[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FEMA HOUSING: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT PROBLEMS AND INNOVATIVE
SOLUTIONS
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HEARING
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 8, 2009
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Serial No. 111-27
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Lavant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana........................................... 3
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Gerald H. Jones, Member, National Institute of Building
Sciences:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Panel II
Ms. Erica Rioux Gees, Representative, The American Institute of
Architects:
Oral Statement................................................. 54
Prepared Statement............................................. 55
Mr. Reilly Morse, Senior Attorney, Mississippi Center for
Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
Mr. Don Kubley, President, Intershelter:
Oral Statement................................................. 70
Prepared Statement............................................. 72
Mr. Braddon B. Rininger, President, Brajo, Incorporated:
Oral Statement................................................. 74
Prepared Statement............................................. 76
Mr. Walter J. Boasso, Chief Executive Officer, Help, LLC:
Oral Statement................................................. 81
Prepared Statement............................................. 83
For the Record
SG Blocks:
Statement, Submitted by Chairman Bennie G. Thompson............ 88
Slides, Submitted by Chairman Bennie G. Thompson................. 6
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for W.
Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Homeland Security........................ 103
Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke of New York for W.
Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Homeland Security........................ 107
Question From Honorable Dina Titus of Nevada for W. Craig Fugate,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 110
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 110
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for
Gerald H. Jones, Member, National Institute of Building
Sciences....................................................... 111
FEMA HOUSING: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT PROBLEMS AND INNOVATIVE
SOLUTIONS
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Wednesday, July 8, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Jackson Lee,
Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green,
Himes, Kilroy, Massa, Souder, Lungren, McCaul, Dent, Bilirakis,
Olson, Cao, and Austria.
Chairman Thompson [presiding.] The committee will come to
order. The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``FEMA Housing: An Examination of Current Problems and
Innovative Solutions.''
Today's hearing will examine FEMA's ability to provide
interim housing after a catastrophic event. While we intend
this hearing to look toward the future, we must recall the
past.
Almost 4 years ago, the most destructive series of
hurricanes this Nation has seen struck the Gulf Coast. One
after another, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma dealt devastating blows
to a region of this country that I call home. Mississippi,
Louisiana, Alabama, and Texas all buckled under the force of
these storms.
Hurricane Katrina destroyed an estimated 300,000 homes,
displaced 700,000 people, and resulted in the deaths of more
than 1,300 individuals. In the aftermath of the rains, the
winds, and the broken levees, the people of this region had to
begin the process of rebuilding their lives. That is when they
looked to FEMA.
In response, FEMA purchased over 27,000 travel-trailers off
the lot, 25,000 mobile homes at a cost of $850 million, and
over 1,700 modular homes at a cost of $52 million.
Unfortunately, prior to these purchases, FEMA did not have a
plan for how these homes would be used. Some of them remain on
lots in Hope, Arkansas; Texarkana, Texas; Purvis, Mississippi;
and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. We have a picture of that lot in
Hope, Arkansas, on the screen.
While FEMA's failure to plan is disturbing, far more
disturbing is the Office of Inspector General's report that,
prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was not fully prepared to
provide sheltering or transitional housing to victims of a
catastrophic disaster.
As a result of FEMA's failure to plan, the last 4 years
have been a series of missteps, missed opportunities, and
misspent money. We have seen the Federal Government resort to
all forms of housing: Cruise ships, converted military
barracks, apartments, hotels, and trailer parks. We have even
seen the Federal Government pay over $100,000 for mobile homes.
Yet we have not seen a comprehensive plan to address the
continued dislocation of the families along the gulf.
On January 16, 2009, in the last week of the Bush
administration, FEMA released a housing strategy. That strategy
called for developing an operational plan and building disaster
housing capabilities. In essence, it is a plan to make a plan;
I think that leaves us without a plan.
Administrator Fugate, under your leadership, I want FEMA to
develop a comprehensive housing plan. This plan can neither
ignore the people who remain homeless after Katrina nor
continue to rely on the same old solutions. I hope this hearing
today will begin a dialogue to create innovative, cost-
effective, and more temporary housing.
Housing gives people a sense of security after a disaster.
Knowing you have a home is truly the beginning of recovery.
I want to thank our witnesses, and I look forward to the
testimony.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
July 8, 2009
Almost 4 years ago, the most destructive series of hurricanes this
Nation has seen struck the Gulf Coast. One after another--Katrina,
Rita, and Wilma dealt devastating blows to a region of this country
that I call home.
Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and Texas all buckled under the
force of these storms. Hurricane Katrina destroyed an estimated 300,000
homes, displaced 700,000 people and resulted in the deaths of more than
1,300 individuals.
In the aftermath of the rains, the winds, and the broken levees,
the people of this region had to begin the process of rebuilding their
lives.
And that is when they looked to FEMA. In response, FEMA purchased:
over 27,000 travel trailers ``off the lot'', 25,000 mobile homes at a
cost of $852 million, and over 1,700 modular homes at a cost of $52
million.
Unfortunately, prior to these purchases, FEMA did not have a plan
for how these homes would be used.
Some of them remain on lots in Hope, Arkansas; Texarkana, Texas;
Purvis, Mississippi and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. We have a picture of
the lot at Hope, Arkansas.
While FEMA`s failure to plan is disturbing, far more disturbing is
the Office of Inspector General's report that prior to Hurricane
Katrina, FEMA was not fully prepared to provide sheltering or
transitional housing to victims of a catastrophic disaster.
As a result of FEMA's failure to plan, the last 4 years have been a
series of missteps, missed opportunities, and misspent money.
We have seen the Federal Government resort to all forms of
housing--cruise ships, converted military barracks, apartments, hotels,
and trailer parks. We have even seen the Federal Government pay over
$100,000 for mobile homes. Yet we have not seen a comprehensive plan to
address the continued dislocation of the families along the Gulf.
On January 16, 2009--in the last week of the Bush administration,
FEMA released a Housing Strategy.
That Strategy called for developing an operational plan and
building disaster housing capabilities. In essence, it is a plan to
make a plan. I think that leaves us without a plan. Administrator
Fugate, under your leadership, I want FEMA to develop a comprehensive
housing plan. This plan can neither ignore the people who remain
homeless after Katrina nor continue to rely on the same old solution.
I hope this hearing today will begin a dialogue to create
innovative, cost-effective and more than temporary housing. Housing
gives people a sense of security after a disaster. Knowing you have a
home is truly the beginning of recovery.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman
from Indiana, Mr. Souder, for an opening statement.
Mr. Souder. I thank the Chairman.
I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for
taking time to be with us today. Ranking Member King is unable
to attend this hearing today due to a scheduling conflict.
This hearing is an opportunity to discuss a broad range of
issues surrounding how our Nation provides housing for disaster
victims. This hearing also marks the first time that Craig
Fugate, the new administrator of FEMA, has testified before the
full committee since his confirmation.
Thank you for being here today.
FEMA has made significant progress since the Gulf Coast
hurricanes of 2005, but more work remains to be done in
coordinating the overall disaster housing response, managing
disaster assistance programs, and clearly delineating roles and
responsibilities for community recovery.
It is important to emphasize that FEMA cannot and should
not handle disaster housing on its own. Resources from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Small Business
Administration, State, local, and Tribal governments,
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector are all
needed to achieve a comprehensive disaster housing capability.
Also, FEMA's housing programs by law are temporary. That
means that housing options that FEMA provides, such as travel
trailers and mobile homes, are not intended to be long-term
solutions for victims of disasters, but rather a means to help
disaster victims return to their lives and recover their
communities.
A lack of housing and rental properties immediately after
Hurricane Katrina and more recently after Hurricane Ike, for
example, made temporary housing units the reasonable solution
for victims who wanted to stay close to their homes.
Especially, for example, in Katrina, for many low-income
people, their land and their homes were their only assets and
have been in their families for many, many years, so they
didn't want to leave their local area.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
how FEMA can potentially use a national disaster housing
strategy, in addition to new technologies and innovative
designs, to continue identifying practical, cost-effective
options for temporary housing.
While FEMA housing is an important issue, I would like to
note that Administrator Fugate testified on a related topic
only last month in the subcommittee, and there are many other
pressing issues on which the administrator could testify today,
such as the state of preparedness for this year's hurricane
season and his plans for managing FEMA.
We really have two fundamental questions. One is the short-
term housing question, which in my district many of the units
were provided from Elkhart County. There were expectations and
many frustrations and claims about the so-called trailers not
being able to be lived in.
Some were not intended to be long-term, but, in fact,
millions of Americans do live in other types of trailers for
many, many years in many locations across the United States
without problems, and I believe the problems were exaggerated,
as is evidenced by there was actually greater problems with
formaldehyde in traditional housing in Louisiana than there was
there.
So I don't believe any of these units were intended to be
long-term housing, but I do believe the frustrations have led
to some false information.
The second thing, having been into New Orleans twice right
after the--immediately after the first group that came in from
Homeland Security and the Government Reform Committee and then
going back for a number of days a few years later, that part of
what we have to deal with and the challenge that you have is
that a smaller-scale disaster and then a larger-scale disaster.
Because when you got down into New Orleans, people wanted
to go back to their land. At the same--and their homes. At the
same time, the entire infrastructure was destroyed, over a
whole section of the city. When you met with the different
leaders as they tried to work through, how do you get medical
facilities there? Is there going to be a grocery store? Is
there going to be a school?
When there is not in an area that didn't necessarily have
an easily restorable financial sector, how do people go back
in? What is the motive for the--do the retailers come first,
the medical come first, the housing come first? It is at a
massive scale, I think something that FEMA has to separate
through a short-term disaster and one when there is a large
scale that is going to take a long time to rebuild, and there
needs to be like two different types of strategies to address
these.
Until we do that, I think you are going to continue to have
very frustrated Members of Congress looking at these massive
ones and saying, ``These people were supposed to be out of
these units years ago, and yet you are trying to rebuild, in
effect, an entire downtown or area of a city that is far more
massive than emergency housing.''
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
I welcome our first panel of witnesses. Our first witness
is Administrator W. Craig Fugate, administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Mr. Fugate began his career in
emergency management as a volunteer firefighter--that is not a
bad beginning--and emergency paramedic. Prior to his
confirmation by the U.S. Senate in May 2009, he served as the
director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management.
Our second witness is Mr. Richard Skinner, Inspector
General of the United States Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Skinner was confirmed as the Department of Homeland
Security's inspector general on July 28, 2005. Between December
9, 2004, and July 27, 2005, he served as acting inspector
general.
Our third witness happens to be a constituent of the
gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver.
I ask unanimous consent to permit the gentleman from
Missouri to introduce our third witness.
No objection is heard. I recognize Mr. Cleaver for the
purpose of introducing the witness.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to introduce Gerald Jones to the committee.
It also gives me a chance--you know, living in a city,
serving as mayor in a city called Kansas City, Missouri, and
then across the river is another city called Kansas City,
Kansas, and some people with 175 I.Q. don't know the difference
between Missouri and Kansas. So they will ask me, ``You know,
how are things in Kansas?'' Or, ``How is Dorothy?'' which, of
course, I don't know the answer.
Overland Park is a suburb of Kansas City, Missouri, but
Overland Park is in Kansas, another State. Our city codes were
in shambles. We had protests from organized labor. We had
complaints from development lawyers. We had complaints from
home builders, all upset over our code system and how difficult
it was to do business in Kansas City as we heard it.
Then, fortunately for us, we had someone just across the
State line who had done a fabulous job over in Overland Park,
Kansas, as the building code engineer, and that was, of course,
Gerald Jones.
So we were able to recruit him. He did not volunteer to
come to Kansas City, Missouri. We recruited him to come into
Kansas City.
Mr. Chairman, he completely reorganized our entire system,
developed a one-stop shop so that people could come through the
city, get the codes and building permits and so forth, in a
very easy way. It is a process that still is underway.
To my great pain, he retired in 1994, which was the middle
of my mayoral term, but he didn't retire from work, and he has
worked tirelessly in the field serving as chair of the National
Institute of Building Sciences and its Building Seismic Safety
Council and Multihazard Mitigation Council. He, in addition to
that, was appointed by FEMA to the Advisory Committee for the
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program.
He is an expert if we have ever had an expert come before
this committee, and I am very pleased, Mr. Chairman, that he
was invited and agreed to be with us today.
Chairman Thompson. Well, with that kind of introduction,
Mr. Jones, we want to welcome you.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted in the record. To provide Members images of the type
housing the witnesses are describing, slides will be displayed
on the monitors. Without objection, the slides will be inserted
into the hearing record at the appropriate point.
[The information follows:]
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Chairman Thompson. I now recognize Administrator Fugate to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF W. CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Fugate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
Members of the committee. I am honored to appear here today and
discuss disaster housing.
I really appreciate the fact, Congressman Cleaver, you
brought up and you talked about mitigation. One of our
challenges will be, as long as our housing stock is vulnerable
to the hazards we face--and the numbers can be staggering--we
are never going to get to where we need to be on housing if the
homes we are building aren't sound in the first place.
To give you some examples of that, Mr. Chairman, during our
catastrophic planning, looking at various parts of the country,
what would happen in a major earthquake, a major hurricane-type
scenario, looking at natural hazards, here are some numbers we
are dealing with.
If we look at the New Madrid earthquake zone, based upon
our catastrophic planning, if a major quake occurred there
today, approximately 2.6 million people, or roughly 1 million
households, will need housing assistance.
If South Florida is struck by a Category 5 hurricane,
similar to the great Miami hurricane in 1926, 3.6 million
households would be uninhabitable with major damage.
San Francisco in a 7.0 to 7.9 earthquake, about 100,000
would need short-term, 36,000 longer-term. That is a pretty low
number until you understand that California has been doing
seismic code for a long time and had been building in
structures for that.
Hawaii, which uses single-wall construction, if you had a
Category 4 hurricane affect the major islands there, as many as
650,000 residents would be without housing.
These are the events that could occur. In our history, they
have occurred. So in looking at how we address short-term to
longer-term permanent housing solutions, I think it is very
appropriate, Mr. Chairman, that one of the presentations is
mitigation and how we build our homes to mitigate against a
hazard we face. That will be the best overall starting point
for reducing demand in future disasters.
But given that and our role at FEMA, the effect of our
housing program and how it scales is demonstrated by a recent
event in 2007 in Kansas, Greensburg, where we had an F4 tornado
strike. It produced about 1,400 families who needed housing and
needed assistance.
Our programs provided temporary housing for over 300 of
those families. That is typical of many of the responses that
occur every day in this country from Alaska to Florida to even
working with our territories and our commonwealths of
reoccurring events where we have housing demands that
oftentimes, either through the use of rental properties, non-
impacted areas, or temporary housing units, we are able to
provide a sheltering environment to allow people to either
rebuild back on their property, repair their homes, or find
other housing in the area.
But there is a point where those systems will not scale up
in a catastrophic event. Oftentimes when we are looking at the
shorter-term shelter issues of providing temporary housing
units as a bridge, it is a bridge that doesn't get us to a
long-term solution.
As we saw in the southern States in the Katrina and Rita
areas, the amount of demand for long-term housing was not
addressed with temporary units because, at the end of what
should have been a temporary program, housing had not come back
with enough housing stock for people to move out of those
units.
When we look at these numbers, what we find is we are often
now facing a point at which we have to make decisions about,
how do we best manage housing needs in the sheltering phase
through that temporary housing process through, what is the
long-term answer? Do we need to look early in some of these
catastrophic events at relocating populations out of an area to
where there are housing units available?
There is finite capacity to install temporary housing
units. There is finite capacity on how quickly units can come
back on-line. When we look at this process, Mr. Chairman, we
need your guidance. We know this is not something that FEMA
will be able to address if we do not have those long-term
housing solution programs.
We are essentially looking at sheltering through the
intermediate housing phase until there is a solution that would
provide long-term needs being met. We need to work as partners
with our State and local governments, with our private sector,
but, Mr. Chairman, most importantly, with you and your
committee on how we lay out a plan.
I think right now we have been able to present that we have
many tools in the toolbox, but without a good architectural
blueprint, I am not sure we are always getting to where we want
to go when we build out for temporary housing.
You brought up the issue, Mr. Chairman, that we still see
people in temporary housing, you know, 4 years later. There are
about 2,700 families in temporary housing units as we speak
right now, and that number continues to go down as we continue
to do casework.
As you present, many units were purchased and not used. We
are having to look at, what do we do with those units and
dispose of them? We currently have court orders saying that
some of those units we may not dispose of; they are being held.
Others, we are trying to dispose of those through GSA and other
aspects of how we eliminate surplus property.
But we still need to work on, what is the number that we
need to have in inventory for a lot of reoccurring disasters?
Then how do we scale up for the large-scale catastrophic
events?
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks and I
am available for further questioning.
[The statement of Mr. Fugate follows:]
Prepared Statement of W. Craig Fugate
July 8, 2009
Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and other
distinguished Members of the Committee on Homeland Security. It is a
privilege to appear before you today on behalf of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
As always, we appreciate your interest in, and continued support of,
FEMA's mission to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate all hazards.
Mr. Chairman, disaster housing may be among the most challenging
and complex missions facing our agency, and the Nation, following a
catastrophic event. No aspect of recovery is more critical to the
timely and sustainable revitalization of a disaster-impacted community
than the return of its citizens and workforce, and no aspect of
recovery is more critical to supporting their return than the
availability of housing. This situation will be most acute in
catastrophic environments where the level of damage is so severe that
locally available rental resources are insufficient to meet the needs
of the displaced. Such situations are enormously challenging, but a
challenge that we, as a Nation, must be prepared to meet.
Let me make one thing perfectly clear. Disaster housing,
particularly in a catastrophic incident environment, is not a mission
that FEMA can or will ever be able to handle alone. While we certainly
have the ability and are prepared to bring an enormous number of
financial and material resources to bear, the sheer size, scope, and
duration of a catastrophic housing mission requires the coordinated
involvement and aggressive engagement of multiple Federal agencies,
State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and voluntary
agencies. Only by working together, and leveraging all of our
respective strengths and capabilities, can we achieve the kind of
timely and comprehensive housing response that disaster survivors need
and that our Nation has come to expect.
FEMA's housing programs are, as mandated by the Stafford Act,
temporary. By law, the President may provide temporary housing
assistance for no more than 18 months, unless he determines that
conditions are so extraordinary as to warrant an extension.
Accordingly, FEMA has focused its efforts on developing temporary
housing assistance that will provide a timely but interim bridge to
disaster survivors while they seek more permanent, stable, and long-
term housing solutions. Within that framework, FEMA considers pre-
existing rental resources as a preferred temporary housing solution,
and employs temporary housing units only as a last resort, when
existing housing and rental resources in and around a community have
been virtually destroyed, rendered uninhabitable, or exhausted. Such
was the case in the States of Louisiana and Mississippi following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and more recently in coastal areas of
Texas following Hurricane Ike. The lack of available housing and rental
resources was so acute that temporary housing units were the only
viable solution for those survivors who wanted to remain close to their
homes, close to their jobs, close to their neighbors, or close to their
children's schools. In such situations, temporary housing units,
whether traditional units, such as travel trailers; or newer
alternative units, such as Katrina-type cottages, may play a huge role
in just how quickly a small community is able to rebound from a
disaster and begin the march to recovery. Community recovery may be
faster if disaster-affected communities identify strategies to
integrate these alternative units permanently into their communities,
rather than viewing them solely as an alternative to temporary housing
units.
FEMA plays a critical role in finding rental resources for
survivors following a disaster. While securing temporary housing in or
near an impacted community for every disaster survivor or household
that needs such assistance is not always possible, FEMA can quickly
relocate survivors to where temporary housing is available. During
large-scale events, such relocations, potentially at a significant
distance from the impacted community, are often inevitable. Our
challenge remains facilitating their return as quickly as possible, so
that they can help their communities recover.
As I've mentioned, we employ temporary housing units as a last
resort, when other forms of housing are unavailable. Utilization of
local rental resources is preferred, as such housing not only provides
a better quality living environment and is suitable for long-term
occupation, but the use of such housing contributes to the local
economy. To help facilitate the timely movement of survivors into--and
monitored occupancy of--rental resources, FEMA's partner, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has developed the
Disaster Housing Assistance Program, which allows HUD to leverage their
network of Public Housing Authorities across the Nation to organize and
manage survivor placement, including case management assistance. HUD
piloted the Disaster Housing Assistance Program following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, and subsequently reprised the program in response to
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav.
With that said, when FEMA is confronted with an event of
catastrophic magnitude, the need for housing will most likely outstrip
locally or regionally available rental resources, and require
augmentation from traditional and non-traditional forms of temporary
housing units. Accordingly, FEMA maintains a baseline inventory of
various types of temporary housing units at several storage locations
around the country, to provide an initial and immediate delivery
capability while our multiple contract suppliers ramp up sustained
production. Our inventory includes manufactured housing, park models,
and travel trailers, a subset of which is specifically designed to be
accessible to special needs occupants.
RECENT IMPROVEMENTS AND INITIATIVES
While our work is not yet complete, we have made significant
progress in a number of key areas related to disaster housing.
In January of this year, FEMA released the National Disaster
Housing Strategy, which provides, for the first time, an overarching
framework for a national disaster housing effort. The Strategy is
intended to bring together all levels of government, nongovernmental
organizations, and the private sector to meet the urgent housing needs
of disaster victims and enable individuals, households, and communities
to rebuild following a disaster. The Strategy draws on best practices
and lessons learned to identify actions that must be taken to improve
disaster housing assistance, an effort that involves renewing our focus
on planning, building baseline capabilities, and providing a broader
range of disaster housing options. It describes key principles;
responsibilities and roles; and current practices in sheltering,
interim housing, and permanent housing. The Strategy is based on a
fundamental understanding that disaster housing is more than simply
providing a structure, but must also address the complex needs of
disaster victims. Disaster housing efforts must address human needs and
connect to a broad range of community-based services. The Strategy also
discusses future directions for how the Nation can work together to
achieve national disaster housing goals. This includes reviewing best
practices and innovations to establish baseline capabilities and core
competencies; validating roles and responsibilities; and improving the
range, quality, and timeliness of disaster housing services provided by
communities, States, and the Federal Government. For example, the
Strategy calls for innovative approaches to meet diverse needs of
disaster victims and reduce shelter demands by improving resilience and
accelerating repairs. It also calls for a broader range of interim
housing options to meet diverse needs. In addition, the Strategy
established the National Disaster Housing Task Force, which will be
staffed by national-level representatives from several Federal
agencies. The Task Force will engage and interact with key stakeholders
at all levels of government, as well as with the private sector,
industry, and voluntary agencies.
In April and May 2009, FEMA convened organizational meetings of the
National Disaster Housing Task Force with representatives of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health
and Human Services, the U.S. Small Business Administration, and the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. First drafts of an implementation
plan, a concept of operations, a National Disaster Housing Task Force
charter and an organizational chart, as well as guidance for the State-
led Housing Task Forces Charter, Organizational Chart, and
Implementation Plan have been developed, and are currently being
reviewed by the partner agencies. Next steps for the Task Force include
finalizing these documents, and continuing outreach activities and
coordination to identify resources and gaps in the disaster housing
arena. We will continue to keep you updated on these efforts.
We also released an updated 2009 Disaster Housing Plan, a
streamlined document that operationalizes guidance contained in the
National Disaster Housing Strategy, and describes the specific types of
assistance that FEMA will provide to support State, local, and Tribal
governments in meeting the housing needs of disaster survivors when
FEMA's Individual Assistance Programs are authorized under a
Presidentially declared disaster.
With regard to temporary housing units, we have made tremendous
progress in improving the quality of our units. We have redefined and
made even more stringent the specifications for every unit that FEMA
procures in support of disaster survivors, to ensure these units are
the safest available in terms of air quality. This includes new and
more rigorous specifications for travel trailers, which are once again
a part of our temporary housing arsenal. As you know, the use of travel
trailers was suspended for a period of time, following concerns with
formaldehyde. However, a number of States have made it clear that they
want travel trailers to remain a part of our inventory, and in many
cases, a travel trailer is the only unit that will fit on suburban
private property. To further meet the needs of disaster survivors and
the desires of our State customers, FEMA awarded, in April 2009, four
contracts for the manufacture of low emissions travel trailers with
improved air exchange. The contractors are required to build, deliver,
and conduct air quality testing for temporary housing units for up to 5
years. This contract award represents the agency's continuing
commitment to identify new alternative housing solutions to supplement
the array of solutions available to best meet the complex, disaster-
related housing needs of the survivors and the States we support.
Travel trailers are not suitable for those who need a housing
solution for a prolonged period of time; however, they provide an
invaluable resource to States with homeowners who need a shorter period
of time to repair their homes and whose property cannot accommodate
other types of housing units, such as park models or manufactured
housing. I am pleased that we have been able to produce FEMA-
specification travel trailers with improved air quality standards and
increased air exchange to help address health care concerns that were
identified as a result of the 2005 hurricane season.
One of our areas of greatest progress has been in the area of
exploring new forms of alternative temporary housing. Our Joint Housing
Solutions Group completed an initial assessment of numerous candidate
alternative units, culminating in the award of a competitive contract
for seven different models. Under this contract, FEMA has had each of
the vendors build and install a prototype unit at our National
Emergency Training Center, in Emmitsburg, Maryland, where we can
closely monitor and evaluate their quality and durability as students
occupy these units throughout the year. While our contract allows us to
purchase multiple units to support a disaster housing response
immediately should the need arise, these prototypes allow us to assess
these units in controlled conditions across all four seasons, and will
help us determine whether these units will become part of our permanent
capability inventory. Additional alternative units are also being
evaluated in Galveston, Texas, and are supporting actual Hurricane Ike-
displaced households.
In 2006, Congress appropriated $400 million to FEMA for a pilot
program to identify and evaluate new alternatives for housing disaster
survivors. This Alternative Housing Pilot Program encouraged state-of-
the-art engineering standards designed to maximize structural strength,
durability, and energy efficiency. Four States received competitive
grants: Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and all have
commenced or completed construction of their units. Once the evaluation
period is complete, these models could potentially be used in response
to future disasters. We look forward to fully assessing these pilot
projects, and anticipate that they will provide valuable housing
lessons for application in future disasters.
FEMA is also evaluating the lessons learned from our Rental Repair
Pilot Program, which Congress authorized as part of the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act. This pilot program, which expired at
the end of 2008, allowed FEMA to test and evaluate the utility and
cost-effectiveness of coordinating and funding the timely repair of
damaged multi-family dwellings, such as apartment complexes. Pilots
were conducted in both Iowa and Texas, and our findings are reflected
in a report that was recently submitted to Congress. Those findings
will assist us in determining if such a capability should be
permanently added to our recovery authorities.
As I noted earlier, FEMA cannot and should not handle a disaster
housing mission alone. Recognizing the critical role that States should
play in the planning and character of any disaster housing response,
the National Disaster Housing Strategy called for the establishment of
State-led Housing Task Forces. The concept of a State-led Housing Task
Force grew out of lessons learned during the California Wildfires in
2007. The State of California and FEMA established a joint State and
Federal housing task force to coordinate housing issues, including
resources, zoning and code concerns, services for survivors, and other
areas of mutual interest. This idea was formalized in the National
Disaster Housing Strategy. The State-led Disaster Housing Task Force
empowers States to have a decision-making role in providing disaster
housing options at the beginning of a disaster, as well as encourages
States to effectively plan and organize for the multifaceted dimensions
of a housing mission before a disaster. These task forces have proven
successful in the States of Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and
Missouri. Partnering State Agencies typically include State Departments
of Health, Housing, Community Development, General Services, Human
Services, and numerous private non-profits such as Habitat for
Humanity, American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and local low-income and
accessible housing groups to ensure that the housing needs of all
affected populations are met.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while FEMA has made impressive
progress improving our temporary housing assistance programs, I clearly
recognize that we--FEMA and our partners across the Nation--have much
more work to do. It will be a challenge, but it is a challenge I
accept. I know I will be able to count on your support.
Thank you. This concludes my testimony. I am prepared to answer any
questions the committee may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Just like Mr.
Souder, we welcome your maiden voyage to this committee. I
don't think it will be too rough, but you never can tell. Winds
sometimes blow differently.
Mr. Skinner, you now have 5 minutes for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. SKINNER, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Skinner. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and
Members of the committee. Thank you for having me here today.
My testimony today draws up on past and on-going work
performed by my office and focuses on FEMA's efforts to improve
its disaster housing operations. As Mr. Fugate pointed out,
disaster housing is one of the most complex challenges facing
emergency managers at all levels of government following a
major disaster.
Deficiencies in the Government's housing response to
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita were well-documented. The
bottom line is that no one was prepared to deal with the
housing crisis created by a disaster the size of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
Nevertheless, there were many failures in the Federal
housing response that could have and should have been avoided.
The absence of completed housing plans for catastrophic events
is not new to FEMA. It is not new to HUD. It is not new to the
Federal Government.
Both the FEMA OIG and GAO reported on housing recovery
deficiencies across all levels of government after Hurricane
Hugo, and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, and again after
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and the Northridge earthquake in
1994.
GAO criticized Federal disaster assistance programs as
being inadequate in providing aid to repair damaged rental
units when there was a shortage of housing. The FEMA IG stated
in 1993, more than 15 years ago, ``Alternatives need to be
explored for situations in which suitable rental resources are
not readily available.''
FEMA recognizes these problems. Prior to August 2005, prior
to Katrina and Rita making landfall, had made at least three
failed attempts to develop a catastrophic disaster housing
plan. Had such a housing plan existed prior to Katrina and Rita
making landfall, the amount of available housing would have
probably increased and the cost of temporary and permanent
housing would most likely have not been as great as it was or
is.
Developing a disaster housing plan, which includes better
alternative housing solutions, is important for a number of
reasons, but a key one is the cost of the current housing
approach.
GAO has estimated that the average lifespan of temporary
housing units can be as long as 3 years, and the lifespan costs
could range from $26,379 for a travel trailer at a private site
to $229,000 for a travel trailer at a group site.
In addition to these costs, FEMA estimates it is currently
spending about $100 million per year to store over 100,000
trailers in manufactured housing units that they eventually
plan to dispose of.
The use of manufactured housing might be a reasonable
approach after most disasters, as Mr. Fugate pointed out, but
in the wake of a catastrophic event, as Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita have taught us, FEMA needs better alternatives that
quickly restore housing stocks and represent a cost-effective
option for American taxpayers.
It is critical to understand the impact that post-disaster
housing stock levels have on disaster housing operations. The
repair and restoration of existing housing stocks is one of the
most important challenges FEMA and its response-and-recovery
partners face following a catastrophic housing disaster. All
other housing decisions and programs hinge on this single
variable.
When January 16 of this year FEMA released a national
disaster housing strategy required by the Post-Katrina Act of
2006, this is FEMA's fourth attempt to develop a catastrophic
disaster housing strategy since 2002. The strategy summarizes
the sheltering housing capabilities, principles, and policies
that will guide the disaster housing process.
It is a positive step forward, but it is only an interim
step. It provides the framework for much-needed changes in
disaster housing policy and outlines a number of potential
programs and Federal agencies that can help victims find
housing solutions.
But the strategy does not include the operational plans
that everyone acknowledges are needed for successful post-
disaster housing recovery. These plans should be tailored to
meet the needs of the particular event or disaster scenario,
that is, from the garden-variety disaster to the catastrophic
disaster.
FEMA needs more flexibility to explore innovative and cost-
effective solutions to disaster housing challenges. In our 2008
report, FEMA's Sheltering and Transitional Housing Activities
after Hurricane Katrina, we encouraged FEMA to explore
alternatives.
Both FEMA's national disaster housing strategy and a recent
U.S. Senate report on disaster housing recognizes the
challenges and the importance of developing greater flexibility
in providing housing solutions. Some promising ideas came out
of those studies.
Catastrophic disasters are high-consequence, low-
probability events, and preparing for these events is extremely
complex and difficult, as Mr. Fugate has pointed out. It is not
something that we are going to fix overnight, so we are going
to require everyone to sit around the table, Federal, State,
local, nonprofit. It also will require considerable input from
this committee and others that have a stake in developing a
solution.
FEMA's greatest housing challenge is helping victims remain
in their communities following catastrophic disasters. To meet
this challenge, FEMA needs flexible, innovative and cost-
effective ways to help victims repair housing stocks. It is
critically important that all disaster stakeholders at the
Federal, State, and local levels and private sector maintain
this momentum and continue to implement needed changes over
time. Only by doing this will we as a Nation be better prepared
for the next catastrophic disaster.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I will be happy
to answer any of your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Skinner
July 8, 2009
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee. I am
Richard Skinner, Inspector General for the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the status of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts to improve its
disaster housing operations.
As you are well aware, hurricane season is upon us. While FEMA has
made strides in a number of areas since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, there is still room for improvement,
including in the critical area of disaster housing.
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall, it devastated far more
residential property than any recent hurricane, displacing over a
million people and destroying over 300,000 homes--nearly ten times the
number of homes destroyed by hurricanes Camille and Andrew combined.
Hurricane Rita caused further devastation, making landfall on the Gulf
Coast in September 2005. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita severely
challenged FEMA's ability to find housing solutions for victims.
Complicating the challenge, these hurricanes affected large numbers of
renters, the poor, and the elderly--groups that have more difficulty
dealing with the challenges of a catastrophic disaster.
Losing one's home in a disaster has far-reaching consequences. In
the immediate aftermath of a disaster, individuals need secure shelter.
When one's home is destroyed, most personal possessions are also
destroyed and must be replaced. In order to begin rebuilding,
individuals often need to return to work. Children need to return to
school. But this may not be possible if a family has to relocate far
from the affected area. The sooner individuals can get into permanent
or semi-permanent housing, the sooner they can begin rebuilding their
lives. In turn, communities can also begin to rebuild and recover.
FEMA is addressing weaknesses identified in a range of post-Katrina
reports and is in various stages of implementing the requirements of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-
295, Title VI--National Emergency Management, of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007) (Post-Katrina Act). FEMA
continues to perform well responding to non-catastrophic or ``garden
variety'' disasters; however, it still has much to do to become a
cohesive, efficient, and effective organization to prepare for and
respond to the next catastrophic event.
My testimony today draws upon past and on-going work performed by
my office and focuses on FEMA's efforts to improve its disaster housing
operations. It also addresses FEMA's progress implementing
recommendations made by my office, as well as external organizations
including Congress and GAO. I will focus on six key areas: (1) The high
cost of FEMA's current housing approach; (2) the critical element of
housing stocks; (3) the importance of communications in the aftermath
of a disaster; (4) the National Disaster Housing Strategy and the Joint
Housing Solutions Group; (5) the importance of State and local
officials' involvement and leadership; and (6) the need for innovation
and ``thinking outside the box'' in addressing the intractable disaster
housing problem.
THE HIGH COST OF CURRENT HOUSING OPTIONS
Developing better alternative housing solutions, particularly
options to be used in catastrophic disasters, is important for a number
of reasons, but a key one is the cost of the current housing approach.
FEMA's traditional housing programs are not always the most cost-
effective way to deal with the massive destruction of housing stocks.
For example, following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA built expensive
community sites and placed victims in travel trailers, sometimes
spending over $100,000 to house a family for 18 months. Further, FEMA
paid rent to tens of thousands of hurricane victims under various
housing programs for up to 44 months, 26 months longer than the 18
months generally allowed under the Stafford Act.
