[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET FOR THE
DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS,
AND THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION
OFFICE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS, CYBERSECURITY,
AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 9, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
Yvette D. Clarke, New York, Chairwoman
Loretta Sanchez, California Daniel E. Lungren, California
Laura Richardson, California Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Jacob Olcott, Staff Director
Dr. Chris Beck, Senior Advisor for Science and Technology
Daniel Wilkins, Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Yvette D. Clark, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology............. 1
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology. 2
Witnesses
Mr. Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Mr. Jon Krohmer, Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical
Officer, Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Appendix
Questions Submitted by Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke for Bradley I.
Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security................... 39
Questions Submitted by Ranking Member Daniel E. Lungren for
Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security........ 45
Questions Submitted by Honorable Paul C. Broun for Bradley I.
Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security................... 47
Questions Submitted by Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke for Jon
Krohmer, Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer,
Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security...... 48
Questions Submitted by Ranking Member Daniel E. Lungren for Jon
Krohmer, Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer,
Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security...... 51
Questions Submitted by Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke for Charles R.
Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office... 53
Questions Submitted by Ranking Member Daniel E. Lungren for
Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office............................................... 56
THE FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET FOR THE DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, THE OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, AND THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE
----------
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:11 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Yvette D. Clarke
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Clarke, Lujan, Lungren, Broun, and
Austria.
Ms. Clarke [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the fiscal year 2010 budget for the Directorate for Science and
Technology, the Office of Health Affairs, and the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office.
Good afternoon.
I welcome our witnesses today and thank them for their
service to our country.
I will keep my comments brief this afternoon so we can get
to the questioning period.
We are here today to discuss the President's fiscal year
2010 budget request for the Science and Technology Directorate,
the Office of Health Affairs, and the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, three critical components of the homeland
security mission.
We have watched all three of these offices grow over the
years. Some have come far in their maturation process. Others
have some work left to do.
Along the way, this committee has offered praise and
criticism of the performance of these offices, as well as
recommendations for improvement.
It is our duty and obligation to do so. But never forget
that in spite of our occasional disagreements, we are all on
the same team, working toward the same goals.
We find ourselves at a critical time in the Department's
history. This is particularly true for each of the offices you
represent. This year, each of your offices faces one
significant question that strikes at the heart of its mission
area.
For S&T, will new leadership keep the IPT process and
division of R&D funding established by the previous under
secretary?
For DNDO, are the benefits gained from deploying ASP worth
the money?
For health affairs, should the office expand beyond its
critical role as a policy shop and become involved in
operational activities?
Each is a difficult question to answer. Fortunately, you
will not have to answer it alone. In the weeks ahead, new
leadership teams will be in place. We hope that they will reach
out to this committee to resolve these and other questions.
Today, I ask that your testimony and responses to the
Members' questions provide the committee with some early
answers about the direction that each of your offices will
take.
For its own part, the committee will soon be considering
authorization language that pertains to some of the issues that
we will discuss today.
I also anticipate holding additional hearings on some of
these matters.
These efforts are designed to fulfill the Department's
mission of protecting the American people, and I look forward
to working with each of you in achieving that goal.
Thanks to you and to the thousands of men and women serving
at the Department for the work that you do.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr.
Lungren of California, of the subcommittee for an opening
statement.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Clarke.
I could not agree more about the important role of science
and technology in achieving the Department's mission of
securing our homeland.
A strong science and technology portfolio helps us
understand the emerging threats and how to identify, counter,
and mitigate them.
Better technology expands our screening capabilities and
frees our agents to focus their efforts where they are most
needed to improve our security. Technology also helps us in
consequence management so we are better prepared to respond to
a natural disaster or terrorist incident.
The S&T directorate is requesting $968.4 million in fiscal
year 2010. I believe that is about a 3.8 percent increase over
the 2009 funding levels. I hope that this funding level is
sufficient to maintain our technical superiority in science and
technology.
I would like to compliment the S&T directorate for adopting
the new strategic approach to better identify, enable, and
transition new capabilities to your science and technology
customers and to thereby improve homeland security.
This new approach creates customer-led capstone integrated
product teams in 13 functional areas. These integrated product
teams allows the directorate to identify the highest priority
needs and allocate resources to those programs that support the
priorities established by the DHS customers.
I believe this is a welcomed management improvement for all
companies attempting to develop technology solutions for our
homeland security needs.
I would like to highlight for a moment a pending project in
S&T's borders and maritime division, which includes building,
demonstrating, and transitioning the first phase of improved
capabilities for detecting the semisubmersible self-propelled
vessels.
Last year, I was privileged to work with then Senator Joe
Biden and others to enact the new criminal statute which allows
the Coast Guard to seize the operators of these South American
drug-running vessels and prosecute them, even if the vessel is
scuttled and the drug evidence is lost.
As we know, they are very difficult vessels to spot and
capture in open waters and any technology that improves
detection will help us stop these drug vessels from delivering
their deadly cargo into the United States.
I note that the Washington Post had a front page article on
this this week in which they indicated that, not only is this
capable of bringing drugs into this country, but could possibly
be a delivery system for terrorists and weapons of mass
destruction.
So it is a priority, because we realize, with our past
experience, how difficult it has been for us to identify these
semisubmersible self-propelled vessels.
I am disappointed to see that no new funding for the
national biodefense architecture is being requested and that
only $1 million was appropriated from the $2 million that was
requested in 2009.
The Federal Government lacks, in my judgment, an
overarching biodefense strategy, in spite of spending $50
billion over the last 8 years on biodefense.
I just happened to look down and see the national
biodefense architecture, NBA. Maybe if we paid as much
attention to this NBA as we do the other NBA, we would be
further along and the costs would be appropriate to the
challenges that we have.
I think we need a better understanding and coordination of
these enormous Government biodefense expenditures.
In regard to the fiscal year 2010 DNDO budget request, I am
concerned that two of the most critical programs to protect our
citizens from the gravest threat, a nuclear attack, are facing
technical difficulties and funding shortages.
The Chairwoman has already made reference to the ASP
program. I would like to make reference to it, too, because as
we know, it is designed to improve our U.S. radiation detection
by identifying radiological materials and limiting false alarms
at land, air, and sea ports.
These machines are undergoing final testing before the
homeland security secretary must certify their performance and
approve their purchase.
So while it has been much delayed, I am hopeful that the
ASP certification process will ensure significant improvement
in our future radiation portal monitoring efforts.
Now, let me make it clear, I am not suggesting that they be
certified if they can't be certified. What I am hoping is that
with all the investment we have made, with all the practice
that we have done, that we have reached that point where
certification can be made and we can utilize them in ways that
we have envisioned in the past.
The securing of cities initiative is not being funded in
fiscal year 2010. I know you have heard from some people about
this, including the ranking Republican on the full committee.
The funding decrease is the result of the 3-year New York
City pilot project, which concluded. The objective of this
initiative, as I understand it, is to prevent an RAD or NUC
attack on high risk metropolitan areas by enhancing the
regional capabilities to detect and interdict radiological
threats.
Although remaining 2009 funds, as I understand it, will
continue the STC funding into 2010, the STC future will depend
solely on new funding from the city.
I believe that it was important for my Ranking Member for
us to mention this, and I would hope that we would take a
serious look at it.
So, Madam Chairwoman, as important as this hearing is, I
would hope the Majority will work to produce an authorization
bill this year for the entire Homeland Security Department.
I want to thank the three gentlemen that are before us for
their service to the country and their future service to the
country.
I thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for having this hearing.
Ms. Clarke. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded
that under the committee rules, opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
I would like to thank my colleagues for participating in
today's hearing on the fiscal year 2010 budget.
I want to welcome our panelists at this time.
Mr. Brad Buswell is the acting under secretary of the
Science and Technology Directorate. Welcome.
Dr. John Krohmer is the acting secretary and chief medical
officer for the Office of Health Affairs. We welcome you.
To Dr. Chuck Gallaway, the acting director of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office. Welcome.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I know ask you to introduce yourself and summarize your
testimony for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Buswell.
STATEMENT OF BRADLEY I. BUSWELL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Buswell. Thank you very much and good afternoon,
Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, and other
distinguished Members of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you here today in my acting
role as under secretary for science and technology.
My real title is deputy under secretary, and, as you said,
we will have some new leadership hopefully in place in a few
weeks, and I will go back to being the deputy as opposed to the
acting under secretary.
I am delighted to be here to update the committee on the
progress of the Science and Technology Directorate and
highlight the President's budget request for fiscal year 2010
and tell you how I think that that will further our effort.
First, let me say that I am grateful for the immediate and
strong leadership of Secretary Napolitano. Over the past
months, she has consistently emphasized the importance of
science and technology in improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of all of our missions across the Department.
I value the opportunity that her support represents and
accept the accompanying responsibility.
I am also very appreciative of the leadership of this
committee in support of the directorate's endeavors. The
Informed Council of Committee Members and Staff has been
critical to the Department's success and in positioning the S&T
directorate for success in the near term and in the future.
The committee is familiar with the directorate's efforts
over the past 2 years to reorganize and restructure the
research portfolio and the business operations in order to
expedite the delivery of technology to our customers.
I am proud to report that these efforts have been
successful and the directorate is delivering products across
the spectrum of homeland security missions.
As the Ranking Member mentioned, we are successfully using
our maturing 12 capstone integrated product teams to identify
the high priority technology needs of our operating components,
and have added a 13th integrated product team focused on the
needs of the State and local first responders.
The fiscal year 2010 budget request includes $12 million in
support of this 13th IPT.
Within the innovation portfolio operated by Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, HSARPA, we are
demonstrating exciting innovative solutions to homeland
security challenges.
This budget request includes an $11 million increase in the
innovation portfolio over last year's appropriation in order to
maintain the momentum of this exciting portfolio and allow us
to have a couple of new starts.
I think, having proven its value, I am specifically asking
for this committee and the Congress' support in sustaining that
request for this budget item.
The budget request also includes a substantial increase in
the investment and air cargo screening, research in support of
TSA's statutory screening mandate, and other research to
protect against the use of improvised explosive devices in mass
transit and other settings.
Additionally, this budget request includes a $37 million
request for cybersecurity research and development, which is
nearly triple the budget request from only 3 years ago.
So in conclusion, Madam Chairwoman, I want to say, again,
that I am honored to be here. I am also honored to serve with
the highly professional scientists and technologists and other
professionals that support them in our shared mission of
delivering technological capabilities to the homeland security
enterprise, to defend our Nation and our freedom.
I am looking forward to working with the committee to
ensure the continued success in both the near term and the long
term.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear.
[The statement of Mr. Buswell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bradley I. Buswell
June 9, 2009
introduction
Good Morning, Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, and
distinguished Members of the committee. I am honored to appear before
you today to update you on the progress of the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate)
and discuss the fiscal year 2010 President's budget request. This
request keeps us on track to provide future technological capabilities
to both the operating components of DHS and our Nation's first
responders.
I am grateful for the immediate and strong leadership of Secretary
Napolitano and Deputy Secretary Lute. They are committed to the mission
of the Department: protecting the Nation from all threats and promoting
a culture of preparedness. The Secretary has also testified to the
importance of greater use of science and technology in improving our
capabilities to accomplish that mission. I am pleased to report that
the S&T Directorate has been successful in improving our Nation's
capabilities across the extremely diverse homeland security mission
set.
I am also very appreciative of the leadership of the Congress and
its bipartisan support of the Directorate's endeavors. I am grateful
for the engaged and positive relationship we enjoy. The informed
counsel of committee Members and that of their staffs has been
invaluable to the Department's efforts to position the S&T Directorate
for accountability, tangible results, and success--both today and for
the future.
The committee is familiar with the Directorate's efforts over the
past 2 years to reorganize its structure, research portfolio, and
business operations in order to expedite the delivery of cutting-edge
technology. I am proud to report that these efforts have been
successful and that the S&T Directorate is fully focused on fulfilling
both near-term and long-term technological capability needs. I will
update the committee on the status of the S&T Directorate's personnel
and processes and then highlight the major initiatives of the
President's fiscal year 2010 budget request.
successful turnaround--people & process
People
I am honored to serve with the many talented scientists, engineers,
and other professionals who work to develop technologies that secure
our homeland and defend our freedoms. The S&T Directorate has seen
significant improvement in work force morale over the past 2 years.
This is best highlighted by the results of the 2008 Federal Human
Capital Survey, which indicate the progress we have made to improve the
Directorate's management and performance. The 2008 results demonstrate
dramatic improvement for S&T since the 2006 survey, and indicate that
the S&T Directorate is in line with the Federal Government as a whole.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
I am pleased with the results of our efforts over the past 2 years,
and I remain committed to further improvement.
Process
Basic Research. The S&T Directorate's basic research portfolio
addresses long-term research and development needs in support of DHS
mission areas. This research has the potential to lead to paradigm
shifts in the Nation's homeland security capabilities through
investment in our universities, Government laboratories, and the
private sector. Basic Research is 23 percent of the S&T Directorate's
budget request.
Innovation. Responsible for funding the research and development of
homeland security technologies to ``support basic and applied homeland
security research to promote revolutionary changes in technologies that
would promote homeland security; advance the development, testing and
evaluation, and deployment of critical homeland security technologies;
and accelerate the prototyping and deployment of technologies that
would address homeland security vulnerabilities,'' the Directorate's
Homeland Security Advanced Research Programs Agency (HSARPA) has
implemented a transparent process for identifying, prioritizing, and
selecting new projects, and has used this process in selecting the
fiscal year 2010 ``new start'' projects. The $11 million increase in
the fiscal year 2010 request over last year's enacted appropriation
will allow us to fund these new starts, and I hope the committee will
support this priority.
During the past year, HSARPA completed several demonstrations of
prototypes that had been developed over the previous 2 years. Those
demonstrations included:
Future Attributes Screening Technology (FAST);
Magnetic Visibility (MAGVIZ);
Resilient Electric Grid (REG);
Levee Strengthening and Damage Mitigation;
Tunnel Detection;
Biometric Detector;
Resilient Tunnel.
The most important process that the Directorate uses is the one
that puts us in direct contact with our customers: The Capstone
Integrated Product Team (IPT) process. It ensures that we are
identifying our customers' highest priority needs and providing near-
term capabilities to address them. These Capstone IPTs engage DHS
customers, acquisition partners, S&T Division Heads, and end-users to
align our research, development, and product transition activities to
their requirements and acquisition activities. The science and
technology solutions that are the outcome of this process, referred to
as Enabling Homeland Capabilities, draw upon technologies that can be
developed and delivered to our customer acquisition programs within 3
years. As with the Innovation Portfolio, the under secretary presents
recommended new start programs to the DHS Technology Oversight Group
(TOG), chaired by the Deputy Secretary, for approval.
Our experience over the last year has led us to maintain 12
Capstone IPT areas--Information Sharing/Management; Border Security;
Chemical Defense; Biological/Agricultural Defense; Maritime Security;
Cyber Security; Transportation Security; Counter IED; Cargo Security;
People Screening; Infrastructure Protection; and Incident Management--
and add a thirteenth to directly support first responders.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The S&T Directorate officially announced the 13th Capstone IPT in
February 2009 at the DHS S&T West Coast Stakeholder Conference in
Bellevue, Washington, which focused on First Responder technology needs
and existing technological gaps.
Within the various First Responder communities there are several
mechanisms currently employed to research and identify First Responder
technical requirements. The Capstone IPT will help formalize these
requirements while leveraging the relationships that the S&T
Directorate has developed with the International Community, within the
Interagency, and at our Universities.
In order to accomplish this, the IPT will formally establish an
Emergency Services Sector Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E) Working Group comprised of representatives from the National
Protection Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Office of Infrastructure
Protection (OIP), the Emergency Services Sector Coordinating Council
(SCC) and the Emergency Service Sector Government Coordinating Council
(GCC). This group will serve as the primary engine for identifying
technology gaps in the Law Enforcement, Fire, Emergency Management, and
Emergency Medical Services areas. Because Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA) rules apply when communicating RDT&E requirements to the
Capstone IPT, a Government-only unit comprised of members from the
Assistant Secretary for State and Local Law Enforcement, the Office of
Health Affairs, the Fire Administrator, and the GCC will officially
represent the First Responder community to the IPT.
The Capstone IPT process for First Responders is similar to that of
the other 12 IPTs. As technology gaps or technology needs are
identified by the RDT&E Working Group, the S&T Directorate will first
examine the DHS S&T and FEMA investment portfolio to determine if the
requested technology already exists or if R&D is currently underway in
the interest area. The S&T Directorate requested $12 million to develop
technologies to address capability gaps identified by the First
Responder IPT. This program will test technologies, assess them for
usability, and commercialize them to make the technology solutions
available across all First Responder communities.
product is job one
Delivery of technological capabilities to our customers is the
reason the S&T Directorate exists. In the past year, the S&T
Directorate has had numerous products which we have transitioned to our
customers in the Capstone IPT capability areas, and we are on track to
continue this performance in the future.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Delta
(E) (PB) --------------------
Program, Project, and Activity (PPA) ----------------------------------------
FTP ($000) FTP ($000) FTP ($000)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Management and Administration...................... 257 $132,100 274 $142,200 17 $10,100
------------------------------------------------------------
Borders and Maritime............................... ....... 33,050 ....... 40,181 ....... 7,131
Chemical and Biological............................ ....... 200,408 ....... 206,800 ....... 6,392
Command, Control and Interoperability.............. ....... 74,890 ....... 80,264 ....... 5,374
Explosives......................................... ....... 96,149 ....... 120,809 ....... 24,660
Human Factors...................................... ....... 12,460 ....... 15,087 ....... 2,627
Infrastructure and Geophysical..................... ....... 75,816 ....... 44,742 ....... (31,074)
Innovation......................................... ....... 33,000 ....... 44,000 ....... 11,000
Laboratory Facilities.............................. 124 161,940 130 154,500 6 (7,440)
Test and Evaluations, Standards.................... ....... 28,674 ....... 28,674 ....... 0
Transition......................................... ....... 28,830 ....... 45,134 ....... 16,304
University Programs................................ ....... 50,270 ....... 46,000 ....... (4,270)
Homeland Security Institute........................ ....... 5,000 ....... ......... ....... (5,000)
------------------------------------------------------------
Research, Development, Acquisition and Operations.. 124 800,487 130 826,191 6 25,704
============================================================
S&T Total.......................................... 381 932,587 404 968,391 23 35,804
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fiscal year 2010 President's budget request (PBR) ($968
million) represents a 3.8 percent increase over the fiscal year 2009
Enacted ($933 million) to support the following R&D initiatives:
Command Control and Interoperability.--DHS requested a $5.4 million
increase to Cyber Security research and development applied towards
cyber security priorities identified in the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). Specifically, this effort will develop
enduring leap-ahead technologies to secure the Nation's critical
information infrastructure (energy, transportation, telecommunications,
banking and finance, and others) and networks.
Innovation.--The S&T Directorate requested an $11 million increase
to fund homeland security R&D that could lead to significant technology
breakthroughs that would greatly enhance DHS operations including
technologies for protecting levees, mass transit tunnels, and the
electric grid in Manhattan, NY; detecting and distinguishing between
harmful and benign liquids at airport checkpoints; and detecting a
person's intent to cause harm based on physiological and behavioral
cues.
Transition.--DHS proposed an increase of $16.3 million to the
Transition PPA. Within this increase $12 million is dedicated to
develop and design technologies to address capability gaps identified
by Federal, State, local, and Tribal First Responders in the First
Responder Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT). This program will
test technologies, assess them for usability, and commercialize them to
make the technology solutions available across all First Responder
communities.
Explosives.--The S&T Directorate requested an increase of $24.7
million, to address critical capability gaps in detecting,
interdicting, and lessening the impacts of non-nuclear explosives used
in terrorist attacks against mass transit, civil aviation, and critical
infrastructure. Of that increase, $10 million will develop high-
throughput cargo screening technology through automated, more efficient
equipment. An additional increase of $14.7 million will build on fiscal
year 2009 efforts to counter the threat of hand-carried improvised
explosive devices to mass transit systems by detecting all types of
explosive threats such as homemade, commercial, and military
explosives.
Border and Maritime.--DHS proposed an increase of $5 million to
fund a new basic research effort to develop the foundations for
technologies to provide advanced detection, identification,
apprehension, and enforcement capabilities along borders, increasing
the security of the border and lower the risk of a successful terrorist
attack. An additional increase of $2.1 million is proposed to fund
programs identified in Maritime Security IPT that will provide
technologies to the United States Coast Guard (USCG), Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and
other components operating in the Maritime environment.
unifying dhs
The S&T Directorate, by virtue of our role supporting operating
components across the Department, is in a unique position to help
accelerate the maturation and unification of the Department. The S&T
Directorate provides Department-wide services that help DHS operate
better as one Department.
Test & Evaluation
The S&T Directorate established the Test and Evaluation and
Standards Division (TSD) in fiscal year 2007 to develop Department-wide
test and evaluation (T&E) policy and provide T&E oversight of the major
acquisition programs. TSD has worked closely with DHS Under Secretary
for Management and all DHS components to develop and implement a robust
Department-wide T&E policy that will be fully integrated into the
Department's Acquisition process framework. We have created an interim
T&E Directive that complements the new DHS Acquisition Directive
(Management Directive 102-01). Together these policies will provide the
appropriate component review and DHS oversight for test planning,
execution, and reporting. The T&E policy requires components to
participate in development and approval of the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP) that will describe the necessary Developmental Test
and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) that
must be conducted in order to determine system technical performance,
operational effectiveness, and suitability throughout the development
process. The S&T Directorate established the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation (DOT&E) in fiscal year 2008 as the principal advisor on
operational test and evaluation to the Office of the Secretary and
component heads. The Secretary formally delegated authority to DOT&E in
fiscal year 2009.
