[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET FOR THE
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS
DIRECTORATE AND THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
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JUNE 10, 2009
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Serial No. 111-23
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Peter T. King, New York (Ex
James A. Himes, Connecticut Officio)
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Beland, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Joseph Vealencis, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 15
Witnesses
Mr. Philip R. Reitinger, Deputy Under Secretary, National
Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland
Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
Ms. Gale D. Rossides, Acting Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Appendix
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee..................... 43
THE FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET FOR THE
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS
DIRECTORATE AND THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
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Wednesday, June 10, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Lujan, Cleaver,
Himes, Massa, Dent, and Lungren.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The subcommittee will come to order.
Let me indicate that my delay was related to some security
concerns that are occurring in and around the Capitol.
Some of you may have heard that there was a shooting at the
Holocaust Museum. The information I have is that two persons
may have lost their lives. We don't have all the facts. But,
hearing no objection, I would like for us to just have a moment
of silence before we start this hearing.
Thank you.
The subcommittee will come to order. The subcommittee is
meeting today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010
budget for the National Protection and Programs Directorate and
the Transportation Security Administration. Our witnesses today
will testify about the budget request of their respective
components for fiscal year 2010.
At the onset, I would like to thank the witnesses for
appearing before us today. Because schedules are hectic and the
Deputy Under Secretary must leave before 3:00 p.m., I would
like to proceed as quickly as possible. In addition, I would
ask the indulgence of the Deputy Under Secretary if we are a
few minutes beyond, but we recognize his scheduling issue.
STATEMENTS OF PHILIP R. REITINGER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY,
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GALE D. ROSSIDES, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Ms. Jackson Lee. Without objection, I would like to request
that the witnesses' testimony be considered as read so that we
can move directly to questions. Hearing no objection, it is so
ordered.
[The statements of Mr. Reitinger and Ms. Rossides follow:]
Prepared Statement of Philip R. Reitinger
June 10, 2009
Good morning, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss the progress the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) has made and how the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2010 will position us to support the overall Department
mission to protect and secure our Nation. I will also take this
opportunity to highlight some of the Directorate's accomplishments.
national protection and programs directorate budget overview
The fiscal year 2010 budget request for NPPD is $1.959 billion and
includes 2,710 Federal positions. This is an increase of $801 million
over the fiscal year 2009 appropriated amount of $1.158 billion.
The primary driver of the budgetary and personnel increase arises
from the requested transfer of $640 million and 1,225 positions of the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) to NPPD from U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). The proposed transfer aligns the FPS mission
of Federal facilities infrastructure protection within the NPPD mission
of critical infrastructure protection. Further, NPPD chairs the
operations of the Interagency Security Committee, a group that includes
the physical security leads for all major Federal agencies and whose
key responsibility is the establishment of Government-wide security
policies for Federal facilities. These missions are complementary and
mutually supportive, and the alignment resulting from the transfer
improves and advances the mission effectiveness of both FPS and NPPD.
To ensure a smooth transition pending congressional approval, NPPD,
ICE, and FPS have formed a joint transition team. The transition team
is reviewing a recently completed inventory of the financial,
procurement, and administrative support services that ICE currently
provides for FPS, along with the annual costs ICE charges for those
services. Services that can be provided by NPPD or DHS Under Secretary
for Management (USM) will be transferred from ICE. In those cases in
which it is determined that ICE should continue as the service provider
for fiscal year 2010, a Service Level Agreement between FPS and ICE
will be established to ensure there is no disruption to operations
during the transition until such time that services can be fully
transferred to NPPD or USM in fiscal year 2011.
Filling vacant Federal positions and right-sizing the Federal and
contractor staff ratio across NPPD is my upmost priority. NPPD has made
great strides in filling critical positions, but much work remains to
build out a cadre of Federal staff across the Directorate. NPPD has
brought on board 300 new employees over the last 12 months, and
currently has approximately 800 Federal employees on board out of the
1,064 fiscal year 2009 positions. We are projecting bringing on board
another 200 by the end of fiscal year 2009. The fiscal year 2010 budget
request includes 350 additional Federal staff across the entire
Directorate offset by funding decreases in contractor support funding.
The fiscal year 2010 request also includes 71 new positions mainly to
support infrastructure security compliance and cybersecurity. This will
bring NPPD to a total workforce of 2,710 in fiscal year 2010.
I would now like to highlight some NPPD accomplishments as well as
review the fiscal year 2010 requested budgets for the Office of
Infrastructure Protection, the Office of Risk Management and Analysis,
US-VISIT, and the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications.
Office of Infrastructure Protection
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) leads the coordinated
national effort to reduce risk to our critical infrastructure and key
resources (CIKR) posed by acts of terrorism; it also enables national
preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an
attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. IP has achieved a number
of key milestones in the past year, such as:
Assigned preliminary risk tiers for facilities covered by
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), a
comprehensive set of regulations that protect high-risk
chemical facilities from attack and prevent theft of chemicals
for use as weapons.
Provided physical security and risk data to 5,000 registered
Homeland Security Information Network--Critical Sector (HSIN-
CS) users responsible for critical infrastructure and key
resources security in a coordinated national effort to reduce
risk posed by acts of terrorism and natural disasters. This
included the development and deployment of targeted baseline
critical infrastructure and key resource protection
information-sharing capabilities.
Assisted the Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT),\1\ as
well as private sector owners and operators, in identifying
vulnerabilities throughout the liquefied natural gas system,
providing recommendations for enhanced security and protective
measures to mitigate risk. This operation was DHS' first
comprehensive, system-based vulnerability assessment of a
foreign nation's infrastructure system and has become the model
for international CIKR security engagements for both DHS and
other departments.
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\1\ The United States imports approximately 70 percent of its
liquefied natural gas from GOTT, and any disruptions to the system
would have an immediate impact on domestic energy supply and security,
particularly for the Northeastern United States.
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Integrated the State, Local, Tribal and Territorial
Government Coordinating Council into the full cycle of national
infrastructure protection planning and reporting. The Council
is a forum for its representatives to engage with the Federal
Government and CIKR owners and operators. The Council
integrates Council stakeholders into the national level
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) framework, its
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, and 18
Sector/Government Coordinating Councils. This evolution of the
CIKR partnership model allows all levels of government to
provide input into both the NIPP and Sector-Specific Plans as
well as their implementation.
Established State and local critical infrastructure
protection training and technical assistance programs. Not only
do these programs support standardized infrastructure and risk
information, they also provide training to assist State and
local law enforcement, emergency responders, emergency
managers, and other homeland security officials in
understanding the steps necessary to develop and implement
comprehensive CIKR protection programs.
IP's fiscal year 2010 request is $333.3 million and includes 725
Federal positions. This request maintains critical capabilities;
expands enforcement of the chemical security; supports development of
final ammonium nitrate regulations; funds new nuclear reactor security
consultations with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; supports five
Regional Resiliency Assessment Projects; and enhances coordinated
national bombing prevention and improvised explosive device security
efforts.
Infrastructure Security Compliance: Chemical Security and
Ammonium Nitrate
The total funding requested for fiscal year 2010 to support the
regulation of high-risk chemical facilities and establish ammonium
nitrate regulations is $103.4 million, which includes 268 Federal
staff.
The increased funding request supports the hiring, training,
equipping, and housing of additional inspectors. Funding will also
support the completion and publication of final ammonium nitrate
regulations that will help prevent the use of ammonium nitrate in an
act of terrorism through both required registration and verification
processes and inspection and audit procedures.
As mentioned previously, DHS released CFATS and the final CFATS
Appendix A rule, listing approximately 300 ``Chemicals of Interest''
and associated threshold quantities. Pursuant to CFATS, facilities
possessing threshold amounts of Appendix A chemicals were required to
complete a Top-Screen assessment within 60 days of the release of
Appendix A (i.e., by January 22, 2008) or, if the facility acquires an
Appendix A chemical subsequent to the release of Appendix A, within 60
days of the facility's acquisition of that chemical. Facilities
preliminarily designated as high-risk based on the Top-Screen
submissions were also required to complete Security Vulnerability
Assessments, and, if that high-risk status is confirmed by the Security
Vulnerability Assessments, will be required to develop Site Security
Plans and implement measures meeting DHS-defined risk-based performance
standards.
To assist facilities in performing these obligations, the
Department developed an on-line suite of tools known as the Chemical
Security Assessment Tool, which includes, among other applications, the
Top-Screen, Security Vulnerability Assessment, and Site Security Plan
tools; a Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance Document that
facilities may use when developing their Site Security Plans; and a
Help Desk to answer questions regarding CFATS. Additionally, upon
request, the Department performs technical consultations and technical
assistance visits for facilities with questions regarding the
compliance process. To date, over 36,000 chemical facilities have
submitted Top-Screens, with over 7,000 facilities preliminarily
designated high-risk in June 2008 and required to submit Security
Vulnerability Assessments. Due to changes facilities have made around
chemicals of interest since the preliminary designations a year ago,
the number of high-risk facilities as of June 2009 has gone down to
6,414 facilities.
The Department recently sent final notification letters to the
highest risk (Tier 1) facilities, confirming the facilities' high-risk
status and initiating the 120-day time frame for submitting Site
Security Plan and implementing the associated security measures. The
Plans are due back to the Department on September 15, 2009. The current
projections for each type of facility are as follows: Tier 1--182; Tier
2--680; Tier 3--1,612; and Tier 4--3,940. Following initial approval of
the Site Security Plans, the Department expects to begin performing
inspections in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, commencing with
the designated Tier 1 facilities.
Vulnerability Assessments
An additional $3 million is requested in fiscal year 2010 to
support Vulnerability Assessment Projects.
Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-58)
requires DHS to perform security consultations for Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) new nuclear reactor license applications prior to the
NRC issuance of the license. DHS is responsible for conducting site
security consultations in cooperation with the NRC, local law
enforcement, and private sector partners to provide a report that
identifies the potential vulnerabilities and threats associated with
the proposed reactor locations. The NRC has informed DHS that there are
10 facilities that have submitted license requests and two pending
license requests that will require site-security assessments in fiscal
year 2010.
Additionally, IP will pilot six Regional Resiliency Assessment
Projects, each of which will involve a cooperative Government-led,
interagency assessment of both the specific CIKR and a general regional
analysis of the surrounding infrastructure. The intent of this program
is to identify and evaluate infrastructure ``clusters,'' regions,
systems, and their key interdependencies. The outcome of the findings
will support the development of coordinated protection efforts to
enhance resiliency and address security gaps within the surrounding
first responder communities and geographic region. The program's
integrated approach will measure and provide metrics for risk
mitigation to a region.
Bombing Prevention
A total of $14.8 million is requested to support bombing prevention
efforts. The fiscal year 2010 request supports the completion of 16 out
of the 22 Implementation Plan recommendations included in the National
Strategy for Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States
that are the responsibility of DHS. DHS is working closely with both
the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense, who are
leading the completion of the other six Implementation Plan
recommendations, to carry out this National Strategy. The funding will
support increased assessments of bombing prevention capabilities across
the country and increased bombing prevention information services for
Federal, State, local, and private sectors.
Office of Risk Management and Analysis
The Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) is leading the
Department's efforts to establish a common risk management framework to
identify, assess, and manage homeland security risk. RMA seeks to
enhance overall protection, prevention, preparedness, and mitigation of
homeland security risks through risk analysis and risk management
strategies. RMA has:
Completed the prototype for the Risk Assessment Process for
Informed Decision-making (RAPID) to support the Department's
overall planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
process. When fully developed, RAPID will support strategic
policy and budgetary decisions by assessing risk, evaluating
risk reduction effects of DHS programs, and evaluating
alternative resource allocation strategies. In 2009, within the
RAPID framework, detailed assessments in the chemical and
biological threat spectrum are being used to inform the
Department's Integrated Planning Guidance by: (1) Providing an
analysis of DHS chemical/biological security programs; (2)
evaluating the degree to which DHS chemical/biological programs
are contributing to risk reduction; (3) identifying gaps; and
(4) recommending strategies for better allocating resources to
manage risk.
Completed the interim DHS Integrated Risk Management
Framework. This framework provides a foundation for
institutionalizing integrated risk management in the Department
by outlining an overall vision--as well as objectives,
principles, and a process--for integrated risk management
within DHS. It also identifies how the Department will achieve
integrated risk management by developing and maturing policy,
governance, processes, training, and accountability methods.
Members of the Department's Risk Steering Committee developed
the framework, which is supported by all DHS components,
directorates, and offices.
Managed and led the administration and operation of a
Department Risk Steering Committee, to serve as the
Department's risk management governance structure. The Risk
Steering Committee is a three-tiered construct. Tier I consists
of all heads of DHS components; Tier II consists of sub-
directorate/component principals (e.g., assistant secretaries,
senior officials, deputy directors); and Tier III consists of
senior policy and analysis staff. The Risk Steering Committee
and its working groups meet frequently to review and produce
risk products for use by the entire Department.
