[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: ASSESSING RISKS AND THE ROAD AHEAD
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-28
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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52-956 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Peter T. King, New York (Ex
James A. Himes, Connecticut Officio)
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Beland, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Joseph Vealencis, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 5
Witnesses
Mr. Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections,
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector
Network Management, Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Dr. Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Ms. Martha King, Pilot:
Oral Statement................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
Mr. Robert P. Olislagers, Executive Director, Centennial Airport:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
Mr. Jeremy Rogalski, Investigative Reporter, KHOU-TV:
Oral Statement................................................. 54
Prepared Statement............................................. 55
Mr. Mark Van Tine, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Jeppessen, Incorporated:
Oral Statement................................................. 56
Prepared Statement............................................. 58
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Letter......................................................... 3
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection:
Letter From the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America...................................................... 24
Letter......................................................... 25
Appendix
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Carlton
I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of
the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security......... 77
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Mr.
John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector
Network Management, Transportation Security Administration..... 78
Questions From Ranking Member Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
Mr. John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector
Network Management, Transportation Security Administration..... 79
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Dr.
Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security.............. 79
Questions From Ranking Member Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for
Dr. Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security.............. 80
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Martha
King, Pilot.................................................... 80
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Robert
P. Olislagers, Executive Director, Centennial Airport.......... 81
GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: ASSESSING RISKS AND THE ROAD AHEAD
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Wednesday, July 15, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Norton,
Kirkpatrick, Lujan, Massa, Titus, Dent, Lungren, Olson, and
Austria.
Ms. Jackson Lee [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order. I am particularly pleased to be holding this hearing. I
am pleased to acknowledge the presence of my Ranking Member,
Mr. Dent, as well as Mr. Olson of Texas and Mr. Austria of
Ohio.
You know where I was going to put you? Hawaii. Would you
like to be there now? Mr. Austria of Ohio, of course I know.
Thank you, welcome.
Likewise, Ms. Titus of Nevada and Mr. Massa, we are very
delighted to have you here.
He wants me to know, I know, Ohio. Thank you very much.
I am pleased to hold this hearing, because this is a
bipartisan effort. In one of our markups, I agreed with Mr.
Olson of Texas that we should have this hearing. But
interestingly enough, our committee has been working on these
issues for quite a while. We frankly believe that, to secure
this Nation in its entirety, the good fortune of the Homeland
Security Committee is to be engaged in preventative medicine
and to work diligently to overcome, if you will, some of the
misconceptions.
I also want to make note of the fact that we are pleased
that, in the regulatory stage, as Mr. Sammon has indicated, the
industry raised their voices and has had very substantial
input. So, we look forward to making progress that does not
diminish the high responsibility of securing the homeland; at
the same time, however, being considerate of some important
issues that have been raised.
So, the subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony
on general aviation security, about risks and the road ahead.
Our witnesses today will testify on security risks associated
with general aviation and help Members assess TSA's existing
and proposed security programs for general aviation. It will
also address how effectively relevant DHS components are
working together to secure this important arena.
Today, we are here to discuss the critical issue of
securing our general aviation system. We will consider the
risks facing general aviation generally, whether a regulatory
regime is required, whether we are doing enough to secure in-
bound general aviation aircraft from being utilized to
transport or deploy WMD, and we will hear perspective from non-
governmental stakeholders.
The general aviation industry is a vital component to our
economy, having an economic impact of $100 billion annually,
supporting 1.3 billion--million--1.3 million jobs. This tracks,
of course, the commitment of our President, who wants to either
create new jobs or save jobs.
General aviation encompasses aircraft of virtually every
size that perform a wide variety of missions, from crop-dusting
to large passenger charters. Further, international in-bound
general aviation accounts for about 400 flights per day. Most,
about 75 percent, are from Canada and Mexico, and the remainder
is from a variety of countries.
Last year, TSA released its Large Aircraft Security Program
rulemaking for general aviation security. While I think it is
imperative that the Federal Government look at risks and
address them, it is clear that this rulemaking process did not
take into account some serious concerns raised by stakeholders.
One in particular, of course, dealt with poundage or tonnage of
the particular aircraft and what level of security should be
placed depending on the size of the plane--a reasonable
proposition that I think we have heard, and we will assess and
address.
Led by Chairman Thompson, this committee expressed its
concern with TSA's Large Aircraft Security Program. Today, we
will hear from TSA and industry about whether the process has
been improved and what the final rule may look like. Under my
leadership, the House recently approved H.R. 2200 with
overwhelming support. The bill includes provisions to
significantly improve stakeholder input into TSA programs and
polices for general aviation.
It is important for us to discuss the rule for general
aviation security. But it is equally important for this hearing
to also consider whether DHS as a whole is doing all that it
should to secure general aviation.
In his recent book, ``The Inheritance: The World Obama
Confronts and the Challenges to American Power'', the chief
Washington correspondent for the New York Times, David Sanger,
interviews Vayl Oxford, the former director of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office at DHS--in the book, Oxford considers
the prospect of someone flying--and of course, just so that you
know that we really read here, this book, I think, is quite
good, to my Ranking Member--the prospect of someone flying a
nuclear weapon into the United States on a private plane and
then detonating it in the air over a major city. In the book,
Oxford asserts: My worry is that you wouldn't even have to land
the jet.
Accordingly, staff has been looking into this hypothetical
to determine what the Department is doing to mitigate such a
risk. Regrettably, TSA and the rest of DHS do not seem to have
a harmonious approach to this problem. One of the issues that
really begs for my consternation is the report by the Office of
Inspector General that frankly, I believe, does an overwhelming
disservice to the importance of homeland security and alerting
people to the dangers or the vulnerabilities of an unsecure
general aviation system.
To be able to write in a summary, ``We determine that
general aviation presents only limited and mostly hypothetical
threats to security,'' is irresponsible. To make light of a
civilian report on various general aviation airports that were
penetrated is, I believe, both disrespectful and certainly not
encompassing of the thorough work that I would like to see from
our governmental agencies.
Entities such as TSA assume that other components, like
CBP, are taking measures that they are, in fact, not taking.
Today, we will try to learn from DNDO about the risks posed by
in-bound general aviation, how the Department is attempting to
mitigate such risks, and what we in the Congress can do to
help. I think today's hearing will lay important markers about
general aviation security and how DHS can more efficiently
harness its resources. My subcommittee stands ready to provide
DHS with the support it needs to keep the American people safe.
Yes, I believe in partnership with the Ranking Member. We
are concerned about the industry, the jobs, and ensuring that
we can have a balanced approach to the security of general
aviation. I welcome that input today.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony,
especially our second panel, for making the effort to come to
Washington, to enlighten us on this issue. Without objection, I
submit for inclusion at an appropriate place in the record two
news stories authored by one of our witnesses, Jeremy Rogalski,
examining general aviation airports in the Houston area,* and
the letter sent by Chairman Thompson to TSA earlier this year
regarding its large aircraft security program. Hearing no
objection, so ordered.
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* The information referred to has been retained in committee files.
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[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted for the Record by Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
March 2, 2009.
Mr. Erik Jensen,
Assistant General Manager, Policy and Plans, Office of General
Aviation, TSNM, TSA-28, U.S. Transportation Security
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202-
4220.
Dear Mr. Jensen: The purpose of this letter is to submit comments
on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) issued by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regarding the Large
Aircraft Security Program, Other Aircraft Operator Security Program,
and Airport Operator Security Program (Large Aircraft Security Program
NPRM), which appeared in the Federal Register on October 30, 2008 [TSA-
2008-0021].
Based upon my concerns over the issues raised in the following
discussion, I urge TSA to delay implementation of final rulemaking with
regard to the Large Aircraft Security Program until the new TSA
leadership has had an opportunity to review the NPRM and engage with
Congress and industry stakeholders.
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001 (ATSA) which requires a security program for charter aircraft
weighing 12,500 pounds or more and a report from TSA detailing measures
which would be necessary to improve general aviation security.\1\ The
9/11 Commission expressed concerns regarding vulnerabilities in
aviation security and found that ``[M]ajor vulnerabilities still exist
in cargo and general aviation security. These, together with inadequate
screening and access controls, continue to present aviation security
challenges.''\2\
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\1\ Pub. L. 107-71, Sec 132.
\2\ The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
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The Committee on Homeland Security has worked diligently to ensure
that the recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission Report were
passed into law. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act directed TSA to develop a risk-based
threat and vulnerability assessment for general aviation airports,
study the establishment of a grant program for general aviation
security, and require international in-bound general aviation aircraft
operators to submit advanced passenger information to Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) before entering the United States.\3\
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\3\ Pub. L. 110-53, Sec 1617.
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The Large Aircraft Security Program which would be established by
the NPRM would require new security mandates for general aviation
aircraft operators with aircraft of 12,500 pounds or greater. These
mandates include conducting background and criminal history checks for
flight crews, using a third-party watch list service provider to
validate passengers against the Federal aviation watch lists,
designating security coordinators at corporations and businesses
operating the aircraft, and checking property on-board the aircraft for
unauthorized persons and prohibited items. Although Congress has
supported increased general aviation security protocols in the past,
and will continue to do so, numerous concerns from industry
stakeholders who would be impacted by the proposed protocols have been
communicated to the committee. As such, the committee was pleased that
TSA extended the initial comment period for the NPRM and conducted a
series of five public meetings across the country to receive input from
the general aviation community.
While all of the concerns expressed by stakeholders have merit,
several critical elements in the NPRM, in particular, appear to be
problematic, infeasible, or overly burdensome to industry. The
committee is also concerned that the formulation of the NPRM was not
based on a threat and risk methodology process tailored to the general
aviation environment. I encourage TSA to continue to work with
stakeholders in crafting a sensible, risk-based approach to improving
general aviation security and to do so in a timely fashion.
The following comments outline the committee's concerns with the
NPRM.
watch list matching of passengers
The NPRM establishes a process whereby third-party watch list
service providers would conduct watch list matching for passengers on
large general aviation aircraft. This use of a third-party vendor would
shift the responsibility away from individual aircraft operators.\4\
The NPRM states that this is an interim step until the Secure Flight
system is fully operational. However, this proposed interim step raises
several concerns. First, Congress has directed TSA to assume the
aviation watch list matching function and TSA has subsequently
developed the Secure Flight program. There is a question as to whether
the use of third-party service providers to perform this function, as
provided in the NPRM, in general aviation on a short-term basis would
undermine Congressional intent to have TSA administer watch list
matching. Moreover, it seems that the use of third-party vendors would
require the release of confidential watch list information to the
private sector. Additionally, it appears that this policy would
indirectly impose a fee on general aviation operators for a service
that commercial airlines receive without a fee. Since Secure Flight
should be operational at some point in 2009, TSA should consider
integrating general aviation watch list matching procedures into the
Secure Flight system so that stakeholders will not be tasked with
implementing a separate, interim watch list matching process.
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\4\ Certain large general aviation aircraft operators are already
required to perform passenger watch list matching such as operators of
private charter aircraft. Currently for these operators, TSA provides
the No-Fly and Selectee lists to the operators.
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In addition, the unspecified time requirements for conducting watch
list matching in advance of a flight are of considerable concern to the
general aviation industry. As you may know, the general aviation
industry routinely performs unscheduled flights, often with very short
notice. This kind of advance matching in the general aviation context
could have adverse economic consequences on the general aviation
community. Further, the proposed rule does not provide a protocol for
general aviation aircraft operators if a prospective passenger is
selected for secondary screening. Industry stakeholders should be
involved in the development of a feasible protocol to address this
scenario.
Finally, in addition to requiring the use of a third-party vendor
for watch list matching services, the proposed rule would require
general aircraft operators to contract with a third-party auditor to
conduct biennial audits of watch list matching compliance. Not only
does this requirement appear to be an additional unfunded mandate on
aircraft operators, it would be a delegation of TSA's Federal
responsibility to protect aviation security to the private sector. TSA
should work with stakeholders to develop a process with a less costly
impact on the general aviation industry, exerts stringent security
controls over the personal data of private individuals who undergo
watch list matching and supports the Federal Government's security
interests in these sensitive areas.
unauthorized persons and accessible weapons on-board large aircraft
The NPRM tasks aircraft operators with adopting procedures to
prevent passengers from carrying prohibited items onto the aircraft.
While unauthorized weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and other
destructive substances must be excluded from general aviation aircraft,
this rule appears to apply a commercial passenger security checkpoint
standard to general aviation. Given that general aviation aircraft are
configured differently from commercial aircraft, with cargo hold access
being generally available to passengers, the rules for prohibited items
aboard general aviation aircraft should be tailored to a risk-based
methodology and assessment specifically developed for general aviation
aircraft and their passengers. This assessment should be completed
before implementing inspection and seizure protocols that may not be
feasible or warranted in a general aviation environment. Additionally,
it should be noted that the risk assessment should include delineation
between protocols for Part 91 operators who have greater knowledge and
control over passengers and Part 135 operators who are available for
hire and may have more limited knowledge of their passengers.
The committee commends TSA for its efforts to strengthen
vulnerabilities in general aviation as recommended and encouraged by
the 9/11 Commission, and prescribed by statute. The committee has
serious concerns, however, about several components in the NPRM as
described above. Therefore, I urge TSA to postpone final implementation
of general aviation security regulations until the new TSA leadership
has had the opportunity to review the NPRM and engage in discussion
with Congress and industry stakeholders.
If you have further questions, please contact Rosaline Cohen, Chief
Counsel of the Committee on Homeland Security.
Sincerely,
Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking
Member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, for conducting this
hearing. We certainly appreciate the courtesies you have
extended on this issue. Also, before we begin, I would like to
say thanks to all of you here today for participating. Our
subcommittee has been very, very busy thus far this Congress.
So, I was very pleased to see the Chair make time for this
important hearing.
As Ranking Member of this subcommittee, and as a Member of
the committee on transportation and infrastructure's
subcommittee on aviation, I am deeply interested in general
aviation and hope this hearing serves as an opportunity to
inform others of the vital role general aviation plays in the
United States. Although general aviation flights account for
some 77 percent of all domestic flights in America, it is not
well understood by most Americans.
Supporters of general aviation come from all walks of life,
not just corporate businesses who rely on these aircraft to
meet client demands. In fact, some famous people like Harrison
Ford and John Travolta are licensed pilots. Some less famous
people, like my neighbor, Mark Kappas, fly corporate aviation.
It is therefore truly unfortunate that recent events have
painted all of general aviation with the same brush as a symbol
of wealth and excess. This is absolutely not the case.
General aviation supports over a million American jobs and
adds about $150 billion to the American economy. In 2005,
general aviation supported businesses totaling over $11 billion
just in Texas and another $6 billion in my home State of
Pennsylvania. We have a proud tradition of general aviation in
my State.
Furthermore, while commercial airlines reach only about 350
major metropolitan areas, there are some 19,000 air fields, air
strips, and general aviation airports that reach the rest of
the United States. If it is not scheduled commercial service or
military flight, it is general aviation. While I recognize that
general aviation is so very important to our small rural
communities and towns, it also poses certain risks that may
require some mitigation.
For example, few aircraft have keys. Aircraft can move much
faster than cars and thus give our response capabilities less
time to react. Finally, it gets a little dicey trying to pull
over a general aviation aircraft with an F-16.
I also understand that Dr. Gallaway of the DNDO, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, has some concerns for the
possibility that a terrorist might charter general aviation
aircraft and use it as a mechanism for the delivery of a weapon
of mass destruction, a very real concern.
As I also sit on this committee's intelligence
subcommittee, I can say that I have never been briefed on such
a plot, either real or hypothetical. Nevertheless, despite the
exceptionally low probability of such an occurrence, as
highlighted by the inspector general's report--the
exceptionally high consequence certainly merits further review.
So, I look forward to Dr. Gallaway's testimony on this subject.
The threat of a terrorist attack through general aviation,
of course, is a very real concern. I am pleased that the
Chairwoman has shared with us David Sanger's book. A lot of
factors weigh in here--you know, the weight of the plane,
international flights, and a lot of things we probably ought
not discuss in an open session. But nevertheless, it is
important that we talk about this issue and also understand, in
some respects, it is a separate and distinct issue from the
LASP program that we are going to get into here in a little
bit.
Certainly, while general aviation could potentially provide
opportunities to allow unauthorized persons and materials into
the sterile area of an airport or airfield, I have strong
reservations about the Department's attempt to address these
potential vulnerabilities with a heavy-handed, one-sided
approach. Of course, I am speaking of the Department's Large
Aircraft Security Program proposal released in October of last
year.
I am very interested in learning how the Department
developed its initial LASP rulemaking, especially since it
appears it summarily rejected any input by the general aviation
stakeholders during the development of the proposed rule. At
first blush, it appears the Department took everything it knew
about risk-based asset allocation and performance-based
standards and tossed it out the window. It checked the box in
terms of consulting with relevant stakeholders and then went on
its own way. This was a case of Government heavy-handedness
that I think that most of us do not embrace.
However, since March, the TSA has reached out extensively
to general aviation stakeholder groups in a very public and a
very inclusive way. I understand that TSA may be close to
drafting a new rulemaking for regulating the general aviation
community--a rulemaking built on collaboration and not
confrontation. I think this is absolutely the right approach. I
want to thank Mr. Sammon publicly and right now for his
leadership on this matter. I know he has taken this very
seriously. I appreciate his help on this.
Nevertheless, given the TSA's history in this particular
area, I thought it important to introduce H.R. 3093, the
General Aviation Security Enhancement Act of 2009, a bipartisan
piece of legislation that requires the TSA to undergo a
negotiated rulemaking to establish new general aviation
security regulations.
Again, I would like to also specifically acknowledge Ed
Perlmutter, our friend and former Member of the committee,
Homeland Security Committee alumnus, for cosponsoring this
legislation.
So, Madame Chairwoman, we have a lot to cover today. But I
would beg your indulgence as I yield the balance of my time to
my good friend and fellow supporter of this general aviation
issue, to Mr. Olson of Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Olson. Well, thank you.
Hey, hit the microphone. It helps. Thank you, my colleague,
Mr. Dent, for yielding your time.
Thank you, Madame Chairwoman for agreeing to hold this
important hearing. This issue is of great importance to the
Houston area. I am glad to see this subcommittee take an
interest in it.
General aviation is a vital component of our national
economy and contributes over $11 billion to the Texas economy.
By rough count, the 22nd District of Texas is home to a dozen
small airports that serve the general aviation community,
including Sugar Land Regional, Pearland Regional, and Ellington
Field. The security of those airports, aircraft, pilots, and
passengers is a great concern of mine.
However, I believe we must ensure that Congress and
Government agencies do not go overboard in legislating or
rulemaking in a way that would make it difficult for them to do
business. I was pleased to see some good, common-sense
provisions included in the TSA Authorization Act regarding
general aviation, including an amendment I offered during the
full committee mark-up prohibiting the outsourcing of the
terrorist watch list to third-party contractors.
I will explore this issue further during my time for
questions and will be interested on hearing the panel's
thoughts on these issues.
Thank you again, Madame Chairwoman, for agreeing to host
this hearing. I look forward to working with the subcommittee
on these important matters, today, and in the future. I yield
back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. The gentleman has yielded back.
Having consulted with the Ranking Member on the matter, the
subcommittee will now view a video related to the issue being
addressed at today's hearing.
[Video played.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. As we begin, I think it is clear that we
are looking at several issues. Mr. Sammon, I think, we've
captured in some previous conversations. We are looking at
vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities represent not only the
existence of the craft, the aircraft, but also perimeter. So,
we cannot look cross-eyed at the holistic concept of general
aviation. We must look at it for all of its elements.
Let me indicate that, to those Members who have come in, I
want to welcome you. Mr. Lujan, Ms. Kirkpatrick, Ms. Norton,
and Mr. DeFazio, welcome to the committee.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I welcome our first panel of witnesses. Our first witness
is Carlton Mann. Mr. Mann has served as the Department of
Homeland Security's assistant inspector general for inspections
since 2006. In that position, Mr. Mann provides the inspector
general with a means to analyze programs quickly and evaluate
operational efficiency and vulnerability across the spectrum of
DHS components. Mr. Mann was previously a senior program
analyst with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Office
of Inspector General.
Our second witness, John Sammon, is the assistant
administrator for transportation sector network management. He
leads a unified effort to protect and secure our Nation's
transportation systems. Mr. Sammon brings more than 25 years of
transportation experience to his position, including management
of customer networks for railroads, motor carriers, ocean
carriers, petrochemical manufacturers, ports, and other public
agencies.
Our third witness is Dr. Charles Gallaway. He is the deputy
director of DNDO. Dr. Gallaway joined DNDO as a career SES with
32 years of service in the U.S. Government.
Prior to joining DNDO, Dr. Gallaway served the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency as a director of the Chemical and
Biological Technologies Directorate, responsible for
transformational research and development to protect the
warfighter from the threat posed by chemical and biological
warfare agents. He has been involved with the development of a
variety of close-in sensors to non-intrusively identify and
characterize a nuclear weapon.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Mann.
First of all, allow me to thank all of you for your public
service. We look forward to hearing from you this afternoon.
Mr. Mann.
STATEMENT OF CARLTON I. MANN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mann. Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member
and Members of the subcommittee. I am Carlton Mann, assistant
inspector general for inspections, Office of the Inspector
General at the Department of Homeland Security. I certainly
thank you for this opportunity to discuss our report, TSA's
Role in General Aviation Security.
In early February 2007, a Houston-area television station
broadcast a report that alleged that there were deficiencies in
security at regional airports near the city, and that those
deficiencies represented a serious homeland security threat.
The broadcast was titled: ``Is Houston a Sitting Duck For
Terrorism?'' The report described visits by reporters to some
Houston area general aviation airports to test airport
security. Three were mentioned specifically: Sugar Land
Regional Airport, David Wayne Hooks Airport, and the Lone Star
Executive Airport.
Madame Chairwoman, you conveyed to us your concerns about
the implications of this report and requested that we examine
the issue. After meeting with you and your staff, we visited
all three airports and a few general aviation facilities at
other major metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, Chicago, and New
York.
General aviation is commonly defined as all aircraft
operations other than military and scheduled commercial
passenger service. The vast majority of flight operations in
the United States, approximately 230,000 aircraft, are engaged
in general aviation. As the Ranking Member mentioned, there are
approximately 19,000 airfields at which no scheduled commercial
passenger operations normally occur--only general aviation.
Even at commercial airports, there is usually some type of a
general aviation operation.
We began our inspection. We defined the objectives to align
with the interest expressed in the situation near Houston and
the implications of general aviation activities occurring near
major cities. We also focused on DHS's activities and
responsibilities regarding general aviation. Our objectives
were to identify TSA security requirements for general aviation
airports and security measures taken, steps non-Federal
stakeholders have taken to enhance security, and any incidents
of concern with security at general aviation airports.
Our team visited 11 airports, where we interviewed managers
and security staff. At each site, we also met with the nearest
TSA officials responsible for aviation security. We examined
Government and public records, consulted with some industry
stakeholders, and obtained information from TSA headquarters.
We believe that the basic facts contained in the television
report were accurate. However, we did not find those facts to
be of significance from a homeland security perspective. For
example, one of the incidents described the television crew
driving up to a closed gate at Hooks Airport, ringing the
callbox for admission and being admitted. The report stated:
The gate slid open letting us past the barbed wire and onto the
tarmac. No one asked us any questions.
When we visited Hooks, we were told that that is exactly
what is supposed to happen, since the system is not intended to
interrogate visitors. Specifically, the purpose of the remote-
controlled gate with the intercom is to ensure that the
airfield personnel will be aware of any vehicle coming onto the
field. From that point, the vehicle and its passengers can be
monitored or questioned as necessary to maintain safe
operations.
The television report also described fencing at Sugar Land
Airport that does not completely encircle the perimeter of the
field. Our inspectors examined that fence, as well as the
unfenced property around the field, which borders a swamp and a
prison. Managers at Sugar Land told us that the purpose for the
fence is to direct normally occurring traffic off of the
landscaped portions of the property onto the paved access
passages.
The airport property includes large unused acreage quite
some distance from aircraft operations. Most important aspect
of the facility's security program, managers told us, involved
maintaining control over the flight line area, not distant
unused grass.
The third incident in the report involved the television
reporter entering Lone Star Executive Airport and walking close
to a parked aircraft. The managers at all three airfields told
us it is routine for people on foot to approach parked aircraft
at public airfields. Unlike commercial aviation, where airport
passengers are sequestered and led down a ramp onto a plane, in
general aviation facilities, airfield personnel, maintenance
teams, pilots, and their passengers might be near aircraft or
on the flight line all day.
The important security issues are: Is the aircraft under
the control of its owner? Is the flight system locked or
otherwise inoperable by others? Is the person who is
approaching the aircraft being observed from a security post or
control tower? Is any suspicious activity occurring near the
aircraft? Is all aircraft movement coordinated with the control
tower or with base operations?
It is possible to steal an aircraft. We certainly don't
assert that a plane cannot be flown without its owner's
permission. However, aircraft thefts are extremely rare. An
attempted theft would almost certainly be noticed.
At each of the airfields we visited, we asked for
information about any incidents of concern relating to general
aviation facilities or aircraft. There were none. We also
requested information from TSA about incidents reported at
general aviation, through the General Aviation Hotline. Most of
the incidents were characterized simply as suspicious activity,
though a few were for property theft, vandalism, unlocked
gates, or anonymous tips about narcotics smuggling.
As indicated earlier, one of our objectives for this
inspection was to identify measures taken by TSA to secure
general aviation. A list of those measures is contained in our
report. We did not evaluate the cost benefit issues relating to
those measures or make any judgments about them. We determined
that TSA, even while it actively pursued all its other
mandates, has also paid significant attention to general
aviation.
When one of our inspections reveals an opportunity for
improving a DHS program, we normally address a recommendation
to the component head to rectify the condition. In this
instance, we did not identify problems with TSA's activities.
We released the results of our inspection without making
recommendations.
Various Government industry studies have concluded that the
risks associated with general aviation are relatively limited.
Reports previously released by the General Accountability
Office and the Congressional Research Service are consistent
with this view. GAO concluded that the small size, lack of fuel
capacity and minimal destructive power of most general aviation
aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists, and thereby
reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse.
The Congressional Research Service reported that typical
general aviation aircraft are too light to use as a platform
for conventional explosives. Moreover, heightened vigilance
among airport operators and pilots would make it difficult to
load the necessary quantity of explosives without detection.