TSD and DOT&E are currently providing oversight to major
acquisition programs by participating in T&E working groups, approving
TEMPs, approving Operational Test Plans, participating in Operational
Test Readiness Reviews, observing testing, and participating in
Acquisition Review Boards. Over the past year, we have:
Established a T&E Council to advise the senior DHS
management in matters relating to T&E. This Council includes
participation by all components in promoting T&E best practices
and lessons learned, ensuring adequate T&E infrastructure, and
establishing consistent T&E policy and processes for use in
acquisition programs throughout the Department.
Provided T&E oversight on critical acquisition programs
throughout the Department, including Advanced Spectroscopic
Portal (Cargo) ASP(C), BioWatch Generation 3, Secure Border
Initiative network (SBInet), Air/Sea Exit, National Cyber
Security Program (NCSP), U.S. Visit, Western Hemisphere
Traveler Initiative (WHTI), Secure Flight, Transformation and
Systems Consolidation (TASC), USCIS Transformation,
Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC), and Automated
Commercial Environment (ACE).
Partnered with the United States Navy (USN), NIST, and DOJ
to develop an initial set of standard test methodologies
applicable to small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) in support
of law enforcement and urban search and rescue missions.
Standards
The S&T Directorate is the Standards Executive for the Department,
with responsibility for coordination of standards activities for DHS as
prescribed in OMB Circular A119 and the National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act (Pub. L. 104-113). S&T works with DHS components to
develop performance specifications, documentary standards, measurement
standards and process standards as well as interoperability and safety
standards. The Office of Standards within TSD has three main functions:
(1) Coordination of standards within the Department; (2) outreach to
the private sector standards development community; and, (3) management
of a program to develop critical standards for homeland security
applications.
The Office manages the processes for formal adoption of standards
as DHS National Standards. The Office also coordinates with private
sector Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) that address the
homeland security community, ensuring that the standards produced meet
the requirements of the DHS components as well as State, local, and
tribal users of equipment and processes. The Office also manages an
investment of funds in development of standards to meet mission needs.
This includes evaluating standards needs; participation in standards
development planning; coordinating standards development efforts with
DHS components and other State and Federal agencies and appropriate
SDOs; and supporting activities at NIST, NIOSH, DOD, and the DOE
National Laboratories and other partners in standards related
technology development. Over the last year, we have:
Private Sector Preparedness--Established an intra-agency
accreditation and certification program with FEMA, the DHS
Private Sector Office, the DHS OIP, the DHS Office of Emergency
Communications and the DHS Office of General Counsel (OGC) to
help ensure emergency preparedness and business continuity in
the private sector.
Coordinated within DHS and with SDOs to complete the
development of standards for homeland security and first
responder equipment:
Biometrics equipment and credentialing standards;
Explosives detection standards for bulk and trace
detection systems, explosives reference materials, and a
pilot program for homemade explosives detection;
Personal protective equipment standards for law
enforcement, respiratory protection standards for first
responders;
Performance standards for robotics: Urban Search and
Rescue & Bomb Squad applications.
Commercialization and Private Sector Engagement
The S&T Commercialization Office and the Office of SAFETY Act
Implementation (OSAI) have both contributed to expand upon and improve
the Directorate's relationship with business and industry. The
Commercialization Office establishes and fosters working relationships
with the private sector to facilitate cost-effective and efficient
product/service development efforts.
In the past year, OSAI has been responsible for coordinating 179
applications from industry partners seeking Federal protection for
their technology under the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act). This office links the
private sector with not only the S&T Directorate but also other members
of the Federal Government.
The S&T Directorate officially established the Commercialization
Office in 2008 to develop and execute programs and processes that
identify, evaluate, and commercialize widely-distributed products or
services that meet the operational requirements of the Department of
Homeland Security's operating components, first responder community,
critical infrastructure/key resources owners and operators and other
Department users. It is committed to conducting outreach with the
private sector in order to engage and leverage the expertise, skills,
and resources of the private sector. This outreach includes a concerted
effort to engage small, minority, disadvantaged and HUB Zone groups. As
a result of these efforts, the Commercialization Office has compiled a
listing of well-over 300 companies, outlining over 2,000 technologies,
products and/or services that may possess alignment to DHS needs.
Information has also been compiled to show the number of small, medium,
and large businesses with whom the Commercialization Office has
interfaced. A majority of those companies are small businesses.
Since its inception, the Office has published a number of
materials, including briefs, books, and articles that outline the major
activities of the Commercialization Office and provide readers with
easy-to-understand guides to execute effective detailed operational
requirements documents (ORDs) and the newly created and implemented
commercialization process. Furthermore, the Office has published three
popular books to assist in the development of detailed operational
requirements. These books serve as a useful resource to explain the
critical role of detailed requirements to cost-effective and efficient
product development as well as an easy-to-use guide to aid in the
articulation of requirements.
The Office also works with the private sector through its System
Efficacy through Commercialization, Utilization, Relevance and
Evaluation (SECURE) Program, an innovative public-private partnership
in which DHS leverages the skills, expertise, and resources of industry
to develop products or services aligned to DHS ORDs. Additionally, the
newly introduced FutureTECH program, which is similar to SECURE,
focuses on delivering TRL-6 technologies through cooperation with the
university, national lab, and private sector R&D communities. For
example, in the SECURE Program, DHS posts detailed ORDs on its web
portal (http://www.dhs.gov/xres/programs/gc_1211996620526.shtm), along
with a conservative estimate of the potential available market (PAM) of
a given product/service and invites the private sector to use this
information to formulate a business case to pursue potential sales
opportunities found within DHS operating components and its many
ancillary markets including first responders and CI/KR owners and
operators. This program has been well received by the private sector,
which had requested that DHS provide more information on the detailed
needs and requirements of its stakeholders.
laboratory facilities
The S&T Directorate has focused on the alignment between the DOE
National Laboratories and the S&T divisions to establish a coordinated
network to help deliver critical homeland security capabilities. The
laboratory alignment provides strategic partnerships between the S&T
divisions and S&T and DOE National Laboratories to leverage
capabilities for basic research programs and portfolios. The aligned
laboratories continue to be engaged by S&T on matters associated with
the planning and execution of basic research as well as with other
Federal partners. For example, the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) Capability Replacement Laboratory construction
project is scheduled to be operational in fiscal year 2011. The project
is a joint investment between DHS and DOE to assure the enduring
capabilities (radiation detection and analysis; information analysis;
and test, evaluation, and certification) continue in these mission-
critical areas.
NBAF
After a rigorous 3-year competitive site selection process, DHS
selected a parcel of real property in Manhattan, Kansas as the site
upon which DHS plans to build and operate the National Bio and Agro-
defense Facility (NBAF). The NBAF will be a world class state-of-the-
art bio-containment level 3 and 4 laboratory that will research and
develop diagnostic capabilities for high-consequence foreign animal and
zoonotic diseases in livestock to protect the country's agricultural
and public health against agricultural threats for the coming decades.
Until the NBAF comes on-line (anticipated during 2015), upgrades and
enhancements will be completed for the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center to enable that facility to continue to safely operate as the
front line of the Nation's defense against foreign animal diseases and
continue to fulfill DHS and USDA research and operational requirements.
Pursuant to Public Law 110-329 (DHS fiscal year 2009 Appropriations
Act), Congress directed DHS to conduct ``a risk assessment of whether
foot-and-mouth disease work can be done safely on the United States
mainland.'' It also directed GAO to review DHS's risk assessment. I
understand that the GAO plans to release a draft written report to
Congress on June 15. I am confident that the risk assessment,
environmental assessment, and security assessment DHS conducted for the
proposed NBAF operations, which included confirmation from FMD experts
and risk modeling experts, was thorough and appropriate. I appreciate
the independent review being conducted by GAO and look forward to
reviewing the report and its recommendations as we move forward with
the design and construction of this important national facility.
Sale of Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)
Pursuant to the release of the National Bio Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF) Record of Decision (ROD) in mid-January 2009, and in accordance
with the fiscal year 2009 appropriations language, Section 540, S&T is
working with the under secretary for management to engage the services
of the General Services Administration (GSA) for the liquidation of all
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) real and personal property.
As our agent for the liquidation, the GSA, following the release of the
ROD, created a team of property, environmental, and legal professionals
who toured Plum Island and spoke with laboratory personnel. GSA, along
with DHS experts, has begun outlining strategies for the sale of the
property to allow the greatest return while minimizing risk to the
Department and impact to PIADC operations and personnel. GSA expects to
put Plum Island on the market in fiscal year 2010 with a final sale and
closing date expected in fiscal year 2011. The sale proceeds will
offset the future appropriation for NBAF construction and all other
associated costs including Plum Island environmental remediation. The
S&T Directorate will request this appropriation in the fiscal year 2011
President's budget. Depending upon the terms of the sale and when the
sale is actually completed, S&T anticipates that it will continue to
occupy PIADC and pay the new owner rent until the NBAF is ready for
full operations in 2017. This would allow the new owner time to
finalize its plans for the island's use and to begin the early design
and preparatory activities for occupation. The sale of Plum Island
purchase agreement would allow current operations to continue during
NBAF construction and eventually transfer upon completion of the new
NBAF facility.
In addition to planning and constructing new laboratories, the S&T
Directorate continues to operate its laboratories to provide homeland
security research, test and evaluation, and technology transition
capabilities to its customers. The Transportation Security Laboratory
(TSL) protects America's skies through its research, development, test,
and validation of solutions to detect and mitigate the threat of
improvised explosive devices. Based on increased requirements to
perform explosives testing, a Capital Investment Plan is being
developed for TSL to provide additional laboratory facility space. The
Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) provides a scientific basis
for the awareness of chemical threats and the attribution of their use
against the Nation. It is a part of the interagency Sample Receipt
Facility (SRF) and expected to be fully operational by the end of
fiscal year 2009. The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) seeks
to improve the science and technology required for preventing and
responding to homeland security threats, especially in the areas of
radiological and nuclear threats.
university programs
Likewise, the S&T Directorate continues to solidify its
relationship with academia through the university-based Centers of
Excellence (COE) Program. This program identifies partner institutions
to conduct research and develop technologies to improve homeland
security-related capabilities. In doing so, we not only gain access to
the best cutting-edge research and development but we also help develop
the next generation of American scientists. Moreover, by supporting
Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs), this program implements our
commitment ensuring that a representative science and technology work
force is fully developed, and that the MSIs that are leading the
development of this work force are rewarded for their efforts. In the
past 2 years, the Directorate made 10 new MSI Scientific Leadership
Awards and named four MSIs as COE co-lead institutions.
conclusion
I am glad to report that the Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate has made significant progress over
the past year, enabling DHS to better protect our Nation. I look
forward to working with the committee to ensure continued success in
both the near and long-term future.
Members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to meet
with you today and look forward to answering your questions.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Buswell.
Dr. Krohmer, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JON KROHMER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND CHIEF
MEDICAL OFFICER, OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Krohmer. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Lungren and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
President's fiscal year 2010 budget request for the Office of
Health Affairs.
OHA is beginning its third year in operation. We have
accomplished much in a relatively short period of time, but as
you indicated, have a lot that we still need to work on.
Let me say, first, how much we really appreciate the
support of this committee and its staff. As a result of your
support, the Department is better able to protect the health of
the American people and our DHS work force.
I am happy to report on the progress that OHA has made as
the Department's lead in safeguarding the Nation against
threats of bioterrorist attacks and pandemics, as well as the
lead in the integration of our Nation's medical preparedness
capabilities and the protection of the health and safety of the
Department's work force.
Today, in OHA, we have a work force of nearly 250 dedicated
individuals devoted to our mission and to our role as the
Department's principal authority for medical and health
security issues.
Acts of biological terrorism and pandemic have the
potential to cause significant harm to the Nation in terms of
loss of life, economic costs, and damage to critical
infrastructure.
We in OHA are focused on preventing acts of terrorism and
outbreaks of disease from becoming national catastrophes. As
such, one of our areas of focus is the early detection and
rapid identification of biological incidents.
To that end, OHA's BioWatch program provides a capability
for early detection and warning of a biological attack in our
Nation's high-risk urban areas.
Early detection is critical to the deployment of effective
medical countermeasures. A 1-day delay in treatment of an
anthrax exposure has the potential to result in thousands of
deaths.
OHA is working to shorten the critical time lapse between
agent release and detection through the procurement and
deployment of automated detection equipment.
The goal is to complete all testing and evaluation in early
fiscal year 2011.
Until Generation 3 is fully operational, though, it is
imperative that the Nation maintain the operation of Generation
1 and 2 detection units. Without these detectors, the Nation
has no ability to detect biological attacks until individuals
start to show clinical symptoms, and, by then, we will have
lost valuable time and the ability to effectively employ
medical countermeasures to prevent needless deaths.
I also want to recognize the contributions of the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center, or NBIC, which the
secretary placed under the authority of OHA at the beginning of
fiscal year 2007.
NBIC was reestablished as the entity where Federal
departments and agencies come together to monitor and analyze
information for potential biological threats by integrating and
analyzing data from human, animal, plant, food, and
environmental monitoring systems.
NBIC will continue to provide the visual, analytic, and
decision support capabilities of the biological common
operating picture and plans to upgrade data sharing services,
access additional data resources, and offer proper data
protection for all NBIC partners.
OHA has made significant strides in protecting the
Department's work force. Our Office of Component Services is
developing strategies, policies, and requirements for a
Department-wide occupational medicine and health program for
work force protection and for medical oversight of DHS EMS
activities.
OHA also has a cadre of medical readiness professionals and
food, agricultural, and veterinary experts who are
participating in end-to-end contingency planning for
bioterrorism and other catastrophic scenarios.
OHA played a critical role in the recent 2009 H1N1
outbreak. On initial report of the H1N1 cases, we stood up a
decision support cell to serve the national operations center.
The Office of Component Services collaborated with DHS
components to inventory their countermeasure stockpiles,
determine needs, and deploy additional countermeasures,
especially to border areas.
NBIC supported the Federal lead agencies with specific
cross-domain analysis related to H1N1 and generated
comprehensive daily status reports. BioWatch contract support
at 27 public health laboratories provided surge support for
laboratory sample analysis.
The OHA structure is fully integrated with the pillars of
biodefense, providing important contributions to threat
awareness, surveillance and detection, prevention and
protection, and response and recovery.
Although OHA is relatively small in size, it is critical in
its mission. The program dollars we receive are essential to
give our dedicated personnel the resources necessary to
vigorously protect the health of the Department and of the
Nation.
It has been my pleasure to serve in this office for nearly
3 years.
Again, I thank you for your support of the critical role
that OHA plays in the Department's mission to secure our
Nation, and I look forward to continuing our work with you.
Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Krohmer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jon Krohmer
June 9, 2009
Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the President's fiscal year 2010 budget request for the
Office of Health Affairs (OHA) within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). I am happy to share with you the progress our office
has made towards promoting the medical and health security of the
Nation.
OHA is beginning its third year in operation. We have accomplished
much in a relatively short amount of time and in the face of
significant challenges such as the recent H1N1 influenza outbreak and
national food contamination events. Let me start off by saying how much
we appreciate the support of this committee and its staff. As a result
of this support, the Department is better able to protect the American
people and our DHS work force than it was just 2 years ago.
I would like to report on the progress that OHA has made in leading
the Department's efforts in protecting our Nation from the threats of a
bioterrorist attack and a pandemic, as well as OHA's progress in
leading the Department's efforts to ensure full integration of our
Nation's medical readiness capabilities and protecting the health and
safety of the Department's work force.
the oha mission and history
Today I represent an OHA work force of nearly 250 dedicated
individuals, devoted to our mission and our role as the Department's
principal authority for medical and health security issues. As the
committee is aware, OHA has its beginnings in Secretary Chertoff's
creation of the position of Chief Medical Officer (CMO) within the
Preparedness Directorate in 2005 as part of his Second Stage Review.
This position was created to provide the Secretary with a medical
adviser for health-related security issues that may arise during a
catastrophic incident.
Congress recognized the Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed
position of CMO in the ``Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
of 2006'' (PKEMRA), Title VI of Pub. L. 109-295 (``The Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007''), and as part of the
consequent reorganization, the Secretary established OHA on March 31,
2007. This new Office was established to fill gaps the Department
identified in the areas of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
biodefense operations; planning and readiness; and the health and
safety of the DHS work force.
The following are examples of key gaps now being addressed by OHA:
Biodefense.--Principal agent for all the Department's
biodefense activities, including its obligations under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 9 (Food and Agro-Defense) and
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 (Biodefense);
Contingency Planning.--Responsible for subject matter
expert-driven contingency planning for bioterrorism and other
catastrophic scenarios involving threats to the health of the
population, from threat awareness through surveillance and
detection, prevention and protection, response, and physical,
psychological, and environmental recovery;
Occupational Health and Safety.--Consistent policies,
metrics, or standards for occupational health issues and
operational medical support for its diverse work force; and
Alignment with the Interagency.--Structured the Chief
Medical Officer in the DHS organization consistent with other
Federal partners.
It is important to note that OHA:
Fulfills its incident management duties under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of
Domestic Incidents;
Supports Critical Infrastructure protection under HSPD-7,
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
Protection;
Promotes medical readiness planning under HSPD-8, National
Preparedness;
Discharges the Department's responsibilities for biodefense
under HSPD-9;
Protects the safety of the public by supporting the Medical
Countermeasures process under HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures
and Weapons of Mass Destruction, and providing an integrated
biosurveillance capability, and working with the interagency on
medical response issues under HSPD-21, Public Health and
Medical Preparedness, and;
Provides medical expertise to the Secretary and the FEMA
Administrator, serving as the DHS point of contact to State,
local, Tribal and territorial governments and the private
sector on medical and health matters and leads the Department's
biodefense mission, all under the PKEMRA.
fiscal year 2010 budget requests and achievements
The President is requesting $138 million for fiscal year 2010 to
further the objectives of the OHA mission. OHA's strategic objectives
for fiscal year 2010 include:
leading the Department's responsibilities for biodefense;
developing, testing, and evaluating automated detection
equipment called ``Gen-3'' for deployment. Gen-3 offers the
near real-time warning of a release of an aerosolized
biological agent;
enhancing the security of the Nation's food and agriculture
supply;
initiating activities to increase coordination of medical
readiness across Federal, State, local, Tribal and territorial
governments and the private sector;
working across DHS to protect the health and safety of the
Department's mission critical work force from a pandemic
influenza or biological attack so that they would continue to
protect the Nation during times of crisis; and
providing medical oversight for the Department's medical
activities.
The following programs highlight how OHA will utilize the proposed
fiscal year 2010 budget request to meet these strategic challenges.
biowatch
BioWatch provides a capability for early detection and warning
against biological attacks in over 30 of our Nation's highest-risk
urban areas through placement of a series of biological pathogen
detectors. Deployment of such technology is critical to our Nation's
security as the detection of a biological pathogen, such as aerosolized
anthrax, at the earliest stages of release is critical to successful
treatment of the affected population. Early detection and warning of a
biological attack is essential for the rapid identification of the
bioagent, which allows for prophylactic treatment and prevention of
casualties, provides forensic evidence to law enforcement on the source
and nature of the attack, and demonstrates a spatial distribution of
contamination and population exposure. Relying solely on symptomatic
monitoring (syndromic surveillance) or post-exposure information
provided from the health care and public health communities adds
significant delays, resulting in increased causalities and loss of
life, potentially in the tens of thousands. To date, this vital program
has conducted over 5 million air samples without a false alarm, and has
formed vital partnerships with State and local public health,
laboratory, law enforcement, and environmental health entities to
further its detection mission.
Early detection is critical to protecting the health of the Nation.
With anthrax, for example, a 1-day delay in the post-exposure
prophylaxis or treatment of exposed individuals could result in many
thousands of unnecessary deaths. Early detection and rapid medical
treatment is therefore essential to protecting the health of the
American people during such an incident of bioterrorism.
If a post-exposure prophylaxis program is initiated early (as would
be the case in a well-prepared BioWatch city), it will also reduce the
economic impact of an anthrax attack. The cost savings estimates
associated with early detection are $15-25 billion if exposed persons
are treated on Day 0, $10-20 billion if treated on Day 1, $10-16
billion on Day 2, and $5-7 billion if treated on Day 3.\1\
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\1\ Kaufmann AF, Meltzer MI, Schmid GP. The Economic Impact of a
Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention
Programs Justifiable? Emerging Infectious Diseases. 1997;3:83-94.
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In fiscal year 2009, the OHA is utilizing its BioWatch program
dollars to maintain Gen 1 and Gen 2 baseline detection capabilities
(which requires manual collection of filters and laboratory analysis)
and has deployed biodetection support to numerous National Security
Special Events (NSSE) and Special Events. It is also providing subject
matter expertise and reach-back to jurisdictions for BioWatch
Actionable Results and continues to cultivate vital partnerships with
State and local public health agencies and laboratories. In addition,
fiscal year 2009 funding has enabled DHS to initiate a field test
program for prototype units for Gen-3 autonomous detectors.