Produced the first set of analytical guidelines for risk
practitioners across the Department. The Risk Management
Analytical Guidelines provide a body of knowledge for DHS and
its components to improve their risk management capabilities by
promoting sound risk management processes and techniques. These
primers capture and promulgate promising practices and lessons
learned to promote convergence of DHS risk management
activities and support education and training. Among the
initial titles are Developing Risk Assessment Methodologies,
Developing Scenarios, Assessing Vulnerabilities for Risk
Assessments, and Analyzing Consequences.
Published the DHS Risk Lexicon, which defines 73 key risk-
related terms and provides a common vocabulary for the
foundation of an integrated risk management capability within
the Department.
The fiscal year 2010 budget request for RMA is $9.9 million and
includes 25 Federal staff. Major programs planned in fiscal year 2010
for RMA expand on recent accomplishments and include:
Leading a study group under the auspices of the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review that will define, frame, and establish
a process for conducting a homeland security national risk
assessment for the purpose of determining comparative all-
hazards risk to the homeland and identifying opportunities to
manage that risk. Following the completion of the study, RMA
will implement the recommendations and begin conducting the
first homeland security national risk assessment.
RAPID II, to be completed by February 2010, will be the
first evaluation of the risk reduction effectiveness of DHS
programs against a broader spectrum of homeland security risk;
it will be used to help inform the Department's fiscal year
2012-2016 resource allocation process.
Continue development of a Risk Knowledge Center. The Center
will serve as the central point for risk data collection and
dissemination, as well as provide training to enable the
building of a risk core competency across DHS and the broader
homeland security enterprise. The Center will also provide
technical assistance to help personnel within DHS (and
eventually outside DHS) develop and/or apply risk assessment
and management concepts, methods, tools, and resulting data.
Further, it will support the application of advanced risk
concepts developed by a broad range of sources--DHS' Science
and Technology Directorate, academia, professional societies,
and RMA staff--to current and future needs.
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) Program assists the Department in facilitating legal travel
and protecting our Nation from dangerous people attempting to enter the
country. Recent US-VISIT accomplishments include:
Deploying 10-print scanner technology to all major ports of
entry. This provides the capability to capture 10 fingerprints
from 97 percent of travelers. Utilizing 10-print capture
improves accuracy in matching fingerprints, increases the
identification of high-risk individuals, and reduces
interaction with low-risk travelers. Full deployment to 292
air, sea, and land ports of entry will be completed by the end
of this fiscal year.
Assisted State and local law enforcement participation in
Secure Communities. Secure Communities is an ICE initiative
that provides assistance in the identification of immigration
violators that have been arrested by State and local law
enforcement. Authorized Federal, State, and local government
user agencies are provided with access to biometric data to
identify and mitigate security risks.
Supporting the U.S. Coast Guard in the use of mobile
biometric services (biometrics at sea) off the coasts of Puerto
Rico and Florida. This aids in identifying and prosecuting
hundreds of illegal migrants at sea, including some wanted for
human smuggling and murder.
Enhancing the integrity of the immigration system through
continued development of alien exit reporting. US-VISIT began
biometric air exit pilots on May 28, 2009. Through July 2,
2009, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Transportation
Security Administration will conduct tests in the boarding area
of the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport and the
security checkpoint of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport collecting biometric information from
non-U.S. citizens.
The fiscal year 2010 budget request for US-VISIT is $356.2 million
and includes 212 Federal staff positions. The request includes funding
to support the growing identity management and screening services
workloads resulting from the increase to 10-print identifications and
verifications. The request also includes increased system operations
and maintenance for the Automated Biometric Identification System (due
to continued growth of existing programs and servicing new customer
program needs), technology refresh for fingerprint matching hardware,
and data center mirroring and migration.
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) comprises the
National Cyber Security Division, the National Communications System,
and the Office of Emergency Communications. Recent CS&C accomplishments
include:
The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) assessed over
4,000 current external internet connections in the .gov domain
and identified approximately 80 of those as consolidated
internet access points.
NCSD began deployment of the National Cybersecurity
Protection System (NCPS) to enable data collection for the
detection of potential malicious cyber activities on Federal
networks and consequent coordination and analysis by US-CERT
(United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team).
During Hurricane Ike, the National Communications System
(NCS) helped leaders in the Houston and Galveston areas
communicate by prioritizing emergency calls over congested
phone lines and facilitating the restoration of critical
telecommunications services. The Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service completed over 93 percent of the
2,200 priority calls placed across five States.
DHS developed the National Emergency Communications Plan and
approved 56 State-wide Communications Interoperability Plans.
The CS&C fiscal year 2010 budget request is $584.9 million and
includes 419 positions.
The fiscal year 2010 request for the NCSD is $400.7 million.
This request includes an increase of $75 million from
fiscal year 2009 for the implementation of the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative to support
the ability to develop and deploy cyber technologies to
counter on-going, real-world national cyber security
threats and apply effective analysis and risk mitigation
strategies to detect and deter threats. NCSD will support
the on-going reduction and consolidation efforts of
external Federal access points, enabling more effective
monitoring and alerting on suspicious activities occurring
across the Federal enterprise.
The NCSD request also includes an additional $15 million
to enhance outreach and coordination across all levels of
government and the private sector. The fiscal year 2010
budget request allows for additional support to the private
sector by funding 50 site assessment visits to CIKR
facilities, increasing the ability to identify
vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems across the 18
CIKR sectors. The fiscal year 2010 request also enhances
the capability for DHS to sponsor and support cyber
exercises with State, local, regional, and private sector
partners, as well as with our international partners. NCSD
also plans to conduct Cross Sector Cyber Assessments to
support enhanced cybersecurity for all 18 CIKR sectors.
This project will analyze cross sector perspectives and
activities on common vulnerabilities, protective measures,
interdependencies, risk assessment methodologies, and
mitigation strategies.
The fiscal year 2010 request for the NCS is $140.2 million;
this will fund 10 new Regional Communications Coordinator
positions and development of a Continuity Communications
Architecture to ensure, under all conditions, Federal executive
branch cross-department and agency communications.
The fiscal year 2010 request for the OEC is $44 million and
includes additional funding to support approximately 100 site
visits that will validate progress against the NECP goals,
provide additional support to lower-achieving urban areas, and
fund State-wide Communication Interoperability Plan workshops.
Office of the Under Secretary
The fiscal year 2010 budget request includes $34.7 million and 104
Federal positions for Directorate Administration and the Office of the
Under Secretary. Priorities for fiscal year 2010 include integrating
the Federal Protective Service into NPPD, consolidating NPPD financial
data and reporting, coordinating with DHS to continue to streamline the
hiring and security clearance processes for new staff, and conducting
strategic assessments for use in developing future capability needs to
combat new and emerging threats against infrastructure, cyber networks,
and biometric technologies.
closing
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss NPPD accomplishments and
plans for fiscal year 2010 and look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
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Prepared Statement of Gale D. Rossides
June 10, 2009
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to provide an update on the President's
fiscal year 2010 budget request for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA).
I would like to begin by thanking the subcommittee for its support
of TSA's on-going efforts to improve transportation security. Your
support positioned us well for a successful Presidential transition. I
also want to thank the subcommittee for supporting the resources
provided to TSA in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA). These resources are enhancing our Nation's explosives detection
capabilities in airports throughout the country by significantly
accelerating the deployment of more effective and efficient
technologies.
ensuring an effective transition
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has worked hard to ensure
that TSA, as well as other DHS components, was poised to maintain our
high level of security during the critical Presidential transition
period. Continuity is essential for an agency that conducts security
operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days a year. TSA
personnel participated in important transition efforts, including joint
exercises with our DHS colleagues and other Federal agencies to ensure
we could effectively prevent and respond to a potential terrorist
attack during this period. Designating the Deputy Administrator at TSA
as a career position also helps ensure continuity, and I am honored to
serve in this position and as the agency's Acting Administrator.
building on our joint success
I have experienced first-hand the growth and maturation of TSA from
its creation following the tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11)
to the current high-performing global organization protecting Americans
and our transportation systems.
Under the oversight of this committee, TSA has grown from a small
cadre of employees to a dedicated workforce of over 50,000 protecting
every domestic commercial airport, strengthening our Nation's surface
transportation modes, and working with our transportation security
partners both domestically and around the world. We began with the
challenge of hiring, training, and placing the first Federal screeners,
known as Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), in airports where
they intercepted prohibited items such as guns, knives, and razor
blades. Now, TSA employs a highly-trained, professional, multi-skilled
TSO workforce that conducts physical and behavioral screening to
counter constantly changing threats and operates state-of-the-art
screening equipment throughout airports and across multiple modes of
transportation.
constant vigilance
Continuing TSA's success is as important today as it has ever been.
For example, the threat level for commercial aviation remains high and
terrorists continue to pose a threat to aviation. But the threats we
face are broader than just aviation and terrorism. TSA is focused on
the wide variety of threats, including natural disasters and health
pandemics, that face all of our transportation hubs and infrastructure.
We must remain vigilant and never lose focus of our mission.
implementing arra funding
Before I address the fiscal year 2010 budget, I want to update you
on our plans for deploying the $1 billion in funding provided by
Congress to TSA in ARRA. Using a risk-based approach, TSA is purchasing
and installing explosives detection systems (EDS) and equipment that
will greatly accelerate the deployment of new technologies in airports
across the country. These ARRA funds will not only improve security,
but also will create jobs and strengthen our economy.
Approximately $700 million of ARRA funding will be allocated to the
Electronic Baggage Screening Program, which includes the procurement
and installation of airport baggage handling systems. TSA approved
funding for 15 airports in ten States, including several small and
medium-sized airports, for optimal baggage screening solution projects.
Additionally, we recently announced the award of $47 million for the
purchase of 123 reduced-size EDS to be deployed at airports throughout
the Nation.
Approximately $300 million of ARRA funding is going to the
Passenger Screening Program (PSP) to improve explosives detection
capabilities in passenger screening. For the PSP, TSA plans to use ARRA
funding for the purchase of Advanced Technology X-rays (AT X-ray), of
which we announced an award of nearly $3 million for 44 AT X-rays, and
additional Whole Body Imagers (WBI), Universal Conveyor systems,
Bottled Liquid Scanners (BLS), and Next Gen Explosives Trace Detectors.
The ARRA funding enables us to accelerate our projected schedules
toward full system operating capacity, greatly enhancing checkpoint
security for the traveling public.
Finally, TSA is providing subject matter expertise and assistance
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the award of the
$150 million appropriated in ARRA for public transportation and
railroad security assistance grants.
fiscal year 2010 budget request highlights
The fiscal year 2010 budget will strengthen current efforts to
secure all modes of transportation and allow critical investments in
key programs. Specifically, the fiscal year 2010 budget provides TSA
$7.8 billion, which reflects a total gross increase of $800 million for
transportation security initiatives.
The fiscal year 2010 budget includes funding to support various
activities and requirements, including;
$856.6 million for the procurement and installation of EDS
at airports;
$128.7 million for checkpoint and checked baggage screening
systems at airports;
$108.1 million for air cargo security;
$80 million for Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) teams, which includes an additional $50 million for new
VIPR teams dedicated solely to surface transportation security.
The fiscal year 2010 budget also includes the annualization of $30
million received in fiscal year 2008 and $20 million received in fiscal
year 2009 for such activities as Security Regulations, Strategies,
Reports and Studies, Vulnerability and Threat Assessments; Name-Based
Checks Infrastructure, Inter-modal Security Training and Exercise
Program; Information Sharing and Analysis Center for transportation
security; General Aviation; and additional Surface Transportation
Security Inspectors (STSI).
I would like to highlight a few programs from the fiscal year 2010
budget.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams.--The $50 million
for 15 additional VIPR teams increases our random and surge force
protection capability at transit hubs and other surface transportation
venues. VIPR teams are capable of protecting any mode of transportation
through risk-based targeted or unpredictable deployment of TSA assets
in coordination with State, local, and Federal officials. VIPR teams
consist of any combination of TSOs, Transportation Security Inspectors
(TSIs), Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), Behavior Detection Officers
(BDOs), Explosives Security Specialists, Bomb Appraisal Officers
(BAOs), as well as local, State, and Federal security and law
enforcement partners.
Bomb Appraisal Officers.--The fiscal year 2010 budget also adds 109
BAO positions by the end of fiscal year 2010 to strengthen security at
domestic airports. BAOs are highly skilled individuals who have
undergone specialized training in the identification and disposal of
explosives. BAOs provide continual interaction and formal training to
TSOs to increase their ability to recognize potential improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and IED components. BAOs also assist in
clearing suspicious articles presented at checkpoints, often avoiding
the need to call bomb squads, which can result in lengthy airport
delays.