The report concluded that, as a platform for conventional
explosives, the threat posed by light general aviation aircraft
is relatively small compared to the threat posed by trucks.
We are aware that our report may be used by those who are
arguing either for or against a particular piece of regulation.
We don't believe that our report is extensive enough to support
such a debate. One of the most frequently quoted sentences from
our report is, ``General aviation presents only limited and
mostly hypothetical threats to security.'' We believe this to
be true. More importantly, it is consistent with the threat
information we reviewed.
We have been forthcoming about the scope of our field work
and about the goals that we established for this inspection. We
had no bureaucratic inclination to dismiss the concerns
expressed by the KHOU broadcast. A cynic can always wonder
whether the DHS inspector general report would go easy or
whitewash a DHS program. But DHS managers will tell you
otherwise.
Madame Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I
would be happy to answer questions that you or the subcommittee
have.
[The statement of Mr. Mann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carlton I. Mann
July 15, 2009
Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Dent, and Members
of the subcommittee. I am Carlton Mann, Assistant Inspector General
(AIG) for Inspections for the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss our recent report TSA's Role in General Aviation Security.
background
In early February 2007, a Houston-area television station broadcast
a report that alleged there were deficiencies in security at regional
airports near the city, and that those deficiencies represented a
serious homeland security threat. The broadcast was titled ``Is Houston
a Sitting Duck For Terrorism?''
The report described visits by reporters to some of the area's
general aviation airports to test airport security. Three were
mentioned specifically: Sugar Land Regional Airport in the town of
Sugar Land, about 25 miles southwest of Houston; David Wayne Hooks
Airport in Spring, 30 miles northwest of the city; and Lone Star
Executive Airport in Conroe, 45 miles to the north.
Madame Chairwoman, you conveyed to us your concerns about the
implications of this report and requested we examine the issue as it
pertains to the Department of Homeland Security. After meeting with you
and your staff, we undertook field visits to all three airports and to
a few other general aviation facilities near other major metropolitan
areas: Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York.
our review
General aviation is commonly defined as all aircraft operations
other than military and scheduled commercial passenger traffic. The
vast majority of flight operations in the United States, approximately
230,000 aircraft, are engaged in general aviation. There are
approximately 20,000 airfields and helipads at which no scheduled
commercial passenger operations normally occur--only general aviation.
Even at commercial airports, there is usually some type of a general
aviation operation.
As is normal in our evaluation process, before we began, we defined
our inspection objectives to align with the interest expressed in the
situation near Houston, and the implications of general aviation
activities occurring near major cities. We also focused, as we must, on
DHS activities and responsibilities. This is significant because most
aspects of aircrew, aircraft, and airfield operations are overseen by
the Federal Aviation Administration within the Department of
Transportation.
Our team visited ten airports and interviewed managers and security
staff. At each site, we also met with the nearest Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) officials responsible for aviation
security. We examined Government and public records, consulted with
some industry stakeholders, and obtained information from TSA
headquarters.
It would not have been practical for our office to perform any kind
of comprehensive assessment of the entire industry. Our objectives for
this inspection were to identify TSA security requirements for general
aviation airports, threats to general aviation, measures taken to
secure general aviation, steps non-Federal stakeholders have taken to
enhance the security of general aviation, and any ``incidents of
concern'' with security at general aviation airports.
our findings
We believe that the basic facts contained in the television report
were accurate. However, we did not conclude that those facts were of
significance from a homeland security perspective.
For example, one of the incidents described the television crew
driving up to a closed gate at David Wayne Hooks Airfield, ringing the
callbox for admission, and being admitted. The report stated: ``A loud
buzzing occurred and the gate slid open letting us past the barb wire
and onto the tarmac. No one asked us any questions.''
When our team visited Hooks, we were told that this is exactly what
is supposed to happen. The purpose of the remote-controlled gate with
the intercom is to ensure that airfield personnel will be aware of any
vehicle coming onto that section of the field. From that point on, the
vehicle and its passengers can be monitored or questioned as necessary
to maintain safe operations. The system is not intended to provide an
opportunity to interrogate the visitor, merely to establish oversight
and control.
The television report also described fencing at Sugar Land Regional
Airport that does not completely encircle the perimeter of the field.
Our inspectors examined this fence, and also the unfenced areas of the
property, which border a prison and a swamp. Managers at Sugar Land
told us that the purpose of the fencing is to direct normally occurring
pedestrian and vehicle traffic off the landscaped portions of the
property facing the main road and onto the paved passages intended for
their access. The airport property includes large unused acreage quite
some distance from aircraft operations. The most important aspects of
the facility's security program, managers told us, involved maintaining
control over the flight line area, not distant unused grass. Any fence,
they added, could easily be scaled by an intruder. And whatever threat
an intruder would pose on the perimeter of the property is no greater
than the threat the same person would pose if he or she was 10 feet
further away but on the other side of a fence.
The third and final incident in the report involved the television
reporter entering Lone Star Executive Airport and walking close to a
parked aircraft. As managers at all three airfields told us, it is not
uncommon for people on foot to approach parked aircraft at a public
airfield. Unlike commercial aviation, where airport passengers are
sequestered and then led down a ramp and onto the plane, at general
aviation facilities individuals walk directly to the aircraft. An
aircraft owner, who is frequently the pilot, usually does not wear a
uniform and their passengers do not have tickets. Airfield personnel,
maintenance teams, and pilots and their passengers might be near the
flight line all day. We were told that security did not involve
separating aircraft from people. The greater and more important
security issues are:
Is the aircraft under the control of its owner?
Is its flight system (not necessarily its door) locked or
otherwise inoperable by others?
Is the person who is approaching the aircraft being observed
from a security post or control tower?
Is any suspicious activity occurring near the aircraft?
Is all aircraft movement coordinated with the control tower
or with base operations?
It is possible, of course, to steal an aircraft. We do not assert
that no one can fly a plane without the owner's permission. It is,
however, extremely rare, and almost certain to be noticed.
Our review also examined the several cases in which aircraft have
for one reason or another struck buildings. We are of course forever
mindful of the horrible events of September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, in
most cases when an aircraft impacts a building, the damage to the
building and its occupants has been limited.
At each of the airfields we visited, we asked for information about
any incidents of concern relating to general aviation facilities or
aircraft. There were none. We also requested information from TSA about
incidents reported to the General Aviation Hotline. TSA gave us
detailed year-by-year lists, which showed that the number of reports
had declined since 2004 (the first year for which we collected data)
and that in 2007, the last full year before our fieldwork, the total
was 66 reports, Nation-wide. Most of these were characterized simply as
``suspicious activity,'' though a few were for property theft,
vandalism, unlocked gates, or an anonymous tip about narcotics
smuggling.
what has dhs been doing?
As I indicated earlier, one of our objectives for this inspection
was to identify TSA security requirements for general aviation
airports, and to identify measures taken by TSA to secure general
aviation. A list of those measures is contained in our report. We did
not evaluate cost-benefit issues relating to those measures or make any
judgments about them.
We determined that TSA, even while it actively pursued all its
other mandates, had also paid significant attention to general
aviation. This was true both in the Office for Transportation Sector
Network Management and in the Office of Intelligence.
When one of our inspections reveals deficiencies or inefficiencies
in a DHS program we normally address a recommendation to the component
head to rectify the condition. In this instance, we did not identify
problems with TSA's activities and we therefore released the results of
our inspection without making recommendations to TSA.
risk and threat
Various Government and industry studies have concluded that the
risks associated with general aviation are relatively limited. Reports
previously released by the General Accountability Office (GAO) and the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) are consistent with this view. In
a November 2004 review, GAO concluded that ``the small size, lack of
fuel capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general aviation
aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists, and thereby, reduce the
possibility of threat associated with their misuse.'' GAO recommended
that TSA develop a plan for implementing a risk management approach to
strengthen general aviation security, and that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) establish a documented process to review and
revalidate flight restrictions. TSA and FAA generally concurred with
GAO's recommendations.
In January 2008, the Congressional Research Service reported that
typical general aviation aircraft are too light to use as a platform
for conventional explosives. Moreover, heightened vigilance among
airport operators and pilots would make it difficult to load the
necessary quantity of explosives without detection. The report
concluded that as a platform for conventional explosives, the threat
posed by light general aviation aircraft is relatively small compared
to the threat posed by trucks.
In March 2008, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA)
report, General Aviation Security, noted that GAO had observed that
although nuclear power facilities were not designed specifically to
withstand a terrorist aviation attack, they are among the most hardened
industrial facilities in the United States, as they were designed to
withstand tornadoes, hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes. The
study concluded that most general aviation aircraft could not penetrate
the concrete containment vessel of a nuclear power plant, release
radiation through an explosion, or otherwise severely damage nuclear
power plants.
We reviewed details of several well-publicized incidents involving
general aviation accidents involving municipal areas--the Tampa and New
York City incidents we mentioned in our report, and a third incident we
did not include involving an ultra-light aircraft in Germany. None of
these incidents had consequences of national security significance--in
the New York City and Tampa cases there was damage to, but no
fatalities within, the buildings. The German case seems to have been a
suicide.
Many risk scenarios describe the hypothetical delivery of a
destructive device to a population center. For such a purpose, a large
truck is probably a superior vehicle. Aircraft in flight are highly
visible by large audiences, and most airspace particularly airspace
near major metropolitan areas is well monitored by civil and military
authorities.
An intelligence analyst at TSA explained the distinction that is
usually made between risk and threat. Risk is sometimes defined as the
intent and the capability of the hostile actor; threat is the
vulnerability of the target and the consequence if the attack succeeds.
If it is easier to steal a small private plane than a commercial
airliner, there is a general aviation risk. If a small private plane
cannot do much damage on impact, there is not a general aviation
threat.
conclusion
We are aware that the results of our report may be used by those
involved in arguing for or against some particular piece of regulation.
We do not believe that our report is extensive enough support such a
debate. On the Internet, one of the most-frequently quoted sentences
from our report: `` . . . general aviation presents only limited and
mostly hypothetical threats to security.'' We believe this to be true,
and more importantly, it is consistent with threat information we
reviewed.
At the same time, we acknowledge the limited scope of our work on
this inspection. In an informal communication we received from TSA
after sharing our draft with them, they pointed out to us that all of
our airport visits were arranged in advance, that we made no
independent efforts to verify security measures, and that we visited
very few sites. This is true. Our inspection techniques were tailored
to the objectives of our review, not to an exhaustive evaluation of the
general aviation industry.
Madame Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be
happy to answer any questions that you or the subcommittee Members may
have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Sammon to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Sammon. Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear here to discuss
general aviation security. Today, I would like to discuss TSA's
engagement with key industry stakeholders to develop
appropriate security measures that minimize general aviation
risk and our process going forward.
General aviation includes all operations outside of
scheduled commercial air carrier flights and military
operations. More than 600,000 pilots, 200,000 aircraft and
19,000 airports and landing facilities are included in general
aviation. General aviation aircraft range in size from Cessnas
to privately owned jumbo jets, such as Boeing 747s.
The vast majority of the general aviation community is
responsible and concerned about security. Much of the input we
received during our industry discussion reflects best practice
security procedures. We would like to thank the industry
representatives who have contributed considerable time and
effort to provide valuable input to this process.
There has been long-standing Federal regulation of parts of
general aviation security. For-hire passengers and crew on
general aviation aircraft greater than 12,500 pounds have been
vetted for many years. International passengers and crew are
vetted prior to departure overseas. The airspace over the
national Capitol region is permanently restricted to general
aviation. There are temporary airspace restrictions over
Presidential travel locations, major sporting events and
special events, such as national political party conventions or
G8 summits, for example.
There is no specific threat in GA, although there have been
past incidents involving the use of GA aircraft. Yet, as with
other transportation modes, where there is no specific threat,
but there is risk, such as toxic chemicals transported by rail
in urban areas, or hazardous trucking, TSA takes prudent
measures to minimize potential vulnerabilities and having those
vulnerabilities exploited in high-consequence situations.
The risk for domestic general aviation is in the potential
consequence of a large aircraft being used as a weapon, as in
9/11, or to introduce dangerous articles into the air side of
commercial airports. In order to reduce GA vulnerabilities, TSA
began a rulemaking process in 2008. The TSA rulemaking process
is working as designed.
TSA proposed a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October
2008, held five public hearings throughout the United States,
received thousands of public comments and extended the public
comment period through February 2009. The day following the
close of the public comment period, TSA invited general
aviation stakeholders and other interested partners to
workshops held in April, May, and June.
Industry groups included were the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, the National Business Aviation Association,
the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the National
Air Transportation Association, the Experimental Aircraft
Association, the American Association of Airport Executives,
the Airport Council International, the National Association of
State Aviation Officials, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
specific operators, such as the Gulf Stream Corporation,
Limited Brands, NetJets, Flexjets, Centennial Airport, White
Plains Airport and Flight Safety among others.
At these workshops, which I personally led, general
aviation security issues were discussed at length. As a result
of this valuable input from stakeholders, TSA is developing
appropriate protocols to restrict the ability for terrorists to
pilot large aircraft, purchase or lease large aircraft, steal
large GA aircraft, overtake control of large GA aircraft, or
bring dangerous articles into the air side of a commercial
airport on a GA aircraft.
These protocols reflect many best-of-industry security
practices used by corporations world-wide. We expect that the
measures developed from the industry workshop comments will be
incorporated into a revised NPRM, which will be available for
public comment in coming months. We will continue our dialogue
with the industry until the regulatory process is reopened for
general public comment.
Our new general manager for aviation, Brian Delauter,
brings extensive general aviation and commercial aviation
experience with him to craft this next edition of the NPRM.
In summary, we recognize there is general aviation risk.
Through close stakeholder collaboration, we are developing a
series of sensible security measures to minimize risk. We
expect to release those measures for public comment in the
upcoming months. Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Sammon follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Sammon
July 15, 2009
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear
today to discuss the security of general aviation (GA), a vital part of
our Nation's aviation system, an important economic engine, and an
essential link to larger communities for many small communities. As
always, we appreciate the subcommittee's support as we continue to
explore optimal security measures for this industry.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) are committed to ensuring that GA is
appropriately protected from exploitation by terrorists and other
security risks while ensuring the free flow of commerce. Following
specific directions from Congress, we already have instituted a few
targeted security measures tailored to the risk posed by certain GA
operations. Our approach to the task of addressing GA security mirrors
our approach to our overall mission of securing the Nation's
transportation systems--we begin by assessing the risks and then we
work closely with our stakeholders to fashion programs to address those
risks.
General aviation encompasses diverse aircraft, airports,
facilities, operators, and operations. GA operators and their aircraft
include recreational pilots, corporations that operate business jets
for executive and employee use, and companies that lease small and
large aircraft to individuals and corporations or manage aircraft on
their behalf. Nation-wide, there are more than 19,000 GA facilities
(including helipads) at some of our largest commercial airports, at
small exclusively GA airports in remote areas, and at airports of all
sizes in between. Aircraft that are used in GA include, among others,
small aircraft with minimal payload capacity, business jets, and jets
often used by commercial airlines, such as the Boeing 747.
Added to this structural diversity is a diversity of risk facing
the industry. The level of risk does not necessarily correlate to the
size or sophistication of a given aircraft or airport. As a result,
general aviation presents unique challenges that preclude a ``one size
fits all'' security program. Prevailing circumstances and risks--
vulnerabilities, threats, and potential consequences--all factor into
the formulation of our security approach. Accordingly, each of the
elements of TSA's security agenda--whether initiated by TSA or
specifically directed by Congress--has been or is being developed to
address a specific risk associated with the GA system--its aircraft,
airports, facilities, operators, and its operations.
dhs's current general aviation security rules and programs
Currently, there is a range of security measures protecting GA
operations. Some take the form of guidance that airports or airport
operators may voluntarily implement, while other requirements are
implemented pursuant to mandatory regulations and security directives.
All are intended to meet the dual goals of protecting GA from terrorism
and other security risks without unduly impacting the free flow of
commerce. The following represent some of the major security
initiatives.
Restricted Air Space Over the Nation's Capital.--Soon after the 9/
11 attacks, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a rule
defining the restricted airspace over the Washington, DC Metropolitan
Area and established rules for all pilots operating aircraft to or from
any of the three Maryland GA airports located closest to the National
Capital Region (College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield and Hyde
Executive Field, known as the ``Maryland Three Airports''). This rule
established regulatory requirements for operating aircraft within the
defined areas, known as the Special Flight Rules Area and the Flight
Restricted Zone.
Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR).--TFRs are employed to mitigate
the threat of an airborne attack against key assets and critical
infrastructure on the ground; they affect the general aviation
community by prohibiting flight in areas of concern, for example, near
sporting arenas for major events such as the Super Bowl. TSA evaluates
requests for security-related TFRs based on several criteria, including
specific and credible threat and intelligence information, the number
of people in attendance at a particular venue, and the number of
allocated defense assets. Additionally, the FAA-issued Notices to
Airmen prohibiting many general aviation aircraft from operating within
a specified distance above ground level of any stadium with a seating
capacity of 30,000 or more people where major sporting events are being
held, or of the Disney theme parks in California and Florida, have been
made permanent by Congress, pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-199.
Additionally, the United States Secret Service in coordination with
FAA, TSA, and the Department of Defense establish restricted airspace
for specified Presidential and Vice Presidential movements, the United
Nations General Assembly, as well as National Special Security Events
such as the G-20 Summit and Democratic and Republican National
Conventions.
DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP).--Recognizing the need
to normalize GA commerce while continuing to protect the National
Capital Region, Congress directed DHS to develop a security plan to
permit general aviation aircraft to resume operations into and out of
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), where GA operations
had been prohibited after 9/11. In coordination with other DHS
agencies, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of
Defense, TSA issued a rule, effective August 18, 2005, requiring TSA
inspection of crews, passengers, property, and aircraft; TSA
identification checks of passengers; submission of passenger and crew
information 24 hours in advance of the flight; Security Threat
Assessments (STAs) for all passengers; fingerprint-based criminal
history records checks (CHRCs) for flight crew; and armed security
officers on board each flight. On average, 20 flights per month into
and out of DCA utilize this program.
Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP).--TSA currently
requires aircraft operators that are air carriers or commercial
operators with a maximum certificated take-off weight (MTOW) of more
than 12,500 pounds (5,670 kg) to implement the TFSSP, which establishes
mandatory vetting procedures of crew and passengers against the FBI
Terrorist Screening Center's No-Fly and Selectee Lists.
Private Charter Standard Security Program (PCSSP).--The PCSSP is
similar to the TFSSP, but for aircraft operators using aircraft with a
MTOW of greater than 100,309.3 pounds (45,500 kg) or with a seating
configuration of 61 or more, adds a requirement to physically screen
passengers and their accessible property.
Maryland Three Airports.--The Maryland Three Airports program was
originally instituted by the FAA in order to reopen these airports,
which, like DCA, had been closed to operations after the 9/11 attacks.
The program was transferred to TSA in February 2005. In addition to
defining the restricted airspace and establishing rules for all pilots
using the Maryland Three airports (discussed above), the rule provides
that in order to be approved to fly into or serve as a security
coordinator for any of these airports an individual is required to
submit certain information and successfully complete a STA.
General Aviation Airport Vulnerability Assessment Tool.--Section
44901(k) of title 49, as amended by the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-53, requires TSA to
develop and implement a standardized threat and vulnerability
assessment program for GA airports, to evaluate the feasibility of a
program to provide grants to GA airport operators to upgrade security,
and to establish such a program, if feasible. The assessment tool
contemplated by this provision is currently under review by the Office
of Management and Budget. When released, this program will assist our
stakeholders in performing self-assessments to determine their security
needs. Their planners will be able to identify security needs and seek
funding from appropriate sources.
Automatic Detection and Processing Terminal (ADAPT).--The ADAPT
system was developed by FAA to allow real-time vetting of air traffic
operating in the National Airspace System (NAS) and neighboring
airspace, in order to distinguish between legitimate flights and those
that might pose a security risk to the United States. TSA identified
the need to prevent the misuse of aircraft as weapons against critical
infrastructure and to provide senior leadership with a common real-time
picture of aviation activities in the NAS. TSA requires a single
integrated solution that can incorporate all segments of aviation, with
a primary focus on GA, and potential expansion to other modes of
transportation.
ADAPT is particularly important to the GA community. By providing
advance warning of potential threats within the NAS and allowing the
monitoring of GA security anomalies before they arrive in the United
States, ADAPT assists in mitigating two critical risks specific to GA:
The use of GA aircraft as a kinetic weapon and the use of GA aircraft
as a conveyance to transport dangerous materials (including chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons) or malevolent people.
Electronic Advance Passenger Information System (eAPIS).--U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a final rule, effective May
2009, that requires more detailed information about GA aircraft
arriving and departing the United States and persons on-board. As part
of a comprehensive effort to strengthen GA security, the rule expands
existing regulations governing these aircraft. Pilots must submit the
following information 1 hour prior to departure for flights arriving
into or departing from the United States: Departure information;
arrival information; information identifying the aircraft; and complete
passenger and crew manifest data, identifying who is aboard the
aircraft.
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and TSA.--DNDO has led
an effort to identify key vulnerabilities and threats associated with
weapons of mass destruction, specifically with regard to radioactive
and nuclear items. DNDO, together with CBP and TSA, is working to
facilitate international general aviation operations, while enhancing
security for these operations and for the Nation as a whole.
In April 2007, then-Secretary Chertoff directed CBP and DNDO to
implement full radiological and nuclear scanning of all arriving
international general aviation aircraft. DHS achieved this goal at the
end of 2007. Today, all international general aviation aircraft are
scanned upon arrival in the United States by CBP officers using
handheld Radiation Isotope Identification Devices (RIIDs). Earlier last
year, DNDO and CBP also conducted a testing program at Andrews Air
Force Base to identify improved operating procedures using these
handheld detectors and to determine requirements for improved next-
generation technologies. These measures are part of a much larger
initiative to create a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture to protect
our country from radiological and nuclear threats whether they come by
land, air, or sea.
public, consultative process is the key to effective regulation
A critical aspect of TSA's regulatory approach is the process-
oriented nature of devising mandatory security measures. DHS believes
it is important to consult with stakeholders to better inform the
Department about the feasibility, benefits, and costs of these security
options.
The Large Aircraft Security Program Proposed Rulemaking.--As risk
associated with air carriers and commercial operators has been reduced
or mitigated, terrorists may view general aviation aircraft as more
vulnerable and thus attractive targets. If hijacked and used as a
missile, many of these aircraft would be capable of inflicting
significant damage. In June 2006 TSA initiated a rulemaking process to
address the risk associated with large GA aircraft. The Large Aircraft
Security Program (LASP) demonstrates our on-going commitment to
government/stakeholder consultation. After engaging in outreach to the
GA community, on October 30, 2008, TSA published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) seeking comments on the proposed LASP. This NPRM
marked the beginning of the process established by the Administrative
Procedure Act for engaging the stakeholder community and the public at
large in formulating new regulatory requirements.
TSA extended the formal comment period for the NPRM by 60 days from
December 29, 2008, to February 27, 2009, to further facilitate industry
input and encourage additional comments. During that time, TSA also
conducted five public meetings throughout the country to solicit input
from the GA community and other members of the public.
In the process of evaluating over 7,000 written comments received,
TSA also actively engaged industry stakeholders and entities indirectly
affected by the NPRM in comment sessions to discuss key issues of
concerns raised during the formal comment period and public meetings.
These comment sessions have featured positive discussions focused on
developing a security solution tailored to GA and have provided TSA
with additional insight on potential alternative solutions that may be
more feasible for industry to implement, while still maintaining an
effective level of security.
TSA appreciates the participation of the many stakeholders who have
contributed to this process, including the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association (AOPA), the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA),
the National Air Transportation Association (NATA), the General
Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), the Experimental Aircraft
Association (EAA), the American Association of Airport Executives
(AAAE), the National Association of State Aviation Officials (NASAO),
the Airports Council International (ACI), and other valued
stakeholders. TSA and DHS are now determining the path forward, based
upon the feedback received from industry and the public. There will be
additional opportunities for stakeholders and interested members of the
public to review and comment on any modified proposal.
Security Directives (SD) 1542-04-08F and -08G.--The productive
interplay between TSA and the stakeholder community also is exemplified
in the issuance and amendment of security directives (SD). Congress
provided TSA authority to implement security measures without prior
notice or opportunity for comment when deemed necessary to protect the
transportation system. SDs are issued in response to emergent
situations and may be amended to adjust requirements to evolving
circumstances. The authority to issue SDs is not new--it had been
exercised routinely by FAA for decades prior to the creation of TSA.
Whenever possible, TSA engages in a collaborative process with
stakeholders when formulating these directives. The recent issuance of
SDs relating to Security Threat Assessments and credentialing of
individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of airports is
illustrative. In the course of preparing the SDs, TSA consulted with
key stakeholders, made changes in response to their feedback, and
conducted several conference calls afterward to ensure they understood
the contents of the revised directives. TSA also extended the deadlines
to give airports significant time to comply.
The SDs, issued in December 2008 and June 2009, apply to
Federalized commercial airports with full TSA security programs in
accordance with 49 CFR Part 1542. The SDs improve identification/work
authorization verification procedures and expand biographic information
collected for processing STAs to improve turn-around time and redress
procedures. The SDs also establish minimum audit procedures for
identification media and require identification media for unescorted
access to areas of the airport for which identification was not
previously required. Although the SDs do not apply directly to GA
operations, they do affect GA pilots who use these regulated airports.
It is important to note that the need for these SDs followed
several special emphasis inspections of airports across the country
during which TSA found an unacceptable level of compliance with
existing credentialing programs. Even with effective stakeholder
outreach in the preparation of SD 1542-04-08-0F, some in the GA
community later raised concerns about potential impacts on GA pilots.