FEMA has estimated that the average lifespan of temporary housing
units occupied by disaster assistance applicants post-Katrina/Rita is 3
years. Their estimate assumes that a temporary housing unit will be
deployed in the field for up to 2 years and stored at a FEMA housing
storage site for 1 year. When a unit is returned after use by an
occupant, the unit is designated either for disposal or redeployment
depending on its condition. FEMA estimates that the lifespan cost of a
travel trailer, park model, and mobile home is $26,379, $37,379, and
$52,634, respectively. When units are disposed of, the average sales
price is $5,550, $7,250, and $19,000, respectively. These cost
estimates are consistent with those determined by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in a 2007 report \1\ based on Hurricane
Katrina and Rita occupants, which indicated that FEMA would spend an
average of $30,000 for each 280-square-foot trailer at a private site.
It is important to note, however, that at some sites, the average costs
were significantly higher, estimated to be as high as $229,000,
approximately the equivalent of the cost of a five-bedroom, 2,000-
square-foot home in Jackson, Mississippi.
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\1\ Hurricane Katrina: Ineffective FEMA Oversight of Housing
Maintenance Contracts in Mississippi Resulted in Millions of Dollars of
Waste and Potential Fraud (GAO-08-106), U.S. Government Accountability
Office, November 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA estimates it is spending about $100 million per year to store
over 100,000 trailers and manufactured housing units that they
eventually plan to dispose of. While in a ``garden variety'' disaster,
the use of manufactured housing might be a reasonable approach, in the
wake of a catastrophic event, FEMA needs better alternatives that
quickly restore housing stocks and represent a cost-effective option
for disaster victims and American taxpayers.
THE CRITICAL ELEMENT OF HOUSING STOCKS
It is critical to understand the impact that post-disaster housing
stock levels have on disaster housing operations. The repair and
restoration of existing housing stocks is one of the most important
challenges FEMA and its response and recovery partners face following a
catastrophic housing disaster. All other housing decisions and programs
hinge on this single variable.
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, there was simply not enough
affordable housing left to allow many victims to remain near their
communities. The Brookings Institution reported that in the months
following Hurricane Katrina, the population of New Orleans might have
fallen by as much as half.\2\ It's not that people wanted to relocate
outside the area; there just wasn't enough housing to support the
population. Three-and-a-half years after the storm, the Brookings
report estimates the New Orleans metropolitan area has recovered to
about 88% of its pre-storm population, but rents have also risen, to
approximately 46% above pre-Katrina rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The New Orleans Index Anniversary Edition: Three Years after
Katrina, The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program &
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, August 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Alternatives need to be explored for situations in which suitable
rental resources are not readily available.'' I don't think anyone is
surprised by this statement, but you may be surprised that it was
written by the FEMA Inspector General in 1993 after Hurricane
Andrew.\3\ I believe it is as true today as when it was written more
than 15 years ago.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ FEMA's Disaster Management Program: A Performance Audit After
Hurricane Andrew (H-01-93), FEMA Office of Inspector General, January
14, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA does not have sufficient tools, operational procedures, and
legislative authorities to aggressively promote the cost-effective
repair of housing stocks, which would increase the amount of housing
available and likely limit increases in the cost of housing,
particularly rental rates. For example, FEMA needs a flexible and
efficient rental repair program for use in catastrophic disasters to
get low-income rental housing back on-line quickly. For catastrophic
disasters, it may help for FEMA to have the flexibility to provide more
repair money, above the $30,300 currently available under the
Individuals and Households Program, to low-income home owners.
In the Post-Katrina Act, Congress required FEMA to develop the
National Disaster Housing Strategy and describe any additional
authorities necessary to carry out any portion of the strategy.
However, when FEMA issued the Strategy, it did not identify additional
authorities to strengthen its ability to repair existing housing
stocks.
COMMUNICATION IS KEY
Whether there is enough housing stock after a disaster to resettle
residents in the affected area, or whether individuals and households
may need to consider relocation, clear communication is key. Following
the 2005 hurricanes, affected individuals, the media, Members of
Congress, and State and local officials severely criticized FEMA for
its response to the housing crisis. Many of these criticisms occurred
because of a misunderstanding of disaster housing roles,
responsibilities, and limitations. To better manage expectations
following a catastrophic event and speed the recovery process, FEMA
should work with State and local officials to state clearly in its
policies, procedures, and public messaging achievable goals and what
constitutes success when howzausing stocks cannot be repaired. In
extreme cases, officials should clearly communicate that some victims
may need to relocate their households, possibly far from their original
communities.
Stakeholders generally understand that quickly assisting affected
individuals to secure housing near their pre-disaster communities is
the primary goal and defines success in virtually all disasters. When
housing stocks are not lost on a massive scale, FEMA and its partners
have the tools to help victims locate permanent housing in their pre-
disaster communities. However, the usefulness of this definition of
success breaks down in a catastrophic disaster.
Homeowners can make home repairs with insurance proceeds or through
small grants provided by FEMA's Individuals and Households Program.
When the storm destroys some rental properties, housing officials can
help individuals find new units from surviving stocks. FEMA can also
provide temporary manufactured housing units until victims can repair
or replace their homes.
However, when housing stocks are destroyed and have little prospect
for quick repair, FEMA, State, and local officials should clearly
communicate to stakeholders that there is not enough housing stock for
everyone and that some will need to relocate to other communities. This
will help individuals and families begin to rebuild their lives. The
sooner FEMA, its Federal partners, State, and local government leaders,
and other stakeholders make this determination, the quicker households
can be assisted in finding permanent and cost-effective housing
solutions. Officials at every level should communicate to affected
individuals their roles and responsibilities in finding permanent
housing. This communication is key and should occur, as the saying
goes, early and often.
FEMA's Acting Administrator summarized the challenge of housing
victims of a catastrophic disaster, in March 2009, this way, ``The
fundamental issue is not whether FEMA and our partners can find and
provide provisional housing to disaster survivors, we can. The
fundamental challenge is whether we can provide those disaster
survivors safe and secure housing where they and their communities want
it, and do so in a timely and cost-effective manner. This latter
challenge is, and will remain, our greatest challenge.''\4\
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\4\ Written Statement of Nancy Ward, Acting Administrator, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee, United States Senate, ``A New Way
Home: Findings from the Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery's Special
Report and Working with the Obama Administration on a Way Forward,''
March 18, 2009.
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THE NATIONAL DISASTER HOUSING STRATEGY AND THE JOINT HOUSING SOLUTIONS
GROUP
On January 16 of this year, FEMA released the National Disaster
Housing Strategy required by the Post-Katrina Act. The Strategy
summarizes the sheltering and housing capabilities, principles, and
policies that will guide the disaster housing process.
The Strategy promotes engagement of all levels of government, along
with non-profits, the private sector, and individuals to collectively
address the housing needs of disaster victims. The goal is to enable
individuals, households, and communities to rebuild and restore their
way of life as soon after a disaster as possible.
The Strategy released in January is a positive step forward, but it
is only an interim step. It outlines a number of potential programs and
Federal agencies that can help victims find housing solutions. But the
Strategy does not include a plan of action designed to achieve a
specific goal. It also does not describe what would be a favorable
outcome or goal in a particular disaster scenario and what steps FEMA
would take to achieve that goal. To be complete, FEMA must specify what
constitutes success under increasingly severe disaster scenarios,
especially catastrophic disasters.
Complementing the National Disaster Housing Strategy is the Joint
Housing Solutions Group (JHSG) initiative, begun in September 2006,
which is a multi-year effort to develop a systematic process to
evaluate and rate various disaster housing options, identify
alternatives to FEMA travel trailers and manufactured homes, and
recommend improvements for conducting disaster housing operations. The
JHSG, which includes housing specialists from the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the National Institute of Building
Sciences (NIBS), and FEMA, evaluated proposals and initiated contracts
with seven alternative housing manufacturers, each of whom has
delivered one prototype unit to FEMA's Emergency Management Institute
(EMI) in Emmitsburg, MD. These units will undergo pilot testing by
having EMI students live in the units. Additionally, the JHSG continues
to develop and field test a Housing Assessment Tool to facilitate
decisions on the selection and use of temporary and alternative housing
units. This tool is used by FEMA to collect information on housing
products and determine whether available options are suitable for
meeting disaster housing needs.
The JHSG has identified seven action items that FEMA should
consider implementing to maintain its momentum in developing
alternative housing solutions:
Develop an Alternative Housing Options Strategy, pulling
together stakeholders in a coherent and structured way;
Continue identification and assessment of potential
alternative housing units;
Pilot the most promising alternative housing units;
Develop performance specifications for new alternative
housing units;
Develop a procurement plan for pilot and full implementation
of alternative units;
Increase coordination between JHSG and the Alternative
Housing Pilot Program (AHPP); and
Conduct public information and outreach.
emphasizing state and local government leadership
Both the National Disaster Housing Strategy and FEMA's 2009
Disaster Housing Plan, which is based on key concepts in the Strategy
and describes FEMA's approach to meeting disaster housing needs during
the 2009 hurricane season, emphasize the role of State and local
governments in assuming greater housing leadership through the State-
led Joint Housing Task Force. Although State and local government
officials are in the position to know the best housing solutions for
their communities, officials may be reluctant to lead this effort.
In a 2008 audit prepared by my office, we reported that after
Hurricane Katrina, a number of local communities were very reluctant,
or even directly refused, to accept FEMA mobile home and travel trailer
group sites in their communities. In some cases, State or local
governments agreed to temporary housing sites, but then reversed their
decision after housing installation had begun. Each time this happened,
FEMA was further delayed in housing disaster victims and incurred
additional costs.\5\ FEMA has wasted millions of dollars in the past
preparing group sites that were later rejected for one reason or
another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ FEMA's Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster (OIG-08-
34), U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
March 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the National Disaster Housing Strategy, when it
becomes necessary to build group housing sites, State and local
governments are responsible for identifying vacant land that they own
that may be suitable for a community site. When publicly owned land is
unavailable or infeasible, the State and local governments are
responsible for identifying potentially viable sites for FEMA to lease.
FEMA must continue to emphasize to State and local government officials
their increased responsibility to develop and implement housing
solutions.
THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
FEMA needs more flexibility to explore innovative and cost-
effective solutions to disaster housing challenges. In our report,
FEMA's Sheltering and Transitional Housing Activities After Hurricane
Katrina,\6\ issued in September 2008, we encouraged FEMA to explore
alternatives to its traditional housing programs, including providing
lump sum payments to disaster victims. This could be a more cost-
effective and expeditious way of returning them to a more normal way of
life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ FEMA's Sheltering and Transitional Housing Activities After
Hurricane Katrina (OIG-08-93), U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, September 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both FEMA's National Disaster Housing Strategy and a recent United
States Senate report on disaster housing \7\ recognize the challenges
and the importance of developing greater flexibility in providing
housing solutions. Some promising ideas include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Far From Home: Deficiencies in Federal Disaster Housing
Assistance After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Recommendations for
Improvement, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery of the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate,
February 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing a rental repair program.--Although FEMA's
Individuals and Households Pilot Program shows promise, it is
uncertain whether the program is sufficiently scalable and
flexible to be effective following a catastrophic disaster.
Expanding the Individuals and Households Program for
catastrophic events.--In catastrophic events that include the
massive loss of housing stocks, the $30,300 repair limit may
not be sufficient to provide victims the flexibility to choose
cost-effective solutions, especially when compared to the cost
of building community sites, providing manufactured housing, or
paying rental assistance over extended periods.
Finding low-cost and low-formaldehyde alternatives to travel
trailers.--FEMA, through its Joint Housing Solutions Group, has
recently developed temporary disaster housing alternatives that
meet stringent emission standards. However, these alternatives
are expensive, ranging from $45,000 to $75,000, before
installation, monthly maintenance, deactivation costs and, when
required, building community sites. Additionally, contractors
may not be able to quickly produce the many thousands of units
that FEMA could need following a catastrophic disaster. Based
on current contracts, FEMA has the capacity to purchase
approximately 38,000 travel trailers, mobile homes, and park
models in a relatively short period of time. However, following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA eventually purchased
approximately 145,000 units.
Maintaining comprehensive cost data on all housing
options.--FEMA should collect and maintain comprehensive
historical cost data for all housing options. This information
will assist FEMA and future disaster victims in deciding among
the most cost-effective housing options.
As a result of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA undertook the Alternative
Housing Pilot Program (AHPP), which funded five projects, in four
States, using $400 million appropriated for this purpose. The goal of
the AHPP is to identify and evaluate better alternatives for housing
disaster victims. FEMA's final report on the AHPP, which will be
produced in conjunction with HUD, is expected to be completed by
December 31, 2011.
CONCLUSION
Catastrophic disasters are high-consequence, low-probability
events, and preparing for these events is extremely complex and
difficult. FEMA's greatest housing challenge is helping victims remain
in their communities following catastrophic disasters. To meet this
challenge, FEMA needs flexible, innovative, and cost-effective ways to
help victims repair housing stocks. But when restoration of housing
stocks is not possible, FEMA, State, and local officials need to
communicate the need for individuals to consider relocation.
In our report on FEMA's response to Hurricane Ike, we stated:
``FEMA's response to Hurricane Ike was well organized and effective,
and FEMA and its Federal and State partners implemented their incident
objectives aggressively. By the end of October 2008, only 7 weeks after
landfall, FEMA had registered more than 715,000 hurricane victims,
completed 359,000 housing inspections, installed manufactured housing
for 339 families, and disbursed $326 million for housing and other
needs. FEMA also assisted more than 100,000 disaster victims at its
Disaster Recovery Centers.''\8\
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\8\ Management Advisory Report: FEMA's Response to Hurricane Ike
(OIG-09-78), U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General, June 2009.
Also, FEMA's National Disaster Housing Strategy, released in January
2009, is a significant step toward improving FEMA's overall disaster
housing response. The strategy catalogues the Nation's housing options
and provides common principles to assist stakeholders in creating
housing implementation plans. However, FEMA's housing program continues
to face challenges.
As demonstrated following Hurricane Ike, FEMA is better prepared
for the next housing disaster. However, FEMA should act quickly to
develop the tools, operational procedures and, if needed, seek
additional legislative authorities to respond effectively to the next
catastrophic disaster. Also, to better manage expectations and speed
housing solutions, FEMA should set achievable housing goals and manage
expectations following catastrophic disasters.
It is critically important that all disaster stakeholders at the
Federal, State, and local levels maintain momentum and continue to
implement needed changes over time. Only by doing so will we, as a
Nation, be better prepared for the next catastrophic disaster, whether
man-made or natural.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy
to answer any questions that you or the committee Members may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Skinner.
I now recognize Mr. Jones for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GERALD H. JONES, MEMBER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
BUILDING SCIENCES
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
committee. I find it hard to live up to the introduction that
Congressman Cleaver gave to me, but I think there is a message
here in that what I was able to accomplish in the city of
Kansas City, Missouri, was only possible because of the
legislature, the council gave the will and the resources to let
me do it. I think that applies across the board.
I am here today as a member of the National Institute of
Building Sciences, which was created by Congress in 1974 as a
single authoritative national source to make findings and
advise both the public and private sectors on the use of
building science and technology to achieve national goals and
benefits.
Our board is diverse and includes six public interest
members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
As part of our mission, we work to reduce social and economic
losses from natural hazards by improving collaboration among
all entities involved in mitigation by deliberately promoting
risk--multihazard risk reduction in the planning, design, and
operation of built environment and not just let it happen
later.
We serve as a focal point for dissemination of information
on major policy issues. We have worked closely with FEMA for
many years in several areas of hazard mitigation to manage
post-disaster information and ensure that lessons learned from
each disaster are documented and disseminated.
My written testimony provides documents of our
collaborative work and many of the things that we have done
with FEMA over the years. Our last project was to assist FEMA
supporting the Joint Housing Solutions Group, as they attempted
to evaluate the many different temporary housing solutions
offered.
We assisted them in developing criteria and methodologies
to determine the suitability of temporary structures, including
safe, hazard-resistant designs, materials, taking into account
geographic location, prevalent hazards, weather, environmental
requirements, cost, delivery, and other factors that must be
considered in reacting to a disaster.
We help the council develop a spreadsheet assessment tool
that had at some 175 characteristics of a proposed housing
unit. It included such things as production capability, the
ability to ramp up production, storage issues, reuse issues,
and it provided a standard frame of reference for comparing
traditional and innovative emergency housing alternatives.
As a result of an open solicitation by FEMA, we then had
representatives on a field assessment team that looked at some
40 potential solutions. We looked--we went into various parts
of the United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada, looking at the
various proposed solutions.
There were a wide variety of units submitted, and the team
assessed each one as we were on the site. Then the team tried
to do a team ranking as we went along. It is my understanding
that those rankings have been taken into consideration in the
units that are currently under testing right now.
We congratulate FEMA on the work they have completed under
the housing group, but--there is always a but--we think that
there is more work to be done in the nature of: What is the
transition issue between temporary and permanent?
As a local building official, let me tell you that I have
some temporary structures that are 20 years old. We have no
scientific basis for how we have determined the interface
between temporary and permanent use.
A community is very sensitive to compatibility with its
housing stock. We need to take that into consideration. Right
now, in my opinion, we are winging it. We are doing our past
experience that says, ``This will work,'' or, ``This will
work.''
There are scientists out there who can provide additional
scientific basis for trying to reach a longer-term goal of: How
do we reach transition into permanent?
We thank you very much for the opportunity to make these
opening remarks and be happy to try to deal with any questions
you may have.
Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald H. Jones
July 8, 2009
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, my name is Gerald Jones
and I am a professional engineer. Before retiring in 1994, I served as
building codes administrator for Kansas City, Missouri, for 14 years.
Prior to that, I was building codes administrator for Overland Park,
Kansas, for 11 years. I worked as a partner and chief engineer for a
metal building design and construction firm for 20 years before
entering into the building official profession. I am testifying before
this committee as a volunteer member of the National Institute of
Building Sciences (Institute). I currently serve on the Institute's
Multihazard Mitigation Council (MMC) Board of Direction. I have
attached a copy of the MMC Overview including a membership listing for
the MMC Board of Direction and Member organizations (Exhibit 1).
I previously chaired the Institute's Board of Directors and its
Building Seismic Safety Council Board of Direction. I also served as
chair of the Council of American Building Officials and president of
the Building Officials and Code Administrators International (two
predecessor organizations of the International Code Council). Over the
years, I have worked closely with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). FEMA honored my service with an Outstanding Public
Service Award for recognition of extraordinary contribution to
improving seismic safety to the Nation's buildings and occupants.
The National Institute of Building Sciences is a private, non-
profit organization established by Congress through the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-383) as a single
authoritative national source to make findings and advise both the
public and private sectors on the use of building science and
technology to achieve national goals and benefits. The Institute is a
public/private sector partnership governed by a Board of Directors that
represents all sectors of the building community, including six public
interest appointees by the President of the United States.
The Institute serves the Nation and the public interest by
initiating advances in building science and technology and supporting
their application to improve the built environment. As a nonprofit,
nongovernmental organization, the Institute brings together
representatives of Government, the professions, industry, labor, and
consumer interests to focus on the identification and resolution of
problems that hamper the construction of safe, affordable structures
for housing, commerce, and industry throughout the United States.
The MMC works to reduce social and economic losses from natural
hazards. Established in 1997 as a voluntary advisory facilitative body,
the MMC works to achieve its purpose by conducting activities and
providing the leadership needed to:
Improve communication, coordination, and cooperation among
all entities involved in mitigation.
Promote deliberate consideration of multi-hazard risk
reduction in all efforts that affect the planning, design,
construction, and operation of the built environment.
Serve as a focal point for sage counsel as well as the
dissemination of credible information on major policy issues
involving multi-hazard risk mitigation.
Since its creation, the MMC has worked closely with FEMA to
stimulate hazard mitigation planning and activities across the Nation
and to explore how best to manage post-disaster information and ensure
that ``lessons learned'' from each disaster event are documented and
disseminated. It currently is developing mechanisms for creating a
network that will foster disaster-related, peer-to-peer mentoring.
Examples of the MMC's collaborative work including:
In 2007 and 2008, assisting FEMA and the Joint Housing
Solutions Group to explore and assess innovative solutions for
post-disaster housing needs.
Issuing an independent report in 2005, making an assessment
for FEMA \1\ of the future savings from mitigation activities,
which provided the Federal Government with quantitative
evidence that every dollar spent on hazard mitigation
activities results in $4 in benefits to society as a whole.
(Exhibit 2)*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information has been retained in committee files.
\1\ FEMA funded this independent study in response to a mandate by
the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee for Veterans
Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and
Independent Agencies of the 106th Congress (Senate Report 106-161).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 1992, the National Institute of Building Sciences has
provided the organizational home for the FEMA-funded HAZUSMH
program. This geographic information system (GIS) based
software program estimates the consequences of a natural
disaster before it happens, which is useful in assessing the
costs and benefits of alternative mitigation actions.
Managing the American Lifelines Alliance (ALA) for FEMA for
the past 7 years. This private-public partnership builds upon
established industry practices to support the development of
national consensus guidance for the design, construction, and
retrofit of new and existing lifelines.
A more complete listing of work within the MMC with FEMA is
contained in the MMC Background document. (Exhibit 1)
The MMC began its work for FEMA in support of the Joint Housing
Solutions Group (JHSG) in late 2006. Its charge was to:
Assist the JHSG in developing criteria and methodologies for
determining the suitability of temporary housing structures,
including safe and hazard-resistant design and materials.
Take into account geographic location and prevalent hazards,
weather and environmental requirements, cost, delivery, and
other various factors that must be considered in reacting to a
large disaster.
The MMC initially helped the JHSG refine a tool that would provide
for the evaluation of innovative models for emergency housing. In
general, the emergency housing is expected to be deployed for a maximum
of 18 months but some alternatives have the potential to evolve into
permanent housing. Essentially, the housing assessment tool (HAT) is a
web-based spreadsheet that permits the collection of information on
housing alternatives from housing manufacturers, vendors, and builders.
The HAT provides a standard frame of reference that permits the
comparison of traditional and innovative emergency housing
alternatives.
MMC representatives also participated in HAT field tests as members
of teams that visited alternative housing models and manufacturing
facilities in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada. In addition,
the MMC worked with a testing facility to develop a draft testing
protocol for FEMA personnel. The protocol could be used to verify the
physical characteristics of housing alternatives and their conformance
with a variety of codes and standards.
Based on feedback from HAT team participants, the Institute
understands that information from the field assessments was used to
identify potential candidates for temporary housing. It also appears
those candidates chosen for further consideration were ones that rated
well during the field assessments. The Institute supports the work done
by the JHSG and believes that significant progress has been
accomplished.
However, work is not yet complete in dealing with the many issues
surrounding emergency housing and requires additional consideration.
While the HAT now serves as an excellent tool for assessing housing
options, it does not yet provide a complete set of specifications that
reflect the full range of considerations for temporary or transitional
housing.
The direction taken by the JHSG in assessing the use of temporary
housing has been influenced by disaster events that occurred over the
past couple of years, including the problems attributed to the use of
temporary housing. What is needed now is a comprehensive post-
application examination and expansion of the JHSG findings and the HAT
to ensure that the broad range of local community attributes and
acceptance issues are addressed. Among the matters of concerns are
attributes and issues surrounding the location and placement of various
temporary housing alternatives in a community environment; potential
social impacts, local sensitivities, and preferences regarding housing
design and appearance; and the potential costs and benefits of housing
re-use, re-sale, and related storage and rehabilitation considerations.
This could result in the creation of an additional tool used to
provide a framework for exploring these community-based issues in ways
that are consistent with Federal, State, and local government needs and
priorities, as well as those of disaster victims. This framework would
provide further information for decision-making in the future and
support efforts to ensure temporary housing alternatives deployed in
communities are acceptable in several respects.
Flexibility remains essential to providing temporary housing on a
large scale. Nevertheless, many factors still require consideration in
a performance context. The opportunity for collecting and analyzing
real-time performance feedback should not be overlooked. A
comprehensive set of standards should include a range of attributes to
provide for flexibility in providing temporary housing throughout the
United States.
Thank you.
Exhibits: 1. MMC Background including Board of Direction, Members
Organizations, and Projects and Activities. 2. Natural Hazards
Mitigation Saves Lives: An Independent Study to Assess the Future
Savings from Mitigation Activities
EXHIBIT 1
MULTIHAZARD MITIGATION COUNCIL--BACKGROUND
The purpose of the Multihazard Mitigation Council (MMC) is to
reduce the total costs associated with natural and other hazards to
buildings by fostering and promoting consistent and improved
multihazard risk mitigation strategies, guidelines, practices, and
related efforts. Total costs are considered to include the direct and
indirect cost of deaths and injuries; property damage; business,
personal, and governmental/civil disruption; disaster assistance and
emergency services; and redundant or duplicative mitigation measures
associated with training, planning, programming, design, construction,
operation, maintenance, and enforcement.
The scope of the Council's interests is diverse and reflects the
concerns and responsibilities of all those public and private sector
entities involved with building and non-building structure and lifeline
facility research, planning, design, construction, regulation,
management, and utilization/operation and the hazards that affect them.
In recognition of this diversity, the Council believes that appropriate
multihazard risk reduction measures and initiatives should be adopted
by existing organizations and institutions and incorporated into their
legislation, regulations, practices, rules, relief procedures, and loan
and insurance requirements whenever possible so that these measures and
initiatives become part of established activities rather than being
superimposed as separate and additional. Further, the Council's
activities are structured to provide for explicit consideration and
assessment of the social, technical, administrative, political, legal,
and economic implications of its deliberations and recommendations.
To achieve its purpose, the Council conducts activities and
provides the leadership needed to:
Improve communication, coordination, and cooperation among
all entities involved with mitigation.
Promote deliberate consideration of multi-hazard risk
mitigation in all efforts that affect the planning, design,
construction, and operation of the built environment.
Serve as a focal point for sage counsel as well as the
dissemination of credible information on major policy issues
involving multi-hazard risk mitigation.
PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES
Since its establishment in 1997 as a voluntary advisory,
facilitative body of the Congressionally authorized, nonprofit National
Institute of Building Sciences (the Institute), the MMC has conducted a
variety of projects:
An assessment for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of
the future savings from mitigation activities that provided the agency
with quantitative evidence that every dollar spent on hazard mitigation
activities results in $4 of benefits to society as a whole.
Assisting FEMA and the Joint Housing Solutions Group in exploring
and assessing innovative solutions (e.g., the latest in factory-built
contemporary housing, modular homes based on universal design, housing
built from recyclable materials) to post-disaster temporary housing
needs.
Providing the organizational home within the Institute for the
FEMA-funded HAZUSMH software that facilitates assessment of the risk
from hurricane winds, riverine flooding, and earthquake events.
Operating, with FEMA funding, the American Lifelines Alliance
(ALA), a public-private partnership that builds upon established
industry practices to support the development of national consensus
guidance for the design, construction, and retrofit of new and existing
lifelines.
Exploring for FEMA of ways to optimize the role of building code
enforcement officials in disaster mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery and providing disaster-susceptible communities with a
resource to assist them in preparing for and recovering from disaster
events.
Administering a community planning fellowship program for FEMA.
Developing, managing, and conducting the Multihazard Building
Design Summer Institute (MBDSI) for the Emergency Management Institute.
Assessing for FEMA the state-of-the-art of hazard mitigation in
graduate-level mitigation planning curricula and formulating a
preliminary strategy for stimulating the integration of hazard
mitigation courses into such curricula.
Assisting FEMA in responding to its responsibilities under the
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Authorization Act of 2000.
Assisting the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
in translating appropriate recommendations from its World Trade Center
investigation into building codes and standards.
Assisting NIST in developing guidance concerning progressive
collapse prevention and fire safety design.
Organizing for NIST a building egress workshop intended to foster
out-of-the-box thinking concerning egress from tall buildings.
Conducting a workshop on the vulnerability of buildings to
chemical, biological, and radiological attack under a grant from the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
MMC BOARD OF DIRECTION
Chair
Brent Woodworth, Global Crisis Services, Inc. (representing the
building/facility owner community).
Vice Chair
L. Thomas Tobin, Tobin & Associates (representing Government and
policy).
Secretary
Ann Patton, Ann Patton Company, LLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma (ex-officio
member representing community interests).
Members
Andrew Castaldi, Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation
(representing the reinsurance community); Ken Ford, National
Association of Home Builders (representing the contracting/building
community); Philip Ganderton, MEc, PhD, University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque (representing the financial community); Michael Gaus, PhD,
Professor Emeritus, State University of New York at Buffalo
(representing the wind hazard mitigation community); David Godschalk,
PhD, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (representing the
planning/development community); George Hosek, Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality (representing the flood hazard mitigation
community); Klaus H. Jacob, PhD, Columbia University, Lamont-Doherty
Earth Observatory (representing the geological hazards research
community); Gerald H. Jones, retired building official, Kansas City,
Missouri (representing the building code enforcement community); David
McMillion, Consultant (representing the emergency management
community); Nancy McNabb, National Fire Protection Association
(representing the fire hazard mitigation community); Michael Moye,
National Lender's Insurance Council (representing the financial
community); Dennis Mileti, PhD, Professor Emeritus, University of
Colorado (representing the multi-hazard risk reduction community);
Michael J. O'Rourke, PE, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (representing
the snow hazard mitigation community); Timothy Reinhold, PhD, PE,
Institute for Business and Home Safety (representing the insurance
community); Alex Tang, PEng, C Eng, Chair, ASCE Committee on Lifeline
Earthquake Engineering, Mississauga, Ontario (representing the
lifelines community); Charles H. Thornton, PhD, SE, CHT and Company,
Inc. (representing the structural engineering community); Eugene
Zeller, retired building official, City of Long Beach, California
(representing the seismic hazard mitigation community).
MMC MEMBERSHIP
Organizational Members
American Forest and Paper Association, Washington, DC; The American
Red Cross, Washington, DC; Association of State Floodplain Managers,
Inc., Madison, Wisconsin; Consortium of Universities for Research in
Earthquake Engineering, Richmond, California; Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute, Oakland, California; Factory Mutual Insurance
Company, Norwood, Massachusetts; GE Global Asset Protection Service,
Hartford, Connecticut; IBM, Woodland Hills, California; Institute for
Catastrophic Loss Reduction, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; International
Code Council, Inc., Country Club Hills, Illinois; Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland;
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State
University of New York, Buffalo; National Fire Protection Association,
Quincy, Massachusetts; National Fire Sprinkler Association, Patterson,
New York; NIST Building and Fire Research Laboratory, Gaithersburg,
Maryland; Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado, Boulder;
Portland Cement Association, Skokie, Illinois; Society of Fire
Protection Engineers, Bethesda, Maryland; State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company, Bloomington, Illinois; The Thornton-Tomasetti Group, Inc., New
York, New York.
Affiliate Members
Arup; Baldridge Associates; Structural Engineering, Inc.; Corotis,
Ross, Boulder, Colorado; EverGlow NA, Inc.; Goettel & Associates, Inc.;
Martin & Chock, Inc., Honolulu, Hawaii; Seismic Installations.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I want to thank you for your testimony. I will remind each
Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the
panel. I now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Fugate, I appreciate your recognition that mitigation
is absolutely important. Going forward, you will see some
legislation that has been introduced to kind of reflect that as
a priority. But for the here and now, as Carl Rogers would say,
I think we have to address it.
Are you presently in your position as FEMA director
satisfied with the temporary housing plan that FEMA is
operating under?
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman Thompson. Can you share with the committee what
dissatisfaction you have identified thus far?
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, the plan does not define an
outcome. It is not scalable. It does not address catastrophic
housing.
I have asked that they incorporate into our strategy an
outcome based upon what our strategy would be and how we would
implement temporary housing for 500,000 housing units
destroyed.
As you heard in the opening remarks about the variety of
catastrophic effects, those numbers don't reflect every
potential scenario. But I believe it is important that we
stress the plan to the point where we see where it breaks. At
what point would temporary housing no longer be an option as
hauling in units versus having to relocate population?
When does it now make sense that we have to look at, how do
we recover and repair and salvage existing structures, which
our programs currently do not address, both through Stafford
Act and other prohibitions against going into rental properties
or repairing private homeowners' homes, above and beyond
individual assistance programs where they are oftentimes having
to go out and find those resources?
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Thank you. I am sorry I cut
you off.
Mr. Jones, you made a reference that we were kind of
winging it as an entity. Is that because you think FEMA or the
United States Government ought to do more than just what they
have done so far?
Mr. Jones. I believe we need to do some additional
scientific study. By winging it, I meant that, in my own case
especially, I am depending on past history and experience, but
I have no scientific basis to back up my intuitive decisions.
I think that, on the long run, we need some more research,
and I know research is kind of a bad word sometimes. But I
think we need to do more in-depth review of this issue of, what
is temporary? When does the transition take place? How do you
transition from something that is readily available on the spot
to make it permanently available and desirable? That is why.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. You showed a slide of seven
possibilities. Mr. Skinner talked about costs ranging anywhere
from $26,000 to $229,000 at a private site. Those are
significant figures.
Have we looked at whether or not the travel trailer
alternative, Mr. Fugate, is the only alternative available in
this situation? Have we asked the private sector to help us
craft something that may or may not confirm that this may or
may not be the best response to this?
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, in the few months I have been
here, we have been able to demonstrate through the pilot
project, because these units you see here are--actually, six of
them are installed up at the Emergency Management Institute in
Emmitsburg, Maryland. We are actually--we host students up
there having them use and tell us about these units.
But I guess the question I have is, have we actually asked
the public what they need? Again, I think we have situations
where, if my home is damaged and I can get a travel trailer or
a travel unit or whatever we are going to call it, put it in my
driveway so I can stay there and fix my house, that may be my
preference.
In many cases, it will be, do we have rental property that
we can rent or hotel-motel rooms while you do that repair? What
if the home isn't yours and it is a rental unit? Is there any
way we can get that rental unit back on-line?
So I think we have to look at these tools and go back and
go, based upon various scenarios, what does the public want to
be able to do? My experience has been, dislocating people even
tens of miles in their community is so disruptive that their
preference is not to leave if they have property to move
outside that area, but sometimes the tools are not going to
provide us with options other than relocation to rental
properties or other locations where housing exists.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Skinner, what is your analysis of these units and
whether or not you think we are getting the best for our
investment?
Mr. Skinner. As far as these units, we actually haven't
done any studies as to the utility, but I think we have to be
careful here as to looking at these as a fix-all, especially
from a cost perspective, and that is something our office is
always looking at.
To transport, store, install, maintain, deactivate, store,
these units are going to cost just as much as a travel trailer.
So we have to take a very close look at what we have here.
Second, do we want to create--and they are looking at these
units as something that is in between--temporary--transitional.
I am starting to use new terms here, temporary, permanent-type
homes.
The thing is--and as Mr. Fugate pointed out--what we have
to do is work with the communities. We are still going to have
the issue of, do we want these units in our community? Do we
want to make these units permanent? Does the community want to
have these units there permanently?
These are the questions you have to work locally with the
local community to address. I am not going to suggest--and we
haven't done a study--that this is the fix-all as a replacement
for travel trailers.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana for 5
minutes, Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I appreciate you all showing the
complexity of whether you are working on your own home, what
your neighbors are like, whether we are in a beachfront
community or an area where they may not have the assets with
which to rebuild because most of the people may not even have a
job at the particular point in time, depending on what has been
hit. It is an extremely complex price range and style of home
challenge and assets of the individuals.
I wanted to make sure I pointed out for the record, Mr.
Fugate, in your testimony, you say--and you have reiterated
here--that many States and communities do want the travel
trailers. You state in your testimony that they are not
suitable for people who need housing solutions for a prolonged
period of time.