Infrastructure for Identity Vetting and Credentialing.--The fiscal
year 2010 budget provides an additional $64 million to modernize the
information technology infrastructure used to vet the identity of
travelers and transportation workers. The funding will enable TSA to
strengthen and enhance the existing infrastructure used to conduct
vetting operations in several of our key security programs, such as
Secure Flight, background checks for airport workers, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), Hazardous
Materials Commercial Driver's License Endorsement, and alien flight
students. The infrastructure funding will also allow TSA to vet new
populations as directed by Congress in the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act).
EDS Procurement and Installation.--In addition to the funding
levels enacted for fiscal year 2009 and through ARRA, the fiscal year
2010 budget requests $565.4 million to further accelerate facility
modifications, recapitalization efforts, and the deployment of new
electronic baggage screening technology systems.
Whisper Communications.--The fiscal year 2010 budget includes $5
million for additional Land Mobile Radios (LMRs) at TSA screening
checkpoints. The LMRs enhance communications between TSOs with
significantly less disruption to the passenger screening process.
Passenger Security Fee.--To better align the costs of aviation
security with the beneficiaries, the President has proposed an increase
to the Aviation Passenger Security Fee beginning in 2012. Since its
establishment in 2001 as part of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA), the Passenger Security Fee has been limited to
$2.50 per passenger enplanement with a maximum fee of $5.00 per one-way
trip. Congress anticipated that the aviation industry would pay for
airline security costs through a combination of the Passenger Security
Fee and an air carrier fee. However, the cost of providing security has
increased substantially since 2001, leaving Federal taxpayers, rather
than passengers and air carriers, to shoulder 60 percent of the expense
of civil aviation security in fiscal year 2008. In the same year,
Passenger Security Fee collections covered only about 31 percent of the
discretionary costs for civil aviation security and air carriers
covered the remaining 9 percent. Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the Fee
would increase by $1.00 per year through fiscal year 2014. Under the
proposal, the maximum fee in fiscal year 2014 and thereafter would be
$5.50 per enplanement and $11.00 per one-way trip. The adjustment in
2012 will fulfill the original intent of ATSA by more closely
allocating the cost of aviation security services to the individuals
who directly benefit while simultaneously reducing the burden on the
general taxpayer. The administration and TSA ask for your support of
this proposal and we commit to work closely with Congress to obtain the
necessary authorization to begin the fee adjustments in fiscal year
2012.
implementing our on-going security strategy
An effective security system must constantly adapt to ever-changing
threats in the variety of transportation security environments in which
TSA operates. Our transportation security strategy begins with
intelligence, a key driver in our risk-based approach to security. Our
daily operational decisions are influenced by the latest intelligence
and the risks that emanate from the constantly evolving threats we
face. As an example of our constant adaptation, we are in the process
of upgrading security effectiveness at all of our aviation checkpoints,
including the most significant overhaul in passenger screening since 9/
11.
People.--The effectiveness of our security screening relies on our
people--they are TSA's biggest investment and most valuable asset. We
work hard to take care of our employees and we are making significant
progress. Our workforce attrition rates continue to decrease. The
latest fiscal year 2009 voluntary attrition rate of full-time TSOs is
5.2 percent--an improvement of more than 58 percent since fiscal year
2006. The number of workplace injuries has fallen over 75 percent from
fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 and continues to decrease. For the
first 7 months of fiscal year 2009 there has been a 16 percent decrease
in workplace injury claims filed compared to the first 7 months of
fiscal year 2008.
Every TSO working at a checkpoint has completed an extensive 16-
hour retraining called ENGAGE!, which provides the latest information
on intelligence, explosives detection, and human factors affecting
security. This training is designed to develop a cadre of analytical
security professionals. Additionally, all supervisory personnel have
completed a second 16-hour training course called COACH! to help
reinforce the ENGAGE! training and provide additional guidance to TSOs.
We have revised our checkpoint Standard Operating Procedures to enable
officers to use their judgment appropriately in achieving sensible
security results.
As part of TSA's improved security measures, we are deploying our
workforce where we can achieve the best security results, most
efficiently, and with minimal hassle for travelers. These improvements
include the Travel Document Checker (TDC) and Screening Passengers by
Observation Technique (SPOT) programs.
The TDC program is now operating at all Federalized airports and
enhances security by disrupting and detecting individuals who attempt
to board an aircraft with fraudulent documents.
We have deployed hundreds of BDOs at the Nation's busiest airports
as part of the SPOT program. The SPOT program uses non-intrusive
behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially
high-risk passengers based on their behavior. The program originated
from other successful behavioral analysis programs that have been
employed by law enforcement and security personnel both in the United
States and around the world. Some of our law enforcement partners at
the local and Federal level have asked TSA to provide training on this
successful program.
TSA believes a highly motivated workforce enhances our Nation's
security. We implemented a pay-for-performance system to recognize and
reward individual and organizational performance, and created a career
progression program for TSOs with new job classifications and
opportunities to acquire new security skills. Our flexible personnel
system authorities enable TSA to offer creative pay incentives, such as
full-time health benefits for part-time TSOs. And most importantly, we
listen to our employees. Through the National Advisory Council (NAC)--a
formal group of TSOs Nation-wide elected by their peers who meet in
person with TSA's senior leadership on a quarterly basis--and the Model
Workplace program, TSA strives for continuous improvement by addressing
employee concerns. At TSA, these programs reflect a genuine commitment
by senior leadership. I have participated in every quarterly meeting of
the NAC.
Process.--TSA is continuing to implement innovations in the
checkpoint process. The current checkpoint during a peak travel period
can be noisy and congested, which has the potential to conceal the
actions of someone with hostile intent. The checkpoint pilot strives to
provide a more convenient layout for passengers with more information
explaining the screening process to create a better security
environment with improved technology and enhanced training for our
TSOs.
Another simple yet effective program that improves the checkpoint
process is the Diamond Self-Select program. Our self-select screening
lanes are designated by signage (modeled after the familiar ski icons)
that directs passengers to the appropriate lane based on their travel
needs and knowledge. Green is the queue line for travelers who need
extra time or special assistance, such as families traveling with
children, people with disabilities or those who need prescription
liquid medications or other liquids for medical conditions. The blue
lane is for casual travelers who are somewhat familiar with the
security procedures. The black diamond lane is for expert travelers who
know the TSA security requirements and arrive at the checkpoint ready
to go through efficiently.
These dedicated lanes give passengers some measure of control over
their own experience and also provide a better, less stressful
environment for us to do our job. The result has been more effective
and robust security. In cities with self-select lanes, we are seeing
considerably lower alarm rates in the green lane because there is more
time to prepare and remove prohibited items.
Technology.--With the support of this subcommittee, we are
expediting the upgrading of technology at passenger checkpoints and for
checked baggage screening. AT X-Ray and WBI technologies greatly
enhance our ability to detect small IED components made of common
items, which remain the greatest threat, resulting in fewer bag checks
and faster throughput, as well as the ability to upgrade the system
with enhanced algorithms. WBI technologies enable TSA to detect
prohibited items such as weapons, explosives, and other metallic and
non-metallic objects concealed under layers of clothing without
physical contact. TSA will continue to deploy in 2009 Bottled Liquid
Scanners that are used to ensure sealed containers do not contain
threat liquids. Additionally, TSA is purchasing and installing reduced-
size explosive detection systems (EDS) to increase security
effectiveness and improve operational efficiencies through improved
throughput.
Deploying new technology is important, and certainly a step this
subcommittee has encouraged, but we are also taking critical steps to
reassess both the technology and the search methods used by our TSOs.
TSA is working with the Science & Technology Directorate and the
National Laboratories to stay ahead of terrorist tradecraft.
update on significant on-going programs
Before I conclude, I also want to update the subcommittee on some
of our most significant programs.
9/11 Act Implementation.--I want to thank the subcommittee for its
on-going support of $20 million in fiscal year 2009 to implement new
regulations and activities authorized by the 9/11 Act. TSA plans to use
$3.6 million to upgrade the Automatic Detection and Processing Terminal
(ADAPT) system that determines threats in the airspace and reduces the
time and energy spent tracking an unknown anomaly that presents no
threat. The remainder of the fiscal year 2009 funding for 9/11 Act
implementation will be used for surface security measures, including
the hiring of an additional 50 TSIs for surface transportation,
completing vulnerability and threat assessments for surface modes,
developing the Inter-Modal Security Training and Exercise Program, and
developing a transportation security Information Sharing and Analysis
Center.
Air Cargo.--The 9/11 Act included two air cargo security
requirements that mandate the screening of 50 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009 and 100 percent by
August 2010. I am happy to report that the industry is meeting the 50
percent screening requirement. We predict that the 100 percent
screening requirement will be met by August 2010 for domestic cargo
through our Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). Under this
program, the responsibility for screening is distributed voluntarily
throughout the supply chain to improve security while minimizing the
potential negative impact on the integrity and movement of commerce.
A key component of achieving these milestones is the requirement,
developed in coordination with air carriers and other stakeholders,
that 100 percent of cargo transported on narrow-body (single-aisle)
aircraft be screened. This requirement went into effect in October
2008. The passenger security impact of this screening is significant:
although these aircraft carry only 25 percent of domestic air cargo on
passenger aircraft, they account for the majority--approximately 95
percent--of domestic passenger flights. More importantly, these flights
carry more than 80 percent of all passengers on flights originating in
the United States. Thus, even at the statutory deadline for screening
50 percent of air cargo aboard passenger aircraft, we are effectively
protecting the vast majority of the flying public.
The requirement in the 9/11 Act to also screen 100 percent of
inbound air cargo from international departure points continues to
present significant challenges. Although it is unlikely that industry
can meet the ambitious timetable set by Congress, we continue to work
with our international partners and the private sector to address these
challenges and expect to continue to see significant improvements in
the level of security for inbound air cargo on passenger aircraft as we
move forward. We have developed an international air cargo inspection
program that expands our on-going foreign airport assessment regime to
include a risk-based prioritization of sites and assets. This
international regulatory activity work plan for air cargo will enable
us to better determine areas of focus for inspection and assistance
with our foreign partners. We look forward to working with this
subcommittee on this issue as the August 2010 deadline approaches.
Secure Flight.--Beginning with the fiscal year 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act, Congress provided TSA with very specific guidance
in the form of ten conditions to meet to address concerns with the
implementation of the Secure Flight program and gave the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) a proactive role in reporting on our
progress in meeting those conditions. As verified in GAO's report on
the Secure Flight program published last month, TSA generally achieved
nine of the ten conditions and conditionally achieved the one remaining
condition. Your oversight and our partnership with GAO in meeting these
conditions made Secure Flight a better program and it is now poised to
effectively fulfill the mandate of comparing passenger information
against watchlists.
Specifically, Secure Flight provides a consistent watch list
matching process across all aircraft operators; provides for earlier
law enforcement notification and coordination; and better protects
watch list data thanks to its limited distribution. The Secure Flight
program utilizes the Cleared List, a product of the DHS Transportation
Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), to ensure that individuals who have
been previously misidentified and have applied for redress are promptly
cleared and do not experience similar problems in the future.
The Secure Flight program began implementation with certain
aircraft operators on selected flights on January 27, 2009. To date,
four aircraft operators have successfully begun cutover and numerous
others have begun testing. TSA truly appreciates the cooperation and
assistance these volunteer aircraft operators provided to the program
during its initial rollout.
Secure Flight has also embarked upon an aggressive public outreach
campaign in partnership with the aircraft operators and the Ad Council
to educate passengers about how the Secure Flight program makes air
travel safer and easier for millions of Americans.
TSA believes that the Secure Flight program will be able to assume
responsibility for watch list matching of passengers for all domestic
commercial flights by the end of the first quarter of calendar year
2010, and all international commercial flights by the end of calendar
year 2010.
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC).--I am also
pleased to update you on the progress of the TWIC program that we
jointly administer with the United States Coast Guard (USCG). TSA
continues to operate over 149 enrollment centers located throughout the
United States and territories to serve the maritime workers who will
require a TWIC. As of May 25, 2009, TSA completed enrollment of
1,208,412 workers and over 84 percent of workers who had enrolled have
been issued their cards. The USCG completed the phased compliance of
enforcement of TWIC in Captain of the Port (COTP) Zones Nation-wide by
April 15, 2009. TSA and USCG closely monitored progress during the
transition period to ensure smooth compliance at the COTP Zones. To
further improve security and enhance enforcement efforts in COTP Zones,
TSA completed initial capability evaluations of TWIC readers and
approved 17 readers for use in the TWIC pilot program; additional
readers are expected to undergo testing and be approved for use in the
pilot. Early Operational Assessment of readers began in Brownsville,
Texas, in April 2009 when the port completed final installation of
readers and began operations of TWIC readers at their MTSA-regulated
facilities. Other pilot participants are expected to follow Brownsville
later this year.