TSA responded to those concerns, on May 28, 2009, by issuing a
revision, SD 1542-04-08G, that clarifies certain issues in SD-08F. The
most significant for the GA community is a clarification that transient
pilots need not obtain an ID at each airport they visit, only at their
home airports.
the inspector general's report validates our approach to ga security
We are pleased that the DHS Inspector General's (IG) May 2009
assessment of TSA's role in GA security concluded that TSA's risk
reduction regime has been appropriate. We do not disagree with the
report's assessment of the level of threat to GA airports; we would
emphasize that risk is composed of more than specific threats and it is
our obligation to address the other risk components: vulnerability and
consequence. We must address the risk associated with larger GA
aircraft. We are gratified that the IG recognizes the effectiveness of
our measured, collaborative approach toward further regulation of this
industry. The IG's report reflected TSA's current efforts to promulgate
new GA security regulations through the Large Aircraft Security Program
rulemaking process.
meeting the challenges of securing the ga system
While we have made progress in meeting the challenges of securing
the GA system, we continue to consult with stakeholders to improve our
efforts. Our goal remains clear: Protecting GA from terrorist and other
security risks while advancing the free flow of commerce. The GA
security programs currently in place have diligently endeavored to meet
those dual objectives. Our success is dependent in large part upon the
collaborative relationships we maintain with stakeholders, which will
continue as we consider new regulations.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to address the security of
this important sector of our aviation system. I will be happy to answer
any questions you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you very much for your
testimony.
Dr. Gallaway, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. GALLAWAY, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Gallaway. Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member Dent and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. As acting director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security, I
would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the work
we are doing with regards to general aviation. I would also
like to thank the committee for its support of DNDO's mission
to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear terrorism to the
Nation.
DNDO was established to improve the Nation's capability to
detect and report attempts to import, possess, store, develop,
or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against
the Nation and to further enhance this capability over time. To
that end, our work is guided by the development of a global
nuclear detection architecture or GNDA.
DNDO has developed a time-phased, multi-layered, defense-
in-depth GNDA that is predicated on the understanding that no
single layer of defense can detect all rad/nuc threats. For
this reason, the GNDA provides multiple detection and
interdiction opportunities overseas, at our borders, and within
the United States to effectively increase the overall
probability of system success.
My testimony today is focused on DNDO's efforts to address
one aspect of the GNDA--international general aviation. While
no current known terrorist threat exists that pinpoints general
aviation as a vehicle for a specific plot, DNDO's initial
architecture study highlighted several exploitable gaps that
exist in the current rad/nuc detection architecture, including
the use of GA aircraft to move or deliver rad/nuc weapons.
GA may be an attractive alternative for an adversary to
exploit, because it offers speed, physical control of the
weapon, and the relative lack of inspection, detection, and
regulation.
For in-bound international general aviation, DNDO is
working closely with CBP to facilitate detection and
interdiction of illicit rad/nuc weapons or materials entering
the United States through international general aviation. By
the end of 2007, CBP was using handheld radiation detectors to
scan all international general aviation aircraft upon arrival
in the United States. Once these detection processes were
established, we worked with CBP to characterize the current
radiological scanning capability and identify methods to
improve effectiveness by enhancing equipment and operational
techniques at Andrews Air Force Base.
Beyond scanning of international general aviation arrivals
in the United States, we are working with our partners to
address some of the unique challenges of detection and
interdiction of international general aviation. Unlike the
other pathways, once an aircraft is in transit, opportunities
for determining the contents of the aircraft or the intent of
the operators are extremely limited. Challenges include the
general aviation direct-to-target scenario, which describes the
ability of an aircraft to deliver a weapon directly from
overseas, non-stop to a target within the United States.
Further analysis of the GA pathway led to consideration of
a concept for gateway airports to provide rad/nuc scanning of
all in-bound international GA aircraft. International gateway
airports are airports outside the United States where GA
aircraft would be scanned for the presence of rad/nuc material
before they enter the United States.
We are exploring the option that rad/nuc scanning could be
done concurrently with other required U.S. entry screening and
inspection activities at these gateway airports. This option
would allow international general aviation aircraft to proceed
to any destination within United States, rather than having to
stop at a CBP air port of entry and might allow for increased
efficiency and reduced costs to GA operators.
To minimize flight deviations for international GA traffic
originating from Canada and Mexico, our proposed concept would
pair the international gateway airports with a complementary
network of domestic gateway airports. Domestic gateway airports
would be current CBP air ports of entry within the United
States, near southern and northern borders, but located away
from densely populated urban centers.
I would like to point out that this gateway airport concept
is still under development. Our gateway airport concept would
require international and domestic participation and address
mainly those aircraft that are compliant with the system.
To effectively secure the GA pathways, there must also be a
capability to detect and interdict any noncompliant aircraft.
With our Federal partners, we are exploring ways to increase
air domain awareness and use available information to quickly
and accurately determine if an aircraft present a threat.
In conclusion, this on-going analysis of general aviation
is part of DNDO's work to enhance the global nuclear detection
architecture and to evaluate programs to effectively fill gaps
in our national capability. We will continue to work with our
Government and aviation community partners to improve the
Nation's ability to detect radiological and nuclear threats.
DHS will balance maintaining the flexibility and mobility of
general aviation and the needs to sufficiently protect the
Nation from nuclear terrorism.
Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer
any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Gallaway follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles R. Gallaway
July 15, 2009
introduction
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As Acting Director of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the work we are doing with regard to general aviation (GA). I
would also like to thank the committee for its support of DNDO's
mission to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear terrorism to the
Nation.
DNDO was established to improve the Nation's capability to detect
and report attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport
nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to
further enhance this capability over time. To that end, our work is
guided by our development of a global nuclear detection architecture
(GNDA). DNDO has developed a time-phased, multi-layered, defense-in-
depth GNDA that is predicated on the understanding that no single layer
of defense can detect all radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) threats.
For this reason, the GNDA provides multiple detection and interdiction
opportunities overseas, at our borders, and within the United States to
effectively increase the overall probability of system success. DNDO
has worked with intra- and inter-agency partners to develop time-phased
strategies and plans for improving the probability of detecting and
interdicting nuclear threats. DNDO will continue to enhance the GNDA
over time by developing better detection technologies, working with our
operational partners to improve concepts of operations (CONOPs),
enabling real-time reporting of detection events, and supporting
effective response to real threats.
My testimony today will focus on DNDO's efforts to address one
aspect of the GNDA--international GA. Specifically, I will speak about
our on-going work to secure the international GA threat pathway.
general aviation pathway studies
The United States border is the first layer within the GNDA where
the United States has full control over detection and interdiction. For
this reason, considerable effort and resources have been placed at this
layer to provide robust radiological and nuclear detection
capabilities, particularly at ports of entry (POEs). While no current,
known terrorist threat exists that pinpoints general aviation as a
vehicle for a specific plot, DNDO's initial architecture study
highlighted several exploitable gaps that existed in the current rad/
nuc detection architecture, including the use of GA aircraft to move or
deliver rad/nuc weapons. Further, the study concluded that GA was an
attractive option for adversary exploitation because it offered a
number of operational advantages--including speed, control of the
weapon, and the relative lack of inspection, detection, and
regulation--when compared to scheduled passenger and cargo operations.
Initiatives for GA security include several interrelated activities
that are considerably broader in scope than radiation detection. DNDO
has approached the solution to the GA threat through a four-phase
series of architecture studies:
In Phase I DNDO developed an end-to-end architecture and identified
gaps by various pathways, including the use of GA as a pathway for the
movement and delivery of weapons. The Air Pathways Phase II study
explored measures to mitigate the vulnerabilities presented by GA and
concluded that the most difficult scenario to counter was the use of GA
aircraft delivering a weapon from outside the borders of the United
States directly to a target. The study identified that once a weapon-
carrying aircraft is airborne, detection and interdiction of rad/nuc
threats are unlikely. A primary Phase II recommendation was to consider
a concept that would provide for screening of all international GA
aircraft for nuclear weapons prior to takeoff for a flight into the
United States. The Phase III study followed with specific
recommendations: (1) Pre-departure screening of most GA aircraft
entering the United States, and (2) requiring all near-border GA
traffic to land only at a small number of specific GA airfields in the
United States for screening. The Phase III study established an
architecture, a CONOPS and rough order of magnitude (ROM) cost
estimates for establishing and operating a system of foreign and
domestic airfields that could perform rad/nuc screening for in-bound
international GA traffic. Phase III recommendations were subsequently
followed up with variants that included screening at U.S. airfields and
screening at U.S.-Canadian airfields. Phase IV seeks to expand the GA
work and address additional elements within civil aviation.
international general aviation
DNDO is working closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) to facilitate detection and interdiction of illicit rad/nuc
weapons or materials entering the United States via the international
GA pathway. For rad/nuc detection with regard to international GA
arrivals, CBP uses handheld Radiation Isotope Identification Devices
(RIIDs). By the end of 2007, CBP was scanning all international GA
aircraft upon arrival in the United States. Once these detection
processes were established, we worked with CBP to characterize the
current radiological scanning capability and identify methods to
improve effectiveness by enhancing equipment and operational
techniques. In Spring 2008, DNDO, in partnership with CBP, began
testing detection equipment in the GA environment and in controlled
laboratory tests using next generation human portable devices. Focusing
on international GA applications, the testing was conducted at Andrews
Air Force Base (AFB) in March-June 2008. Five test sessions were
conducted at Andrews AFB to baseline the performance of currently-
deployed systems for scanning of small, medium, and large international
GA aircraft, to determine if any CBP operational procedure changes are
necessary and to evaluate performance of other human-portable scanning
equipment. Test results validated the effectiveness of the current
technologies for use during a majority of State-side scanning
operations. These test results will be used to guide subsequent
research and development efforts, including improvements to
identification capabilities of current technologies through the use of
alternate systems that are being assessed through our Human Portable
Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS) program. The evaluation of
operational systems also resulted in recommendations to enhance
scanning Standard Operating Procedures for this type of rad/nuc
detection.
Scanning of international GA arrivals in the United States is one
step towards mitigating the rad/nuc threat, but the international GA
pathway presents other unique challenges that we are working with our
partners to address. Unlike other pathways, once an aircraft is in
transit, opportunities for determining the contents of the aircraft or
the intention of the operators are extremely limited. Challenges
include the GA ``direct-to-target'' scenario, which describes the
ability of a GA aircraft to deliver a weapon directly from overseas,
non-stop to a target in the United States. GA aircraft originating from
overseas and flying to a target would enable an adversary to bypass the
multiple detection and interdiction opportunities that are part of a
defense-in-depth architecture. To effectively secure the GA pathways
there must be a capability to detect any non-compliant aircraft
(aircraft that do not submit a flight plan or otherwise attempt to
enter the country illegally and aircraft that divert from their legal
flight plans) and options to mitigate the threat.
gateway airports
Additionally, the Gateway Airports concept was developed as a way
to defend against the international GA threat. Gateway Airports are
airports at which GA aircraft are screened for the presence of rad/nuc
material: (a) Before they enter the United States, or (b) before they
approach major population centers or high-value targets. International
Gateways are airports outside the contiguous United States. Some
international GA aircraft flights may originate from International
Gateways and others may choose to pass through them for rad/nuc
screening en route to the United States. In either case, rad/nuc
screening is accomplished as the last act prior to takeoff for the
flight into the United States. We recommend exploring the option that
all other U.S. entry screening and inspection activity (e.g., Customs,
Agriculture, and Health) be conducted concurrently with rad/nuc
screening at the Pre-Clearance Gateway. This option would allow
international GA aircraft to proceed onward to any destination in the
United States, rather than having to stop at a CBP Aerial Port of Entry
(APOE) and might allow for increased efficiency and reduced costs to GA
operators. In fact, the Gateway Airport system might be presented as a
convenience for GA operators--as part of a ``one-stop'' service that
would consolidate disparate activities and provide for more efficient
flight operations.
The United States already operates border preclearance facilities
at a number of ports and airports in foreign countries. They are
staffed and operated by CBP officers. Travelers pass through
Immigration and Customs, Public Health, and Department of Agriculture
inspections before boarding their aircraft, ship, or train. This
process is intended to streamline border procedures, to reduce
congestion at ports of entry, and to facilitate travel between the
preclearance location and some U.S. airports that may not be equipped
to handle international travelers. Preclearance exists at most major
Canadian airports, providing convenience to travelers from those cities
to the Unites States. Arrangements also exist with some airports in
Bermuda, Aruba, and at two airports in Ireland. The proposed Gateway
Airport plans could leverage some of these existing foreign pre-
clearance sites and would require some additional locations for rad/nuc
detection. Based upon the priorities identified in the GNDA, DHS, and
the Department of State are working to increase international awareness
and participation in our general aviation pre-clearance programs.
In order to properly serve international GA traffic with minimal
flight deviations, our proposed plan would pair the international
Gateways with a complementary network of Domestic Gateway airports, to
serve short flights originating from Canada and Mexico. Domestic
Gateways would be current CBP APOEs spaced around the U.S. southern and
northern borders. These would be inside the United States but at least
100 miles away from major urban areas designated by the 2006 Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI). The 100-mile standoff range is arbitrary,
but it provides increased reaction time for identification and
interception of non-complying aircraft when compared to the 30-mile
distance commonly used for the largest temporary flight restricted
(TFR) areas.
I would like to note that while the Gateway Airport concept is a
proposal for rad/nuc detection for international GA, it is only a piece
of the viable solution. The Gateway Airports plan as proposed would
require international and domestic participation and addresses mainly
those aircraft that are compliant with the system. We are still faced
with the challenge of identifying and dealing with noncompliant
aircraft. With our partners, we are exploring options to increase air
domain awareness and use available information to quickly and
accurately determine if aircraft present a threat. This on-going
analysis of GA is part of DNDO's work to enhance the GNDA and ascertain
appropriate programs to effectively fill gaps.
path forward
In the near term, we will work with partners and stakeholders to
support programs to produce widespread awareness of rad/nuc scenarios
at airports of all sizes across the United States. Detection
capabilities will become more available at air POEs with improved
detection capability over current assets. Initial deployments of rad/
nuc detection technology for GA outside the United States will begin
the process of scanning international GA traffic and introduce the
concept of gateway airports, beyond what already is in place.
The long-term structure of the GA architecture will expand to
include a network of gateway airports, including overseas pre-clearance
airports. GA traffic will be tracked more closely, providing increased
air domain awareness and an enhanced ability to interdict rad/nuc
materials or devices. The end result will be integrated security
programs that provide a high degree of protection against GA transport
of radiological/nuclear materials, including direct-to-target
scenarios.
conclusion
DNDO will continue to work with TSA, CBP, and other partners and
stakeholders within and beyond DHS to improve the Nation's ability to
detect radiological and nuclear threats at our ports and borders. DHS
intends to balance facilitating the flexibility and mobility of general
aviation and the need to sufficiently scan in-bound flights for
radiological or nuclear threats.
I welcome and appreciate the committee's active engagement with
this program, and look forward to continuing our cooperation as we move
forward together. Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be
happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, let me thank all the witnesses for
their testimony. I would remind each Member that he or she will
be recognized for 5 minutes to question the panel. I will now
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Let me thank you, Mr. Sammon. As I proceed with my
questions, let me, first of all, ask unanimous consent to
introduce into the record letter dated June 18, 2009 addressed
to John from the Chamber of Commerce, United States of America,
that in part thanks you once again. Your keen understanding of
the vital role that the private sector plays in securing our
homeland is evident to all. Much is appreciated by the Chamber
and its members.
But it really recounts your meeting with them and
reflecting on the insight necessary. I would ask unanimous
consent to submit that in the record. Hearing no objection, so
ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee
Washington, DC, June 18, 2009.
Mr. John Sammon,
Assistant Administrator, Transport Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 601 S. 12th Street, Arlington,
VA 20598.
Dear John: Thank you for meeting with Ann Beauchesne, Kevin
Schmiegel, and me last month. The Chamber is looking forward to working
with you and your team on a wide array of homeland security issues over
the coming months.
I appreciate you updating us on the issues surrounding the Large
Aircraft Security Program (LASP). As you know, the LASP is an important
issue for the Chamber, and your comments have assured me that the
Chamber's voice, and the voice of its members, is being heard. Ann told
me that your stakeholders' meeting this week was very productive, and
that all of the points that we agreed during our meeting were well-
received. We look forward to seeing the details of the next Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and are hopeful that things continue to move in the
right direction.
Thank you once again for your time. Your keen understanding of the
vital role that the private sector plays in securing our homeland is
evident to all--and much appreciated by the U.S. Chamber and its
members. I look forward to working together and please call if I can be
of help.
Best wishes!
Sincerely,
Tom.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I also introduce into the record a letter
that comes from an organization of general aviation
representatives dated April 15, 2009. Each of them have signed
it to indicate their appreciation for your coordinating an
April 6 meeting.
[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee
April 15, 2009.
Mr. John Sammon,
Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network Management,
Transportation Security Administration, East Building, 601
South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202-4220.
Dear Mr. Sammon: We would like to thank you for coordinating the
April 6 meeting with representatives from the general aviation industry
to discuss the proposed rulemaking on the Large Aircraft Security
Program. This collaborative effort between the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the general aviation industry clearly
demonstrates how common ground can be achieved when addressing
America's aviation security needs.
As we prepare for our next meeting on May 6, 2009, we ask that TSA
provide us with its summary of the April 6 meeting discussion within
the next week. Providing this summary in a timely manner will allow
representatives from the general aviation industry to better prepare
for the May 6 meeting so that we may continue this productive effort.
Continued dialogue on this important issue is critical to a
successful resolution. We also encourage you to utilize this
collaborative process on other critical security issues affecting the
general aviation industry.
Thank you again for your commitment and support to address the
general aviation industry's concern on this important rulemaking.
Sincerely,
Craig Spence,
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Aircraft Owners & Pilots
Association.
Christopher Bidwell,
Vice President--Security and Facilitation, Airports Council
International--North America.
Carter Morris,
Senior Vice President, Trans. Security Policy, American Association
of Airport Executives.
Doug Macnair,
Vice President, Government Relations, Experimental Aircraft
Association.
Jens Hennig,
Vice President of Operations, General Aviation Manufacturers
Association.
Eric R. Byer,
Vice President, Government & Industry Affairs, National Air
Transportation Association.
Henry M. Ogrodzinski,
President and CEO, National Association of State Aviation
Officials.
Doug Carr,
Vice President, National Business Aviation Association.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I assume now we can go forward unshackled
by any thought that the Congress and/or the administration has
any interest in undermining the 1.3 million jobs and not
recognizing the vital economic role and the important role that
general aviation plays.
My first logistical question to you is when do you foresee
moving forward on the next step of rulemaking, having proceeded
in the initial rulemaking? I consider this fine reading that
you gave me, the old rules. What will we expect with the new
rules? When will that proceed?
Mr. Sammon. We have a very firm outline of where we want to
proceed from the workshops. We expect to begin writing that
next week. We expect to sit down with folks in TSA and begin
putting that to pen. The subject matter and the content, I
think, we are fairly clear on. We expect to start----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you begin next week.
Mr. Sammon. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are also aware of the inspector
general's report that was dated May 2009.
Mr. Sammon. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are also aware of the language that
indicates, in a cavalier manner, that general aviation has
nothing to worry about, and it is insignificant. Do you agree
with that?
Mr. Sammon. Not----
Ms. Jackson Lee. In terms of its vulnerabilities.
Mr. Sammon. I believe the report indicated there was no
threat. We don't believe there is a specific threat. But we
believe there are vulnerabilities, as was mentioned in the
film, and you have mentioned, particularly larger aircraft have
no keys. They need to be secured, among other things.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just suggest for our memory
there was no perceived threat with commercial airlines driving
into the World Towers on 9/11.
Mr. Sammon. Correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, can I ask you the question again? Is
perceived threat the basis upon which we make a report that, in
essence, deadens our ears, deadens our sensitivities to being
more secure or being more responsible about security in general
aviation?
Mr. Sammon. We agree that threat is one part of risk. We
think there is a risk for general aviation. The vulnerabilities
must be addressed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much.
Mr. Mann, there is no doubt that we respect the public
service that the IG's office has given.
Mr. Mann. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But for the life of me, I am not sure why
there couldn't have been a broader understanding of the
question as relates to Houston, which is only an example. I am
hoping that we could have looked at that as an example of the
question of general aviation security.
The statement that Houston is not a sitting duck--and might
I just say, again, this is generic for any city that has
general aviation--because I guess you focused only on the
framework of the question. Because as Dr. Gallaway has
indicated, the potential of some aircraft coming in with
radioactive materials and coming into general aviation, that
poses a threat.
If, for example, a general aviation aircraft took off and
had untoward intentions, are you suggesting that it is an
impossible thought to have the vulnerability of our refineries
being the eye of the storm? Did you not look at that, which is
part of the question--certainly should have been part of the
question that should have been answered in this IG report?
Mr. Mann. It is a good question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. To me, it looks as if you made complete
light of some very real and serious issues. I am just appalled.
Mr. Mann. Well, I can assure you, Madame Chairwoman, that
we did not make light of the very serious issues that you have
indicated. Certainly none of us can forget the horrible events
of 9/11/2001. I think you make a very good point with regard to
perception. There was not a perceived threat at that time
either.
But I think that a lot of general aviation depends on how
risk is defined. If it is easier to steal a small airplane,
then there is certainly a risk in general aviation. However, if
the damage that a small airplane can do by running into a
building or running into a chemical plant is minimal, then we
have to consider whether or not there is a serious threat.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The only question I would say to you, Mr.
Mann, is I am not sure if you are doing a risk analysis in this
report, or the IG's office is just speculating; because again,
I emphasize that no one would have speculated on 9/10 that
there would be terrorists that manipulate their documents, that
would have been trained to fly a plane and not land, that will
have taken a major commercial aircraft and gone into the
towers.
Our job at homeland security is to be preventative. Your
report kills any intention or effort by anyone to believe,
well, we should be a little careful here; because you mention
that, in a general statement, is there a concern? Absolutely
not. I don't understand how you made a report without expanding
it to perceive potential threats, so that we could at least
have a framework to work from.
Let me just quickly, and I will finish with you and move to
the next question. That will be my last question. The perimeter
issue is an issue. You made a point of suggesting that someone
entering on the grounds was not a problem. And certainly coming
back after the fact, all of the potential heads of these
aviation airports, general aviation airports, were on notice.
So their answers certainly were going to be ones that you
wanted to hear.
But, from my perspective, the entrance onto the grounds was
similar to the terrorists getting on the airplane. So, I don't
know why that is not a potential vulnerability or threat,
because it could have been someone wanting to do something
untoward. The first act could have left a bomb on site. Maybe
it would have done nothing but blow up a number of unoccupied
airplanes, but it would have been an action.
Why wasn't the intrusion on the perimeter something of
concern?
Mr. Mann. Well, Madame Chairwoman, we can speculate on
numerous possibilities of things that could have happened. Yes,
it could have been a vulnerability, or it could have been a
very serious incident if an individual enters onto an airport
unchallenged. I mean, it is--that undeniable.
But the mere fact that we have not had an incident of
significant proportions certainly doesn't mean that we won't
have one. But it doesn't appear that there is a clear threat
for that sort of activity to happen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right, Mr. Mann. It seems as if, in
conclusion, that probably further assessment might have shown
that there were vulnerabilities. I thank you for your
testimony.
Let me just quickly ask Dr. Gallaway, you quickly indicate
something that I think is very, very important in your
testimony. That is the seeming coordination necessary with DNDO
on this potential radioactive/nuclear component. I want to know
how we can help you.
It seems as if there is not the coordination. TSA, CBP,
DNDO do not appear to be working cohesively for the potential
of a large aircraft, general aviation, coming from overseas,
equipped to create havoc with nuclear materials. How can we be
of help, Dr. Gallaway?
Mr. Gallaway. Ma'am, we work as a result of our global
nuclear detection architecture, working across the spectrum of
opportunities to mitigate the risk. Many of our resources in
the past have gone into containerized cargo. We are scanning 98
percent of the cargo coming into the United States every day,
for example.
We, as a Nation, have started turning our attention to
these other pathways. But we have not done it as aggressively
as we probably should to try to mitigate the threat across the
board.
I think we are working quite well with CBP and TSA. It is a
matter of the amount of resources that are available. So right
now----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you need more funding?
Mr. Gallaway. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think you have just answered how we can
be of help. We will pursue that with you.
Let me now recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes.
Mr. Olson. Well, thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I appreciate
the time to ask the witnesses some questions.
I am going to start out with you, Mr. Mann. You know, your
report says that TSA is using a threat-based approach to assess
some of the things we saw in the report from KHOU. I don't want
to confuse some of the large aircraft with the general aviation
aircraft.
As we remember the attacks of September 11, those were
large passenger liners loaded with over 20,000 pounds of
aviation fuel at the time they hit those buildings. Now, as we
know, one of the factors that brought those buildings down was
that excessive fuel burning and heating the steel that
ultimately resulted in the collapse.
So, I am concerned that we are confusing some of the
threats from a large aircraft with threats from a small
aircraft, like a Cessna 182, which holds 92 gallons of aviation
fuel. So I just wanted to give you the opportunity to explain
some of the differences in your study between the threat
assessment from a large aircraft, as opposed to the threat
assessment from a small general aviation aircraft.
Mr. Mann. Well, as we mentioned small general aviation
aircraft makes up the majority of the fleet. Larger 747s are
privately owned. 747s are larger airplanes, have a, in our
experience, what we are able to determine, are secured
differently, most always in hangars. They are not just
generally available; would certainly require a higher level of
expertise, not only to gain access to the plane, but be able to
move it, navigate it, take off, do all the things that it would
take in order to use that aircraft as a weapon of mass
destruction.
So, quite honestly, sir, the bulk of our concern was with
regard to smaller aircraft, less than 12,500 pounds. As the
GAO, the CRS and as we have indicated, they do not appear to
have a significant threat to homeland security.
Mr. Olson. Yes, sir. Thanks for the answer. Very different
threat, largely because of the size of the aircraft----
Mr. Mann. Yes.
Mr. Olson. Mr. Sammon, I would just like to also ask you
about the public comment period. The LASP ended in February.
Your office has engaged with the stakeholders, who had serious
concerns with the mandate in the Notice of Public Rulemaking. I
want to commend you for the effort you have undertaken to hear
their concerns. I just wanted to let you know that I am pleased
today to hear you are going to put out an NPRM. Is this going
to be a new NRPM or a revised NRPM?
Mr. Sammon. Our attorneys are looking at the best vehicle.
It may be easier to take where we are going from and start from
a clean sheet of paper. The attorneys are wrestling with that
right now. But they will work out the specifics of that
shortly.
Mr. Olson. Okay. We will get out of the business if the
attorneys are wrestling with it. Don't want to get involved in
that. Anyway, my final question for you, Mr. Sammon, is just
how are DHS and TSA going to deal with the terrorist watch list
and its possible outsourcing in future, large aircraft security
program rules?