The President requests $94.5 million for BioWatch in fiscal year
2010. This funding will enable DHS to continue to maintain and deploy
capability to support BioWatch jurisdictions and for NSSEs and special
events, and maintain subject matter expertise and reach-back support
necessary to assist local jurisdictions in the event of a BioWatch
actionable result (BAR). Fiscal year 2010 proposed funding would also
be used to complete the Gen-3.0 prototype unit field testing (to
include characterization and jurisdictional tests), perform data
analysis, and verify the performance of one or more autonomous
detection technology platforms in preparation for large-scale
procurement and system-wide deployment.
OHA's goal is to complete all testing and evaluation for a larger
deployment of automated detectors beginning in fiscal year 2011 to
decrease detection times from attack to as little as 4 to 6 hours.\2\
It is imperative, however, that the Nation maintain the operation of
Generation (Gen) 1 and Gen 2 detection units until such time that the
Gen 3 system is fully operational. Without the detectors currently in
operation, the Nation has no ability to detect biological attacks until
affected individuals start to present symptoms in our Nation's
emergency departments and physicians' offices--by that point, we will
have lost valuable time and ability to effectively employ medical
countermeasures, resulting in needless loss of life.
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\2\ Such a large-scale deployment of new technology would take
place only after rigorous third-party evaluation and testing and
Departmental review.
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national biosurveillance integration center (nbic)
The Secretary placed NBIC under the authority of OHA at the
beginning of fiscal year 2007, and reestablished NBIC as the entity
where other departments and agencies come together to monitor and
analyze potential biological threats to the homeland. Later that year,
Congress authorized NBIC in Section 1101 of the ``Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,'' (9/11 Act) Pub.
L. 110-53, to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to
identify and monitor biological events of national concern by
integrating and analyzing data from human, animal, plant, food, and
environmental monitoring systems. The 9/11 Act also called on NBIC to
disseminate alerts to Federal partners, States, and localities to
better enable them to prepare for and respond to such biological
threats.
While Federal partners continue to operate their respective
surveillance programs, NBIC is charged with synthesizing and analyzing
information collected from these member agencies and other information
sources in order to identify and monitor biological threats. No other
place in Government serves to integrate this information from across
the spectrum of public and private, domestic and international, open
and protected sources.
In fiscal year 2009, NBIC continued to encourage all Federal
partner agencies to be actively engaged in NBIC, and reached out to
State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners via existing DHS
relationships, State and local Fusion Coordination Center
representatives, and Protective Security Advisors (PSAs). OHA also
finalized two additional NBIC Memorandums of Understanding (Department
of Commerce and the Veterans Administration respectively) and
encouraged NBIC Member Agencies (NMAs) to enter into Interagency
Agreements to support placement of detailees to serve at NBIC to
provide in-depth subject matter expertise and analytic perspectives to
support the analysis and reporting on biological events.
For fiscal year 2010, the President requests $8 million, an amount
equal to the fiscal year 2009 enacted level.
With those funds NBIC will continue to provide the visual analytic
and decision support capabilities of the Biological Common Operating
Picture (BCOP) by providing access to in-depth scientific data,
situational awareness, digital and analog depictions, and modeling and
simulation results in a User Defined Operational Picture (UDOP). UDOP
will provide a full, comprehensive electronic picture with assessments
of current biological events and trends and their potential impacts on
homeland security. In addition, funding will be used to link the BCOP
and the Biosurveillance Common Operating Network into an integrated IT
architecture, supported by life-cycle management, and make it
exportable to NMAs. This funding will also upgrade systems
infrastructure to implement data-sharing services, provide access to
additional data resources across the biological and surveillance
communities, and offer proper protection of data for all NBIC partners.
rapidly deployable chemical detection system
OHA's Rapidly Deployable Chemical Detection System (RDCDS) provides
for the detection of a potential chemical release. It is part of a
larger effort to provide leadership and direction to a comprehensive
chemical defense program.
In fiscal year 2009, RDCDS funding is being used to continue to
validate intelligence information on chemical compounds believed to be
of interest to terrorists and conduct primary field experiments based
on findings, conduct a market survey and evaluate chlorine gas
detection equipment, and collaborate with the EPA to provide aerial
surveillance and support during natural or man-made disasters.
The President requests $2.6 million in fiscal year 2010 for RDCDS
to further validate intelligence information on chemical compounds
believed to be of interest to terrorists and conduct primary field
experiments based on findings. In addition, RDCDS will procure,
install, and validate equipment for aerial surveillance and detection
of chlorine gas.
food, agriculture, and veterinary defense
OHA's Division of Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAVD)
serves as the Department's lead for HSPD-9, Defense of United States
Agriculture and Food. It provides expertise to the Secretary on
zoonotic, food, and agriculture threats to homeland security. This
includes evaluating and coordinating DHS' research, grants, and
veterinary preparedness and response activities. FAVD utilizes some of
the Nation's premier leaders in veterinary medicine and agro-defense to
support its activities.
In fiscal year 2009, FAVD is completing the development of the
Strategic Plan (for Federal Bio Planning Against Biological Attacks)
for catastrophic Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease) and
Food Contamination Scenarios. It is also participating in the
development of CONOPS, OPS Plan and Tactical Plan (for Federal Bio
Planning Against Biological Attacks) for Foreign Animal Disease (Foot
and Mouth Disease) and Food Contamination Scenarios. In addition, FAVD
is developing a Preparedness and Response Toolkit which will enable
State, local, Tribal, and territorial organizations to measure their
preparedness and response capabilities against established food and
agricultural catastrophic scenarios, develop exercises to test their
response, and facilitate the implementation of lessons learned from
exercises and/or events as a means to improve capability. Additionally,
the self evaluations will be used to develop national standards that
are based on real-world experiences of the State, local, and Tribal and
territorial organizations.
The President requests $727,000 for FAV Defense for fiscal year
2010, an amount equal to the fiscal year 2009 enacted level. This
funding provides for: (1) The completion of the development of the
Defense of Food and Agriculture ``Dashboard'' and Collaboration Tool on
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) MAX Web site, which has been
recognized as a model for interagency collaboration; (2) the completion
of the Preparedness and Response Benchmarking Tool Kit to enhance
preparedness at the State, local, Tribal, and territorial level; and
(3) the performance of gap analysis specific to FAV Defense arenas
across internal, external and Federal, State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and private organizations to support the integration of a
comprehensive program of food defense.
the office of medical readiness
The Office of Medical Readiness (OMR) is the area of our office
that interfaces most closely with our Federal, State, local, Tribal,
and territorial partners. It develops policies and programs to enhance
all hazards planning, exercises, and training, promote integration of
State and local medical response capabilities, align DHS emergency
preparedness grants and support the medical first responder community.
This Office is critical to the coordination of health and medical
issues both within DHS and within the interagency as it relates to
multidisciplinary, multi-jurisdictional planning, and coordination
activities.
In collaboration with the Department of Health and Human Services,
OMR developed and disseminated the Pandemic Influenza Vaccination
Allocation and Targeting Guidance, which assists State, local, Tribal,
and territorial communities in preparing for the allocation of vaccines
to reduce a pandemic's impact. Also, in collaboration with the Federal
Interagency, OMR developed the National Strategy for border management
during an Influenza Pandemic.
For fiscal year 2010, the President requests $1.75 million for OMR.
This funding will be used to initiate the implementation of the Medical
Intelligence/Information Sharing Program in support of better
integrating public health and health care communities with the homeland
security intelligence community. In addition, funds will promote the
representation of health security communities within the national
network of State and Local Fusion Centers. It will also be used to
support the interagency process for development of policies and
guidance related to medical readiness for Weapons of Mass Destruction
and natural disasters. In addition, this funding will be used to
initiate a plan to provide guidance and technical assistance to States
and local communities on medical and health issues related to medical
readiness and response and to provide reachback technical assistance
for Occupational Health for intra-DHS first responder forces, through
our Office of Component Services.
office of component services
The Office of Component Services provides work force protection
guidance to the Secretary and under secretary for management. The
Office leads the development of strategy, policy, requirements, and
metrics for the medical elements of the Department-wide occupational
health and safety program. This Office also provides oversight for
medical services rendered by or on behalf of DHS, including all
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel. The Office provides a forum
for leaders of component medical officers to collaborate and share best
practices and to participate in reviewing Departmental medical policy
and procedure.
The Office of Component Services has led efforts to establish
baseline reviews of the Department's occupational medicine services and
health and safety programs for the Department's work force. It has
developed the requirements and an implementation plan for a
comprehensive workers injury and disability management system, in
conjunction with the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer; worked with the
Department's Office of Safety and Environmental Programs on
occupational safety and health policies; provided a travel medicine
program to support internationally-deployed work force; and identified
key management level occupational health and safety metrics which can
drive Departmental implementation of occupational health principles.
In fiscal year 2009, the Office of Component Services is using its
funding to: (1) Develop consultative services for Component leads on
health issues; (2) develop cross-DHS Emergency Medical Services
protocols, credentialing and quality assurance standards; (3) support
international deployment health and wellness decisions; (4) support the
Division of Immigration and Health Services (DIHS) with quality
assurance and medical input; (5) promote wellness through newsletter
and a internet-based health information site; and (6) advise FEMA on
safety and environmental health housing issues.
For fiscal year 2010 activities, the President requests $750,000
for the Office of Component Services. These funds will be used to: (1)
Augment Occupational Medical Services staff members to assist the
Medical Director in the development of strategy, policy, requirements
and metrics for the medical aspects of a Department-wide occupational
health and safety program; (2) provide health and medical consultation
resources and assistance at a leadership level on a 24/7 basis; (3)
assist Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer personnel with
assessing position descriptions, physical evaluation programs (pre-
placement, fitness-for-duty, return-to-work, etc.), performing post-
incident analyses, and working with programs to improve return-to-work
programs and to facilitate evaluation and treatment activities within
Department of Labor guidelines and limitations; (4) work to define the
requirements for job appropriate personal protective equipment,
vaccinations, and post-exposure prophylaxis; and (5) create a
Departmental credentialing and medical oversight framework.
oha's activities related to h1n1
In addition to the OHA activities described above, OHA has played a
critical role in the Department's response to the recent H1N1 influenza
outbreak. The funding approved by Congress has enabled OHA to carry out
these functions. OHA provided information, analysis and medical advice
to the Secretary and the Department 24 hours a day/7 days a week on
medical and health aspects of the incident. OHA is working with the
Secretary and other DHS components to take steps to help protect the
DHS work force, specifically those at the border and working overseas.
Upon initial reports of H1N1 cases in Southern California, OHA
stood up a Decision Support Cell (DSC) through its Office of Medical
Readiness to support the National Operations Center (NOC). This
decision support cell served as a focal point for monitoring and
coordinating OHA-related operations. It was the central collection,
analysis, and processing element for medical and health information and
guidance for the Department, feeding into the NOC. The cell was staffed
by physicians, toxicologists, epidemiologists, and public health and
emergency management experts, as well as representatives from the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center and the Intelligence and
Analysis Directorate, who worked collaboratively to collect and analyze
information and distribute analysis and guidance to the Secretary in
support of her role as the Principal Federal Official, the NOC and
other DHS components.
Each Office within OHA contributed to the H1N1 response.
The Office of Component Services collaborated with DHS
Components to inventory their respective countermeasure
stockpiles, determine needs, and deploy additional
countermeasures (antivirals and personal protective equipment),
especially to border areas. Component Services working closely
with the Management Directorate in developing guidance to DHS
personnel on the use of personal protective equipment and on
prophylactic antiviral dispensation.
The Office of Medical Readiness set up and operated the DSC,
fielding questions from Departmental leadership, the
interagency, and States and locals, and managing the
information flow into and out of OHA, through the NOC. OMR also
supported other DHS components and Interagency partners in
conference calls and meetings to provide updates, situational
awareness and medical and health advice, and participated in
White House activities to address the outbreak. In addition,
OMR collaborated with CDC on the development and distribution
of Travelers Health Alert Network (THAN) notices, which provide
travelers entering and exiting U.S. ports and border crossings
with information about the symptoms of H1N1 and direct
travelers to the CDC Web site for updates.
Three divisions within the Office of Weapons of Mass
Destruction have contributed to the H1N1 response. NBIC is
supporting the Federal lead agencies with specific cross-domain
analysis related to H1N1 and has generated comprehensive daily
status reports based on integrating Federal, State, open
source, and classified information sources on the status of the
H1N1 influenza outbreak. BioWatch contract support at 27 public
health laboratories has provided surge support for laboratory
sample analysis. The Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Division
is in frequent communication with USDA's Office of Homeland
Security and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), and has provided to the DSC, NBIC, Department senior
leadership information on: APHIS and CDC's recent development
of a pilot surveillance project to better understand the
epidemiology of swine influenza virus infections in swine and
in humans; the current status of biosurveillance of swine
diseases in the United States; and, the current status of
agricultural imports and exports between the United States and
Mexico.
oha and our federal partners
OHA is designed to contribute to the health and security of the
American people, in instances like the H1N1 outbreak, and in full
coordination and collaboration with other DHS components and our
Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector
partners. OHA's responsibilities and activities enhance National
planning for and response to the health consequences of catastrophic
incidents. This approach is consistent with the incident management
coordination mandated by HSPD-5 and will ensure that the full,
coordinated force of the Federal Government is appropriately applied to
management of incidents of any scale.
OHA works closely with all of the Department's components by
supporting their occupational health and safety requirements, and
coordinating with others to meet operational requirements. We have
spent much of our time over the last 2 years collaborating with our
Federal partners at the Departments of Health and Human Services,
Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, Justice and Veterans
Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Postal Service
and members of the intelligence community on a wide range of activities
and initiatives. OHA has reached out to numerous State and local
governments and non-governmental organizations, associations, and
private sector entities to advance the mission of a Nation prepared for
health consequences of catastrophic events.
Though it has been over 7 years since the attacks of September 11,
and the anthrax mailings that followed soon thereafter, the risk of
biological and chemical attacks still exists. To manage this risk, the
OHA structure is fully aligned with the pillars of biodefense providing
important contributions to threat awareness, surveillance and
detection, prevention and protection, and response and recovery.
OHA is relatively small in size, but critical in its mission. The
program dollars we receive are essential to give our dedicated
personnel the resources they need to take action to protect the health
of the Department and the Nation.
We appreciate the committee's support for our budget so that we can
fulfill the mandates of the President and Congress.
It has been my pleasure to serve in this office for the past almost
3 years. I thank you for your support of the critical role of OHA in
the Department's homeland security mission. I look forward to answering
any questions you may have.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Dr. Krohmer.
Dr. Gallaway, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. GALLAWAY, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE
Mr. Gallaway. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking
Member Lungren and distinguished Members of the committee.
As acting director of DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity
to discuss radiological and nuclear detection and to highlight
the work we are pursuing.
I would like to express my gratitude to the committee for
its support of our mission to reduce the risk of radiological
and nuclear terrorism to the Nation.
Since DNDO was formed just over 4 years ago, we have made
significant strides in improving the Nation's capability to
detect RAD/NUC sources in containerized cargo.
Working with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, we have
employed radiation portal monitors to a majority of sea ports
and land border crossings, resulting in scanning of 98 percent
of all incoming containers.
We are working to achieve 100 percent by finishing the
remainder of the deployments along the northern border by the
end of this year, matching what we have already accomplished on
the southern border.
Additionally, we are moving to other previously unaddressed
cargo challenges, including on-dock rail, international rail,
and air cargo.
We have made substantial investments in the development of
the next generation portal monitor, known as the advanced
spectroscopic system, or ASP. ASP technology will significantly
improve our ability to correctly identify and interdict
smuggled nuclear material and offer the ability to
automatically sort threat materials from naturally occurring
radioactive material.
This should reduce the number of alarms due to innocent
radioactive sources, alarms that currently consume large
amounts of CBP officers' time.
The ASP units are currently undergoing an extensive test
and evaluation campaign. The successful completion of this
testing, along with other analysis and consultation with the
National Academy of Sciences, will then inform the secretary's
certification of ASP performance this fall.
You have probably noted that in the Department's fiscal
year 2010 budget request, there is no funding request for
systems acquisition. In fiscal year 2010, we will continue to
carry out the joint CBP/DNDO deployment strategy using the
unobligated funds from previous years to procure current
generation RPMs.
Following a successful outcome to secretarial
certification, prior year funds would be used to procure a mix
of current generation and ASP systems. If certification does
not occur, these remaining unobligated funds will continue to
be used to pursue current generation systems.
Another key objective is to address the threat of shielded
nuclear material that passive systems are not capable of
detecting. We are working with CBP on a range of technologies
to address this concern.
We are focusing much of our activity on radiography systems
that provide the ability to automatically detect special
nuclear material or dense materials that may be used to shield
nuclear threats.
Moving beyond containerized cargo security, we have shifted
our focus and are now dedicating increased time and effort to a
wide range of issues and challenges. Much of our insight has
come from our work on the global nuclear detection
architecture, which seeks to integrate efforts across the
Government into a single strategy to improve the Nation's
nuclear detection capability.
We have been working with our partners to pursue a range of
programs to strengthen the architecture.
To be effective, countermeasures in each layer,
international, at the border, and in the interior, along with
each threat pathway, land, sea, and air, will require a
flexible approach utilizing a variety of operational and
technical solutions.
Most importantly, no single solution is sufficient to
completely address this threat. It is often said that we have
to be right 100 percent of the time and terrorists have to be
right only once.
For a terrorist with an extremely valuable asset, like a
nuclear weapon, our multilayered approach reverses that logic.
Now, the terrorist must get it right his one chance and we need
only succeed interdicting him at one of our many layers.
As we work with our operational components, we remain
committed to providing cutting-edge technology that can be used
in a variety of environments to address remaining
vulnerabilities.
These technologies and strategies are coupled with our
operational support services to ensure that alarms are properly
resolved and that real threats are quickly transitioned to
effective response.
In addition, we train State and local officers to support
our detection mission using a curriculum that provides
instruction on how to operate detection equipment and
investigate the potential malicious use of RAD/NUC materials.
Finally, I look forward to continuing our work with our
partners within DHS, our Federal departments, State, and local
agencies, and the Members of this subcommittee, and the
Congress to keep the Nation safe from radiological and nuclear
terrorism.
This concludes my prepared statement.
Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren and Members of
the subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be
happy to answer any questions that you have.
[The statement of Dr. Gallaway follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles R. Gallaway
June 9, 2009
Good afternoon Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As Acting Director of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity
to discuss our fiscal year 2010 budget request and to highlight the
work DNDO is pursuing. I would also like to thank the committee for its
support of DNDO's mission to reduce the risk of radiological and
nuclear (RN) terrorism for the Nation.
DNDO was established to improve the Nation's capability to detect
and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or
transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation,
and to further enhance this capability over time. To that end, our work
is guided by our development of an enhanced global nuclear detection
architecture (GNDA). DNDO has developed a time-phased, multi-layered,
defense-in-depth GNDA that is predicated on the understanding that no
single layer of defense can detect all RN threats. For this reason, the
GNDA provides multiple detection and interdiction opportunities
overseas, at our borders, and within the United States to effectively
increase the overall probability of system success. DNDO has worked
with intra- and inter-agency partners to develop time-phased strategies
and plans for improving the probability of detecting and interdicting
RN threats. DNDO will continue to enhance the GNDA over time by
developing better RN detection technologies, improving concepts of
operations (CONOPS), enabling real-time reporting of detection events,
and providing effective response to real threats.
My testimony today will share with the committee some of our plans
for fiscal year 2010 and also our progress in addressing emerging
mission requirements that will protect the United States from RN
threats.
The United States border is the first layer within the GNDA where
the United States has full control over detection and interdiction. As
such, considerable effort and resources have been placed on this layer
to provide comprehensive RN detection capabilities, particularly at
ports of entry (POEs).
A key consideration in RN detection is the ability to effectively
detect threats without impeding the flow of legitimate trade and travel
across the border. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
currently scans cargo entering at our Nation's POEs using polyvinyl
toluene (PVT)-based radiation portal monitors (RPMs) that can detect
radiation, but cannot distinguish between threat materials and
naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM), such as kitty litter
and ceramic tiles. To address this limitation, DNDO is developing next
generation technology to automatically detect and distinguish threat
from non-threat materials, while also reducing false alarm and referral
rates. Narrowing down alarms for just dangerous materials is especially
important for POEs that have a high volume of containers, or those that
see a high rate of NORM.
As you may know, DNDO initiated the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
(ASP) program in 2006. ASPs are the next generation of radiation portal
monitors. ASP units are now being developed with two separate
performers. These units have been subjected to one of the most rigorous
testing campaigns of RPMs ever conducted prior to deployment. Both
systems will complete several rounds of performance testing and field
validation at POEs. Following these performance tests, both systems
will complete operational testing and evaluation conducted by the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate's Operational Testing Authority.
Test data will be provided in support of the Secretary's Certification
decision. DNDO is also engaged with the National Academy of Sciences,
to allow NAS to review ASP testing and inform the certification
process, as required in the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act. Indeed, in its most recent report on ASP testing,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has acknowledged the many
enhancements and lessons that DNDO has incorporated into its testing
programs.
Following a successful outcome of Secretarial certification, prior
year funds will be accessed to procure ASP systems. If certification
does not occur, prior year funds will be used to procure only current
generation systems.
In addition to improving the basic functionality of the RPMs, DHS
faces a number of unique challenges to secure cargo at our POEs that
may require development of new CONOPS or technologies in order to
mitigate identified risks. For example, the intermodal transportation
of containerized cargo at terminals which transfer containers from a
ship to a rail facility that is within the terminal, referred to as
``on-dock rail'', accounts for approximately 2% of all import
containers to the United States.