Global Outreach.--As TSA continues to adapt to changing threats, we
recognize the need to expand our zone of security and interdict threats
before they arrive on our shores. Through collaboration and
partnerships, TSA promotes the implementation of effective global
transportation security processes world-wide while ensuring compliance
with international and TSA standards. Focusing on closing gaps and
providing enhanced capabilities, TSA seeks to manage risks and work
with our international partners to harmonize security measures.
We accomplish this daily on many international fronts,
multilaterally and bilaterally, through Transportation Security
Administration Representatives in 23 countries overseas; a cadre of
inspectors working with stakeholders and officials at airports, air
carriers and Foreign Repair Stations; technical assistance programs;
and standard-setting organizations such as the European Commission and
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO.) We promote best
practices, capacity building and information-sharing through other
international organizations such as the Group of Eight, the
International Working Group on Land Transport Security, the European
Community, the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference; and numerous ICAO
regional groupings in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the
Middle East.
Another example of our global efforts is our Office of Law
Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) relationship with
foreign air security partners. OLE/FAMS conducts training for foreign
air marshals to combat international terrorism. As demonstrated during
the United Kingdom August 2006 plot to use liquid explosives to take
down passenger aircraft bound for the United States, TSA worked with
our international partners to respond immediately.
The Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards Team
(ASSIST) initiative is already showing positive results. This program
works to effectively build sustainable institutions through information
sharing and best practices. Key focus areas include training needs,
equipment, current aviation programs, and aviation security
legislation. St. Lucia is the first nation to partner with TSA in this
new program, which launched in January. In April, the Republic of
Liberia became the second ASSIST partner country and just last month
TSA completed an intensive 2-week training program on aviation
passenger screening there. In the coming months we look forward to
continuing this effort in other locations.
conclusion
Madam Chairwoman, thank you and this subcommittee for the resources
you have provided in the past to achieve significant enhancements in
our people, processes, and technology. Thank you also for the
opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal year 2010 budget request
for TSA and our plans for continuing to improve transportation
security. I look forward to working together. I would be pleased to
respond to your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Because this hearing will be abbreviated
due to the scheduling, the subcommittee requests that each
witness meet with staff soon after this hearing concludes to go
over additional questions. I would like to indicate that
Members of the committee will have the opportunity to submit
their questions, as well. At that point, Ranking Member Dent
and I may ask that you meet with us, as well.
Today's hearing is an important part of the subcommittee's
oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. Specifically,
it provides us with the opportunity to assess, discuss, and
analyze the President's budget request for fiscal year 2010.
I do thank the acting director, member of the
Transportation Security Administration for the meetings that
our committee has been able to have with her. So I thank you
very much.
As you all know, this subcommittee has jurisdiction over
TSA and many elements of NPPD.
With respect to TSA, we have already done a great deal this
year. The TSA authorization bill was passed out of the House in
an overwhelmingly bipartisan manner just last week. I again
thank the Ranking Member, Mr. Dent, for being my original
cosponsor on this legislation.
When it comes to infrastructure protection and the other
elements of NPPD, the committee is moving quickly to extend and
comprehensively modify the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards. In addition, the subcommittee will be working on an
authorization packet for NPPD later this year. Some of our
Members have asked about paying more attention to general
aviation. A number of new issues will be coming to our
attention.
With respect to TSA, the subcommittee is generally pleased
with the budget request of almost $7.8 billion. For fiscal year
2010, TSA has requested an additional budget authority for
adding bomb appraisal offices, travel document checkers, and
behavioral detection officers to enhance aviation security.
In addition to the standard checkpoint and baggage
screening operations, TSOs will continue to support security
initiatives, such as screening of passengers by observation
techniques, visible intermodal prevention and response teams,
and the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program. TSA has also
made heightened investments in technology, precisely what we
need to keep the traveling public safe.
I am concerned about TSA's fiscal year 2010 budget request
of $108 million for cargo security operations. This figure does
not support an increase in FTEs for air cargo and reflects a 12
percent decrease from the fiscal year 2009 enacted amount. Even
as TSA faces significant challenges with respect to air cargo
security, it is imperative that TSA has significant resources
to face these challenges.
The President's fiscal year 2010 budget request for surface
transportation security at TSA totals roughly $128 million,
which is more than double the fiscal year 2009 enacted
appropriation. Although I have concerns about how these new
resources are allocated, this request reflects a real
investment in securing non-aviation modes of transportation and
is consistent with the broader priorities of our authorization
bill.
Turning to NPPD, there is much to applaud in this budget
proposal. This directorate has a troubled history, and this
budget attempts to unify an entity that contains several
disparate components.
In fact, let me be very clear: Sometimes it is not
understood what the infrastructure protection aspect of our
jurisdiction is. The only thing that I can say to you that
makes it as real and as viable and important as I believe it
is, and I believe my Ranking Member believes it is, is to
recognize the overall responsibility of this committee,
including infrastructure protection, takes into account aspects
of cybersecurity, which we know is shared by our other
subcommittee, but also it deals with the very incident that we
have just pointed to that happened today. Infrastructure is
everything in America, and we must be concerned about it.
The committee welcomes the $87 million increase over fiscal
year 2009 appropriations for the National Cybersecurity
Division. This addresses an important function. We are pleased
that the Deputy Under Secretary, who has a career of success in
the cyber environment, is willing to serve in order to help
protect the Nation.
We still need to better understand how the Department's
efforts will interface with the rest of the Federal Government,
especially with the creation of a new cyber coordinator in the
White House. Because this subcommittee works a great deal with
the 18 critical infrastructure sectors, we must ensure that the
Department's cyber efforts are efficiently leveraging these
important relationships.
I applaud the Deputy Under Secretary for his testimony that
filling vacant Federal positions and right-sizing the Federal
and contractor staff ratio across NPPD is his utmost priority.
This subcommittee fully supports this effort. But I am
concerned about the suitability protocols of NPPD. This
subcommittee stands ready to assist you in your efforts to
expedite the security clearance process for prospective
employees.
The subcommittee is pleased with NPPD's request for $333
million for infrastructure protection. As you well know, we
have done a lot of work in this important area, and the
response to the Mumbai attacks shows that we have a long way to
go. The increases for chemical site security and the ammonium
nitrate regulations are also important steps.
However, the subcommittee is concerned about the cuts to
partnerships related to the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan. In this economic climate, it seems that we should be
bolstering these efforts as the private sector, an important
security partner, will have fewer resources.
I remain very concerned with the Office of Risk Management
and Analysis. Staff has quarterly briefings with RMA, and it
seems both underfunded and headed in too many different
directions. As I said last spring, we need a strategic plan
from RMA that puts it on a path to success. I look forward to
introducing legislation that will clarify the roles and
responsibilities of RMA.
Finally, the President's 2010 budget request proposes to
move FPS out of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and into
NPPD. The committee agrees that ICE was not the proper entity
to house FPS but questions whether moving it to NPPD will
address the problems encountered under ICE. And we look forward
to hearing your thoughts about the proposed move today.
I look forward to our discussion today, and I will work
with you and am willing to work with you in order to support
the vital mission of both TSA and NPPD. Once again, I thank the
witnesses for their participation today.
Let me also acknowledge the presence of the gentleman from
California, Mr. Lungren; the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.
Himes; and the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Lujan; and thanks
them for their presence here today.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Dent, for an opening statement.
Mr. Dent. Thanks, Madam Chairwoman.
Good afternoon. I would like to thank both our witnesses
for joining us today. I know your time is in short supply, so I
will respect that.
We understand that there is an inordinate amount of time
senior officials of the Department spend answering too many
different congressional committees because of Congress's
dysfunctional jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland
Security. However, since the Committee on Homeland Security is
the principal authorizing committee in the House, we very much
appreciate you being with us today. So, that said, in light of
some of the time constraints, I would like to keep my remarks
short.
As you know, the House passed the TSA Authorization Act
last week. The bill was negotiated on a bipartisan basis. I
thank the Chairwoman for her leadership on that issue. Also,
the committee met with many different stakeholder for input. I
believe it was a good bill, and I was happy to be an original
cosponsor of the legislation.
The Republican Members of committee, however, believe that
it was premature to bring the bill to the floor for
consideration before a new administrator was named for the TSA.
As you know, TSA did not provide any formal input into the
bill, and that is unfortunate.
One of the casualties of TSA not being able to provide
input to the TSA Authorization Act was the misguided adoption
of the amendment that would have severely restricted the use of
whole-body imaging technology. The adopted amendment will
prevent TSA from using whole-body imaging technology for
primary screening purposes at the airport checkpoints.
As you know, the committee has been very supportive of WBI
technology because we know that it enhances aviation security.
We understand that WBI technology can detect many things, such
as small IEDs, plastics explosives, ceramic knives, and other
objects traditional metal detection cannot detect.
This technology was developed with the backing of Congress
because we know our enemies are looking to use certain
explosives which are not detectable with metal detectors or
magnetometers. Restricting the use of WBI technology at the
airport checkpoint will put us in a vulnerable position, just
as we were prior to 9/11. We simply can't allow that to happen.
I should note that I saw the WBI technology for myself last
week at Reagan National. I think it is a great technology, and
I am very satisfied with the privacy measures currently in
place. I know you have taken a great deal of care to ensure
that. I think there is a lot of inaccurate information out in
the public domain, and many Members are misinformed on the
technology.
As the TSA Authorization Act makes its way through the
legislative process, it is my sincere hope, and for the sake of
all Americans who fly, that TSA will weigh in and inform
Congress on the advantages of WBI technology so we can ensure
the use of this innovative and very necessary technology at our
Nation's airport. My colleague, Mr. Lungren, was very eloquent
on this issue. I wish more Members could have heard his
comments on that amendment.
Moving to the National Protection and Programs Directorate,
I am very glad to see that the administration is making
cybersecurity a priority. I am encouraged by the increased
funding request of $75 million over fiscal year 2009 to support
the implementation of the Comprehensive National Cyber Security
Initiative.
Mr. Reitinger, I understand you have an exemplary
background in cybersecurity, and I look forward to the work you
will do at the National Protection and Programs Directorate.
Thanks again for both of you being here today.
I will yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the gentleman for his
testimony.
I welcome our witnesses.
Our first witness is Philip R. Reitinger, who was appointed
by Secretary Janet Napolitano to serve as a Deputy Under
Secretary for NPPD on March 11, 2009. In this role, Reitinger
leads the Department's integrated efforts to reduce risk across
physical and cyber infrastructures.
Prior to joining DHS, Mr.--let me just ask, how do you
pronounce your name?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, ma'am, it is ``Reitinger.''
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is ``Reitinger.'' I just want to make
sure. Thank you.
Prior to joining DHS--I wanted to make sure that we were
not getting that smile because--you are just a smiling person.
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Reitinger was the chief trustworthy infrastructure
strategist at Microsoft Corporation. I would suggest to you
that you come widely applauded, because in his title of his
previous position had the term ``trustworthy''. Is that
correct?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, ma'am, it is.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I couldn't imagine that the Secretary
could find a better selection. Thank you.
In that role, he worked with Government agencies and
private-sector partners to enhance cybersecurity and
infrastructure protection.
Our second witness, Ms. Rossides, is acting administrator
of TSA. As acting administrator, Ms. Rossides oversees a
workforce of 50,000 and the security operations of 450
Federalized airports throughout the United States, as well as
the Federal security regime for highways, railroads, ports, and
mass transit systems. Ms. Rossides was one of the six original
Federal executives handpicked in 2002 to build TSA. We are
certainly appreciative of your leadership on that issue.
As agreed to at the beginning of today's hearing, the
witnesses' testimony will be considered as read so that we can
begin to question our witnesses in the interest of time.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes, Mr.
Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Just by way of commentary, I learned a long time ago--my
middle name is W-I-E-D-E-R. My mother taught me, as a young
person from Pennsylvania Dutch country, I-E is ``E,'' E-I is
``I.'' Mr. ``Reitinger,'' there are a lot of names like that in
my area.
But just a couple things, Mr. Reitinger. Is the Department
aware that the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee
on Energy and Commerce are crafting legislation to authorize
the Department's regulatory authority over chemical facilities?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dent. Then, the Department did request a 1-year
extension for the current CFATS regulations. Why did you do
that knowing that the committees are engaged in legislation?
Mr. Reitinger. Thank you, sir. Let me first, before
answering that question, thank the committee for the
opportunity to testify today and for the kind words that both
you and the Chairwoman said about me and about NPPD and the
criticality of our mission.
To answer your question in particular, sir, the Department
requested a 1-year extension of CFATS in the budget because we
believe that 1 year would give us the time to work effectively
with Congress for a permanent reauthorization of CFATS.
The Department supports the permanent reauthorization of
CFATS, and a year seemed to be a reasonable amount of time to
enable that discussion to take place and an action to be taken
by Congress.
Mr. Dent. Do you believe that the current CFATS regulations
are sufficient?