Mr. Sammon. Through our discussions in the workshop, when
the rule was originally proposed, Secure Flight, which you may
be aware of, was quite some far off in the distance. Secure
Flight is now a reality. We started with a number of carriers.
So a variant to Secure Flight is something called eSecure
Flight, which would be available directly to the operators. We
do not envision using third-party auditors or third-party watch
list services.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much. I appreciate my time. I
yield back my time, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Olson, thank you so very much. It is a
delight to recognize the gentleman from Ohio, who is a pilot. I
hope will continue his oversight of this regulatory process.
His input early on, I believe, helped this committee and the
Chairman look to TSA for their visions as relates to the
aircraft and a distinctive weights of the aircraft. So I thank
you very much.
Mr. Massa is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I will be--for me
to offer a correction. But my constituents in New York would
hold me accountable should I----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You let me get away with that twice. I am
sorry.
Mr. Massa. Yes, ma'am. Out of respect. But in self-defense,
I must----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You must defend yourself. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Massa. It is the proud heritage of western New York
that brings me here today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. There might be some connection. I am not
sure if there is a border. But I will proudly say that this
gentleman is from New York.
Mr. Massa. Thank you. I do hail from one of the cradles of
general aviation, the home of Glenn Curtiss, the home of
Schweizer Aircraft Corporation. So, I come at this, not only
from personal experience, but also from a very strong interest
in seeing general aviation in all of its categories flourish in
this country.
A couple specific questions if I may. I would ask the
appropriate witness to comment. I saw in the beginning of the
rulemaking process, the potential of embarking air marshals on
corporate aviation jets. Is that still a provision that is
under consideration?
Mr. Sammon. No. It originally was in there really under
exigent or extreme circumstances that the administrator would
do that. But it is not envisioned that you would have air
marshals flying on general aviation planes, no.
Mr. Massa. Well, I commend TSA for removing that provision,
and that I believe that most individuals who use corporate
aviation are the CEOs of some of our most important companies
who probably have a good idea of who is supposed to be on the
airplane with them. I envision that they would be able to
identify any interlopers with relative speed and ease.
I also would like to comment for the record that I
recognize general aviation embodies a wide swath of flying
aircraft. In fact, by the rules discussed today here, also in
company up to our largest aircraft, if they are non-scheduled
commercial aircraft, including passenger and cargo-carrying
Boeing 747s. So, it is very important to get the rules right on
this as far as access to those aircraft.
I also agree with the gentleman from Texas that a Cessna
152/182, a King Air or Queen Air, does not possess the same
kinetic energy threats as those larger multi-engine commercial
jets. As a pilot, I understand very clearly, and I believe here
in the audience today we have a representative from a company
who has done its very best to take a large number of dollars
out of my back pocket, Jefferson, Incorporated, without whom
general aviation would suffer greatly.
But, as a community of pilots that adds a great deal, not
only to the transportation, but just to the outright fun of
flying, I really would like to be very deeply involved in
ensuring we get this right. It is very, very important that we
do not overpenalize general aviation and act in a heavy-handed
draconian manner that will destroy a large industry that brings
so much to this country. I would like your comment on how we
are going to balance that please.
Mr. Sammon. Good. We, again, have had lengthy discussions.
The meetings we had lasted up to 8 hours. In those months, it
wasn't an hour meeting coming in and brushing things off. They
were significant dialogue back and forth. I have briefed Joe
Lombardo, the president of Gulfstream in Savannah 2 or 3 weeks
ago, and understanding where we are.
Craig Fuller, I attribute Craig Fuller's leadership to the
process in terms of where we have gotten and how far we have
come along. So we have, in addition to Tom Donohue in the
Chamber of Commerce, we have engaged folks, outlined what we
see coming out of the process. I think that they are
comfortable we are hitting the right way.
I would be happy to offer a brief to you, or any Members of
the subcommittee, on the details of what we are thinking right
now. Also, any of the studies we have that support where we are
going. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Gallaway. I would like to also add one comment--that
one of the things that makes general aviation so appealing from
a corporate point of view is the access and speed of
transportation of those executives, where time definitively is
money. So, I hope that, as we move forward, we do not place
irrational or unnecessary barriers to that very essence that
makes those aircraft such an important part of American
business.
Mr. Sammon. Again, that is why we have made specific--in
addition to other folks, the folks from Gulfstream, obviously,
that is what they do. That is their business. That is what they
are selling is speed and flexibility. We wanted to make sure
that they were aware. Also the folks from Gulfstream offered us
quite a bit in terms of securing aircraft, simply, easily,
inexpensively, but securely. We appreciate their input.
They attended our working sessions. So, I think that, if
you look at the folks whose ultimate--the end of chain, we have
got to sell these things for that particular purpose, I think
we have had very good dialogue with them. I think if you called
Mr. Lombardo, you would find out where we are.
Mr. Massa. Well, thank you very much for your attention to
this. I look forward to being available to you in any manner
possible to be of assistance.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to thank the gentleman of New York,
Mr. Massa, for his questioning and his insight into these
areas.
I am now pleased to recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman. I
sometimes wonder what is the greater threat to general
aviation, over-regulation or comments out of the White House
condemning executive jet service and private aircraft.
Hopefully, we are getting away from that sort of thing. That is
an industry that the United States is involved in. When we
condemn it, we create an atmosphere in which we lose jobs.
I am also reminded, when I hear some of the questions asked
of Mr. Sammon and Mr. Mann, that you two are sort of in a
damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't situation.
I have noticed some of the comments that have been coming
out lately about the CIA, an agency of the Federal Government
that appears to have done a pretty good job in keeping us from
being attacked by terrorists. As a result, CIA employees get
threatened with prosecution. They get threatened with
investigation.
Sometimes I just have to shake my head, because we haven't
had an attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. It hasn't happened by
accident. So I would actually like to take my hat off to those
of you in the Federal Government, in the Executive Branch, who
have been doing a good job of attempting to ensure that we
don't have another attack.
Having said that, obviously I, as others, am concerned
about the risk as it exists with respect to general aviation.
So, Mr. Sammon, I would like to ask you this question. Have
we moved away from the risk-based approach? Have we moved away
from the layered defense approach that we have embarked on with
respect to the Department of Homeland Security in all other
areas, particularly other areas of aviation, as we have tried
to deal with the potential threat in the area of general
aviation?
Mr. Sammon. No. I think if you look at risk, obviously,
many people have had the conversation. But we look at risk in
terms from DHS's perspective is made of three parts: The
threat, the vulnerability, and the consequence. As we focused
our discussion, in my oral testimony, it said that there is not
a specific intel-based threat on general aviation.
But, in terms of the vulnerability of unsecure aircraft and
other issues that we talked about, and the consequence that a
large GA aircraft could cause, we need to address those two
other portions of risk. So, just as other areas where we don't
have specific threats, but we do take prudent measures that are
reasonable, sensible to reduce the risk, that is our
responsibility to do that.
Mr. Lungren. What I hear from some of my constituents who
are private aircraft owners or operators, particularly those in
the agricultural industry, and some in the business industry,
what they are concerned about is this. They say, look, we may
get up in the morning and not know where we are going to fly
that day. We may not know who is on our plane until we make a
decision a half-hour ahead of time.
For legitimate business reasons, particularly in the area
of agriculture, where you have got large expanses of property,
or for example, farmland in California and farmland in Arizona,
maybe farmland in Nevada, their concern is--and I would ask you
if it is justified or not--that the Department, in its effort
to try and respond to the legitimate issues that we have talked
about here, may impose obligations on them that don't make
sense from their perspective.
Can you give me an idea of how you deal with that issue,
because they have been worried about, gee, do we have to give
prior notice of who we have on board? Do we know who is going
to be on our plane 12 hours from now? I may not know that.
Mr. Sammon. Yes. That was one of the subjects of
considerable discussion during our workshops. I think we have
worked out with the industry associations reasonable protocols
from the group. I have reviewed these personally with most of
the folks who participated in the workshops in terms of how we
deal with that and how to pilot and command the discretions
they have or wouldn't have to do address some of the issues you
are concerned about.
I think when we publish these--and again, I would be happy
to brief you separately--I think you will see that they seem
reasonable.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Gallaway, I would just like to ask you
about the gateway airport situation, can you give us a little
more detail on how that is shaping up, and how you see that as
an effective means of dealing with this issue that you brought
up?
Mr. Gallaway. Right now, it is still in a conceptual phase.
We are working out the details, because there are a lot of
different options that we can work. Of course, the amount of
money that is spent to implement those options can vary
considerably.
But ultimately, we are trying to balance the inconvenience
to the flying public or to the general aviation public with
increasing the security. So costs will ultimately be a large
driver in whatever solutions start gelling. Then we would take
it to the aviation community to see how they would----
Mr. Lungren. Cost to the aviation community, cost to the
individual operator, or cost to the Government?
Mr. Gallaway. We are looking at costs across the board,
because it would increase the cost, depending on which of these
solutions we are talking about, it could potentially increase
the cost to the operator as well as the Government.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the gentleman for his
question.
My pleasure to recognize Ms. Norton of the District of
Columbia for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Madame Chairwoman, I can't thank you enough for
putting the focus on the Homeland Security Committee on general
aviation. For the first time, I think, most of the work on
general aviation has been done in the aviation subcommittee. It
is very frustrating, particularly considering we are talking
about a major industry, 50 percent of all aviation in the
United States.
I listened to all of you for evidence of the risk analysis
that you say--I agree is the way to approach this has been
done. I thought it was a disgrace to contrast what we saw,
which is virtually none of what I would take to be the
appropriate guidance that you would want to give, regardless of
vulnerability in Houston with what can only be described as
nuclear overregulation.
Here, in the Nation's capitol, it is shameful. It makes us,
what is it, 8 or 9 years after 9/11 look like we haven't even
learned how to protect our own Nation's capitol, New York
airports, New York--far greater risk and consequences analysis.
Density, if you are looking to do damage there----
Shortly after 9/11, they did the right thing. Major
commercial center, general aviation was up, up and going. Let
us contrast that to the District of Columbia where, for
example, we get what even looks to be arbitrary actions--South
Capitol Street Heliport, deliberately kept open for 2 years. It
is a heliport now--2 years after 9/11, abruptly shut down, no
explanation to the public or anybody else, including this
committee.
General aviation in the District of Columbia, you, Mr.
Sammon, lay out the shameful picture. You have destroyed the
entire industry in the Nation's capitol. You have 240 you say.
Our information is 200 flights per year.
Guess what, sir? It was 2,000. You just wiped it out in the
Nation's capitol. Indeed, you, TSA, wouldn't even open national
or general aviation in this airport until the chair of the
Transportation Infrastructure Committee, when I was in the
minority, said that he was going to hold the agency in
contempt.
Then you opened it in a way that was in the face--it was a
kind of in-your-face opening, because you said, okay. You can
fly into the Nation's capitol. But you have got to do a
security threat assessment for all passengers coming in,
including fingerprints and criminal histories. Don't mind it
for the flight crew, of course; but all the passengers.
Guess what? Those air marshals, you have got to have them
on every flight. That means that you opened it all right with a
destroyed industry that still can't come into your Nation's
capitol.
I am trying to reconcile how you have treated civil
aviation here with the testimony of Mr. Mann, the assistant IG.
Now, here is what he said--and he says the GAO and CRS agree.
The small size lack of fuel capacity and minimal destructive
power of most general aviation aircraft make them unattractive
for terrorists and thereby reduce the possibility of threat
associated with their misuse.
A light use of a--that too light an aircraft to use for
conventional explosives, Mr. Gallaway. Let me just ask you
point blank, because this gets to be very tiresome, given the
resistance of an agency that is supposed to know how to keep us
safe and open at the same time.
We understand there is already a plan to open general
aviation at national airports. Is there a plan? When do you
intend to issue it, so that general aviation is available here
the way it is in New York City and every other part of the
United States?
Mr. Gallaway. In terms of the national capitol region and
the airspace, TSA does not control the airspace security. We
are one member of an airspace working group, including the
Department of Defense, the FAA----
Ms. Norton. I asked you a point-blank question.
Mr. Gallaway. We don't have a----
Ms. Norton. Is there a plan?
Mr. Gallaway. There isn't. There is not a plan.
Ms. Norton. We were told in a hearing that there was a
hearing of the Aviation Subcommittee. Now, you say there is no
plan. Has there ever been a plan?
Mr. Gallaway. I don't know----
Ms. Norton. Do you intend to do a plan?
Mr. Gallaway. I don't have a plan. I think that----
Ms. Norton. So, you believe that it is justifiable to
essentially close down general aviation and a major commercial
and government center of the United States--what is it? How
many years after 9/11, when you believe that is acceptable and
that that is necessary?
Mr. Gallaway. I think if we get our rule out and in the in
force----
Ms. Norton. Will the rule make it possible?
Mr. Gallaway. I think it will be helpful with the other
members who control the airspace----
Ms. Norton. We are the stakeholders, our people who use----
Mr. Gallaway. Yes, we agree.
Ms. Norton [continuing]. The--who in fact have used general
aviation services in the Nation's capitol and are the people
who own helicopter services----
Mr. Gallaway. Yes.
Ms. Norton [continuing]. Who routinely flew into Merseley
among the stakeholders with whom you are meeting?
Mr. Gallaway. Yes. Again, I think when the rule comes out
and talks about plane size and other issues associated with
that, I think that discussion becomes easier to have with the
members of the people who control the overall----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Sammon, we are going to demand equality
with New York. You have not, in this testimony, nor has anyone
from the Department ever made the case that is more necessary
to reduce general aviation here than it is in New York City,
where your own assessments show the risks, the threats, and the
consequences to be far greater than in the Nation's capitol.
Therefore, that is what I am looking for--that, and nothing
less. You can tell that to the other people at the table that
you are trying to point the finger at as the reason; because
that is what we want here, equal treatment.
Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the gentle lady from the
District of Columbia. Frankly, let me say to the gentle lady
that she has this Chairwoman's support for the issue of general
aviation in Washington, DC, so that we recognize that the
balanced perspective that I utilize is that what we do have
should be secure. But it does not mean that we cannot look in
an open-minded manner at how we can restore general aviation in
this area.
So, Mr. Sammon, I knew you are just one part of it. This
committee will take up the issue. We would like you gentlemen
to remain. We understand the challenges. But we have votes. We
will then recess, and we will restart this panel, so that Mr.
Dent, the Ranking Member, will be able to pose questions to the
panel. We thank you very much for your time and courtesy. The
committee stands at recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. This hearing will be resumed; thank you
for your patience. It is my pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished Ranking Member from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
Thank you to the panel for sticking around here. I
apologize for the interruption.
Mr. Sammon, thanks for being here too, and also for your
work on this issue, and also for meeting me separately from
this meeting.
Why do you think that, in hindsight, TSA issued such a
broad sweeping rule that, in the opinion of many was pretty far
off the mark with respect to the LASP program?
Mr. Sammon. I think the approach there was just to bring
something back down once you get the comments, rather than
trying to broaden if you find out you have missed the mark
somewhere. So, it was probably more broadly based. I think
where we are going, as we have discussed, is a much more narrow
focus based upon considerable industry input.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. Did you guys consult with any
stakeholders prior to the release of the original NPRM?
Mr. Sammon. Yes. In fact, Administrator Hawley on numerous
occasion had meetings with stakeholders and attempted to come
to some process. But, he had met personally, as I did, and
other staff met, with stakeholders beforehand.
Mr. Dent. How does TSA document any consultations with
outside groups or industry groups or stakeholders, while
developing a potential rule?
Mr. Sammon. The documentation of those meetings, I would
have to check and get back to you and let you know. On the
working sessions, we have documented them. I think they are
being cleared to be put on a public format.
Mr. Dent. Also, and finally, in your written testimony, you
mentioned the automatic detention and processing terminal, or
ADAPT----
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Mr. Dent [continuing]. As a system designed to mitigate the
use of a GA aircraft as a conveyance to transport dangerous
persons, materials in the country. How does that work? How does
it distinguish between a scheduled legitimate flight and a
flight that may be deviating from its flight path?
Mr. Sammon. Yes. ADAPT is a program developed by FAA. They
track tail numbers. Essentially ADAPT is just a--if you think
about it as a data management system. So, with that tail
number, for instance, if the particular aircraft is part of the
security plan, and ADAPT recognizes that. If people who do not
have security plans and are applying to come into the country,
for instance, apply for waivers, if they have a waiver, ADAPT
will recognize that. If they don't, ADAPT will recognize the
aircraft, highlight it to FAA and ground-stop at that aircraft.
We have had a considerable number of aircraft, say from
Venezuela, to have come up without a waiver is ground-stopped
in Ft. Lauderdale, stopped. But essentially, what kind of
information that you want to tag onto that particular tail
number, ADAPT is simply a--that is what it does.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Dr. Gallaway, thank you too for being here as well. I have
been out to the DNDO facilities out there in Nevada and I got
quite an education out there. As you know, DNDO's responsible
for developing a global nuclear detection architecture
predicated on the understanding that ``no single layer of
defense can detect all radiological and nuclear threats.''
How does the radiation, nuclear detection on general
aviation aircraft play into DNDO's global nuclear detection
architecture?
Mr. Gallaway. We look at all the pathways coming into the
United States in the border layer. We look at the maritime
coming across land and also air. So, we looked at the entire
aviation pathway and found, obviously, a variety of flights
that come into the country. So, we are trying to work across
the board.
Our analysis, however, shows that international general
aviation is particularly attractive, because it allows somebody
a lot of autonomy. They can maintain control of the weapon,
because they can travel with it if they chose. The speed,
obviously, is attractive. But then finally, that they could fly
it, in fact, directly to the target without ever encountering
officials here in the United States.
Mr. Dent. My next question is this. I understand that
concern. Do you agree with the TSA and the inspector general's
conclusion that general aviation provides a possible method for
terrorist attack. But it is not a probable method for an
attack. Do you agree with that contention?
Mr. Gallaway. We have no specific intelligence information
that suggests that this is a threat vector, that the adversary
is pursuing.
Mr. Dent. How would DNDO, working with TSA and CBP, address
this high-consequence, but low-probability, method of attack?
Mr. Gallaway. We would work with both those agencies. But
CBP would probably be the more natural one that we would have
overseas pre-clearance airports, where we would go out and do
radiation scanning of the aircraft to assure that there is not
a nuclear device on board the aircraft before it departs
foreign soil. Then, we would have confidence that, as it enters
U.S. airspace, that it is okay.
Mr. Dent. Can I ask one more question?
I am sorry. Mr. Sammon, one other series of little
questions here. In your testimony you mentioned that a critical
aspect of TSA's regulatory approach is the process-oriented
nature of devising mandatory security measures. By process-
oriented nature, are you referring to the rulemaking process?
Mr. Sammon. I am sorry, the process-oriented nature is
what----
Mr. Dent. Yes.
Mr. Sammon. I think----
Mr. Dent. Are you referring to the rulemaking process when
you say that?
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Mr. Dent. Okay. If so, then why does the TSA have literally
dozens of security directives issued without any opportunity
for public notice or comment?
Mr. Sammon. I think there were two security directives
which were issues recently: One called 8F, another 8G. The
regulated parties in both cases, the directly regulated
parties, were the airports. 8F was designed specifically to
address vulnerabilities for people with unescorted access in
commercial airports. They do not apply to general aviation
airports.
We consulted specifically with both AAAE and ACI, the two
major airport associations who also brought airports in to
comment both on the security directive. As we got closer to the
deadlines, we also consulted with other affected stakeholders.
But you must also be aware that the other people who were
affected by this would be Coca-Cola vendors, plant maintainers,
anybody who is wandering around airports, with unescorted
access, who has not been issued an airport clearing security
badge.
So, there is a wide variety of folks that we--most of our
consultation was with the regulated party and the airports.
Mr. Dent. Finally, what is the process for issuing these
security directives? Are they ever reviewed to identify if an
actual rulemaking would be possible?
Mr. Sammon. In the case when the security directive,
particularly the 8F, was issued because of security
vulnerabilities that were identified by ICE and other parties
at O'Hare, where parties were using unauthorized badges.
Illegal people were basically taking badges out of a box, using
those as their airport credentials. We wanted to move forward
as expeditiously as possible to close that vulnerability.
Rulemaking would have taken us much longer.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Thank you for your indulgence. I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Dent. Before I
move to the next panel, I have just a few questions that I
wanted to make sure that we were clear, and that I had a full
understanding.
Mr. Sammon, as we go forward in the rulemaking process, I
am going to ask you and your team--and I know that your team is
being rebuilt as it moves forward under this new
administration--to keep this committee, this Chairwoman and the
full committee apprised of the progress of the rulemaking. In
fact, as Chairwoman of this subcommittee, I would like to have,
along with the staff, specific briefings as you make your way
through this process.
The other question is, as you watched the video--and I do
agree with much of the comments that have been made by my
colleagues. Particularly Mr. Lungren, I think, made some points
about farmers and the question of a manifest, and some of the
challenges in general aviation, when you ask for the
preciseness of a manifest and a time frame.
I might add that I also recognize that general aviation has
much different topography, when we talk about where small
planes may land. Coming from Texas, they may land on an
airstrip on a farm.
But my question to you is, in the view that you have just
been able to look at, we do have reasonable need to be
concerned about perimeter invasion or entry. Let me not use the
term invasion as much as perimeter entry.
Will you look at that in your rulemaking? Particularly as
it relates, as we discussed previously, Teterboro, I believe,
in New Jersey, in a congested area, and the airports in
Houston; because there was a clear, if you will, violation of
the perimeter--an un-ID'd, uninvited, nonrelevant, meaning that
the person had no purpose, and I won't even call them a
visitor--got on the grounds with no bar or no security check
whatsoever.
So, that is a problem, is it not? If you could turn your
mic on, so I could hear you. I think that is a problem, is it
not?
Mr. Sammon. Yes. In May, in 2004, we issued a series of
security guidelines.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right, I understand that.
Mr. Sammon. The guidelines, for instance, at airports as
you were speaking of would include fencing, hangar security,
CCTV, intrusion detection, access controls, lighting, personal
ID and so on, so forth. Our struggle there has been to issue
those as a mandate without a funding source.
That has been the thing we have been struggling with is--in
terms of we are--the assessment of vulnerabilities, the
riskiness of the airport, the grass strip, for instance,
compared to Teterboro. The requirements are clearly laid out.
But the question is, if we issue a rule, how will it be
paid for? We don't know that yet. That is our new struggle.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we have established that there is a
threat. We established that there is a vulnerability. I think
we established on this record that 9/11 was not predicted, per
se. I assume there were many security experts that probably
have written or wrote articles pre-9/11 saying America's
vulnerable. But it had not reached the American psyche, or
unfortunately the policy makers, many of whom are here today,
including myself if you will, on this whole question of
terrorism.
So, we now have a different look at terrorism. We know that
we may not all be able to predict what might happen. Even
though we have not had a terrorist act on our soil, which we
are very grateful for, the combination of the Executive and
Congress working together to ensure that not happen, we cannot
predict the future.
So, my point to you would be that we want to work with you.
There needs to be a balance in the struggle that you have.
Frankly, I believe there can be a balance. Teterboro, there can
be established parameters and regulations that would be very
helpful. I believe in Houston, there can be a balance. Although
smaller airports, but as you noted in the video, large
airplanes seemingly were housed there.
So, I want to pose the question--and I would like to work
on the response with you--that we look at perimeter security as
it relates to risk-based analysis, small and large, but also as
it relates to just the penetration and vulnerability aspects of
it; because you can have a small airport with large aircraft
that is, in essence, housed there. Can we work on this issue?
Do you see the necessity of ensuring perimeter security?
Mr. Sammon. I would be happy to come up and sit down with
staff and with you to discuss this and discuss the procedures
that are in place; and then discuss how we would go forward,
particularly if it were made part of a rule and without the
funding. I think that is really the issue. I would be----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand.
Mr. Sammon [continuing]. Happy to spend as much as time as
possible.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You see the need for perimeter security.
Mr. Sammon. It is in part of our guidelines. We just have
no means. It is just the resource to make it happen.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Mann, let me just raise this one
question with you. I would appreciate it if you convey this to
the IG, Mr. Skinner. I do believe that you worked in good
faith. But I do believe you did a disservice in the summary and
the conclusions that came about.
I assume you responded to what was an interesting and
provocative headline as to whether or not Houston was a sitting
duck. I don't believe the answer needed to be as provocative--
no, it is not a sitting duck. Do you have any scientific
evidence that, if a small plane was either loaded or non-
loaded, and penetrated one of our refineries, one of the tanks
in our refineries, one of the areas that are holding chemicals,
that there wouldn't be a potential catastrophic event?
Mr. Mann. Well, there is certainly the potential for that.
But----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me have you answer the question. A
small plane could cause damage in a catastrophic event. Could
it not?
Mr. Mann. It could.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It could. So even if you want to hang your
hat on the question of risk and whether it ever happens, again
I emphasize to you that I am not trying to, in essence, cry
fire in a crowded theater. I am not trying to re-elevate the
horror of 9/11. We all went through that. Those in New York
most of all.
But I am trying to capture the unpredictability of
terrorism. Therefore, the concern I have with the IG's report
is that you gave no credence to the unpredictability of
terrorism. You gave you credence to the particular area that
you are in. You have just heard me say that I supported Ms.
Norton. I am not against general aviation. I frankly believe it
should be open here in this region, and we should find ways to
secure it.
But then, in Houston, it is just laissez-faire. It is okay.
You seem to not look at the region that we were in. Those
airports were minutes away from our refinery corridor, with all
kinds of potential. We have had catastrophic incidences, and
that we are not, in essence--it didn't take a major loss of
life. But we had loss of life, 15 at one particular incident.
That was, of course, an accident that occurred. But it has
great potential.
So, my simple question is do you concede the point that,
even if it is a question of how you assess the risk, that a
small plane in the region that we are speaking of could cause
major damage?
Mr. Mann. I think that is correct, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And could cause loss of life.
Mr. Mann. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If it was not an accident, meaning some
unfortunate pilot that lost their way, but in fact someone who
intended to do so, the perimeter entry that you witnessed by
video, and the easy access to airplanes, could contribute to
that.
Mr. Mann. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. I want to thank you for that.