Operational testing at the Rail Test Center (RTC) at the Port of
Tacoma has demonstrated that mobile RPM (mRPM) systems can be used to
scan cargo where special carts or container chassis move the containers
to the rail facility, but this approach is not applicable where ports
use straddle carriers in this role. For these terminals DNDO, CBP, and
the Department of Energy (DOE) are investigating alternative
technologies including ``spreader bar'' detectors and straddle carrier
portals. Recent tests by both CBP and DOE have indicated technical
weaknesses in the spreader bar approach, so DNDO is moving forward with
the construction of a straddle carrier portal test article at RTC this
year. We will reach a key decision point next year, where the results
of spreader bar detection systems tested by CBP and DOE can be compared
to the results of prototype straddle carrier portal testing by DNDO at
RTC. At that point, we will identify the most effective mix of spreader
bar detectors, straddle portal detectors, or a combination of the two
approaches.
Another key DNDO program seeks to address the threat of shielded
nuclear materials placed in cargo conveyances that passive
spectroscopic systems, such as ASP, are not capable of detecting. DNDO
is also working with CBP to address next-generation radiography needs
that can utilize radiography scanning to detect RN threats. The Cargo
Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program is specifically
designed to automatically detect shielded nuclear material. Since
beginning the program in 2006, however, the commercial marketplace has
made many advances. This, coupled with lessons learned from the ASP
program--namely that high-risk development should not necessarily be
procured concurrently with production--has led DNDO to de-scope the
CAARS program from an acquisition program to a research and
development-focused program. Under the new course, fiscal year 2009
CAARS activities will subject both CAARS systems and commercially-
available systems to a test and evaluation program and a final
demonstration of the products.
Our on-going work with CBP to facilitate container security has
resulted in the scanning of 98% of all incoming containerized cargo for
RN at our land and sea ports of entry. Due to this significant
progress, DNDO is now able to place a greater emphasis on our land
borders between POEs, maritime, air, and the interior.
To address gaps in the GNDA that remain unfulfilled by current
technologies for RN detection, DNDO established a transformational
research and development program that identifies, explores, and
develops scientific and technological approaches that will dramatically
improve the performance of nuclear detection components and systems. We
have three efforts underway that support long-term research--
Exploratory Research, Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs), and a
dedicated Academic Research Initiative (ARI). There is tremendous
involvement with the National Labs, private industry, and academia for
these efforts. I am proud to say that these programs have already
yielded some very promising results that we hope will make a tangible
impact on this Nation's nuclear detection capabilities in the future.
Just as one example, there have been major advances made in the
area of new materials for passive radiation detection. Since all
detectors rely on some material to detect the radiation emitted by a
threat, discoveries of new, more effective detection materials have a
high payoff because they can be incorporated into many different types
of detectors for many different applications or threat scenarios. For
gamma-ray detection, the new materials will result in detectors that
are more efficient, cheaper, or have improved ability to reduce false
alarms. For neutron detection, DNDO is accelerating the final
development and initial production of new materials to replace the
scarce, but presently-used, helium-3 by the end of fiscal year 2009 or
early fiscal year 2010. To put this in perspective, to advance from the
discovery of a new detector material to construction of prototype
instruments in the space of 2-3 years is really remarkable. It is our
intent to continue and accelerate these material research successes in
fiscal year 2010.
DNDO also has multiple programs that will provide a wide variety of
law enforcement and first responders with effective human portable
systems for RN detection: the Handheld program, the Human Portable Wide
Area Search (HPWAS) program, and the Human Portable Tripwire (HPT)
program. Each of these programs will result in the delivery of human
portable systems that will be used in all DNDO mission areas: Aviation,
land, maritime, and interior. Overall, each of the three human portable
system program development efforts seeks to expand the spectrum of
detectors available to end users by: (1) Investigating existing
commercially available human portable systems and tailoring them to
better meet the needs of operators; (2) developing cutting-edge
technology when current systems are inadequate to meet customer
requirements; and (3) conducting systems development efforts for
maturing technologies that transition from ATDs. The first ATD expected
to transition a system to development in fiscal year 2010 is the
Intelligent Personal Radiation Locator (IPRL).
One thing that DNDO has learned in its short existence is that
industry, even without Government funding, often continues to develop
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) detectors that may satisfy a greater
range of requirements with limited additional development. DNDO has
accordingly adjusted its strategy to investigate opportunities to
address certain needs by developing customer-driven design
modifications to currently available human portable equipment. In
addition to these efforts, DNDO will develop human portable systems
that transition successfully from our transformational research and
development work. As we work at DNDO to improve our business models, we
are looking at additional ways to leverage COTS technology wherever
appropriate.
DNDO also has a Congressional mandate to set Technical Capability
Standards and implement a test and evaluation program to provide
performance, suitability, and survivability information and related
testing for preventive RN detection (PRND) equipment in the United
States. In fulfillment of this requirement, we have established the
Graduated Rad/Nuc Detector Evaluation and Reporting (GRaDER) program to
assure independent and consistent testing of radiation detectors. This
program will be leveraged to ensure technologies advanced by industry
will be considered for acquisition programs, as appropriate. We are in
the first phase of this program that will provide for commercially-
driven and privately-funded testing of COTS rad/nuc detection systems.
GRaDER will work with the DOE and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) to use the National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) to support testing of COTS radiation
detectors. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has already
received NVLAP accreditation, and it is anticipated that the first
units to be tested through GRaDER will be COTS handheld detectors.
Results of the GRaDER program will also be made available to DHS
components and State, local, and Tribal law enforcement and first
responder agencies to inform their procurement and grant process.
One successful strategy that DNDO has used to enhance security is
by ``piggy-backing'' on existing programs. In the land border between
POEs, DNDO initiated the Phased Deployment Implementation Plan (PDIP)
with CBP to evaluate and field test potential RN detection options
where no off-the-shelf solutions are currently available and
environmental conditions are particularly challenging. DNDO expedited
the procurement of radioactive isotope identification devices (RIIDs)
to provide CBP with an initial operating RN detection capability, and
will improve that capability over time. Similarly, DNDO has coupled RN
capabilities with the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams (VIPR) to provide a
greater Federal detection capability and add an additional layer of RN
detector-equipped law enforcement personnel in support of the GNDA.
Through the delivery of tailored training and a suite of RN detection
equipment, the TSA VIPR teams will become another Federal asset that
can perform regular PRND operations and may be called upon during
periods of heightened alert levels. Prior to DNDO's involvement, the
VIPR teams had no preventive RN detection capability.
In the maritime environment, DNDO has established the West Coast
Maritime Pilot to work with authorities in Washington's Puget Sound and
the San Diego area to design, field, and evaluate a RN detection
architecture (specific to each selected region) that reduces the risk
of RN threats that could be illicitly transported on recreational craft
or small commercial vessels in a ``direct-to-target'' scenario. The
project aims to develop RN detection capabilities for public safety
forces for use during routine public safety and maritime enforcement
operations. In addition to this pilot, we have tested boat-mounted
detection systems under our Crawdad test campaign.
DNDO has similarly expanded work to secure the air pathway--both
commercial operations and general aviation. Within the aviation
pathway, RN threats may be transported via air as a prelude to an
attack elsewhere, or the actual attack involving an RN threat device
may be executed and delivered by air. As a result, DNDO is working
closely with CBP to enhance capabilities to detect and interdict
illicit RN weapons or materials entering the United States via the
international general aviation pathway. These efforts included a test
campaign, with CBP officers, at Andrews Air Force Base in 2008 that
characterized CBP's current radiological scanning capability and
identified methods to improve effectiveness by enhancing equipment and
operational techniques.
To further build upon the layered structure of the GNDA, DNDO works
within the Nation's borders to develop PRND capabilities for urban
areas, transportation vectors, special events, and State and local
entities. DNDO works regularly with Federal, State, local, and Tribal
entities to integrate nuclear detection capabilities in support of the
GNDA. Our ``Securing the Cities'' initiative in the New York City (NYC)
region, brought together law enforcement and first responders to design
and implement a layered architecture for coordinated and integrated
detection and interdiction of illicit radiological materials that may
be used as a weapon within a metropolitan area. After 3 years of
engaging with NYC and regional stakeholders, no additional funds are
being requested for the STC initiative in fiscal year 2010. The 3-year
pilot ends in fiscal year 2009. Additionally, NYC regional STC
stakeholders can continue to fund additional capabilities through the
DHS grants (e.g., Homeland Security Grant Program). DNDO will continue
to support the STC initiative through the obligation and expenditure of
appropriated STC funds with experienced program management and subject
matter experts in preventive radiological and nuclear detection. For
example, we are planning to actively support a regional full-scale
exercise in 2010. DNDO has a vested interest in the continued success
of the initiative as it seeks to reduce the risk of radiological and
nuclear terrorism to New York City and extract lessons-learned for
application to other major urban centers.
DNDO's outreach also includes a State and Local Stakeholder Working
Group with 25 States and territories meeting approximately once a
quarter to bring the Nation's PRND community together, inform
participants on activities within DNDO and the community, and obtain
feedback on DNDO's programs and initiatives. State and local
authorities also can use the PRND Program Management Handbook created
by DNDO which provides consistent guidance for building or enhancing
State and local PRND programs. In fiscal year 2008, DNDO used a five-
course training curriculum to train over 7,400 law enforcement, first
responder personnel, and public officials, and has provided Federal,
State, and local exercise support as a validation instrument to
evaluate their RN detection, deterrence, prevention, reporting,
vulnerability reduction and alarm adjudication capabilities in a risk-
free environment.
Another facet of DNDO's interior work involves performing gap
analysis and promoting mitigating strategies for securing radiological
material at its source within the United States. Last year, our budget
request included $1 million in funding for irradiator hardening,
however in fiscal year 2010 the national implementation programs will
be funded primarily by DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). Interagency collaboration for source security between DOE, DHS,
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is still in place, and DHS,
through the Nuclear Government Coordinating Council and Nuclear
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), will
still have a seat at the table to coordinate a variety of ``source
security'' projects as catalogued and tracked through the ``Initiatives
to Improve Source Security'' matrix.
Our fiscal year 2010 budget request also reflects increased
emphasis on the critical area of nuclear forensics. In 2006, DNDO stood
up the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) as a
national-level interagency office. NTNFC serves as the national
``system integrator'' weaving together the various specialized nuclear
forensics activities across a number of different agencies. This role
includes exercising, assessing, planning, and providing overarching
stewardship. NTNFC also leads the development of the national
capability for pre-detonation rad/nuc materials forensics, which
provides the technical capabilities to rapidly, accurately, and
credibly conduct nuclear forensics to support attribution conclusions
about the origin, nature, and pathways of interdicted threats. In
addition to supporting attribution conclusions, the forensics program
can also contribute to national deterrence, by dissuading nations from
providing nuclear materials or devices to terrorists.
A related area of concern identified by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, the American Physical Society, the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National
Academy of Sciences is the loss of trained individuals versed in
nuclear science and engineering. DNDO has begun efforts to address
these ``pipeline'' issues on multiple fronts, including awards of
academic fellowships, internships, and research grants to academic
institutions and national laboratories. The goal is to reinvigorate the
Nation's pool of trained nuclear scientists and engineers. These
individuals represent an investment in the future of DNDO, the overall
GNDA, and the Nation's long-term security.
By working with our DHS and interagency partners, DNDO is
continuing to assess the best technological solutions for use in all
pathways. We remain committed to providing cutting-edge detection
technology that can be used in a variety of environments by Federal,
State, local, and Tribal operators to address identified
vulnerabilities in the GNDA. RN detection technologies and strategies
are coupled with DNDO's operational support services to ensure that
personnel on the front lines are properly trained in the PRND mission,
alarms are promptly resolved, and detection of threats is seamlessly
transitioned to operational response. Continuous coordination with
interagency partners and State and local officials allows DNDO to
integrate user requirements with technological solutions to address
vulnerabilities. I look forward to continuing to work with components
within DHS, other departments, State and local agencies, and the
Members of this subcommittee and Congress to pursue this goal.
This concludes my prepared statement. Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking
Member Lungren, and Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for your
attention and will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you for your testimony.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Dr. Gallaway, what is your current estimated date for ASP
secretarial certification?
Mr. Gallaway. We are looking at certifying this fall. I
hesitate to give a specific date.
Ms. Clarke. Is the current intention to certify for primary
inspection, secondary inspection, or both?
Mr. Gallaway. We would like to keep the option open to
potentially certify for both. We are very focused on trying to
get certification through on secondary.
Ms. Clarke. So we are looking at somewhere between
September, late November.
Mr. Gallaway. October is kind of our notional date right
now. We need to get our field validation restarted. We are
looking to get it started early next month and assuming that it
goes well, that we would then be on track for an October
certification.
Ms. Clarke. Very well.
Let us suppose that the significant increase in operational
effectiveness criteria are met for the ASP and that the
secretary certifies the ASP.
The next consideration is that an ASP costs 2.67 times as
much as a current PVT.
Does the increase in performance then justify the increased
cost?
Mr. Gallaway. Ma'am, you have hit the $64,000 question and
that is one that will be deliberated by the secretary, because
what we are doing is offering a system with significantly
improved performance, but we will have to weigh that against
the cost, and the secretary will then be forced to make an
acquisition decision.
Ms. Clarke. Well, I am sure she will be able to use your
expertise, Dr. Gallaway. Thank you for answering those
questions.
Dr. Krohmer, do you believe that the Office of Health
Affairs should continue to exist as a stand-alone office within
the Department?
Dr. Krohmer. Ma'am, based on the experience that we have
had over the last 3\1/2\ years, a little bit more, that the
office started as a chief medical officer and then transitioned
to the Office of Health Affairs, I think it functions most
effectively as an independent office.
Ms. Clarke. Do you think that it should be split up with
pieces sent to various other organizational entities within
DHS? How would efficiency and effectiveness increase in either
scenario?
Dr. Krohmer. I think I have a biased perspective because of
the experience that I have had working with the various
programs that we have in the office.
It is my personal perspective that there is a very close
tie-in and could make a very good argument for keeping all of
the programs together.
I do acknowledge that there is some very close interaction
with a number of our programs and other offices within DHS. So
I think it is possible to make things work, but I think most
efficiently and most effectively, it would be my preference to
keep the programs together as they are.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Dr. Krohmer.
Mr. Buswell, what are your plans for Environmental
Measurements Lab in New York City?
Mr. Buswell. EML is a crown jewel, I think, of the Nation
and it has worked in a very good way with the Department of
Energy and the Department of Homeland Security since it was
transferred over.
As you know, it was a radiation monitoring laboratory under
DOE.
We are morphing that now to be a test and evaluation and
technical assistance entity in support of first responders. I
mentioned the 13th IPT. We really have a heightened emphasis on
our service to the first responders who are the Nation's heroes
and on the front lines of homeland security every day.
So to the extent that we can provide the first responders
with technical assistance and test and evaluation of equipment
that they would need in their homeland security role, that is
what we plan to do at EML.
We are developing a strategic plan for EML that I think
will be completed. We will brief that to the new under
secretary and to the deputy secretary and the secretary when
that is ready, and I expect that to be in the next couple of
months, and they will start executing that plan.
I think using New York as a test bed, with the various,
obviously, high-profile activities that go on there, the port
authority and all of those homeland security-centric things, it
is a prime location and it is a prime capability, and I really
look forward.
I think the leadership up there is ready to go and do that.
Ms. Clarke. I am glad to hear you say that, Mr. Buswell.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Dr. Krohmer, the budget request for planning and
coordination, as I understand it, has been cut by about $3.3
million.
Can you tell me where there was the cut for this?
Then, second, according to the budget, there is no specific
funding request for pandemic activities.
Is that because it is included somewhere else or is there
some reason we don't have it this year?
Dr. Krohmer. The overall cut in Office of Medical Readiness
was part of the administration's overall budget reduction
strategy, and we are working very closely through the office to
modify activities so that we are able to continue many of the
activities that have been on-going.
You had mentioned the national biodefense architecture and
that is a program that is very important to the office and that
working with some of our partners, we are hoping that we will
be able to continue.
We have made some staff adjustments to try and address
that.
The issue of pandemic influenza activities, we are talking
about very close or very thoroughly in the Department, working
with the CFO and the under secretary of management, and it is
unclear at this point exactly where additional pandemic
influenza requests may come from, whether it be the Office of
Health Affairs or management.
We are working within the Department right now to address
those issues.
Mr. Lungren. So I guess what I am trying to get at is at
least throughout the country, there was concern about pandemic.
We are concerned about what may happen in September with the
second wave of swine flu, to whatever extent it is.
It just struck me as perhaps timely that that be a specific
project area and that is why I was--while you suggested you are
looking for areas where we might be able to respond to it, why
there would not be a funding request for pandemic activities
specifically.
Dr. Krohmer. I suspect that there will be a request. We are
working within the Department just to identify, because of the
overall departmental nature and the supplies and logistics
storage, whether that should be handled most appropriately
within the Office of Health Affairs or within the management
directorate.
We were able, with the H1N1 incident that we have had so
far, to use some of our carryover pandemic funds to acquire
additional antivirals and personal protective equipment earlier
this spring that had not been acquisitions that had been
anticipated.
So we are continuing to move forward with that.
Mr. Lungren. As I read the mission statement for the Office
of Health Affairs, it says OHA, ``leads the department's role
in developing and supporting a scientifically rigorous,
intelligence-based biodefense and health preparedness
architecture to ensure the security of our nation in the face
of all hazards.''
Yet, I don't see any specific funding request for the
national biodefense architecture.
Is there a reason for that?
Dr. Krohmer. As a result of some of the budget constraints
that we were placed under, we have been looking at all of the
programs within the office.
We felt that we were able to continue the activities of the
biodefense architecture by making some modifications in
personnel and support activities.
Mr. Lungren. So you couldn't use additional money
effectively.
Dr. Krohmer. We would be able to use any money that is
available very effectively, yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. So if we stimulated your budget, you would be
able to use it in an effective fashion.
Dr. Krohmer. We would.
Mr. Lungren. Just one of the concerns I have got. When the
Federal Government tries to do everything for everybody else,
maybe we don't do all the things we are supposed to be doing at
the present time.
Mr. Buswell, you mentioned the area of cybersecurity, and I
am very supportive of the administration's announced emphasis
in that area going forward.
What specifically is the S&T directorate doing in terms of
prioritizing cybersecurity?
You mentioned that you tripled the amount of money directed
toward that. But in what way is that going to be used?
Mr. Buswell. In a couple of very important ways. No. 1, let
me make it clear that the National Programs and Protection
Directorate within the Department, NPPD, and the under
secretary for NPPD have the lead for the Department in
cybersecurity.
So they are our customer, if you will, in the cybersecurity
world and identify the requirements for us.
The work that we are doing is work that, one, the private
sector is not doing, first of all, for a number of reasons and
that has to do with investing in things like test beds, data
sets that can be used to understand the cyber threats, and
allow all comers to use those facilities in order to develop
cybersecurity.
I am very mindful of the fact that we don't deploy the
technology. We develop the technology and especially in the
cybersecurity and infrastructure, other infrastructure
protection kinds of roles, much of this is deployed by the
private sector.
So we have to keep them closely involved with all the
development that we are doing and make sure that what we are
doing and what they are doing, we are not duplicating, first of
all, because $37 million, quite frankly, is not a lot of money
in the grand scheme of cybersecurity.
But I will be happy to provide a complete answer for the
record.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Ms. Clarke. I fully support Doug Mullen's work on
cybersecurity and S&T, and I think his budget should be raised
even more.
Having said that, I would like to acknowledge the gentleman
from New Mexico, Congressman Lujan.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
If I may, the first question I will be addressing our
experts with will be a follow-up, I think, on what our Ranking
Member was asking about cybersecurity.
But first and foremost, I want to thank everyone for their
testimony today.
As you know, in New Mexico, we have a few laboratories,
Sandia National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory,
of which Los Alamos National Laboratory is my district.
They are working on developing a range of technologies
which could be utilized to provide some of the resources, some
of the technology, I think, that could enhance what we are
talking about today from a homeland security perspective, many
of which may already be in use and some of the modeling
capabilities already in practice within the Department of
Homeland Security.
I am pleased that Mr. Buswell, in his prepared remarks,
touched upon the dynamic partnership between the laboratories
and the Department of Homeland Security.
In recent years, specific projects that have worked in
conjunction with the Department at Los Alamos are the magnet
airport scanner and the national infrastructure simulation and
analysis center, which I believe was utilized to assist our
Nation in being able to adequately prepare for H1N1, as well.
In the area of cybersecurity, with the specific
partnerships that do exist and as we are looking for compiling
the necessary datasets to be able to truly understand the
threats, some of these are already in use and in place in many
of our national laboratories.
I am more familiar with those at Sandia National Laboratory
and Los Alamos, and I would encourage that the Department look
to our national laboratories to be able to build upon the
expertise that is in there, especially as the President is
moving to bring some attention to what we as a Nation need to
be doing to adequately protect ourselves from cybersecurity
attacks, as well the dollars that can be saved to both business
and the Federal Government and governments, State and local and
tribal, within the United States.
So I appreciate that very much and would ask you to touch
upon that in a minute, as well.
A few things, Madam Chairwoman, that I would like to
specifically ask, if there is no objection, to be able to ask
that the Office of Inspector General's report, which is
included in our remarks today, from the Department of Homeland
Security, dated August 2008, document OIG-085B, entered into
the record.