Mr. Reitinger. I believe the current CFATS regulations give
us a good basis for going forward, sir.
As the Ranking Member knows, we are currently in the
process of implementing the regulations, in tiering assets, and
in executing the site security plans that are called for under
the regulation. That activity will give us a lot of additional
experience about the effectiveness of the regime, if there are
holes in it.
So, while I am comfortable with the regime as it is, I
believe we will have additional opportunities to learn about
opportunities for improvement going forward. I look forward to
working with the committee and staff on the most effective
design for that program.
Mr. Dent. I have introduced legislation to extend the
current CFATS regulations by 3 years. So thank you for that
comment.
One of the issues Congress is grappling with is whether or
not to require facilities to re-engineer their plants to use
different and perhaps less dangerous chemicals in their
manufacturing processes. Alternatively, plants could shift from
on-site storage model to a just-in-time delivery model. A
popular catchy phrase for this is called ``inherently safer
technologies,'' or IST.
If IST reviews were mandatory, how many Government
employees who are professional IST experts capable of analyzing
each of these facility processes does the Department have on
staff? Any idea?
Mr. Reitinger. Well, sir, in terms of specific IST experts,
I am not aware that we have any. We, of course, are in the
process of hiring and training chemical experts, chemical
inspectors, who would develop certainly expertise that would be
applicable to that sort of activity, if not completely aligned
with it.
One of the things I would say is that there is nothing
about the current statutory regime, however, that forbids the
use of what amounts to IST technologies, choosing to use
different chemicals, choosing to use different technologies, in
order to tier down or comply with the existing regime.
So the current regime allows use of those, it just doesn't
mandate their analysis or use.
Mr. Dent. Does the Department's fiscal year 2010 budget
request include any investment in IST expertise?
Mr. Reitinger. Not specifically, sir. It does, however,
include authorizations to hire up to 139 CFATS inspectors, with
an additional 20 ammonium nitrate inspectors who could be
cross-trained, or with the upcoming addition of 40 chemical
inspectors who could be cross-trained to do CFATS inspections.
Mr. Dent. Ms. Rossides, as you know, during the last week's
authorization, TSA's authorization bill, the House adopted the
amendment offered by Mr. Chaffetz and Ms. Shea-Porter, which
would prohibit the use of whole-body imaging in primary
screening positions. Of course, I opposed this amendment very
strongly, as did Mr. Lungren.
As you know, I went to Reagan National last week and saw
this technology first-hand. I was, as I mentioned, really very
impressed by it. I saw an individual walk through a checkpoint
with two weapons, and, without giving any detail, let's just
say I was unnerved by the magnetometer's inability to detect
them. However, the whole-body imaging showed both concealed
weapons pretty easily.
Could you explain the Department's current privacy
safeguards in place that govern the use of this technology?
What would be the practical implications if the prohibition of
using whole-body imaging technology for primary screening were
to become law? You know, what capabilities would be lost?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir.
First of all, with respect to the privacy issues, TSA took
really great measures to protect the privacy concerns. We have
a privacy impact assessment study that was published that
reflects those measures.
But, very specifically, first of all, the passengers have a
choice as to whether or not they go through the WBI or the
walk-through metal detectors.
Second, the images that are viewed are viewed in a remote
location, so that the officer that is viewing the image never
sees the passenger and the officer that is assisting the
passenger never sees the image. The face is blurred.
There is signage in the checkpoint advising the passengers
of their options and what the image actually looks like. The
technology itself does not store, it does not print, it does
not transmit nor save the image. Once the image is deleted, it
cannot be retrieved.
These are the measures that we have put in place. In the
places where we have the technology, we have over a 95 percent
satisfaction rate with the traveling public.
In all honesty, sir, based on the intel that I and the
leadership team at TSA sees every single day, if we do not have
the ability to deploy this technology and utilize it to the
best of the abilities for the system, it will represent a
severe limitation of our detection capability.
We know that those who intend to do harm today have moved
way beyond metal items. They are, in fact, looking for things
that they can conceal. They are looking for things that the
walk-through metal detector cannot detect, and the whole-body
imaging technology can.
Mr. Dent. Well, thank you. I hope somebody in the media is
writing that down and they publish that tomorrow. It is a very
good statement. I appreciate that.
Finally, on the LASP program, as you know, I have some real
concerns about the proposed rulemaking. I noted that, with some
comfort, the Department has recently conducted a couple of
workshops of various stakeholder groups, and will soon hold a
third, to consider future proposed rulemaking.
How is this process that you are conducting different than
the process used to develop the initial rulemaking, which has
given a lot of us, on a bipartisan basis, some real heartburn?
Ms. Rossides. Well, sir, the initial rulemaking that we
sent out, we actually did something that was rather
unconventional with our regular rulemaking process in that we
did have five public meetings on the initial rulemaking.
But after the extensive comments--and I believe we got over
6,000 comments from the public in general--we have held a
series of meetings with major trade associations and other
stakeholders. We held the first meeting in April, the second in
May, and we have the third meeting scheduled for June 15. What
we are looking at is those areas of concern by the external
stakeholders and associations.
Once we have these meetings, we will look to see where the
interests of those persons are and the TSA concerns and
security interests are. Then we will go out with--we will
reopen the notice of proposed rule making for a second round of
comments.
I am hoping, and from the feedback we are getting from the
associations, that is a positive step in the right direction,
in terms of coming to agreement on how we close some of the
security vulnerabilities we are concerned with and meet their
concerns, as well.
Mr. Dent. I just think a lot of the Members here would be
appreciative if the stakeholder input was not summarily
dismissed.
Ms. Rossides. It won't be.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I will yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Let me ask Mr. Reitinger again, how close to the 3 o'clock
hour can you stay?
Mr. Reitinger. Thank you, Chairwoman. I have a speaking
engagement at the Chamber of Commerce, where I know one of your
Members is going later. I was supposed to leave at 2:45, but I
will push it, as we need to, to respond to the committee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me do this. My questions are
only going to be to you. I hope, if you give quick answers, I
might be able to get Mr. Lungren in and Mr. Himes before you
leave.
If I could ask Members to only question--we will be able to
come back around for Ms. Rossides. If that can work for your
questioning, it would be helpful, since he has an opportunity
to leave.
Let me quickly ask the question about the NPPD. There have
been a lot of discussions about the permanence of NPPD. As we
all know, it is a disparate collection of entities that, in
some cases, do not appear to a unifying focus beyond being
security programs.
With that said, does this budget set the stage for the
reorganization of the NPPD before or after the delivery of the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review next winter, Mr.
Reitinger?
Mr. Reitinger. No, ma'am, it does not. The budget, in fact,
is designed to help drive unity of NPPD by building an
effective front office that will enable the organizations to
move effectively and work together on its joint mission of
mitigating threats to the homeland.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are you saying that you don't intend to
begin to look at reorganization at this time or before the
delivery of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or are
you going to do it after? What is the time frame for
reorganization? What is the interest in reorganization?
Mr. Reitinger. Well, ma'am, an ultimate decision about
reorganization I would leave to the Under Secretary, once
confirmed by the Senate.
I believe we have a good basis going forward with NPPD.
There are no current plans to reorganize NPPD, other than to
move IGP up as a direct report to the Secretary. We intend to
move forward effectively. As experience tells us whether the
organization of NPPD is optimal, we would come back and work
with the committee to make sure that could be done as
effectively as possible and with minimal disruption to
business.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just hope that you will
convey to your leadership there that we are interested in
seeing a plan for reorganization or at least some argument that
it shouldn't be reorganized.
The subcommittee is concerned with the level of personnel
NPPD employs. I am happy to learn from your testimony that many
you brought on 300 new employees over the last 12 months and
currently have approximately 800 Federal employees on board out
of 1,064.
For that reason, I was pleased to learn from your budget
request that you intend to bring on additional personnel. Could
you describe NPPD's efforts to employ additional personnel, how
this will affect current contracts at the Department?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, ma'am. As you indicated in your opening
statement, Madam Chairwoman, my No. 1 priority is bringing the
right people on board. It is my personal belief that
organizations succeed or fail based on the people that they
have. Therefore, that takes the majority--of my time, I spend
the biggest chunk of it working to make sure that we have
effective processes in place to bring on the right people as
rapidly as possible to supplement the excellent staff we
already have.
To that end, we have aggressive hiring plans for the
remainder of the fiscal year, and we will be bringing on
additional people next year.
As my testimony also indicates, we are making efforts to,
as you said, correctly right-size the contractor workforce so
that we build up our Government personnel capabilities, create
expertise in Government, and use contractors appropriately for
the roles for which they are best suited, which includes
scaling to meet needs and for getting particular expertise that
is readily not available in the Government workforce.
That will, I think for the foreseeable future, remain my
No. 1 priority, because I believe if we can do that
effectively, everything else will come with it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like you to make yourself
available for briefing for Members who may be interested and
myself--I happen to be interested--on the progress of that
effort and how you are approaching it, particularly since it
relates to utilizing or non-utilizing of contractors. So if you
could make note of that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Reitinger. I would be happy to, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On the RMA, you heard my comments earlier.
They have been meeting with our staff. We know that they have
an ambitious agenda, ranging from a national risk assessment to
the informing of budget cycles to a heavy presence working with
the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
So how, then, is approximately $9 million enough for fiscal
year 2010 for this particular subset? Staff was told last week
that 19 of the 26 FTEs are filled; that means that you have
seven that are not. How quickly can you get to full capacity,
given the major hiring that you are trying to do within NPPD?
Mr. Reitinger. Well, ma'am, I believe that the budget
request is reflective of what we believe we need to start to
drive success with RMA; and, in particular, to have it lead the
risk management study group within the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review.
I think, going forward, this and other areas will get
additional knowledge about the scope of requirements and could
come back to the committee or find the resources within DHS and
reallocate personnel, if necessary, to accomplish the mission.
In terms of hiring, I believe that the number that you
stated refers to--my recollection is we have 13 Government
personnel on-board in FTE, with six offers outstanding, and 10
contractor personnel on-board. That is my current
understanding. So we will be to be the number you said very
soon. We are focusing just as much on RMA hiring as we are on
hiring for other components. So we will bring on the additional
FTEs as rapidly as possible to make sure that we can
effectively execute the mission.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me suggest that I appreciate the
answer that you had to give. This should be an on-going review
by those of us who are concerned that any cuts in the budget,
when we are trying to build and ensure that the Department does
have the staff, is of concern to us.
It follows that my next question about the $11 million cut
from IP's national infrastructure protection program efforts,
we are curious as to the rationale behind those cuts,
particularly since we know the private sector are not regulated
for security purposes. Many do not have the financial resources
in this economic climate.
So I would appreciate it if you would explain whether other
departments and agencies which partner with DHS under the NIPP
will be providing resources to counter and to complement the
losses of $11 million and to further security efforts under the
NIPP and fiscal year 2010.
I think one of our biggest Achilles heels are the private
sector, although they are aware of the responsibilities of
securing their facilities, the question is, do we have it at a
level that suggests that they are doing everything they can do?
We are now cutting in this area.
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, ma'am. Let me answer that in several
different ways, if I could. I will try to be as brief as
possible.
First, it is not our intention to not do anything we were
going to do with the cut of $11 million. We might simply have
to push out particular products that we were designed from
fiscal year 2010 to perhaps fiscal year 2011.
We are also going to have to rely on a more, as your
question indicates, a more distributed model for resourcing the
partnership. That seems, to me, appropriate because it is, in
fact, a distributed process involving not just the Department
of Homeland Security but multiple Federal agencies and
literally thousands upon thousands of private-sector entities.
We are going to need to rely more on them to help drive the
NIPP partnership. I will be working personally and avidly to
make sure other Federal agencies do their part in that process.
In addition, with regard to the private sector, as your
question points out, it is a more difficult time for the
private sector to devote things such as working to partnership
with the Department of Homeland Security.
That said, I spent the last 6 years in the private sector,
and I can personally testify to the fact that large portions of
the private sector are deeply committed to the security of the
United States and I believe, with the right partnership, with
the right opportunities, are willing to go to even greater
lengths to work with U.S. Government, and DHS in particular, to
more effectively secure the homeland.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman.
With that, I will end my questioning and yield to Mr.
Lungren. I will reserve my questions for you, Ms. Rossides.
Thank you.
Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Reitinger, in the President's budget I think there is
$19 million for the implementation or enforcement of the
chemical security regulations. Can you give us an update on
where we are in terms of the implementation of the chemical
security regs?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, sir. The most recent action--as I am
sure you know, the original notice of rulemaking was published
back in 2008, and initial tiering determinations were made.
This is also reflected in my testimony.
Most recently, back in May, the tiering of the entities
regulated under CFATS, the initial letters went out to those
regulated under tier 1, the highest level. So, those have been
notified of their need to develop a site security plan. So that
effort is on-going. Further communications to the lower tiers
will take place over the remainder of the year.