Let me just go to Dr. Gallaway. I think, Dr. Gallaway, that
people are not understanding--I shouldn't say understanding--
but capturing the essence of what you are saying; because I
think it is major. You really focused us on international
general aviation. Many times, those are large planes. It could
be that they could be carrying radioactive material. They are
unscreened overseas. Is that my understanding?
Mr. Gallaway. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you have come here today. Let me just
read into the record again your testimony that says: We
recommend exploring the option that all other U.S. entry
screening and inspection activity, i.e., customs, agriculture,
and health, be conducted concurrently for radioactive nuclear
screening at the pre-clearance gateway.
What you are saying is that you would like to have a
scheme, a structure in place, that would put in place the
international general aviation structure that would screen for
potential radioactive or nuclear material, that is not at this
point happening, and therefore making them a potential deadly
target heading towards the United States, if that was their
destination.
Mr. Gallaway. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Did I understand you to say that you are
working on such a structure, and funding would be the asset
that you would need to carry through with this?
Mr. Gallaway. We are still in the planning phase for this.
I will call it more that it is a sophisticated concept at this
point. But there would be a lot of things to actually require
to implement this. Funding would certainly be the backbone for
it. But we would have to negotiate with our international
partners. We would have to figure out, in fact, how to set up
the gateway airports and the scanning processes, and then to
operationalize all those. So, it would be a challenge, but a
doable challenge.
The other component of that problem would be to deal with
the aircraft that come across on relatively short flights from
Canada and Mexico, that we would set up airports along the U.S.
border, but away from population centers, where they could land
safety in the United States and then be scanned once they are
on the ground. But the key to that is keep them away from
population centers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think maybe we could work with this
proposal and utilize pilot programs initially to see how this
structure would work?
Mr. Gallaway. Yes. In fact, customs and border protection
has gateway airports in Aruba, Canada, and Bermuda, and which
we are trying to negotiate the rights overseas with the foreign
countries to allow us to do rad/nuc screening. I think we are
doing pretty well in those negotiations. Then we would
implement them as pilot programs.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I think most Americans would be
grateful, Dr. Gallaway, for your work. I would think most
Americans wouldn't be aware of the potential threat of rad/
nuclear materials coming in on an international general
aviation flight. Again, we are not attempting to create
hysteria. But we are attempting to be good stewards of the
American people and their need of security.
I would like to ensure that we have an opportunity to be
briefed as you move forward. Particularly, I would like to get
a status report on the cooperative efforts that you are
attempting with our neighbors. I would also like to hear on the
progress we are making with our extended neighbors, and that is
our allies and friends and various countries that are, of
course, in Europe and other parts of the world, because our
general aviation flights come from all over the world, which
leaves us vulnerable to any precipitous incident that might
occur.
So, I would appreciate that. I would appreciate us engaging
on this concept of beginning with a pilot program. As you have
indicated, funding is not the only part of your need. We need
to have an effective structure. I think it is both insightful
and needed. I will look forward to meeting with you as you make
progress on this particular effort.
I would like to thank the witnesses and appreciate, again,
very much, your----
Ms. Norton. Madame Chairwoman, Madame Chairwoman, could I
say a word?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Oh, I am sorry. I didn't see you come in.
Let me yield for a moment to the gentle lady from the
District of Columbia, which I have already gone on record
saying that I support her proposition with respect to the
District of Columbia and general aviation. The gentle lady from
the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. I appreciate your support, Madame Chairwoman. I
particularly appreciate this hearing, because it has given us a
study in contrast without evidence that has been an underlying
risk/consequences analysis. Everyone knew, particularly after
9/11--but they would know in any case--that New York was a
particularly vulnerable jurisdiction to planes of every kind,
yes, even of course general aviation with its skyscrapers, with
its enormous, indeed, its magnificently unique density.
Indeed, Department of Homeland Security knows it, because
it places New York City as the highest-risk jurisdiction in the
United States. Yet, the Homeland Security Department, it tells
us it isn't us, it is the Secret Service, approved within days
of 9/11 general security aviation in the Big Apple. You know,
they did a risk and consequences analysis of the kind they gave
lip service to here, when it came to Houston and to the
District of Columbia.
Now, as a result of this hearing, Madame Chairwoman, I must
say I believe that Houston is more vulnerable than the Nation's
capitol. We don't have any manufacturing facilities, nuclear
facilities, fuel storage facilities anywhere close to the
Nation's capitol. There is plenty of perimeter control here. In
Houston, I saw no evidence, either of perimeter control, or of
control by TSA in the air.
Yet, if I am a terrorist, and all I have got is a small
plane, I am not likely to try the Nation's capitol. For one
thing, we got the Air Force, as all of you know, who since 9/11
we have seen go in the air if they see anybody who even looks
like they are penetrating the airspace of the Nation's
capitol--false alarms, but all of us were put out in the street
several times.
There is no question that the only thing that you have not
given sufficient attention to is commercial aviation in a
country that prides itself on keeping commerce in place.
Frankly, we have had to--in this city, Madame Chairwoman--
beat Federal officials around the head and shoulders, just to
keep the city open until finally people understood that this is
the United States. This is America. We are capable of
protecting our country.
I wanted to say to all three of you gentlemen, it is a
matter of some embarrassment to me that we created a whole
Department of Homeland Security, and you all haven't figured
out how to get ordinary commerce into the Nation's capitol. It
is not only the Nation's capitol, it serves one of the real
growth regions of the country. So, it is a matter of
embarrassment. It should be a matter of shame to you.
Even without general aviation up in the air, you have had
precautions here of the kind we don't have in New York and the
kind we don't have in Houston. I think you have got to get your
cities straight. I think an appropriate risk analysis must be
done here in the Nation's capitol.
There are all kinds of layers. I didn't see any in that
film. I haven't heard you speak in any layers. So, while I
would agree with you that, on any Nation-wide risk analysis,
general aviation doesn't come up very high, but a
particularized risk analysis needs to be done.
It looks like you have done it only for the Nation's
capitol. You got it all wrong--all wrong. You have never been
able to justify what you have done here. But I haven't seen
comparable attention paid to jurisdictions near nuclear
facilities, near fuel storage facilities. It does seem to me
you have got some work to be done.
By the way, I still think general aviation does not pose a
major threat, even to those jurisdictions. But this testimony
today, Madame Chairwoman, has convinced me that no risk
analysis, major area of the country by major area of the
country, has been done; and that they are dealing with Nation-
wide assessment that I think you and I would agree with. I
think we are entitled to more than that, given vast
differences.
Sometimes they don't have the same population. But
terrorists are smart enough to know that we have guarded places
like New York and the District of Columbia and have a lot of
chatter going on there. They may be smart enough to look for
places where if you just do a big blow-out, and where maybe you
want to take extra precautions there, instead of spending all
your time looking at the navel of the Nation's capitol and
stopping all general aviation for all intents and purposes
here.
Shame on you. That has simply got to be corrected. You have
got to get all the players at the table and show that you know
how to meet your dual responsibility to, in fact, keep this
Nation safe and to keep us economically and commercially strong
at the same time. You have got two missions, not one.
Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We thank the gentle lady.
I think, gentlemen, you have just recognized the great
interest of this issue of general aviation probably more so
than you might have expected. I think we have had an
opportunity to strike a balance in recognizing that general
aviation is valuable. But it has its vulnerabilities.
Maybe we now need to look across the Nation, Mr. Sammon, as
you look at your regulations. Of course, the issue of the
District of Columbia is more than you and a major policy
decision, which we, as Members of Congress, will join with the
congresswoman.
But as you look at this issue of general aviation and the
regulations, I think there is merit to looking at perimeter
security, looking at where airports are located. Certainly you
have already worked with the industry as relates to manifests,
protection of vehicles, size of vehicles. We are making
progress. But I want to be able to see a holistic approach to
this issue.
As I indicated, I want to thank Mr. Mann, Mr. Sammon, and
Dr. Gallaway. There being no further questions for this first
panel, I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before
the subcommittee today. The Members of the subcommittee may
have additional questions for you. We ask that you respond to
them expeditiously in writing.
We now welcome our second panel to the witness table.
I welcome our second panel of witnesses. Our first witness
is Martha King. Since the early 1970s, Ms. King and her
husband, John, have been teaching pilots. Their company, King
Schools, operates out of a dedicated complex in San Diego,
California, that includes a television and software production
facility. For more than 34 years, King Schools has delivered
millions of videotapes, CD-ROMs, DVDs and on-line courses to
pilots and mechanics.
Ms. King is the first and only woman to hold every category
and class of FAA rating on her pilot's certificate, as well as
every flight and ground instructor certificate offered by the
FAA.
Our second witness is Mr. Olislagers, who is the executive
director of Centennial Airport in Denver, Colorado, one of the
busiest general aviation airports in the United States, and
among the 30 busiest U.S. airports of any kind.
Our third witness is Mr. Jeremy Rogalski. He is an
investigative reporter for KHOU-TV, the CBS affiliate in
Houston. In February 2007, he aired a report exposing security
lapses at three general aviation airports in the greater
Houston area. Specifically KHOU-TV acquired entry to those
facilities and, in many cases, the aircraft doors were wide
open, and nobody questioned KHOU-TV's activities. This
important reporting helped to galvanize a national conversation
of general aviation security and was among the reasons for the
IG report we discussed during our first panel.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Mark Van Tine. Mr. Van Tine is
the president and chief executive officer of Jeppessen.
Jeppessen is a subsidiary of the Boeing Company. He has spent
his career working in a variety of different areas within
Jeppessen's businesses, including flight operations, customer
service, charting, and information technology.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement shall be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Ms. King.
Ms. King, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MARTHA KING, PILOT
Ms. King. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent,
Members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. It is a privilege
to be here before you today. My name is Martha King. I am co-
owner of King Schools, a family-owned business located in San
Diego, California. Our company produces DVD and Web-based
training courses for pilots.
Nearly half the pilots in America, who learned to fly in
the last 30 years, have taken one of our courses. In addition
to being type rated in our small company airplane, as
Chairwoman Jackson Lee indicated, I also hold every category
and class of FAA rating on my pilot and instructor
certificates.
My husband and I wouldn't have been able to build our
business without the use of a general aviation business
aircraft. Our airplane is critical to the survival of our
company and to the customers we serve.
For example, King Schools provides the computer-based pilot
training materials for some 300 flight schools throughout the
United States that are Cessna pilot centers. These small
independent businesses are located on small airports at some
distance from airports served by the airlines. We visit these
flight schools regularly to give marketing and business
development talks to their owners and employees. We bring along
software engineers and technical support staff to solve our
customers' computer issues.
Because of our relationship with these Cessna pilot
centers, we visit often with Cessna Aircraft Company in
Wichita, Kansas. By using our company airplane, we can take
eight members of our small management team from San Diego to
Wichita in the morning and return to San Diego that same night.
The airplane helps us turn travel time into work time and
limits our employees' time out of the office. This productivity
just wouldn't be possible using the airlines.
You don't often hear about companies like King Schools when
you hear discussions about business aviation. But for every
large company that operates a business airplane, there are
eight or nine companies, just like mine--small and medium-sized
companies that provide jobs and bring commerce to communities
across the United States.
I want to thank you for having me here today as part of
your hearing to discuss the Large Aircraft Security proposal or
LASP, as put forward by the Transportation Security
Administration. From an overall perspective, the proposal does
not recognize the significant differences between commercial
airline operations and non-commercial operations which do not
carry members of the general public.
The primary difference is that we general aviation
operators know personally everyone on our aircraft. As a GA
operator, I am concerned about several provisions in the
proposal. I would like to briefly mention three of them.
A first concern is the prohibition of more than 80 items
from being carried on board. This plan would dramatically
restrict the productivity of many businesses. Some wouldn't be
able to carry their own necessary equipment or their own
products.
A second major concern is the proposal to establish a
third-party compliance audit program. Some business airplane
operators have told me this proposal would actually decrease
security, since businesses would now be required to reveal
internal security procedures to outside parties. I am also
concerned with the requirement to constantly vet our passengers
against a no-fly list that, at times, has proven to be
inaccurate or incomplete. We know our passengers. They are our
employees and our customers.
I believe that general aviation security would be best
enhanced by the TSA establishing a rulemaking committee to
address the questions and concerns raised by industry and the
public on the LASP. This type of forum, often used by the FAA
and other Government agencies, has proven benefits.
Since the events of 9/11, the general aviation community
has been very proactive in developing and implementing a large
number of workable and effective security measures. What
general aviation operators seek, and America needs, are
measures that do not represent a needless sacrifice in liberty
without a benefit to society.
The freedom of movement of private citizens has always been
one of our great American ideals. We are confident that we can
ensure security without sacrificing that ideal.
Thank you, and I am happy to address any questions you may
have.
[The statement of Ms. King follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martha King
July 15, 2009
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, Members of the
subcommittee, good afternoon. This is the first time I have testified
before a Congressional subcommittee and it is a privilege to be here
before you today.
My name is Martha King, and I am co-owner and co-chairman along
with my husband John--of King Schools, Inc. which is a family-owned
business located in San Diego, CA. Our company produces CD-ROM, DVD and
web-based training courses for pilots in training. I say with some
pride that it has been estimated that nearly every pilot has taken one
of our courses during their flying career. We launched our pilot
training business out of our home more than 30 years ago.
In addition to being type rated in our company airplane, a Dassault
Falcon 10, I also hold every category and class of FAA rating on my
pilot and instructor certificates. I regularly fly everything from jet
and piston airplanes and helicopters to weight-shift trikes and powered
parachutes. I also pilot blimps from time to time.
Since 1996, King Schools has been a member of the National Business
Aviation Association (NBAA). I am pleased to appear today on behalf of
the Association which represents over 8,000 diverse companies with only
one thing in common--they all depend on general aviation aircraft to
help them address some of their business travel challenges.
My husband and I would not have been able to build our business, or
conduct our now world-wide small business enterprise, without the use
of a general aviation airplane for business. Our plane is critical to
the survival of our company and the customers we serve.
For example, King Schools provides the computer-based pilot
training materials for some 300 flight schools throughout the United
States that serve as Cessna Pilot Centers. These small independent
businesses prefer to be located on small general aviation airports at
some distance from airports served by the airlines, because that is the
best location to conduct flight training. We visit these flight schools
regularly in order to give marketing and business development talks to
the flight school owners and employees, and occasionally take software
engineers and technical support staff to solve our customers' computer
and networking issues.
As an additional example, because of our relationship with these
approximately 300 Cessna Pilot Centers we have the need to visit often
with the Cessna Aircraft Company in Wichita, Kansas. By using our
company airplane, we can take eight members of our small management
team from San Diego to Wichita in the morning, and return our staff to
San Diego that same night. In a small company like ours, it is
important that we minimize the duration of time our management team is
out of the office. The airplane helps us turn travel time into work
time and limit our employees' time out of the office. This productivity
would not be possible using the airlines.
My story is a familiar one--every Member of this subcommittee has
businesses in your State with a story similar to ours.
You don't often hear about companies like King Schools when you
hear discussions about business aviation. People tend to exclusively
focus on large companies when in reality large companies represent only
a small portion of business aviation operators. For every large company
that operates a business airplane, there are 8 or 9 companies like
mine--small and mid-size companies that provide jobs and bring commerce
to communities all across the United States.
I know that you invited me to be here today to talk not only about
the benefits of business aviation, but also about the important issue
of general aviation security and the pending TSA rulemaking known as
the Large Aircraft Security Program or ``LASP.'' My long experience as
a businesswoman, aviator, and flight instructor gives me additional
insight into some of the challenges general aviation faces in today's
economic, political, and regulatory environment. So I am pleased to
have the opportunity to be with you today to be part of this discussion
on general aviation security.
Let me be clear. The general aviation community is committed to the
security of our national transportation system. We want to be a partner
with the Federal Government on reasonable, workable, and effective
regulations that simultaneously ensure security and facilitate general
aviation operations.
Since the events of 9/11, NBAA and indeed the entire general
aviation community has been very proactive in enhancing security by
developing and implementing a large number of workable and effective
security measures. We have worked closely with several Government
agencies including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and this partnership
approach has produced tangible results. The security measures we have
implemented include an AOPA Airport Watch program, the monitoring of
aircraft financing transactions, a new requirement for government-
issued, tamper-proof photo-IDs for pilots, and guidelines for security
at general aviation airports. In addition, 5 years ago, NBAA members in
the NY area voluntarily initiated a pilot program to design a security
program specifically for operations in that area.
We believed that these collaborative efforts would set the
foundation for a reasonable and effective Large Aircraft Security
Program, which we all understood the TSA to be developing.
Unfortunately, that turned out not to be the case. The community was
not only disappointed but alarmed when TSA issued its Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) known as the ``Large Aircraft Security
Program'' (LASP) in October, 2008. Their proposed rule clearly
reflected a lack of basic understanding of general aviation.
Let me give you two clear examples: First, it appeared to ``cut-
and-paste'' security measures specifically designed for commercial
operations onto non-commercial general aviation operations. The
proposed rule did not demonstrate even a basic understanding of the
vast differences between commercial operations, and non-commercial
general aviation operations which, among other things, do not carry
unknown members of the public. The failure to understand and recognize
these fundamental differences can lead to absurd results. For example
can you imagine a company that makes tools not being able to take the
tools they make on the plane they own? Secondly, the Large Aircraft
Security Program as it has been proposed would apply to very small
airplanes--airplanes that are one-twentieth the size of the smallest
airplane used in the 9/11 attacks.
I do want to point to one area of agreement--for over 2 years, the
TSA has repeatedly indicated that pilot identification has been the
agency's primary focus in the development of a general aviation
security protocol. NBAA members recognize the value and endorse the
concept of pilot background checks. We stand ready to work with TSA to
further define and implement this proposal.
As a general aviation operator, I am most concerned about several
of the proposed mandates contained in the current LASP proposal. These
include:
The proposal to include a list of more than 80 ``prohibited
items'' which could no longer be carried on-board GA aircraft.
Many of these items are routinely carried aboard because they
are central to the business needs of the operator. As I
mentioned before it makes little sense for a company sending a
team of employees to fix a problem with a customer's assembly
line to be unable to access their tools during a flight--or a
company to not be able to use their own products during flight
as they prepare for a sales presentation.
The LASP would also require owners/operators of some
airplanes to develop procedures to carry a Federal air marshal
when told to do so by the TSA. Here again, this proposal shows
a lack of understanding of the general aviation community since
every business operator knows who is on-board their aircraft at
all times.
The proposed LASP rule proposes to establish an external
third-party audit program to measure compliance with the rule.
We believe that ``contracting out'' such security functions to
oversee the application of TSA's No-Fly and Selectee list and
to conduct compliance audits is contrary to our national
homeland security goals.
The requirement to constantly vet our passengers against a
no-fly list that at times has proven to be inaccurate or
incomplete. We know our passengers. They are our employees and
our customers.
In response to the proposed LASP rulemaking, the TSA received over
7,000 public comments including a letter from Committee Chairman
Thompson as well as other letters from many House and Senate Members
expressing concern with the proposal.
Following release of the LASP NPRM and in recognition that the TSA
proposal was seriously flawed and needed to be modified, NBAA joined
with other general aviation associations in requesting that the TSA
establish a rule-making committee to address questions and concerns
raised by industry and the public on the LASP.
We greatly appreciate the support which we received from Members of
Congress for such a working group. We continue to believe that this
type of forum--often used by the FAA and other Government agencies--
would be beneficial for the development of the LASP, and we hope that
the TSA will consider the proven benefits of utilizing the ``rulemaking
committee'' mechanism going forward.
As the subcommittee is aware, the TSA also held a series of
listening meetings across the United States to receive additional
public testimony from hundreds of other concerned parties.
My husband John attended the TSA listening session in Burbank, CA
last January, and provided comments for the record. I believe his
comments on our commitment to aviation security are shared by the
general aviation community at large when he stated that:
``My wife and I operate an airplane that weighs more than 12,500
pounds--still it weighs less than 10% of the weight of a Boeing 737.
When applied to private operators like us, these proposed regulations
are pointless. You asked earlier about what security procedures are in
place. Our airplane is located at a secondary airport, but it is fenced
and gated and has 24-hour security. The airplane is in a locked hangar.
The airplane itself is locked and the steering system is disabled. But
what is more important, we already have in place the best security
system possible--we personally know every one of our passengers. And we
are not going to allow an unknown person into our airplane, even at the
point of a gun. You see, we have all learned from 9/11 that the days of
complying with hijackers, and living through the experience, are
over.''
We appreciate that TSA made those additional forums available for
the public to ask questions and express concerns with the LASP
proposal. Following those meetings, the TSA and the general aviation
stakeholders have held three additional listening sessions to further
discuss our outstanding concerns with the current proposed LASP rule.
These meetings were insightful, deliberative, and valuable to both
industry and I believe the TSA. I'm encouraged by reports of the
progress made since February and by Mr. Sammon's comments today.
It is regrettable that these types of open exchanges didn't occur
prior to the release of the LASP as I believe that the proposal would
have looked significantly different. I am hopeful that TSA's commitment
to releasing a revised LASP proposal for another round of public
comment shows renewed commitment to developing a reasonable, effective,
and implementable security program.
I'm looking forward to reviewing TSA's revised proposal as part of
the next public comment period and hopefully we'll all see a more
rational approach to general aviation security. Adoption of TSA's
current LASP proposal would most surely create significant economic and
operational burdens for general aviation operators and to many American
businesses--like mine--that rely on general aviation aircraft to
support their businesses and the economic base that is so vital in
today's difficult economic environment.
I would also like to express our congratulations and appreciation
to the Members of the Homeland Security Committee for your hard work
and efforts in crafting HR 2200, the TSA Authorization bill. We are
pleased that this important legislation creates an Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) for aviation stakeholders and a ``General
Aviation Working Group'' within the ASAC to give the GA community a
forum to formulate recommendations on GA security proposals for TSA
consideration.
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, in closing, I want to reiterate the general
aviation community's commitment to ensuring that we continue to operate
in a secure environment. We were pleased that the recent Department of
Homeland Security report by the Office of the Inspector General--which
you requested--effectively summarized the current state of general
aviation security. It reports that general aviation ``presents only
limited and mostly hypothetical threats to security'' and, that actions
taken by GA airports and operators are ``positive and effective.'' We
are especially mindful of the responsibility that we as a community
have to maintain and improve those efforts.
I also want to express my appreciation and that of all the members
of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), to you,
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent and the Members of House
Homeland Security Committee for your on-going support for general
aviation. You have been most helpful in working with us on the LASP and
other issues of concern to general aviation.
Please be assured that the general aviation community is committed
to working in partnership with this subcommittee, the Congress and the
administration in developing and supporting reasonable and effective
aviation security measures.
The freedom of movement of private citizens has always been one of
our great American ideals. We are confident that we can ensure security
without sacrificing that ideal.
I look forward to responding to any questions you might have. Thank
you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Ms. King. We appreciate your
testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Olislagers to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. OLISLAGERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CENTENNIAL AIRPORT
Mr. Olislagers. Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking
Member and Members of the committee. My name is Robert
Olislagers, and I am executive director at Centennial Airport,
which is located in the metropolitan area of Denver. I wish to
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today
regarding the general aviation security program, as well as the
Large Aircraft Security Program.
Before I begin my testimony, I would like to thank the
committee and the committee Members for your continued support
on this issue. The provisions in H.R. 2200 could foster the
kind of cooperative relationship that we are seeking with TSA.
We also appreciate the security grant program as part of H.R.
2200. It is equally important and very much appreciated.
I would also like to thank Mr. Sammon for his personally
leading the stakeholder meetings following the closure comment
period of the NPRM. His open and pragmatic approach certainly
was refreshing. We hope that that will carry forward in the
revised NPRM when issued.
By way of background, I served on the working group of the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which drafted the
Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports. I have also
managed General Aviation airports for the last 25 years. At
present, I manage one of the busiest GA airports in the
country. I also studied national and international security at
the Air War College and at Harvard University.
I believe that progress has been made with respect to
general aviation airport security, including the recommendation
that the TSA reconvene the working group to update the Security
Guidelines for General Aviation Airports. It appears that that
suggestion is resonating with the TSA.
That said, while the industry does not question that
potential threats exist, I remain concerned with the over-
emphasis on the threat and the threat posed by general aviation
aircraft. I am also concerned about associated program costs,
irrespective of the state of the current economy, as well as
the erosion of civil liberties.
Specifically, the NPRM-stated reason for the proposed rule
contradicts TSA's own intelligence evaluation and conclusions.
The TSA states that the reason for the NPRM is that the TSA is
aware that, as vulnerabilities within the air carrier and
commercial industry are reduced, GA operations become more
attractive targets. However, this is in direct contradiction
with the assessment by the TSA Office of Intelligence and the
recent 2009 report by the IG makes the same finding.
Another point I would like to make is that the NPRM
constitutes, in our opinion, an unfunded mandate pursuant to
the Unfunded Mandate Act of 1995. Just at Centennial Airport
alone, we estimate the law enforcement cost--nothing else, just
the law enforcement cost--to run between $300,000 at the very
low end, up to $1.3 million per year. That would amount to a
current operating level somewhere around $60 to $80 per landing
or takeoff for each aircraft coming into Centennial Airport. It
basically amounts to double taxation.
The NPRM ignores privacy laws and private property rights.
We are very concerned, and this is one of the more complex
aspects of the NPRM. But it touches on both conflicts with
other laws as well as Federalism issues. I am not an attorney.
However, extensive case law suggests that citizens enjoy
extraordinary legal protections related to private property,
privacy rights, as well as due process. For this reason, we
recommend that the privately owned aircraft be exempt, and that
the NPRM focus only on publicly operated aircraft for the most
stringent initiatives.
The NPRM also may inadvertently force some airports that
are unable to comply with the NPRM as proposed to violate
Federal Aviation Administration grant assurances, and also be
in noncompliance with Federal commerce law relating to
interstate access, possibly resulting in becoming ineligible
for airport improvement program funding or becoming subject to
other punitive actions.
The NPRM also proposes an aircraft weight threshold not
supported by the facts. The proposed weight threshold of 12,500
pounds is at least 50 percent below TSA's own classified throw
weight analysis and well below the industry recommended weight
thresholds. Industry recommends that the threshold be at least
100,000 pounds or more. I can go into greater detail if you
would like.
In conclusion, regarding the NPRM, we do not question that
potential threats exist, but these must be weighed against
mitigations already in place, including voluntary as well as
mandatory, the threat to national security, and their likely
probability. If the TSA is indeed serious about taking a more
pragmatic approach to managing who flies the aircraft, who is
on-board the aircraft and what is on-board the aircraft--as
Administrator Sammon said, a more aircraft-centric approach--
then the industry sees no need for costly airport security
measures that do not demonstrably improve security.