Ms. Clarke. Without objection.*
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* The information referred to has been retained in committee files.
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Mr. Lujan. Madam Chairwoman, the reason I ask that is on
pages 26 and 25 of this report, it talks about some of the work
that needs to be done for basic research projects that can be
improved upon, whether it is selection process or how we can
truly work with tribal governments, with our first responders.
The report details, by the inspector general, that there is
very little funding to address the first responders' needs, and
that is listed on page 24 here.
So, again, I know that we have made this request before. I
know our colleague, Mr. Bill Pascrell, typically speaks out on
behalf of our first responders, especially our firefighters.
I would encourage that we continue to work closer there, as
well as S&T'S inability to secure technology transfer
agreements.
One of the areas that we can take advantage of not only our
laboratories, but our bright minds in our Nation is to support
tech transfer opportunities that exist from the research
investment that we as a Nation are making within our
laboratories.
I would encourage that we look to see what we can do to get
those to market to protect our Nation and to provide the level
of security that we need.
But the doors that can be opened up for small business
opportunities, to be able to encourage economic growth and job
creation are second to none, and would like to hear a little
bit about that, Madam Chairwoman.
Maybe if I would be indulged with a second round of
questions, that I would get a chance to hear about everything
that I am trying to bring up now.
The last, Madam Chairwoman, is on pages 27 and 29 of the
report, one of the things that I hope that we can see changes--
the report outlines that in 2007, the under secretary selection
process that was identified through the inspector general's
report was such that items were undocumented. There was a
question of pre-selection for some of these projects.
One thing that we can't afford to do is not to allow the
latest and greatest technology, ideas that can be proven, that
can work, to be able to have an opportunity to provide a level
of support to those that need the help as opposed to saying,
``Well, we think these are the best one and I know these
people, so let's go help them.''
I would hope that what we learn from that process is that
when we go forward, that we are able to document adequately the
selection criteria, how the projects move forward. So that if
there is ever a question in the future, we are all able to come
back and talk about what we learned from it.
Whether they were good selections or not, we are able to
document it. It is not a matter of trying to hide the selection
process. It is a matter of being open about it so we can learn
what we can do better.
So thank you, Madam Chairwoman. When I get an opportunity,
I will follow up on those questions and I will do more
listening for the second round as opposed to more speaking.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Lujan, you sure had a lot on your chest
there.
We will be doing a second round of questions now,
gentlemen.
I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Buswell, in the 2008 inspector general review of the
S&T directorate, the IG stated that the S&T should develop a
more rigorous process for identifying, prioritizing, and
selecting HIPS and HITS projects, and ensure the process
documents the reasons behind the selection.
Additionally, the IG suggested that the under secretary
delegate the responsibility for managing the HITS/HIPS process
to the director of innovation at HSARPA.
Have you notified the IG about completing these outstanding
requirements and did former under secretary Cohen establish
procedures for documenting selection of future HIPS and HITS?
Did he assign the director of innovation responsibility to
identify and select these projects?
Mr. Buswell. In short, yes, ma'am he did and, yes, we
have--I think we have closed this out with the IG.
The process that we put in place--and we also have to put
in context that the innovation portfolio was brand new starting
in December 2006 and was jump-started with a handful of
projects that then-under secretary Cohen identified as being,
well, innovative.
So that, in itself, was a necessary thing to do to jump-
start that portfolio, but the IG had it exactly right in that
we needed to formalize the process going forward.
We have done that. The process, as it now stands, the
directorate of innovation, HSARPA, collects recommended
projects from really all comers. It can come from within the
Department. It can come from within Science and Technology
Directorate. It can come from the private sector. It can come
from universities, come from laboratories.
Those are categorized and analyzed for operational impact,
first of all, and then do they fit the innovation model. In
other words, is this a high-risk, high-gain kind of thing?
He makes a proposal to the S&T corporate board, which is an
entity that is made up of the six division heads for each of
the technical divisions and the three portfolio managers, the
basic research portfolio, the transition portfolio and himself
as the innovation portfolio manager.
That recommendation comes to me in priority and then, with
my concurrence, it gets presented to the under secretary.
That, I think, is an adequate process. But what we have
done is we have taken it one step further in that we then
present those projects to the technology oversight group, which
is chaired by the deputy secretary and, also, consists of the
under secretary for management and the under secretary for NPPD
and all of the--they are the voting members--and all of the
members of the operating components are free to participate in
that meeting, in that group, for their concurrence that these
do represent capabilities that would be of priority to the
Department and the homeland security enterprise in general.
So we did that with the fiscal year 2010 process, budget
development process and the two new starts that we have
proposed in the budget submission were approved--were developed
and approved in that way.
Ms. Clarke. That sounds great.
Mr. Buswell, would you just present us with some follow-up
documentation on the process, as you have described it?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, ma'am, I would be pleased to.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
I have a follow-up question to you. In looking at the
increase and decrease in the funding of individual research
areas, such as border and maritime, chemical and biological,
explosives, human factors, et cetera, the committee presumes
that the budget request numbers reflect the interests and needs
at this particular time of other DHS component agencies in the
current state of agreement and projects pursuant to integrated
project teams.
Is this the case? If so, can you please tell us what, with
specifics, led you to increase or decrease specific research
projects? If not, can you tell us what else drove the decision?
Mr. Buswell. Well, in the next 25 seconds, I will be happy
to. The short answer is, yes, they do reflect the priorities of
the capstones that have been developed in the capstone IPT
process, for the most part.
Now, remember, that is only 50 percent of the directorate's
budget. The other percentages are in the basic research and in
the innovation portfolios and those are also guided or informed
by the IPT process.
So if you need additional information beyond what is in the
justification for the budget request, we will be happy to
provide that as to the incremental changes within those PPAs.
But the general answer is, yes, those reflect our
customers' priorities.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. Thank you very much, Mr. Buswell.
I now recognize the gentleman from California, Ranking
Member Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Buswell, I mentioned in my opening statement the fact
that I was very pleased that your borders and maritime section
is building, demonstrating, and transitioning the first phase
of an improved capability so that we could detect the
semisubmersible self-propelled vessels to customers.
We have been looking at that as a problem of drug running,
which it has been to this point in time, but as the Washington
Post article suggested, it has been a pretty good delivery
system for drugs into this country where they can't be
detected.
Wouldn't it be a possible delivery system by terrorists for
a nuclear device? Of course, we have the DNDO operation, which
is specifically directed toward making sure that we don't have
those devices delivered here.
With that in mind and with the work that we have been doing
under DNDO and hopefully get through the certification and we
have enhanced detection at our ports of entry, are we giving
sufficient attention to the problem of the semisubmersibles and
the possible delivery system?
Is this just a drop in the bucket in terms of what you are
doing, or is it truly a serious effort in this regard?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir, it is a serious effort, and we will
need to do more, clearly.
This first effort is really working at identifying the
capabilities that may exist already nationally, whether those
are national overhead assets or Navy assets.
As you may be aware, I spent the first 25 years of my adult
life driving submarines. So I am very familiar with the
difficulty that exists in finding those kinds of platforms.
These aren't even really true submarines. I mean, they
really are surface ships with a very low profile.
Mr. Lungren. They cost $1 million to build. They bring a
payload of $100 million in. They have been very successful. The
law we passed is because they scuttle them. They can lose $100
million because they just do the next one.
But the law helped us prosecute those ones we can detect.
The question is: How many are we not detecting? If that proved
to be a successful delivery system, I am very concerned about
it being--we can spend all the time we want in terms of
protecting against these ports of entry, and we are spending a
tremendous amount, because we see all these cargo containers
coming in and we realize what an opportunity there.
I don't want us to stop our dedication to that, but I am
concerned about this other thing.
So your background helps us consider the seriousness of
this problem and I appreciate that. I just hope others in the
Department and throughout Government share that.
Let me ask you this, and maybe it is for you, maybe it is
for Mr. Gallaway. That is: Does your Department at all get
involved in the impact of an EMP attack on this country?
Mr. Buswell. I can take a stab at that. I know that the EMP
and the potential threat to the infrastructure of this country
is something that the Office of Infrastructure Protection has
looked at.
The commission issued the report last year on EMP attacks,
was widely distributed and read and considered. I have
discussed this with Jim Snyder, the acting assistant secretary
for infrastructure protection, to see if there were research
and development needs that he identified and what he told me
was they factored that threat, along with all the other
threats, into their annual risk assessment and, currently, he
doesn't see any research and development needs that are of a
priority that he would ask us to sacrifice other programs in
support of----
Mr. Lungren. Okay, let me ask the question this way. So,
evidently, there is nothing that is going directly to you. But
because of your experience, you know the report was out there
of the commission. You have read the report. It has been out.
Do you get any sense of urgency throughout the Department,
throughout the Government, either on the Hill or out there,
that we are seriously enough considering that?
Mr. Buswell. I think it is being very seriously considered.
I am just not sure that there is a consensus or that we have
finalized where that falls among all the other potential
threats and vulnerabilities that we have and where we can best
expend resources in order to harden our infrastructure against
those kinds of attacks.
Mr. Lungren. It just strikes me that at least one way of
launching an EMP is, obviously, a missile that hits a certain
altitude, so to speak, and explodes the nuclear device.
You don't have to have an accurate missile and those rogue
nations and transnational organizations might be able to get
their hands on that and we would breathe a sigh of relief
because they are not very accurate. That doesn't go into the
question.
I am just concerned about whether any of us have
internalized the seriousness of that such that we understand
not only the possibility of that occurring, but we understand
the consequence of that occurring.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Member Lungren.
You may be aware that there is going to be a group meeting
at the Capitol Hill Club tomorrow. I will be addressing them on
that very topic.
You are absolutely correct. I couldn't agree with you more.
This is an area that we need to really focus on much more than
we do.
At this moment, I would like to acknowledge Mr. Lujan, of
New Mexico, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Madam Chairwoman and Mr. Lungren, one other piece of
information I would like to get for you on that point is there
was an article that I read where recently--I don't know if it
was a satellite or something that had to be brought down, but
we had one shot to do this and it had to be precise, because it
had to be broken up in such a way that it wouldn't--when it
entered into the atmosphere, that it wouldn't hit anything or
that it would fully disintegrate, and they did it.
So I will make sure that I get the information on that and
we will put it together, and that might be something for us to
talk about as we collaborate on those ideas together.
Madam Chairwoman, as I stated earlier, I asked a lot of
questions about education, cybersecurity, detection, national
laboratories, process improvements, in each of those areas.
So, Mr. Buswell, if we could begin with you and just share
a little bit from the panel.
Then I would follow up with one question pertaining to the
budget request to an 8.5 percent cutting university programs
and to see what we could truly do, again, to be able to take
advantage of some of the brightest minds, from an educational
perspective, to make sure that we have an avenue for them to
assist us in solving some of these problems.
Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir. I took some notes as you were
talking in your first 5 minutes. Let me sort of tick down this.
We have taken very seriously the IG report that you referenced
and had entered into the record.
We are working--I think we have closed out everything
except for the basic research aspect that you are discussing,
that you mentioned.
The national laboratories, universities are the primary
providers of the basic research that we fund. Centers of
excellence that comprise most of the university programs'
funding that you mentioned took a slight reduction are very
important for two reasons.
No. 1, we develop centers that will be of enduring value to
homeland security. So these are capabilities that will last
long after their funding from us has ended and they will be out
on their own gathering funding from all sources in order to do
this kind of work, and we think that is very important.
The second has to do with the scholars and fellows program.
We fund a number of--near 100 scholars and fellows and over 450
over the course of the program over the last 4 or 5 years.
These are people who are doing their undergraduate and
graduate work in disciplines, technical disciplines that are
relevant to homeland security. We are looking to place those at
national laboratories, like Los Alamos or Sandia, that are
truly the long-term and the foundation of the research within
the country.
There is a reason they are called national laboratories.
They really are a national asset.
As far as the private sector engagement, which you also
mentioned, let me just talk a little bit about that. The
public/private partnerships are a win-win-win for the
Government, for the private sector, and for the taxpayers.
I have found that you get a faster speed of execution when
the private sector is involved, because they are interested in
a return on the investment that they are making in the effort.
It creates jobs, it creates revenue through the development
of a marketable product, not through slipping and trading, but
development of a product and, under certain circumstances, I
think we can actually do that with minimal taxpayer investment.
A couple ways that we approach this. This is the output of
the capstone integrated product team process, and we publish
this every year. This is the one that we just put out in May.
These are our high priority technology needs, and this is for
everyone to see and everyone to participate in.
We have a long-range broad agency announcement in place
where people have the ability to come in with very simple, 1-
to 2-page white papers that address the needs that we have
identified with the technology that they have developed.
It doesn't cost them a lot of bid and proposal funding to
build these things. We received about 350 such white papers in
fiscal year 2008, in the last fiscal year.
Out of that, we requested about 50 full proposals and we
funded about 30 of those. So we are getting participation from
the private sector and we are using those resources in a way
that the country can appreciate.
There are a number of other things that we are doing from
stakeholder outreach to commercialization that I would be happy
to get you additional details on.
But I think our engagement with the private sector is one
of the things that we have really worked on over the last 2
years, and I think that is working pretty well.
Ms. Clarke. I want to thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony here today, and the Members for their
questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses. We will ask you to respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke of New York for Bradley I.
Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. What are the most significant challenges for the S&T
Directorate that you have discovered over the last 3 years, and how
will you recommend the next under secretary resolve some of these
problems?
Answer. When Under Secretary Cohen joined the Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate, he identified four areas for improvement:
Organization, people, books, and program content. The S&T made
substantial improvements in all four areas over the past 3 years. The
organizational structure is stable and has proved effective. Morale and
employee satisfaction has improved and many vacancies have been filled.
The S&T now has one set of financial books. Customers now drive the
program content and the Directorate's investments through the
Integrated Product Team process.
The S&T's employee satisfaction is now on par with the rest of the
Federal Government after being rated among the lowest in the Government
4 years ago. Work force improvement continues as we are already working
to assess which job positions are most appropriately and cost-
effectively held by a contractor or a Federal employee. Combined with
this initiative, S&T will continue to fill vacancies to achieve a full,
steady-state staff.
The S&T's financial management and budget controls have been
praised by Congress as an area of significant improvement, but we must
remain vigilant to ensure that these new processes and practices
continue. DHS is in the process of selecting and moving to a new
financial system for better fiscal management and S&T's 5-Year Research
and Development (R&D) Plan has become a bridge between the budget and
the programs. It needs to continue to capture and define the
Directorate's program for years to come to support a stable research
budget and agenda.
The 5-Year R&D Plan is also crucial to documenting and maintaining
the appropriate R&D program content at S&T. Our customers must continue
to inform the content of the S&T's research investments. New methods
for broadening customer involvement, such as standing up a Capstone
Integrated Product Team (IPT) for first responders, are already being
executed. These practices need to continue to receive support from
within S&T and across the Department.
Going forward, S&T must continue to improve its work force,
financial processes, and research investments while keeping the
organization stable. The S&T will continue to refine its process for
determining investments. Further strengthening program content will
enable the Directorate to direct its investments to R&D that achieves
the most significant benefit for homeland security. Implementing these
improvements will require the next under secretary to continue to
exercise leadership and promote cooperation across all DHS components
and with the first responder community to identify operational
requirements that can be implemented by the public and private sectors.
Question 2. What role do you see for the National Labs in
supporting DHS?
Answer. The Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories play a
critical role in meeting the broad range of research and development
(R&D) requirements associated with the mission of securing the
homeland. The DOE National Labs provide the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) with world-class facilities and more than 30,000
scientists and engineers performing cutting-edge homeland security
research. On-going homeland security-related research at the National
Labs examples include: Enhancing transportation security through
development of advanced screening and detection technologies; designing
multi-scale modeling and simulation capabilities in the event of a
biological attack or a disease outbreak; and designing resilient
electric grid technologies to ensure better protection of our Nation's
critical infrastructures.
In fiscal year 2009, 10 DHS components, including the Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate, used the National Laboratories for
homeland security-related R&D. The DHS's partnership with the National
Laboratories will continue to make significant contributions to the
homeland security mission in coordination with S&T laboratories, DHS
Centers of Excellence, and other DHS R&D-related entities.
Question 3. What are your plans for the Environmental Measurements
Lab in New York City?
Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate plans to
continue operations at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML),
which historically has focused on research and development (R&D) in the
areas of radiological and nuclear threats. As S&T moves forward with
its efforts in the area of first responder technologies, EML's mission
is being re-focused toward being a dedicated laboratory for test and
evaluation of first responder technologies. The laboratory's New York
City location, experienced staff, and established trusted relationships
with key New York City regional entities, are significant assets for
conducting field and laboratory-based tests with our local partners in
the first responder community.
Question 4. Your testimony mentions the sale of Plum Island.
Approximately how much do you expect to realize from that sale? How
much will the Plum Island site clean-up cost, and is your expected sale
price net of clean-up costs? Will the proceeds of the Plum Island sale
be sufficient to cover the cost of NBAF?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working with
the General Services Administration on determining an estimated real
estate value of Plum Island. The estimated funding needed to clean up
Plum Island is approximately $200 million. It is expected that the sale
of Plum Island will provide sufficient funding to cover clean-up,
construction, and related costs.
Question 5. Can you describe the role of the Chief
Commercialization Officer, and what impact this role has had on S&T's
success?
Answer. The Chief Commercialization Officer (CCO) leads the Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate's Commercialization Office, which was
established in 2008 to leverage the private sector to rapidly develop
products and services for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
operating components and the first responder community. Through this
office, the CCO provides the private sector with an understanding of
the market potential for needed homeland security tools and
technologies, thereby encouraging private sector investment. This has
directly benefited S&T and other DHS components by strengthening
private sector interest in developing homeland security tools and
technologies.
Specifically, the Commercialization Office identifies DHS and first
responder technology needs with large market potential and develops
operational requirements documents that correspond with those needs and
pushes that information out to private sector vendors. In the past
year, the Commercialization Office has:
Developed and published for DHS components a variety of
books, tutorials, and teaching materials on developing
requirements;
Compiled a repository of well over 300 companies, outlining
more than 2,000 technologies, products and/or services that may
possess alignment to DHS needs;
Published 8 detailed requirement documents with the
participation of more than 40 partners. We are developing 25
additional documents.
In addition, the CCO oversees the System Efficacy through
Commercialization, Utilization, Relevance and Evaluation (SECURE
TM) and FutureTECH TM programs. SECURE
TM is a public-private partnership in which DHS leverages
the skills, expertise, and resources of industry to develop products or
services aligned to DHS operational requirements documents. FutureTECH
TM focuses on delivering Technology Readiness Level 6
technologies through cooperation with universities, national
laboratories, and the private sector.
The Department has quickly recognized the benefits of
commercialization outreach to the private sector and is in the process
of integrating commercialization best practices into its Management
Directive on Acquisition.
Question 6. The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review began in 2008.
Do you expect the outcome of this review to change the direction of R&D
in the S&T Directorate, based on a new assessment of the challenges
faced by the other directorates? In conducting the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review within your own directorate, what input have you sought
from other agencies, considering your statutory coordinating role for
all Federal homeland security R&D?
Answer. The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) will
include recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and priorities
for homeland security and guidance on the Department's programs,
assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. While this
will undoubtedly have impacts across the Department in terms of mission
and priority, it should not result in sweeping changes to the Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate's research agenda. The S&T's projects
currently address the highest priority needs of DHS components; and
these highest priority core missions are the least likely to change in
this review.
Question 7. The DHS S&T budget is small in comparison with the R&D
budgets of other defense agencies. This makes it imperative that S&T
spends its money wisely, on projects that have a good chance to
transition into the field. Of course there is also an obligation on the
DHS components, who work with S&T on identifying projects that they
want funded. Can you describe the importance of the Technology Transfer
Agreements that S&T enters into with the components? How many have been
signed by the components? Does the fact that components do not sign
these agreements impact the work that S&T will perform for components?
Answer. Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) are non-binding
agreements developed at the technology product level between the
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate and DHS component customers
and are integral to technology transition. They define the capability
gap, the technology under development, delivery schedule, performance
metrics, rough order of magnitude of life-cycle cost, exit criteria,
and transition responsibilities for technology products. The TTAs also
ensure that all parties understand the technology being delivered and
the path to transition the technology. By defining the transition path
and the responsibilities of the participating parties, TTAs remove the
ambiguity in technology development and the transition process.
Of the 251 products currently in the Transition portfolio, 194
require TTA's. Currently, 75 TTA's have been signed, 53 are in
negotiation, and 66 are currently in development.
Absence of a TTA does impact research and development done by the
S&T Directorate. After appropriate time to develop a TTA, projects
without TTAs come under increased scrutiny for termination. Lack of a
TTA is an indicator that the identified customer does not have a plan
to deploy the technology. During semi-annual reviews of S&T projects,
program managers identify which projects do not have TTAs. The under
secretary for science and technology then makes a decision to allow
further time for TTA development or recommends project termination to
the relevant Capstone Integrated Product Team and to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Technology Oversight Group. In cases where a
project is terminated, resources are applied to other customer-
identified, high-priority requirements.
Question 8. How will the two new homeland security Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) utilize the expertise of
historically underrepresented colleges and universities?
Answer. The Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs) will use consultants and sub-contractors in carrying out their
work. Historically underrepresented colleges and universities would be
considered for sub-contracting opportunities, as well as for consulting
assignments.