While I would agree that certain of those units are not,
the fact is, is that many people spend their whole lives in
larger versions of these. Sometimes we get confused the park
trailer, which is very small, not as much ventilation, are
intended for emergency use. In fact, most of what are in
Arkansas are not for sale to the general public.
They were FEMA specs that you would not have in a regular
situation that were designed specifically for short-term, but
many because FEMA purchased all kinds are now being smeared
beyond that and saying, well, you shouldn't live in those long-
term, but millions of Americans in our Park Service, in our
Border Patrol, in our Government agencies live in different
forms of trailers for extended periods of time.
In addition to that, modular housing, which gets thrown in
with this, we have classrooms in this for many years, as we try
to make the transition, and, you know, this temporary,
transitional, and permanent housing is not only confusing in
emergency after a disaster.
It is when a neighborhood gets a new school and they didn't
have enough buildings for it and you have trams, so to speak.
You have how you put the police department back-up, the fire
department back-up, an emergency health unit. Where are you
going to get groceries in the neighborhood? All those things
are variations of modular housing. Now, my--and temporary. We
shouldn't look for a simplistic, quick fix.
Also, some people have four kids and a big family and the
grandparents there. Some are single people. Size and scale,
cost.
But I think that all of you--and Mr. Jones in particular--
and I wanted to ask Mr. Skinner this question. Fundamentally,
just as a business guy, I don't understand why we don't have a
fixed time where this is a FEMA emergency management and then
it gets handed off to HUD or a housing agency? Why is FEMA
involved in something 4 years later?
Wouldn't a logical way to do this, say, FEMA, your
responsibility is--and would you say 1 year, 2 years, take care
of emergency, and then there is a long-term that looks at the
neighborhoods, it looks at complexity of problems, because FEMA
isn't supposed to be a housing agency?
Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. That is an excellent point. Traditionally, we
have always talked about housing as sheltering prior to,
during, and immediately after an event, temporary. If you want
to define temporary, by the Stafford Act standards, it would be
18 months, but that is extendable. Then bringing people into
permanent housing.
FEMA had never considered itself as responsible for the
permanent housing business, so to speak. FEMA was to coordinate
and help people get back on their feet so they can transition
into permanent housing.
The issues that we are dealing with here is, should there
be a finite time? You know, to get--I hesitate to say we should
use a cookie-cutter approach here. Every disaster is going to
be different. Sometimes we can do it in 6 months; sometimes we
can do it in 18; sometimes it may take 3 years.
Mr. Souder. If I may----
Mr. Skinner. We need a plan----
Mr. Souder. If I may reclaim my time for just a second,
because it is ticking down, you said several different things.
You said 18 months, but the Stafford Act can be continued
indefinitely would be one question. The second thing is, is
that, once again, we are going emergency housing into
transitional housing into permanent housing. Why is FEMA in
transitional housing? That is a housing question, not an
emergency management question.
And that nobody is arguing that some of these things don't
take longer. The question is, if it takes a fully developed
plan, why would FEMA be doing the development plan? I am not
anti-FEMA here. It is just that then they are getting into
these massive long-term plans, and emergencies are coming up
all over the place, that it seems to be a different skill set
even and different people that you would need and different
strategies.
Mr. Skinner. If you can develop a comprehensive plan, I
think FEMA definitely needs to be at the table. They have the
responsibility to shelter people, to put them in temporary
housing, and they need to pass off those people into permanent
housing.
They should be at that table helping HUD, SBA, VA, IRS,
other agencies, Agriculture, all have capabilities, not only at
the Federal level, not only horizontally, but vertically, down
at the local level. They are major players. It is the State and
locals that have the responsibility to be working to put their
citizens back into permanent housing.
FEMA is responding, and they have a statutory
responsibility to help people recover in the community. They
have to be working with the people on the infrastructure, for
example. You pointed out, do you want to put a neighborhood--
and I just came back from the Lower Ninth Ward just this past
week, as well as Biloxi, Mississippi--and do you want to be
putting people back into housing where there are no shopping,
where there is no food, where there are no medical facilities?
All of this has to be taken into consideration, and FEMA
needs to be at the table helping coordinate that.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri for 5
minutes, Mr. Cleaver.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
apologize. I am on Financial Services, and we are in markup. So
I am going to leave.
I have one question. The photograph that was shown on the
screen with all of the trailers in Hope, Arkansas, I am just
wondering--and then based on the--on your testimony, Mr.
Skinner, and this story in today's Washington Post, A-5, which
actually talks about your testimony today--when you look at all
of those homes, it makes sense to somebody like me that if we
are going to have a mass holding place for temporary housing,
that it would be located in the areas that have been mentioned
by your testimony, where we normally will have disasters.
I mean, instead of Hope, Arkansas, then what about
somewhere on high ground in Louisiana or Florida or California
or somewhere in the Midwest, not--I mean, because of what
happened in Greensburg and all around the Midwest, and
particularly the northern part of Texas, we know that that is
tornado alley.
So would it make sense and save money if we located
temporary housing, maybe even a manufacturing center, near
areas that we could expect, just based on history and
topography and weather patterns, for a disaster to hit? Is that
just beyond anything that we can do or even imagine?
Mr. Skinner. I think that is something that should be part
of our strategy, and then I believe that it also should be part
of our operational plan. Incidentally, with Hope, Arkansas,
that was just one of several sites.
Mr. Cleaver. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Skinner. The reason that got so much attention was
because of the volume of trailers that went in there that were
never--were not eventually deployed for use.
But, yes, as far as the manufacturing of these things, that
that is something I think maybe the private sector and FEMA
need to work on as to--so you have these places that we can
deploy in a timely manner.
But we also have to take into consideration, we don't want
to put these places in harm's way. For example, storing travel
trailers in Louisiana could present a problem because it is--
most of Louisiana is in a flood zone. Putting these trailers
along in Florida, they could be in a hurricane area that is
prone to hurricanes on an annual basis. So those things have to
be obviously taken into consideration.
Hope, Arkansas, was actually, I believe--my recollection--
was a good place other than the tornado threats that could go
through that region because of the highway systems. They could
be deployed easily to Mississippi. They could be deployed
easily over to Louisiana and Texas, and that was the reason
that site was, in fact, selected.
Mr. Cleaver. Yes, just to follow up on that, I am not
suggesting that that an inappropriate or bad location. I am
wondering if we were in Hope, Arkansas, with great
intentionality or were we just there? Because this was--because
there was some land there. You know, I mean, why were we there?
Mr. Skinner. Keep in mind, we were not prepared. We were
not prepared for a catastrophic disaster, and we were not
prepared to handle a housing disaster of this magnitude. That
is what we need to have in place before the disaster.
We were actually preparing in the midst--developing our war
plan in the middle of the battle. That is why--and I think,
under the reform act, the Homeland Security--the Post-Katrina
Reform Act is requiring now that we start developing and
thinking along these lines.
I think FEMA is now taking the first step forward. We do
have a strategy. We now have to fill in the blanks. The devils
are the details. We have to start developing the operational
plans. It is not going to be easy, and it is going to involve a
lot of players.
Once that is put together, we should not have to be
developing and amending our strategies during the course of a
disaster or after the disaster strikes.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentleman from New Orleans, Mr. Cao,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cao. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fugate, in the beginning, you spoke of mitigation,
which is important, but in the case of Katrina, no mitigation
process could have gotten people back into their homes when
city and utility infrastructures were destroyed. During your
testimony, I did not hear any specifics with respect to housing
plans.
What plans do you have, for instance, to house people for a
period of 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, 2 years? Can you
provide us with some specifics?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. If you have in the tens of thousands,
we can probably house people in their communities using a
combination of renting non-impacted properties and temporary
housing units that can be brought in site-specific.
Once you probably get up around the 100,000 range, we are
probably looking at having to relocate people out of the area,
if there is no housing. You also, as you have seen in some of
the other previous statements, that along with the housing
loss, you also tend to also lose a lot of infrastructure.
So you end up with a situation that there is a point at
which we will not be able to bring in housing or find enough
housing in the immediate area, and we have to look at
relocating people.
Now, the next part of that question--and this is the one
that is, I think, of great concern to everybody, particularly
to communities--is, how long will that relocation take place?
We know--and this is something I have faced in Florida in
many disasters--that, once people are moved from their
community for any period of time, a certain percentage will not
return. That number will increase by the time frame it takes to
re-establish a housing base for people to move back, provide
schools, safety, and infrastructure.
So the initial tendency is not to move people and try to
bring the resources to them. That is why you see us using
things like temporary housing units, because that is something
that we can add to the housing stock when the housing stock is
destroyed.
But that is finite. It is not time or fast enough. In many
cases, we have to determine--and this is part of where I want
to go in our planning from the strategy--to how we implement
this. So, community leaders, if we have a disaster, you would
know that if we were dealing with several thousand homes
destroyed, this would be the response and the solutions that we
can bring to bear and the time frames we can bring to bear.
If it is larger than that, the answer may not be what
people want to hear, but the reality is, if we cannot establish
enough housing--and, Mr. Chairman, I will just throw this out
probably for semantics. But in what we do at FEMA, I would look
at a sheltering, because even up to 2 years is not the long-
term solution.
But if we can provide enough sheltering, whether it is
congregate, whether it is individual, to keep people in that
community, that is the initiative first starting point. That is
the best option we would have.
But there will be a point where the option will not work.
We can either get it there, or is there enough property that we
can repair, rebuild, or somehow get back on-line? We need to
know early that we are going to have to relocate people and
then what that plan is, as been pointed out here, what is the
housing solution?
Our business is sheltering. We may be using units up to 2
years, but our business is sheltering. We do not have the
solution for, how do we re-establish housing stock to get a
community back? This goes right to the heart of long-term
recovery. If we don't solve this problem, we risk communities
not coming back.
Mr. Cao. Thank you.
This is to either Mr. Skinner or Mr. Fugate. I believe that
a more important issue--shelter is extremely important, but to
me the more important issue, having lived through Katrina
myself, is the ability for people to move back into their homes
as quickly as possible, because oftentimes you sent trailers to
different houses and, by the time you would get them there,
their temporary housing, their house might have already been
repaired.
I believe that Mr. Skinner's absolutely right in a sense
that we have to have better coordination between Federal, State
and city agencies in order to push the issue of recovery.
This is to either Mr. Fugate, Mr. Skinner. What plans do
you have in place in order to better coordinate? Because,
having lived through Katrina, after 4 years after Katrina, I
still see a lack in the area of coordination between State,
Federal, and city agencies with respect to recovery.
Mr. Fugate. Well, let's tackle this one. Let's talk about
it very specifically, your house. Who is responsible for
repairing your house? Because if the majority of the homeowners
can get that house repaired, then we can focus on renters and
other folks that don't have those options.
That is generally the way we have modeled our response out
of Stafford Act, the responsibility of individual insurance or
their private funds. We are not really set up under the
Stafford Act to directly enable that person to fix their house.
Yet, as has been pointed out, we will spend considerable
sums of money to fund a temporary housing unit in their
driveway. That goes back to permitting. That goes back into
working with the private sector, because even if you have
financial assistance, you may not have enough contractors, you
may not have enough materials.
These disasters in Florida, it took better part of a year,
year-and-a-half to re-roof houses just from the 2004 hurricane
season, and that had nothing to do with the Federal response.
That had to deal with supplies, contractors, and workers.
So when you talk about--if we can get the answers on how we
would approach homes that either--because the insurance isn't
fast enough or the workforce isn't there or we got supply chain
disruptions, how do we work better with the private sector,
State, and local governments, and address issues such as
bringing in out-of-State contractors, doing the type of things
to get houses fixed, and then look at, how do we work issues
such as: Can we provide assistance?
Now, there was a pilot program where we could have provided
assistance to people that had rental properties. That has
expired. We don't have that tool going forward.
These are things, Mr. Chairman, we need to come back and
look and use these numbers to drive not what we are capable of
doing, but what the demand is in a large-scale event and go,
``What are the tools we need, the whole spectrum from it's
1,000 homes to it's 500,000?''
Mr. Cao. Mr. Chairman, I see that my time is expired. I
yield back my time. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. I don't think you have any
trouble with the committee, Mr. Fugate, when you come back. We
are willing to work with you on that.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas for 5
minutes, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just
thank you for, I think, what will turn out to be a very
important and instructive hearing and also to thank you for
leadership on making some changes that I think are crucial in
the structure that we have.
I am a veteran and would never call myself a victim of
Hurricane Katrina, Rita, and Ike. Unless I have missed it, Mr.
Fugate, let me extend an invitation for you to come to the Gulf
Region. I think I have mentioned it to you in the past.
But what I have seen--and my colleague from New Orleans
probably lives it every day--certainly, we have lived through
the Ninth Ward, I as a guest, visiting as a Member of the
Homeland Security Committee. Others have lived with it.
But then, of course, the region that I live in took tens of
thousands of Hurricane Katrina survivors, compounded by
Hurricane Rita, and what we now call the forgotten hurricane,
Hurricane Ike.
So our frustration is mountainous. It is the question of
getting housing in fast enough and the right kind of housing.
You were not there, but you know the question of toxicity, the
trailers that were unlivable, but people lived in them for a
period of time.
So my question is going to both Mr. Skinner and our new
FEMA director as to what has changed. That is the first
question.
To the--Mr. Skinner, if you would speak to this question of
more flexibility and also the idea that, when a disaster of
mountainous proportion occurs, do we need to look at, consider,
review the idea of usurping, overriding--and maybe with certain
criteria--certain ordinances and zoning laws that really have
inhibited people from being able to get a temporary structure
in some places?
The other question would be for Mr. Fugate in particular.
In our region, when we needed emergency housing, we would have
to listen to, ``It's in a flood zone.'' Well, you know, should
I say, a light bulb just went on. Of course we are in a flood
zone. That is where we live. You have us kicked out and can
come back, because you are telling us we are in a flood zone,
if you could answer that.
Let me just put two other questions on the table. You have
a FEMA pilot program, if you can tell me what the status of
that is. In Texas, we are still trying to be able to respond to
that pilot program. I spoke with you a couple of weeks ago; I
have not heard back from you on the environmental issue. If you
can give me a report on the new contract you have on the
alternative housing that is out in Maryland.
Mr. Skinner, if you would on those questions?
Mr. Skinner. With regards to your question with, should the
Federal Government assume the authority to usurp local laws and
ordinances----
Ms. Jackson Lee. With criteria.
Mr. Skinner [continuing]. With criteria----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Enormous----
Mr. Skinner. I would suggest that we should not do that.
What we need to focus on is preparedness. We need to know what
city ordinances, what codes that would prohibit us from
responding to a disaster on different scales and to work with
the local community to find solutions before the disaster
strikes so that, when the disaster does strike, we know where
to go.
For example, in the State of Florida, Mr. Fugate's former
State--or maybe still current State--but with debris removal,
the State of Florida knew before disaster strikes who--many of
the counties that have defined----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me let you move on to the next
question about flexibility. The reason why I say that is that
is not always the best approach. Some people believe that the
fix is in when you get contracts ahead of time. But I don't
want to focus on that. What about the flexibility issue on
housing?
Mr. Skinner. I keep referring to flexibility, and this is
something that I have been--that I have referred to not just
from Katrina or Rita, but it goes back to Hurricane Andrew and
Northridge earthquake, and that is that we have to define the
Stafford Act. We, I think, are tying our own hands when we try
to implement the Stafford Act.
For example, there is a belief that we cannot pay a local
unit of government to begin rebuilding, that, instead, they
must spend their funds and we will reimburse them. I have
always challenged and questioned that interpretation.
Yes, it is a reimbursement program, but that is at the end
of the day, not at the beginning of the day. If we need that
working capital fund or need that advance to get the work
started, then you should have that flexibility to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Fugate, can you----
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired. You
asked about six questions, and that created a program, because
there is no way they can answer them within 5 minutes.
I mean, I will--Mr. Fugate, if you will give it as quick a
shot as you can?
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, Congressman, I have got two good
facts to you. Where is that environmental review at and the
contract status of our pilot program? We will have that for you
today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate it. The alternative program,
if you would, as well.
Mr. Fugate. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We now recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes,
Mr. Olson.
Ms. Olson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for coming today. Mr. Fugate, great to see
you again. I appreciate you coming back. Welcome back.
I have a question for you regarding Hurricane Ike, which
seems to be, as my colleague mentioned, a forgotten hurricane
in many regards. But as you know, the Bolivar Peninsula, which
is on the east side of Galveston County, suffered probably the
greatest single damage of one area during Ike.
Galveston County there has over 300 road projects, with the
majority of them right there on the peninsula. Many of these
projects are in a state of flux right now because they are
located at the velocity zone, where over, as you know, if they
are over 50 percent damaged, they are prohibited from
rebuilding.
I was tremendously encouraged with your testimony when you
were here for your confirmation on the velocity zones. I
understand that FEMA was going to go back to take another look
at that and see if the Federal rules regarding velocity zones
could be somehow modified to be more helpful.
I just want to see, what is the status review? Has the
issue been clarified? Do you have a timeline for us?
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, the National Flood Insurance
Program reauthorization is coming up this year. These are many
of the issues we need to address. I am not sure we are going to
be able to do it in the short time frame. I think we need to
take a step back and have a dialogue on how we are doing this.
But to get to the crux of the matter, when we are looking
at these types of temporary programs, I think semantics have
gotten in our way, because the way the National Flood Insurance
Program reads, if I put in a temporary housing unit there, I
can do that. If I put in something that is more permanent, like
a manufactured housing modular unit, that is considered
housing.
Well, if I just call it a shelter and recognize it is
temporary--because I have run into this issue in Florida. We
have gotten in many cases where we are not talking about a
long-term fix. We are talking about sheltering people whether
it is in congregate care or in many of these programs we call
temporary housing. It is literally a shelter program on a
temporary basis.
Yet the way we interpret our rules, because we deal with
one part that is temporary and one part that can be considered
permanent, we apply the National Flood Insurance Program to
what is, in effect, how we try to shelter a population while
they get back into their homes and rebuild.
So, again, I think that a lot of times, as we go through
these programs, as the IG points out, the Stafford Act hasn't
said a lot of the things that we try to interpret, and we have
to come back and clarify, well, is that the intention of this
body? Did Congress intend for us to do things that way?
If not, are we seeing procedures and processes--and what we
see as conflict between two separate bodies of legislation
that, in trying to deal with short-term shelter issues, we are
mixing housing and sheltering operations in defining how we can
approach that in a velocity zone, which is different than where
we would be if we were not in that same zone?
But it is essentially a short-term housing or shelter
operation to bridge that gap between what has happened so
people have a long-term housing solution.
Ms. Olson. Thank you for the answer to that question.
One more for you. With Sheila, my colleague from Texas, but
with a lot of hard work on her behalf in the defense
supplemental, H.R. 2346, the cost-share ratios for the
communities affected by Hurricane Ike were amended and to be
altered consistent with Hurricane Katrina, the 100 percent
reimbursement.
I just wanted to see if you have issued the letters to the
affected governments notifying this change. Is the money
starting to flow or the reimbursements starting to flow? What
can we do to help if it is not?
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, I will have to check. I have not
seen that or signed that, and I will get back to you today on
the status of that.
Ms. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Fugate.
Thank you, panelists.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Kilroy for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kilroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for being here this morning.
I am from a district in Ohio, in Columbus, Ohio, and you
might not think that disaster planning for hurricanes is of
significant concern to us, but if you think that, that would be
wrong.
In 2005, I was a county commissioner, and I could tell you
that the people in our county watching on their televisions
what was going on with Hurricane Katrina were angry. They were
angry at the Federal Government. They were angry at every level
of government for not being in a position to respond
effectively.
Our county was asked by FEMA to take in some of the Katrina
veterans. On a very short-term basis, we got called. We said,
``Sure.'' We got called four times, and we said, ``Sure.''
Nobody ever came.
What we ran into was, time and time again, jurisdictional
fights and wranglings instead of working with the local
community here that was willing to help. I just wanted to say
that it is just appalling to me that, even in the face of a
disaster like that, that people can't stop their jurisdictional
in-fighting.
We came up with a plan on a very quick basis that utilized
some Section 8 vouchers--not very many, because they are not
very available to people--even in our own community, there is a
long waiting list--a plan that took in childcare, helping
people get their Social Security checks, their child support
checks, their IDs re-
established, their banks re-established, and make sure they had
doctor's care and childcare. We worked with our National Guard
to house people on base at Rickenbacker. Nobody ever came, and
that is fine.
But what really struck me was the lack of planning and the
winging it that was going on. It disturbs now today to get the
sense that we still don't have the kind of planning that is
necessary.
I think it was General Eisenhower that said, in war, a plan
is useless, but planning is essential. I think right starting
from evacuation on out, it is all part of the housing and
relocation. So how people are evacuated and where they are
evacuated to affects what kind of housing is going to be needed
and how we are going to be able to get them back to their homes
to do that kind of repair.
So that is enough of the speech. I just want to really
encourage you to continue to plan and want to know now, how are
you planning to engage local, State, Federal, or private-sector
agencies to effectively and efficiently plan for post-disaster
housing needs, no matter what the level of disaster or what
type of disaster?
Mr. Fugate. Congresswoman, we currently have a national
disaster housing task force that is made up of representatives
that are working these issues. We also are utilizing through
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act our national
advisory committee to help bring in a diverse group of people
to look at these issues and help us craft a strategy and a plan
that you can execute.
I think one of the things you point out is, a lot of what
was happening and how we were dealing with things was based
upon, we had kind of a concept, but we never put an outcome on
there.
That is why I like coming back and saying: Let's look at
500,000 housing units and what we are going to do within 60
days, and then start driving, and go into the areas where it is
likely to see those types of events, and start planning ahead
and going, ``If we had to evacuate because of earthquakes,
parts of Arkansas, where are those people going?'' Then go into
those States and work with those States and going, ``All right,
based upon the plan, your willingness to accept people, how do
we make this work so that we lay down a much better
framework?''
We won't have all the answers, as you point out. But we
will have the framework, and we will have built the team that
can address these issues, and it is going to take all the
moving pieces of a community. It cannot just be done at the
Federal level.
But let's use where we have already looked at, these large-
scale impacts to housing from disasters, and plan how we would
handle and do relocation. If something occurs outside that
area, at least we have built a concept and a team that we can
then apply to things that maybe we had not anticipated.
But as you show Hope, Arkansas, and other pictures, those
aren't the results of a plan. They are the consequences of not
having the plan.
Ms. Kilroy. Has there been collaboration with HUD on how to
transition from interim housing into more permanent, affordable
housing structures?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, ma'am. That is an on-going process, and
that is one I think where the administration is very much
focused in on is: How do we bring in all the Federal family to
address the long-term housing needs after a disaster? What is
the appropriate role for each agency? How do we provide a
seamless system from we evacuate, we shelter, to we do
temporary or sheltering operations, out to the point where a
long-term housing solution is present in that community?
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Ms. Kilroy. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Thompson. We see your interest.
We now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much.
I want to welcome Director Fugate. I am familiar with all
your good work in Florida. I served in the legislature.
As you probably know, Florida recently completed an
emergency management training exercise to strengthen the
State's plan for preparing for and responding to a catastrophic
hurricane. One of the scenarios considered during this exercise
focused on potential options for housing the evacuees from a
Category 4 hurricane that could displace hundreds of thousands
of State residents.
State emergency management officials suggested temporary
housing, such as evacuees in foreclosed homes as an option of
last resort. They reasoned that such a plan could avoid the
large-scale relocation to other States of people whose homes
were destroyed, like those evacuees in Katrina and Rita, many
of whom have yet to return to their homes.
Do you have any thoughts on that? Is FEMA actually
listening to this? Will they propose something like this? I
have major concerns.
Mr. Fugate. We have listened to it. In fact, I was part of
those original discussions of how we would look at those
properties. I think the way to approach that and the way I
would look at it, the way I have--was looking at it originally
was that we would look at, would banks be willing to lease or
rent us those properties like we would rent and lease other
rental units and do it under our traditional program?
If we could acquire a rent or a lease with that property
owner, whether it is the mortgage-holder or the bank or the
institution, and then we would look at the cost-effectiveness
of that rental against renting a hotel or motel room.
That is my approach. I think anything other than that gets
into areas that I am not sure, (A) I have any expertise or any
authorities to forcefully go in there and try to take those
properties, but I think if we could sit down and look at where
we do have those properties, if they are appropriate, is, is
there a mechanism, through perhaps one of the major lending
institutions that has those properties?
The other thing, Congressman, is, are those properties
ready to go? As you know, this condition of many of those
foreclosed properties ranges from they are ready to move in to
they are dilapidated and would not be usable.
But look at it from the standpoint of, is a rental
property--if that is available, look at the cost-effectiveness
versus other programs and see if that would work. But anything
else, I think, goes into gray areas that I am not sure that
either we have the tools, the authorities, or whether or not it
would be cost-effective for us to house evacuees.
Mr. Bilirakis. I am sorry. My mic is not on. Could you give
us an assessment of how prepared Florida is--and, specifically,
the Tampa Bay area--for a Katrina-like storm?
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, you have heard my answer before.
We are prepared as our public is. Probably our biggest
challenge is getting people to evacuate out of the vulnerable
areas.
Again, what we are focused on both at our Federal level,
but working with our State and the local partners, is life
safety. We can rebuild communities. That is something we work
to strive to do. But if people have not prepared, if people
don't heed evacuation orders, then our response is not going to
be as successful.
It comes back to the public is part of the team. They have
to prepare. They have to respond. We have a lot of vulnerable
citizens out there that we should be focused on. People need to
take more responsibility for being prepared.
I think we have good systems in place across the Nation,
but it always comes back to the public is a key part of that
process to be prepared so we can focus on our most vulnerable
citizens. Most importantly, for hurricane threats, to heed
those evacuation orders early. You know that Tampa Bay is a
very challenging place even for rush-hour traffic, much less an
evacuation.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes. Give us an example of the most
effective actions our constituents can take.
Mr. Fugate. The first one is, if you live anywhere--since
we are talking hurricanes in the hurricane-prone areas, is to
know if you are in an evacuation zone or not. If you are, your
plan should be to evacuate when local officials tell you it is
time to go and not wait for the next 6-hour forecast and hope
it gets better.
The second part of this is, all of us have responsibilities
to get a plan, protect our families, get training--take CPR,
first aid--and when disaster strikes, do one more thing. Once
you are okay and your family is okay, check on a neighbor. This
has got to be something we all understand is, you know, the
survivors have to pull together. They are part of the team.
They are not the liability. They are part of the resource and
the community.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses
for appearing.
I would like to speak rather quickly on a number of topics,
and specifically I am concerned about the role of a
congressperson in the post-disaster recovery. I understand that
there is a need to work with the local and State officials, but
for whatever reasons--and I can cite many--constituents tend to
think that congresspersons have a significant role in the
process.
When pods are being located, they assume that the
congressperson will have some input. When NGOs are not being
reimbursed as they perceive reimbursement should take place,
they assume that congresspersons should have a role in the
process.
So if you can, take about 1 minute and give me your
perception of what the role of the congressperson is in this
process.
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, your role is to represent your
constituency and work with our external affairs and figure out,
where is the best place to answer the questions? If it is
local, if it is our State partners, if it is something Federal
agencies are doing, again, our job is to work with you to help
get those answers and to work with your constituent issues.
Again, it may be something that a local government has got
the best response or their responsibility. It could be the
governor, or it could be Federal programs that we need to
address.
Mr. Green. Well, let's examine that statement. I appreciate
it. It was candidly stated.
Here is what happens under the current thinking or
methodology process, if you will. It almost becomes adversarial
as we proceed, because we find that we are engaged in this
process after things have occurred and we are trying to, for
want of better terminology, straighten things out.
It creates some tension that I think we need not have.
There must be some way for us to find our way into this process
in a different manner so as to be helpful as opposed to
reactionary or as opposed to trying to resolve things after
they have become too much of a problem to be resolved in some
instances.
Let's just talk for a moment about one circumstance that we
might try to help you with. NGOs will come to us after the fact
and have receipts and say, ``I really should be reimbursed for
all of this.'' The rules seem to be dynamic, as opposed to
static. There are times when they can be reimbursed, and there
are times when they cannot.
Is there any codification with reference to reimbursement
of NGOs, faith-based institutions?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. It is a complex, as you point out,
process for any applicant receiving assistance under a public
assistance for what we would generally refer to as Category B
or emergency protective measures.
There are a lot of activities that are eligible that non-
profits engage in, whether they are faith-based, community-
based, or your traditional response organizations, that could
be reimbursed. There are others that are not. Oftentimes, it is
making sure we understand clearly what activities were taking
place. Was it eligible work? Was it done in the declared area
and to find how we can support that?
But, from time to time, we also run the challenge of some
of the things they were doing--which were good things--however,
were not eligible for that process. So it is--for most
communities, the first disaster has a steep and painful
learning curve of trying to apply these programs.
So I have asked staff to come back, as the IG has pointed
out, many of their programs have a lot of complexity that I am
not sure if we would be better off simplifying our process so
it is more understandable and cuts down on the confusion.
Ultimately, I believe that will save in money and give us
greater accountability if the programs are easy to explain to
anybody, not just somebody who has been doing the program for
some time.
Mr. Green. With reference to equipment that may be needed--
for example, an air conditioner--we find that sometimes they
are difficult to come by, and this isn't post-disaster relief.
Is there any way for us to have a working relationship with
reference to trying to facilitate the placement of needed
equipment?
Mr. Fugate. How big of an air conditioner, Congressman?
Mr. Green. We are talking about something that usually will
cool an area perhaps smaller than this room.
Mr. Fugate. Residential?
Mr. Green. Yes, residential, generally speaking, or it
could be at a church center of some kind.
Mr. Fugate. Generally, Congressman, we would work those
requests if they came from the State for support. Depending
upon how that program--there may be something that would be
done under the individual assistance program, under what they
call other needs assistance.
In general, those types of processes, we would just be
supporting a request that the Governor makes, references what
that team would need, whether it is support from acquisition or
support from working with the private sector.
Mr. Green. My time is up. I just wanted to give you this
clear indication. I really want to work with you on these
projects, and I would like to try to find a means by which we
can establish that working relationship early on.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We now recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes,
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me echo the
sentiments of my colleague from Texas on the point of
collaboration with the Members of Congress in the impacted
areas. I think that would help for a more smoother process as
we go forward.
I wanted to bring up again, Mr. Fugate, the issue I brought
up at the previous hearing on the discrepancy between the
assistance provided in Hurricane Katrina versus Hurricane Ike.
I know some of this probably has to do with I think some of the
good legislation we passed after the good work that was done by
Mr. Skinner's office on the fraud, waste, and abuse that we saw
after Hurricane Katrina. We passed the FEMA reform bill.
Having said that, though, I do want to put some numbers out
there, because the discrepancy is pretty high. In Hurricane
Ike, the housing assistance was 17 percent of applicants
received assistance. That is a pretty low number, compared to
Katrina, where 74 percent of the applicants received
assistance.
Other needs assistance, Katrina was three times more than
Ike. Total assistance, the average payment was almost $5,000
per application or registrant in Katrina, and about $700 in
Hurricane Ike.
To boil it down, less than one-fifth of the Ike victims who
were referred for assistance were actually deemed eligible for
assistance, which means that about 80 percent of the people who
applied for assistance didn't get that assistance.
These numbers come from your office, and I just--to me,
that seems a little--that discrepancy just seems to me very,
very high. I wanted to get your comments on that.
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, as I understand it, you have asked
either the General Accounting Office or IG to take a look at
those numbers in the background. Some of the other numbers I
would like to run against those tables and take a look at is,
what was the percentage of insured property versus uninsured
property? Because, again, insurance is one of the factors we
look at to determine eligibility.
Mr. McCaul. Right.
Mr. Fugate. Also, look at the structures themselves and go,
what was the level of damage versus repairs? Because that will
also drive those numbers.
I have seen in situations where, if I had a lot of roof and
wind damage, that those numbers would probably be right. If I
had--or I had more storm surge or flood damage where homes were
destroyed, the other numbers would sound about right.
So I would actually--I am welcoming the look at, did we
unintentionally screen out people by trying to tighten up the
rules that should have been eligible for assistance? Or are we
seeing a reflection of the types of damages, insurance, and
things people do to get ready that actually reduces the burden
on the Federal taxpayer?
But I think your point is well taken: Have we inadvertently
screened people out of assistance they should have received? If
we did, what is the remedy to that? But we need to go back--and
I think what you have done is the appropriate thing--is, let's
get somebody outside to take a look at this and tell us why
these numbers or why they were there and then see if that is
something that was an unintentional consequence of trying to be
mindful of how we spend taxpayers' money, or is this a
reflection that this type of storm, this type of damages, and
the level of insurance and preparedness actually drove those
numbers down?
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate your candid and honest response. I
think that an outside look would make some sense whether it
comes out of the IG's office or whether the GAO does that.
Mr. Chairman, I would hope that you would join me and have
this committee take a look at these numbers from an outside
point of view. I think, again, 80 percent being denied
eligibility is a pretty high number. I would hope this
committee could join that effort.
Chairman Thompson. I don't think I have any problem with
that. I see our chairman of oversight nodding his head, so I am
sure Congressman Carney would be happy to join us in that
effort.
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that. Thank you for your
testimony.
With that, I will yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here.
My question has to do with a procedure that we have been
using in my congressional district, and I think other folks
are, I am sure, doing that. Texas, as you know, we have a State
surplus commission there. They have been working with FEMA, GSA
to get those trailers that have been surplus equipment from
FEMA.
We have been able to place a lot of those to small
communities that have used them for fire, police stations, for,
you know, county offices, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. You
know, just to make sure that--you know, that--you know, they
are--free, you know, our State folks are saying that they are.
But is there a way we can get some sort of certificate or
something from you all that would say that, if they--you know,
that if we get them and then we distribute them out, through
the Federal surplus, State surplus commissions that we have in
Texas? I just want to make sure that we don't come back and
hear that there has been a problem with them.
But, Mr. Fugate, what ideas do you have?
Mr. Fugate. Well, right now, there is a court order that is
limiting what units I can release. Those units that are not
covered by the court order, we are slapping all kinds of bumper
stickers and labels on them that these are not to use for long-
term housing.
As we go forward with the new models that we are looking at
that--our specifications require a fairly low level of any type
of product that would involve any noxious or potentially toxic
gases, those are less restrictive.
But the current ones we have, because of the on-going
issue, those that are not covered under the court order that we
are releasing, we are making it very clear that the temporary
housing units are labeled not for long-term housing.
The ones that are manufactured housing are actually covered
by HUD standards. As long as they met HUD standards, we don't
have that restriction, and they can be used however that
jurisdiction appropriately uses--so long as it was manufactured
to the HUD standard.
Mr. Cuellar. Could we follow up at a later time with our
State folks to make sure whatever has been sent to Texas, that
we don't have any follow-up problems?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I am glad the gentleman mentioned that, Mr. Fugate. The
transition between FEMA and GSA on to the State has been a
question, because there is still the question of what is scrap,
what is sellable, and the lines are not quite clear, so that is
an issue.
One of the issues tied to that I think I would be
interested has, to your knowledge, the ability to resell any of
the temporary units or put back in use for another emergency,
have we ever looked at that as a condition for what kind of
units we look at?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. Primarily it was--that program was
built around mobile homes, manufactured housing-type units,
that were actually specced and built, that they would be used
and then potentially be used again.