However, the effectiveness of a layered approach to
security compels general aviation airports to play a value-
added role in security. For this reason, we reiterate the
recommendation that TSA reinstate the working group and update
the Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports in lieu
of the airport security requirements proposed in the NPRM.
This concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you very much for
your time.
[The statement of Mr. Olislagers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert P. Olislagers
July 15, 2009
Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and Members of
the committee, my name is Robert Olislagers and I am Executive Director
of Centennial Airport, located in the Denver metropolitan area. I wish
to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today regarding
General Aviation Security.
Before I begin my testimony, I would like to thank the committee
and committee Members for your continued interest in this issue. As
many of you have pointed out over the past several months, the lack of
collaboration with general aviation airports and the general aviation
industry has brought us to this point. As was illustrated very clearly,
effective security requires TSA and industry to work closely together
toward common goals. The provisions you have constructed as part of
H.R. 2200 to establish stakeholder working groups to address general
aviation security and other important security issues could foster the
kind of cooperative approach that was initially missing as TSA
developed the NPRM. Your efforts to create a general aviation security
grant program as part of H.R. 2200 is equally important and much
appreciated.
I would also like to express my appreciation to TSA Assistant
Administrator John Sammon for personally leading several stakeholder
meetings following the conclusion of the NPRM public comment period. I
participated in two of the three meetings and his open and pragmatic
approach was particularly refreshing. The general aviation industry,
including the airport community, look forward to seeing this pragmatism
carried forward in the much-anticipated reissue of the NPRM.
By way of background, I served on the Working Group of the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee (``ASAC'') and assisted the TSA in drafting
the ``Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports''. I have
managed General Aviation (``GA'') airports for 25 years and at present,
I manage one of the largest and busiest GA Reliever airports in the
United States. I also studied national and international security at
the Air War College and Harvard University, and I am a published author
on the subject of GA airport security. I served as the Principal
Investigator for the only GA security research grant ever issued by the
TSA and previously chaired two aviation security research projects on
behalf of the National Academy of Sciences, Transportation Research
Board. I currently chair the General Aviation Security Working Group
for the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE).
I believe that progress has been made with respect to general
aviation airport security, including the recommendation that the TSA
reconvene the ASAC Working Group and update the Security Guidelines for
General Aviation Airports in lieu of the NPRM recommendations related
to airports--a suggestion that appears to resonate with TSA. However,
while the industry does not question that potential threats exist, I
remain concerned with the over-emphasis on ``the threat'', and the
threat posed by general aviation aircraft. I am also concerned about
associated program costs, irrespective of the state of the current
economy, as well as the erosion of civil liberties. Specifically;
(1) The NPRM stated Reason For The Proposed Rule (145) contradicts
TSA's own intelligence evaluation and conclusions;
(i) Specifically, on page 181, the TSA states that the reason for
the NPRM is that; the ``TSA is aware that, as
vulnerabilities within the air carrier and commercial
aviation industry are reduced, GA operations become more
attractive targets.''\1\ However, this is in direct
contradiction with an assessment by the TSA Office of
Intelligence (``OI''), which concluded that there is little
evidence that terrorists have turned their attention to
general aviation in the United States.\2\ The recent May
2009 report by the Department of Homeland Security,
Inspector General makes the same finding.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Large Aircraft Security Program, Other Aircraft Operator
Security Program, and Airport Operator Program, Federal Register TSA
Docket 2008-0021. P. 145
\2\ Civil Aviation Threat Assessment. Transportation Security
Administration, Office of Intelligence. December 30, 2008 (U/FOUO),
Appendix A, P. 2.
\3\ TSA's Role in General Aviation Security. Department of Homeland
Security, Office of the Inspector General. OIG-09-69, May 2009. P. 28,
29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) General aviation is an asymmetric business and unlike
commercial airlines with very predictable time schedules
and routines, general aviation behavior is random and too
unpredictable for terrorists to conduct training exercises
that lead to well-planned attacks with a high degree of
success.
(iii) Unlike the commercial aviation sector, the vast majority of
pilots and passengers flying on general aviation aircraft
are known to aircraft and airport operators. Therefore, the
focus should be on the small number of unknown travelers,
including any unusual situations, transactions, or
behavior.
(2) The NPRM proposes to make mandatory what is already in place
without demonstrating the efficacy [or lack thereof] of the
existing combination of mandatory and voluntary initiatives,
including a cost benefit analysis;
(i) Specifically, the NPRM suggests that the GA industry is
mostly unregulated, and that this presents a risk (145). We
know in fact that GA is highly regulated, including
security. I will not repeat all the mandatory and voluntary
security initiatives that have been implemented since 9/11;
however, it appears that the TSA issued this NPRM without a
comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the GA industry
that takes into account the effectiveness of all mandatory
and voluntary initiatives implemented to date.\4\ We
believe therefore that it is premature to conclude that
this proposal is in fact, needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For example, the TSA is just now in the process of reviewing
data of vulnerability assessments at 100 GA airports through a pilot
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Ancillary, the TSA did not provide a cost/benefit analysis
in the NPRM that justifies the cost of implementing the
NPRM against the efficacy of the existing mandatory and
voluntary initiatives.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ It should be noted that former DHS Secretary Chertoff often
spoke about ``measurable programs'' and therefore this standard should
apply to this DHS/TSA-crafted NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) The NPRM constitutes an Unfunded Mandate pursuant to the
Unfunded Mandate Act of 1995 (182);
(i) Specifically, the TSA estimates that it will cost affected GA
airports $5.5 million over 10 years, while estimating its
own costs to implement the program at $136.6 million.
(ii) In spite of having access to data at all U.S. reliever
airports, TSA relied instead on very general data to
conduct its fiscal impact analysis. The results are not
only deeply flawed but even the TSA questions its own data
in the NPRM (174, 175) Even more troubling is the fact that
the TSA did not verify its data against even one airport.
For this reason, AAAE conducted a survey of member airports
and 45 (or 18%) of the 273 Reliever Airports responded. The
resulting data confirmed that the TSA substantially
underestimated NPRM implementation costs while
overestimating airport revenues and, the TSA completely
omitted Law Enforcement Officer (``LEO'') costs.
24% of Reliever Airports (``RA'') that operate 24/7 have
full time staff on hand, therefore,
64% of RAs report having to add staff to meet ASC
requirements.
Individual cost analyses are on file with AAAE for TSA's review but
below are some of the findings of the survey:
72% of airports reported ASC training costs to be no more
than $5,000;
28% of airports reported ASC training costs to be more than
$10,000, with most of the larger airports reporting costs in
excess of $20,000, including Centennial Airport.
But this is only part of the story:
(iii) The TSA completely omitted from the NPRM cost analysis what
every airport reported would be the largest cost center,
which is Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) training and
deployment. One-third of airports surveyed indicated having
to enter into a reimbursement agreement with local law
enforcement and another 24% are uncertain of whether they
have to negotiate such agreements. Most Alaska airports and
many of the larger Reliever Airports reported estimated
annual LEO costs in excess of $200,000 and smaller Reliever
Airports estimated costs between $50,000 and $100,000.
Centennial Airport for example handles some 130,000
itinerant operations per year with aircraft weighing more
than 12,500 lbs. Assuming half are departures with 20%
deadheading, the airport would have to accommodate an
average of 142 aircraft per day, operating from four
separate Fixed Base Operators (``FBO'') The timely
emplaning of GA passengers is the bane of existence for GA
and with multiple departures from multiple locations, we
would need multiple LEOs in order to satisfy customer
throughput. We are just one example. All told,
60% of airports estimated the annual NPRM cost at more than
$40,000, with the larger airports report costs over $200,000.
Centennial Airport estimates costs at more than $300,000 at a
minimum and as high as $1.3 million per year depending on
traffic volume.
88% of airports told AAAE that they would pass the cost on
to aircraft operators;
22% of RAs may have to consider giving up RA status or ban
large aircraft; and,
15% of RAs will either close or consider closing if they
cannot meet the NPRM;
(iv) The TSA also grossly overestimated revenues earned by
airports, with only the very largest of airports reaching
or exceeding the estimate cited in the NPRM. Most Reliever
Airports, however, report less than $500,000 in annual
revenues, a significant discrepancy from the $3.8 million
NPRM estimate.
(v) Finally, for the record, unlike the commercial air carrier
sector, TSA does not propose to reimburse any costs to GA
airport operators to implement the NPRM, nor will TSA
provide screeners or other logistics support.
(4) The NPRM ignores privacy laws and private property rights (181,
183); this is one of the more complex aspects of the NPRM and
touches both on conflicts with other laws and Federalism
issues. I am not an attorney; however, extensive case law
suggests that citizens enjoy extraordinary legal protections
related to private property and privacy rights. For this
reason, we recommend that privately owned aircraft be exempt
and that the NPRM focus only on publicly operated aircraft for
the most stringent initiatives:
(i) Specifically, the Fourth Amendment guarantees ``the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects'', which includes vehicles and aircraft.
Private aircraft do not operate with the benefit of a
``Contract of Carriage'' as is the case with commercial air
carriers, and passengers on private aircraft therefore do
not waive any rights as such. Warrantless searches are not
automatic with respect to private aircraft; however,
although there is no case law at this time that would deny
or uphold the right of law enforcement to conduct
warrantless searches involving private aircraft without
probable cause, the issue nevertheless requires substantial
justification.
While the United States Constitution does not use the word
``privacy,'' our courts have identified the interests of Americans in
their individual privacy as flowing from a number of constitutional
provisions. Most importantly, the Fourth Amendment protects Americans
from ``unreasonable search and seizure'' by the Government of their
``persons, homes, and effects,'' including many types of personal
information. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
entirely Government collection and use of individuals' protected
information. It does, however, require that any such intrusion be
justified by a valid governmental interest in having and using the
collected information, that such collection only be as intrusive as
necessary to accomplish the Government's legitimate interest, and that
the information be handled, protected, used, and destroyed reasonably.
Historically, constitutional justification for intrusive airport
security measures, notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement has rested in significant degree on the so-called ``special
needs'' exception. Beginning in the 1970s, our courts recognized the
need for warrantless searches and seizures at commercial airports in
the wake of a wave of aircraft hijackings. However, courts were only
willing to recognize such an exception--and permit new warrantless
searches and seizures at airports--based on evidence of a real and
substantial threat to human life, public safety, and U.S. national
security and foreign relations. Even after September 11, 2001, our
courts have consistently held that, for the ``special needs'' exception
to apply, in addition to other conditions being met, there must be some
showing of a distinct or definite threat, although, for air threats,
specific intelligence concerning a threat to any particular flight is
not necessary for generalized security measures.
Further, to pass constitutional muster under the ``special needs''
exception, a security program must intrude on Americans' privacy and
civil liberties interests to the minimal extent necessary to protect
against the threat and the program must be expected to be effective. In
other words, the Government's interest in preventing the potential
harm, and the reasonable expectation of effectiveness of the proposed
measures must be balanced against the intrusion on Americans' privacy
and liberty likely to result.
In light of these requirements for ``special needs''-justified
searches and seizures, the lack of a valid threat assessment and
seemingly little consideration of relevant privacy and civil liberties
interest, balance, or effectiveness in the NPRM, is troubling.
(5) The NPRM may inadvertently force some airports to violate
Federal law (181);
(i) Specifically, the NPRM may force GA airports unable to comply
with the NPRM to violate Federal Aviation Administration
Grant Assurances and be in non-compliance with Federal
commerce law relating to Interstate access, possibly
resulting in becoming ineligible for AIP funding or
becoming subject to other punitive actions.
(6) The NPRM proposes an aircraft weight threshold not supported by
the facts;
(i) Specifically, the proposed weight threshold of 12,500 lbs is
at least 50% below TSA's own classified throw weight
analysis and well below industry recommended weight
thresholds.\6\ Industry has concluded that 100,000 lbs is
more appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Although the TSA throw weight analysis remains classified, TSA
nevertheless concluded that a threshold weight of 25,000 lbs was more
appropriate, acknowledging that the lightest of aircraft do not have
the kinetic energy to cause much damage. However, TSA also concluded
that 10,000 gallons of fuel (approx. 1,500 lbs of fuel) had sufficient
kinetic energy to cause significant damage. Applying both thresholds it
would appear that a higher weight threshold is warranted. In a national
security assessment I prepared for the TSA, I concluded that a throw
weight threshold of 100,000 lbs was more appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in conclusion (regarding the nprm)
Many individuals and entities have provided separate verbal and
written responses that provide greater detail than was possible here
today. That said, I believe that it has been demonstrated that this
NPRM as written, is seriously flawed because of the numerous
discrepancies noted in this response. It is flawed not only by virtue
of the fact that the NPRM contained an overwhelming 44 unresolved
questions posed by the TSA; its use of highly questionable data, faulty
and incomplete financial analyses without the benefit of verification,
is very disturbing. Most disturbing is the fact that the NPRM appears
to contradict TSA's own intelligence assessment, which, coupled with
the lack of sound threat assessment in view of existing security
mandates and initiatives, makes this NPRM a leap of faith rather than a
well-executed plan to improve security. We do not question that
potential threats exist, but these must be weighed against mitigations
already in place; the threat to national security; and, their likely
probability.
If the TSA is indeed serious about taking a more pragmatic approach
to managing who flies the aircraft; who is on-board the aircraft; and,
what is on-board the aircraft, the industry sees no need for costly
airport security measures that do not demonstrably improve security.
However, the effectiveness of a ``layered approach'' to security
compels general aviation airports to play a value added role in
security. For this reason, we reiterate the recommendation that TSA
reinstate the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group and
update the Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports in lieu of
the airport security requirements proposed in the NPRM.
supplemental comments regarding security directive 08g
The general aviation industry continues to have concerns with the
use of Security Directives (``SDs'') for the purpose of issuing new
rules. The recent release of SD 08G and the numerous questions it has
raised within the general aviation community is a case in point.
Specifically, the SD has raised a host of issues concerning the
potential need for multiple badges, the treatment of pilots who fly
into regulated airports for after-hours fueling, and the like. While
TSA is said to be addressing some of the concerns raised by the general
aviation community, there remains a startling lack of communication and
collaboration concerning the implementation of this SD.
Beyond the specifics of this particular SD, there is a broader
policy question regarding the use of Security Directives as a means of
implementing policy by TSA. Through the utilization of SDs, TSA can
effectively bypass collaborative efforts and limit the ability of
industry to comment on such changes. As our experience with the Large
Aircraft Security Program NPRM has illustrated so vividly, effective
policy and results are best achieved when TSA and industry work
together toward common goals.
This concludes my prepared remarks.
Thank you for your time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Olislagers, we do thank you for your
testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Rogalski to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JEREMY ROGALSKI, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTER, KHOU-TV
Mr. Rogalski. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, for the
opportunity to discuss our investigative report which aired in
February 2007. KHOU-TV's initial approach was quite simple: Go
to general aviation airports and see if you can get in. If so,
how far in could you get? As you have seen, the result was some
GA airports were practically wide open to someone potentially
stealing an executive-sized jet, taking off, and turning it
into a lethal weapon.
Acting on a tip from inside the aviation industry, KHOU-TV
investigative photojournalist, Keith Tomshe, and I visited
three GA airports in the Houston area. Using undercover
cameras, we captured how easy it was to gain access into these
facilities and to aircraft with doors left wide open--aircraft,
I should mention, with auxiliary power units plugged in;
aircraft with unobstructed pathways to the tarmac and the
runway.
At one airport, we walked right through an unlocked door
and walked right up to an unlocked executive jet. At another,
we parked just yards away from a regional commercial jet and
walked right up to it--no fences, no security, no questions. At
another, it had a security gate and call box. But both proved
seemingly worthless on our visits, as evidenced by
Photojournalist Tomshe's comments to gain access.
Can you open her up for me? I am here to see the plane. I
was here last week. In both cases, the gate opened, and we were
next to a hangar and those aircraft with doors wide open.
But KHOU-TV also uncovered the one thing that no one seemed
to want to talk about in Houston, and that the DHS Office of
Inspector General failed to address as well in its recent
study. That is our area is a target-rich environment that
potentially makes us particularly vulnerable for a particular
type of terrorism.
Why crash a plane into a building when the Houston area,
the Houston ship channel to be specific, is littered with
million-gallon containers of toxic chemicals right next to a
vulnerable population center--containers that chemical plant
engineers say could easily be ruptured by a small jet, a jet
under 12,500 pounds; containers that often are no more than a
half-inch thick; containers that, in the words of one veteran
chemical engineer, would ``tear like tin foil from the kinetic
energy alone, irrespective of fuel or weight-carrying
capacity.''
In fact, we discovered deadly chlorine gas, a certain type
of nerve gas and many other dangerous chemicals stored all
around Houston. To quote a 2004 Homeland Security Council
study, that study showed at least 17,000 people could die in
such a strike from the ensuing toxic vapor cloud.
Also, as we stated in our report, Mohamed Atta, the
purported ringleader of the 9/11 hijackings had been
considering a similar sort of attack for years. We have
attached a verbatim transcript of our original report as well
as a follow-up report we did 3 weeks later in 2007.
In that, I should mention, a corporate tenant at one of the
airports we featured was quickly in the process of taking
action--installing $100,000 in security upgrades, including a
barbed wire chain link fence, cameras, infrared and motion
sensors. In that follow-up report, I should add, then-DHS
secretary, Michael Chertoff, promised to ``turn up the
temperature on the general aviation industry.''
Thank you for your time. I will be happy to answer any
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Rogalski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeremy Rogalski
July 15, 2009
Madame Chairwoman and Members of the committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss our investigative report, ``Airport Insecurity''
which first aired February 2, 2007.
KHOU-TV discovered while commercial airports all over the country
had been forced to make millions of dollars in security upgrades since
9/11, smaller general aviation airports remained unchanged. In fact, we
found they were practically wide open to someone stealing a corporate
to mid-size jet, lifting off, and turning it into a weapon.
Acting on a tip from inside the aviation industry, KHOU-TV
Investigative Photographer Keith Tomshe and I visited three general
aviation airports in the Houston area. Using undercover cameras, we
captured how easy it was to gain access into these facilities and to
aircraft with doors left wide open and an unobstructed pathway to the
tarmac.
At Hooks Airport in Northwest Harris County, we walked right
through an unlocked door and into a hangar containing an unlocked
executive jet. At Lone Star Executive Airport, about an hour north of
Houston, we parked just yards away from a regional commercial jet and
walked right up to it--no doors, no fences, no security, no questions.
At Sugarland Regional Airport southwest of the city, it had a security
gate and call box. But both proved worthless on our visits, as
evidenced by our comments to gain access:
First visit: ``Can you open 'er up?'' (Gate Opens).
Second visit: ``I'm here to see the plane I was here last week''
(Gate Opens).
In addition, we consulted with numerous security experts so as to
ascertain was this scenario a real threat? Indeed terrorism experts, a
former Inspector General for the FAA, structural engineers, industrial
chemists, and others all confirmed that in these situations, one could
indeed take these planes and do effective terrorism with them.
Part of the reason for that was something else KHOU-TV uncovered:
That our area was a target-rich environment that made us ``a sitting
duck'' for a particular kind of terrorism. Why crash a plane into a
building when the Houston area is littered with million-gallon
containers of toxic chemicals right next to a vulnerable population
center? In fact, we found deadly chlorine, a certain type of nerve gas,
and many other dangerous fluids stored all around Houston, and
uncovered a Government study showing at least 17,000 people could die
in such a strike. Again, we confirmed with chemical plant security
experts that nearly all such plants were vulnerable to a plane crash
attack. We also interviewed structural engineers specializing in these
types of plants, who agreed that a general aviation plane could easily
pierce and explode one of the many huge containers lining the Houston
Ship Channel. Finally we also brought in one of the leading national
experts on such scenarios, Dr. Jay P. Boris of the Naval Research
Laboratory, to examine our local landscape. Using computer-modeling
programs to assess the possibilities and outcomes of an attack in our
city, Boris concluded such an attack would be ``far worse than 9/11.''
And one more thing: Mohammad Atta, the self-proclaimed ringleader
of 9/11, and his cohorts had been considering a similar sort of attack
in the years leading up to that tragic day. Various news reports,
security reports, and counter-terrorism experts we consulted confirmed
this.
Attached is the verbatim transcript of our February 2, 2007 report
as well as a follow-up report which aired February 22, 2007.* In that,
Wing Aviation, a corporate tenant at Lone Star Executive Airport, was
in the process of installing $100,000 in security upgrades.
Additionally, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff promised to ``turn up the
temperature'' on the general aviation industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Attachments have been retained in committee files.
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I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Rogalski, thank you for your
testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Van Tine to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
Mr. Van Tine.
STATEMENT OF MARK VAN TINE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, JEPPESSEN, INCORPORATED
Mr. Van Tine. Thank you. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ms.
Norton, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, my name is
Mark Van Tine. I am president and chief executive officer of
Jeppessen and chairman of the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association for 2009.
Jeppessen is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Boeing
Company and is based in Englewood, Colorado. For more than 75
years, my company has provided navigation charts, electronic
databases, and other information services to general aviation
and commercial airlines around the world. We serve more than 1
million pilots globally. I am also an active general aviation
pilot.
That said, I appear here today primarily in my capacity as
the current chairman of GAMA. General aviation is an important
contributor to the U.S. economy, supporting over 1.2 million
jobs, and providing more than $150 billion in economic activity
annually.
In 2008, general aviation generated over $5.9 billion in
exports of domestically manufactured airplanes. We are one of
the few manufacturing industries that still provides a
significant trade surplus for the United States.
Madame Chairwoman, I appreciate you for convening this
hearing and to discuss general aviation security issues. GAMA
has long been an advocate for general aviation security to be
based on risk analysis, measuring threats, vulnerability, and
consequences. When higher risks are identified, the appropriate
countermeasures and security postures absolutely should be
deployed in order to mitigate those risks.
Since the events of 9/11, the general aviation community
has worked diligently to increase security and raise the
awareness of potential threats to the aviation system. A number
of voluntary and regulatory initiatives have been put in place
by both Government and industry, which have substantially
increased aviation security. I included a list of these
numerous initiatives in my written testimony.
These initiatives have been implemented to help prevent
terrorists from using a general aviation airplane to attack the
United States. It is in this light that we should review the
development of the TSA's Large Aircraft Security Program.
When TSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for last
October, it generated a groundswell of negative reaction from
the general aviation community, as well as from many Members of
Congress; because, as it was written, it was unnecessarily
burdensome, impractical, and did not reflect an adequate
understanding of general aviation operations.
I want to be very clear. The general aviation community
does not oppose enhancing security. Rather, it believes the
NPRM, as proposed, needs to be reworked with adequate input
from stakeholders. We want to help the TSA develop a program
that mitigates legitimate security risks by facilitating
general aviation pilots and passengers to exercise their
freedom to fly.
We have made good progress. During two industry working
group sessions in April and May, we were able to agree with TSA
on a framework for the LASP rule. Assistant Administrator John
Sammon has committed to building upon what the TSA has learned
from these two sessions and to issue a second NPRM. We commend
the hard work that Mr. Sammon and the staff within the general
aviation office has put into reworking the NPRM and their
willingness to consider our views.
We also appreciate the strong support we received from
Members of Congress, who have recognized our concerns and urged
TSA to develop a more practical and effective approach. In
particular, I want to thank Congressman Dent and Congressman
Olson for introducing H.R. 3093, the General Aviation Security
Enhancement Act of 2009, which would ensure stakeholder
participation in the development of LASP.
Madame Chairwoman, I would like you to know that GAMA is
very concerned about TSA's liberal use of security directives
to implement new requirements on operators that are not subject
to the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures
Act. For instance, TSA has issued a security directive
mandating an expansion of security credential requirements for
tens of thousands of pilots, employees at airports and aviation
manufacturing facilities without prior input from these
constituents or due process protection under APA.
We recognize and we respect TSA's authority to issue
security directives. However, we do not believe that TSA should
use security directives to make policy, unless there is a
compelling and immediate national security risk that warrants
it.
In closing, Madame Chairwoman, I wish to thank you for
providing me the opportunity to appear and testify today on
these important issues. I must say I feel strongly that if TSA,
industry, and the Congress continues to work together on
general aviation security issues, we will put in place a
security system that is safe and effective, yet does not
inhibit the freedom people enjoy today to privately use general
aviation aircraft.
Thank you again for allowing me to be here. I am happy to
answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Van Tine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Van Tine
July 15, 2009
introduction
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, distinguished Members
of the subcommittee; my name is Mark Van Tine and I am the president
and chief executive officer of Jeppesen and the chairman of the General
Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) for 2009. Jeppesen is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company and is based in
Englewood, Colorado. For more than 75 years, Jeppesen has provided
navigation charts, electronic databases, and other information
solutions to general aviation and commercial airlines around the world.
I appear here today in my capacity as the current chairman of GAMA.
As the committee knows, general aviation (GA) is an essential part
of our transportation system that is especially critical for
individuals and businesses people needing to travel and move goods
quickly and efficiently in today's just-in-time environment. GA is also
an important contributor to the U.S. economy, supporting over 1.2
million jobs, providing $150 billion \1\ in economic activity annually
and, in 2008, generating over $5.9 billion \2\ in exports of
domestically manufactured airplanes. We are one of the few remaining
manufacturing industries that still provide a significant trade surplus
for the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ General Aviation Contribution to the U.S. Economy, Merge Global
2006.
\2\ 2008 General Aviation Statistical Databook and Industry
Outlook, GAMA 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
general aviation security
GAMA has long advocated for general aviation security to be based
on risk analysis--measuring threat, vulnerability, and consequences.
When higher risks are identified, appropriate countermeasures and
security postures should be deployed in order to mitigate those risks.
We also believe that this risk analysis should consider the security
risks inherent with other modes of transportation.
Since the events of September 11, 2001 the general aviation
community has worked diligently to increase security and awareness of
potential threats to the aviation system. Numerous voluntary and
regulatory initiatives have been put into place by both Government and
industry that have substantially increased security. For instance:
The TSA has published Security Guidelines for General
Aviation Airports that outline best practices for enhancing
security at GA airports.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ TSA Information Publication A-001, May 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Twelve-Five Standards Security Program requires that
commercial operators of general aviation airplanes weighing
more than 12,500 pounds establish a formal security program
which is overseen by the TSA.
