulgate the Orders of Increased Control, GTRI has
seen increased funding and the Radiological Materials Security Act has
been introduced a second time. Abroad, radiological security has become
a way for President Obama to engage the world from a foreign policy
standpoint. Not only does the president advocate for the reduction of
nuclear weapons through arms reduction agreements, but there is also a
significant effort underway through these discussions to increase
security of all other radiological material that are at risk.
Funding security enhancements and implementing networked radiation-
monitoring systems that are interoperable with the security systems
already in place are two large challenges that we face in addressing
these security questions. Internet Protocol (IP)-based radiation
detection systems can help make our Nation safer from radiological
abuse by lowering costs and facilitating systems integration--just as
the internet has revolutionized many aspects of our society, we can
apply these technologies to do a better, faster, and more cost-
effective job protecting ourselves from the threats of radiological
terrorism.
what is ip radiation security?
A fully integrated enterprise security system provides near real-
time monitoring of persons who enter facilities that house radiological
materials and enhances control and reporting capabilities. Such systems
integrate and utilize information from many discreet security systems.
IPRS combines digital, or ``IP-enabled'' radiation monitoring
systems with other IP security tools, such as video surveillance,
access control, motion detection, and the enterprise security
management software in an integrated solution, or ``systems of
systems'' approach. By combining specialized tools it is possible to
better manage response procedures or ``CONOPS'' in case of a
radiological event. Beyond better procedural response, IP Radiation
Security tools can improve things such as forensic analysis, security
policy, training and reporting. IPRS video systems can even
automatically save video of an incident in a court-admissible format
for evidentiary purposes.
There are three major categories of radiological security:
(1) Custodial--protecting materials in the places where they are
used.
(2) Transport--monitoring the flow of goods and people to stop
unwanted movement of illicit materials.
(3) Ingress--protecting potential target locations from a dirty
bomb, or possibly the arrival of patients to a medical facility
after a nuclear event.
For the purposes of this hearing on Radiological Source Protection,
I have highlighted the application of these systems to Custodial
activities. It should be noted that IP security tools could also be
applied to Transport and Ingress applications. The waste management
industry is one additional sector that can also use IPRS tools to help
eliminate radioactive materials from transfer stations and landfills;
again, not the focus of this statement of record.
The IAEA recently released publication number 1387, entitled
Security of Radioactive Sources. It is an implementation guide for the
security of facilities housing radiological sources that provides a
comprehensive tool for legislators and regulators, physical protection
specialists and facility and transport operators, as well as for law
enforcement officers. (STI/PUB/1387, 66 pp.; 2009, ISBN 978-92-0-
102609-5, English. Date of Issue: 6 July 2009.)
Below, I have enclosed Table 2 from IAEA's Security of Radioactive
Sources publication, which outlines the specific objectives of a
radiological security program, based on the prerequisite threat
assessment that drives the prescribed security functions. This table
identifies the many ways a fully integrated systems approach to
radiation security can help to achieve the program recommended by the
IAEA.
IPRS systems can be designed for a stand-alone facility, or to be
incorporated into an enterprise security management software
environment to maximize the scope of response capabilities. Systems can
even enable communications that span across organizational boundaries.
In all cases a threat assessment is conducted, and a security plan is
developed, prior to systems design.
Below the IAEA's Table, I have taken the recommended security
functions and measures presented in the IAEA guide and provided a lower
level of detail to show how a range of commercial IP security systems,
configured to work together with IP-enabled radiation instrumentation,
can increase the likelihood of achieving the IAEA's stated security
objectives.