In addition, the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's Office
of University Programs (OUP) will work to extend its career development
programs to the new FFRDCs. The OUP presently has established
relationships across the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Energy national laboratories to place students from its
education and science and technology career development programs,
including the Minority Serving Institutions program, in internships and
post-graduate positions. The OUP will target its career development
programs more specifically to fill the jobs needed at Federal
laboratories and research facilities with homeland security
responsibilities.
Question 9. In the 2008 Inspector General review of the S&T
Directorate, the IG stated that S&T should develop a more rigorous
process for identifying, prioritizing, and selecting HIPS and HITS
projects, and ensure the process documents the reasons behind the
selections. Additionally, the IG suggested that the Under Secretary
delegate the responsibility for managing the HITS/HIPS process to the
Director of Innovation/HSARPA. Have you notified the IG about
completing these outstanding requirements? Did former Under Secretary
Cohen establish procedures for documenting the selection of future
HIPS/HITS? Did he assign the Director of Innovation responsibility to
identify and select these projects?
Answer. Yes, the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate provided
a formal response in December 2008 to recommendations in the inspector
general's report, ``The Science and Technology Directorate's Processes
for Selecting and Managing Research and Development Programs, 2008''.
The response outlined S&T's process for identifying, prioritizing, and
selecting new HIPS and HITS projects. The S&T Directorate officially
documented this process in the latest revision of its Science &
Technology Organization Regulation Manual (STORM) and used the process
to select new HITS and HIPS projects proposed in the fiscal year 2010
President's budget. As recommended by the IG, the Director of
Innovation/HSARPA plays a key role in identifying and selecting
projects, as follows:
The process begins with gathering ideas for potential new
HIPS and HITS. These ideas come from documented needs of DHS
customers; solicitations and proposals; discussions with S&T
stakeholders; technology conferences and symposia; university;
laboratory and industry interaction; and international
collaboration. Then the ideas are gathered by the HSARPA staff
as well as other S&T members including the six division heads.
The director of Innovation/HSARPA screens the list of
potential projects to ensure that they meet the fundamental
philosophy of the innovation portfolio, namely that though they
still contain high risk, they offer substantially higher payoff
than programs currently handled in the transition portfolio or
an actual acquisition program of record. The director then
presents this list of recommended new start HIPS and HITS to
the S&T Corporate Board to ensure the recommended efforts are
not redundant with efforts already under way, and to obtain
corporate board agreement that the recommended projects are
neither more appropriate for the basic research or transition
portfolios.
Following concurrence by the corporate board, the Director
of Innovation/HSARPA presents the list of recommended new
starts to the deputy under secretary for science and technology
and the under secretary for science and technology for
concurrence.
The final phase of the approval process takes place annually
when the under secretary for science and technology presents
the recommended new starts to the DHS Technology Oversight
Group (TOG) for approval.
Following approval by the TOG, the Director of Innovation/
HSARPA works with the S&T's chief financial officer to ensure
the appropriate level of funding is requested in the
President's budget.
Question 10. The S&T budget zeros out the $5 million core funding
for the Homeland Security Institute (HSI), presumably to indicate that
the Department's Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) has been re-bid. The plan was to have HSI replaced by two new
FFRDC's: the Studies and Analysis Institute, and Systems Engineering
and Development Institute. The budget provides $5 million for the
first, and no mention of the second. Please explain.
Answer. The Homeland Security Institute (HSI) contract expired in
April 2009, and a new Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) was established to conduct strategic studies and analysis for
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Funding for the core
research activities of the new FFRDC, the Homeland Security Studies and
Analysis Institute (HSSAI), is included in the fiscal year 2010 budget
request.
The other new FFRDC, the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and
Development Institute (HSSEDI), was established to provide DHS and the
homeland security enterprise with program-level concept evolution,
system-of-systems development integration, and homeland security best
practices in lifecycle systems engineering and program (acquisition)
management. The HSSEDI has a different business model, one in which its
funding will be solely task-based, and that has no core research budget
requested. Rather, each task will be funded directly by the requesting
DHS component.
Question 11. The budget requests an 8.5% cut in the University
Programs portfolio. The committee is concerned with this because of our
strong support of university programs in general, and more specifically
the great value that should be placed in basic scientific research,
which University Programs usually conduct. What is the decision for the
decrease?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2010 budget request for the
Office of University Programs (OUP) is $4.3 million less than the
fiscal year 2009 enacted budget. Of the $4.3 million reduction, $2
million supports a homeland security project at the Naval Post Graduate
School (NPS). The fiscal year 2010 request moves this $2 million from
OUP to Transition Division, which will continue the field testing
objectives that are the central focus of the NPS project. The remaining
$2.3 million represents the actual program change to OUP. With this
relatively small reduction and additional funding anticipated to be
forthcoming from Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate divisions and
DHS components in fiscal year 2010 to support the Centers of Excellence
(COE) research, S&T should be able to continue supporting mission-
critical activities in the DHS COE, the Minority Serving Institutions
Program, and Education Programs.
Question 12. Due to some serious problems with Testing and
Evaluation on important Domestic Nuclear Detection Projects, the
committee supports the idea of a separate office within the Department
whose sole responsibility is conducting operational and performance
testing. Will the Department's Testing and Evaluation/Standards Office
have this responsibility? Your budget documents state that [t]he Test &
Evaluation and Standards programs provides policy and oversight of the
Department's test and evaluation program. There does not appear,
however, to be a budget for actual test and evaluation activities.
Please explain.
Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's Test and
Evaluation and Standards Division (TSD) and Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) are responsible for approving and
overseeing the developmental and operational Test and Evaluation
activities for major DHS acquisition programs, including the approval
of test and evaluation master plans (TEMPs) and Operational Test Plans.
The DOT&E is also a member of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Acquisition Review Board responsible for providing an independent view
of the status of major programs to decisionmakers. The Department
requires each major program to identify an independent Operational Test
Agent to conduct Operational Test and Evaluation that must be approved
by DOT&E.
The DHS components fund for each program's Test and Evaluation
activities (e.g. U.S. Customs and Border Protection budgets for SBINet
testing and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office budgets for Advances
Spectroscopic Portal Testing). The TSD and DOT&E personnel provide
guidance and oversight only. The personnel expense of conducting the
oversight is included in S&T's Management and Administration budget
which pays for all S&T Federal employees' salaries and expenses. There
is also funding in the Test and Evaluation and Standards budget that
covers the cost of subject matter experts needed to support some of the
reviews.
Question 13. The Chairman is very concerned about the risk posed to
the Nation's electric grid and other critical infrastructure by an
Electromagnetic Pulse. As such, it is our intention, as part of our
authorization, to include language that will reauthorize the EMP
Commission. He also believes that the Commission should be a great
asset to the Department, and as such, could function in the near term
as a DHS task force. However, we seem to be getting a lot of pushback
from the Department in our initial discussions with the Infrastructure
Protection division. Do you agree on the value of the Commission? Do
you believe that such a task force would interface better with S&T than
IP?
Answer. When the Electricmagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission's report
was finalized, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) engaged the
Department of Defense to brief the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Working
Group in September 2008. All 18 critical infrastructure sectors were
represented by both Government and industry personnel. Additionally,
the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
examined the potential threat and impact of an EMP attack to the
physical assurance of the core communications network and released a
report on November 6, 2008. The DHS continues to look at the control
systems implications of an EMP attack.
The EMP Commission exhaustively studied the effects of EMP on
infrastructure; and DHS included the EMP Commissions' findings in its
internal risk assessment process. The work of the EMP Commission is
completed for the foreseeable future.
I believe the Infrastructure Protection division is the proper
organization within DHS to work with the EMP commission.
Question 14. In looking at the increase or decrease in funding of
individual research areas such as Border and Maritime, Chemical and
Biological, Explosives, Human Factors, etc, the committee presumes that
the budget request numbers reflect the interest and needs at this
particular time of other DHS component agencies and the current state
of agreements and projects pursuant to Integrated Project Teams. Is
this the case? If so can you please tell us what specifics led you to
increase or decrease specific research budgets? If not, can you tell us
what else drove your decisions?
Answer. Yes, the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate used the
Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) process to develop the fiscal
year 2010 budget request. The major programmatic changes by research
area are as follows:
Borders and Maritime Security.--The fiscal year 2010
increase funds maritime security requirements identified by the
Maritime Security IPT and Urban Tunnel Detection basic
research.
Chemical and Biological.--The fiscal year 2010 increase
supports the initiation of the Multiplex Detection Technology
project. This project will develop a technology to address
food-borne pathogens in food and clinical sample matrices;
detect biological threat agents in food, clinical, water, and
environmental sample matrices; detect foreign animal disease
from animal samples; and cover a wide variety of other
pathogens of interest in a variety of sample matrices. This
will provide multiple Federal partners with a tool to meet
their ever-demanding needs for preparedness and support of the
National Bio-Defense Strategy through rapid detection for rapid
mitigation.
Command, Control and Interoperability (CCI).--The fiscal
year 2010 increase will enable CCI to fund cyber security
research and development applied towards cyber security
priorities identified in the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). Specifically, this effort will
develop enduring leap-ahead technologies to secure the Nation's
critical information infrastructure (energy, transportation,
telecommunications, banking and finance, and others) and
networks.
Explosives.--The fiscal year 2010 increase supports the High
Throughput Air Cargo Screening projects. The High Throughput
Air Cargo Screening project is developing technologies for the
Transportation Security Administration. The requested funding
will support the objective to screen 100 percent of air cargo
by developing high throughput screening technology suitable for
cargo screening applications and filling the current technology
capability gap. The increase in fiscal year 2010 also supports
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Research in the
Transportation Security IPT, specifically the Person-Borne IED
project. This funding will enable S&T to build upon existing
research programs and improve large threat mass detection for
large areas, such as mass transit and special events.
Human Factors.--The increase in fiscal year 2010 reflects
additional support for efforts in the Biometrics, Suspicious
Behavior Detection, and Human Systems Research, and Engineering
Programs.
Infrastructure and Geophysical.--The fiscal year 2010 budget
request increases research and development of first responder
technologies such as 3-D locators, physiological monitors, and
extremely strong, lightweight, resilient materials (compared to
the fiscal year 2009 budget request). The fiscal year 2010
budget request does not include the National Institute for
Hometown Security and the Southeast Regional Research
Initiative.
Innovation.--The fiscal year 2010 increase will fund
existing programs whose scopes increase as they mature and will
allow for new starts projects in the area of multi-modal tunnel
detect, where capabilities are currently non-existent to
inadequate; and low-cost biological detection, which could
result in huge gains in capability for DHS.
Transition.--The fiscal year 2010 increase million provides
funding for the First Responder Capstone IPT. This increase
will allow DHS to test technologies, assess them for usability,
and commercialize them to make the technology solutions
available to Federal, State, local and tribal first responders.
University Programs.--The fiscal year 2010 request for
University Programs is $4.3 million less than the fiscal year
2009 enacted budget. Of the $4.3 million reduction, $2 million
supports a homeland security project at the Naval Post Graduate
School (NPS). The fiscal year 2010 request moves this $2
million from University Programs to Transition, which will
continue the field testing objectives that are the central
focus of the NPS project. The remaining $2.3 million represents
the actual program change to University Programs. With this
relatively small reduction and additional funding anticipated
to be forthcoming from S&T Divisions and DHS components in
fiscal year 2010 to support the Centers of Excellence research,
S&T should be able to make up the remaining difference and
continue supporting mission-critical activities in the DHS
Centers of Excellence, the Minority Serving Institutions
Program, and Education Programs.
Question 15. The committee supports the transition of operational
aspects of the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) from
S&T to the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) as soon as possible. The
committee understands that S&T has wanted to transfer operational
aspects of the ICLN to OHA for some time now, but that the inability of
OHA to provide the necessary support has prevented this from occurring.
How does the money requested in the fiscal year 2010 budget address
this problem?
Answer. The Technology Transfer Agreement (TTA) between the Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate and the Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
on the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) identifies
three conditions for transfer of operational aspects to ICLN: (1)
Adjudgment that the Integrated Response Architecture (IRA) being
currently built by the ICLN under S&T leadership is functional as an
operational system; (2) OHA has identified funds to support the
assumption of operational aspects; and (3) OHA has identified an
individual to begin to serve as Chair of the ICLN Network Coordinating
Group. The target date for the transition as of last fall was December
2009. On further examination of information technology issues related
to data flow among laboratory systems to support functionality of the
Integrated Response Architecture, OHA and S&T agreed to delay the
transition by 6 months to June 2010. It is anticipated that this
additional delay caused by technology issues will provide sufficient
time for OHA to address the commitments it made to support transition
of operational aspects of ICLN. Regardless of when the transition
occurs, S&T is committed to ensuring the requisite capability is built
and functional. Fiscal year 2010 funding allocated to ICLN in S&T
funding will be applied as necessary to maintain functionality under
S&T leadership until all conditions necessary to enable transition are
met.
Questions From Ranking Member Daniel E. Lungren of California for
Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. How is the budget for the S&T Directorate prioritized?
Does the Department undertake a comprehensive risk assessment, and
allocate funding requests based on the ranking of the perceived
threats?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) components and
agencies receive numerous inputs to their prioritization processes
including intelligence briefings and threat assessments from various
sources. The knowledge gained from these inputs form the prioritization
of missions within the components and in turn the components
prioritization of the research and development (R&D) activities
requested of the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate.
Approximately 50 percent of S&T budget is dedicated to the Transition
Portfolio which uses Integrated Product Teams to define the highest
priority capability gaps within the Department. In addition to the
Transition Portfolio, S&T manages a Basic Research Portfolio. The Basic
Research Portfolio is approximately 20 percent of the R&D budget and is
driven by the need for fundamental technology advancements to address
gaps that cannot be filled with mature technologies. The S&T's
Innovation portfolio is between 5 percent and 10 percent of the R&D
budget and it addresses high-priority needs of the Department with
high-risk, high pay-off research projects. The Technology Oversight
Group (TOG) plays a key role in the selection of and funding levels for
the Transition and Innovation projects. The TOG is headed by the DHS
Deputy Secretary and ensures that the Department's priorities are
reflected in S&T's R&D portfolio and its investments.
Question 2. I noticed that your budget for the Chemical and
Biological Division outlines a nearly $7 million response and
restoration program to develop plans to respond and recover to a
biological attack. We need to see more of this for radiological and
nuclear events.
Does S&T undertake any such research for radiation and nuclear
events, or does that fall entirely to the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office?
Do you foresee interest in radiological preparedness and response
increasing when the new under secretary comes on board?
Answer. When the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was established
it assumed all responsibility for radiological and nuclear research and
development R&D in fiscal year 2006 and all related funding in fiscal
year 2007 and later. In fact, the SAFE Ports Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 109-
347) modified Title 3 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 removing
from the under secretary for science and technology authorities or
responsibilities for radiological or nuclear research and development.
Question 3a. The Department is the subject of a lawsuit and an
inspector general investigation over its handling of the site selection
process for the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility, or NBAF. The
NBAF is meant to replace the research facility on Plum Island. The
allegations are serious, contending that the selection process for this
more than half-a-billion dollar enterprise was biased and based on
neither good science nor good Government.
What actions have been taken to sell Plum Island?
Answer. Pursuant to Section 540 of the Consolidated Security,
Disaster Assistance and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L.
110-329, the Secretary of Homeland Security has directed the General
Services Administration (GSA) to move forward with actions that will
allow the liquidation of the Plum Island asset. The GSA is currently
reviewing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) documents related
to Plum Island in order to create the appropriate marketing plan,
conduct due diligence and meet environmental planning requirements. The
GSA and DHS representatives meet regularly to lay the ground work for a
memorandum of agreement that will govern agency actions going forward.
Question 3b. Do you believe it is prudent to undertake such actions
when a lawsuit and an IG investigation into serious allegations are
only just getting underway?
Answer. The Department cannot comment on pending litigation and has
no knowledge of any IG investigation into the National Bio and Agro-
Defense Facility NBAF site selection. However, as for the merits of
DHS's site selection process, the selection of the Manhattan, Kansas
site concluded a rigorous, 3-year, multi-agency planning process to
identify the preferred site upon which to construct and operate NBAF.
The process involved a qualitative analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of each site alternative and included information from the
risk assessment, environmental assessment, and security assessment on
proposed NBAF operations. A steering committee, comprised of Federal
employees from DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, was convened
to lead the evaluation process and unanimously recommended the site in
Manhattan, Kansas as its preferred site alternative. The DHS leadership
concurred with the Federal employee steering committee's
recommendation.
Question 3c. Will S&T break ground on the NBAF and sell the island
before these allegations have been resolved?
Answer. DHS cannot predict when the lawsuit or any IG investigation
(or any potential IG investigation) will be resolved. However, due to
the aging infrastructure at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center
(PIADC) and the need to find an efficacious cure for foot-and-mouth
disease and other foreign animal diseases, DHS will continue with site
specific design for this high containment laboratory, which will
provide the country with biosafety level 3 and 4 facilities for large
animal research.
Question 4a. The Directorate funds national laboratories and DHS
Centers of Excellence to basic and applied research.
How does S&T prioritize the split between these entities?
Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's divisions
work with the Director of Research when developing research topics in
their areas. This coordination helps the S&T divisions select the
University or National Lab performer with the most appropriate
expertise for each research project. The Director of Research, through
the Office of University Programs, has aligned the DHS Centers of
Excellence with S&T's divisions to ensure that the centers research
efforts are meeting the strategic needs of the Department and that the
centers are building a capability to best match those needs. The
Director of Research, through the Office of National Laboratories, has
also aligned the Department of Energy's National Laboratories to each
S&T division to identify the laboratories with the most relevant
capabilities and enable the divisions to select the appropriate
performers for high-priority research and development.
Question 4b. Is enough basic research being funded to establish a
long-term research basis for future applied and transitional
technologies?
Answer. Yes, S&T has grown its basic research portfolio from
approximately 10 percent in 2006 to about 20 percent in 2010. Basic
research needs to be balanced with the Transition and Innovation
projects to ensure that technologies are being delivered to the field
to support our customers, and that there is a pipeline of next-
generation technologies to address the future requirements.
Question 5a. The Directorate has established two new research
centers, the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development
Institute (HSSEDI). This center will transition work away from non-DHS
research centers.
From which centers will work be shifted?
Answer. Work will transition from the Internal Revenue Service,
Center for Enterprise Modernization (CEM), Federally Funded Research
and Development Center (FFRDC), and the Department of Defense, Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) FFRDC to the Homeland
Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute. The CEM and C3I
FFRDCs are operated by the MITRE Corporation.
Question 4b. Will the work be funded solely from the S&T
Directorate, or from other DHS components as well?
Answer. Each task will be funded directly by the requesting
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component, which may include the
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate.
Question 4c. Is the funding request for HSSEDI?
Answer. The Homeland Security Institute (HSI) contract expired in
April 2009, and a new FFRDC was established to conduct strategic
studies and analysis for the Department. Funding for the core research
activities of the new FFRDC, the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis
Institute (HSSAI), is included in the fiscal year 2010 budget request.
The other new FFRDC, the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and
Development Institute (HSSEDI), was established to provide DHS and the
homeland security enterprise with program-level concept evolution,
system-of-systems development integration, and homeland security best
practices in lifecycle systems engineering and program (acquisition)
management. HSSEDI has a different business model. Its funding will be
solely task-based, and there is no core research budget requested. Each
task will be funded directly by the requesting DHS component, which may
include the Science and Technology Directorate.
Question 6. Across the Federal Government not just in Homeland
Security, there is a proliferation of detection technologies being
developed, tested, purchased, and deployed. From chemical sensors to
nuclear material sensors, there are numerous stove-piped programs
aiming to address one specific threat.
In your view, is there an opportunity to take a more strategic view
of technology development so instead of buying three sensors--one to
detect a chemical threat, a second to detect an explosive threat, and a
third to detect nuclear material--we can look more strategically to
develop and deploy multi-mission technology to detect more than one
threat? Are we doing this now? Do you believe such an approach might be
reasonable and worth investigating?
Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate does pursue
opportunities to strategically develop and deploy integrated systems
that will detect more than one threat. For example, the Integrated
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNe)
Detection System Project is developing an architecture that integrates
reporting from disparate CBRNe detection/collection systems. This
system will provide timely CBRNe detection, identification, and
assessment of the threat and enables appropriate response by local,
State, and Federal officials. It will greatly improve the integration
of alarm and response assets across multiple potential attack modes,
resulting in more rapid and informed decisions at the appropriate
response level. The S&T is also in the process of developing sensors
for bench-top and handheld applications with the joint capability of
detecting explosives and narcotics. Customers for these technologies
include DHS U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast
Guard.
However, while leveraging opportunities to develop multi-mission
technology systems is worthwhile, there are limits. The underlying
technologies that enable detection of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats are fundamentally very
different from each other. In addition, the operational environments
for these distinct detection technologies vary, making testing of the
detectors a challenge. For example, programs working across the
chemical and the explosives threat domains have much different concepts
of operation and hence testing environments; such as first-responder
needs versus transportation security requirements. These differences
can make development of multi-threat detection technology beyond the
scope of what is possible today. While it is necessary for many
programs to focus on developing single-threat specific detection
technologies, the ultimate goal is to integrate them into deployable
multi-threat detection systems to the greatest extent possible and to
exploit testing programs for different threat domains, where feasible,
to make best use of program funds. Collocation and integration of
single-threat specific detection technologies can, in the near-term,
achieve more efficient and effective operations.