The smaller units, where basically the wear and tear is
generally such that it is a cost-benefit of how much you invest
to repair those, versus their normal lifespan and how they are
used. So part of that has been because of these large
inventories that we have, which was, again, consequences of the
response, not necessarily driven by the plan, is, what is the
best way to go forward?
Some of these units we are looking at in the pilot programs
are looking at it from that standpoint of recyclability,
rehabbing them, and being able to reuse them. But in the event
where the lifespan of them and the wear and tear on them does
not make a cost-effective repair, that they are relatively easy
to recycle and that we are able to dispose of them if we do not
have the option of rebuilding it, repairing it, storing it, or
selling it, that if we do have to, you know, go in and, you
know, salvage it, is that it does have a much better recyclable
process.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Souder. I thank the Chairman for yielding. I just
wanted to make a brief comment on Mr. Cuellar's comment, that
there is a distinction between whether something is safe and
whether a community might get sued.
There were three cases in the United States of complaints
being filed prior to Katrina and that all those were lost. It
doesn't appear that most of these suits are being won, either.
But just because they certified doesn't mean somebody is going
to get sued, unless we get liability protection.
Thanks.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I wanted to thank Mr. Fugate publicly for how
quickly you handled the problem in Montgomery, Alabama, after a
flooding. It was very much appreciated.
I want to talk more about lessons learned--and we have
talked about this in the past--lessons learned after post-
Katrina. One of the themes that we heard within Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama was that these local communities
needed the ability, latitude--to go ahead and negotiate when
things are calm, arm-length deals with people for debris
removal, as well as other services, that they would have to
have immediately after a disaster, rather than having to use
some contractor from far away that comes in, and the only way
the city gets reimbursed is if they use that contractor.
We have had plenty of time. Please tell me those contracts
have been authorized, and they are in place, as well as
prepositioned supplies.
Mr. Fugate. Sir, these programs are oftentimes not going to
sustain. We had a pilot program for debris management that
would increase the cost share in a disaster--magnitude of
Katrina from an average cost share of 75 percent Federal, 25
percent State and local. We wanted to incentivize that.
We had a pilot program that provided, if you had an
approved debris management plan in your local community that
was signed off on, that the cost share would go to 80 percent,
which doesn't seem like a lot, but 5 percent is substantial,
particularly when you look at the costs of debris.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Fugate. That program was a pilot. I think these are the
things that we need to go back and look at, is how do we
incentivize people taking those steps to pre-plan, identify,
and have contracts in place? Because many communities won't
face a disaster. It is, again, competing with every other
resource and every other time constraint of trying to get these
things ahead of time that, in a smaller disaster, cost share
could be a factor that would drive that.
But, again----
Mr. Rogers. On what time-line do you expect to complete
that pilot study and move that to other local communities so
that the mayors and county commissioners can go ahead and
explore those contract opportunities?
Mr. Fugate. As I understand it, that was a pilot program
that was in the legislation that has expired. We--finished up
the report on that and reported back. It would require, again,
taking a look at whether we have the authority to do that under
Stafford or whether we would have to get guidance from Congress
on how to implement that.
Mr. Rogers. Well, you know, we are back in the hurricane
season. If we are hit with a hurricane this year, and these
local leaders had this problem again, it is a shame on us. It
is inexcusable to have gone this long and not have given them
the one thing that all of them said they needed after Katrina.
That is the authority to pre-plan these things, negotiate it,
have them signed off on by all, that the contractors are
credible and the contracts are agreeable, but it is just a
shame that it had not happened already.
I want to go back to a point that the Chairman was talking
about earlier, and that is on these trailers. This will be more
for Mr. Skinner, I guess.
I still don't understand why there is not a point after the
disaster period has--the reasonable period of recovery has
ended that we don't transition the responsibility for housing,
when it becomes more interim housing or permanent, over to HUD.
That is not FEMA's responsibility. It, in my view--I mean, they
are to move on to the next disaster.
You said 18 months was how much was in the Stafford Act,
but why don't we see HUD move in? Because they have got more
expertise and skill sets and personnel prepared for this role.
Mr. Skinner. Please understand, I agree that it should be
transitioned to HUD.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Skinner. In fact, we have made recommendations in prior
reports that permanent housing, can HUD play a more active role
in permanent housing, in that we should transition--that is our
ultimate goal. What is the end game to get people back into
their homes to rebuild the community? But what I was suggesting
is that FEMA has a role to play up to that----
Mr. Rogers. Yes, I agree. I think everybody should be at
the table, like you said, in the planning stages, but there
should be mutual agreement that it is a 12-month period or this
18-month period, whatever, that HUD then takes over that
housing responsibility.
If, you know, if you have recommended that, my next
question is, has the policy been put in place to mandate that?
Mr. Skinner. We didn't recommend a timeline, again, because
of the extenuating circumstances. Every disaster is going to be
a little different. Some may take 12 months; some may take 18
months; some may take 24 months. Some----
Mr. Rogers. Does this committee need to do anything
statutorily to help you?
Mr. Skinner. Could the committee do----
Mr. Rogers. Do we need to do anything statutorily or
legislatively to help you?
Mr. Skinner. Well, we could--the committee could--what I
think needs to look at HUD's role, their disaster housing
program, their disaster assistance housing program to
institutionalize that program. That is something, I think, that
came in late after Katrina and Rita, and it is something that
we might want to consider continuing. If it had a legislative
base, that would be helpful.
Chairman Thompson. Yes, I think one thing is the Stafford
Act kicks in and that is T&I, and we have to work with them to
try to negotiate it. But you are absolutely correct.
One of the issues with that is, you know, Mr. Jones, you
put in place part of that strategy. I am a little concerned
that nothing has happened since you did the first step. Is it
your expert opinion that FEMA now needs to go and do a little
more of the planning toward this housing?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir. I believe that is correct.
FEMA is almost overwhelmed at times with the magnitude of
the here and now. It is a little hard under those circumstances
to think 4 and 5 years down the road. So our recommendation, I
believe, is to get busy on some longer-range research and
planning so that we can get our arms around these issues of
transition and permanent.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania for 5 minutes, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fugate, Mr. Skinner, Mr. Jones, good to see you again.
Just a couple of questions. I kind of want to follow up on
what Mr. Rogers was talking about earlier. How far down the
road are we in prepositioning in different areas, as far as
housing and supplies?
Mr. Fugate. Well, in both cases, we have inventory that we
have built up in previous storms. We are also looking at our
response capabilities through either contracts or through
storage of commodities to move in the areas. We work with our
States.
One of the areas we have done more advanced work has been
on the hurricane-prone States. That is a seasonal event.
But also going back and looking at our catastrophic
planning at the types of events that can occur, and what those
numbers look like, and where those supplies are.
Again, with housing, we are looking--and, again, this based
upon what numbers we are talking about--our ability to purchase
and contract for those units that we have specified after our
experiences with Katrina versus those that are inventory that
we can use.
Part of our planning that we want to get to is, what is the
appropriate number to maintain an inventory versus what we
would then depend upon other options?
There is a finite capability to haul and install these
units in a short time frame. So that is why I wanted to use a
large number of 500,000 housing units in a 60-day period to see
what is actually possible with the existing infrastructure,
what we can do with current capabilities, and that--we will
never get to that number, but then that starts telling us when
we have to look at other options.
That may be, as we come back and work with the Chairman,
go, all right, if that is not going to be the answer, then what
is the answer? Does it mean we have got to fix houses? How do
we do that? If we have got to relocate people, then we don't
want to wait until there is a disaster and not have that plan
ready to go. How do we support communities that end up hosting
those populations?
As has been pointed out, this is a very complex issue when
we move people and then we want to get them back home. We have
to solve the bottom line: Are we going to be able to store
enough housing units?
Mr. Carney. You are asking a lot of questions. What are the
answers to those questions?
Mr. Fugate. I think we start with a big number and see what
the system currently does and where it breaks, and that is
where we go after it. I think too often what I have run into is
we have built our plans around what our capabilities are, not
what the issues are, and then we run into the places where the
system breaks down, and it tends to fail us catastrophically at
that point.
Mr. Carney. Well, one of those considerations, certainly,
is the cost of the housing trailer itself. What on average is
the cost when you can put in the maintenance and the
deactivation and the community construction and all those kinds
of things?
Mr. Fugate. Well, one of the numbers that we had--and this
was a response earlier to a question the Chairman asked--on
just the temporary housing units, it is probably about anywhere
from $40,000 to $50,000.
The other factors you have got to add in, though, is how
far it took to haul it, because we pay per mile on the trailer
from either the manufacturer or from storage. So it depends
upon how far those units go.
Now, as pointed out, in some of the group sites where we
actually are leasing space and it is not on somebody's private
property, we have got reoccurring costs to go there, those
costs can get up to several hundred thousand dollars. So you
have got to ask yourself----
Mr. Carney. Per unit?
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. Is a couple hundred thousand
dollars----
Mr. Carney. Per unit?
Mr. Fugate. Per unit, sir. You know, in a lot of parts of
the country, you can pretty well get a small-sized home for
that price or----
Mr. Carney. In my part of the country, you get a big house
for several hundred thousand dollars. I will yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. Souder. One of the challenges is, is that, when you go
to a manufacturer that has a regular business and say, ``We
need 30,000 right now,'' you pay overtime. You pay--you don't
have the materials in stock. Some of the wood that we had came
in from Indonesia. It was mixed in, because we were buying wood
like crazy. So some of it is not having a plan, which is very
hard to plan for disasters.
Mr. Carney. Well, it is not easy to plan for disaster, but
we try to do as much as we possibly can. You know, I just--and
we will address all this down the road from the oversight side,
as well, but to try and get the cost of these things down, I
think, you know, the more we plan, the more we think about
these things.
You know, we have had some experience now. It is not like
we are coming to this stuff cold and to figure these things
out. You know, nothing is going to be perfect, but I don't want
to an 80 percent solution to be the--to stop something that
you--because we are never going to get perfection, so let's
just make sure we plan down the road a little bit.
I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
One of the things that the gentleman hit on is, is whether
or not the maintenance costs on this inventory is of such that
it becomes prohibitive to have certain things in stock. I think
that is one of the considerations long-term that you will have
to look at is, can we maintain a stock that requires less
maintenance than what we are doing?
Staff tells me that, when they looked around at the sites,
you know, there was--some of the in-stock items, if the
emergency happened, it couldn't roll out, because it has been
there for a period of time, and, over time, has depreciated. So
have you all looked at that?
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, I know that they have. I have
asked for more specifics. Part of what I want to get to is,
what should be the inventory that we maintain based upon the
disasters we face, knowing we will never be able to maintain
enough inventory for the larger-scale events? But what should
we maintain on short of those types of events to have ready to
go within a short time frame those products?
Then, what is the lifespan in storage? How do we rotate
that? So if we have product that has been there, we know the
avenue lifespan in dry storage is only going to be finite
years, that we don't go and go past that point where they now
have no residual value, but how do we replace and maintain that
stock?
The second piece of that, as was pointed out by the
congressman, was there is a manufacturing capability in this
country. What is that? If we went and started to let contracts,
how many could they start building right now in a time frame
that could provide those units? How long would it take to get
in there? That tells us the next number.
Once we get past those, we are going to come back and say,
``We need to look at a better--how do we get homes fixed? If we
are going to spend this much money on a temporary unit, is it
possible to fix homes faster?''
Well, that is going to come back to material, crews, and
permitting, contracting, all these issues that are local State
issues to drive that----
Chairman Thompson. It is called a plan that Mr. Carney was
talking about.
Mr. Fugate. Yes.
Chairman Thompson. I am going to have to cut you off,
because I think that we are called to vote.
Gentleman from Texas--California, Mr. Lungren. Everybody
here is from Texas.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is the first
time I have been called from Texas, but that is all right.
Chairman Thompson. The accent gives you away.
Mr. Lungren. That is it. We are further west than Texas.
Mr. Fugate, first of all, let me thank you for your
service. It is refreshing to hear your testimony here today as
someone who understands the problems that this committee is
posing to you and has given some thought and has provided us
with some insights.
I notice in your written testimony you started out by
explaining that FEMA can't do it all and that, in fact, FEMA
shouldn't be the one that does most of it. It is a local and
State responsibility and a personal responsibility.
I wish you would underscore that a little bit, because
while I come from a State that is not hit by hurricanes, we
have just about everything else. Whenever we get the big one,
the big earthquake, we are going to be the recipient of
assistance.
That is why I sometimes get very concerned about all the
attention given to FEMA, as if you are the end-all and be-all,
and if it is a problem, it is your problem. If it is a
solution, it is your solution.
Could you just indicate a little bit what FEMA's prime
responsibility is and the necessity for everybody at the local,
State, regional levels to be intimately engaged in preparing
and responding to a natural disaster?
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, it would be an honor. FEMA is not
a first-response agency. We are part of a team, and that team
is made up of State and local officials, local responders, the
private sector, faith-based communities that every day deal
with disasters, oftentimes that do not involve Federal
assistance.
Our primary mission on behalf of the President is, when a
Governor requests assistance, to provide that assistance under
the Stafford Act to support those States, as well as coordinate
with the Federal family, our parent agency, Homeland Security,
but all the other Federal agencies in providing assistance via
those Governors' requests.
But a big part of that, as you point out, of that team that
oftentimes our plans we don't recognize is the role of the
public. They are one of our best resources in ensuring that we
are going to be successful. The better prepared they are, the
more we can focus on our most vulnerable citizens and make sure
that we can address the needs of children, our frail elderly,
people with disabilities, people that just don't have the
resources, but it is a team effort.
So oftentimes my analogy, coming from local and State
government, is FEMA tends to now take on the aspect of its
description of a team of which we are just one component. But
the reality is, most of the things that people are going to
interface with in a disaster are going to be local and State
officials. Where they are going to interface with FEMA is maybe
through the individual assistance program or assistance we are
coordinating on behalf of the President with the Governors.
But the strength of that team will always be in local and
State government and, more importantly, individuals being
prepared to the best of their ability.
Mr. Lungren. Now, earlier there were some questions asked
of you about the difference in both per capita expenditures and
eligibility and so forth, and in part of your response, you
said, well, I would have to look at the--you either said the
number or the percentage of insured property. Can you explicate
a little on that?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. The whole intention of the Stafford
Act was non-duplication of benefits. So the first thing we look
at in the individual assistance or even for governments was,
what should be insured? Was it insured?
Again, personal responsibility is, I should be insuring my
property. Many of these events, the majority of people do not
seek or receive Federal assistance, they had insurance, they
paid their bills, they had their homes repaired.
Our programs are really designed to address people that did
not have the insurance, were not insurable, did not have the
resources, or when the magnitude of the event is so great that
insurance--particularly in housing--can't address the housing
needs, because there is no housing to get into, even if you had
insurance.
Mr. Lungren. The reason I ask that is it would be a
terrible thing for us to criticize the response of your agency
based on the fact that many people in these areas had insurance
or were able to insure their property, which is what we want to
encourage, as opposed to suggesting that you are not doing a
good job when, in fact, we had a situation where people were
responding on a personal basis the way we want them to respond.
Mr. Skinner, just a very quick question, and that is, you
mentioned in your testimony the high cost of current housing
options. Mr. Fugate just responded as to what the dilemma is,
in terms of determining the life of the stock, whether it cost
money to hold it, as opposed to attempting to wait until there
is a disaster and then trying to increase the production at
that point in time.
Anything you would add to what Mr. Fugate said about how we
might be able to bring the cost of these housing options down?
Mr. Skinner. I certainly do. I think we definitely need to
do some type of cost-benefit analysis, as to what our options
are, and that is having pre-award contracts or something--I
call them--refer to them as call contracts, with those
manufacturers, with some type of agreement that they have the
capability and the willingness to provide us with what we need
after disaster or when a disaster strikes versus maintaining
trailers or maintaining an inventory of housing stock, which
can be very expensive.
FEMA at one time back in the 1980s did, in fact, maintain
trailers in three different locations around the country. They
gave up that. They discovered back in the early 1990s and mid-
1990s that it was not cost-benefit-wise to continue to maintain
those trailers. They were deteriorating. They were expensive to
maintain. They were subject to the elements. We had full-time
staffing over securing them.
So eventually, during the mid- to late 1990s, we depleted
that stock and then started relying on contractors. I think we
need to take a real close look as to what would be most
beneficial for us.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. We have a dilemma. We have
three Members who need to ask questions, and we have about 7
minutes left for questions.
We can do 2, 2, and 2 and release our panel and take the
next witness on the next round.
Gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Himes, for 2 minutes.
Mr. Himes. I will be very quick. I was encouraged to see in
your testimony the commitment to working with HUD.
I wonder--a general question--can you characterize whether
you are satisfied with the communication between your agencies?
They are obviously very important as an entity that understands
where housing is regionally and nationally.
Specifically, coincidentally right now the Financial
Services Committee is marking up the Section 8 voucher reform
act. I don't see or hear a lot of discussion about the
potential for the use of temporary Section 8 vouchers, which
strikes me, at least in theory, as an interesting way where you
might provide a temporary solution.
Mr. Fugate. I think our dialogue with HUD, particularly as
the new team has come on-board, has been very good. My
experience with Section 8 actually--there is one thing that is
kind of interesting. You have those that are applied to the
individual, and they are transportable. You have those that are
applied to the facility and are not transferable.
I have had situations as a State director where I had
people that did not have their own Section 8 certificate, so if
that rental unit was destroyed, they had to go back to the
housing authority and get in line to get another Section 8
voucher so they could get rental property, which put them at a
disadvantage, competing with other people that still had not
been able to get Section 8 housing vouchers.
Mr. Himes. What if we, for example, created in response to
a catastrophe temporary Section 8 vouchers that could be
distributed precisely to people like that?
Mr. Fugate. I think I--you know, I would want to work with
my partners at HUD, but I think giving them more tools and more
options is, again, what we are looking for, because, as the IG
has pointed out, all disasters are different. We need a variety
of tools based upon, do we have housing available? Would
Section 8 help meet those issues? Would we be able to get
vouchers through HUD to help people get the longer-term
solutions in those communities?
Mr. Himes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady from California for 2
minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Two brief questions. Mr. Fugate, you said
it is the people's responsibility to evacuate and it is their
responsibility to be prepared. I have been watching a lot of
news, and if people had difficulties in 2005 responding, we now
have major financial crises going on.
Has your plan been re-evaluated to consider the crises that
people are going through? Many people are unemployed, don't
have the resources, don't have the vehicles, all the things--
other people helped each other. Those things we won't
necessarily be able to count on. Have you evaluated your plan,
given the current financial state of this country?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, we have. Again, as we pointed out, we want
people to prepare to the best of your ability. We know that
people don't have transportation. Those are transportation-
dependent populations our local governments plan for. We
provide support, as we do with supporting the State of
Louisiana, if we have to evacuate Orleans Parish.
The other issue that we run into, particularly with
hurricanes, is making sure that we are able to, with our State
and local partners, shelter people closer to the area. In many
cases, there are--and, again, there are exceptions, but in many
cases, people really need to evacuate just tens of miles, not
hundreds of miles. Shelter capacity in those States is very
important.
Some of the biggest costs people face when they evacuate,
though, is, again, lost work, lost wages, gas, other expenses
that can make those decisions very difficult. I think that is,
again, why we worked back through our States and local
partners, to identify, as the situation changes, will they need
assistance from us to support that?
But in many cases, the shorter the distance of the
evacuation, the less costly it is for the people.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. I have got 26 seconds. Let me make
sure I am really clear. Have you evaluated the jobless rates,
the financial situations, things that have happened in these
major cities that we could expect an occurrence to occur? Have
you looked at that and evaluated what specific additional
things need to be done in order to deal with what we think will
probably be even more people who are not prepared? Yes or no?
Mr. Fugate. No.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. We need to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fugate, you and I have talked about the subject, going
back to the former administration, to review and reform where
it is necessary some of the processes they undertook. We have
got 29 regional indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity areas,
contractors, three PTS contractors, the production and
technical services, I believe that is.
The FEMA process effectively cut out small-, medium-sized,
potentially many minority-owned businesses. This is a serious
problem. It was done in December of last year. I don't want to
get off on that. I don't have the time, but I wanted to, but I
don't have the time.
What I am asking you to do is to remedy the decision to
allow each FEMA region to make its own decision as to whether
they would like to stick to the IDIQ contractors or choose the
new PTS contractors.
The people who work in each FEMA region, the people who
work in our backyards should be responsible for these
decisions, not contracting services here in Washington, DC. We
are doing just the opposite of what we said we were going to do
8 years ago.
As far as I know, nothing in either set of contracts
precludes the other from being used. The PTS contractors can
supplement the work of IDIQs instead of supplanting them.
Now, Administrator Fugate, are you willing to undertake
this solution, instead of mitigate the effects to small- and
medium-sized businesses under these flood mapping contracts,
particularly in view of what the financial situation is today?
This is unconscionable.
Mr. Fugate. I understand, sir. I am researching it to give
you an answer by Friday as to where we are at in this
contracting process and what my options are and what I can and
cannot do under the current----
Mr. Pascrell. Is my analysis of the issue and the problem
correct?
Mr. Fugate. I will have an answer Friday, as I go back and
look through the answer, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will begin with the next panel in about 20 minutes or at
the time we finish the next two votes.
The committee is recessed.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. I would like to reconvene our hearing. A
number of Members have indicated they will come as the
testimony is given, given some other matters.
I now welcome our second panel of witnesses. We would like
to welcome you.
Our first witness to this panel is Ms. Erica Gees, a member
of the national board of directors of the American Institute of
Architects. Ms. Gees is currently serving as a Massachusetts
State-wide disaster coordinator for the AIA and formerly served
on the AIA's national director assistance committee and
disaster assistance task force.
Welcome.
Our second witness is Mr. Reilly Morse, senior attorney for
the Biloxi office of the Mississippi Center for Justice, where
he focuses his attention on affordable housing policy and civil
rights.
Welcome.
Our third witness is Mr. Don Kubley, president and chief
executive officer of Intershelter, Incorporated. Mr. Kubley has
served as a chief of staff and legislative liaison to the
lieutenant governor of the State of Alaska and a special
appointment from the Governor of Alaska as director of the
Governor's office of regulatory reform.
Welcome, also.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Braddon Rininger--I hope I did
you justice, Braddon--president of Brajo, Incorporated, a
housing initiative to create affordable, safe, and sustainable
housing units using environmentally responsible materials and
methods.
Our firth witness is Mr. Walter Boasso, chief executive
officer of Housing Emergency Logistics Plan, or HELP. Mr.
Boasso has been in the business over 20 years and is a former
member of the Louisiana State legislature, where he served as
chair of the senate select committee.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted into the record.
I now recognize Ms. Gees to summarize her statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF ERICA RIOUX GEES, REPRESENTATIVE, THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS
Ms. Gees. Thank you, Chairman Thompson.
Chairman Thompson and other Members of the committee,
present and not, I am Erica Rioux Gees, AIA. I am an architect
in Amherst, Massachusetts. I am also a member of the national
board of directors for the American Institute of Architects.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear today to discuss
disaster assistance and housing issues. There are strong
connections between the dual challenges of post-disaster
housing and sustainable approaches to mitigation and long-term
recovery.
Architects and their allied design and construction
professionals are ideally and uniquely suited to help FEMA,
State and local emergency management agencies, and communities
address post-disaster housing and recovery in a number of ways.
Through our disaster assistance program, the AIA works with
these agencies to put design professionals on the ground to
assist communities after a disaster hits.
In the short-term, architects and fellow design
professionals conduct rapid damage assessments to homes,
businesses, and public infrastructure to begin the process of
rebuilding. Licensed design professionals need to be involved
to identify exactly what can be repaired and rebuilt and what
must be torn down or reconstructed. This process is what gets
people out of emergency housing and back into their community.
With regard to temporary and transitional post-disaster
housing, there are a lot of interesting and ambitious ideas in
the field, and many of our members are engaged in finding
creative approaches. The main criteria that should be used to
judge such housing are practicality, comfort, and
sustainability.
We urge FEMA to continue working with HUD, NIST, NIBS, the
Joint Housing Solutions Group, and design and construction
professionals to continue fostering innovative housing
solutions.
We also urge FEMA to work with these stakeholders to
address not just the quality of the housing units themselves,
but also that of the places where those units are located to
avoid the FEMA-ville effect of isolated, unsafe, and
unsustainable clusters of temporary shelter cut off from the
rest of the world.
As a community transitions from short-term response to
long-term recovery, it will need to make decisions that affect
and may even significantly alter the built environment. It is
essential, therefore, that they are made aware of the
opportunities to not just rebuild, but rebuild better.
Among these opportunities are comprehensive neighborhood
redesign, urban redesign, landscape redesign, preservation, and
appreciation of little-known assets and utility relocation.
At the AIA, we have been providing long-term assistance
through pro bono public service programs that offer unique
opportunities to build long-term recovery strategies which are
inexpensive and achievable.
We are encouraged by the recently announced partnership
between HUD, DOT, and EPA on livable communities. We believe
this approach has application in a post-disaster context, as
well, and we urge FEMA to explore ways to work collaboratively
with these agencies.
I would like to discuss some key principles that my fellow
architects and I have observed through our program. First,
building a local capacity to respond to disasters is at the
center of our strategy. There is no national one-size-fits-all
approach to disaster response.
Our programs foster local communities' ability to take
action in the wake of disaster by deploying the assets that are
already in place. They also develop an engaged, knowledgeable
community of citizens ready to respond.
The second principle is the importance of partnerships,
effective collaboration between emergency management agencies
and professional associations to be the centerpiece of efforts
moving forward. It is vital that these partnerships are planned
and formed before the disaster strikes so that plans can be put
into motion immediately.
Communications are often challenged in the aftermath of a
disaster. Having a well-established in-place network beforehand
is absolutely critical.
The final principle is speed, the ability to get trained
and licensed design professionals on the ground to perform
damage assessments quickly is no less an urgent need than
providing food and medicine. Getting people back into their
homes lessens the needs for temporary shelter and other forms
of emergency provisions. This is a key part of our disaster
assistance program.
That is why it is very important that governmental agencies
responsible for disaster recovery from FEMA to the local level
have in place the communication plans to enable them to trigger
the post-disaster response as soon as possible.
It is also important to note that these principles apply to
all forms of disaster, natural or man-made, whether it is a
hurricane, an earthquake, an act of terrorism, or even a
pandemic, we need to ensure that people have adequate shelter
and that the built environment is safe.
Thank you so much for the opportunity to provide testimony
today on this very important issue. We look forward to working
with the committee, and I am happy to answer any questions you
may have. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Gees follows:]
Prepared Statement of Erica Rioux Gees
July 8, 2009
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee--good morning. I am Erica Rioux Gees, AIA, an architect from
Amherst, Massachusetts, and a member of the national board of directors
of the American Institute of Architects.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss
disaster assistance and housing issues. There are strong connections
between the dual challenges of post-disaster housing and sustainable
approaches to mitigation and long-term recovery. We believe that
architects and their allied design and construction professionals are
ideally and uniquely suited to help FEMA, State and local emergency
management agencies, and communities address these challenges.
As an associate with Kuhn Riddle Architects, a 17-person
architecture, planning, and interior design firm in Amherst, MA, I
focus on the master planning and design of multi-family housing,
commercial, and institutional projects. I currently serve as the
Massachusetts State-wide Disaster Coordinator for the AIA and have
previously served on the AIA's National Disaster Assistance Committee
and Disaster Assistance Task Force. I also have served on numerous AIA
Sustainable Design Assessment Teams (SDATs) in communities across the
country, including Louisiana, Washington, Florida, Hawaii, and
Massachusetts.
I would like to share with the committee some information about the
work of the AIA and architects to support mitigation and recovery
efforts, discuss the role of architects and other design professionals
in helping communities recover and rebuild from both natural and man-
made disasters, and provide some thoughts about the key issues
affecting post-disaster housing and community recovery.
THE AIA DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
The AIA is comprised of more than 83,000 licensed architects,
architects-in-training, and allied professionals across the country.
Through our Disaster Assistance Program, we are training and mobilizing
architects to help communities recover from disasters.
The program dates back to 1972, when the AIA formally recognized
the important role that architects can play in disaster response. In
Washington, DC, Members and staff began developing strategies to assist
member components to respond quickly to requests for aid.
Several State and local components, including Texas, California,
Florida, Kansas, and New York, began to develop programs to provide
assistance to communities struck by disasters. The program coordinates
with local AIA components and the larger disaster response community to
train locally based teams of volunteer architects to respond in the
event of a disaster. A dedicated network of State coordinators fulfills
an invaluable role by coordinating with local or State emergency
management agencies. More information on the AIA Disaster Assistance
Program can be found on-line at http://www.aia.org/about/initiatives/
AIAS075269.
The architectural community is well-positioned to offer expertise
at every phase of the recovery process. When the focus shifts from
emergency response to making homes livable and workplaces functional;
licensed building experts--architects, engineers, builders, and
others--are often called to assist in evaluating post-disaster
conditions and later to help in restoring a community. There are two
key areas where architects play a vital role when a disaster strikes:
Performing damage assessments of buildings and helping communities
develop long-term recovery plans.
Damage Assessments of Buildings
One of the most immediate concerns after a disaster is the safety
of the buildings that people occupy. It is critical to be able to
conduct rapid damage assessments to homes, businesses, and public
infrastructure to begin the process of rebuilding, and it is essential
that licensed design professionals be involved to identify exactly what
can be repaired and rebuilt and what must be torn down and
reconstructed. Completing this process is what gets people out of
emergency housing and back into their community. For instance, more
than 600 AIA members volunteered to perform damage assessments and
offer technical assistance to recovery efforts in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Long-term Recovery
As a community transitions from short-term response to longer-term
recovery, local and State officials need to make decisions that will
affect--and may even significantly alter--the built environment. It is
absolutely essential, therefore, that they are made aware of the
opportunities for change. Among these are comprehensive neighborhood
redesign, urban redesign, landscape redesign, preservation,
appreciation of little-known assets, and utility relocation. The
recovery process can offer the opportunity to remedy underperforming
aspects of a community.
There are a number of groups and associations that offer assistance
programs to address long-term planning. However, these efforts should
be better coordinated between FEMA's National Response Coordination
Center and the National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster
(NVOAD), which have had a strategic partnership since 2003.
We also are encouraged by the recently announced multi-agency
partnership between the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
the Department of Transportation, and the Environmental Protection
Agency on Livable Communities. We believe this approach has application
in the post-disaster context as well, and we would urge FEMA to explore
ways to work collaboratively with these agencies.
At the AIA, we have been providing long-term assistance through pro
bono public service programs that offer unique opportunities to build
long-term recovery strategies which are inexpensive. We have helped 143
communities through our Regional and Urban Design Assistance Team
(RUDAT) programs since 1967. The RUDAT program has included post-
disaster contexts such as East Nashville, Tennessee, in 1999, and
Lancaster, Texas, in 1995 following tornadoes. Similarly, through our
Sustainable Design Assessment Team (SDAT) program, we have been active
in over 30 communities since 2005, including several projects in New
Orleans. Through these two programs, multi-disciplinary teams of
professionals can provide communities with recommended changes to a
city's comprehensive plan and building codes, offer suggestions on
urban design issues, and educate and engage the community in a dialogue
about the options available.
KEY ISSUES AND PRINCIPLES IN POST-DISASTER RESPONSE
I would like to take a few moments to discuss some key issues and
principles that my fellow architects and I have observed through the
Disaster Assistance Program.
Place-based Strategies
Building the local capacity to respond to disaster situations is at
the center of our strategy. There is no national, one-size-fits-all
approach to disaster response. Our programs foster local communities'
ability to take responsibility and action in the wake of disaster by
deploying assets that are already in place. We recognize that the most
effective programs must be organized at the State level, in part
because:
Most government agencies coordinating disaster assistance
and long-term reconstruction are at the State level, and AIA
components can most easily connect resources through this
network.
A State component is better able to examine and discern
regional patterns and trends to customize programmatic
approaches and meet contextual needs.
Most importantly, the local AIA component can most
effectively marshal professional resources from nearby
unaffected areas.
Therefore, the AIA's approach has focused on building a national
Comprehensive Response Network of member volunteers that can deploy
locally and regionally. First established in 2006, the Comprehensive
Response Network currently has 52 volunteers in 39 States, the majority
of whom are currently trained to coordinate local disaster response.
These State coordinators have the ability to mobilize hundreds of local
architects to respond to disaster situations.
This network has proven valuable in both small and large contexts.
In 2008, AIA Disaster Coordinator Tom Hurd, AIA, mobilized member
volunteers in Mason City, Iowa, to conduct more than 350 building
assessments in the days following their historic floods. Along the
Texas coast, the Texas Society of Architects and Disaster, Inc., worked
to train and mobilize volunteers to conduct hundreds of damage
assessments following last year's hurricanes. Our members mobilized
similar efforts earlier this year in Washington State following the
flood emergency there. Collectively, our network represents a unique
resource to the emergency management field.
Partnerships
Today's partnerships will yield tomorrow's recovery success
stories. We believe effective collaboration between emergency
management agencies and professional associations should be the
centerpiece of efforts moving forward. With an effective local
structure in place, the disaster assistance process can swiftly and
efficiently respond to a range of situations.
Currently, the AIA is working to foster a more productive
relationship with the larger disaster-response community, recognizing
that partnerships are fundamental to our future work. In Rhode Island,
for example, the AIA is collaborating on the development of the Rhode
Island Architects and Engineers Emergency Response Task Force to
formally recognize and provide licensing for volunteers to conduct
damage assessments. This State-recognized network of design
professionals would be trained and accredited by the Rhode Island
Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA). They also have plans to work with
the State Attorney General's office to develop a set of bylaws and an
activation protocol for the group. While this is an on-going process,
we are very hopeful that it will provide a model for other States to
establish a more comprehensive protocol for incorporating architects
and design professionals who are willing to volunteer for this work.
Similarly, AIA Louisiana recently met with representatives from the
office of Governor Bobby Jindal (R) and State emergency management
officials. They are interested in working with us as well as FEMA to
develop a pilot program for training and licensing architects and
design professionals to engage in post-disaster assessment. In
California, we have continued to work with the California Emergency
Management Agency (CEMA), which has a volunteer database of thousands
of design professionals licensed to conduct damage assessments. In
Florida, Governor Charlie Christ (R) declared March 18 Florida
Architects' Day in recognition of their contributions to society,
especially through disaster assistance. AIA members have also
participated in a limited capacity on FEMA Mitigation Assessment Teams,
most recently in Galveston, Texas, following the 2008 hurricane.
Post-disaster Housing
There are a lot of interesting and ambitious post-disaster housing
ideas in the field currently that relate to post-disaster housing, and
many of our members are engaged in work that addresses creative
approaches to the challenge of post-disaster housing. The main
principles that I believe should be used to judge them are
practicality, comfort, and sustainability.
Practicality is the easy one. Emergency housing must be available
quickly to people who are displaced. It is vital that FEMA has
contracts and plans in place to ensure that temporary housing can be
procured quickly in the event of a disaster, and in amounts that
closely correspond to the need.
The level of comfort will be directly correlated with the length of
time people are expected to need temporary housing. The longer the time
frame, the more comfort and greater the number of amenities that will
be necessary. Proximity to shopping and employment centers may also
become important considerations when relocating large numbers of
displaced people.
Housing that is designed to be temporary is unsustainable by
definition. It has to be reusable, and if it is reusable it must be
lightweight to travel quickly and cheaply.