Mr. Lungren. The authority to regulate the chemical
security expires in October of this year because of how we had
to fashion legislation in the past. How long does the
Department need to complete and review all the vulnerability
assessments, the site security plans and site visits to the
covered facilities?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, sir, we believe that will be an on-
going activity and would support reauthorization of CFATS. That
is the reason that we ask for, in the budget request, the 1-
year reauthorization, so we could discuss with Congress a
permanent reauthorization of the CFATS regulatory regime.
Mr. Lungren. I want to stress that, because, you know,
there is a lot of talk here on the Hill that we didn't do
enough or we have to change it and so forth. You got the
industry to buy into it. You had a cooperative effort with the
industry to come up with regulations that, it appears to me,
can actually work. I am worried about us starting the whole
process again, not that we can't improve the process, but
starting it again and losing all the good work that we had in
the past.
Do you share that concern?
Mr. Reitinger. I certainly would not like to start again
from scratch. We have made a lot of headway. We have done some
extensive hiring. We are bringing the right expertise on board
to be able to execute the regime. Zeroing out that program and
restarting would be costly and inefficient.
Mr. Lungren. The budget request has $19 million in there to
complete the ammonium nitrate regulations that were mandated
some years ago. Can you give us the status of the regulations,
when you expect those will be completed?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, sir, I can. The advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking came out last year, and comments were
received. Based on those comments, which came in through
December of last year, a task force was established by DHS in
January of this year.
That body has been reviewing the comments, contacting
internal and external stakeholders, and is working on
developing an actual notice of proposed rulemaking that should
be released some time in the fall, after review by OMB. The
ultimate effective date of such a regulation will depend on a
number of factors after that.
Mr. Lungren. Sure, I understand that. But I hope that you
understand that we, in the Congress, are very concerned about
the ammonium nitrate. It does appear to be a substance that is
a favored substance used by terrorists. This Congress was
concerned, with some sense of urgency, that do have
regulations, so I hope that they will be completed sooner
rather than later.
The committee will be considering chemical facilities
security legislation next week. We have the issue of inherently
safer technology, or IST. There is some issue--again, this goes
back to the question about whether we start almost from scratch
or revamping it again. Can you give us your thoughts on IST and
its reasonable application to regulations?
Mr. Reitinger. Of course, sir. I will be brief on this
subject, because, as you indicate, sir, there is a hearing next
week specifically on the topic.
There is nothing in the current regime that prohibits a
covered entity from implementing the use of inherently safer
technologies to tier down or to comply with the existing
regime. So the existing regime has the flexibility to allow
regulated entities to use those sorts of technologies. It does
not, however, mandate them.
I, and NPPD generally, would be happy to work with the
committee going forward to make sure that any permanent
reauthorization of CFATS or other statutory amendments most
effectively allow meeting critical national needs around
protecting chemical facilities and, at the same time, preserve
the greatest degree of flexibility around risk-based
performance so that covered entities can comply most
effectively with the Federal requirements.
Mr. Lungren. I thank you. I appreciate that response.
I will return any time I might have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you.
Before I just may be able to yield a minute or 2 to the
next speaker, looking at the clock, Mr. Reitinger, I just want
to make mention of the fact that our chemical legislation we
have been working on for a very long time, so it would not be
starting from scratch.
If we got momentum and saw this thing really formulating,
would you welcome it getting done within the year?
Mr. Reitinger. I would welcome a reauthorization, a
permanent reauthorization, as rapidly as possible of the CFATS
regime, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Himes, we have you for a moment.
Mr. Himes. One minute, one question, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Reitinger, I am interested in the topic of
cybersecurity, in particular. I have listened to people at DOD
and elsewhere who are concerned with this issue make statements
indicating they understand the threat. In all candor, it also
seems like people are just now beginning to really think how to
address that threat.
So my question is, looking at your budget request and also
aware of the fact that the White House has developed this
concept of naming a cyber coordinator, can you address how you
are thinking about this, how you are coordinating this in an
integrated fashion with DOD and other interested agencies and
departments, and how you might relate to the White House cyber
coordinator, and how your budget proposal reflects that
possible integration?
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, sir, I can. We have a very strong
interagency coordination process under the White House through
interagency policy committees. They meet regularly to make sure
that all of the agencies are moving forward jointly to address
the issue.
In that vein, I would greatly welcome the appointment of a
cyber coordinator in the White House, because it is my opinion,
as the President indicated as the outcome of the 60-day review,
that this is an issue of such national importance that we need
White House leadership. We need White House leadership to
continue to bring all of the agencies together as effectively
as possible.
I pledge to you and the committee that DHS will be a part
of that and will work effectively, not only with the White
House but with all of our agency partners from DOD, through the
Department of Commerce, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and many others, to make sure we are effectively addressing the
issues.
I believe our budget proposal reflects the increasing
seriousness of the issue. As the Chairwoman noted, we are
devoting substantial additional dollars to help do our part in
DHS to help provide for cybersecurity both within the Federal
Government and in the private sector.
Mr. Himes. Thank you.
I yield.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Lujan is next.
Mr. Massa, did you have a question? Because you would have
to ask Mr. Lujan to yield.
Mr. Massa. No, Madam Chairwoman. I will wait until we go
around our first round.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Thank you.
I think he is ending his time. Mr. Lujan, did you have a
second of any comment?
Mr. Lujan. Well, Madam Chair, maybe not necessarily
anything that the Under Secretary would have to respond to. I
could probably make my point as the Under Secretary is packing
up, so best to utilize his time. I know he has an important
speaking engagement.
But, you know, the issue that we would have to visit about
our report as well. But I would yield back to the Chairwoman
and allow him to maybe be excused, and I could make my point as
he is packing up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I am yielding to you, Mr. Lujan. You
are ready to make your point.
Mr. Lujan. Okay. With that, Madam Chairwoman, thank you
very much.
The one thing, to carry on what Mr. Himes was discussing
pertaining to cybersecurity, is again that we have an
invaluable asset in some of our NNSA laboratories, both
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National
Laboratories, of which they already process real-world
experience, technology, Government, and private-sector
interface to be able to be an immediate asset to these efforts
and to this program.
I would hope that, as we look at DHS in conjunction with
what the President's efforts are in this area, that we look to
the NNSA laboratories for their expertise and to fully utilize
their experience with the data sets that have been compiled, as
well as other security measures that can be taken.
I yield back, Madam Chair. My other questions I can reserve
until later on. Thank you.
Mr. Reitinger. Let me again offer my apologies that I need
to leave and my thanks to the committee for understanding that
I had a prior commitment and my commitment to come back and
meet with you and/or staff at your convenience to address any
additional questions that you have.
I would, in response to the last Member's point, say that I
agree completely that this is a national problem and we need to
bring all national capabilities to bear to address it. So I
look forward to working with the committee and all elements of
the Government to make that happen as effectively as possible.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We are understanding of that. As you are
putting your papers together, I don't want to--Mr. Cleaver, did
you have a point you wanted to get on the record as he is
packing up?
Let me suggest to the Members what I said earlier, that any
additional questions we will provide in writing. Mr. Reitinger,
you indicated that you would be willing or accepting the fact
of sitting down with staff after this particular meeting to go
over any additional points.
Mr. Reitinger. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
We are somewhat out of order here, but let me find out, Mr.
Lujan, did you finish?
Mr. Lujan. Madam Chairwoman, I would yield back so we can
go to the second round of questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. So then I am going to go to Mr.
Cleaver. The witness that you have before you is the acting
administrator for TSA.
Mr. Cleaver. I am concerned about--and I apologize if this
issue has already surfaced. But the TSA has this mandate by
2010 to do 100 percent screening. Based on what happened with
this existing budget, I am wondering if it is still realistic
to have a 100 percent screening by 2010 if we are going to
begin to cut back in the current budget?
Ms. Rossides. You are speaking about the air cargo budget?
Mr. Cleaver. Yes.
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir. First of all, let me explain the
reduction, which is a reduction of $18 million that was in the
2009 budget that was for pilots of utilizing technology. Those
dollars went out to various partners that were testing the
technology. So, in essence, that was a one-time investment that
was made in 2009. So, in essence, the budget is a flat budget,
you know, the same investment in terms of the program dollars
from 2009 to 2010.
With respect to the screening and the mandate for the 100
percent screening for both domestic and international by August
2010, we are absolutely certain that, on the domestic side, we
will meet that mandate.
We do believe that it is going to be a significant
challenge to meet the international mandate by August 2010.
Because, in essence, you have 98 countries that are importing
to the United States via air cargo, and it is going to be a
challenge to get all of those in compliance by the August 2010
deadline.
Honestly, sir, that is not necessarily a function of the
dollars that TSA has, but it is the limitations we have with
some of those foreign governments in getting them to comply
with that mandate.
Mr. Cleaver. So you do believe that, with the existing
revenue funding stream, that domestically, at least, you will
be able to meet the deadline?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cleaver. Now, then what needs to be--there is nothing
that needs to be done congressionally to deal with the
international?
Ms. Rossides. No, sir. What we are doing is we are visiting
these countries, we are giving them our standards. We are
assisting them with teams of TSA experts that are going there
and assisting them to try to get their supply chains to meet
the U.S. standards.
It is not that we are not going to get quite far towards
that 100 percent; we are estimating today that we will get
about 80 to 85 percent of the way. But there will be some
countries where it is going to be difficult to get to that
August 2010 date.
Mr. Cleaver. Where are we now? What percentage----
Ms. Rossides. We are over 50 percent, both domestically and
internationally, as of today.
Mr. Cleaver. You have no reservations whatsoever----
Ms. Rossides. For the domestic side, yes, sir.
Mr. Cleaver. But your projection is perhaps under 90
percent.
Ms. Rossides. For the international, that is right.
Mr. Cleaver. Madam Chairwoman, one other question that is
related to this, because I am concerned that when the budget
shows a reduction--and I am not sure how it can be addressed--
but when the budget shows a reduction like this--and I don't
want you to make up stuff and pad it--you wouldn't do it
anyway. But, you know, it does create some concern, and I am
not sure how to address it.
Are you familiar with H.R. 2200?
Ms. Rossides. Uh-huh.
Mr. Cleaver. Was the congressional action taken in that
legislation helpful in addressing this issue?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir, in a way, it does----
Mr. Cleaver. Internationally.
Ms. Rossides. It extends the time frame, but that
legislation actually does not change the mandate that we have
under the 9/11 Act, which is for the August 2010 deadline. That
legislation is still in effect, and that is the target date we
are working towards. That is the date we are working towards
with our international partners, the August 2010 date.
Mr. Cleaver. All right.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman from Missouri.
That last point that you made, could you restate it and
clarify it for me, please?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, ma'am. It is my understanding that,
although the provision to provide for the 2 years from the date
of the enactment of the TSA reauthorization bill recognizes--
this is what the counsel is advising me--that the mandate under
the 9/11 Act to meet the August 2010 date doesn't change. Now,
I may be incorrect on that, but that is my understanding, that
we still have an August 2010 mandate under the 9/11 Act.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is for domestic?
Ms. Rossides. I believe it is both domestic and
international.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will pursue that further.
Let me recognize Mr. Massa for 5 minutes.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you, Secretary, for being here today. I would like to
return to one topic with a follow-on question.
You very adroitly answered a question about whole-body
imaging. Paraphrasing what you said, I believe the word was
``critical'' for the security of the agency to fulfill its
mission.
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir.
Mr. Massa. Am I understanding your opinion of that process
correctly?
Ms. Rossides. Yes.
Mr. Massa. You also stated that passengers in all cases
would participate voluntarily.
Ms. Rossides. Right.
Mr. Massa. Can you help me understand how a voluntary
program could therefore be critical to the security of the on-
going operations, since there is no way to screen or determine
who is going to be participating since they self-select?
Ms. Rossides. No, sir, the way the system is designed is
the passenger would be given the option to go through the
whole-body imaging technology. If they pass through that
technology, then that technology is so superb at detecting
anything on the body that it will not require us do an officer
do a pat-down.
Mr. Massa. No, I understand that. Although I would never
want to inflict anyone on my participation in this program, my
point here is, you may the statement that the deployment of
this technology is critical to the overall improvements in the
security of TSA.
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir.
Mr. Massa. But you also outlined and have now confirmed
that participation by passengers is voluntary. That, to me, is
a fundamental disconnect in logic.
If I say that we have to do that to this group to increase
security and then I say to this group it is voluntary to
participate and no one opts in, how could that technology
thereby be considered to be crucial to the increase in security
of the group?
Ms. Rossides. Well, sir, it is because the majority of the
passengers are opting in, No. 1. No. 2, in order to do what we
have to do every day, we have to be able to deploy as many
tools as possible to help us in the screening process.
Mr. Massa. Is it a question of speed?