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun of Georgia for Bradley I.
Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. As you know, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has recommended a site in Manhattan, Kansas for its proposed National
Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, known as NBAF. The Department of
Homeland Security is now the subject of a lawsuit and an inspector
general investigation over its handling of the new NBAF's site
selection process. The NBAF is intended to replace the smaller, out-of-
date Plum Island facility. However, the allegations against the
Department are serious, contending that the selection process for this
more than half-a-billion dollar facility was biased and based on
neither good science nor good Government. We believe the best way to
safeguard the process for future competitions, and to ensure that the
needs of the American people for an agricultural and bio-defense
facility are being served in an optimal manner.
Will S&T break ground on the NBAF and sell the island before these
allegations have been resolved?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) cannot predict
when the lawsuit or any IG investigation (or any potential IG
investigation) will be resolved. However, due to the aging
infrastructure at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) and the
need to find an efficacious cure for foot-and-mouth disease and other
foreign animal diseases, DHS will continue with site-specific design
for this high-containment laboratory, which will provide the country
with biosafety level 3 and 4 facilities for large animal research.
Question 1b. What actions have been taken to sell Plum Island?
Answer. Pursuant to Section 540 of the Consolidated Security,
Disaster Assistance and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L.
110-329, the Secretary of Homeland Security has directed the General
Services Administration (GSA) to move forward with actions that will
allow the liquidation of the Plum Island asset. The GSA is currently
reviewing DHS documents related to Plum Island in order to create the
appropriate marketing plan, conduct due diligence and meet
environmental planning requirements. The GSA and DHS representatives
meet regularly to lay the groundwork for a memorandum of agreement that
will govern agency actions going forward.
Question 1c. Do you believe it is prudent to move forward on this
project so quickly when a lawsuit and an IG investigation into serious
allegations are only just getting underway?
Answer. The Department cannot comment on pending litigation and has
no knowledge of any IG investigation into the National Bio and Agro-
Defense Facility (NBAF) site selection. However, as for the merits of
DHS's site selection process, the selection of the Manhattan, Kansas
site concluded a rigorous, 3-year, multi-agency planning process to
identify the preferred site upon which to construct and NBAF. The
process involved a qualitative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of each site alternative and included information from the risk
assessment, environmental assessment, and security assessment on
proposed NBAF operations. A steering committee, comprised of Federal
employees from DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, was convened
to lead the evaluation process and unanimously recommended the site in
Manhattan, Kansas as its preferred site alternative. The DHS leadership
concurred with the Federal employee steering committee's
recommendation.
Questions From Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke of New York for Jon Krohmer,
Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer, Office of Health
Affairs, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Do you believe that the Office of Health Affairs should
continue to exist as a stand-alone office within the Department? Or do
you believe that it should be split up with pieces sent to various
other organizational entities within DHS? In your opinion, how would
efficiency and effectiveness increase in either scenario?
Answer. Currently, the Office of Health Affairs is a stand-alone
entity within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This
organizational structure promotes the health component of homeland
security in protecting the Nation from the effects of natural
catastrophic events and acts of terrorism and ensuring consistent
standards are in place across DHS to protect its critical work force.
However, DHS is always looking at ways to improve the management and
performance of all its components. For example, as part of the DHS'
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) process, the Department is
reviewing Departmental organization, including OHA.
Question 2. The recent outbreaks of H1N1 provided the Office of
Health Affairs with the opportunity to demonstrate its utility to the
DHS and the rest of the Executive Branch. Please talk to us about how
OHA performed, and what would have helped the Office to carry out its
responsibilities better. For example, how did the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center and System contribute to the overall
effort, and would more funding have helped to provide a more
comprehensive picture of developments with the outbreaks and spread of
the disease?
Answer. The Office of Health Affairs was very involved in the
Department's response to the recent H1N1 flu outbreak. We also worked
extremely closely with our interagency partners during this event. OHA
actions in response to the H1N1 influenza outbreak include the
following, among other activities:
Collaborating with DHS Components to inventory their
respective countermeasure stockpiles, and determining current
needs, especially for border personnel;
Deploying additional protective countermeasures--antivirals
and personal protective equipment (PPE)--to border areas for
DHS personnel;
Answering questions from the components and the interagency
regarding workforce protection issues;
Setting up and managing the OHA Decision Support Cell, which
served in support of the DHS National Operations Center as the
central collection, analysis, and processing element for
medical and health information and guidance for the Department;
Answering requests for information from the Secretary, the
Deputy Secretary, DHS Components, State and local community
officials, and other DHS stakeholders;
Collaborating with CDC on development and distribution of
Travelers Health Alert Network (THAN) to State and local Health
Officers, Public Information Officers, Epidemiologists and HAN
Coordinators as well as clinician organizations;
Supporting the Federal lead agencies with specific cross-
domain analysis related to H1N1 through the National
Biosurveillence Integration Center (NBIC);
Generating comprehensive daily status reports based on
integrating Federal, State, open source, and classified
information sources on the status of the H1N1 influenza
outbreak spread;
Maintaining the real-time dynamic biosurveillance operating
picture of the current status of the H1N1 influenza outbreak
event 24/7 for the Federal interagency participants (via the
NBIC);
Connecting with the Nation's modeling capability, including
the National Infrastructure Simulation Analysis Center (NISAC)
to evaluate more fully the potential work force and critical
sector infrastructure impacts that could result for different
H1N1 influenza outbreak scenarios to better inform future
planning and policy decisions; and,
Providing surge support through the BioWatch program at 27
Public Health laboratories, as well as providing surge support
for sample analysis (this is not impacting on-going BioWatch
operations).
Question 3. Various outbreaks have tested the ability of the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) to obtain and
integrate biosurveillance data from the Federal Departments and
agencies. To date, NBIC has struggled to operate at even a low level,
and is not providing value-added to any of the individual members of
the Executive Branch or the collective. The committee believes that
either NBIC needs to receive a much larger infusion of funding--on the
order of five times as much as currently requested--or that the NBIC
should be discontinued because it is not performing the way Congress
intended. What is your opinion of the NBIC, and do you think it is
possible for the Center to operate and provide integrated surveillance
information on only $8 million/year?
Answer. NBIC is a critical component of the Nation's ability to
integrate biosurveillance data. The Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53) established the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) to provide a biosurveillance
common operating picture to senior leaders and partner agencies
regarding natural disease outbreaks, accidental, or intentional uses of
biological agents, and emergent biohazards through the acquisition,
integration, analysis and dissemination of information from existing
human health, animal, plant, food, and water surveillance systems and
relevant threat and intelligence information. NBIC has provided
valuable situational information to senior leaders (both within DHS and
the interagency) on ongoing biological incidents.
Current funding levels support current operations and NBIC will
continue to analyze information and data and will provide integrated
surveillance information to senior leaders during biological incidents.
Question 4. The National Biodefense Architecture Project has
received very little funding in this and previous Presidential budget
requests. As with NBIC, the committee does not believe it is possible
for this project to accomplish what it aims to with only hundreds of
thousands of dollars budgeted for its activities. (In fact, this seems
mostly to be funding the development of concept papers by contractors.)
The committee believes that millions of dollars are necessary to fully
characterize the architecture, perhaps with the inclusion of funding
for a Commission to undertake this activity (as opposed to a Government
contractor) and to provide relevant information and recommendations to
both the legislative and executive branches. Dr. Kramer, given what you
know about the biological threat and the need for vastly enhanced a
domestic biodefense architecture, do you think that it is possible for
such an activity be undertaken for only a few hundred thousand dollars
per year?
Answer. The National Biodefense Architecture (NBA) program is
currently focused on developing a concept for a national biodefense
capabilities assessment, a task charged to the Department by Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 10, Biodefense for the 21st Century. In
fiscal year 2010, OHA plans to begin performance of this capabilities
assessment. This assessment will lay the foundation for a future
biodefense architecture. It is our plan to catalog capabilities, seek
gaps in surveillance, preparedness, and response and develop a
structure to fill these gaps by linking together the existing
capabilities or developing new ones based on best practices into a
national framework or architecture. OHA will also continue to work
closely with existing interagency relationships and reach out to
additional agencies in order to preserve its interests in a national
plan to set out this architecture. We agree that this effort cannot be
limited to one Department or agency and must be a coordinated
interagency effort.
Question 5. The Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks seeks
to integrate Federally sponsored and funded laboratory networks that
have arisen for a variety of purposes (for example, the Laboratory
Response Network for Bioterrorism is a member network, Federally
sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). This
activity originated in the DHS S&T Directorate, but has matured to the
point that DHS S&T feels that its operational aspects should be
transferred to OHA, where other personnel and programs interact with
the various communities (such as the public health laboratory
community) that compose these various networks. Dr. Kramer, do you
support this transfer? Why or why not? Where within the current
organizational structure for OHA would you put this activity, and how
much funding do you think should be allocated in order for it to
function effectively?
Answer. The transfer of the management of the Integrated Consortium
of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) from the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate to the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is appropriate upon
achieving operational status of an integrated system capable of
providing optimal response to an event requiring an integrated
laboratory response. In 2008, the under secretary of S&T transferred
his duties as chair of the ICLN Joint Leadership Council to the
assistant secretary for health affairs/chief medical officer.
Presently, the S&T Directorate manages the ICLN and is making advances
toward its operational status.
The recent emergence of the H1N1 influenza strain has highlighted
the critical need for a system of laboratory networks capable of an
integrated and coordinated response and consequence management during
times of surge. The Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction--Biodefense
within OHA has an agreement in place with the S&T Directorate's
Chemical and Biological Division to transition the ICLN when S&T, in
conjunction with ICLN partners, completes the establishment of
coordination and governance mechanisms and establishes an integrated,
functional response architecture. The current ICLN roadmap indicates
completion of that integrated response architecture by June 2010.
However, in addition to the criterion for a complete and functional
integrated response architecture, the time of transition of the ICLN
also hinges on two additional requirements. First, OHA is required to
secure funding in order to manage the ICLN. Second, OHA must provide
personnel to assume full-time duties of managing this effort.
S&T will continue its management of the ICLN until OHA has adequate
resources to ensure the success of the ICLN. While I firmly believe OHA
is well-positioned with its mission and existing relationships with the
public health community to more appropriately manage ICLN operations,
my intent is not to prematurely transition an effort from S&T that
would not have the requisite support in OHA, but rather provide for a
seamless transition that maintains the trust and confidence of the ICLN
partners through the transition.
Question 6. OHA has indicated that it is developing medical
intelligence capacity for use and inclusion in the State fusion
centers. Although the committee supports the notion that public health,
medical, veterinary, environmental, and other types of information
should be fused with law enforcement and intelligence information
already residing in fusion centers, we are concerned about the
duplication and possible contradictory efforts occurring with medical
intelligence activities at OHA, health intelligence activities
occurring in I&A, and medical intelligence activities occurring (with
DHS participation) at the DOD-sponsored National Center for Medical
Intelligence. Dr. Kramer, what is your vision for DHS-driven medical
intelligence activities, and how do you propose to eliminate
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in this regard for the Department?
Answer. OHA does not conduct medical intelligence activities; we
provide expertise to I&A and input as needed. OHA is a customer of--and
supports as needed--I&A's efforts on medical intelligence. OHA has been
involved as a gateway to the public health and medical communities for
the Health Security Intelligence Enterprise (HSIE)--a partnership which
includes OHA and I&A. Both partners bring critical elements to the
HSIE. OHA gathers public health/medical responder requirements and
serves as an interface to that community, while I&A produces
assessments for this community (in collaboration with other relevant
agencies) and sponsors the program throughout the national State and
local fusion center. OHA provides support through funding, personnel,
subject matter expertise, and a network of health and medical
professionals in the public health and health care community. It is
important to note that OHA will not be placing representatives in State
and local fusion centers. The HSIE initiative is designed to facilitate
the placement of State and/or local public health/health care
representatives in those centers.
I&A has worked with the 70 designated State and local fusion
centers to create an information-sharing environment that serves
stakeholders' information needs and builds interoperability. By
partnering with I&A, OHA has been able to leverage those relationships
to formulate policies, guidance, and strategies to provide outreach,
advisory services, training, and a variety of coordination and
education activities. These activities maximize the efforts of OHA to
enhance existing relationships with the health community and promote
the appropriate exchange of health security information and
intelligence between all homeland security partners. As an indication
of the strength and efficacy of the partnership between OHA and I&A,
OHA has detailed an individual to I&A's State and Local Program Office
to develop this program.
OHA is partnering with I&A to develop mechanisms to share
appropriate WMD and health-related threat information with fusion
centers and partners in the health community. Building information
sharing links and a network is only part of the solution--we must have
timely, tailored, and relevant intelligence information to share with
our partners. To that end, I&A established a medical intelligence
analysis team within the National Center for Medical Intelligence
(NCMI) that focuses on threats to the homeland, and provides all-source
analysis on human, animal, plant, and food security threat issues for
customers at all levels--from the Secretary of Homeland Security to
public health officers in the field. I&A is fully integrated within the
NCMI and leverages existing capabilities to ensure there is no
duplication of effort and that all customer requirements are met. I&A's
integration into NCMI is such that the NCMI created a position of
Deputy Director for Homeland Security, staffed by a senior I&A
intelligence officer. I&A and NCMI provide individual and co-authored
all-source intelligence analysis for medical intelligence threats to
the homeland, and are able to disseminate them as appropriate to DHS-
recognized fusion centers. In addition, I&A supported the 2009 H1N1 Flu
Incident Management Cell located at OHA's main office, affording prompt
access to intelligence products generated specifically for H1N1 by
NCMI.
Question 7. As you are well aware, there are many emergency medical
personnel--most especially EMTs--that work in various capacities
throughout the Department of Homeland Security for the various
component agencies. In carrying out their responsibilities, they are
often required to traverse State, territorial, and sometimes
international boundaries. The current approach utilized by the
Department is to require all such personnel to obtain and maintain
accreditation in the States in which they are permanently assigned.
However, this does not take into account their cross-border operational
requirements. Further, it does not take into account the requirements
of those undercover law enforcement personnel to maintain their EMT
status while remaining under cover. A simple solution would be for DHS
to establish an accreditation program similar to those used by other
Federal departments and agencies (such as the FBI and the DOD). The
committee supports the implementation and use of such a model. Dr.
Kramer, do you agree? If not, please explain to the committee how the
currently used or alternative models best serve the needs of the
Department and its employees?
Answer. The Department is currently developing a plan for
establishing an EMS medical oversight and credentialing system within
the Department. This system would provide that EMS providers who are
employed by, contracted by, or detailed to DHS who possess a current,
valid State license or certification to provide EMS, and who perform
authorized duties for the Department, may provide EMS in any State, the
District of Columbia, or a Commonwealth, territory, or possession of
the United States. DHS is currently determining whether the Department
can move forward with such a system under its current statutory
authorities.
Questions From Ranking Member Daniel E. Lungren of California for Jon
Krohmer, Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer, Office
of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. The budget request for Planning and Coordination, which
is predominantly accounted for by the Office of Medical Readiness, has
been cut significantly, by $3.3 million. This office is responsible for
the critical task of planning the medical aspects of incident
management for both the Department and the interagency, including for
pandemic influenza preparedness. The importance of its work has become
readily apparent during the current influenza outbreak. Yet I
understand that the office has received no specific funding request
this year for pandemic activities.
Why was the budget cut for this office?
Why is there no funding request specific for pandemic activities?
Answer. The Planning and Coordination PPA account funds the
activities of the Office of Medical Readiness and the Food,
Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense Division within the Office of
Health Affairs. The budget request reflects a balancing of priorities
within the Department. As the requested funding level, the Office of
Medical Readiness will continue to review Federal plans for the medical
and public health impacts, including pandemic influenza, and will
continue to provide subject matter expertise during incidents and
exercises.
DHS pandemic activities will continue in fiscal year 2010 through
funding from the Pandemic Supplemental of fiscal year 2006 ($47.283
million). That supplemental is 99% obligated at this time, and will be
fully obligated in fiscal year 2010. The Department is currently
conducting an after-action review of the recent H1N1 flu outbreak
response. If the Department identifies additional needs or resources in
fiscal year 2010, the Department will prepare a request for
Congressional and Department of Health and Human Services consideration
to be funded out of the recent pandemic supplemental appropriation. OHA
will continue to provide subject matter expertise for DHS pandemic
activities through fiscal year 2010.
Question 2. OHA's mission statement states that OHA ``leads the
Department's role in developing and supporting a scientifically
rigorous, intelligence-based biodefense and health preparedness
architecture to ensure the security of our Nation in the face of all
hazards.'' Yet, the National Biodefense Architecture received no
funding request. This initiative was a necessary attempt to do what no
other agency or program is doing to collate and coordinate the myriad
biodefense activities across all levels of Government.
Why have you cut a program that is, by title and definition, key to
OHA's mission?
Why does the Department view oversight and coordination of
biodefense activities as an unnecessary initiative?
How can a reduction in contractor support, which was given as a
reason to staff for the reduction in the budget request, explain
zeroing out of the program entirely?
What are your plans for the future of this program; will it
disappear after its fiscal year 2009 funding is consumed?
Answer. The National Biodefense Architecture (NBA) continues to be
an important program for the Office of Health Affairs. The bulk of the
work supporting the NBA will be done with 2009 funds. In fiscal year
2010, the NBA program will continue some of the activities started in
fiscal year 2009 including development of a baseline assessment of the
Nation's biodefense capabilities. OHA will continue to work closely
with existing partners and will reach out to other agencies as well to
ensure that DHS plays the appropriate role within the interagency and
preserves its interests in a national plan to monitor, detect, respond
to, and recover from biological catastrophes.
Question 3. The Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAVD)
office request was level, at $727,000. This office has the critical
mission of leading the Department's efforts to ensure the security of
the Nation's food supply. OHA has informed staff that the current
funding and staff levels enable FAVD to meet its most pressing needs.
Is it enough to support only the most pressing needs? Shouldn't we
support this office so it can meet the day-to-day needs as well as the
crisis of the moment?
What needs is the office not meeting at current staffing and
funding levels?
Answer. The fiscal year 2010 President's budget requested $727,000
to fund the Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAVD) Division
within the Office of Health Affairs (OHA). This funding level will
support current operations and FAVD will continue to work, in
coordination with the United States Department of Agriculture and other
internal and external partners, to ensure the security of the Nation's
food and agriculture sectors.
Question 4. BioWatch Gen-3.0 is getting ready for operational
testing and evaluation by the Office of Health Affairs.
I have heard with some concern that when it is ready, the Gen-2.0
machines will be taken out of commission. Is this the case, and if so,
wouldn't it make more sense to maintain the budget for both, thereby
gaining a significant net increase in capability?
Even though the Gen-3.0 machines will offer faster detection times,
is it true that they may not in fact be able to identify any more
agents than Gen-2.0? Would it make sense to fund the S&T Directorate
for development of better, broader assays to make this happen?
Answer. DHS' current plan for the BioWatch Program is to replace
manually operated collectors (Gen-1 and Gen-2 systems) with automated
detectors. These automated detectors will analyze air samples
internally and will report out results. Automated analysis of air
samples is estimated to reduce detection time from 10-34 hours to 4-6
hours. When fully deployed, an automated BioWatch detection network
will have replaced all previous generation sensors.
It is DHS' expectation that the value gained by having an
autonomous system will provide the Nation with the most effective
approach toward biodetection.
The initial testing and use of the Gen-3 systems will be for the
same agents as detected by Gen-1 and Gen-2 systems. The end goal for
the Gen-3 systems is to have the capability to detect as many as 20
agents if appropriate. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate at
DHS will continue to lead the development of additional assays for
inclusion in the BioWatch detection system that allow for a broader
range of detectable agents for Gen-3 systems.
Questions From Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke of New York for Charles R.
Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Question 1. What is your current estimated date for ASP Secretarial
Certification? Is the current intention to certify for primary
inspection, secondary inspection, or both?
Answer. Testing for Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) systems is
currently on-going, but we anticipate that we will be prepared to
provide test data and analysis, along with consultation with the
National Academy of Sciences, to inform the Secretary's decision on
certification of ASP performance this fall. Based on the fulfillment of
criteria defining a ``significant increase in operational
effectiveness'' set forth for primary and secondary inspections, the
Secretary will be able to determine whether to certify ASP systems for
primary and/or secondary deployments.
Question 2. The fiscal year 2010 budget request for Systems
Acquisition--that is for procurement of detection technologies--has
been zeroed out, a cut of $153.5 million. Your Congressional
Justification states that: ``No funds are being requested for the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Systems Acquisition reflecting
unobligated carryover balances from prior appropriations and
unanticipated delays in final Secretarial certification of Advanced
Spectroscopic Portals. DNDO will continue to acquire radiological/
nuclear detection equipment in fiscal year 2010 as it draws down
unobligated balances remaining for this activity. To date, DNDO's
acquisition program has successfully enabled DHS components to
dramatically increase scanning of cargo and persons at U.S. points of
entry.'' How much do you have in ``unobligated carryover balances''?
Are these carryover funds sufficient for all fiscal year 2010
procurements?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 unobligated balance for current
generation radiation portal monitors (RPMs), which will soon be
obligated for current year requirements, is $39 million. The
unobligated balance for ASP systems is $77 million, of which $17
million remains from fiscal year 2008 and $60 million remains from
fiscal year 2009. Assuming a successful outcome of Secretarial
certification, these funds will be used to procure a mix of current
generation and ASP systems. If certification does not occur, these
funds will be used to procure only current generation systems. Based on
prior year purchases, 158 additional PVT radiation portal monitors
could be delivered and deployed in fiscal year 2010 using the funding
currently planned for ASP systems.