The AIA was pleased to work with FEMA on the Alternative Housing
Pilot Project for the Gulf Coast, authorized by Congress 2006 following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. But clearly more needs to be done to
ensure a wide range of innovative housing strategies to meet the
aforementioned goals. We urge FEMA to continue working collaboratively
with HUD, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the
National Institute of Building Sciences, the Joint Housing Solutions
Group, and design and construction professionals to both evaluate the
progress and results of the AHPP projects and to continue fostering on
innovative housing solutions. We also urge FEMA to work with other
stakeholders in the public and private sectors to address not just the
practicality, comfort, and sustainability of the housing units
themselves, but also those of the larger communities in which those
units are located, to avoid the ``FEMA-Ville'' effect of isolated,
unsafe, and unsustainable clusters of temporary shelter cut off from
the rest of the world.
Good Samaritan Legislation
The involvement of architects in post-disaster contexts raises the
related issue of the need for Good Samaritan legislation. During a
disaster event, licensed architects and engineers may be exposed to
questions of liability even though they are acting in good faith to
preserve the safety of a community. While most States have statutes
that cover certain volunteers from liability during an emergency
situation, it is questionable if these statutes would shield an
architect or engineer from liability if he or she is called upon to
render professional services in a time of crisis. This ambiguity needs
to be removed by passing Federal Good Samaritan legislation.
Many States have extended immunity from liability to doctors and
various other professionals who are needed during a crisis. Immunity
from liability allows these professions to volunteer more readily and
gives the public access to crucial services during major disasters.
Similarly, some States have recognized the importance of giving
licensed architects and engineers immunity during a disaster. States
ranging in size and population from Colorado to Washington have adopted
such legislation. Many, however, have not. For the public good it is
important that Congress pass a Federal Good Samaritan law for
architects and engineers.
Speed
Last but certainly not least, post-disaster assistance needs to be
implemented quickly. Although we cannot predict with any certainly when
the next disaster will strike, we have seen time and again that timing
is everything. The ability to get trained and licensed design
professionals on the ground to perform damage assessments quickly is no
less an urgent need than providing food and medicine, as getting people
back into their homes lessens the need for temporary shelter and other
forms of emergency provisions.
That is why it is very important that governmental agencies
responsible for disaster recovery, from FEMA down to the local level,
have in place the partnerships and communication plans to enable them
to trigger the post-disaster response as soon as possible.
Lastly, it is important to note that all of these principles apply
to all forms of disaster, natural or man-made. Whether is it a
hurricane, an earthquake, an act of terrorism or a pandemic, the need
to ensure that people have adequate shelter and the necessity of
assessing the safety and usability of the built environment are equally
great.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on this
important issue. We look forward to working with the committee to help
communities prepare for, mitigate, and respond to disasters, and I am
happy to answer any questions the committee may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Mississippi for 5 minutes, Mr. Morse.
STATEMENT OF REILLY MORSE, SENIOR ATTORNEY, MISSISSIPPI CENTER
FOR JUSTICE
Mr. Morse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
committee for holding this hearing and for inviting Mississippi
Center for Justice to testify.
Housing is fundamental for disaster recovery, to state the
obvious. Nearly 4 years after Hurricane Katrina, coastal
Mississippi's population, civilian labor force, and permanent
housing stock all remain below pre-Katrina levels. Until more
affordable housing becomes available, the labor force cannot
return.
We strongly support the strategy of immediate repair
assistance for rental properties and the development of rental
repair sweep teams to carry out this mission. This was a missed
opportunity after Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Chairman. There were
over 171,000 single-family rentals in the Gulf Region with
minor damage, and over 163,000 of those untouched by storm
surge.
The per-unit cost of restoring a lightly wind-damaged
rental is one-sixth the cost of a FEMA trailer when on private
property, one-thirteenth or less the cost of a trailer on a
group site. So we urge Congress to authorize and fund FEMA's
ability to pursue this rental repair strategy on a large scale.
Across the region, the 2005 hurricanes significantly
reduced the affordable rental stock, and rental rates spiked
dramatically for what remained. These pressures sharply reduced
the housing options for low-income individuals. Rebuilding an
adequate, affordable rental supply can take years.
As FEMA's 2009 plan notes, populations with additional
needs or low income receive the same amount of financial
assistance that the general population, even though their needs
may exceed the limits of the program. FEMA should ask Congress
to modify the cap to meet the needs--the greater needs of
lower-income persons following a disaster, particularly a
catastrophic disaster.
Affordable rental shortages after a disaster only magnify
the acute national undersupply of rental housing for the 9
million extremely low-income Americans who have only $6.2
million rental units that rent at rates they can afford.
Congressional action to close this structural gap serves the
national interest to house our working poor, elderly, and
disabled and the interest in responding to the housing needs of
those displaced by disaster.
Federal disaster housing strategy increasingly depends upon
HUD housing voucher programs. But as FEMA's David Garratt
acknowledged, handing someone a voucher if there are no other
forms of housing available at or near the fair-market rate is
not worth a lot. Recently, Mississippi requested funds for
5,000 housing vouchers citing FEMA data of 2,000 vacancies in
voucher-qualified apartments.
But, in fact, Mr. Chairman, coastal Mississippi has less
than 1,000 such vacancies according to preliminary results of
surveys attached to my written statement in the past 2 weeks.
Mississippi today is not better able to use vouchers should
another disaster strike because its current programs do not
remedy the undersupply of affordable rental housing. Congress
must exert greater control over how States spend disaster
recovery grants and serve the national interests in affordable
housing and disaster housing response.
When a disaster destroys most of the available rental
housing and forces longer stays in interim housing, FEMA should
look to other options instead of travel trailers. We support
the Mississippi cottage pilot program funded by FEMA that
produced and placed 2,800 modular units that are stronger,
safer, and roomier than the FEMA trailer, and can be converted
to permanent use on a foundation, provided local jurisdictions
cooperate.
Disability access, fair housing enforcement, and
improvements to case management in interim housing also are
crucial to meet the needs of the affected population, and I
have detailed recommendations in my written statement and
exhibits on these subjects.
I want to close with a plea for teamwork and an example.
James Johnson, a 74-year-old Mississippian on Social Security,
left school at age 9 to work in a sawmill. He helped his family
buy the land and collected the scrap wood used to build the
shotgun house that a tornado spawned by Katrina demolished,
according to a front-page Washington Post report last month.
Nearly 4 years after Katrina, this man wakes up every
morning on a bench pushing in a FEMA trailer because of a lack
of teamwork. Mississippi's homeowner grant program approved by
HUD turned him down because the State chose to exclude wind
damage. Mississippi's MEMA cottage program, funded by FEMA,
won't say if he can buy one of the 700 empty cottages sitting
in a field 5 minutes' drive away from him.
Case managers cannot connect the dots for him. HUD allowed
Mississippi to divert disaster aid from unmet needs like his to
other purposes.
I urge this committee and Federal agencies to remedy this
lack of coordination and to ensure that Mr. Johnson and other
displaced storm victims like him, as well as future victims of
disaster, receive better treatment than he has.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Morse follows:]
Prepared Statement of Reilly Morse
July 8, 2009
INTRODUCTION \1\
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\1\ I express appreciation for contributions to this testimony from
the National Low Income Housing Coalition, the National Fair Housing
Center, PolicyLink, Texas Appleseed, my colleagues at Mississippi
Center for Justice and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, and the 2009 University of Maryland Law School Summer interns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good morning. I am Reilly Morse, a senior attorney in the Katrina
Recovery Office of the Mississippi Center for Justice in Biloxi,
Mississippi. I thank Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and the
Members of the committee for holding this hearing to examine current
problems and solutions on FEMA disaster housing. I also thank the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for their efforts to house Gulf
Coast residents following emergencies and natural disasters.
The Mississippi Center for Justice (``MCJ'') is a non-partisan,
non-profit, civil rights legal organization that was founded in 2003.
It was formed to provide a home-grown means to advance racial and
economic justice in Mississippi. In 2005, MCJ became the Deep South
affiliate of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
(``Lawyer's Committee''), a national civil rights legal organization
formed in 1963 to remedy racial discrimination. Shortly after Hurricane
Katrina, MCJ opened a Katrina Recovery office in Biloxi, where we
joined forces with the Lawyers' Committee and attorneys and law
students from across the Nation to provide free legal representation,
impact litigation, and policy advocacy for storm victims, particularly
low-income and minority populations.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ MCJ's early experience in partnership with the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, is described in Jonathan P.
Hooks, Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery
Excludes Those Most in Need, 43 California Western Law Review 21 (Fall
2006).
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I am a third-generation Gulfport, Mississippi lawyer. After Katrina
destroyed my office, and displaced innumerable relatives and friends, I
joined MCJ to provide legal assistance for others to move towards
recovery. My family and our home survived Katrina, but the clients I
represent here today were not so fortunate. On behalf of those clients
and future disaster victims, I urge you to do the following:
1. Ensure that post-disaster housing and the necessary public
assistance to local governments that supports housing recovery
remain FEMA's top priorities.
2. Require FEMA to maximize the repair and rehabilitation of
existing housing resources, prioritize modular housing over
travel trailers, and accelerate and increase aid to special
needs and lower-income populations.
3. Require FEMA to provide unified, comprehensive, and intensive
case management, especially for vulnerable populations, to
reform eligibility and duplication of benefits rules, and to
strengthen fair housing training and enforcement for its staff
and contractors.
I. POST-DISASTER HOUSING IS TOP PRIORITY FOR RECOVERY PROCESS
Housing is central to disaster recovery, to state the obvious.
``Housing is the connector to how we live our lives and interact with
the social networks within our communities,'' notes FEMA's 2009
National Disaster Housing Strategy.\3\ All stages, from shelter to
interim to permanent housing, determine the pace of recovery. As
pointed out by the Director of Governor Barbour's Office of Recovery
and Renewal, ``[t]he repair and reconstruction of housing is the
foundation of individual, community, and overall economic recovery . .
. Without the rapid provision of temporary and permanent housing
solutions, recovery will be slowed or fail to occur in a manner that
meets the needs of disaster victims, the recovery objectives of local
leaders, or the intent of the Governor, which is to achieve a coastal
`renaissance.' ''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ FEMA National Disaster Housing Strategy, January 16, 2009, p.
52 (hereafter ``the Strategy.'') http://www.fema.gov/news/
newsrelease.fema?id=47305.
\4\ Testimony of Gavin Smith, January 14, 2006 Field Hearing of
House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community
Opportunity, ``Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita,'' (hereafter January, 2006 Housing Options Hearing), pp. 2-3.
http://www.house.gov/financialservices/media/pdf/011406gs.pdf.
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Affordable housing is a prerequisite to the recovery of the job
market. This is as true years later as it is in the immediate
aftermath. ``Housing is our biggest priority. Our community cannot
survive without housing. The jobs will come and have come back but
people must have a place to live,'' testified a local minister in
January, 2006.\5\ In 2007, Mississippi proposed to solve the hiring
problem of many of its major employers through a long-term workforce
housing program. As of May, 2009, both the population and the civilian
labor force in the Mississippi coastal region were 7 percent or more
below pre-Katrina levels.\6\ Housing stock, excluding temporary
housing, likewise stands at roughly 7 percent below pre-Katrina levels,
according to recent estimates by Mississippi officials. Until more
housing becomes available, the affected region's civilian labor force
cannot return.
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\5\ Testimony of Rosemary Williams, Mount Zion United Methodist
Church, January, 2006 Housing Options Hearing, transcript, p. 48.
\6\ See Census Report and Labor Market data attached as Exhibit
``A''.
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II. FEMA'S INTERIM HOUSING STRATEGY SHOULD MAXIMIZE AVAILABLE HOUSING
RESOURCES
Interim housing, according to FEMA, ``covers the gap between
sheltering and the return of disaster victims to permanent homes.''\7\
Providing interim housing is more difficult when the disaster also
damages the public and commercial infrastructure of the community. As
households transition from shelter to interim housing, the recovery of
their neighborhood will determine their access to food, health
services, work, and school.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The Strategy, p. 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
People tend to recover sooner from disasters the closer they are to
home, and so MCJ endorses FEMA's plans for immediate repair assistance
to rental properties to enable as many tenants as possible to return to
their pre-disaster locations.\8\ Congress should amend the Stafford Act
to permanently enable FEMA to use public funds for repairs of private,
for-profit rental property following a Federally declared disaster.\9\
In Mississippi, 30,017 out of 42,187 single-family rentals had minor
damage (below $5,200).\10\ The per-unit cost of restoring a lightly-
damaged single family rental to permanent habitability is one-sixth of
the cost of a FEMA trailer on a private site, and one-thirteenth of the
cost of a FEMA trailer at a group site.\11\ Rental repair is quicker,
it stimulates the local economy, it reduces neighborhood blight and
depopulation, does not incur expenses for mobilization/demobilization,
and it avoids zoning barriers that may block conversion of other
housing alternatives from temporary to permanent use. In the case of a
major disaster or catastrophe, we also encourage consideration of the
use of rental repair sweep teams using a civilian-led combination of
civilian/military personnel to make habitability repairs within 90 days
of a natural disaster.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The Strategy, pp. 57-58.
\9\ We support in concept FEMA's Rental Repair Pilot Program;
however, we cannot comment on the details because we have not yet seen
the report that was to have been filed on March 30, 2009.
\10\ Housing Unit Damage Report, February 12, 2006, FEMA (``FEMA
February 2006 Report''). http://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/
Katrina_Rita_Wilma_Damage_2_12_06_revised.pdf.
\11\ General Accounting Office, ``Hurricane Katrina: Ineffective
Oversight of Housing Maintenance Contracts in Mississippi Resulted in
Millions of Dollars in Waste and Potential Fraud,'' GAO 08-106, Figure
3, p. 24 ($30,000 per trailer on private site) Table 4, p. 25. ($69,000
to $229,000 per unit at group sites). http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08106.pdf.
\12\ See Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared
by IEM, Inc, for FEMA and State agencies, January 5, 2005, pp. 88-90,
92, 97, Appendices pp. 68-70.
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FEMA's public assistance programs are critical to achieving the
recovery of essential public services and infrastructure on which the
housing and commercial recovery depends.\13\ For this reason, MCJ urges
FEMA to streamline and coordinate the public assistance approval
process with FEMA's interim housing activities in each community. In
cases of catastrophic loss, we urge FEMA to eliminate cost shares and
reimbursement-based assistance to local governments. Just as people and
families need enhanced financial assistance to restore their stability,
local and county governments need Federal public assistance without
having to shoulder additional cost shares in the wake of a catastrophic
loss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The Strategy, Annex 2, pp. 54-57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. FEMA'S INTERIM HOUSING STRATEGY SHOULD PRIORITIZE MODULAR HOUSING
OVER TRAVEL TRAILERS
FEMA should look to other options instead of travel trailers when a
disaster destroys much of the available rental housing and requires
longer stays in interim housing. FEMA's $400 million Alternative
Housing Pilot Program sought to develop alternatives to travel trailers
in situations where a disaster has left a significant shortage of
available rental housing. In Mississippi, nearly 2,800 cottages were
constructed and deployed under this pilot program funded by FEMA and
administered by the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (``MEMA'').
The cottages were larger, stronger, and more livable than the FEMA
trailers they replaced. While a few hundred cottages in extremely low-
lying flood zones were surge-damaged by Hurricane Gustav, the majority
of cottages weathered the winds well. Also, the cottages were designed
to be converted to permanent use. MCJ endorses the Mississippi cottage
as an important interim housing option. MCJ opposes use of travel
trailers as FEMA's default option.
Despite the MEMA Cottage's superior modular construction,
vernacular architecture, and higher quality, some communities have
banned or severely restricted the permanent placement of the MEMA
cottage because it must be towed in on axles.\14\ MCJ has pursued
advocacy and litigation against local municipalities to ensure that the
MEMA cottages are treated the same as any other modular unit, and to
remove other restrictions such as pre-storm ownership.\15\ The axle
fixation demonstrates how local perceptions on relatively small details
can alter the fate of a proposed housing solution. It also demonstrates
the importance of clear legal and engineering classifications to
overcome objections to the conversion to permanent use of any FEMA
interim housing program.
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\14\ Examples of excessive restrictions include veto authority to
any resident within 160 feet of a proposed cottage site and
requirements of pre-Katrina title and homestead exemption.
\15\ Gambrell et al v. City of Waveland 2301-09-0045(1) (Hancock
County Chancery Court) http://mscenterforjustice.org/press-
article.php?article_id=107.
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``Interim housing'' is a FEMA construct which can obscure the core
mission of housing: To keep occupants safe and healthy. All housing,
whether classified by FEMA or other Government entities as
``temporary,'' ``disaster'' or otherwise should at a minimum meet the
requirements as set forth in the ICC's International Residential Code
without restriction. These requirements are the standards by which a
building official would inspect a structure to deem it safe and healthy
and thus secure the basic human right of people in FEMA's care. In
cases of catastrophic loss, durability is especially important because
the residents will likely stay longer in interim housing and face
successive exposures to disaster. All modular housing, like the
Mississippi Cottages, meet these codes.
IV. FEMA'S INTERIM HOUSING STRATEGY SHOULD PRIORITIZE AID TO LOWER-
INCOME AND SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS
Disasters like Hurricane Katrina reduce significantly the
affordable rental stock in the affected region and reduce the permanent
housing options for low-income renters. In coastal Mississippi,
thousands of units of public housing and subsidized private rental
housing were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Rental rates rose on
average between 30-40 percent, and in some evictions handled by MCJ,
they doubled within months of the disaster. Restoring the public and
subsidized rental housing market after a catastrophic disaster can take
years and call for greater flexibility on financial caps than exists in
current law. As FEMA notes, ``[c]urrent legislation imposes financial
restrictions on Federal programs; therefore, populations with
additional needs and/or low income receive the same amount of financial
assistance as the general population, even though their needs may
exceed the limits of the program.''\16\ (emphasis added). In
catastrophic losses, FEMA should eliminate the financial cap for very
low income households or implement a sliding scale cap that recognizes
that lower-income disaster victims need greater financial assistance
over time than those with greater personal resources, such as higher
income, credit, and insurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The Strategy, Annex 3, p. 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This shortage stems from a persistent trend to under-fund Federal
housing programs. FEMA's 2009 Strategy catalogues various housing
programs for special needs and low-income populations, including those
with disabilities, as well as those for the general population \17\ but
gloomily notes that ``many if not most . . . have extensive waiting
lists (frequently in excess of one year) and thus have few vacancies,
so all alternatives for housing will need to be considered.''\18\ Our
Nation faces a vast structural shortage of affordable housing that
requires a fundamental shift in Federal housing policy. As noted by the
National Low Income Housing Coalition, there is an acute shortage of
rental homes for the lowest income people in the United States--9
million extremely low-income renter households (earning 30% of area
median income or less) but only 6.2 million homes that rent at prices
they can afford. For Mississippi there are 55 homes for every 100 such
households.\19\ Given these troubling truths, MCJ questions the
capability of current housing voucher programs to adequately meet the
interim housing needs of our most vulnerable populations following a
disaster.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Id. p. 80-89 (special needs, low income) pp. 90-98 (general
population).
\18\ Id., p. 80.
\19\ Testimony of Sheila Crowley, ``A New Way Home: Findings from
the Disaster Recovery Subcommittee Special Report and Working with the
New Administration on a Way Forward,'' Senate Homeland Security Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, March 18, 2009, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It therefore was surprising to learn in May, 2009, that FEMA's
Rental Resource Division informed Mississippi Governor Barbour that
there are over 3,000 rental vacancies on the Mississippi Gulf Coast,
nearly 2,000 of which will accept a Section 8 voucher.\20\ To test this
assertion, the Mississippi Center for Justice and Lawyers' Committee
contacted all landlords accepting Section 8 vouchers on current lists
from the area's two largest public housing authorities. The provisional
results showed a maximum possible 773 vacancies, over 60 percent less
than FEMA claimed, out of 2,631 units.\21\ The provisional results
overstate the actual vacancy rate, since the survey counted all units
as Section 8 eligible for several large property managers who were
unable to separate Section 8 from other units. MCJ will provide final
supplemental data following the hearing. In addition MCJ verified
through public records requests that there remain thousands of persons
currently on PHA Section 8 waiting lists. This field research mirrors
the shortfalls, backlogs, and inability to serve clients in HUD's
public and assisted housing programs described in the Special Report of
the Senate Homeland Security Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster
Recovery.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Governor Haley Barbour, ``The Role of the Community
Development Block Grant Program in Disaster Recovery,'' Senate Homeland
Security Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, May 20, 2009, p. 6.
\21\ Summary of Results of Coastal Mississippi Section 8 Vacancy
Rate Survey, Exhibit ``B''.
\22\ ``Far From Home: Deficiencies in Federal Disaster Assistance
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Recommendations for
Improvement,'' Special Report of Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster
Recovery of Committee on Homeland Security, February 2009, pp. 173-181.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While broader use of HUD programs is a sound step, it will not be
enough to create a permanent DHAP-like stream of vouchers to address
interim housing needs. Any such program must include steps to provide
an adequate supply of housing, a national inventory of available
housing, an effective case-management regime, and a funding stream to
finance the cost of providing these capacities.\23\ As FEMA's David
Garratt acknowledged, ``[H]anding someone a voucher . . . if there are
no other forms of housing available at or near the fair market rent . .
. is not worth a lot.''\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Id., at 183-84.
\24\ Testimony of David Garratt, Senate ``Beyond Trailers''
Hearing, April 24, 2007, p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disability access in interim housing is both practically necessary
and required by Federal laws. Over one-third of households in the
Mississippi Cottage Program have a person with disabilities, according
to a recent survey.\25\ Yet only one-quarter of Mississippi cottages
were ADA compliant, according to MEMA.\26\ The problem was
substantially worse for those in FEMA trailers, only a miniscule
percentage of which complied with the Uniform Federal Accessibility
Standards. FEMA's non-compliance with Federal accessibility laws
prompted a class action on behalf of persons with disabilities and a
settlement.\27\ To better meet the needs of the class FEMA agreed to
order 10 percent of temporary housing units that complied with the
UFAS, to modify common areas to render the group sites accessible to
persons with disabilities, and to notification and reporting
requirements for persons with disabilities who seek disability-
accessible interim housing.\28\
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\25\ ABT Associates, Mississippi Alternative Housing Pilot Program,
Quality of Life Evaluation, April 15, 2009. Slide 4.
\26\ Table of ADA units provided by MEMA to Mississippi Center for
Justice, Exhibit ``C''.
\27\ Brou v. FEMA, (No. 06-0838) (E. D. La. 2006) (Duval, J.).
\28\ Settlement Agreement on file with MCJ Biloxi office (available
on request), pp. 7-15.
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Today, FEMA has the opportunity to do better. In October, 2008, the
U.S. Access Board Federal Advisory Committee released a report with
detailed recommendations that should be reviewed and incorporated into
emergency and interim housing solutions for persons with disabilities
by architects, engineers, manufacturers, and contractors. These
recommendations deal with the vital nuts and bolts of accessibility,
deserve careful scrutiny, but require more space than permitted by this
committee to adequately discuss.\29\ Accordingly, MCJ recommends that
the committee ensure that these requirements are factored into its
future plans and that FEMA make contact with disability advocates with
recent disaster housing experience to ensure that its future response
is an improvement over Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
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\29\ ``Recommendations for Accessible Emergency Transportable
Housing,'' U.S. Access Board Federal Advisory Committee, October, 2008,
http://www.access-board.gov/eth/report.htm.
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V. BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT OF INTERIM HOUSING IS REQUIRED, ESPECIALLY
FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
MCJ agrees with FEMA's 2009 Strategy that case management is
important to successfully place and transition special needs and low-
income populations into and out of interim housing.\30\ Several
advocacy organizations have submitted a set of recommendations to the
Office of Management and Budget on case management. The letter urges
the adoption of a comprehensive and client-centered service delivery
system that transcends program barriers and agency turf. The letter
recommends unified and intensive case management coupled with unsiloed
and accessible resources, and provides additional detail and guidance
on both elements.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The Strategy, p. 5; Annexes, pp. 58, 80.
\31\ Letter to Xavier Briggs from National Low Income Housing
Coalition, PolicyLink and MCJ, July 6, 2009, Exhibit ``D''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA's track record since Hurricane Katrina indicates that there
remains major areas for improvement. Following Hurricane Dolly in July
2008, half of all applications for housing assistance were denied. In
May 2009, a Federal judge in Brownsville, Texas issued a preliminary
injunction finding that FEMA's failure to publish clear and
ascertainable standards, criteria, and procedures for determining
eligibility for home repair housing assistance violated the Stafford
Act and ordered the agency to rewrite its rules.\32\ According to Texas
Appleseed, FEMA denied 85% of applications for housing assistance
following Hurricane Ike. The most common reason for denial was
``insufficient damage,'' but applicants were denied for reasons as
minor as an omitted middle initial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Lupe v. FEMA, Civil Action No. B-08-487, S.D. Texas, May 13,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VI. REFORM OF FEMA'S ELIGIBILITY AND DUPLICATION OF BENEFITS RULES IS
REQUIRED FOR INTERIM HOUSING TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED
Closely related to case management are reforms to the overall
administration of FEMA's temporary housing programs. Annex 7 of FEMA's
2009 Strategy correctly emphasizes that ``differences in interpretation
of programs under the Stafford Act have led to inconsistencies in
assistance provided.''\33\ (emphasis in original) However, FEMA must
take additional steps to clarify its eligibility and appeal
requirements to ensure success of any FEMA interim housing effort. In
testimony before the Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery,
MCJ and the Lawyers' Committee provided a detailed critique,
recommendations, and endorsement of solutions proposed in the Senate
``Far From Home'' report. Please incorporate this discussion and these
recommendations into your overall strategy.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ The Strategy, Annex 7, p. 126.
\34\ Testimony of Reilly Morse, ``A New Way Home: Findings form the
Disaster Subcommittee Special Report and Working with the New
Administration on a Way Forward,'' March 18, 2009, pp. 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA's ability to transition residents from interim to permanent
housing will require reexamination of Federal duplication of benefits
rules, especially in the setting of catastrophic disasters. MCJ urges
FEMA to use a more nuanced approach in determining whether an
individual FEMA benefit actually ``duplicates'' another Federal
benefit. As FEMA's Strategy notes, the different housing programs,
shelter, interim, and permanent housing serve fundamentally different
purposes.\35\ Likewise, other benefits funded via Federal disaster
community development block programs can frequently serve different
purposes than an individual FEMA payment under review.\36\ FEMA,
working with HUD, should put away broad brush approaches to duplication
of benefits, and instead precisely classify its assistance to enable
true matching of duplicate benefits without eliminating the full
spectrum of assistance available and necessary for disaster victims to
return to permanent housing. As previously noted, this is especially
important for lower-income renter populations who will need greater
than normal housing assistance. If necessary, FEMA and HUD should
jointly seek revisions to the applicable laws to achieve this goal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ The Strategy, Annex 7, pp. 131-141.
\36\ For example, a landlord who accepts a tenant's DHAP voucher,
and who receives a forgivable loan under a State's CDBG-funded small
rental assistance program is not receiving a duplication of benefits
because the two payments provide different, necessary layers of rental
housing subsidy, with different eligibility criteria, and different
rent-restriction obligations.
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VII. FEMA MUST BETTER INTEGRATE FAIR HOUSING TRAINING AND ENFORCEMENT
INTO ITS MISSION
The Stafford Act requires FEMA to promulgate regulations to ensure
that all of its functions are carried out in a manner that does not
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, nationality, sex,
age, disability, English proficiency, or economic status. (42 USC 5151,
Sec. 308 (a)). FEMA regulations provide that no one involved in
carrying out FEMA functions (either FEMA employees or contractors) can
discriminate on any of those bases. (44 CFR 206.11, citing to 44 CFR
part 7, Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs). FEMA needs
to increase its efforts to train staff and contractors on non-
discrimination and place on its Web site the regulations, policies,
procedures, and manuals that actually spell out the steps that FEMA
employees or contractors should take to be in compliance.
After a disaster, FEMA itself needs to provide information to
individuals about fair housing rights, how to recognize discrimination,
or what to do if they encountered it. Following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA
failed to take this very basic step and so it fell to local fair
housing organizations to do so. The information should be provided in
English and appropriate alternate languages.
FEMA's use of resource networks should carry with it a
responsibility to police and enforce non-discrimination by users. In
the immediate aftermath of Katrina, a FEMA-endorsed Web site,
Dhronline.com, intended as a resource to help evacuees find housing,
posted advertisements for housing vacancies by third parties that were
blatantly racially discriminatory.\37\
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\37\ Testimony of James Perry, Greater New Orleans Fair Housing
Action Center, House Financial Services Subcommittee, February 28,
2006, http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/022806jp.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA's delegation of interim housing to contractors carries the
risk of discriminatory treatment of displaced storm victims. It is
essential that FEMA provide the initial investigation and training to
weed out contractors with histories of discrimination. FEMA and HUD
also should develop a joint operating agreement to more expeditiously
address housing discrimination complaints in FEMA interim housing. This
is necessary to prevent incidents such as the one detailed in a
recently-filed HUD complaint on a 3-year-old allegation of racial
discrimination against African-American persons against owners of a
FEMA trailer park in Mississippi.\38\ It simply is unacceptable that
FEMA and HUD had no capacity to take address and more quickly resolve
complaints of racial discrimination in FEMA disaster housing programs.
If FEMA does not want to develop the staff and expertise in-house, it
could contract with private fair housing groups to investigate
complaints, or it could negotiate an agreement with HUD to investigate
complaints on an expedited basis. In any event, a more accelerated
solution for solving this sort of problem for disaster victims is
required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ HUD v. Hebert, et al, FHEO 04-06-0723-8, April 30, 2009,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/enforcement/
09_HUD_v._Christopher_S_Hebert_etc.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not clear whether FEMA's 2009 Strategy mentions or
acknowledges the Fair Housing issues associated with interim housing.
The result is that people who have been displaced by storms like
Katrina, or other disasters, may find themselves barred from
desperately needed housing because of their race, color, religion,
national origin, familial status, disability, etc. FEMA, working with
HUD, and private fair housing groups, clearly can improve this aspect
of its operations.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
EXHIBIT A
POPULATION MISSISSIPPI COAST CITIES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2007 2008 08-'05 Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bay St. Louis............................................ 11,211 8,123 8,052 -3,159
Biloxi................................................... 46,287 45,760 45,670 -617
D'Iberville.............................................. 8,258 7,758 7,928 -330
Gautier.................................................. 16,641 16,091 16,306 -335
Gulfport................................................. 73,260 68,981 70,055 -3,205
Long Beach............................................... 17,469 11,481 12,234 -5,235
Moss Point............................................... 14,944 14,210 13,951 -993
Ocean Springs............................................ 17,555 17,258 17,149 -406
Pass Christian........................................... 6,938 3,794 3,993 -2,945
Pascagoula............................................... 24,862 23,466 23,609 -1,253
Waveland................................................. 8,346 4,795 5,249 -3,097
------------------------------------------------------
Coast Total.............................................. 245,771 221,717 224,196 -21,575 -8.78
------------------------------------------------------
Lucedale................................................. 2,860 3,018 3,077 217
Picayune................................................. 10,650 11,530 11,787 1,137
Poplarville.............................................. 2,578 3,030 3,003 425
Wiggins.................................................. 4,395 4,745 4,901 506
------------------------------------------------------
20,483 22,323 22,768 2,285
------------------------------------------------------
6 Counties............................................... 266,254 244,040 246,964 -19,290 -7.24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: ``Census Numbers,'' Biloxi Sun Herald, July 1, 2009. http://www.sunherald.com/658/story/1448035.html.
COAST LABOR MARKET DATA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biloxi Gpt Pascagoula
Metro Metro Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aug. 1, 2005:.................
Employed 115,260 66,070 181,330
Unemployed 7,140 4,700 11,840
Civilian labor force 122,400 70,770 193,170
May 1, 2009:..................
Employed 101,810 62,430 164,240
Unemployed 8,560 5,750 14,310
Civilian labor force 110,370 68,180 178,550
Difference:...................
Employed (Percent) 11.67 5.51 9.42
Unemployed (Percent) -19.89 -22.34 -20.86
Civilian labor force 9.83 3.66 7.57
(Percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Mississippi Department of Employment Security Labor Market Data.
EXHIBIT B
SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF COASTAL MISSISSIPPI SECTION 8 VACANCY
RATE SURVEY
Research and analysis by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law and the Mississippi Center for Justice \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Lawyers' Committee and the Mississippi Center for Justice
would like thank students from the University of Maryland School of Law
for their assistance in conducting this research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From Wednesday, June 24, 2009, through Thursday, July 2, 2009, the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Lawyers' Committee) and
the Mississippi Center for Justice (MCJ) surveyed landlords in coastal
Mississippi to gauge the vacancy rate for units that are available to
tenants with Section 8 vouchers. The research team interviewed
landlords whose names appeared on lists produced by the Biloxi Housing
Authority (BHA) and the Mississippi Regional Housing Authority for
Region VIII (MRHA Region VIII) of landlords in Biloxi and the region,
respectively, who accept Section 8 vouchers. Interviewers asked
landlords how many Section 8-eligible units they currently had vacant,
how many total Section 8-eligible units they had, how many total units
they currently had vacant, and how many total units they had.
The research team called a total of 242 out of a list of 267
Mississippi Gulf Coast landlords and conducted 164 interviews, talking
with 61.4% of the landlords on the lists provided by the housing
authorities. In those interviews, landlords indicated that they
currently had 773 vacant Section 8-eligible units that they were
willing to rent to tenants with vouchers. The landlords indicated that
they had a total inventory of 2,631 Section 8-eligible units that they
were willing to rent to tenants with vouchers. 29.4% of those units are
vacant.
MRHA Region VIII's list included 247 unique landlords. The research
team was able to call 222 of these landlords and conduct interviews
with 152 of them, 61.5% of the unique landlords on the list. In those
interviews, landlords on the MRHA Region VIII list indicated that they
currently had 724 vacant Section 8-eligible units that they were
willing to rent to tenants with vouchers. The landlords indicated that
they had a total inventory of 2,373 Section 8-eligible units that they
were willing to rent to tenants with vouchers. 30.5% of those units are
vacant.
BHA's list included 20 unique landlords. The research team was able
to call of the landlords and interview 12 of them, 60% of the total. In
those interviews, landlords on the BHA list indicated that they
currently had 49 vacant Section 8-eligible units that they were willing
to rent to tenants with vouchers. The landlords indicated that they had
a total inventory of 258 Section 8-eligible units that they were
willing to rent to tenants with vouchers. 19.0% of those units are
vacant.
MRHA Region VIII and the BHA are the two largest administrators of
the Section 8 program in the region and the low total numbers of vacant
Section 8-eligible units held by the landlords on their lists is
alarming given the anticipated introduction of 5,000 new vouchers to
the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The research team believes that the results
of this survey represent an over-count of the number of vacant Section
8-eligible units as a result of multiple factors, including the
inability of landlords to provide a breakdown between Section 8 and
other units in several large complexes. The survey also revealed deep
problems with the housing authorities' lists of landlords, including
the listing of landlords who refuse to rent to tenants with vouchers,
the listing of disconnected phone numbers, and widespread typos.
The final results of this survey, including the underlying
spreadsheet will be provided in supplemental submissions to this
committee.