Ms. Rossides. It is a very effective process to screen
people very quickly. It is much quicker to go through the
whole-body imaging than it is to do a pat-down. So one is a
passenger throughput, but the primary goal is the ability to
detect without ever having to touch the passenger.
Mr. Massa. So a second point I would like to ask, if you
could just give me a few moments on this, it is my understand--
and I apologize that I arrived late; it may have been addressed
before my arrival--that we are preparing to fulfill a
requirement to increase security in corporate aviation.
That brings the presence of air marshals, the screening of
passengers, and the handling of corporate, in fact all private
aircraft over a certain weight limit, to the standards that we
have come to be familiar with as the general public, myself
included, flies.
Is that program continuing, as had been previously briefed?
Ms. Rossides. It is subject to continuous discussions
currently with the stakeholders. We are going to go out with a
second round of proposed comments and a second round of a
notice of proposed rulemaking. The goal is to listen to and
address the concerns that the stakeholders have, but also to
close the gap in what we see as some security vulnerabilities
with the general aviation population.
Mr. Massa. Is part of that enhanced security in corporate
aviation entailed in the embarkation of air marshals on those
aircraft?
Ms. Rossides. It is one of the elements. Whether that
ultimately ends up in the final decision, you know, that is to
be determined. But it was one of the elements, to know, to have
a law enforcement security official on board.
Mr. Massa. So one of the concerns I have with this
potential mandate is, where will these people come from? It is
my understanding--and I apologize, I am just a country guy from
upstate New York--but it is my understanding, from the reading
of the information I have been given, that we kind of are
looking for people anywhere and we are facing some shortages in
that particular endeavor.
Where will we find all the additional officers necessary to
fulfill this requirement in general and corporate aviation?
Ms. Rossides. I believe that the proposal would allow those
corporations to employ their own, and then we would train them
or offer training to a certain standard.
Mr. Massa. Well, I would offer an observation that if a
company is buying and training their own, we have kind of lost
control of that particular aspect of the security operation.
So it is my opinion, as a pilot, I am very dubious of the
enhanced security that this particular mandate, in all of its
factions, will bring. I am concerned about its cost-benefit
analysis and detracting from other areas that are a much more
significant potential threat.
I am open to participate and offer any insight, as a guy
with an awful lot of hours behind the stick, as to what this is
going to mean to general and corporate aviation and to the
traveling corporate world. This is an incredibly important tool
to them. I don't want to put any more burdens on business when
we don't have to.
Ms. Rossides. We would be happy to sit down and talk to you
and actually brief you on the comments as we go through the
period of working with the associations.
Mr. Massa. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me query my colleague, because he does
have a lot of information.
Before I do that, Ms. Rossides, let me suggest to you that
we are going to look at the jurisdictional question of 9/11
versus H.R. 2200. I would offer that clarification.
Before Mr. Massa leaves, I wanted to query Mr. Massa before
I move us to our next round.
Because of your experience behind the stick, could you just
articulate for the committee the point that you are making?
Were you suggesting the impact on general aviation?
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So our witness can hear it, as well, maybe
in a clearer manner.
Mr. Massa. Certainly. So my concerns about this particular
proposed enhancement of security on aircraft--and I think it is
over 18,500 pounds; I may be off on that number, but it is
almost everything that flies--has to do with not only its
impact on general aviation, which I believe, if fully
implemented, will basically terminate general aviation, but
also on the ability to use corporate aircraft as an extensive
business tool.
I fully understand that a three-engine Intercontinental jet
or a Gulfstream 5 or any of the larger corporate jets
potentially represents an aviation threat as per the nightmares
that we have lived through in the last decade. But every
individual on a corporate flight is self-identifying and self-
selecting. That airplane will never get off the ground unless
everybody on the airplane knows everybody else on the airplane.
That is the fundamental difference between corporate aviation
and the general traveling public.
Likewise, in light general aircraft it is much the same. If
the airplane is small enough, you can't put the security
measures inside of a Cessna 150 or a Cessna whatever.
So I am very, very concerned about the impact on this
industry. It represents a significant sector of our economy. We
have, you know, whole cities, literally, for whom the
construction of light and corporate aircraft is a key element.
I do not presuppose or recommend that the current briefings
I have received get enacted into law. This is going to be very,
very, very problematic. Again, I am speaking to this as a guy
who has done a lot of flying.
So I offer those viewpoints, and I stand ready to help in
any way possible. Although I will counsel there are a lot of
people on this that are a lot smarter than I am. But I know the
questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I wanted you to restate your concerns on
the record and just to say to you that, on that particular
question, we are going to have a general aviation hearing so
that we can respond to being helpful to TSA. TSA's regulations
have been, if you will, somewhat challenging. I happen to err
on the side of wanting more security, but I also want to be
balanced and responsible.
So I wanted you to be able to articulate that on the record
again. Also indicate to you, Mr. Massa, that we will be having
a hearing on this question overall of general aviation
security.
I would just ask the agency to be prepared, because we will
be asking you to respond to your framework for security in that
instance. I thank you.
We are going to start a second round that I am going to
start with and then yield to you, Mr. Dent. I am going to focus
my questions on cargo and a number of other issues.
I would appreciate, Madam Administrator, if you would
explain to us the reduction in light of the upcoming August
2010 100 percent cargo screening deadline for cargo on
passenger aircraft. The reduction I am talking about, the
fiscal year 2010 request for air cargo security programs is
less than the enacted fiscal year 2009.
Can you describe how the budget is changing with respect to
the number of inspectors, as well as the resources being
allocated to certify shippers' screening facilities?
I have visited a number of our airports; I think I relayed
that to you. One of the issue was the certification of the
shippers' screening facilities, which can be helpful in moving
cargo.
Would you provide us with your understanding of that?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, ma'am. The enacted 2009 cargo budget was
for $123 million, and the request for 2010 is $108 million, and
that difference, which is actually $15 million, represents a
reduction from 2009 to 2010 for a one-time investment in
technology to be deployed in pilot locations with these cargo
facilities to test in the cargo environment the technology.
With respect to the number of inspectors, the program level
from 2009 to 2010, it remains the same. In fact there is a
small increase for the cost of living for the payroll for the
employees in the program area.
The work that we are doing in the air cargo program is a
very strong partnership with the external business cargo
facilities, those who are becoming certified shippers, and that
is on-going and we are actually making very, very good
progress, particularly here in the United States, with
certifying those facilities and those certified shippers so
that we are quite confident that we will get to the 100 percent
by August 2010 here in the United States.
With respect to the international partners, we are doing a
lot of work internationally, visiting those countries, really
training them, educating them about the process that the United
States Government has put in place here, and gaining compliance
that way with our international partners.
So from a budget standpoint from 2009 to 2010, that
reduction was a one-time technology investment that does not
impact the strength of the program from 2009 to 2010.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That seems to be a limited window. You are
suggesting that the work that you do between 2009 and 2010 is
not going to be diminished. What about perspective planning,
needing more staff to prepare for after 2010? How does this
budget relate to those issues?
Ms. Rossides. The projection is once we gain compliance
with the mandate by 2010. Then those resources will be in an
audit role. They will go out and they will visit, and we will
have a series of ways of looking across the system, looking at
compliance and then selecting for audit those locations where
we believe we may have a concern. But the program will shift
from educating to gain compliance and certification to an audit
process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what you are saying is you have enough
personnel to certify, and you use a formula to audit and to
check to see whether or not they are functioning properly?
Ms. Rossides. That is correct, after they have been
certified.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me put a hold on that point and just
raise the issue of whether or not I am comfortable with
security being done by audit. So I know some information has to
be gained that way as well. Why are there no new FTEs or
funding increases for the purpose of building and expanding the
expertise and workforce for surface transportation programs? I
hope you and the staff will review extensively H.R. 2200
because it does have a lot of positive aspects for surface
transportation security.
Ms. Rossides. First of all, let me say that we do
appreciate the fact that with the TSA reauthorization bill,
there is direction to TSA to focus on surface modes of
transportation.
With respect to our budget in 2010, it is for $128 million.
That actually represents an increase of about $65 million over
our enacted 2009 level. Most of that is going towards our VIPR
teams, which are--this will create 15 permanent VIPR teams that
will be deployed in the surface modes of transportation. In
addition, that supports 225 surface inspectors who work across
the system in the surface areas doing the inspection work and
working with those industries in terms of meeting certain
security standards that we put out across the system.
Also, our surface program includes canines, which currently
we have 86 teams which cover 15 different mass transit
locations and ferries as well on a random basis.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just pursue the VIPR teams, which
have their fans and nonfans. When you say deploy 250, are you
talking about over various surface transportation systems?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, ma'am. Working with our State and local
partners, we would go into various modes of transportation. For
example, we would work in the rails with Amtrak, we would work
in mass transit in some of the major cities, working with them
to put these VIPR teams, which we have found to be an excellent
deterrence. The success of these, for example, in the last
couple of years we have probably executed about a thousand VIPR
team deployments, and about 45 percent of those have been in
the surface areas. It is very much a partnership with the local
mass transit police departments, local mass transit
authorities, and we have done work in collaboration with the
Coast Guard with the ferries in the Pacific Northwest.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We have the funding to deploy them and
have them remain in place for a period of time?
Ms. Rossides. They would be strategically situated around
the country to work in an area in the mass transit in those
areas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Targeted or to remain on-going?
Ms. Rossides. It would be an on-going process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So they would be assigned to a specific
area when we have funding to keep them on duty?
Ms. Rossides. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just for my own edification, are there
various oversight in terms of back at headquarters on issues
dealing with civil liberties and civil rights in terms of how
these teams will be acting?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, ma'am. They all have a supervisor on the
site with them, and they have been through the training. Our
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties does monitor their
activities, and any instances of concern are immediately
investigated.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Last year working with Assistant Secretary Hawley, we
discussed checkpoint evolution as TSA's new way of modernizing
checkpoints across airports. This initiative was started at the
end of the previous administration. Outside of BWI, it does not
appear that many of the elements have been implemented in other
airports. What is the status of Checkpoint Evolution?
Ms. Rossides. Well, I am very happy to say that as of end
of April, we have completely trained all 50,000 frontline
officers in the training which we called ``Engage and Coach,''
which was a combination of providing them enhanced IED
detection capabilities.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you are saying it is across all
airports?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, ma'am. We have trained the entire
workforce by the end of April.
The other part of the evolution strategy is to continue to
focus on the training of our supervisors, which we are in the
process of doing now. Then the third element really is the
technology, which is the major investments in technology that
we are making to bring the entire system at the checkpoint up
in terms of our advance technology X-ray and continuing to
improve the in-line baggage systems.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What methods are you using to measure to
check to see whether or not the Checkpoint Evolution is
working? What are your benchmark standards?
Ms. Rossides. The benchmarks and standards include, we have
a pilot program on-going where we are asking the traveling
public for feedback as soon as they have passed through the
checkpoint. We have piloted that at BWI.
We also are developing surveys in conjunction with several
of the carriers to ask about passenger experience that they
have had.
When we have deployed any of the new technology in, for
example, the WBI in the pilot modes, we do surveys right there
with passengers to ask them for their feedback, and we are
developing a series of pulse surveys that we will provide to
the workforce that continues to focus on their ability, their
quality of work life issues within TSA, all of which goes
towards their ability to better do the job.
Ms. Jackson Lee. These are good benchmarks. Do you have
someone reviewing this and making assessment?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, ma'am. The senior leadership team of
TSA, and particularly our managers in our security operations,
look at these measures and they drill them down to every
airport in the country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me yield now. Thank you very much. Let
me yield now to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
The Inner City Bus Security Grant Program has provided
grant programs to private over-the-road buses for the past 5
years. The President's fiscal year 2010 budget request,
however, proposes the elimination of this grant program. Can
you tell us why the Inner City Bus Security Grant Program is
being eliminated in this year's budget?
Ms. Rossides. Sir, the proposal was to shift the focus from
the grants funding per se to the work with what we call an
ISAAC, which is an interagency advisory committee. In the
course of looking at the entire grants process this year, those
were not funded for 2010.
Mr. Dent. Also, section 1604, the implementing
recommendations act of the 9/11 Commission Act required that
airports that have incurred eligible costs associated with the
development of partial or completed in-line baggage systems
before enactment of the implementing recommendations act of the
9/11 Commission Act be included in the TSA prioritization
schedule for airport security improvements projects. The
President's budget request includes a significant funding
increase of $565 million from the 2009 level for in-line
explosive detection systems, procurement, and installation.
Can you tell us how much of that funding will go towards
the reimbursement of airports for in-line systems that airports
themselves installed and paid for?
Ms. Rossides. No, sir, at this point I can't give you an
exact figure on that. I will tell you that we do, through a
rather extensive process, have the airports apply, but I can
predict the breakdown of that right now.