Question 3. Is there a ``drop-dead'' date for Secretarial
Certification for ASP? That is to say, the date for certification has
been pushed back several times. Is there a point at which you must cut
your losses and re-evaluate the program?
Answer. The fundamental technology that ASP brings to the Nation's
homeland security arsenal is sound, and as a system it promises to
deliver a significant improvement over previous capabilities in the
detection and identification of radiological/nuclear threats. To date,
the delays in certification of ASP have been related to issues of
operational ease and reliability--problems that take time to resolve
but do not seriously threaten the viability or potential contribution
of the new system. Given the nature of the rad/nuc threat, our
continuing belief in the soundness of the underlying technology, and
the progress we have made in addressing operational issues to date, we
are confident that ASP remains the ideal solution to the requirement
for a detection and identification system at ports of entry for the
near future.
Question 4. Let us suppose that the ``Significant Increase In
Operational Effectiveness'' criteria are met for the ASP, and that the
Secretary certifies the ASP. The next consideration is that an ASP
costs 2.67 times as much as a current PVT. Does the increase in
performance then justify the increased cost?
Answer. DNDO has prepared, and is in the last stages of reviewing,
a comprehensive Cost Benefit Analysis and Life Cycle Cost Estimate to
determine the cost effectiveness of ASP detectors. This analysis, along
with input from the stakeholders, and concurrence from the DHS
Acquisition Review Board, will form the basis of any acquisition or
deployment decisions.
Question 5. The committee is very concerned with Source Security
and DNDO's role in the trilateral effort to secure radioactive sources.
It is our understanding that OMB requested that source security funding
go through one agency (DOE/NNSA), rather than multiple sources. Please
describe the current status of the trilateral effort, DNDO's role, the
role of the other two agencies (DOE/NNSA and NRC), and the funding
levels for these efforts at DNDO and at your other two agency partners.
Answer. DNDO's source security work involves performing gap
analysis and promoting mitigation strategies to secure radiological
material at its source within the United States. In fiscal year 2009,
the DNDO budget included $1 million in funding for irradiator
hardening, however in fiscal year 2010 source security work such as
irradiator hardening will be conducted exclusively by DOE. A forum for
discussion on source security between DOE, DHS, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is still in place, and DHS, through the
Nuclear Government Coordinating Council and Nuclear Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), will continue to
play an advisory role.
The NRC is the regulatory body of the United States Government for
licensing of all radioactive medical and industrial sources in the
United States, including the security of the radioactive materials. In
addition to regulatory controls on radioactive materials, NRC has
implemented many additional security requirements on the licensees of
radioactive source, and has raised the security culture among the
licensees in the United States in partnership with the Agreement
States.
DOE has established a domestic source security program that, in
cooperation with the U.S. licensees and the NRC, is targeted at
implementing security measures above what is required by the NRC. DOE
is providing funding to licensees to implement increased security
measures at licensee facilities in the United States. It is our
understanding that the DOE funds approximately $400 million for their
domestic security program; the NRC does not break out their source
security expenditures in this manner.
Question 6. The budget requests a plus-up of $7.2 million for
Transformational Research. Can you give us some examples of research
that you are pursuing?
Answer. DNDO's transformational research and development program
identifies, explores, and develops scientific and technological
approaches that will dramatically improve the performance of nuclear
detection components and systems. There are three efforts underway that
support long-term research--Exploratory Research, Advanced Technology
Demonstrations (ATDs), and a dedicated Academic Research Initiative
(ARI).
The Exploratory Research program has made major advances in the
area of new materials for passive radiation detection. Since all
detectors rely on some material to detect the radiation emitted by a
threat, discoveries of new, more effective detection materials have a
high payoff because they can be incorporated into many different types
of detectors for many different applications or threat scenarios. For
gamma-ray detection, the new materials will result in detectors that
are more efficient, cheaper, or have improved ability to reduce false
alarms. For neutron detection, DNDO is accelerating the final
development and initial production of new materials to replace the
scarce, but presently-used, helium-3 by the end of fiscal year 2009 or
early fiscal year 2010. To put this in perspective, to advance from the
discovery of a new detector material to construction of prototype
instruments in the space of 2-3 years is really remarkable. It is our
intent to continue and accelerate these material research successes in
fiscal year 2010, while still focusing on potential techniques for
closing gaps in the architecture and substantially improving the
performance or reducing the cost of RN detection capabilities.
DNDO is also partnering with the National Science Foundation (NSF)
on the ARI to emphasize radiation detection sciences in academia, a
field that has been in decline at American universities for years. The
joint DNDO/NSF effort, in coordination with the efforts of other
agencies, is advancing fundamental knowledge in new technologies for
the detection of nuclear threats, and in the development of the next
generation of scientists and engineers in technical fields relevant to
long-term advances in nuclear detection capability.
DNDO's ATDs are also showing great promise for users in the law
enforcement, first responder, counterterrorism, and intelligence
communities. The IPRL ATD is developing pocket-sized systems to
autonomously determine the location of radiation while maintaining
sufficient energy resolution and sensitivity to reliably discriminate
between NORM, background radiation, and special nuclear materials.
Likewise, the Stand-off Radiation Detection Systems (SORDS) ATD is
developing mobile passive gamma detection system that can locate small
sources at distances up to 100 meters using developing technologies
like gamma-ray imaging, advanced alarming algorithms, and sensor and
data fusion techniques that may dramatically improve sensitivity and
directional accuracy. Finally, the Shielded Special Nuclear Alarm
Resolution (SNAR) ATD is developing systems to verify the presence (or
absence) of shielded SNM. These systems are being developed as either
an addition to existing radiography systems or a relocatable system
which potentially could greatly improve the clearing of alarms.
Question 7. DNDO has, in the past, expressed to this committee the
need to push radiological and nuclear detection to other modes of
transportation, such as rail, commercial aviation, general aviation,
and small maritime craft. What are these plans, and if you are pursuing
them, where are they in the budget?
Answer. Rather than considering development-specific efforts in
isolation, DNDO considers all activities that inform the solution
development process for a given pathway or mission area, including
pilots, training and exercises, follow-on architecture studies, and
cross-cutting technologies.
Within the maritime mission area, DNDO is conducting a number of
testing activities, pilot programs, and architecture studies to assess
alternatives for radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) detection in the
maritime domain, and to inform future maritime systems development
activities. The West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) program supports the
DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy objective to develop a robust
layered defense by expanding and enhancing maritime rad/nuc detection
capabilities for international, Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
private stakeholders. Consequently, the focus of this effort is to
evaluate the effectiveness of a limited, phased deployment of
commercially available and Government-Off-the-Shelf (GOTS) rad/nuc
detection capabilities against the small vessel threat in the Puget
Sound and San Diego port regions and gather lessons learned to improve
effectiveness of a wider deployment of maritime capabilities to other
priority U.S. ports. In addition, results of the fiscal year 2008
maritime test campaign (Crawdad) and the fiscal year 2009 boat-mounted
system test campaign (Dolphin) will help define future development and/
or deployment of boat-mounted radiation detection systems.
DNDO is also focusing on On-Dock Rail, which accounts for
approximately 2% of all import containers to the United States. This
program addresses the challenge of scanning cargo at seaport terminals
where containers are transferred from ships to a rail facility that is
within the terminal. These shipments therefore leave on rail cars that
bypass the detectors at the terminal exit gate which scan trucks
departing with the other 98% of the containers. Operational testing
conducted at the Rail Test Center at the Port of Tacoma has
demonstrated that either mobile or fixed radiation portal monitors are
adequate to scan containers where chassis are used to move containers
to the rail facility. However, when straddle carriers are used in this
role, no currently available technology is sufficiently effective at
scanning containers at domestic operations. Efforts are underway to
develop the use of a large radiation detector portal to scan the
container as a straddle carrier moves it from dockside to a lay-down
area prior to being loaded onto a rail.
Within the aviation mission area, DNDO worked closely with Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) last year at Andrews Air Force Base to
obtain an accurate baseline assessment of the Radio-Isotope
Identification Devices currently being used by CBP to scan
international general aviation (IGA) aircraft. Additionally, other
handheld Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment, variations to the
current CONOPs, and infrastructure requirements were evaluated during
this campaign. As a result of these testing activities, DNDO and CBP
conducted a joint assessment indicating that current equipment is
sufficient to execute the rad/nuc mission for arriving IGA aircraft,
with appropriate Standard Operating Procedure adjustments. Thus, DNDO
will not undertake an aviation-specific development program at this
time. The joint assessment, however, recommended inclusion of next-
generation detection and identification systems within the IGA
environment, as they become available through DNDO's R&D programs.
DNDO and CBP have also initiated a pilot program for screening
international commercial passengers and their baggage at airports of
entry (APOEs). This Passenger and Baggage (Pax/Bag) Pilot Program will
evaluate the technical and operational integration of rad/nuc detection
capabilities in this environment. DNDO will also undertake a number of
architecture studies using fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funds
to further evaluate the aviation domain. With the exception of these
architecture studies and cross-cutting programs (e.g., human portable
systems) referenced above, all fiscal year 2009 activities in the
aviation mission area are funded using fiscal year 2007 supplemental
funds.
Finally, within the land border mission area, DNDO has established
the International Rail (IRAIL) Program to develop a family of systems
to scan rail cargo (either passively, actively, or both) for rad/nuc
screening. The IRAIL program will use a phased approach with a mix of
risk reduction activities, technology development projects, and pilot
demonstration projects as appropriate, and will develop and test rad/
nuc threat system solutions to achieve minimal impact on the flow and
speed of commerce via Concept Studies/Experiments/Technology
Demonstrations. Interim existing technology solutions that contribute
to the rapid reduction of the threat space will be considered for
prototype and/or pilot activities to evaluate performance in a cargo
environment representative of international rail commerce. To support
project test and evaluation (T&E) with rad/nuc materials, a Rail Test
Bed Infrastructure Study will be conducted to determine how, when, and
where to conduct system T&E. Ultimately, the suite of technical
solutions or family of systems for each international rail scanning/
screening site will be tailored to meet the requirements of the rail
POE and accommodate physical, geological, or infrastructure
limitations.
Question 8. The committee has been concerned in the past with
DNDO's (as well as other DHS component's) reliance on large
corporations for technology development. What are you doing to ensure
that small businesses with specific technologies that could further the
DNDO mission are able to work with you?
Answer. DHS has an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization, which works to ensure that small businesses have a fair
opportunity to compete and be selected for contracts. DHS provides a
Forecast of Contracting Opportunities to assist small businesses in
finding contracts with DHS, which includes opportunities at DNDO.
Further DHS efforts include compliance with U.S. Government goals for
procurement and subcontracting contracts with regards to dollar amounts
for small businesses.
DNDO also has a dedicated Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)
program. This program funds research and development projects from
small firms within private industry on selected topics that directly or
indirectly further the DNDO mission. The goal is to utilize small
businesses to meet R&D needs and increase private sector
commercialization.
In addition to the dedicated SBIR program, new awards for
Exploratory Research and ATDs are done through open solicitations, to
which small businesses are eligible to apply. Currently, several small
businesses have Exploratory Research projects underway.
Question 9. Many Members are concerned that the DNDO budget request
zeroes-out the Securing the Cities Initiative. Please explain why this
decision was made.
Answer. Beginning in fiscal year 2010, no additional funds are
being requested for the STC initiative. The 3-year pilot is scheduled
to end in fiscal year 2009. To date, the initiative has been
appropriated over $50 million to support New York City regional STC
stakeholders. For fiscal year 2010, DNDO will extract lessons learned
from the pilot in the New York City region.
Question 10. Many Members are concerned that the DNDO budget
request zeroes-out the Radiation Portal Monitors program. Please
explain why this decision was made.
Answer. Due to unanticipated delays in Secretarial certification of
ASP systems, DNDO has a carryover balance from past year
appropriations. DNDO will continue to carryout its radiation portal
monitor deployment plan by using the remaining funds appropriated for
current generation (PVT) RPMs. Following a successful outcome of
Secretarial certification, prior year funds could be used to procure a
mix of current generation and ASP systems. If certification does not
occur, these funds will be used to procure only current generation
systems.
Questions From Ranking Member Daniel E. Lungren of California for
Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Question 1. Are we setting the bar too high for testing and
certification of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) monitors, the
next generation of radiation monitoring technology?
Answer. The plans and procedures in place for the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program provide a sound foundation for
future certification and acquisition decisions. ASP systems have been
under review and evaluation for over 3 years and, while further
improvements will always be possible, I believe that after the planned
testing and analysis is complete and the requirements of MD 102-01 have
been fulfilled, DHS will be in a position to make an informed
certification decision.
Question 2. If the Secretary fails to certify ASP in September or
whenever certification is determined, you testified that you would
procure current generation systems or PVT units.
Is there another emerging technology that could fill this void and
identify the radiation materials detected and minimize false alarms? Is
radiography scanning a possible replacement for ASP?
Answer. The fundamental technology that ASP brings to the Nation's
homeland security arsenal is sound, and as a system it promises to
deliver a significant improvement over previous capabilities in the
detection and identification of radiological/nuclear threats. To date,
the delays in certification of ASP have been related to issues of
operational ease and reliability--problems that take time to resolve
but do not seriously threaten the viability or potential contribution
of the basic system. Given the dire nature of the threat, our
continuing belief in the soundness of the underlying technology, and
the progress we have made in addressing operational issues to date, ASP
remains the most immediate solution to the requirement for a detection
and identification system at ports of entry.
Passive radiation detection (radiation portal monitors (RPMs),
including ASP) and active detection technology (radiography) are
considered complementary, rather than competing, technologies. Passive
radiation detection provides the capability to screen 100% of cargo
against unshielded and lightly shielded threats, but capability
diminishes with greater levels of shielding. Conversely, radiography
systems can detect large heavy objects such as shielding sufficient to
defeat passive systems, but would struggle against small unshielded or
lightly shielded threats and slow down commerce. While DNDO is pursuing
development of advanced radiography systems, there are operational
considerations associated with radiography that reflect its role as a
complementary detection technology in a layered system, rather than a
replacement for passive inspection systems. For example:
Scanning time.--Radiography systems may require the driver
to exit the truck during the radiograph and could take about a
minute per scan. Doing this for targeted screening or secondary
inspections would not impact the flow of commerce, but if all
cargo was required to be scanned by radiography, the impact on
the flow of commerce would be severe. Radiation portal
monitors, like ASP, in contrast, are drive-through systems that
take only a few seconds per scan.
Cost.--It is anticipated that radiography systems could cost
significantly more than current systems.
Operational staffing.--Radiography systems can also be used
to detect other types of contraband as well as special nuclear
material (SNM) detection. Current CBP policy requires that any
images of incoming cargo must be reviewed by a CBP image
analyst to screen for dangerous or illegal goods or people.
This manual analysis process requires staffing by an image
analyst and can take several minutes, determining the actual
scanning time.
Operational footprint.--Radiography systems have larger
footprints than portal monitors. Some ports of entry may not
have adequate space to accommodate these larger systems.
Technical readiness.--In a layered approach to counter
threats, systems should be fielded as they are ready. An
advanced radiography system that can automatically detect and
locate shielding in cargo and is also capable of directly
detecting and locating high density, high atomic number
materials such as nuclear threats is still under development.
For these reasons, deployments of radiography systems to detect SNM
would be done as a complement to passive detection systems.
Question 3a. Over the last year, DNDO and its Government partners
have developed a nuclear detection architecture, which is designed to
assess how we, as a Nation, are doing to detect dangerous nuclear
material. Part of that strategy includes an assessment of gaps that
exist, and what technology might be needed to mitigate those gaps.
How does DNDO work with the private sector--specifically the
technology development community--to explain the architecture and the
technology gaps that exist so that Government and industry can work
together to develop solutions and better manage risk to our Nation?
Answer. Within DNDO, there are several offices that work together
and communicate with stakeholders in private industry. We communicate
with the private sector through conferences and solicitations. We work
with the technology development community to address gaps in the GNDA
through our transformational research and development programs that
foster innovative solutions to address capabilities gaps.
One thing that DNDO has learned in its short existence is that
industry, even without Government funding, often continues to develop
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) detectors that may satisfy a greater
range of requirements with limited additional development. DNDO has
accordingly adjusted its strategy to investigate opportunities to
address certain needs by developing customer-driven design
modifications to currently available human portable equipment. In
addition to these efforts, DNDO will develop human portable systems
that transition successfully from our transformational research and
development work. As we work at DNDO to improve our business models, we
are looking at additional ways to leverage COTS technology wherever
appropriate.
Question 3b. Is DNDO charged with responding to a rad/nuc attack?
If not, who has that responsibility?
Answer. The 2009 DHS Integrated Planning Guidance assigns FEMA the
responsibility to initiate a Response and Recovery program for a
nuclear incident.
FEMA will develop and issue a strategy for improving the national
response and recovery from an IND attack by the end of fiscal year
2009. The strategy will include prioritizing and addressing capability
gaps identified by the fiscal year 2008 Nuclear Response and Short-term
Recovery RPT; specifying intra- and inter-agency roles and
responsibilities; identifying research and development and training
needs; and addressing any conflicts that exist in current activities,
plans, and procedures. FEMA will develop and implement a dedicated IND
Response and Recovery Program within FEMA no later than fiscal year
2010.
Question 4. In your testimony you discuss DNDO's development of
time-phased, multi-layered, global nuclear detection architecture
(GNDA) because no single layer of defense can detect all radiological
and nuclear threats.
What are our detection and interdiction opportunities overseas? Are
we operating beyond foreign seaports?
Answer. DNDO supports other Federal efforts to improve detection
capabilities beyond the Nation's ports of entry. In late 2006, DHS,
DOE, and the State Department announced the Secure Freight Initiative
(SFI)--an effort to build upon existing port security measures by
enhancing the Federal Government's ability to scan containers for
nuclear and radiological materials overseas and to better assess the
risk of inbound containers. Phase I of SFI leverages the DOE Megaports
Initiative, DHS Container Security Initiative (CSI), DHS domestic
nuclear detection programs, and recent test deployments of relevant
technology. Under SFI, all U.S.-bound containers are being scanned at
three ports in Pakistan, Honduras, and the United Kingdom, fulfilling
the 2006 SAFE Port Act requirement to couple non-intrusive imaging
(NII) equipment and radiation detection equipment in order to evaluate
the effectiveness of 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound containers.
Furthermore, DHS and DOE also expanded the deployment of scanning
equipment to certain terminals in Port Busan (South Korea) and
Singapore.
DNDO has been working with SFI representatives to develop methods
for analyzing the combined data produced by these installations, i.e.,
the combination of passive radiation detection scans from polyvinyl
toluene (PVT) radiation portal monitors (RPMs), X-ray or gamma-ray
images from NII equipment, and targeting information taken from
manifests and other sources. DNDO is working in coordination with CBP
to develop image analysis tools that could be included in the viewers
that CBP officers use to scan SFI data. The groundwork for these
cooperative efforts has been laid by DNDO's analytical work on the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). DNDO continues to work
with DOE and partners in DHS to coordinate data fusion efforts and
support development and acquisition of technology that meets the
operational and performance needs of detection programs.
To strengthen international rad/nuc detection, DNDO works with DOE,
the Department of Defense, and State to engage other nations through
the Global Initiative (GI) to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Within the
framework of the GI, DNDO has been working with foreign counterparts to
jointly develop model guidelines for a global rad/nuc detection
architecture that will focus on all the layers and associated pathways
and can serve as a template for an integrated defense-in-depth
strategy, should nations or regions decide to develop or strengthen
their nuclear detection capabilities.
Question 5. I support leveraging commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
technology wherever appropriate and I'm pleased to hear you say that
this is part of DNDO's long-term business model. I also agree with
``piggy-backing'' on existing programs to enhance our security i.e.,
the radioactive isotope identification device (RIIDs).
Are these RIID devices providing CBP with the capability to detect
radiological and nuclear threats? What improvements are on the horizon?
Answer. At ports of entry, current-generation poly-vinyl toluene
(PVT) RPMs are typically installed in a primary scanning location to
detect the presence of radiation in cargo and vehicles. CBP operates
additional RPMs and handheld radioisotopic identification devices
(RIIDs) in secondary scanning locations to further investigate alarms
originating in primary and identify the specific source of the
radiation detected. Test campaigns have identified limitations in the
hardware and algorithms of the current RIID systems to effectively
identify nuclear materials over the ranges of shielding that are
relevant for passive radiation detection.
To improve the capabilities of handhelds, DNDO has several
development programs underway in conjunction with our end-users. The
human-portable systems under development will be targeted for use by
CBP Office of Field Operations and Office of Border Patrol. Our human-
portable system programs seeks to expand the spectrum of detectors
available to end users by: (1) Investigating existing commercially
available systems and tailoring them to better meet the needs of
operators; (2) developing cutting-edge technology when current systems
are inadequate to meet customer requirements; and (3) conducting
systems development efforts for maturing technologies that transition
from ATDs. Next-generation systems will provide enhanced radiation
detection and threat source identification, localization, and
notification capabilities to aid end-users in mitigating nuclear
threats.
The first human-portable detection technology expected to
transition from an ATD to a systems development phase is the
Intelligent Personal Radiation Locator (IPRL), a pocket-sized
spectroscopic radiation locator that detects radiation, delineates
source type, and locates the source.
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