EXHIBIT C
OCCUPIED MEMA COTTAGES AS OF DECEMBER 15, 2008
Data provided by MEMA to the Mississippi Center for Justice
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total ADA
Jurisdiction Units ADA Units Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waveland.............................. 163 32 19.6
Hancock Co............................ 570 131 23.0
D'Iberville........................... 41 12 29.3
Ocean Springs......................... 14 6 42.9
Gulfport.............................. 163 39 23.9
Pass Christian........................ 103 23 22.3
Pascagoula............................ 72 10 13.9
Pearl River Co........................ 35 13 37.1
Picayune.............................. 10 5 50.0
Biloxi................................ 175 45 25.7
Harrison Co........................... 359 100 27.9
Long Beach............................ 27 3 11.1
Jackson Co............................ 386 106 27.5
George Co............................. 1 1 100.0
Bay St Louis.......................... 64 17 26.6
Moss Point............................ 92 16 17.4
Gautier............................... 50 23 46.0
---------------------------------
Total........................... 2,325 582 25.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT D
July 6, 2009.
Xavier D. Briggs,
Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Washington, DC 20500.
Dear Mr. Briggs: This letter follows up on our recent discussions
with you and members of your staff concerning finding permanent housing
solutions for people displaced by the 2005 hurricanes who are still
receiving temporary housing assistance.
The quest to successfully and permanently rehouse the citizens
whose homes were damaged or destroyed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
has been hampered by a highly fragmented service delivery system that
has had to accommodate the requirements of the myriad agencies that
control the resources than it has been to the needs of the people it
was intended to help. As Federal and State governments attempt to end
the FEMA temporary housing programs almost 4 years after Katrina
struck, we urge the establishment of a unified, comprehensive, and
client-centered service delivery system that transcends program
barriers and agency turf in the interest of achieving the best possible
results.
Services must be available for people still receiving FEMA
temporary housing assistance (including DHAP) and for those whose
assistance was prematurely ended in the time period of January 1, 2009
to today, as well as for those trying to return from out-of-State.
Such a delivery system would include the following two elements:
1. Unified and intensive case management.
If any one person or family has more than one case manager,
by definition, the case is not being managed. The point of case
management is for the person or family in need of assistance to
have one person on whom to rely as together they navigate the
complex array of programs that they may or may not be eligible
for and the rules that may or not apply to them. Once a client
has to relate to more than one case manager, the potential for
case MISmanagement grows exponentially. At best, multiple case
managers become nothing more than clerks who facilitate single
transactions. At worst, harm can result when no one is
coordinating the various transactions. Think about the role of
the primary care provider in health care. And just as is the
practice with primary health care providers, a client should
have the option to petition to change case managers if he or
she does not think that the case manager is doing an adequate
job.
Case management should never be provided long distance by
phone or email. All case management relationships must be in
person with phone and email used only as a secondary means of
providing information.
The intensity of case management must match the intensity of
the needs of the clients, which first requires that case
managers be skilled enough to conduct the kind of assessment
that is required to uncover the extent and depth of needs. Many
of the remaining clients receiving temporary housing assistance
are people with multiple problems and may be considered ``hard-
to-reach,'' that is, conventional, ``light-touch'' methods of
communication will not work. These case managers must ``go
where the client is,'' both literally and figuratively.
Outreach means visiting clients when and where works best for
them, instead of telling them to show up at an office at an
appointed time between 9am and 5 pm, Monday to Friday, or only
calling them for referrals by phone. Case managers must have
both the autonomy and authority to go where needed and conduct
the activities needed to provide proper assistance for each and
all clients.
These case managers must be skilled in establishing rapport
with people with physical, emotional, and developmental
limitations and with people who are suspect of representatives
of Government agencies. Social workers who have experience in
working in non-traditional or client-centered agencies should
be recruited for this work.\1\ Many of the smaller grassroots
agencies employ people with the training and professional ethic
that this kind of case management requires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Rapp, C.A. & Poertner, J. (1992). Social administration: A
client-centered approach. New York: Longman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Case managers should have a reasonable number of clients
that makes it possible to provide the quality and intensity of
service required. The 1:50 case worker-client ratio used by
FEMA is too high for the intensity of services that are
required. Case managers should also be able to rely on high
quality clinical supervision.
Case managers must be knowledgeable about and be able to
access the full range of resources available to assist their
clients settle in the best possible permanent housing option
for each person or family. For example, a case manager visits a
family living in a FEMA travel trailer sited on property that
the family owns. The clear objective is to get the family out
of the travel trailer. But where they go depends on their
unique situation. Are they rebuilding their home, but not able
to finish? If so, why? What will it take to get the home
finished? How do they access the needed resources? What is the
best option in the meantime? Should they be issued a voucher
and move to an apartment? Is there an apartment nearby? Or
should they buy a FEMA mobile home for a $1 and place it on
their property to live in until their house is completed? Are
there legal or other barriers to siting the mobile home? What
will it take to overcome the barriers? Regardless of the agency
that controls the resource (FEMA, HUD, different State
agencies), the case manager should be able to tap into all that
he or she determines the client is eligible for and that which
best matches each client's given situation.
If the case managers are properly trained, have the right
size caseload, necessary supervision, and the authority to
access and deploy available resources, then they, and the
agencies for which they work, can and should be held
accountable for successful outcomes; i.e. clients who are
permanently housed in a manner that best suits their needs. The
number of contacts, number of referrals, or any other process
measures should NOT be used to measure case managers'
performance or the performance of the agency providing the case
management services. Under no circumstances should a case be
closed before an appropriate permanent housing outcome to which
the client agrees has been achieved.
2. Un-siloed and accessible resources.
The list of publicly funded resources that can be brought to
bear immediately to access successful permanent housing for
people still receiving FEMA temporary housing assistance
include:
Section 8 vouchers for people transitioning from DHAP.
New Section 8 vouchers provided in June 2009 supplemental
bill.
FEMA mobile homes and park models that can be sold to
clients.
Katrina cottages in MS and LA.
Unspent CDBG disaster funds allocated to MS and LA.
Unspent non-disaster CDBG and HOME funds allocate to MS,
LA, and participating jurisdictions. HOME can be used for
tenant-based assistance for people whose income exceeds 50%
AM1 and therefore are ineligible for disaster-related
Section 8 vouchers.
Rapid Rehousing and Homelessness Program and other ARRA
funds allocated to MS, LA, and participating jurisdictions.
State-funded programs.
The agencies that control these funds should voluntarily
agree to come together, or be compelled to so, to devise a
system by which they can deploy the resources in a unified
fashion, so that case managers can access them with a minimum
of red tape. A unified and accessible resource pool will not
only yield better results for clients, but will be more cost-
effective by reducing the time that it takes case managers and
clients to negotiate with multiple agencies.
In the case of vouchers, HUD should assign voucher
distribution to the agency in each State that is carrying out
the case management, similar to the design of the VASH vouchers
for homeless vets, and not simply allocate them to PHAs in the
jurisdiction.
It also follows that the various streams of funding for case
management should be unified.
Thank you for your consideration of our comments. We look forward
to working with you to design and implement a program to assure
successful permanent housing for the people who remain displaced by
Katrina and Rita even today.
Sincerely,
Sheila Crowley,
National Low Income Housing Coalition.
Reilly Morse,
Mississippi Center for Justice.
Kalima Rose,
Policy Link.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize Mr. Kubley for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DON KUBLEY, PRESIDENT, INTERSHELTER
Mr. Kubley. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the
Homeland Security Committee, my name is Captain Don Kubley, and
I am president of Intershelter, Incorporated, headquartered in
Juneau, Alaska. I would like to thank you for the privilege of
addressing you here today.
May I please ask that my full testimony be included in the
record?
Intershelter produces and markets a revolutionary new
portable prefabricated building called the Intershelter Dome. I
applaud you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for the vision and
leadership to take a hard look at the status quo and potential
new and innovative options in first responder and emergency
shelter and housing for victims.
There are few issues as important as to those most in need
after a devastating event that has left them injured or
homeless. In fact, in a detailed report dated December 16,
2006, by the Department of Homeland Security, looking at how
they and other first responders could have improved their
response to the horrific aftermath of Katrina, they identified
five top priorities that they felt would improve future
disaster relief efforts.
No. 3 in those top five were pop-up shelters, improved and
increased numbers of them. Frankly, that is exactly what our
domes are: Pop-up shelters.
In that report, they also concluded that Hurricane Katrina
transformed thousands of people's lives into a battle for
survival. For some, finding adequate shelter proved at least as
difficult as finding something to eat or drink.
After the recent earthquake in Italy north of Rome, I had
the opportunity to talk to one of the leaders at the embassy
here in the District of Columbia about their response to those
devastated communities and their victims. While discussing his
Nation's response to the quake, he said something to me that
was very profound.
He said: You know, Mr. Kubley, I am embarrassed to tell you
that the emergency shelters we are responding to this disaster
with is the very same thing the Romans used after Mount
Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii--tents.
We all understand the attributes of tents in a situation
like this. They are portable, easy to assemble, can be
warehoused until needed. But just as obvious to all who have
ever been forced to live in a tent are their many shortcomings:
They are too hot in the tropics; they are too cold in the
northern climes; they are damp and unhealthy in wet, inclement
weather; they are extremely susceptible to fire; they are
drafty on windy and dusty days and become projectiles in
anything greater than a gale force wind; they have very short
life expectancy and once damp are prone to mold and mildew if
stored for reuse.
I think you would be hard-pressed to find anyone who has
had to go from a normal housing situation to a tent that would
tell you they are either comfortable or impressed and cannot
wait to get out of them. Perhaps that is one of the strongest
assets of tents: They have a very easy exit strategy.
In regards to improving on tents, I would like to share
with you a letter dated May 16 from the head of the Alaska
National Guard. ``Mr. Kubley, I would like to offer support and
encouragement to all federal agencies that might be interested
in procuring your temporary dome shelters for emergency use.
These domes provide safe, reliable shelter in all types of
extreme weather conditions. They are easy to assemble and
easily transportable. These shelters are optimal for use as
temporary shelters in times of disaster emergencies, and these
domes would be exceptional for use in Alaska. They far exceed
the existing canvas tents.''
Mr. Chair, I would say that, if these work this well in
Alaska, the most extreme and remote State in our union, that
they would work very well Nation-wide.
A well-known expert on emergency preparedness, Mr. Ellis
Stanley, former director of L.A. county emergency preparedness,
is convinced that in an emergency room surge scenario,
Intershelter domes are the answer for properly responding to
the multitudes of injured and contaminated victims.
In a letter to me, Mr. Stanley wrote, ``After reading
today's MSNBC article, `FEMA Trailers Toxic Tin Cans?', I want
to renew our discussion regarding the domes that have been
working so well here in Los Angeles with the homeless
community. As we discussed earlier, I believe this system has
some great utilization as we continue to do our pandemic
planning as related to surge capacity around hospitals, at
airports, et cetera.''
``As a 32-year career emergency manager, we see very few
opportunities to really make giant leaps in the way we do
things in disaster preparedness, and I believe Intershelter is
one of those opportunities when we can really do things
differently.''
In the same space it takes to ship one FEMA trailer, Mr.
Chairman, we can ship enough domes to house 25 families.
Instead of costing $70,000-plus a unit for a building that
cannot be disposed of, our buildings could be totally
sustainable and self-contained for under $20,000 a unit.
Instead of having to figure out what to do with the now-
unusable trailer, we power-wash our units, disassemble them in
a matter of minutes, and stow them for the next 10 hurricane
seasons, or for any other disaster or emergency that might
happen between hurricane seasons.
We stand ready to provide the next generation of emergency
shelter in the numbers needed at a vast savings given to the
United States.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, again, I would
very much like to thank you for the honor of being able to
address you here today. Godspeed to you, and God bless America.
[The statement of Mr. Kubley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Don Kubley
July 8, 2009
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, my name is Captain Don
Kubley. I am President/CEO of InterShelter Incorporated, headquartered
in Juneau, Alaska. I would like to thank the committee for the
privilege of addressing you here today concerning your effort to
examine our current national disaster response problems and
capabilities.
I applaud you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for your vision and
leadership in reviewing the shortcomings of our present response
systems. There are few issues as important as sheltering the victims
and first responders as they meet the emergency needs of our
communities, treat the injured, and shelter the homeless. As a matter
of reference, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a
detailed report on December 16, 2006, reviewing how they and other
first responders could have improved the response to the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. DHS concluded in their report that ``Hurricane
Katrina transformed thousands of people's lives into a battle for
survival--and, for some, finding adequate shelter proved at least as
difficult as finding something to eat or drink.'' To meet this need,
InterShelter has designed and produced a revolutionary portable,
prefabricated structure called The InterShelter DomeTM which
is pictured above.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The image referred to has appeared previously in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adequate emergency shelter is a global problem. After the recent
earthquake north of Rome, I had the opportunity to talk with The First
Counselor at the Italian Embassy, Mr. Marco Mancini, about their
response to those communities devastated by the quake. While discussing
his Nation's response he made a very profound observation. He said
``you know Mr. Kubley, I'm embarrassed to tell you that the emergency
temporary shelters we are responding to this disaster with are the very
same thing the Romans used after Mt. Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii . . .
tents''!! We all understand the attributes of tents in a situation like
this. They are portable, easy to assemble quickly, and can be
warehoused until needed. Just as obvious, to all who have ever been
forced to live in a tent for weeks or months, are their many
shortcomings. They are too hot in the tropics, too cold in the Northern
climes, damp and unhealthy in wet inclement weather, are extremely
susceptible to fire, drafty in blustery weather, dusty in desert areas,
and become projectiles in anything above ``Gale Force'' winds. One of
the tent's strongest assets is that they have by far the easiest ``exit
strategy''. However, they have very short life expectancy and once they
have gotten wet they are prone to mold and mildew when stored for
reuse. Anyone who has gone from a normal accommodation to a tent will
tell you that they were neither comfortable nor safe and couldn't wait
to get to an adequate form of shelter.
In this regard, I would like to share some comments from General
Craig Campbell, Commander of the Alaska National Guard in a letter
dated May 16, 2009. He stated concerning our domes:
``These domes provide safe, reliable shelter in all types of extreme
weather conditions. They are easy to assemble and easily transportable.
I would recommend you contact the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and encourage their purchase of these domes for emergency
deployment use. Should FEMA purchase your shelters, I would encourage
them to be deployed to FEMA Region 10, so that they would be accessible
to Alaska and other states in the Pacific Northwest.
These shelters are optimal for use as temporary shelters in times of
disaster emergencies and these domes would be exceptional for use in
Alaska. They far exceed the existing canvas tents.''
Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that if our domes are a vast
improvement over tents their attributes can apply Nation-wide. With our
cutting edge insulation kits and alternative energy systems installed
they are the most efficient, off-the-grid, portable structures on earth
and are as effective in keeping you cool in the Mohave Desert as they
are in keeping you warm and dry on the North Slope of Alaska.
To provide a more substantial shelter response agencies often have
turned to trailers or mobile homes. These, of course, provide more
creature comforts and are used for longer-term temporary housing
requirements. However, there are many, very large differences between
our ``domes'' and trailers. Trailers take longer to produce and are
more expensive to acquire, warehouse, transport, and maintain. The
entrance and exit strategy for a trailer or similar hard-wall structure
is much more difficult to plan and execute. Often existing roads are
blocked with traffic or debris and cannot accommodate the passage of
large the trucks that transport them. As evidenced in Katrina, too
often they can only be used once, if at all, and proper disposal is
extremely difficult and an added expense.
Obviously, the use of tents and trailers leaves a huge unfilled gap
in providing adequate, safe, and reusable accommodation. After Katrina,
we heard from response agencies, first responders, those being housed
and many NGO's that, ``trailers just don't work, and tents are simply
not acceptable''. We are confident that we have developed the ``missing
link'' in the emergency accommodation scheme.
Our structures go up as fast as a tent and because of their dome
design once erected they are stronger than a trailer and many stick-
built houses. Utilizing simple tools and unskilled labor, they can be
erected in a couple of hours and when they are sealed and anchored
properly, they are hurricane-proof, earthquake-proof, water-proof and
extremely fire-resistant. They can remain in place for months or years,
as necessary, or dismantled and stored in a matter of hours. In
contrast to trailers or other hard-wall structures, our portable
shelters can be transported using light trucks or medium lift
helicopters and can be easily placed close to response victim centers
using parking lots or existing athletic fields. Over the past 12 years
they have been fully tested and used successfully in the most extreme
weather and hazardous terrain on earth.
On the home page of our Web site at www.intershelter.com you will
see one of our domes sitting next to the helicopter that brought it
there, on a mountain top above Valdez, Alaska. This is one of the
snowiest places on earth with an average of 300 inches. On top of that
mountain overlooking Prince William Sound our 14-ft. Survival Sphere is
hit by winds in excess of 175 MPH during the fall and winter storm
seasons. In winter it is then buried under 40 feet of snow until melt-
off in late summer. This shelter has housed sensitive
telecommunications and computer equipment used to communicate with the
oil tankers plying the waters below. It has withstood 6 winters with
absolutely no maintenance or structural damage fully protecting the
expensive, important satellite communications gear inside. The
versatility, durability, storability, mobility, and economy of our
buildings cannot be matched by any of the tent or trailer variants on
the market today.
We feel that our buildings would be a great asset for the
sustainment of the victims of disaster. Using our domes it may not be
necessary to totally remove those left homeless from their local
communities. Once the area is cleared, it may be possible to
accommodate families on or close to familiar surroundings. In a best-
case scenario, families could stay on or close to their own property,
near their neighbors and friends, protecting what little property and
belongings they have left to begin the daunting task rebuilding their
lives and homes. In time, when families can be adequately housed,
whether in weeks or months, the ``exit plan'' for our shelters couldn't
be simpler. The domes can be washed, disassembled in under an hour, and
stored until they are needed with no requirement for the recurring
maintenance required for tentage or trailers.
Because of the ``Pringles''-like stackability of our dome
components, in the same space it takes to ship one FEMA trailer we can
ship enough domes to house 300 people. Instead of spending $45,000 to
$70,000+ for a trailer that cannot be easily disposed of or
reconditioned for reuse. Our domes, which do not have these
limitations, can be produced for under $20,000 which is less than many
of the proposed tentage systems for this purpose.
Our domes can be used as command posts for ``first responders'',
emergency communications centers, and MASH-style hospitals, and triage
facilities, long-term accommodations for offices or shelter for the
homeless. They can be interconnected in any configuration needed.
Because the domes are of fiber-glass resin construction many types of
computer, communications, and satellite equipment can be used and
protected from the elements with absolutely no signal interference from
the building materials. To meet the needs of FEMA and other global
response organizations.
InterShelter has proposed to team with the AAR Corporation to build
``total response'' packages using our modular dome designs which can be
seen in the Annex to this presentation. Our objective is to produce
fully air-deployable self-contained and supported camps that can be
installed with little or no site preparation for 300 people within 24
hours and for up to 2,000 people within 72 hours. This effort, using
U.S.-manufactured products, is well underway and will incorporate
totally interoperable communications and IT systems for police, fire,
and military response teams, ID card production facilities, over-
pressure systems for chemical and biological response teams to include
decontamination facilities and medical modules with complete field
surgical capabilities and accommodation packages for first responders,
office and lodging, and family accommodation modules. AAR's mobility
systems and Contingency Response Communication Systems, integrating
first responder communications nets, are presently in use in the U.S.
Army and Army National Guard Units. All modular dome configurations
will be supported by fully integrated alternative energy sources, solar
and wind, as well as, potable water production facilities and waterless
human and hazardous waste disposal systems.
If given the opportunity, we stand ready to provide ``The Next
Generation of Emergency Shelter'', in the numbers needed at a
substantial savings to our Government.
Again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I would like
thank you for the honor and privilege of addressing you here today.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize Mr. Rininger for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRADDON B. RININGER, PRESIDENT, BRAJO,
INCORPORATED
Mr. Rininger. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and
distinguished Members of the committee for the invitation and
opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of behalf of
Brajo, Incorporated, and as American people.
In considering products for use in conjunction with the
emergency preparedness program, we made three points our
priority: Affordable, safe, and substantial.
Affordable units will save the American taxpayers money by
reduced initial costs and reusability. Safe. We have a Class A
fire rating. Green, and we are formaldehyde-free. Substantial,
with sound construction of steel and structural insulated
panels and 160 mile-per-hour wind load exceeding seismic
ratings of 8 on the Richter scale.
Features and benefits of the Brajo Hurricane House:
Flexibility. Non-wheeled units promote dignity and pride of
ownership.
What are the options? Recover the unit, reuse it, or store
it in a future deployment--for future department. They can be
used as adjacent structures, further increasing the tax base.
But to realize the cost-effectiveness of our design, we
must address emergency preparedness. The Brajo preparedness
alternative consists of understanding the foundation issue,
which is continuity of community.
The Brajo Hurricane House addresses the need to maintain
and preserve the continuity of the community in a disaster
situation because of its ease of transition of the dwelling
from quick response to intermediate and then finally to
permanent housing, where possible, which preserves the tax
base.
Ease of construction, using local unskilled labor
encourages team effort, people helping people.
Quick response is imperative to maintaining the community.
Quick response means hope, and hope sustains faith in our
country's system. Quick response requires emergency
preparedness. The Brajo preparedness alternative will assist
FEMA in meeting the crisis head on by demonstrating the ability
to fill the void of the initial impact of the disaster by
having product on-site within a 24-hour period of notification,
creating the time element necessary to gear up, meet the need,
while cementing goodwill with the American people.
Emergency preparedness requires a proactive decision in
inventorying product. Inventory warehousing alternative will
accommodate 60,000 people short-term for approximately $150
million.
Now, with my submittal and testimony, I have the details on
that.
Container-based product. By comparison, utilizes
approximately 20 percent of the comparable size wheel units, 80
percent savings. Please note: container-based products allow
ease of security, preventing damage due to vandalism and
exposure to the elements. Container-based product reduces
freight costs, because you can ship a Brajo--eight Brajo
Hurricane Houses for every one wheeled unit. The point to
container-based product is the ability to manage the product,
whether in inventory, during transition, or on-site.
In closing, history shows us that change is imperative. I
am here to assist in improving the way we address disaster
relief through product design. We believe that, by using
correct product initially, we enable local and State
governments to build on what FEMA has provided.
This product is in 36 countries throughout the world. A
pilot project for permanent housing is currently underway in
Lafayette, Louisiana, under the Lafayette, Louisiana, housing
authority.
Ladies and gentlemen, I offer my personal pledge to provide
our fullest support to achieve the ultimate goal of this
program: The rapid and dignified restoration and recovery of
American communities devastated by acts of nature or man.
Honorable Chairman Thompson and distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you, and may God bless America.
[The statement of Mr. Rininger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Braddon B. Rininger
July 8, 2009
Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Members of the committee, for the
invitation and opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of
Brajo, Incorporated and the American people.
Ladies and gentlemen, in considering products for use in
conjunction with the Emergency Preparedness Program, i.e. Disaster
Relief Housing, we made three points our priority:
1. AFFORDABLE/SAFE/SUBSTANTIAL
In addition to these 3 points, we also recognize the utmost
importance of maintaining the continuity of the community. These 3
points played a key role in our decision as to what to bring to the
table.
Affordable--Units will Save the American Taxpayers Money
Initial Cost--compared to the cost of units currently in
use--a substantial savings can be realized.
Reusability--Unit can be dissembled, refurbished, and
returned to inventory status.
The unit can be incorporated as permanent real estate
enhancing the tax base.
Safe--It Is Built With Environmentally Responsible Materials
Green.
Formaldehyde-Free.
Class A Fire Rating.
Substantial
Sound construction of Steel and Structural Insulated Panels
(SIPs) meeting 160-mph wind load.
Exceeding seismic ratings of 8 on the Richter Scale.
To recognize the cost-effectiveness of our design, we address
emergency preparedness.
2. FEATURES AND BENEFITS OF THE BRAJO HURRICANE HOUSE
Non-wheeled Units.--Our units promote dignity and pride of
ownership.
Recovery/Reuse/Storage Capability for future deployment or
conversion to alternate use as an adjacent structure, further
increasing tax base.
(Reference CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL34087 Updated August 8,
2008 at page CRS-27 and therein referenced bibliography.)
Options.--Throw it away/back to the warehouse for refurbishing and
re-use in the future once again saving money/can be left on site as an
auxiliary bldg to the homeowner/can be upgraded to permanent housing
where primary structure has been deemed to be irreparable. Up-fitting
to standard building codes with minimal costs will convert unit into a
permanent home, securing acceptance of dwellings at the local
government level by qualifying as real property tax base.
The Brajo Hurricane House is designed to be situated when possible
on the primary property. This is due to a self-supporting floor frame
design which requires minimal terrain preparation in conjunction with
simple utility connections when available. Auxiliary utilities must be
utilized in the interim.
3. BRAJO PREPAREDNESS PLAN
Consists of understanding the foundation issue, which is:
Continuity of Community
The Brajo Hurricane House addresses the need to Maintain and
Preserve the continuity of the community in a disaster
situation because of: Maintaining continuity of the community;
Quick Response is imperative to maintaining the continuity of
the community.
Quick Response
Method of implementing Quick Response: Purposes offers (a)
Ease of transition of the dwelling from Quick Response to
intermediate and finally to permanent housing which preserves
the tax base when possible; (b) Ease of construction using
local unskilled labor encourages team effort--people helping
people.
Cost of Haste
(As quoted from CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL34087 Updated
August 8, 2008 at page CRS-5 Paragraph 3 and therein referenced
bibliography.)
The Katrina Experience.
``During their use the ships housed over 8,000 people and served
over 2 million meals to Katrina victims and workers helping in the
recovery. While meeting emergency needs, critics questioned the cost of
housing victims on the ships. Some doubted the efficacy of the plan,
the location of some ships, the cost and length of the contract, and
the process used to arrive at the agreement. As one story noted: `The
6-month contract--staunchly defended by Carnival but castigated by
politicians from both parties--has come to exemplify the cost of haste
that followed Katrina's strike and FEMA's lack of preparation.' ''
Distinguished Members of this committee: We all like the words
``Emergency Preparedness,'' however we seem to ignore the requirements.
Why do we tend to ignore the requirements? Because with requirements
come commitment and commitment costs money. Can we not further our
considerations in this effort to the point where we have the issues on
the table? In private industry we must identify the points clearly to
do a fair comparison. And that is what I am asking you to consider.
Rather than saying ``No'' to spending money upfront, consider the costs
of reaction vs. pro-action. We are asking for a proactive decision.
Recent history shows us that for every dollar not spent up-front,
resulted in astronomical costs on the backend. We all know and are
experiencing the cost of recent disasters and I think we can agree that
the decision to not spend money on the front-end, i.e. little or no
preparation in terms of inventory of product, a warehousing program,
advance party, etc. results in exorbitant over-runs, financially
penalizing the American taxpayer.
The Brajo Preparedness Plan is designed to assist FEMA in
meeting the crisis head-on by demonstrating the ability to fill
the void of the initial impact of the disaster by having
product on-site within a 24-hr. period of requirement, creating
the time element necessary to gear up to meet the need while
cementing good-will with the American People.
Therefore, we propose the Brajo Preparedness Program, which
consists of:
4. INVENTORY/WAREHOUSING PROGRAM
Inventory to accommodate 60,000 people short-term and with the
capability of transitioning that our U3 Design offers enables going
from Quick Response Shelter status to Intermediate Temporary Housing
and most important up-fitting to permanent housing. This capability
will have a major effect on the entire effort across the board. It
addresses the following questions:
Must victims leave the area? No, there is a reason to stay.
Can local volunteers support effort immediately? Yes, quick
response.
Are the initial shelter units useless after crisis is over
rendering all monies invested a loss? No money lost.
Can shelter be up graded to intermediate and then permanent
status? Yes.
Will unit become real estate therefore improving tax base?
Yes.
Will the unit be acceptable by local governments and qualify
for local funding? Permanent status meets HUD code.
Is unit aesthetically acceptable and people-friendly? Yes.
NOTE: The U3 design may be used at the existing site or on the
alternate site of the host community. Once again, units will qualify as
permanent housing and real property, thus maintaining tax base.
Warehousing Costs
10 Locations=1 inventory site in each of the 10 FEMA
Regions.
Total number of Flat Pack Modulars=5,000 Accommodating
20,000 people.
Total number of Brajo Hurricane Houses (U3)=5,000
Accommodating 40,000 people.
Total Estimated $150,000,000 up-front costs of shelters.
Warehousing and Administrative costs to include:
Warehousing Leases 10 Locations.
Security and Insurance.
Annual Inspections All Containers.
Pest Control Annually.
Training Seminars for National Guard Advance Party
Annually Each Site.
Total Lump Sum Annually $5,000,000.
A low-cost outdoor storage facility location in each of 10
FEMA regions tailored to historic disaster demographics.
Example: Conventional storage of a comparable sized wheeled
units requires appx. 5,000 cu. ft. The Brajo Hurricane House,
while container-based and stackable, requires appx. 1,000 cu.
ft. This is a major reduction in inventory cost. Please Note:
Container-based products allow:
Ease of security.
Preventing damage due to vandalism and exposure to the
element.
In addition, container-based product reduces freight cost
because you can ship 8 Brajo Hurricane Houses for every 1
wheeled unit.
The point to container-based product is the ability to
manage the product, whether in inventory, during transition
via highway transport and/or on-site.
Training of National Guardsmen in each of the 10 inventory
locations, which is the responsibility of the contract holder,
not the Government.
A master inventory site is strongly suggested for a central
location adjacent to the ``hot zone'' for the purpose of
rehabilitating our reusable units prior to returning inventory
to assigned region.
A national emergency preparedness program that will assist
FEMA in providing an emergency quick response throughout the
United States enabling FEMA to react anywhere in the
continental United States within 24 hrs. of notification. This
is predicated on transportation infrastructure being intact.
This plan calls for employment of trained National Guard
team leaders (2 Guardsmen on first shipment) to deploy with the
units to act as advance party at the disaster site as incident
command centers are set up.
Training and orientation of advance party for each of the 10
locations will be the responsibility of the contract holder.
Contract management team of the contract holder is on call
to receive the request by FEMA to alert the appropriate
warehouse operation and the National Guardsmen assigned to that
operation simultaneously.
This program is designed to facilitate the quick response
necessary to maintain continuity in the community.
Note.--It has been our experience and I am sure you all agree that
once the continuity of the community is lost, the result is
astronomical over-expenditures due to the inherent chaos and confusion
that ensues. History tells us that the faster we react the more
successful the relief effort becomes. Consequently, we are saving our
people, and we are saving the taxpayers' money due to averting
outrageous costs overruns.
Part of the equation that is ever most important is
efficiency. While in the onset it may appear that by not making
a financial commitment to be emergency prepared, that we are
saving money, however, history tells us once again that because
of the inability to react in a quick response sense, outrageous
and extreme cost overruns are inevitable.
And last but certainly not least . . .
5. A MORTGAGE RECOVERY PLAN FOR DISASTER VICTIMS
Reference: Congressional Oversight Panel Foreclosure Crisis: Working
Toward a Solution--March Oversight Report dated March 9, 2009 Submitted
under Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343.
In an effort to support President Obama's announced homeowner
affordability and stability plan intended to prevent unnecessary
foreclosures and strengthen affected communities, specifically where
disasters are involved, we offer this mortgage recovery plan. This is
an attempt to show that by having quick response capability with the
correct product foreclosures can be averted.
Purpose
Avoid Foreclosure
Encourage Residents to Remain at Homesite
Mitigate Loss by Hazard Insurance Companies
Mitigate Loss by Mortgage Insurance Companies
Aid Community in Rebuilding Process--People present
Help Prevent Looting and Crime--People present
Speed Recovery Process--Keep People local
Promotes Local Labor Force
Restores Pride of Home Ownership--hands on by victims
Encourages Psychological Healing from Loss
Personal Property Can be Recovered & Secured
Community Integrity Through Self-Help/Promoting Solidarity &
Team-Spirit
Refurbishing Efforts Will be Expedited, Returning Community
to Normalcy
Proposed Plan of Action
Deliver Brajo Hurricane House to Damaged Property Site
Clear Site for Erection in Appropriate Proximity to Damaged
House
Pre-Trained Team Leader Arrives with the Brajo Hurricane
House
Team Leader Initiates Erection of Brajo Hurricane House
Team Leader Enlists Property Occupant and Local Labor to
Begin Erection Process
Approximately 5 Persons Can Erect the Brajo Hurricane House
in 1 day
Connect Brajo Hurricane House to On-Site Infrastructure
(Water/Sewer/Utilities Quick Connect)
Progress Toward Rebuilding the Damaged Home and Community
Begins
In closing, this product is currently in 23 countries throughout
the world and in addition, a pilot project for permanent housing is
underway for the Lafayette, Louisiana Housing Authority.
Units are on display at the International Aid and Trade show
convention in the District of Columbia July 9-10 at the Ronald Reagan
Building, 1300 Penn. Ave., Washington, DC.
I offer my personal pledge to provide our fullest support to
achieve the ultimate goal of this program--the rapid and dignified
restoration and recovery of American communities devastated by acts of
nature or man.
Honorable Chairman Thompson and Members of the committee, thank
you.
EXHIBIT A
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EXHIBIT B
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Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now hear from Mr. Boasso for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WALTER J. BOASSO, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HELP,
LLC
Mr. Boasso. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
Members. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
I come from a 30-year history in the intermodal industry,
doing business basically all over the United States and, of
course, foreign countries. I was elected to the Louisiana
Senate in 2004. One year and 8 months after my introduction
into politics, we had Hurricane Katrina.
The 122,000 people that I represented all lost everything
or were affected by Hurricane Katrina. I was part of the first
contingent that made it into the city of New Orleans, 100
wildlife agents with 60 boats, where we began the rescue
operations in the Lower Ninth Ward, making our way to St.
Bernard Parish.
I have had first-hand witness the loss of life, the lack of
food, medicine, water, ice, no communication system, no
logistical coordination, no coordination from a State or
Federal response for almost 8 days.
Through my personal experiences of having 13 feet of water
in my house during Katrina and, 3 weeks later, 5 feet of water
in my house for Rita, my company, Boasso America, went
underwater and my almost 200 employees of Boasso America in St.
Bernard Parish lost everything, as well.
So I have the experience of seeing more grief, upset, and
death after the storm. If we track the lives of the people that
died after the storm instead of during the storm, the numbers
would be staggering, because these people lost everything they
worked for and had nowhere to turn. People couldn't get back
into their communities because of the housing and the logistics
or the lack of logistics that occurred.
So basically, what does this mean? I am someone here today
as a civic leader, a businessman, a family man, a veteran of
two national disasters, and a former occupant of a FEMA
trailer. I have to say what a challenge that was.
So as I looked as FEMA progressed in their housing options,
I felt that we are missing a very key opportunity. What I am
here today to present to you is a solution, a solution to
interim housing.
This is where I began the establishment of HELP, Housing
Emergency Logistics Program, because it is not just a matter of
providing the housing unit. It is getting the unit there. It is
taking care of the unit during the process of why it is there
and then removing the unit and restoring and reusing for
another disaster.
The last 30 years, I have been modifying containers for--
industry, as well as--and using containers for different use.
What I propose to you today is looking at the module of the
HELP unit. With the HELP unit, if you look at the national
disaster housing strategy, is a range of use, deliverability,
the timeliness, and the cost.
Well, what is great about this range of use is that we are
able to use the current intermodal system that exists today. I
will just give you the example where we talk about having the
units in harm's way. I had thousands of containers, both in
Jacksonville, Charleston, South Carolina, Houston, Texas, and
in St. Bernard Parish during all those hurricanes. They were
all there, and they all stayed there.