TABLE 2.--SECURITY LEVELS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Objectives
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security functions................... Security Level A Goal: Security Level B Goal: Security Level C Goal:
Prevent unauthorized Minimize likelihood of Reduce likelihood of
removal \1\ unauthorized removal unauthorized removal
\1\ \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detect............................... Provide immediate detection of any unauthorized access to the secured
area/source location
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide immediate Provide detection of Provide detection of
detection of any any attempted unauthorized removal
attempted unauthorized unauthorized removal of the source
removal of the source, of the source
including by an
insider
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide immediate assessment of detection
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide immediate communication to response personnel
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide a means to detect loss of source through verification
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delay................................ Provide delay after Provide delay to Provide delay to reduce
detection sufficient minimize the the likelihood of
for response personnel likelihood of unauthorized removal
to interrupt the unauthorized removal
unauthorized removal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response............................. Provide immediate Provide immediate Implement appropriate
response to assessed initiation of response action in the event of
alarm with sufficient to interrupt the unauthorized removal
resources to interrupt unauthorized removal of a source
and prevent the
unauthorized removal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security management.................. Provide access controls to source location that effectively restrict
access to authorized persons only
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ensure trustworthiness of authorized individuals
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Identify and protect sensitive information
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide a security plan
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ensure a capability to manage security events covered by security
contingency plan (see the Definitions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish security event reporting system
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Achievement of these goals will also reduce the likelihood of a successful act of sabotage.
systems and their capabilities
Radiation Detection.--Alerts from ``stand-off'' IP sensors
that sit on the security network and are strategically placed
in a facility. These sensors can transmit the ``activity''
levels in terms of dose rate to first responders. These sensors
give an indication of the strength of the source and ``energy
level,'' which helps to provide an indication of the isotope
that has been detected. Software from Defentect in Norwalk, CT
can gather specialized radiological data from many types of
detectors from manufacturers like Ludlum Measurements, located
in Sweetwater, TX, and transmit ``intelligent'' alerts to the
other components of the security framework to help radiation
safety personnel, security professionals, and public safety
officials better understand the situation to which they are
responding.
Video Surveillance.--Video from cameras in the area that
would capture a person's image and for storage in Digital Video
Recorders. Robust video surveillance software addresses many
other functions. Systems, like those from OnSSI of Pearl River,
NY, enable customized viewing of many cameras, pushing of video
to specified personnel on preset events, storage, and archival
management of thousands of hours of recorded video, easy search
interfaces to help security and radiation safety personnel
investigate incidents, and saving of video in tamperproof
court-admissible format. These systems offer ``analytics,''
such as license plate recognition and specific detection rules
for identifying suspicious activities.
Access Control.--Authorized persons requiring access to a
facility are required to provide information for use in
conjunction with a magnetic swipe, or RFID card. Identity
confirmation is made whenever the card (with PIN if required)
is used to access a door in the facility. The database record
created in the system can include the person's name, the door
accessed and date/time of the attempt to access a doorway. This
information can be combined with other elements of a
comprehensive security management system.
Interaction with a ``tamper strap'' device used to monitor
the containment receptacles in which radiological materials are
stored can trigger video surveillance, text messaging and calls
for personnel to investigate the incident.
Motion detection, a common feature of IP video surveillance
management systems from companies such as OnSSI, triggers
alerts to be generated to the system. Infrared sensors can also
identify motion in a facility.
Dry contact devices, which indicate that an analog
electronic circuit has either been opened or closed. These
enable a wide range of capabilities from identifying open
windows to taking the pulse from an analog radiation detector.
Equipment from companies like Defentect now exists to
``digitize'' the pulse from analog radiation instrumentation,
so that the signal can be included into an IP radiation
security system to enhance required security procedures.
Systems can automatically generate instructions based on
predetermined events to minimize injury, or loss of life.
Documented response procedures, or CONOPS can be presented to
responders in a variety of formats, so that they react to an
event in the best possible fashion as outlined in planning and
training.
Finally, all of these components must be configured to enable a
faster, more informed response by police, fire, medical, and private
security--in addition to management and regulatory officials. A
security infrastructure must offer multifaceted communications and
messaging between humans and machines. Examples of such communication
ranked in order of response criticality include:
(1) Send relevant data to other components of the security system
on the IP Network using a protocol called ``XML.''
(2) Broadcast video to guard stations, cars, handheld devices, cell
phones, laptop computers.
(3) Send SMS text messages with incident details to responder cell
phones and pagers.
(4) Send emails with incident details to personnel who need to be
informed, but not necessarily respond immediately.
(5) Log all data (including video) to a database for later
reporting, forensic analysis, training or policy analysis, and
future personnel training.