The TSA has established a hotline for the general aviation
community to report suspicious activity and the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association (AOPA) is actively promoting an airport
watch program for the community.
Non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training are subject to
background checks through the Alien Flight Student Program
(AFSP).\4\ Flight school employees are also required to undergo
security awareness training per 49 CFR 1522.23(d) to be able to
identify potential risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Additional background about the AFSP is located at https://
www.flightschoolcandidates.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAMA has, in conjunction with the Department of Treasury,
published ``Guidelines for Establishing Anti-Money Laundering
Procedures and Practices Related to the Purchase of a General
Aviation Aircraft'' to assist in identification of suspicious
transactions in accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act.
Foreign airplanes flying into the United States are subject
to specific security procedures from both the TSA and Customs
and Border Protection and are actively monitored by the TSA
when operating into, within, or out of United States airspace.
Domestic aircraft are subject to the requirements of the
Electronic Advanced Passenger Information System when crossing
into the United States from an overseas location.
General aviation aircraft are subject to specific airspace
requirements within the Washington Air Defense Identification
Zone and its more restrictive Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ)
including restrictions at three Maryland Airports \5\ where
pilots are subject to additional background check and
procedural requirements. General aviation operators who wish to
fly into Ronald Reagan National Airport are required to comply
with the DCA Access Standard Security Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ College Park Airport, Washington Executive/Hyde Field, and
Potomac Airfield.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of these initiatives have been put into place to help prevent a
terrorist from using a general aviation airplane to attack the United
States. At the same time, we would like to draw the attention of the
committee to the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the
Inspector General's \6\ May, 2009 report which concludes that ``general
aviation presents only limited and mostly hypothetical threats to
security'' and that ``the steps general aviation airport owners and
managers have taken to enhance security are positive and effective.''
We appreciate the recognition by the IG and believe we have been a
positive, proactive partner in addressing legitimate security threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ TSA's Role in General Aviation Security, OIG-09-69, May 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the large aircraft security program (lasp)
The Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) has received significant
attention from the general aviation community and Members of Congress
since published as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in October
2008. The general aviation community does not oppose enhancing
security; rather it believes that the NPRM proposed by the TSA was
unnecessarily burdensome and did not reflect an adequate understanding
of general aviation operations.
For instance, under the NPRM, an individual who wishes to fly his
or her own plane would have to pay a third-party contractor to undergo
a background check before every flight. Not only is this needlessly
redundant from a security standpoint, it could also substantially
increase the cost of flying a plane. The proposed use of private
contractors also raises important questions about privacy and
protection of personal information and the ability of TSA to oversee
this program. It is these types of concerns that generated a
groundswell of negative reaction from general aviation operators across
the country.
industry view
The LASP proposal is the first time that TSA has attempted to
regulate private travel. We believe strongly that the TSA should take
pains to recognize this and ensure that LASP does not infringe on the
ability of general aviation pilots and passengers to exercise their
freedom to fly.
In this regard, GAMA believes that any final rule should recognize
that passengers who board general aviation aircraft are known to the
operator and crew, and are made up of employees, guests, family
members, and clients who typically have close ties to the operator of
the aircraft. Unlike commercial operations, passengers in this context
are not ``revenue service passengers'' and warrant a uniquely different
consideration from a security vulnerability context. In assessing risk,
the general aviation ``passenger,'' an individual known to the pilot,
represents an inherent and significant risk reduction which should be
recognized and accounted for by the TSA as it finishes drafting a final
rule for LASP.
Indeed, as a point of reference, the preamble to Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) NPRM ``Security Related Considerations in the
Design and Operation of Transport Category Aircraft 14 CFR Parts 25 and
121'' (i.e. above 12,500 pounds in scheduled commercial operations) the
FAA states:
``Generally, airplanes in private use carry heads of state, business
leaders, and ordinary citizens. In contrast to commercial passenger
airplanes, access to airplanes in private use is limited to specific
individuals, names, the owner and guests. For this reasons, these
airplanes typically are not targets of onboard terrorists. [We] believe
that applying the proposed requirements to airplanes in private use
would not provide significant improvements in security.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ FAA NPRM RIN 2120-AI66, Docket No. FAA-2006-26722; Notice No.
06-19.
GAMA believes this basic philosophy should be the guiding principle
throughout the development of the LASP and for any future regulations
proposed for general aviation.
steps taken to address concerns in lasp
Over the past 8 months, our industry has raised concerns with the
LASP and actively engaged with the TSA to help develop a program that
appropriately balances legitimate security risks with the right of
citizens to fly their own airplanes.
GA manufacturers have testified at the five public hearings hosted
by the TSA and GAMA submitted a formal position paper that was among
7,000 comments to the docket during the public comment period. We have
also provided TSA officials with opportunities to visit general
aviation manufacturers to see the types of aircraft that would be
subject to the LASP.
We have made good progress. During two industry working group
session in April and May set up by the Transportation Security Network
Management (TSNM) office we were able to agree on a framework for the
LASP rule. Assistant Administrator John Sammon \8\ has committed to
build upon what the TSA has learned from these two sessions and issue a
second NPRM that incorporates suggestions from stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ John Sammon, Associate Administrator for Transportation
Security Network Management (TSNM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The framework we have identified in our sessions with the TSA
includes:
The establishment of a ``trusted pilot'' system that would
require pilots to meet certain requirements before operating
their aircraft if that aircraft falls within the TSA-defined
scope of LASP.
The trusted pilot would be responsible for conducting key
security functions for flights including identity verification
of known passengers and an established process for subjecting
unknown individuals to vetting through eSecure flight.
The establishment of a sensible restricted items list that
takes the place of the prohibited items list originally
proposed by the TSA.
We commend the hard work that Mr. Sammon and the staff within the
General Aviation Office has put in to reworking the NPRM and their
willingness to consider our views. We also appreciate the strong
support we have received from Members of Congress who have recognized
our concerns and urged TSA to develop a more practical and effective
approach. In particular, I want to thank Congressman Dent and
Congressman Olson for introducing H.R. 3093, the General Aviation
Security Enhancement Act of 2009, which would ensure stakeholder
participation in the development of the LASP.
tsa's use of security directives
The general aviation industry is very concerned about the TSA's
liberal use of Security Directives to implement new requirements on
operators that are not subject to the rulemaking requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act.
The general aviation community strongly supports a risk-based,
threat vulnerability approach to securing our national transportation
system. However, we have seen the TSA repeatedly use Security Directive
to vastly expand existing security requirements without consideration
of the implementation challenges, operational impacts, and economic
burdens these mandates impose on the aviation industry. Our most recent
experience involves the expansion of security credentialing
requirements to tens of thousands of pilots and employees at airports
and aviation manufacturer facilities without any input from these
constituencies or due process protections under the APA.
GAMA strongly supported an amendment that was offered by
Representative John Mica to the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Authorization Act (H.R. 2200), which would require TSA to
initiate a rulemaking process for Security Directives 6 months after
implementation. Representative Mica's amendment provided appropriate
discretion to TSA to waive the rulemaking process in the event of an
emergency situation.
We supported the Mica amendment because it struck the right balance
between national security and due process. We recognize and respect
TSA's authority to issue Security Directives. However, we do not
believe that TSA should use Security Directives to make policy unless
there is a compelling and immediate national security risk that
warrants it.
This is an issue of great concern to the general aviation community
and we urge Congress to include the Mica amendment in the final TSA
reauthorization bill.
conclusion
In closing, Madame Chairwoman, thank you for your leadership on
these issues and for inviting me to testify before the subcommittee. I
feel strongly that if TSA, industry, and Congress continue to work
together on general aviation security issues we will put in place an
effective security system that does not inhibit the freedom people
enjoy today to privately use general aviation aircraft.
Thank you and I would be glad to answer any questions that you may
have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank all of the witnesses for
their testimony. I would like to remind each Member that he or
she will have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now recognize
myself for questions. I would like to also add just an
additional welcome to all of the Members who have come and have
been effective in contributing to our deliberations.
I am hopeful that, in your opportunity to listen to the
earlier testimony, and as stakeholders, many of you, that you
have had a positive response to this committee's personal, or
this committee's inquiry, about March 2009, to TSA, to ensure
that the industry would have ample opportunity to engage.
So I do want to pose a general question to all of you. I
respect the different perspectives in which you have come. That
is to answer the question whether or not you think, overall,
whether security has improved at general aviation airports.
Again, some will be speculating. Some will be based upon what
you have heard.
But I think the second question is even more important.
That is, do you feel that security regulations are necessary
for general aviation?
Let me start with Ms. King.
Ms. King. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee. In my personal
observation around the airport, I find very noticeable
increases in general aviation security in awareness of all of
the people at the local--base operators, the people that sell
gas and provide services; and an awareness of who is around the
airports checking out the cars as they are let through the
gate.
One of the things that some people may not be aware of is
that many of the security procedure that are enacted are not
obvious, deliberately so, because the point of having good
security is that some of it is obvious to stop the casual
person. Some of it is less obvious.
One of the points I would make is that, in our own
aircraft, when we go on a transient basis to another airport,
the first thing we do after we land, and the last thing, is to
disable the steering on the aircraft for security. Also, it
allows the operators there to tow the aircraft if they need to
move it to allow for space.
But, the steering is disabled. It is not obvious that it is
disabled. The last thing we do before we leave is to enable it
again. We may have the door open while we are loading luggage.
But the airplane is still not stealable, if you will, because
it is not steerable until we are back there permanently and
ready to leave.
So, many of the security procedures that have been put in
place are not obvious to someone who is not knowledgeable. The
security measures will vary depending on the model of the
aircraft. That is just an example regarding our particular
aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Same question, just go right across and
answer the question.
Mr. Olislagers. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I think
general aviation security, the awareness since September 11 has
been raised significantly. As a result, I believe that general
security at general aviation airports has increased.
Should it be regulated? We believe that there is already a
number of regulations in place, including the 12-5 Rule, large
charters. So, going beyond that, with respect to the large
aircraft security program, we believe that he industry has done
an outstanding job regulating itself. I was part of the
drafting of the guidelines for general aviation airport
security. We believe at this point that that is sufficient.
We are asking the TSA that working group is reconvened, so
that we can take another look at it. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Rogalski.
Mr. Rogalski. Since our report aired, Madame Chairwoman, we
know two of the three airports we featured made voluntary
security enhancements. As we mentioned Lone Star Executive in
Montgomery County, north of Houston, a corporate tenant there
made $100,000 in security upgrades. I spoke with the airport
director as of yesterday. He informs me that an interior
security fence has been installed, and a contract has been
awarded to install a perimeter fence as well. That interior
security fence has six locked gates.
At Sugar Land Regional Airport, a spokesman there tells me
90 percent of their small planes have been moved into a fully
fenced-in area with locked gates accessible by authorized key
card holders. So, in terms of the three airports we featured,
we know two of the three have made those security upgrades. We
have not received comment from the third airport, Hooks
Airport.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We know that you are not an aviation
expert. But would you then suggest that regulations with
oversight would be a responsible act?
Mr. Rogalski. Respectfully, ma'am, as a news reporter, it
is neither appropriate nor germane for me to offer an opinion.
I can only report on the facts, shine a mirror up to those in
the industry and those in your seats and let you decide the
appropriate course of action.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is a fair enough response. We will
take from what you reported as an offering of what you perceive
to be facts. We will make our own decisions.
Mr. Van Tine, your response.
Mr. Van Tine. Madame Chairwoman, if you look at the
response since 9/11, a lot of organizations, such as Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association; the National Business Aircraft
Association; GAMA, who I am representing today; and the Airport
Operators and all the general aviation organizations that
represent the industry, I think it is clear that security is
improved as a result of these different programs that have been
put in place and the actions that they take.
Improving security will be a never-ending goal and activity
in our industry, in our world, as we go forward, which is why
we must work closely with FAA and TSA to look at those
practical risks. Risk mitigation comes from very accurate risk
assessments. As an industry, we will take action to close and
mitigate those risks where we can.
At the same time, it is easy to come up with a myriad of
scenarios that make it very difficult for us to make it 100
percent safe. So, as an industry and organizations industry, we
are committed to work with the Government to find ways to make
it practical, and yet allow the free commerce and use of
aircraft the way that we have for almost 100 years.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will come back. I will come back to you
on my line of inquiry, Mr. Van Tine. I thank you for your
answers.
I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Dent, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
For Mr. Olislagers, Mr. Rogalski's investigative report
pointed out that he and a colleague were able to gain access to
an airport, and that one had a substantial gap in the fence
around the perimeter. You contend in your written statement
that ``the industry sees no need for costly airport security
measures that do not demonstrably improve security.'' Is it
fair to say that you see airplanes, as opposed to airports, as
the proper focus of additional security?
Mr. Olislagers. Thank you. The security of general aviation
airports is layered. I prided myself, when I first started to
get into the flying business, when I was a little boy, just
being very interested in aircraft, being able to walk onto an
airport. The thing that people decry today is that all these
airports are now shut down, and fathers can't take their kids
out to the airport, you know, see the airplanes anymore.
I think that is a very sad state in the industry. In fact,
at Centennial Airport, which is one of the busiest general
aviation airports in the United States, we continue to
encourage folks to be able to get to their aircraft and even
visitors to be able to get to the aircraft.
With respect to security of airplanes, there is a complex
series of things that happen in order to perpetrate anything
with an airplane. It is just not simply of being able to access
an aircraft, but being able to access a hangar, maybe, do
something in that hangar.
Most of our clients are known to our industry. We have
lease agreements with them. We know who they are. They have
been vetted properly. So we feel that the current regulations
are sufficient. In fact, as Mr. Sammon had suggested, there
should be a more aircraft-centric approach to security rather
than an airport-centered approach.
Mr. Dent. So you think it should be more aircraft- as
opposed to airport-centric.
Mr. Olislagers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dent. Do you believe that fencing around an airport's
entire perimeter will have any substantial effect on general
aviation security?
Mr. Olislagers. No, sir. Just like locks on doors, they are
for honest people only.
Mr. Dent. So what do you say to Mr. Rogalski, then,
regarding his finding about the general aviation airports'
vulnerabilities in the Houston area?
Mr. Olislagers. You know, reporters have come on-board at
Centennial Airport on the ramp. That is just one part. I don't
believe that that is necessarily a breach of security, grabbing
the airplane, loading it perhaps with explosives, turning it
into an IED. A lot of other things have to happen. We take a
layered approach to security, simply getting on an airfield is
very simple.
Mr. Dent. Sure. Thank you.
Mr. Van Tine, thank you too for being here. You mentioned
that expanding existing security requirements will involve
implementation challenges, operational impacts, and economic
burdens on the aviation industry. Could you please elaborate on
that statement? In particular, what is the nature, extent, and
severity of the side effects to increased security
requirements?
Mr. Van Tine. Well again, we focus on the safe use of
aircraft, but the efficient use of those aircraft. So, for
example, when we look at the DNDO requirements and the
suggestions they have for having gateway airports, which would
require an additional stop for aircraft coming into the United
States, it takes away the utilitarian benefit of the airplane
as a time machine and a time--support the efficient use. We
would put airplanes into locations, 100 nautical miles away
from major metropolitan areas, unfortunately put some into the
airports that don't have the facilities or the infrastructure
to support these kind of aircraft.
So, it is situations like that that we are concerned about.
Mr. Dent. Will expanding existing security requirements
exacerbate the already intense economic challenges businesses
face every day, do you think?
Mr. Van Tine. It certainly will.
Mr. Dent. Finally, I have a minute left.
To Ms. King, thank you for being here as well. I have to
tell you, you know, when this issue first hit, many pilots have
contacted me, but none more forcefully than my neighbor, you
know, who actually, at 11 o'clock at night, came over and on
the kitchen table laid it all out for me and said, my goodness,
what are you doing?
What is happening here in Washington to our industry? You
are going to make it very difficult for us to fly and for me to
maintain my job in corporate aviation. So he really made the
point not very delicately. But he made it just the same.
Could you please elaborate on and describe the differences
between commercial and general aviation operations? Why do you
think they are so different?
Ms. King. Well, in a commercial operation, you are
basically taking an airline operation or even a charter for
hire. You are basically taking anyone who walks up with money.
You don't know them. You don't know who they really are
necessarily. You don't know what they really want.
In an operation like ours, we are a small company. We have
about 50 employees. The people we carry on our airplane, and
what most general aviation business aircraft carry, are their
employees and their customers, all of whom have been known to
them for a significant period of time. In my case, my husband
and I are also the pilots.
Pilots are already vested with great responsibility for the
safety and the airworthiness of their aircraft, and also really
for the security; because when we take any person onto our
aircraft, we are not like someone standing at a metal detector
in the terminal. When we make the decision that we are going to
take that person on the aircraft, we are betting our lives on
the fact that we know those people well enough that nothing is
going to happen; that we know our employees, we know our
customers. We are in the airplane all together.
Mr. Dent. You are not picking up any hitchhikers. I
understand.
Ms. King. We are not picking up any hitchhikers.
Mr. Dent. I am going to yield back my time and just thank
all of you for being here and just say I felt very encouraged
about Mr. Sammon's comments today. What he told me in my office
the other day, I feel very encouraged. I am looking forward to
something positive occurring on this issue.
Thanks, I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman will now recognize other Members for
questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance
with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize Members
who were present at the start of the hearing based on seniority
on the subcommittee, alternating between Majority and Minority.
Those Members coming in later will be recognized in order of
their arrival.
Before I yield to the distinguished gentle lady from
Washington, DC, I just want to make sure Mr. Van Tine is aware
of the legislation that I offered, Transportation Security
Legislation H.R. 2200, that really laid the groundwork for
improving stakeholder input into security policy decisions made
by TSA.
I think it is important to note that, if we are to have the
structure that you are speaking of, we really need to be
careful about discussing security-sensitive information in a
public rulemaking process. We need to be careful in restricting
the administration's ability to issue security directives that
address an imminent threat.
I think we struck the right kind of balance in H.R. 2200.
But we did give you some additional rights. I just wanted to
make sure that was on the record. We will have an opportunity
to discuss this shortly.
But let me yield to the gentle lady, Ms. Norton, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Norton. Yes, Madame Chairwoman. Your work and the work
of this committee is why they are at the table at all.
The Chairwoman has constantly discussed balance, because I
believe she, as well as I, have been on this committee since 9/
11. We lived through the worst of it. So, the last thing we
want to do is to go throw out the baby with the bathwater.
But the subcommittee and committee have been very, very
critical of lack of balance and of failure to do--in fact, we
had to, over and over again, compel homeland security to
understand that risk and consequences and threat is what it is
all about, as opposed to, you know, close the joint down,
meaning the United States of America.
Ms. King, I want to congratulate you on your
accomplishments as a pilot and the work of your company. I am
particularly interested in getting any real-time experience you
may have. For example, have you flown into DCA or, in general
aviation aircraft, into the Nation's capitol since 9/11?
Ms. King. Since 9/11, no, not in general aviation aircraft,
because I am not allowed to.
Ms. Norton. Why are you not allowed to, as one of the most
experienced pilots in the country?
Ms. King. Because there are extremely difficult-to-meet
rules about gateway airports and criminal background checks and
air marshals on-board the aircraft that, frankly, take the
flexibility and the efficiency out of using a general aviation
aircraft for transportation. We do still, on occasion, come to
the D.C. area. But at this point, our airports of choice are
either Manassas or Frederick, Maryland.
Ms. Norton. So, they have made it, even with the so-called
open general aviation here, impossible, economically
impossible----
Ms. King. Economically impossible.
Ms. Norton [continuing]. For you to come that----
Ms. King. Technically possible, but economically not.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Of course, notwithstanding your
experience, the reduction in general aviation here means that
you reflect what is happening throughout the industry.
Could I ask all of you--thank you, Mr. Rogalski, for your
work.
But could I ask those in the industry to say to me, I know
you are getting good cooperation. We heard from Mr. Sammon. I
want you to know, you are getting that cooperation, because
this committee has insisted upon it. This is not the goodness
of their heart.
So, this committee needs to know, are the relevant
representatives of helicopter, small aircraft companies, and
pilots at the table as we speak?
Mr. Van Tine. So, I will answer the question from our
perspective, and the answer is yes. They are there. The fact
that there were 7,000 responses and input back to the NPRM.
Again, we appreciate Mr. Sammon and the work that TSA is doing
to allow that process to happen. We need to continue to do it.
They are being represented and being heard now. That is
important. We still have a lot of work to do.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Olislagers, do you agree with that?
Mr. Olislagers. Yes, I do agree with that. Certainly, I
have been able to represent a lot of the general aviation
airports in particular, the reliever airports, on behalf of the
American Association of Airport Executives, as well as airports
and pilots in the State of Colorado. We have seen great
representation at all levels, as well as my own airport, where
we have 700 based aircraft, again from the very large aircraft
to the very small aircraft. We appreciate----
Ms. Norton. So, I ask all of you, what about your ability
to fly into other airports using general aviation aircraft? Are
you able to fly? Ms. King indicated something very close to the
Nation's capitol. Do these other airports have gateways,
entrances with air marshals, things----
Ms. King. No, they do not. They make----
Ms. Norton. How about New York City?
Ms. King. We go into Teterboro. We have been into Newark.
We go into Macarthur on Long Island. We go into White Plains.
They, of course, have appropriate security on the airfield and
the operators that provide services.
Ms. Norton. But no Gateway, no----
Ms. King. No gateway, no air marshals, no criminal
background checks.
Ms. Norton. Right there in the Big Apple with all those
skyscrapers, you were able to fly into New York City.
Ms. King. Absolutely. They are very welcoming.
Ms. Norton. That is the experience, I take it, of all of
you. The problem is one peculiar to here. But you have been
able, at least, to get in and out. I mean, get in and out of
Houston. But it looks like nobody is watching where they should
be.
We learned that, of course, it is prohibitive to come into
the Nation's capitol, even though the capitol, if you add to
the capitol the surrounding region, you have one of the engines
of the American economy. What is then, finally, the impact
nationally on the industry, whether you are looking at it from
the pilot's point of view or from the point of view of the
manufacturers?
I am trying to find out the industry--the result of the
apparent, until you all got at the table, application across
the board with very little distinction between commercial and
general aviation. How is the industry----
Ms. King. From a pilot training point of view, the
regulations and particularly the prospect of more additional
regulations that were considered when they were proposed to be
very onerous with very little benefit, has been very
discouraging to people who might otherwise have been interested
in taking up pilot training. So it has been very detrimental to
the growth of the industry. It has been detrimental to the
growth of the pilot population. Pilot training, at the basic
level, is of course where eventually our airline pilots come
from.
Ms. Norton. Okay. So, nobody wants to be a pilot anymore,
because you can't get in the air.
Mr. Olislagers, you are the industry. Does anybody want to
make these planes anymore?
Mr. Olislagers. I am actually part of the airport industry.
Certainly for us, since 9/11, things have changed considerably,
because we do operate these airports. I can tell you, you know,
there are about 19,000 different landing facilities on the
general aviation side of the house. You have seen one airport,
you have seen one airport.
So, it has been very difficult having personally been
involved with the working group, writing the guidelines for
general aviation security to really get a template going that
covers all of the airports. I think the most important thing
that we have been able to do, working with AOPA and then VAA
and other organizations is just raise the bar on awareness.
Frankly, that has been the best security measure that we have
been able to take.
That goes for Centennial Airport as well as some of the
small grass fields. It is just be aware of your surroundings. I
think that goes to the same as you are, you know, walking in a
parking lot these days or any other threat environment.
Ms. Norton. Finally, Mr. Van Tine.
Mr. Van Tine. Well, these security programs have added
overhead to the industry clearly, and one that we have
accepted. To your question about whether we want to build
airplanes or not, we are also challenged by the economic times
that are in front of us. The optics that have come from
Washington and from other such areas as through the use of,
just particularly business aircraft.
Certainly the misunderstanding that those situations have
created, and how the airplane really is a general aviation
airplane is an important tool of our economy, an important tool
to commerce and to the businesses that use it. It is not just
CEOs that use airplanes. In fact, some 85 percent of business
aircraft operations do not contain, in the back of the
airplane, the CEO or executive management, but are used for
middle management, are used for transportation of parts,
materials, and for the conduct of commerce.
So we are an industry that has entrenched in many different
directions. This is one. But again, one that we recognize our
obligation and need to support that continued enhancement in
security in a practical way that works on both sides of this
issue.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentle lady for her
constructive questioning.
Now, I would like to recognize the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Olson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman.
I appreciate the second panel. You guys are thinking it
out, learning a little bit about congressional procedure. I
know it has been a long day for you. Thank you for giving us
your time and expertise today.
I want to briefly talk about, again, the Large Aircraft
Security Program. Mr. Olislagers--and I apologize if I
mispronounced that. But can you generally describe what has
been required of you as executive director of a general
aviation airport, at least how the LASP would have affected you
as it was proposed originally; and how some of the changes are
going to affect you?
Mr. Olislagers. Thank you for your question. You know,
prior to the NPRM being issued, we had a robust security
program in place already. We had a lot of high-income
individuals at the airport who bring in their own security. So,
we kind of follow that line.
At the same time, we are also host to a lot of small
aircraft. Folks that come on the airfield with their grandkids
and so on, want to have an open environment as well. So we try
to strike the balance. As Ms. Norton mentioned earlier, we have
always tried to strike that balance.
With the NPRM, our greatest cost, which actually the TSA
completely omitted from its cost-benefit analysis, were the law
enforcement officer requirements that this would have imposed
on general aviation airports at Centennial Airport.
We estimated, at the very low end, about $300,000 for that.
The normal operating level at the high end, $1.3 million in
additional costs. That represents about 20 percent of my
operating budget, which is not very large. We run a fairly lean
operation on a 24/7 basis. So, that would have been a very
significant hit to us.
We had indicated, as many other airports did when we did a
poll through the American Association of Airport Executives,
that all these other airports would, in fact, pass those costs
on to the aircraft operators. In our case, anywhere between $60
to $80 per landing or takeoff, very significant.
There are a host of other issues that come with it. But
that was certainly the most significant one.
Mr. Olson. It sounds like you are happy, then, with the
progress that has been made on the Large Aircraft Security
Program.