So we have a durable unit that can be reused again. In our
industry, these units are amortized over 15 years, so therefore
we have the longevity. The initial cost is much cheaper than
the options that are put out there today.
But in putting that unit together, we are also going to
incorporate all the failings of the activities that people
need. An example: Once you got that trailer, you need an
electrical pole. You needed a plumbing system. You needed a
water hookup. All of this will be contained in that module
itself.
So when we deliver that module, all you have to do is
connect it, and it is taken care of. We don't have to worry
about losing it during a subsequent storm. Furthermore, we
could take it and reuse it many times, where we will see the
advantage of saving American dollars during that process.
So as far as footprint, the indoor air quality, the
production lead, we fit all of those requirements. But I think
the most important thing is when it comes down to storage, the
longevity of being able to reuse that unit again.
So for, once again, my plan is put into testimony here
today, and I thank you for the opportunity to be here.
[The statement of Mr. Boasso follows:]
Prepared Statement of Walter J. Boasso
July 8, 2009
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King and Members of the committee: My
name is Walter J. Boasso and I am the president (CEO?) [sic] of HELP,
Inc. and, more importantly, I am a former resident of a FEMA trailer.
HELP stands for Housing Emergency Logistics Plan and is a direct
outcome of what I experienced as one of the first officials on-site in
New Orleans dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and what me
and my family experienced as displaced residents of New Orleans living
in a trailer provided by FEMA after this disaster.
Until recently when I sold my company, I was the CEO/President of
Boasso America Corporation. Boasso America is the largest tank
container operation in the world, with over 500 employees. Through this
role, I have over 30 years of experience and expertise with shipping
containers and all of the alternative uses for these items. Our
operations covered all of the major ports in the United States
including Chicago, Detroit, Charleston, South Carolina, Jacksonville,
Florida, Houston, and New Orleans.
In addition to my role as CEO and President of Boasso America, I
was involved in government through my election to the Louisiana State
Senate, serving from 2004 to 2008. My district covered a large section
of the east coast of Louisiana and I represented 122,000 people--every
one of which was affected in some way by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Through my position as a State senator, I was part of the first
contingent of officials coming in to New Orleans after Katrina's
devastation. Mr. Chairman, I could spend hours with this committee
recalling that event and the governmental response to that event. I
could describe in detail and through plain and simple facts the loss of
life I dealt with, the lack of food, the absence of medicine and safe
water, no communications system, no logistical coordination of any
kind. I could describe in detail the personal impact of this event on
me and my family. My home had 13 feet of water during Hurricane Katrina
and 5 feet of water during Hurricane Rita. My business's home office
was underwater as well and all of my employees--all of the people who
made up Boasso America--lost everything.
We lost everything because of a natural disaster that occurred and
the simple fact that, after it occurred, there was no plan or effort
from a governmental level to help people return to their homes or to
their work or to have the basic necessities to survive. Quite simply,
there was no coordinated State or Federal response of any kind for
almost 8 days. Mr. Chairman, that's the tragedy of New Orleans and
Hurricane Katrina. When the people of New Orleans and St. Bernard
Parish and the other impacted areas of the Gulf needed it the most, the
Government's emergency and disaster systems and services failed them.
The death and destruction I saw and the responses to these disasters,
or in reality the lack of response, led me to begin work on providing
an alternative interim housing program or plan and thus was born HELP.
HELP stands for Housing Emergency Logistics Plan and our plan and
company provides interim emergency and disaster housing solutions that
are more effective, comfortable, environmentally acceptable, and cost-
efficient than the interim housing solutions the Government has relied
upon for too long. It also incorporates into the overall disaster
housing response system a coordination with the Nation's intermodal
logistics systems in order to get housing units where they're needed as
quickly as possible and in the least costly manner possible.
Our model is very efficient and understandable. They are built upon
the models of shipping containers--they are made of a heavy steel outer
shell in accordance with international shipping container standards and
re-styled to suit community housing types and needs. The interiors are
built from sustainable materials with no hazardous chemicals involved,
thus creating a green environment for the residents. They're
handicapped accessible and, most importantly, the internal layouts,
furniture and fittings see to provide comfort to those who have
suffered the loss of their home in a more ``normal'' or ``home''
environment. Also, these units are designed to be hurricane and storm
resistant, unlike FEMA trailers.
Because of the shipping container model they're based upon, the
HELP interim housing units are designed and built for immediate
dispatch for placement at the home site of families who have suffered a
loss of their home. The units are not dependent upon one (and only one)
form of transportation to get them where they're needed. The units can
be moved on any conventional container truck chassis readily available
throughout the country. They can also be deployed by rail or barge and
are placed on-site using standard fork lift trucks.
As shown in the following diagrams, the units are very attractive
and, yet, very flexible and versatile in their configurations. The
following three diagrams present the outside of the unit and typical 20
and 40 feet in length units.
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The most important aspect of the HELP model and its disaster
housing unit is the storage and reuse factors. Because of the container
model it's based upon, the HELP units are stackable and easily
maintained while being stored. As with all shipping containers, the 20-
foot and 40-foot HELP units can be stacked up to nine units high.
There, over 2,000 HELP 20-foot units can be stored on 1 acre of land as
opposed to the same acre only able to store 170 FEMA-style 22-foot
trailers.
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The flexibility of the units is another important aspect. Only two
types of HELP units are needed to accommodate between 2 and 6 persons
per unit. Therefore, most families can be accommodated but, if larger
units are needed, two or more units can be sited closer together, thus
providing unlimited flexibility.
From an environmental perspective, HELP's units stand alone. The
units are constructed from sustainable materials that have no hazardous
chemicals. The insulation factor in the HELP unit is double that of a
FEMA trailer, providing significant energy savings during its use. Air
conditioning and ventilation systems are provided with the unit and are
easily maintained during both use and storage. Each unit stores its own
waste and this waste is either regularly pumped out to a handling
vehicle or into the existing community sewage lines. And, as with all
shipping containers, the units are recyclable.
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As outlined in the chart above, the HELP unit model from a
logistical standpoint and an implementation standpoint is very simple.
The units are manufactured and fitted out. They are stored in pre-
positioned or strategic locations. They are transported via any number
of modes of transportation to where they are needed in the event of a
disaster. They are ready to go when they are delivered and families can
start utilizing them immediately. When a family can go back to their
home, the units are removed, cleaned up and stored for the next time
they're needed. Again, a very simple chain of events logistically.
In particular, as you can see from this chart, the HELP disaster
housing unit provides very important elements that other disaster
housing units utilized in the past do not and cannot meet. I want to
expand on two very significant elements which I hope the Members of the
committee view in the same light as I do. First is the element of
storage and the second element is longevity. These two items provide,
in my opinion, the criteria that have been missing from the disaster
housing options provided by FEMA in the past.
As noted earlier, the HELP units are designed off of shipping
containers. Having been in the shipping business for over 30 years, I
understand the need for utilizing small spaces for storage as
efficiently as possible. Because of the design and because of how
they're manufactured, the HELP units can be stored in almost any
location and a large number of them can be stored in a small space.
Because of their stackability, we can pre-position or store until
needed almost 2,000 units in the same space that only holds around 180
traditional FEMA travel trailers. This storage efficiency frees up
valuable space in order to pre-position or store other much-needed
disaster response supplies and equipment.
Secondly, with simple maintenance during storage (items such as
checking the heating and cooling systems, water and wastewater systems,
etc.), the longevity of the unit is significantly higher than
traditional FEMA disaster housing options. This single element of
longevity ensures that disaster housing assistance is available
whenever and wherever it's needed. With enough units on hand at any
given location, in a pre-positioned storage facility, the units are
ready to be delivered wherever necessary and set up, year after year.
There's nothing to rot, nothing to fall apart, no axles to break.
All of the components of the HELP unit add up to one very important
point--the HELP unit provides a cost-effective, efficient, long-lasting
type of disaster housing that the Government and FEMA desperately need.
In preparation for my presentation today, I reviewed FEMA's plans
contained in the National Disaster Housing Strategy. This strategy laid
out several criteria for disaster housing options. These criteria
include:
1. Range of Use.--How adaptable it would be under various
environmental, geographic, and cultural or conditions required
by local governments;
2. Livability.--How well the units can accommodate or help provide
for a household's daily living essentials as well as their
physical and emotional need;
3. Timeliness.--How fast units could be made ready for occupancy;
4. Cost.--How cost-effective the unit would be in absolute terms
and in terms of its value relative to additional requirements
established as critical in meeting FEMA immediate housing needs
and priorities that include:
a. Footprint.--Units should be small, capable of HUD certification
and suitable for FEMA community sites or privately owned
sites;
b. UFAS.--A sufficient number of units must be available for
occupants who are disabled and the units must comply with
Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards;
c. Indoor Air Quality.--Utilizing a holistic approach to indoor air
quality control measures by eliminating or limiting use of
products that contain pollutants, enclosing potentially
harmful air pollutant sources in impermeable barriers,
using filtration/ventilation to dilute or decrease airborne
pollutants, requiring rigorous quality control measures
during the manufacturing process, specifying control
methods through contracting and procurement processes and
other methods of control; and
d. Production Lead-Time.--Providers must be able to deliver a
certain number immediately or within a short time frame to
meet FEMA's operations and performance requirements.
Let me state again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, that
I reviewed these items only recently and I was surprised at the
compatibility of the HELP units with these criteria. Our units meet
every one of these criteria and I would hope, because of that fact,
that FEMA would see the benefits in having the HELP unit as one of its
disaster housing response options.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King and Members of the committee, I
want to thank you for this opportunity to come before you today and
provide information and background on what I believe is truly a
significant new tool for FEMA to use in providing disaster housing
options for families that have lost their homes and need safe, clean,
and efficient temporary housing and which can be provided to them
almost immediately after a disaster strikes. I lived through Katrina
and I've applied the lessons I learned, and lived through, in
developing this concept. I want other families that go through a
disaster of any kind to not have to go through what I went through and
I believe HELP and its product can provide the type of housing that
disaster victims need and deserve.
Again, I appreciate this opportunity to provide this information
and I will be happy to answer any questions you might have at this
time.
Chairman Thompson. I thank you for your testimony.
Without objection, a statement provided to the committee by
Mr. Cross of SG Blocks will be inserted into the hearing
record.
[The information follows:]
Statement of SG Blocks Submitted for the Record by Chairman Bennie G.
Thompson
Public Policy Issue Response.--The need for quick, reactive,
durable, economical housing relief in disaster situations is a national
priority. The country's ability to respond to virtually any size
disaster that involves the need for emergency shelter has been tested
on numerous occasions, only to be met with inconsistent results. A
comprehensive approach has been elusive until now. SG Blocks offers an
affordable, immediate, sustainable answer with the SG Blocks Disaster
Relief Unit.
Multi-faceted Solution.--SG Blocks provides an integrated and
multi-faceted solution for housing needs brought on by population
displacement from disasters both at home and abroad. Published on
January 16, 2009, FEMA's National Disaster Housing Strategy highlights
an essential need for disaster housing to ``leverage emerging
technologies and new approaches in building design to provide an array
of housing options.'' There is a stated emphasis on understanding and
meeting individual household needs, while providing a full range of
flexible and adaptable housing options. The SG Blocks approach provides
both; employing a sophisticated, logistically driven management and
deployment system with numerous benefits:
Ability to flexibly build up inventory as required by FEMA.
A service life of 25-75 years, depending on the application.
Flexible, durable, and affordable storage capability for
multiuse purposes.
Stackable to maximize storage in a way traditional modular
housing cannot.
Design integration for expandable transitional shelter that
can be converted to permanent housing.
A safe, sustainable, energy-saving green product with an
exceptionally low-carbon footprint.
Highly transportable and demountable for rapid deployment,
reconfiguration, or reuse.
Built to meet or exceed HUD and other building codes.
Fitted for persons with special needs, including the elderly
and the disabled; this group is disproportionately impacted
during disaster emergencies.
SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units offer inherently protected interior
space. Selected units can be pre-configured and simultaneously
deployed. They provide a safe and secure environment for transporting
emergency water, food, blankets, and medical supplies, power-
generating, and water treatment equipment. Once on-site and unloaded,
the pre-configured units convert into shelter as standard SG Blocks
Disaster Relief Units.
The system is proven through its use by the military. CHU's
(Containerized Housing units) have previously been deployed through
multiple applications. A large complex was built by SG Blocks for the
249th Engineering Battalion Command at Fort Bragg.
The SG Blocks system conforms to U.S. Government mandated COTS
(``Commercial off the Shelf'') initiatives for products and service. It
meets or exceeds all COTS specifications including: Storage,
deployment, re-deployment, inspection, maintenance, and repair
capabilities. The interior of an SG Blocks Disaster Relief Unit uses
commercially available off-the-shelf components throughout: Doors,
windows, flooring, interior sheetrock, electrical, and plumbing
approved for use and routinely installed in modular and factory built
housing. Zero formaldehyde standards are applied to all interior
components. At the heart of the system is the Value-CycledTM
SG Block; a cargo container that is efficiently modified and re-
purposed from an international instrument of trade carriage to an
international instrument of housing. SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units
can be easily converted to permanent installation, as the fundamental
building block (container) is designed to be grouped for easy
expandability and connectivity after deployment. When the SG Block is
used in multiple configurations, the company's proprietary engineering
and linking methods create honeycomb design strength.
Addressing available housing options (pg 31 NDHS), FEMA states:
``The range of available housing options sets the parameters for the
type of assistance that can be provided and challenges planners to be
creative in seeking innovative solutions. Disaster housing must include
a sufficient range of options that are compatible with the community
characteristics, including population density, climate, geography, and
land availability. They must be safe, durable, physically accessible,
and cost-effective. Viability may also hinge on timely availability and
sufficient capacity to meet the size and diversity of a household, as
well as cost effectiveness.''
The SGB Disaster Relief Units address every one of those needs. The
Units will contain all the basics required for sufficient housing.
Kitchen, baths, living and sleeping space will be included along with
standard appliances and home features. The building facade may be
aesthetically adjusted to fit into any landscape, and as necessary, can
be regionalized to suit any climate. Should the SGB Disaster Relief
Unit ultimately become permanent, exterior modifications can easily be
made; enabling the permanent home to seamlessly integrate into any
environment. With extraordinary structural integrity, SGB Disaster
Relief Units are more durable and weather-resistant than other
shelters, conveying a sense of personal safety, strength, security, and
well-being. This inherent stability aids in the recovery from
psychological trauma during and after a disaster and the displacement
that follows.
The Logistical Advantage.--There is a significant logistical
advantage when using the SG Blocks system. The supply source is part of
a global logistical shipping network. The existing manpower, equipment,
and organization mobilize immediately for quick and efficient
deployment. EDI data management software is already in place; and
uniquely flexible equipment handling and transport options provide
unmatched deployment capabilities. A rapid dispatch rate is estimated
at 45 units per hour. SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units may be
transported on intermodal chassis trailers, flatbeds, tilt-beds, step-
decks, railroad, ocean barge, inland barge, or on container vessels.
The mission changes but the execution mirrors the daily logistical
operations that the depots routinely handle with containers. Industry-
accepted inspectors are based at the deployment site and are available
around the clock to receive, inspect, and certify SG Blocks Disaster
Relief Units.
A significant space-saving advantage is inherent in the ability to
stack the SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units. 90 units per acre are
typical of non-stackable modular or trailer housing currently being
deployed. In stark contrast, SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units may be
stacked vertically 8 high, creating a vastly enlarged site storage
capacity of 1,040+ SGB Disaster Relief Units per acre. This translates
into high-density site storage and maximized use of available space.
SINGLE UNIT SCALABLE SYSTEM
The Structure.--The SGB Disaster Relief Unit is a highly
transportable, low-maintenance, long-lasting structure built from
Value-Cycled ``green'' engineered containers, utilizing oxidation
resistant COR-TEN heavy gauge steel. Designed to carry up to 60,000
lbs. on ships, the containers are converted for shelter by SG Blocks
and re-engineered to meet and exceed FEMA specifications.
SG Blocks proposes to deploy the Disaster Relief Units and provide
full logistical support and maintenance management.
Key Features:
Options for 1, 2, and 3+ bedroom units with the ability to
incorporate into transitional and more permanent housing.
Rapidly transportable and highly deployable units; multiple
modes of transportation to choose from to assure quick and
dependable delivery to a designated site.
Continual, abundant supply at multiple and strategically
located U.S.- and internationally-based depots.
Rapidly deployable, both domestically and internationally.
Designed to meet all Federal fair housing requirements along
with Federal and local accessibility requirements for disabled
occupants; this includes ramping, grab bars, appropriate
turning radii, corridor width, appropriate hardware, accessible
showers and/or tubs. Depending upon end-users' needs, a
specific number of compliant units may be provided, or all
units can be designed to be in conformance.
Constructed of heavy-gauge, oxidation-resistant COR-TEN
steel, the SG Block Disaster Relief Unit meets and exceeds
published requirements of the U.S. Government for emergency
housing. The system includes the disaster unit, full logistical
control of deployment, re-stocking support, inventory control,
and the capability of conversion into on-site permanent
housing. The interiors incorporate robust paperless drywall
proven suitable for transport as demonstrated in the modular
housing industry. SG Blocks has selected steel cabinetry and
furniture in addition to other sustainable interior components.
Compliance with all interior air quality standards is assured.
These units contain no formaldehyde glues or any building
materials that have the potential to give off formaldehyde gas.
Flexible, Demountable, and Adaptable.--SGB has designed a livable
and versatile unit with the needs of the occupants in mind. As families
expand or contract, our system may be expanded or reduced to
efficiently meet these changing needs.
Designed for scalability and exceeding Government requirements for
1, 2, & 3 bedroom units, SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units have
additional applications as well. The units may be easily deployed as
office space, relief worker live/work space, or as clinics, with
geographic flexibility for all topography and weather variables. As a
stand-alone or multi-unit structure, the uniformity and integration
options of the SGB Disaster Units will result in substantial cost
savings to the Government.
Chapter 3 of NDHS focuses on Interim Housing. Point 11 addresses
its temporary nature. ``Whenever possible, disaster victims should be
moved directly to permanent housing. In creating interim housing plans,
officials must balance the intensive effort to supply temporary housing
with the need to immediately start developing plans for restoring
permanent housing . . . During this period, the State should also be
ready to resume responsibilities once Federal assistance ends. These
fundamental expectations must be established at the beginning of the
interim housing process and guide decisions throughout.'' The
professional and experienced staff of SG Blocks has worked seamlessly
at the municipal planning levels for permits and approvals and can
easily be integrated in the transition phase of temporary to permanent
housing.
The use of SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units provides significant
advantages over modular and travel trailer housing currently being
deployed. While these incumbent structures are deployable, they do not
share the logistical benefits and support provided by the SG Blocks
system. Modular and travel trailer housing has proven to have a
comparatively short service life; they are not built for long-term
durability. The SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units are durable, rugged
steel-framed buildings that last for 25-75 years; they are less
susceptible to moisture damage and provide full compliance with wind
and seismic design codes. Further, scalability and storage capacity of
the SG Blocks unit is over 10x the level of the modular and travel
trailer housing currently being deployed.
SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units far surpass available alternatives
in meeting the disaster housing parameters set forth by FEMA. Inherent
logistical control and geographic proximity both support rapid and
efficient deployment. Multiple modes of transportation enhance rapid
deployment options. SG Blocks Disaster Relief Units are stronger,
safer, and greener. They are more durable, stackable, expandable, and
affordable and can be converted to permanent housing. The SG Blocks
approach is comprehensive; what makes the SG Blocks system so
compelling resides in the sum of its parts.
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ABOUT SG BLOCKS . . .
SG Blocks LLC is the premier provider of code-engineered cargo
shipping containers specifically Value-CycledTM to meet the
growing demand of safe and green construction. SG Blocks capitalizes on
the structural principles associated with the hostile dynamic life a
shipping container is exposed to aboard ship, modifying them into
significant building components that usually exceed building code
requirements. The company has been the leader in establishing container
technology for building code permitted sustainable building. SG Blocks,
LLC management team has disciplines in structural & civil engineering,
building codification, real estate development, management,
architecture and intermodal logistics.
Chairman Thompson. I will remind each Member that he or she
will have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now recognize
myself.
Let me also indicate that Mr. Fugate is still here. I would
like to acknowledge his presence.
Ms. Gees, from the AIA standpoint, have you looked at this
issue of temporary housing from a sustainability standpoint?
Have you made recommendations as to what that type housing
should consist of?
Ms. Gees. Well, from a sustainability standpoint, the most
important thing is to have the maximum usage be a flexibility
of usage, being able to use a temporary housing shelter in
multiple situations, either as temporary or potential long-
term. That is the most important thing, that you can get
multiple use, that you do not have housing sitting there,
waiting for that eventual emergency, but that you have use as
much as possible.
We have committees that are studying this, are looking at
this, so we can get back to you in more detail specifically
about that.
But the other aspect, in response to your question, is that
location of these units, looking at the work that we do with
our communities, SDATs, the SDAT program--we have submitted
some written testimony about that--but we have expert teams
going into communities and looking at their overall
infrastructure, their planning and mitigation. Also with our
disaster assistance coordinators, we are doing the same thing.
What we are looking at ahead of time is where you would
place units, where you have safe areas, how you can take
existing areas of communities that are at risk and already
design them so they are in other locations, that they are
elsewhere. It is really that planning ahead of time that is
very, very important and how then those shelters fit in to that
view, to that vision.
Also, looking at public structures--and I will finish up
this comment--looking at public structures that you are
building, it used to be in the 1960s, in the past, we provided
bomb shelters during the Cold War. I am sure everybody
remembers that. Our public buildings had that dual usage.
That is something to consider potentially in the future as
we look at public buildings, that they again have that full-
time use in the event of emergency.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. One of the comments that the
first panel talked about was the ability to either mass
produce, ramp up should an emergency occur. It was based on
what I interpreted, that the existing trailer industry, either
travel or mobile home industry, was a better fit.
I would just like for the record to get the three companies
represented to see whether or not the ability to ramp up or
mass produce would be an impediment to providing an alternative
solution should a disaster occur for FEMA or any other entity.
Mr. Kubley, we will start with you.
Mr. Kubley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
That is really an excellent question, and I think it goes
to the heart of what I am hearing at this table today. You
know, when you go into the battlefield--and I have never been
in the service, so I am speaking as a layman--when you get out
into the battlefield and you call in for helicopter support or
more ammunition, you have got to know that that helicopter was
built a long time ago and that the ammunition is right behind
the line that you are on.
If you wait for them to built before they bring it to you
to help you, you are in serious trouble. That is exactly what
these people are talking about here today, is preparing and
planning and staging shelters before the problem happens.
Absolutely, we can ramp up to mass production capability
that is needed. That really is our mission and goal here today,
Mr. Chairman, is to offer that ability and that new product,
that new innovative product out there that has never been
available to FEMA or any other emergency service organization
before.
We would suggest that the way to do it as we have proposed
to FEMA, with my partners, AAR Global, which is a team that a
lot of which just came from DynCorp that have hundreds of years
of tactical military experience in responding to emergencies
and setting up communities.
The way to do it, sir, is to have regional warehouses in
strategic places like, for example, on the east side of the San
Andreas Fault, so when the big one hits Los Angeles--not if,
but when, because that is what all the experts are predicting--
that when that San Andreas Fault gives way, you have the
ability to move these in, in a very short order.
With Intershelter domes, you can fly them. You can truck
them or whatever mode of transportation is available. The other
way to do it, sir, is to store them in containers around the
country in all 50 States so, in a matter of 24 hours, whether
it is a tornado, a hurricane, or an earthquake, you can have a
facility set up within 24 hours. With our buildings, you can do
that.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Rininger.
Mr. Rininger. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I might agree with that totally. Inventory warehousing
alternative is the name of the game. Emergency prepared means
you must have inventory in stock, something to draw from.
So, if you don't mind, I will just read this paragraph that
I skipped earlier. The transition capability that our U3 design
offers enables going from quick response shelter status to
intermediate temporary housing and permanent housing when
possible. This capability will have a major effect on the
entire effort across the board.
Okay, note the U3 design may be used in existing sites and
alternate sites of the host community. Once again, units will
qualify as a permanent housing and real property, thus
maintaining a tax base.
Now, warehousing is--we have set up a model for you with 10
locations, one warehouse in each one of the FEMA regions,
totaling 5,000 what we term a Flat Pack Modular, and 5,000
units in a Brajo Hurricane House called the U3.
The sheltering capacity of that is 60,000 people. The
administrative costs of that is about $5 million per year.
Chairman Thompson. I appreciate it. But I am really trying
just to see if you have the capacity to do it, as well as the
suggestion you offered is excellent. I think--I even heard it
from the last panel.
Mr. Boasso.
Mr. Boasso. Yes. I think Director Fugate said it very well
earlier this morning, is that you never can be prepared 100
percent to have every single unit available for a Katrina/Rita/
Ike event.
But what we are proposing to you, Mr. Chairman, is a
national fleet. You do have to have units in waiting. Using the
intermodal industry, we could be anywhere in the United
States--in the whole United States--in 24 hours. So if there
was a disaster that happened of the coast of California, you
could position those units and put them by rail and by truck
and have them delivered.
The same thing goes with any other State as far as one
disaster or multiple disasters.
I think the other part that really rings home is that we
heard today that they spent over $100 million storing FEMA
trailers. I can port 2,000 containers in the same footprint as
180 FEMA trailers. So, therefore, the costs of storage, it is
going to probably be about less than one-third of what FEMA
currently pays today.
But what it does, it gives you a rapid deployment fleet
that you can bring in and move in, but also in a design that we
have is by using the skin of a shipping container, is we have a
modular design that could be manufactured at the current
trailer manufacturers today and where you insert this module
into the outer shell and secure it to the outer shell itself.
So instead of building a trailer that is only going to last
a year or 2 is that we could use those same people to assist us
in ramping up production by just having them build the interior
and inserting the module.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your comments.
One of the concerns you heard from the committee is the
cost. We are real concerned as a committee that the present
cost to respond is very high and the cost to maintain is very
high.
I think the testimony also went to the fact that even some
of the mobile homes that we bought that we never put in use,
because they have been sitting there over a period of time,
there is a question as to whether or not they will really be
able to be pressed into service. But what I have heard from you
is that you have a product that can be reused, stored.
Part of what I hope FEMA is doing, Mr. Fugate, is looking
at the whole picture of what we are faced with and not focusing
on just one particular approach. I think that is key to me.
The other is cost is a problem, as I said, but we also have
to have a plan. If that plan takes in the product, but also how
we deploy, whether it can be reused, where we will put it,
hopefully we won't put it in harm's way, but it will be as
close as we can or there is a method to get it there. All that,
I think, is part of that plan that I hope we will see.
The other issue that is important to a lot of us on the
committee is how FEMA approaches putting vulnerable populations
who obviously are at risk. Ms. Richardson talked about a plan
for the unemployed, but just vulnerable populations in general.
Mr. Morse, can you tell me what concerns you might have
around that, as well as the whole fair housing issue, in
situations like Katrina, what you experienced?
Mr. Morse. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Mr. Fugate for staying to hear the
remainder of the panel. That is very encouraging.
I am a native of Gulfport. I have been through Camille and
Katrina. I have worked after Katrina on precisely the question
you asked. How do you solve the housing problems of vulnerable
people?
The experience that we saw was that, early on, the
experience that we saw early on was that people just doubled up
and tripled up and tried to make do. That just goes to show how
strong people's impulse is when possible to stay where they
already are.
So my single strongest recommendation is to encourage
Congress and FEMA to put into place some mechanism to repair to
the maximum extent possible maximizing the existing housing
that is in place, even if it is a little bit damaged. If that
requires legislative change to enable FEMA to be able to do
rental repair teams, I strongly encourage that to occur. As I
mentioned in my previous testimony, there was a big missed
opportunity there.
I think the other problem that comes up--and it comes up
particularly in this interim housing situation both for
trailers or for cottages, and it would certainly come up with
these other alternatives that the gentlemen here are talking
about--is, there inevitably becomes an impulse to try to
convert the interim housing to a permanent housing solution.
When that particular model or style of housing stands out
very strongly, it becomes a sharp target for local governments
to resist under various pretexts. The FEMA cottage, for
instance, Mr. Chairman, was brought in on axels. But once those
were removed, they were indistinguishable from any stick-built
house that you could see.
Now, I can imagine the howls of dismay that would arise if
someone were to try to take any of these other very interesting
alternatives and to make them to be permanent. They are
probably not completely intended to be permanent. Some of them
could be modified to be doing it.
But what it does is it makes--it paints a target on the
back of low-income, which are predominantly minority
populations in this Nation, and makes it very easy indirectly
for local governments to increase the burdens of return for
more vulnerable populations.
So I would encourage FEMA in every step of its training of
its case managers and in every action that it takes to increase
its own awareness of the fair housing law requirements,
increase the right-to-know literature given to people the
outset so that they can spot the problems, and for FEMA and HUD
to come up with a coordinated solution and a memorandum of
agreement, some kind of teamwork approach that will enable
people to solve problems like that family in Gulfport who faced
blatant racial discrimination in a FEMA trailer, and it took
more than 3 years for a complaint, a citizen complaint to work
its way through the workings of the fair housing department of
HUD.
There has got to be a better, more expeditious answer for
that, and I can't imagine anything more discouraging for
somebody than to be discriminated against when they are
starving.
Chairman Thompson. Absolutely.
Mr. Morse. Where is the humanity in that?
Chairman Thompson. Well, and I think--I talked with
Chairman Frank about that particular situation, and he is
trying to get the agencies who were involved to come up with a
streamlined approach.
I think the key takeaway here is flexibility. Every issue
and proposal I have heard ought to be an option. What might
work in one region of the country from a temporary housing
standpoint may or may not work.
But what I have seen is this over-reliance on one model as
the temporary model. I think what we have to do is broaden the
view on what the temporary model is so that, if one of these
tight units is acceptable in one area, it might be the way to
go.
But I think right now, based on what information we have
received at the committee, it is just one model, and that is
it. I think we need to give the director of FEMA the
flexibility to look at community standards and other standards
to see what is acceptable and try to ameliorate any resistance
that may or may not happen.
This notion of one-size-fit-all is probably not the best
approach to take. That being said, one of the things that we
are also concerned about--and some Members of the committee
raised it--is whether or not these temporary units can be
reused. If you can reuse a unit a second or third time, then
there is a notion that costs will be reduced over time.
Now, the question from me I guess for Ms. Gees and then to
the industry representatives: Is that something that could be
factored into the overall approach to looking at this as to
reusability?
Yes.
Ms. Gees. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, we were just
talking about that earlier, and there--I think there are a lot
of ways to look at this. We almost have to turn this problem
upside-down, but I give one example, just one of many.
We have a real need for caring for our elderly, ailing
parents, and the elderly. There are a lot of we have seen doing
work in our communities. A lot of communities are adapting
accessory unit zoning bylaws to allow accessory units to be
added to a single-family house to care for an ailing family
member.
So imagine, for example, you have a community that is safe,
that is out of harm's way of disaster, but you have a
possibility of adding a mobile accessory unit that could be
used for an ailing senior as they transition to more extended
care or could be used for a family after a disaster that needs
to be relocated on a temporary basis. That is one example of
flexibility that is possible and that I think is really
important to look at. There are many others.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
What about just the notion from the industry people of
reusability, either for another disaster or some other form
that the Government might have?
Mr. Kubley.
Mr. Kubley. Thank you very much.
First of all, I would like to express my appreciation for
Ms. Gees' comments today. I think she has hit a lot of the
really important things right on the head. As far as
practicality, comfort, durability, versatility, and we agree.
That is absolutely essential in whatever shelters they use.
The Intershelter Force 5 domes can be used for first
responders, for communication centers, for MASCAL triage
centers. One of the things that we heard over and over again
today, Mr. Chairman, was the desire to have something that
allows people to remain as a family unit near their neighbors,
in their communities, and near their clergy, and the folks they
know. They have already been through enough trauma.
With our units, they could drive down the street, kick down
enough dome space for each family to use, and the family
themselves can put up their own houses. They can remain as a
family unit. They can stay with their friends and neighbors.
They can supervise the rebuilding or repairing at their homes.
They can protect what few belongings they have left on Earth,
instead of being taken away and stuck in a Superdome or in some
tent city in an army camp somewhere.
Being able to stay together as a family unit is crucial in
the healing process. Once the disaster is over, once their
houses are repaired, our units can break down in less than an
hour. You power-wash them off. You disassemble them. You put
them back in their creates, and you can warehouse them until
the next hurricane for the next 10 hurricanes.
These can be reused over and over and over again, which, of
course, dramatically cuts the cost of the unit. I think that is
an important factor.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Rininger.
Mr. Rininger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree totally. Our
units can be used over--oh, excuse me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our units can be used over and
over again, as well. They can also be changed in their initial
configuration. While they start out as a quick response shelter
and at that pricing level--and I think it is about $19,000
grand, actually--they can also be expanded into intermediate
and permanent housing, which helps your tax base or maintains
your tax base as a local government.
They can also be changed in configuration. We have what we
call H houses, T houses, L-shaped houses, where you take one,
two or three units and add them together to make a larger
square footage to meet the need. Larger families need larger
square footages and so forth.
So, yes, reusability in any number of ways, certainly. We
can do that. It is a must to have that flexibility that you
mention.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Boasso.
Mr. Boasso. Mr. Chairman, in the container industry, the
average expected life of a container is 15 years old. So,
therefore, we should have no problems for 15 years.
Now, the cost of our unit is going to be much cheaper. We
figure around a $30,000 range for a family of six. For a
couple, our 20-foot module will probably be around a $20,000
range.
But one thing please consider with our units is that FEMA
will not have to ever buy electrical poles again or do the
stair construction that is needed because we will be able to
take care of it all in the unit itself. It will have the air
conditioning, the heat, the ventilation system, the telephones,
the washer-dryer, the sewer connectivity.
So all of those pieces are so important for these people
trying to re-establish their life. The part that we missed
during Katrina, Rita and Ike will now be available in this unit
itself.
One thing I kind of want to make clear is that there are
several types. For the rental people, they have to have a
different situation. But you have people that would just love
to go back in front of their home, that they can get--start
working on cleaning their home out and rebuilding it.
That is what we were up against because we couldn't get the
FEMA trailers quick enough. So, therefore, you lost those
family units. Then, in those FEMA trailers that we had to deal
with, I had one family that had three of them because they
couldn't fit their whole family in one unit.
So, therefore, the cost, the durability, and this is
factual knowledge, as far as how long it lasts in the industry
itself, and the way the financial markets look at it, so 15
years should be no problem.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
One of the reasons for having this hearing is the wide
range of costs associated with this. We want to help our new
FEMA director with coming up with that housing plan. If we can
get a plan that includes flexibility and some of the other
things we have heard, I am convinced that we will be in a
better position to respond to whatever the emergency might be.
But I do want to make sure that we have given as much
foresight to ingenuity and flexibility. We had a number of
staff members go up to Emmitsburg, and they were a little
concerned that it was still headed in one direction, and that
flexibility that we are talking about is not there. So we will
be talking with our FEMA director about that flexibility,
because we think it is really needed in this instance.
Ms. Clarke, I see you have joined us. We will give you the
benefit of as much time as you need.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I won't take
up a whole lot of time, and my questions will be submitted to
the record.
But this is a very important issue. Our ability to have
resilience in recovery after a natural or manmade disaster will
speak to a whole lot of what our civil society has evolved
into. Right now, from where I sit, we are not quite there yet.
So I wanted to just follow up on a question that the
Chairman just asked, and I am going to ask this of Mr. Morse.