With proper design and integration, mobile and wireless systems can
also be supported to extend the security zone.
conclusion
Certainly, terrorists have proven their capability to commit crimes
against unsuspecting targets, making radiological security a bigger
concern than ever before. While radioactive materials offer significant
benefits to society and the vast majority is in well-secured
environments, there are cases where responsible licensees have lost
control of those sources. These cases represent only a small fraction
of the total sources in use, but there have been a few cases of
accidents, which have yielded serious consequences. Terrorism would
make a radiation situation far worse and create serious consequences
for civil society.
Vendors have begun to market COTS IPRS solutions that need broader
consideration. A growing number of radiation control, physical and
homeland security, and information technology professionals believe
additional safeguards, including the networking of radiation detectors
with IP-based security systems, is needed.
By including IPRS as part of an overall program that utilizes
industry standard IP security and surveillance tools, users of
radiological materials--and others concerned about securing facilities
from threats posed by radioactive materials--can implement radiation
security and response systems on a broader and much more cost-effective
basis than the proprietary systems deployed since 9/11.
IPRS is a natural extension of ``digital convergence'' in the
disciplines of security and information technology. IPRS offers a
reliable and cost-effective means to provide higher security for
radiological materials. Security tools that are commercially available
today can not only increase security, but also reduce start-up and
operating costs in implementing large-scale source protection
initiatives.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the
record. I am available to answer any questions you may have.
appendix a.--nrc incident report post from ipradiationsecurity.com blog
This is a case where IP radiation security systems would improve
the understanding of what happened. Networked surveillance video and IP
radiation sensors that work in concert with each other should have
monitored the door and strategic internal locations. The video images
and any radiation information (dose rate, count rate, energy level,
isotope) could have been immediately transmitted to guard stations,
corporate RSOs, local and State authorities, etc. as part of the
standard response procedures in a comprehensive security plan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Information or Other Event Number: 45301
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM Notification Date: 08/26/
Licensee: KAISER PERMANENTE 2009
Region: 1 Notification Time: 16:00
City: JONESBORO State: GA [ET]
County: CLAYTON Event Date: 08/22/2009
License No.: GA1276-1 Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Agreement: Y Last Update Date: 08/26/2009
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC JAMESON
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY Person (Organization):
10 CFR Section: JOHN WHITE (R1DO)
AGREEMENT STATE LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT--EXTERIOR ACCESS DOOR TO RADIOLOGY LAB FOUND
OPEN
While responding to an audible alarm, the Clayton County Police
Department found an exterior door open to the Radiology Lab at the
Kaiser Permanente Nuclear Medicine Clinic located in Jonesboro,
Georgia. The Clayton County Police Department notified the Federal
Bureau of Investigations and the Georgia Information Sharing and
Analysis Center. The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center
then contacted the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program.
The licensee is authorized to possess diagnostic imaging isotopes.
At this time, no information is available whether radiological material
is missing, or if the open door was the cause of the alarm. The
investigation is on-going.
* * * UPDATE FROM IRENE BENNETT TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1036 EDT ON 09/04/09 *
* *
The State conducted an inspection at the licensee's facility and
determined that no material was missing. A complete report will follow
later.
Notified FSME (Angela McIntosh), R1DO (James Dwyer), and ILTAB (via
e-mail).
These ``Event Notification Reports'' are posted to the NRC website
for public review.
Ms. Clarke. I would like to thank the witnesses for your
valuable testimony and for your willingness to participate in
today's hearing.
I would also like to thank the subcommittee Members that
traveled to Brooklyn yesterday to participate, all the way from
California. I hope you enjoyed your stay in our great borough,
our great city, and our great State.
Members will have 10 days to submit questions for the
record. Witnesses are reminded that Members may submit
additional questions in writing, and we ask that you reply to
the committee in writing in an expeditious manner.
Hearing no further business----
Mr. Lungren. Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Clarke. The gentleman from California.
Mr. Lungren. Before I respond to your inquiry about how we
enjoyed this, can I say am I going to wait until I get my ride
back to the train station before I can respond?
Ms. Clarke. That will be fine, Mr. Lungren. See you in
Washington.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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