Mr. Olislagers. Yes, sir. I have actually participated with
two of the three stakeholder meetings that took place following
the closure of the comment period. Mr. Sammon has been very
pragmatic in his approach. We certainly look forward to seeing
that reflected in the revised NPRM, thanks to you.
Mr. Olson. Thank you.
Ms. King, same question for you, ma'am.
Ms. King. Most business aviation is in small companies like
ours. We have about--as I say, about 50 people. The economic
impact of the original proposal would have been very
significant in terms of, not just directly, but considerable
administrative obligations and reporting requirements.
We are a small, lean company. It is very important to us to
be efficient in order to be competitive. Every administrative
burden and impact that we have to bear significantly decreases
our competitiveness and our ability to operate profitably. The
original proposal would have had substantial economic impact on
us.
Mr. Olson. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but it
sounds like you are very happy with the progress that has been
made since that original proposal.
Ms. King. I am personally not part of the stakeholders
meetings as an individual business owner. The organizations
that I belong to--MBAA and AOPA and EAA--have been involved,
and they are happy with the progress being made. My feeling is
that aviation security is very much like aviation safety. We do
have, in aviation, the safest mode of transportation in the
country. But that doesn't mean that we sit back and say that is
enough. We have done all we need to.
Industry has partnered with the FAA and others on the issue
of aviation safety to continually keep increasing and enhancing
safety. That is what we look forward to doing with the TSA and
with your committee and with the Government to partner with
you, to continue to increase and enhance safety.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much. So, the answer to that is a
great point about how it relates to safety, and how they are
sort of analogous. I appreciate that.
My final question is for you, Mr. Van Tine. I personally
believe that flight and aviation is the perfect example of
American innovation and ingenuity at its finest. I enjoyed your
written testimony and how you talk about the freedom to fly,
and how the LASP must not hinder that freedom. If you are not
familiar with my background, I was a pilot in the Navy for 10
years; had those wings of gold with P-3s. Taking off was the
thing I enjoyed the most about it, going up to 5,000, 10,000,
and 20,000 feet, looking down at the world, looking at the
ocean.
I tried to fly a little bit after I got out of the Navy,
flew a Cessna out of Winchester, Virginia here. But it became
pretty obvious that the costs were going to be a little
different than with the Navy who supplied all the fuel I needed
to go flying. But I just can't tell you how much I identify
with that freedom to fly. Can you explain how the LASP may be
detrimental to that freedom?
Mr. Van Tine. Well, I think one of the examples we talked
about, that I heard in earlier testimony, had to do with
ranchers using aircraft to move materials and move workers.
This is under commerce. That the LASP rule, particularly as it
talked about prohibitive items list, which really was a carry-
over from the commercial side, would make it impossible for
those folks to use that aircraft in rural areas.
General aviation supports--when you look at the 19,000
airports, landing strips, heliports around the country, many,
many of those are located in rural areas or areas not served by
commercial aviation. This is a vital asset to, not just to our
commerce, but for people being able to travel, to see family,
for recreation purposes as well as for business.
So, LASP, if you looked at an original submission by TSA,
when you talk about the passenger watch list, people who get on
our airplanes are known to us. If they are not known to us, we
have systems now that, in working with TSA, I think we ought to
find a way to make use of the eSecure system for the private
sector, so we can vet those that may not be known to us, but
yet come to us recommended by a friend or by somebody that also
will be flying with us.
So, this is an important part of our American heritage,
certainly an important part of our commerce. So, again,
practical rules that mitigate security risk, but allow us to
use these airplanes as we have had for many, many decades is
important to us. We are making progress with TSA. Certainly,
there still are many things to do, though.
Mr. Olson. Good to hear. Again, we can't ever lose the
freedom to fly, in my personal opinion.
I want to thank all the witnesses for your time, your
patience and your expertise today.
Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman. I yield back the
rest of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I look forward to us utilizing what I
think has been very important. Before I conclude this hearing,
Mr. Olson, you were able to fly. The rest of us want to fly.
So, we are grateful for your comments about the freedom of
flying.
There is something I think we all agree with as Americans.
This hearing is to promote safe and secure general aviation.
You have heard from both sides of the aisle a commitment to
general aviation. In fact, you have heard a rather vigorous
statement by the gentle lady from the District of Columbia
wanting to ensure that general aviation can come to Washington,
DC.
I do think it is important, as I ask these few questions of
clarification, that we try to assess, again, the line of
questioning of Mr. Olson. I would like to hear it from the
three industry representatives, just again--because we are
moving forward. I hope that you will affirm that, because of
this committee's work, that we got the attention of TSA. You
were in very important industry meetings.
So, I know, Ms. King, that you were not in the meetings.
But do you feel that we don't have the next step of the written
regulations? But have you gotten word back that TSA's new
procedures, with the stakeholders' input, was a better
procedure, was a better opportunity?
Ms. King. We participated in the TSA's general public
meeting hearings in Burbank, California. Ours was one of the
7,000 comments that went in regarding the original NPRM. We are
very encouraged by the fact that the TSA is rewriting or
reworking--I am not quite sure the procedure that they follow--
that notice.
The information that we are hearing through the
associations that we belong to does indicate that they are
paying attention to the stakeholders and recognizing that what
they had done in the previous proposal was a cookie-cutter copy
all of the commercial airline rules over. That they recognized
that that is inappropriate.
There are, of course, still issues to be worked out. But I
understand that there are significant discussions underway.
That is the extent of my knowledge.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You feel better about the process?
Ms. King. I do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Olislagers, would you comment on this
whole idea of your thought about vulnerabilities that need to
be addressed? We would be interested in your perception of
whether or not we can do that together.
Mr. Olislagers. Certainly. First of all, I would like to
thank this committee for continuing to raise the issue, because
I think, without it, the TSA may not have come to the table
necessarily to provide the perspective and some of the sit-
downs that we have had with the TSA. So I want to thank you for
your leadership on the committee and the Members.
With respect to vulnerability assessments, TSA to date has
not done any vulnerability assessments that I know within the
general aviation industry. Obviously, we have done our own
vulnerability assessments at Centennial Airport. We had the
National Guard in. Also private sector, we did red team
exercises. I think they are very important to understand for
any infrastructure environment, any critical asset that should
be done.
My own assessment of the general aviation industry is such
that we believe that there are a lot of other threats elsewhere
that are far greater than the general aviation. I hope that
those will get addressed as well. We are doing our part, at
Centennial Airport. On behalf of the American Association of
Airport Executives, I am assisting certainly my colleagues are
all grappling with this issue.
But, again, we appreciate all of your time in this as well.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Van Tine, thank you.
Mr. Van Tine and Ms. King, I would like to ask this
question. How much do you think general aviation can invest in
security measures?
Mr. Van Tine. Well, that is a difficult question to answer,
because it depends on what those security measures need to be;
which is again why we feel it is important that we team with
TSA and really understand those risk assessments and then what
are mitigating actions that will result from that.
So, it is an industry that, you know, is highly regulated,
and it is expensive. So, you know, clearly in this kind of
economic environment, our tolerances are low, as are other
industries. But, at the same time, this is an essential issue.
We are going to do out part to find the right way, and the
right balance between that security and the ability for the
industry to operate.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is a cooperative expression
of being willing to work with us on security and safety. In
this instance, this is about security.
Ms. King.
Ms. King. Obviously, security is important to everyone in
general aviation, because it is part of our whole safety
orientation. As pilots in general aviation operators, we are
trained from the time we first start flying to focus on risk
management and risk assessment and mitigating risk. The
economic impact of the additional security measures, and again,
as Mr. Van Tine remarks, it depends on what those measures
are--maybe disproportionate depending on the size of the
company.
For a company our size or smaller, it could be--depending
again on what security measures we are talking about--it could
be a crushing economic impact issue that makes you reconsider
whether you can afford to use a company airplane. That would
be, in my opinion, a tragedy, because it would mean a
considerable decrease in efficiency and competitiveness.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that. I want to leave this
hearing, so that we have the parameters that we can work with
TSA in this committee.
So, Mr. Olislagers, let me just suggest that there are all
levels of suggested security procedures or implementation. Say,
for example, an airport, a small airport, was asked to have
signs, was asked to document their security procedures, have
some sort of report, positive passenger cargo baggage--four
passengers, four bags, or however many--the aircraft secured at
night or in the daytime, community watch program in the contact
list, and the contact list would be who do we reach in times of
trouble. Is that onerous?
Mr. Olislagers. Madame Chairwoman, that is not onerous.
Those are all good business practices. Those are part of the
best practices. During last summer, we hosted the Democratic
National Convention. We also ramped up during that special
event our security protocols. We stand down when we believe
there are no specific threats.
So, we take a layered approach to security. All the
aforementioned items that you brought up, certainly, are part
and parcel of a good best practices program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can those of you who deal with airlines,
the airports and airplanes, tell me the size plane by pounds--
and I use tonnage at another point, but I will use pounds--
12,000 to what, Ms. King, have you been engaged in or utilized
in terms of aircraft?
Ms. King. The airplane that we currently own weighs
approximately 18,000 pounds.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Eighteen thousand, thank you.
Mr. Olislagers.
Mr. Olislagers. The aircraft, we can effectively handle up
to 100,000 pounds, although we have had Boeing 737s up to about
160,000 pounds. So we can handle those airplanes.
Ms. King. So, and you go down--what is the smallest?
Mr. Olislagers. Probably J-3 Cub, a slow Piper Cub, you
know, fabric wings, that sort of things.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay.
Mr. Olislagers. Probably less than 5,000.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Less than 5,000.
Mr. Van Tine.
Mr. Van Tine. Personally, I am flying aircraft that are
3,000 to 4,000 pounds, since I have those very small. Although,
again, my company works with 650 airlines in all segments of
general aviation around the world. So my exposure comes from
working with customers. But personally operating small, very
small, light aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rogalski, when you did this report, did you visit with
or look at video or work that other reporters had done on this
same topic?
Mr. Rogalski. No, we didn't, Madame Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have any knowledge about whether or
not any other incidences occurred in terms of just other
locations? If you didn't consult with them, do you know of any
tapes or any other reports like this, not in Houston, but
around?
Mr. Rogalski. From a news perspective, one would think that
would have been the objective of the inspector general reports.
But when you make announced visits--as we sought comment from
aviation security experts regarding that report, one of the
takeaways that they got was that the OIG visits to these
airports were announced.
The proper analogy, according to this expert, was if you
are a restaurant owner, and the Health Department is going to
do a health inspection, and they call you ahead of time, by
golly, you are going to have your kitchen spotless clean.
Whether or not that holds true is, again, not my place to make
a judgment. But no, I don't know of any other incidents. But
then, again, I think it is evidence from the OIG report that
there was no attempt to gain entry unannounced, unplanned----
Ms. Jackson Lee. My----
Mr. Rogalski [continuing]. To see if there was a larger
issue, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I can say that my staff did find other
media outlets who had come across some of the same
circumstances. I wouldn't expect you were not made aware of
them. But they existed. That was my question to the IG.
Now, you raised a very good point, the announcement. But,
more importantly, did they take the single question that
happened to come from a single market trying to express a
broader concern? Did they thoroughly look any more broader
fashion, so that we could help all? This was not a Houston
story. This was, in fact, an effort to secure America better.
That is what I took from the reporting that you were able to
do.
Let me compliment, as I conclude, so that you can
understand the thrust of our efforts. You can view this as a
compliment, even though it is a stark set of circumstances.
Ms. King, I think, teaches pilots, or is it only that you
have a craft that people are able to secure? Do you do
training, pilot training?
Ms. King. We do. What we do is training pilots for the
knowledge component. We don't actually teach in the aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. But we all are aware, certainly, of
the facts of 9/11 as relates to general aviation. We know that
the terrorists found a general aviation facility. We know that
they were being trained in all innocence. We understand that
their source of exchange was U.S. cash. We also documented that
they were trained in their rush to take off.
It appears that they really were not interested in getting
any training to land. It may have been differing levels of how
they handled that. But we know that happened.
So, my question or my comment is look how far we have come.
Mr. Van Tine, do you think anyone is now, we hope, at least
monitoring how they take cash. Would you say that is occurring?
Would you say that general aviation is very suspicious of
anyone who wants a hybrid training takeoff and have no way of
getting down?
Mr. Van Tine. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you also surmise that there is a
little bit more documentation on students that are coming into,
you would suspect, any training facility to be trained?
Mr. Van Tine. Not just a little bit, but quite a bit.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I make the point, because although that
was a set of circumstances that none of us could have ever
imagined, look how far you have come. You have made very
reasonable and rational decisions that really are about
security. We applaud you for that.
But we live in remorse, obviously, of that whole tragedy
which had many different factors that contributed to it. That
is why we are here today, to ensure that we take the next leap,
having the industry as stakeholders, recognizing it is a
vibrant and thriving industry, and as well, recognizing that
the media reporters help us in an instructive manner, so that
we have the documentation, the actual documentation, that can
help us do better. That is what this hearing was about today.
So, I simply wanted to make that point. Mr. Van Tine has
answered for all of you.
But if Ms. King, if you want to say that you believe you
have made strides, I know you were in business in 2011--nine,
excuse 9/11, 2001, 9/11. Were you not?
Ms. King. Yes. Flight instructors throughout the country
are taking security training and recurrent training on a
regular basis. The points that you have talked about, Madame
Chairwoman, about taking cash and students who want unusual
kinds of training--those and other points are a very heavy
focus of that training. So there is a very, very heightened
awareness.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you.
Mr. Olislagers, do you want to comment?
Mr. Olislagers. Very briefly, I think since 9/11, just as
passengers on a commercial flight will no longer accept a
hijackers thought, you know, that they will still survive the
end of the flight, we have seen changes in general aviation
and, you know, become smarter. I think that awareness issue
needs to continue to take place.
As I have said before, overregulation is probably not the
answer. We have a security program at Centennial Airport that
is probably the simplest security program we have. We reward
people who see anything that happens on the airport that is
unusual. It is very successful.
No high-tech cameras can do a better job than us being
aware. That is really, I think, the focus, certainly from our
general aviation, and would like to continue to pursue. So,
less regulation and more awareness.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I thank you for that final word. I
will just add back that it will be regulation with balance. I
think that will be a fair approach to how we move on general
aviation.
Allow me to thank all of the witnesses who have now
appeared. I want to make mention of the fact that I also thank
the Members for their valuable questions and acknowledge the
constructive manner in which the witnesses answered the
questions. The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses. We ask that you respond to them
expeditiously in writing.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you again for your patience.
[Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Carlton I.
Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the
Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Mr. Mann, the OIG report talks about your discussions
with Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office of
Intelligence, which takes the lead for developing threat assessments
for aviation. Did you feel the office was adequately staffed and has
all of the necessary resources to be able to make threat assessments
concerning existing or emerging threats?
Answer. We did not collect the information you have requested
during the course of our review, which had a different focus.
Nevertheless, in the interest of being as helpful as possible to the
committee, we recently contacted TSA and asked them about resource
sufficiency. They have informed us that the Office of Intelligence
Threat Assessment Unit is staffed sufficiently and has the necessary
resources to make threat evaluations concerning existing and emerging
threats.
Question 2. Mr. Mann, the OIG report states that the terrorist
threat to general aviation is low due to the fact that most of the
aircraft are too small to inflict great damage. What are your thoughts
on large general aviation aircraft that could inflict damage? Do you
have any comments about larger general aviation aircraft and the risk
they pose?
Answer. Aircraft operated by corporations for executive and other
corporate employee travel, charter services, or private citizens who
use business jets and large turbo-prop aircraft, as well as businesses
such as Federal Express, which use aircraft that are equivalent to
commercial airliners, do pose unique risks because of their size,
payload capacity, and speed. As evidenced by the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, large aircraft can cause catastrophic damage to
structures. However, occurrences of misuse of general aviation aircraft
in this category are practically nonexistent. According to the Aviation
Crime Prevention Institute, thefts of all types of aircraft have
declined since 2001, when 15 planes were stolen compared to five
reports of aircraft thefts thus far in 2009. Of the five aircraft
stolen this year, all were propeller-driven--four single-engine and one
light twin-engine plane. To our knowledge, no jet aircraft have been
reported stolen since 2005, when a man stole a Cessna Citation VII,
belonging to a flight services company in Arkansas. The subsequent
investigation into the theft of the Cessna revealed no terrorist
activity or intent to cause harm.
We believe charter services pose the most significant risk. Unlike
corporate and private flights where the crew usually knows the
passengers, the crew of charter flights might not have ``first-hand''
knowledge about those aboard the aircraft. However, TSA has enacted the
Twelve-Five Security Program and the Private Charter Standard Security
Program to deter the potential misuse of chartered flights. Twelve-Five
Security Program requirements include passenger identification checks,
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks for the flight crew,
specific bomb and hijacking notification procedures and requirements,
and the implementation of a TSA-approved operator security program. The
Private Charter Standard Security Program requires operators of
passenger charter flights using aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight
greater 100,300 pounds, or with a passenger-seating configuration of 61
or more passengers, among many other requirements, must ensure that all
passengers and accessible baggage are screened prior to boarding the
aircraft. In addition, the Private Charter Standard Security Program
prohibits passengers from boarding a chartered flight with weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices. It also requires the use of metal
detectors and X-ray systems that meet TSA standards, to screen charter
passengers. These operators must have a security program that
establishes all the required security components for private charter
operations.
As is a matter of record based on our July 15, 2009 testimony, one
of our objectives for the TSA's Role in General Aviation inspection was
to identify TSA security requirements for general aviation airports,
and to identify measures taken by TSA to secure general aviation. We
determined that TSA, even while it actively pursued all its other
mandates, had also paid significant attention to general aviation. This
was true both in the Office for Transportation Sector Network
Management and in the Office of Intelligence. Various Government and
industry studies have concluded that the risks associated with general
aviation are relatively limited. Reports previously released by the
General Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service
are consistent with this view.
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Mr. John
Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network
Management, Transportation Security Administration
Question 1. Mr. Sammon, in your written testimony you discuss, to
some extent, the collaboration between DNDO and CBP to mitigate risks
associated with in-bound general aviation aircraft. As TSA continues to
develop its GA security policies with the LASP and other tools, what
will be TSA's role in the collaboration DNDO and CBP are currently
undertaking?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What is TSA's overall strategy for addressing the
security of general aviation airports?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Since 2004, what actions has TSA taken to strengthen
the security of the general aviation system? To what extent have these
actions been developed in coordination with general aviation
stakeholders?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. How does TSA plan to assess the effectiveness of its
actions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. What additional actions does TSA plan to take to
further strengthen this area of aviation security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. What financial, technological, and operational
challenges do TSA and its stakeholders face in securing the general
aviation system?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. What progress has TSA made in its efforts to conduct a
systematic analysis of security vulnerabilities at general aviation
airports Nation-wide? How has this progress been measured?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. To what extent were the general aviation security
regulations issued in the last year based on the results of a
systematic risk analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. What steps has TSA taken to systematically and
comprehensively obtain general aviation stakeholder input in developing
the proposed regulations to enhance general aviation security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. In the absence of a focused risk assessment for
general aviation, is TSA justified in imposing a broad array of
additional security regulations on the general aviation industry? What
is the specific threat that these regulations seek to mitigate?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. Conversely, if general aviation represents a
significant threat that justifies the proposed regulations, why has it
taken TSA 6 years to develop and implement regulations to close these
security gaps?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. What steps has TSA taken to systematically and
comprehensively obtain general aviation stakeholder feedback on the
quality of the agency's risk communication efforts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13. What steps, if any, has TSA taken to identify and
prioritize the need for security enhancements at general aviation
airports? What is the estimated cost of the improvements needed to
comply with the proposed regulations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. What, if any, general aviation security enhancement
has TSA funded to date?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15. Has TSA developed any security requirements for
domestic charters flights operated by foreign air carriers?
If yes, which regulations are required to be met?
If no, has TSA made a determination that private charter operations
in the United States conducted by foreign air carriers pose no
significant security risk to aviation and national security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 16. What is the likelihood of a nuclear attack occurring
from a GA aircraft?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 17. What will be the financial costs of intensifying the
security measures to GA aircrafts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Mr.
John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network
Management, Transportation Security Administration
Question 1. Which general aviation stakeholders did the TSA consult
with prior to the release of its October 2008 Large Aircraft Security
Program (LASP) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), TSA-2008-0021?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How did TSA document these consultations with outside
industry groups or stakeholders while developing the LASP NPRM?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Do you believe that the TSA's use of open forums and
workshops since April 2009 will result in a better, more risk-based
rulemaking? If so, will TSA endeavor to, whenever possible, use much
more inclusive, open, and transparent approaches in future rulemakings?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Who does the Automatic Detection and Processing
Terminal work? How does it distinguish between the scheduled,
legitimate flight and a flight that may be deviating from its flight
path?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. In 2007, then-Secretary Chertoff required CBP and DNDO
to scan all arriving general aviation aircraft for radiation and
nuclear signatures. Does the Department have any programs either
deployed or scheduled to be deployed that would require general
aviation aircraft inspections overseas vice once the aircraft has
landed in the United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. We've heard from the DNDO that these foreign in-bound
general aviation flights are of particular concern to them. Do you
agree with the DNDO as to the extent of the threat of these aircraft to
the United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. If TSA really believes, as you testified, ``a critical
aspect of TSA's regulatory approach is the process-oriented nature of
devising mandatory security measures,'' why does the TSA have literally
dozens of security directives issued without any opportunity for public
notice or comment? What is the process for issuing these security
directives? How often are security directives formally reviewed to
identify if an actual rulemaking allowing for public comment would be
possible?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Dr. Charles
R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Dr. Gallaway, according to DNDO, what approach poses
the greatest risk for radiological and nuclear terrorist attack from a
foreign departure point?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are some of the advantages that terrorists might
associate with GA aircraft when orchestrating a terrorist attack?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. How does the preclearance agreement structure currently
utilized by CBP mitigate the risk of unknown in-bound GA aircraft? How
could the program be strengthened?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Can you tell us about the weapons that might be used to
inflict a nuclear or radiological attack using a GA aircraft?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Domestic general aviation air carriers have complained
that Air Canada has a competitive advantage in its charter programs
because it is not required to screen passengers and baggage like
domestic carriers. Please explain the Air Canada issue. Do you feel
this is a security vulnerability? If so, what steps is TSA taking to
address it?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Dr.
Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. How is DNDO working with TSA and CBP to address the
high consequence by low probability WMD attack utilizing a general
aviation aircraft?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What capabilities current deployed to the field exist
for DHS inspectors to identify shielded radiological materials? What
R&D projects are in the works to improve radiological detection
capabilities that might be useful in the general aviation field?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Martha King,
Pilot
Question 1. Mrs. King, are some security programs being
administered by TSA for general aviation more effective than others?
Could you tell us what programs work well in general and which need
improvement? For example, the Airport Watch hotline or the security
program for large charters, how effective are these programs?
Answer. General aviation aircraft represent a significant
investment and commitment of time and effort for general aviation
operators. It is in their interest to keep these valuable assets
secure. The best approach TSA can take is to provide tools to assist
operators in discharging this responsibility that the operators have
recognized was theirs long before the creation of TSA. The Airport
Watch Program is an excellent example of the kind of tools that are
helpful and effective. Since I am not a charter operator, I am not in a
position to judge the effectiveness of the security program for charter
operators of large aircraft.
Question 2. Mrs. King, do you think there are some situations in
general aviation transportation where it would be beneficial to know
the watch list status of a passenger or do you feel that, in all
circumstances, general aviation passengers are known to pilots and
crew?
Answer. It is hard to image a case in which someone would present
an unknown person to be carried on a private flight along with valued
personnel, who are often conducting confidential discussions and work
on-board. In any event, making the watch list available to a trusted
pilot would provide one more security tool should a question ever
arise.
Question 3. Mrs. King, I would like your opinion on how vulnerable
general aviation is to the insider threat--either flight crew or
airport personnel. Do we currently have enough security protocols in
place to mitigate this risk?
Answer. Aircraft large enough to possibly be used as a weapon are
owned by operators who consider the aircraft and the highly valued
personnel they carry strategically important to the well-being of their
business. These operators carefully vet all those who will come into
contact with the airplane or its occupants. In every case these
companies will have a security system in place that functions
differently than, but often exceeds the effectiveness of, of airline
security programs. It is highly improbable that Government regulation
would improve this process. In many cases it is likely the specificity
in the regulation and the disclosure of plans to outsiders would result
in the unintended consequence of degradation in security.
Question 4. Mrs. King, what is your opinion on the international
in-bound threat? How can the Government work to address this
vulnerability?
Answer. This is a subject in which I am not an expert. Having said
that, here is my opinion:
My observation from the occasional international travel I have
conducted with our aircraft is that the TSA and CBP processes in place
at our borders and overseas effectively detect and deter those that
would do harm to our country. We are subject to passenger and aircraft
screening at ports of entry, including radio isotope scanning. And CBP
now requires submission of the names of our passenger and aircraft
information prior to departing from a foreign location for the United
States.
International access for general aviation is as important to the
economy of our country as access for the commercial airlines. We must
ensure commerce and transportation remain a easily accessible for all
businesses and travelers.
An aircraft large enough to be a threat on an international flight
would represent a substantial investment, and would be a valuable
resource to its owner. It would be carefully secured by an owner with
legitimate intent. Additionally, an organization able to purchase such
an aircraft to commit mayhem would have many avenues available that
might be subject to less scrutiny and be much more effective than the
use of an aircraft. The simplest answer of making every aircraft go
through a portal and inspection abroad would have a disastrous effect
on the use of general aviation aircraft for commerce and travel and on
the economy of the United States. The best answer is international
cooperation and intelligence that follows the money.
The risk that a general aviation aircraft might be used to carry a
nuclear weapon is limited by the fact that any nuclear weapon that a
general aviation aircraft could carry would have to be produced through
a sophisticated Government program. The best solution for that problem
would be to focus efforts on tracking the results of those programs.
For more information on this subject, see Physics for Future Presidents
by Richard A. Muller.
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Robert P.
Olislagers, Executive Director, Centennial Airport
Question 1. Mr. Olislagers, tell me about how the general aviation
industry is faring in this recession and what impact you think changes
in the number of flight operations has on revenue and security
programs.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Mr. Olislagers, please tell us generally how involved
State and local governments are with providing resources for security
at general aviation airports? How has the recession impacted State and
local grants or programs for general aviation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Mr. Olislagers, what is your opinion on the
international in-bound threat? How can the Government work to address
this vulnerability?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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