Mr. Morse, private groups had to sue FEMA to make its housing
accessible to people with disabilities and had to return to
court numerous times after FEMA failed to comply.
The Brou v. FEMA lawsuit filed on behalf of Katrina
evacuees who needed emergency housing that was accessible to
people in wheelchairs or other mobility limitation illustrates
FEMA's complete failure, in my assessment, to address the
particular housing needs of people with disabilities.
Attorneys involved in the case have reported that, even
after the settlement, it was necessary to go back to court
repeatedly to get FEMA to fulfill the terms of the settlement
agreement. It is not clear at all that the measures put in
place as a result of the suit have resulted in institutional
changes at FEMA that will prevent or at least minimize such
problems in future disasters.
Let me ask: Do you know of any steps that FEMA has taken to
make permanent changes to access to housing for people with
disabilities in response to Brou v. FEMA lawsuit brought by
private groups following Hurricane Katrina?
Mr. Morse. Thank you. I was local counsel in the Brou case,
and I was, you know, pretty closely involved in the initial
part of that litigation and then also in the follow-up, once
the settlement was achieved and FEMA agreed to order 10 percent
of its temporary housing units to comply with the uniform
Federal accessibility standards and put into place some other
mechanisms to ensure people with disabilities had the necessary
access.
We discovered that, at that final compliance stage, we were
coming upon situations where access--and this is in 2007, I
would think it would be--where steps that were part of a 2006
settlement were only at the very last minute getting done in
2007.
So, you know, it is just one other facet of what was a, you
know, massively dysfunctional FEMA response under that
leadership. I do believe and hope that we will see a lot
greater responsibility out of the current director of FEMA.
I read the 2009 plan looking for very specific information
about disability access, because it is so important, and I may
have overlooked it, but I didn't see a specific, discrete set
of recommendations that seem to step from Brou, so I would hope
that either I have overlooked it or else, if I haven't, that
that gets incorporated into further refinements of that 2009
plan.
It was also not just a problem with FEMA. The alternative
housing pilot program that Mississippi carried out--and it was
the first to roll its own out--had a small percentage of its
units that were ADA-compliant. What we discovered was that over
a third of the households in those cottage programs had people
with disabilities.
So it is going to be an important characteristic of the
population to be served in these settings.
There is one other thing. As I understand it, there is, in
2008, October 2008, the U.S. Access Board, Federal Advisory
Committee released a report with some detailed recommendations
on how to do better. So this may be one of these opportunities
where some really good technical work is readily available for
FEMA to plug into other plans that it is carrying out, and the
details about that are on page 7 of my written testimony.
Thank you.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Morse.
I would like to recommend, Mr. Chairman, that we look at
the--whether, in fact, the plan does specifically indicate the
steps that must be taken to address the persons with
disabilities and enabling them to access temporary housing and
shelter.
Just to say to the innovators at the panel that, as you,
you know, roll out your new units, that, again, this is
something that you may want to be cognizant of, that, you know,
our population is very diverse. When disaster hits, it hits
everyone equally. We need not look at our citizenry as
monolithic. We will have to look at the nuances in order to
make sure that we are meeting the needs of all Americans.
So I want to thank you for the work that you are doing, but
I would encourage you to be as innovative as possible in the
work that you do and recognize those nuances as we look to be
prepared in the event of future disaster in our Nation.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I guess the question for the companies: Is there any
problem with your units being handicap-accessible or complying
with the Americans with Disability requirements?
Mr. Kubley. Mr. Chairman, absolutely not. We are planning
on responding and being able to be totally handicap-accessible.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Rininger.
Mr. Rininger. Mr. Chairman, once again, absolutely not. We
are handicap-accessible, absolutely.
Mr. Boasso. Not a problem whatsoever. As being a veteran of
those storms, we know the problems that need to be fixed.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I want to thank our witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions. Before concluding, I would
like to remind our second panel of witnesses that the Members
of the committee may have additional questions for you, and we
will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those
questions.
There being no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for W. Craig
Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department
of Homeland Security
Question 1. The National Disaster Housing Strategy states that FEMA
will consider the use of permanent housing solutions in the wake of
future catastrophes. However, FEMA's recent contracting activities
suggest that FEMA is continuing its use of manufactured homes and
travel trailers. In the aftermath of a catastrophic event in which a
large amount of the housing stock is destroyed or severely damaged,
what extended and long-term housing options are a part of the FEMA
housing strategy?
Answer. FEMA will continue to use manufactured homes and other
traditional forms of temporary housing units because they are readily
available, livable, and enable FEMA to house disaster survivors within
close proximity to their homes and communities. The majority of
temporary housing units FEMA provides are placed on private sites, such
as the disaster survivor's property. Many private sites require a unit
with a smaller footprint, such as a park model or, when a State agrees
and the need for temporary housing is expected to last for 6 months or
less, a travel trailer. Manufactured homes, as discussed in the
Strategy, can be used for prolonged interim housing needs and can be
relatively easily converted to a permanent housing solution when
appropriate.
FEMA will continue to work with its Federal partners to assist
disaster survivors most in need of assistance to transition to a
sustainable housing situation independent of Federal disaster
assistance. FEMA may, in response to a catastrophic event, consider
authorizing semi-permanent or permanent construction in coordination
with HUD and the affected State, when all other forms of interim
housing are unavailable, infeasible, or not cost-effective.
Question 2. According to GAO and DHS OIG studies, FEMA spends about
$30,000 per 280-square-foot travel trailer. According to their
manufacturers, these travel trailers are intended for short-term use.
Has FEMA explored sustainable housing options that may be available at
a comparable price?
Answer. FEMA only utilizes temporary housing units if existing
housing alternatives, such as rental resources, are unavailable. When
temporary housing units are appropriate, FEMA will first employ
manufactured housing units (often called ``mobile homes'') or park
models. FEMA recognizes the limited usage of travel trailers beyond the
short-term. Accordingly, FEMA will only authorize the use of travel
trailers at the request of the State when the need for temporary
housing is for 6 months or less. Disaster survivors who are likely to
require temporary housing assistance beyond 6 months are referred to a
more appropriate form of housing assistance.
FEMA continuously conducts market research in efforts to identify
the most cost-effective forms of temporary housing. This on-going
market research includes, but is not limited to, FEMA's Joint Housing
Solutions Group initiative. FEMA is currently testing prototype units
that have been installed at our National Emergency Training Center, to
monitor and evaluate unit quality and durability as students occupy
these units throughout the year. The JHSG will use the information
gathered in this evaluation period to assess the suitability of each of
unit for use in future disaster housing operations.
Question 3. FEMA is currently awarding manufactured housing
contracts with terms that guarantee a minimum purchase of 100 units.
While pre-positioning these contracts may be helpful in a catastrophic
event, has FEMA considered similar pre-positioned contracts with
alternative housing manufacturers?
Why has FEMA emphasized the role of traditional manufactured units?
To what extent has FEMA examined the potential benefits of existing
non-traditional housing units?
Answer. FEMA's contracts for alternative housing are pre-positioned
similar to the manufactured housing contracts. FEMA's minimum purchase
for the alternative housing unit contracts is one unit per vendor, with
the capacity to order an additional 999 units per vendor.
Traditional temporary housing units are generally able to be
procured relatively quickly due to the existing production
infrastructure supporting the private market. These forms of temporary
housing units have been utilized successfully for temporary housing for
many years. Alternative forms of temporary housing units, by
comparison, have varying degrees of production capabilities, and have
not been previously used for extended periods of occupancy in any
substantial quantities. Some forms of alternative housing units pose
unique delivery and installation challenges, whereas there is an
existing private market for delivery and installation of traditional
forms of temporary housing units.
FEMA is currently evaluating these aspects of alternative housing
units, and other concerns, in our pilot assessment at NETC. FEMA is
also in the process of soliciting a second round of alternative housing
unit contracts, and intends to conduct a similar pilot for vendors who
are awarded the second round contracts.
Question 4. It is my understanding that FEMA has exercised the
option to purchase over two dozen units from a manufacturer of an
alternative housing model currently being tested at the National
Emergency Training Center (NETC) at Emmitsburg, MD. If so, please
provide a written rationale for the decision to purchase prior to the
conclusion of the pilot testing process. Additionally, please provide
the final score and assessment for each unit included in the NETC pilot
program. If the units chosen were not the highest scoring units, please
provide the results of all units examined for inclusion in the pilot.
Answer. FEMA purchased 30 housing units from one of our alternative
housing unit vendors, D&D, for use following Hurricane Ike. FEMA
considered greater use of alternative housing unit supply contracts due
to supply concerns but was able to meet the needs of the operation with
traditional housing units. However, FEMA took the opportunity to test
these units on a limited basis. The Task Order for the delivery and
installation of the 30 temporary housing units was competed among each
of the vendors awarded with alternative housing unit contracts. The
evaluation criteria utilized for this competitive award was determined
by the operational picture for the event. D&D's proposal was determined
to best meet FEMA's requirements. FEMA's assessment of alternative
housing units at NETC is still underway, and has not been completed.
The assessment does not utilize a quantitative, numeric scoring system.
Units are evaluated through a qualitative rating system based on speed
of delivery and installation, safety, quality, and cost-effectiveness.
Question 5. In November 2007, GAO outlined numerous deficiencies
involving FEMA's 2005 housing contract awards and oversight processes.
This prompted FEMA to articulate a new contracting process that is
designed to ``engage local small, minority, and small disadvantaged
businesses.'' What specific steps has FEMA taken to maximize the role
of local, minority, and small disadvantaged businesses in the housing
process?
Answer. Since November 2007 FEMA leadership and acquisition have
made significant improvements in the manner in which they procure
housing for their customers. Currently our national Individual
Assistance--Technical Assistance Contracts (IA-TAC), are used for the
initial set-up for temporary housing units unless there is sufficient
time to do a local business set-aside as we did in Arkansas. We then
conduct local area set-aside competitions, consistent with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), for the on-going maintenance and
deactivation of all temporary housing units. These competitions are
done at each Joint Field Office (JFO) or at the responsible FEMA
Region.
FEMA recently issued a solicitation valued at nearly $500,000,000
to purchase up to 67,000 park model and manufactured homes from small
business set-aside procurement. This solicitation will close on August
7, 2009. FEMA intends to award up to three contracts for Park Models
(PM) and up to three contracts for Manufactured Homes (MH), although
the number of awards could change depending on the proposals received.
FEMA has awarded seven contracts for the purchase of alternative
housing, of which six went to small businesses. This procurement was
solicited as a Full and Open Competition, but the majority of the
awardees are small businesses under the current North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) Code. One of the six small businesses was
determined to be in a Hub-zone small business.
FEMA continues to negotiate subcontract opportunities in all its
large contracts to ensure that the small business and local small
business subcontracting goals are an integral part of the contract, and
that the goals are aggressive. FEMA has strengthened its subcontracting
goals by incorporating the results of the subcontract plans with small
businesses as a review and evaluation factors in the exercise of future
option periods. FEMA and its managers at all levels are utilizing the
Stafford Act to use local small businesses to the maximum extent
possible. We understand the need and urgency of revitalizing the local
economy as quickly as possible and will continue to seek innovative
ways to comply with the Stafford Act, DHS goals, and the Federal
Acquisition Regulation.
Question 6. To date, during the contract process it seems that the
central economic consideration for FEMA has been the cost per housing
unit. However, Katrina and Rita exhibited nontrivial expenses
attributable to refurbishment, storage, and disposal of used FEMA
housing units. In light of this, it seems that the cost-benefit
calculus of FEMA's contract process should include these expenses.
To what extent does FEMA consider refurbishment, storage, and
disposal expenses during the contract process?
What other factors weigh into FEMA's consideration of costs?
Do sustainability, flexibility, and the potential to re-use units
impact FEMA's decision-making process?
Answer. FEMA considers the total lifecycle costs in the management
of its disaster housing operations. FEMA has addressed these concerns
by partnering with HUD and private industry groups to develop
``ruggedized'' specifications which exceed commercial market standards
for durability during storage and multiple deliveries and
installations.
FEMA requires vendors who are awarded supply contracts to provide
storage instructions in order to minimize costs associated with unit
damage or deterioration while in storage. FEMA has also investigated
including vendor-managed storage of the temporary housing units in
supply contracts, but did not receive sufficient interest from industry
to incorporate that capability into the contracts.
FEMA utilizes a ``best value'' approach to temporary housing unit
procurements, which means that cost is only one factor taken in to
consideration. FEMA also considers the offeror's ability to meet or
exceed FEMA's specifications, conform to FEMA's indoor air quality
testing protocol, and their ability to produce and deliver housing
units. The production and delivery capabilities are evaluated on volume
as well as ramp-up time. FEMA also considers the offeror's ability to
correct deficiencies and provide timely warranty services.
Sustainability, flexibility, and the potential to re-use units do
impact FEMA's decisionmaking process. These factors are addressed
during the requirements phase of the procurement for manufactured
homes, park models, and travel trailers. Reusability, sustainability,
and adaptability also are criteria that FEMA's Joint Housing Solutions
Group utilizes in the assessment of potential alternative forms of
temporary housing units and are incorporated in FEMA's requirements
documents for alternative housing units.
Question 7. In February 2009, the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Disaster Recovery Subcommittee provided details of
a 9-month investigation on the Katrina housing response with analysis
of what went wrong and a blueprint for reform moving forward. The
report noted that in February 2009 FEMA had over 100,000 manufactured
housing units ``not ready for dispatch'' in inventory at a cost of
approximately $100 million a year.
What does ``not ready for dispatch'' mean and how did these units
get in that condition?
What has been done to reduce this inventory?
What changes in procurement have been put into place that reduce
FEMA's storage and maintenance costs for this inventory?
Answer. ``Not ready for dispatch'' means the unit is not mission-
capable for shipment to support a disaster mission. Units are
determined Ready for Dispatch (RFD) based on routine maintenance
requirements (i.e., replacing tires and axles, fixing water intrusion
and roof leaks) while in storage, or immediately following road
transport.
FEMA has developed a fiscally responsible inventory reduction plan
to dispose of unsuitable temporary housing units that are located at
FEMA staging sites throughout the United States. As of this date, FEMA
has disposed of 7,355 temporary housing units since Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita through sales and donations. The majority of units are being
disposed of through the process outlined in the Federal Management
Regulation (FMR), 41 CFR 102 (Personal Property) in a coordinated
effort with the General Services Administration (GSA), FEMA's agent for
disposal actions. The GSA ensures that the units offered through their
Utilization and Donation program are reused for the public good--such
as public health, education, and parks. In addition, 1,364 surplus
unused housing units were also transferred to Tribal governments, as
directed by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.
FEMA plans to manage its procurement of units to keep the RFD
inventory at a baseline level of 4,000 units; to be housed at three THU
readiness sites. FEMA has an inventory management plan in place that
allows the housing units to be fully utilized before their life-cycle
is over, and allows FEMA to maintain a smaller inventory of temporary
housing units in storage for disaster response. As units are
deactivated, the first priority is to sell them to the current occupant
as permanent housing. If the unit isn't sold at deactivation a
determination is made whether it can be recovered to a THU site for
refurbishment and returned to RFD status. If the unit cannot be
returned to RFD status it is sold via the GSA sale process. If the unit
can be recovered and made suitable again, it is refurbished and placed
back in the RFD inventory for reissue. As the Katrina/Rita excess
inventory is disposed of, the THU RFD inventory will consist only of
the 4,000 units stored at the three readiness sites.
Question 8. What involvement, if any, has HUD had in the evaluation
and implementation of alternative housing solutions other than
manufactured housing?
Answer. HUD is a charter member of FEMA's Joint Housing Solutions
Group and has been involved throughout FEMA's efforts to identify,
evaluate, and implement alternative forms of temporary housing. HUD
personnel accompany FEMA employees and contractors to conduct field
assessments of alternative housing units, and have assisted FEMA with
the procurement of alternative housing unit contracts by participating
on the source selection board.
Question 9. The National Disaster Housing Strategy addresses the
development of performance specifications and a procurement and pilot
program for new alternative housing units. What performance
specifications have been introduced that promote the use of alternative
housing options?
Answer. FEMA's Joint Housing Solutions Group developed performance
specifications establishing baseline requirements and functional
criteria for the purpose of assisting FEMA with the procurement of
alternative forms of temporary housing. These performance
specifications were used in FEMA's alternative housing procurement and
have been revisited for the upcoming second round of alternative
housing units. FEMA's specifications and procurement process are
intended to allow offerors as much room as possible to develop
innovative solutions to FEMA's baseline requirements, rather than
having to adhere to rigid and detailed specifications. However,
alternative housing units must meet or exceed the same safety and air
quality standards as FEMA's traditional forms of temporary housing
units.
Question 10. The mass devastation caused by Katrina profiled the
need for a comprehensive and collaborated disaster response, extending
beyond the capability or capacity of FEMA. As the primary authority on
disaster response, how does FEMA plan to engage local, State, Federal
and private-sector entities to efficiently prepare for post-disaster
housing needs?
Answer. The National Disaster Housing Strategy underscores that all
organizations involved in disaster housing must conduct joint planning
to address housing needs, engage appropriate stakeholders, identify a
range of options, describe how those options would be implemented, and
identify the necessary resources. As stated in the Strategy, the
primary vehicles for engaging local, State, Federal, and private-sector
entities in the delivery of post-disaster housing needs is through the
National Disaster Housing Task Force, as well as individual State-led
Disaster Housing Task Forces and FEMA's National Advisory Council.
State-led Disaster Housing Task Force.--States are encouraged to
form a standing task force of disaster housing experts, whose objective
is to monitor the status of the housing market in advance of a disaster
and be prepared to make informed recommendations in the event of a
disaster requiring a housing mission. The task force is intended to
bring together State, Tribal, local, Federal, non-governmental, and
private sector expertise to evaluate housing requirements, consider
potential solutions, and propose recommendations, some of which may
require national level concurrence or engagement. States are also
encouraged to include disability organizations and advocacy groups on
the Task Force to provide advice regarding housing requirements for
those with special needs or limited English proficiency.
FEMA is working through its Regional Offices to assist States in
establishing State-led task forces.
National Disaster Housing Task Force.--The National Disaster
Housing Task Force will, during the response to a major incident that
requires a significant housing effort, provide technical expertise and
advice to the Joint Field Office and the State-led Disaster Housing
Task Force. This assistance may include deploying liaisons or teams to
affected States to help develop and tailor Federal disaster housing
plans to meet the needs of the particular event. In this role, Federal
representatives on the National Task Force will work with and support
established FEMA field operations and structures, as well as directly
with State-led Disaster Housing Task Forces.
A draft implementation plan for the National Disaster Housing Task
Force is currently posted for partner comment. Once finalized, this
implementation plan will outline task force goals and milestones which
will include the development of expanded resources for State partners
to assist in the identification and delivery of appropriate housing
resources.
Question 11. Has there been any collaboration with HUD on how to
best transition from interim housing to permanent affordable
structures? If so, please provide a narrative explaining the nature of
the collaboration and provide copies of any documents that may have
resulted from the collaborative effort.
Answer. The coordination of FEMA and HUD disaster recovery housing
assistance is outlined in the National Disaster Housing Strategy.
FEMA's and HUD's roles in the delivery of disaster housing will vary,
depending on support requirements identified by the impacted State, as
well as the scope of damage to local housing stock and rental
resources. Under the Strategy, FEMA and HUD will partner to provide
Federal interim housing assistance, each bringing its expertise and
experience to bear. When Federal permanent housing assistance is
needed, HUD will have the lead responsibility under this Strategy, and
will coordinate with its partners to provide housing and community
development resources.
The disaster housing operational roles of FEMA and HUD are further
articulated in FEMA's 2009 Disaster Housing Plan. The Disaster Housing
Plan was released on April 21, 2009, and outlines new concepts in
disaster housing, enhanced roles for Federal, State, and local
partners, as well as expanded choices in disaster housing, and improved
health and safety requirements. Specific roles for HUD include
supporting the implementation of financial assistance for rent and
their role in the construction of permanent and semi-permanent housing.
In addition, FEMA and HUD have partnered to implement the Disaster
Housing Assistance Program (DHAP) in response to Hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, Gustav, and Ike. FEMA and HUD are currently reviewing DHAP
lessons learned to develop a standing Interagency Agreement that could
be used to administer and implement DHAP on future disasters as
disaster housing needs dictate. This standing authority would allow
both FEMA and HUD to have plans in place to effectively coordinate DHAP
implementation.
Question 12. In addition, have FEMA and HUD determined what Federal
entity is responsible for recovery costs associated with the repair HUD
housing units in the wake of a major disaster declaration?
Answer. FEMA could not previously provide permanent repair
assistance to HUD Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) because of section
9(k) of the Housing and Economy Recovery Act of 1937 and a set-aside
appropriation in the Public Housing Capital Fund for PHA repairs
necessitated by a disaster. Section 9(k) of the Housing Act, was
repealed, effective July 30, 2008, by the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008. Congress also eliminated the set-aside in the fiscal year
2009 HUD appropriations legislation, which was passed as part of the
Omnibus Appropriations Act on March 11, 2009, retroactive to October 1,
2008. PHAs are now eligible for permanent repair funding from FEMA
under the Public Assistance Program. FEMA is currently updating the
Public Assistance policy on assistance to PHAs to reflect the change in
the law.
Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke of New York for W. Craig
Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department
of Homeland Security
Question 1a. Mr. Fugate, after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA did not
provide any information to people who had been displaced, including
people to whom it was providing housing assistance, about their fair
housing rights, how to recognize discrimination, or what to do if they
encountered it. Instead, private fair housing groups had to step in,
without assistance from FEMA, to address this issue. In addition, in
the immediate aftermath of Katrina, FEMA sponsored a Web site
containing discriminatory ads that were illegal under the Fair Housing
Act. It also has no system to address fair housing complaints.
Currently, the National Disaster Housing Strategy does not mention any
of these housing issues.
What has FEMA done to carry out its fair housing responsibilities?
How does FEMA ensure that its staff and contractors do not
discriminate?
What does FEMA do if discrimination is reported?
How does FEMA intend to address issues of housing discrimination in
the event of another disaster?
Answer. Section 308 of the Stafford Act protects individuals from
discrimination on the basis of their race, color, religion,
nationality, sex, age, or economic status in all disaster assistance
programs. Section 309 of the Stafford Act applies these non-
discrimination provisions to all private relief organizations
participating in the response and recovery effort.
FEMA has addressed its responsibilities through:
Incorporating language in all Memorandums of Understanding,
Interagency Agreements, and contracts with other Federal
agencies, States, organizations, and contractors who are
assisting FEMA with housing disaster survivors.
Informing disaster survivors of their rights both in oral
and written communications.
Mandatory annual Title VI and Title VII anti-discrimination
training. Deployed Equal Rights Officers conduct this training
at the JFO for DAEs; and FEMA has on-line training for
employees and supervisors.
While this training is not specific to housing, it does
raise the awareness of the staff to the issues of
discrimination and FEMA's commitment to non-discrimination.
Consideration will be given to:
including some housing discrimination information in the
mandatory training;
including written anti-discrimination information from HUD
in the JFO and DRC locations; and
providing a link to HUD's housing discrimination office on
FEMA Web site.
Deployed Equal Rights Officers participate on the JFO
disaster housing group during disasters to provide input about
non-discrimination in FEMA housing efforts.
Housing Inspection Contractors provide sensitivity and
conduct training for inspectors. Additionally, FEMA's
Inspection Services works closely with Equal Rights Officers in
the Joint Field Offices and HQ on any related discriminatory
complaint filed against an inspector.
FEMA also informs disaster survivors of their rights both in oral
and written communications. Page 2 of ``Help After a Disaster'' (FEMA
publication 545) includes a section on ``Your Civil Rights and Disaster
Assistance,'' where FEMA informs applicants of their rights:
``The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act) is the law that authorizes Federal assistance when the
President declares a State to be a disaster area. Section 308 of the
Stafford Act protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of
their race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic status
in all disaster assistance programs. Section 309 of the Stafford Act
applies these non-discrimination provisions to all private relief
organizations participating in the response and recovery effort.
In addition, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also protects
individuals from discrimination on the basis of their race, color, or
national origin in programs that receive Federal financial assistance.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a Federal law that
protects individuals with disabilities from discrimination in all
programs receiving funds from the Federal Government or operated by the
Federal Government. Section 508 of that law prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities in regard to federally operated
technology systems.''
Question 1b. How does FEMA ensure that its staff and contractors do
not discriminate?
Answer. Inspection Services takes each complaint seriously and
tracks an inspectors' complaint history. FEMA works closely with the
contractors to address every complaint, discriminatory or not, and
based on the outcome of the investigation FEMA works with the
contractor to determine continual inspector employment.
Question 1c. What does FEMA do if discrimination is reported?
Answer. When Title VI or Title VII discrimination is reported to
the Office of Equal Rights or to the deployed Equal Rights Officers
those cases are processed through established FEMA complaint processes.
Since, by law, HUD has the responsibility for processing cases of
housing discrimination; survivors alleging housing discrimination are
referred to HUD.
NPSC employees and call center contractors receive training on the
procedures for reporting Civil Rights complaints that are reported to
them by applicants. Guidance on reporting Civil Rights complaints is
also posted on the Individual Assistance intranet sites. http://
ia.fema.net/contents/bpas/benefits/documentation/
civilrightshelplineguidance.pdf.
The procedure for NPSC employees and contractors is to report all
alleged Civil Rights violations, regardless of the agency or business
involved, directly to FEMA's Office of Equal Rights. NPSC employees are
also provided with a phone number to give applicants who insist on
speaking with an Equal Rights Officer directly.
Question 1d. How does FEMA intend to address issues of housing
discrimination in the event of another disaster?
Answer. In addition to staff training, FEMA's Office of Equal
Rights will seek to work collaboratively with HUD's Office of Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity to ensure that information regarding
housing discrimination is made available to disaster survivors and
develop a protocol for coordinating the processing of housing
discrimination complaints. Also, language regarding non-discrimination
in housing will be considered for inclusion in appropriate documents,
contracts and agreements related to housing.
Question 2. Mr. Fugate, in 2007, GAO outlined numerous deficiencies
involving FEMA's 2005 housing contract awards and oversight processes.
This prompted FEMA to articulate a new contracting process that is
designed to ``engage local small, minority and small disadvantaged
businesses.'' What specific steps has FEMA taken to maximize the role
of local, minority, and small disadvantaged businesses?
Answer. Since November 2007 FEMA leadership and acquisition have
made significant improvements in the manner in which they procure
housing for their customers. Currently our national Individual
Assistance--Technical Assistance Contracts (IA-TAC), are used to do
initial set up for temporary housing units unless there is sufficient
time to do a local business set-aside as we did in Arkansas. We then
conduct local area set-aside competitions, consistent with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), for the on-going maintenance and
deactivation of all temporary housing units. These competitions are
done at each Joint Field Office (JFO) or at the responsible FEMA
Region.
FEMA recently issued a solicitation valued at nearly $500,000,000
to purchase up to 67,000 park model and manufactured homes from small
business set-aside procurement. This solicitation will close on August
7, 2009. FEMA intends to award up to three contracts for Park Models
(PM) and up to three contracts for Manufactured Homes (MH), although
the number of awards could change depending on the proposals received.
FEMA has awarded seven contracts for the purchase of alternative
housing, of which six went to small businesses. This procurement was
solicited as a Full and Open Competition, but the majority of the
awardees are small businesses under the current North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) Code. One of the six small businesses was
determined to be in a Hub-zone small business.
FEMA continues to negotiate subcontract opportunities in all its
large contracts to ensure that the small business and local small
business subcontracting goals are an integral part of the contract, and
that the goals are aggressive. FEMA has strengthened its subcontracting
goals by incorporating the results of the subcontract plans with small
businesses as a review and evaluation factor in the exercise of future
option periods. FEMA and its managers at all levels are utilizing the
Stafford Act to use local small businesses to the maximum extend
possible. We understand the need and urgency of revitalizing the local
economy as quickly as possible and will continue to seek innovative
ways to comply with the Stafford Act, DHS goals, and the Federal
Acquisition Regulation.
Question 3. Mr. Fugate, private groups had to sue FEMA to make its
housing accessible to people with disabilities--and had to return to
court numerous times after FEMA failed to comply. The Brou v. FEMA
lawsuit, filed on behalf of Katrina evacuees who needed emergency
housing that was accessible to people in wheelchairs or with other
mobility limitations, illustrates FEMA's complete failure to address
the particular housing needs of people with disabilities. Attorneys
involved in the case have reported that, even after the settlement, it
was necessary to go back to court repeatedly to get FEMA to fulfill the
terms of the settlement agreement. It is not clear at all that the
measures put in place as the result of that suit have resulted in
institutional changes at FEMA that will prevent, or at least minimize,
such problems in a future disaster. What steps has FEMA taken to make
permanent changes to access to housing for people with disabilities in
response to the Brou v. FEMA lawsuit brought by private groups
following Hurricane Katrina?
Answer. FEMA has made institutional changes to ensure temporary
housing assistance is available for disaster survivors with mobility
and sensory limitations, as well as other accessibility needs. Specific
actions include the following:
FEMA has established a strong partnership with the U.S.
Access Board on a number of accessibility issues related to
disaster housing, and has developed manufactured home and park
model specifications which comply with the Uniform Federal
Accessibility Standards (UFAS). Some of FEMA's travel trailer
and alternative housing vendors have also developed UFAS-
compliant designs for their units.
Established a policy to provide the necessary guidance for
identifying eligible disaster survivors with accessibility
needs, the accommodations required to meet their needs, and the
steps necessary to ensure FEMA retains the resources necessary
to meet those needs.
Incorporating new policies and procedures, and information
on the UFAS standards have also been incorporated into FEMA's
training program for disaster housing managers in the field.
Question From Honorable Dina Titus of Nevada for W. Craig Fugate,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of
Homeland Security
Question. As you continue these efforts, I am interested in
learning more regarding your efforts to prepare for disasters in places
like Las Vegas. Unlike many cities in the Gulf Coast Region, Las Vegas
is not located near many other population centers. In the event of a
serious emergency, the relatively remote location of the city could
provide substantial logistical challenges. These challenges would be
magnified in attempts to provide satisfactory temporary housing. These
challenges are not unique to Las Vegas, but would be faced by any
population center that is of great distance from other population
centers. How is FEMA preparing for this type of situation?
Answer. FEMA would use the same prioritized approach set forth in
the 2009 Disaster Housing Plan for a disaster in a remote population
center, such as Las Vegas, as we would use in other areas of the
country. FEMA always strives to house as many people as possible within
close proximity of the affected area, beginning with the use of
existing housing stock in the area. FEMA, its contractors, and Federal
partners have a robust logistics capability between them to support
first responders and relief personnel in order to prioritize disaster
survivors for the existing accommodations. After exhausting available
resources, FEMA would consider the use of manufactured and alternative
interim housing, followed by employing innovative forms of interim
housing, and utilizing permanent construction as an option of last
resort.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Richard
L. Skinner, Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security
July 8, 2009
Question 1. When cost-effective, should FEMA consider the use of
permanent housing for disaster victims when the recovery period is
going to be much longer than the standard 18-month period envisioned by
the Stafford Act?
Answer. FEMA provides disaster victims with temporary forms of
housing including hotel/motel rooms, rental assistance, and travel
trailers/mobile homes. Under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (Pub. L. 93-
288) (Stafford Act), this assistance is limited to a period of 18
months after the disaster declaration, unless extended by the
President.
In most cases, the provisions of the Stafford Act allow for
adequate assistance to disaster victims. Displaced residents often only
require short-term assistance until repairs to their own houses can be
made or alternate rental units can be identified. Following a
catastrophic disaster, however, longer-term assistance may be required.
In these cases, Federal officials need the ability to weigh the costs
of long-term temporary housing against the provision of permanent
housing.
FEMA has traditionally interpreted the Stafford Act as prohibiting
permanent or semi-permanent forms of housing assistance to disaster
victims, except in insular areas outside the continental United States.
The Stafford Act provides an exception to this prohibition that has not
generally been utilized by FEMA. Specifically, the Stafford Act allows
the provision of permanent or semi-permanent housing assistance when:
(A) No alternative housing resources are available; and (B) the types
of temporary housing assistance [described in the provision] are
unavailable, infeasible, or not cost-effective.
Arguably, after a catastrophic incident, it might be more cost-
effective to provide permanent rather than temporary forms of housing.
Further, if providing assistance for permanent housing allows more
residents to resettle in their communities and resume their lives
quicker, the entire economy and well-being of the community or region
may recover faster.
While FEMA should maintain the authority and responsibility for
sheltering disaster victims, consideration should be given to
transferring responsibility for longer-term housing assistance to the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), or another
appropriate Federal agency, whether the assistance is in the form of
temporary or permanent housing.
Question 2a. Your testimony points out that rent has gone up 46% in
New Orleans after Katrina. This obviously has a negative impact on
residents' ability to return to the city.
Should FEMA's plans, currently being developed under the Housing
Strategy, include details as to how FEMA will support the restoration
of pre-existing housing stock?
Answer. Hurricane Katrina destroyed a tremendous amount of rental
housing stock in the New Orleans area. While some of the housing stock
has been rebuilt, the amount of rental housing available today cannot
meet the demand of residents who would like to move back to the city.
This demand drives up rental prices. One way to combat this type of
rent increase is to help landlords repair their damaged rental stock,
thereby increasing the number of rental properties available.
Section 689i of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of
2006 (Pub. L. 109-295, Title VI--National Emergency Management, of the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007) directed
the FEMA Administrator to establish and conduct a pilot program to make
better use of existing rental housing, in order to provide timely and
cost-effective temporary housing assistance. FEMA did establish the
Rental Repair Pilot Program and implemented the program in response to
disasters in Iowa and Texas in 2008. Authority for this pilot program
expired in December 2008.
As FEMA continues to develop plans under the National Housing
Strategy, it should work with its Federal, State, and local partners to
plan for the quick restoration of housing stocks, including rental
units, after a disaster.
Question 2b. Could direct housing assistance, such as providing
housing units directly to families for permanent use, facilitate return
to an area following a disaster?
Answer. Providing direct housing assistance, including housing
units for permanent use, could facilitate residents' return to an area
following a disaster. I would caution, however, that this type of
assistance should only be considered in the case of a catastrophic
disaster. For a less serious disaster, the provision of temporary
housing assistance is adequate. A decision to provide permanent forms
of housing should only be made when it is in the best interests of
taxpayers to do so, such as when the costs of temporary forms of
housing assistance outweigh the costs of permanent forms of housing.
Further, a decision to provide permanent forms of housing should be
made by FEMA and HUD, in cooperation with Federal, State, and local
partners.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Gerald H.
Jones, Member, National Institute of Building Sciences
Question 1a. GAO reported in August 2007 that FEMA's implementation
of the Alternative Housing Pilot Program failed to state the importance
of rating criteria that the agency would use in evaluating grant
applications. The absence of these factors may have impacted FEMA's
ability to solicit and fund more innovative and creative disaster
housing solutions.
Has FEMA engaged NIBS in the development of rating criteria?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 1b. How were these criteria used to determine which
housing units would be selected?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Has NIBS been continuously engaged with FEMA during
this process? Is NIBS currently working with FEMA?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 1d. Has NIBS worked with FEMA to conduct an assessment of
various community social factors and local sensitivities that should be
considered in the wake of catastrophes? If so, please provide a copy of
the assessment. If not, why has this assessment not been conducted? Can
you please explain the importance of conducting such an assessment?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
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