Mr. Dent. The final rule for the Secure Flight was
announced in October of last year. Can you give us an update on
the Secure Flight implementation?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir. The Secure Flight Program began to
actually what we call cutover air carriers at the very end of
January. As part of the building of this program and the work
to bring it on-line, we have done an extraordinary amount of
work with the Government Accountability Office, which has been
a terrific partner in getting us to a program level that is
really quite exceptional. We have met all 10 conditions that
the GAO set before we launched the program.
As of today, we have four or five carriers that are now
providing their passengers' names, and TSA is screening them
under the Secure Flight Program, and we are working with all of
the domestic carriers to provide the dates for when they will
begin cutover. The goal is to have all domestic carriers cut
over and operating fully under Secure Flight by March 2010. We
are working with them now on those schedules for the cutover.
The ultimate goal is the international carriers will be all
covered under Secure Flight by the end of 2010.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Lujan for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
One of the questions I have in and around, and I guess most
of my questions center around, in and around surface
transportation, with how we are able to fully screen vehicles,
trucks. We go back to 1995 with the Oklahoma City bombing, how
we are screening vehicles and the importance of looking at
container vehicles and those vehicles delivering packages to
homes and business, and what we truly can do to ensure we are
providing adequate screening for these vehicles.
How is the Department ensuring that these vehicles, there
is adequate support for surface transportation going forward?
Ms. Rossides. Part of the dynamic is what is the TSA role
versus the State and local role with respect to surface
transportation, the truckers, and we do this through a series
of assessments. We have a model where we are assessing each of
the industries in terms of their abilities to provide training
to their workers. We do have programs in place where we vet the
drivers and we also have an extensive work through our grants
administration which goes to surface in general, particularly
with respect to rail. It is a matter of our providing them
certain standards to meet rather than we are in there actually
inspecting.
Mr. Lujan. I talk about our laboratories quite a bit. I
think they are an immense resource. But there are laboratories
that are developing technology for quick screening but it is
very effective screening that I hope we look to employ. One of
the concerns that I have is a few of the programs that are
related to surface transportation. One is the First Observer
Program, which appears to be getting reduced, although there is
the Highway Information Sharing Analysis Center, which is
getting an increase, but it is part of the First Observer
Program which appears to be getting cut. I would like to know
how that is going to truly work or provide support from a
surface perspective.
Then related to the efforts with utilizing some of the VIPR
teams, one of the concerns that I have, and I will quote from
some information here, that the surface transportation security
and efforts to analyze functions established in the 9/11 Act,
it is troubling that the additional funds and personnel are not
targeted to any of the most urgent needs or gaps in TSA's
execution of its surface transportation security mission, such
as the Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, the
Transit Security Grant Program, and building up surface
transportation security personnel and expertise.
Although we are seeing more support with surface
transportation or with the VIPR programs, the resources don't
appear to be going toward the surface transportation security
inspectors, and I may have that unclear and if I need to clear
that up, please let me know. But when we are utilizing these
programs to assist or offer the initial support with transit or
with surface, why is it that the training that is taking place
is maybe those who have more expertise with air as opposed to
those on surface, where in fact that program is to be managed a
bit by the entity with the air marshals?
Ms. Rossides. If I understand your question, on the surface
side what we do is we help design training, we help put
standards out. We work with whatever the mode is, whether it is
rail, mass transit, highways, to provide training conferences.
But a lot of that is done as part of creating a baseline of a
standard for that particular industry.
The VIPR program is utilizing TSA resources, TSA personnel,
to assist, to complement, to help provide as a deterrence in
those surface areas.
I don't know if I have answered your question. We can go
back and I can give you a total picture of what we are doing in
the highway area with the ISAAC and how that is viewed as one
of the strong partnerships between TSA and the Federal sector,
is the work that we are doing with the highway and the motor
carriers. But I am not sure that I am being responsive to your
question and that I am answering your question.
Mr. Lujan. Madam Chairwoman, I will submit the question in
writing.
Can you include where are the most urgent needs or gaps in
TSA's execution of its surface transportation security mission
exists to the committee? I think that will assist us in
providing the needed resources and they are being targeted to
areas where we are making sure that we are keeping our surface
areas the safest.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. We would be happy to have the
gentleman meet with representatives from TSA going forward, or
the gentleman can engage the committee staff and we can be sure
that his questions receive an answer in writing. That may be
helpful to the gentleman.
I am delighted now to recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Registered Traveler, Congress likes the idea. Congress says
they like the idea. Congress repeats they like the idea.
Congress puts it in legislation; and TSA says, What? What does
it take for Congress to convince TSA and whatever
administration it is that we are serious about Registered
Traveler?
Ms. Rossides. Well, sir, I think we know that you are
serious about it, and I think one of the things that we are
looking at is how do we create the kind of process that is
first focused on security; second, enables us to ensure that we
don't have what we are concerned about with respect to clean
skins?
Second, one of the things that the Secretary now is looking
at is Registered Traveler-like programs across the whole
Department, and how do we maybe bring some alignment with those
and how do we employ those in a risk management way?
One of the areas that will make all of our jobs easier at
some point down the road, and hopefully in the not-too-distant
future, is the use of biotechnology and biometric cards and
things like that so we have a confidence in who is presenting
that you don't have a fraudulent form of identification and
that you create a program where you are maximizing the security
benefits as well as the customer service benefits.
We don't have the program today, and I will tell you that
the Secretary is committed to looking at this as well as other
RT-like programs across the Department.
Mr. Lungren. What I can't understand is we use now, we use
the license you get from a State. Some States do a better job
than others in making sure that the person who gets it is the
person who says he or she is. I have always thought that part
of the equation of risk is threat consequence--threat
vulnerability and consequence, and the only way you know the
threat is by gathering information or intelligence. The whole
idea of registered travelers is people expose themselves to
more information checking for you than the average person.
Presumably a one-time or twice-a-year person getting on the
airplane is not going to be as interested in it as a regular
traveler. So presumably you can do the vetting of these people
or have the company that does the Registered Traveler Program
do the vetting of these people on a regular basis and you would
have more information. I don't understand. Why does giving you
more information make it more likely that they are more of a
threat than less information? I can't get over that. I
understand you folks say we don't understand it, but I just
don't understand that. I mean, I presume if you have more
information upon which to check against somebody's bona fides,
that is better than not having the information, isn't it?
Ms. Rossides. It is. It is. As I said, the goal going
forward is to look for what kind of a protocol, what kind of a
security clearance, and what kind of a card could you have that
would benefit the interest of folks that are looking for an RT
versus our interest for screening.
I would say it is still an issue on the table and we just
haven't gotten the solution yet.
Mr. Lungren. I understand the Behavior Detention Program at
the checkpoints have been very effective?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Can you give us a status update on the
program? What do you think we will be doing in 2010 funding to
further improve the program?
Ms. Rossides. It is basically a flat budget for behavior
detection officers, and they are the folks that are trained to
observe passenger behavior and then refer to the officers at
the checkpoint if they see any anomalies in those behaviors.
We also have a slight increase of about 55 FTE for our bomb
appraisal officers. These are two complementary skill sets
around the checkpoint that help with detection. Both of these
programs have been terrific internal to TSA from a security
standpoint, but also they have given our officers a career path
to move from a transportation security officer up to a behavior
detection officer or a bomb appraisal officer.
Mr. Lungren. So from your standpoint and from your
administration's standpoint, you think these have been
successful programs?
Ms. Rossides. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. They have come through well under the testing
and we ought to integrate them as a regular part of our
program, correct?
Ms. Rossides. Absolutely.
Mr. Lungren. I don't think these programs are that well-
known here on the Hill, and I think we need to do a better job
of letting Members know exactly what this is and the basis upon
which you have made the evaluation so that you will have the
support for it that I think it deserves.
Ms. Rossides. I would be happy to brief the committee.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman very much, and I
want to thank Mr. Cleaver for his patience, and I yield the
gentleman 5 minutes for questioning.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you.
Let's go back and revisit the whole issue of cargo. I have
three quick questions. With H.R. 2200, TSA was given additional
time to move up to 100 percent of the cargo internationally.
Perhaps I should have asked this question a little better when
we had our earlier exchange because I am not sure whether you
said you still don't believe that we will get up to 100 percent
internationally after the additional time?
Ms. Rossides. At this point, the additional time would be
beneficial to have. I just can't say sitting here today what
countries will be the last to come into compliance and by what
date we will be able to get that date. If it is August 2010,
December 2010, that is part of the work with these
international partners that we are trying to do. I will check
and we will provide, I am happy to provide the committee a
specific schedule by country when we think we will have
compliance. But I can't answer the question right now.
Mr. Cleaver. It would be important for me to know that
because I remember when we had the onslaught of public
criticism, as I am sure you do, so this is an important issue
out in the world.
I am a former mayor, and we have all of our police
officers, when they stop individuals they always refer to them
as ``Mr.'' and ``Mrs.'' because people don't like to be stopped
so you have got to be as courteous as possible. I am familiar
with police departments, primarily in Missouri, but the chances
are that is the case around the Nation, for the same reasons.
That is not a part of the training for TSA officers?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, it is, sir. We put a lot of emphasis on
the courtesy, the professionalism, the respect that they should
pay passengers. We even go so far as to recommend specific
statements that they should be making when they are approaching
the passengers, when they are patting them down. We do focus on
the communication with passengers.
Mr. Cleaver. Yes, I flew out of an airport yesterday in
Springfield, Missouri, and Bentonville, Arkansas, have a joint
airport, and there was an older gentleman who was being
screened and the TSA office kept saying, ``Bob, just come over
here and sit down.'' I wanted to say something, but of course I
thought better of it and I think I was probably smart in not
saying anything. It just occurred to me that may not be a part
of the training, but you are saying it is?
Ms. Rossides. It is, sir. But there is always room for
improvement for a workforce of 52,000 people.
Mr. Cleaver. Yes, and that is exactly where I am going now
because there is an increase in the training budget this year.
Is there a certain area where you intend to go in terms of
improving training or creating training with the additional
money that is appropriated or will be appropriated?
Ms. Rossides. Yes. Our focus is on their ability to detect
small improvised explosive devices, and those training dollars
go principally to continue to train them in that area. However,
the training that I just described we finished to all 52,000
employees, actually a good deal of that was on how you engage
the passenger and how you communicate with them. One of the
things we are looking at as well is continuing to put out
training on that side of the equation because for the officer,
honestly, if they have a calm passenger and they get in the
proper kind of conversation with the passenger where they
remain calm as they are going through the screening process, we
actually get a higher level of screening as a result. So it is
very much a part of the training for both improvised explosive
device training as well as how they engage with the passengers,
how they communicate with the passengers.
Also, we put a tremendous amount of focus on dealing with
people with disabilities and training for persons in
wheelchairs and other disabilities because such a great
percentage of our traveling population either is persons with
disabilities or persons with artificial hips or persons with
pacemakers, and so that is also a part of the training.
Mr. Cleaver. I have a missing knee, my left knee, and so I
go through it twice a week. I am perfectly willing and happy to
do that, and I am glad that the training is moving in that area
because this gentleman that I spoke of earlier, he was
irritated and a little confused and then I became irritated and
confused, as were others around me. But I held back because if
you are a Member of Congress and you say something, you end up
on the front page of the newspaper, maybe even get the chair,
the electric chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Cleaver. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman has articulated a concern
that has been constant. My recollection, Mr. Cleaver, is that
we worked very hard to secure TSA officers or TSOs after 9/11.
It was a massive plus-up, a surge. I am grateful for the
wonderful Americans that rose to the cause. I think as we have
thanked them for their service, and there are probably a number
of individuals he might know in his own airport that he sees on
a regular basis and says thank you, but this training issue has
come up a number of times.
Professional development, I would like to call it. I would
like to work with the gentleman. In fact, we are going to be
writing freestanding legislation on this whole question of
professional development. I thought we had more of it in H.R.
2200, but we had so much to do.
Let us put this on your mind. What the gentleman has been
saying and what we have all been saying, one of the reasons we
went to behavioral assessment, and that information was given
to me by another TSO who was trying to be responsive, that
behavioral person didn't have all of the manners that I think
they should have. Security should not be conflicted with
manners.
I would just like to join the gentleman. He made a simple
point which is he could call this person mister, whoever the
TSA officer was, but that is in a line of circumstances that we
seem to find, and I am just going to put--I am used to putting
gorillas on the record. No Member is asking for special
privileges, it is not about us. But what I would say is what
the gentleman has indicated, if we were or a good citizen were
to offer a suggestion, think what the gentleman is saying, that
our suggestion would be taken out of context and there is no
question as to there is some doubt as to how it would be
received and whether or not there would be a supervisor there
that would welcome Congressman Cleaver's calm assessment of the
circumstance. That is all in training and that is all in
professional development, and at the same time balancing and
making sure that terrorists and the shoe bomber and some other
creative person doesn't get through.
When we first started this, Congressman Mayor, you were a
mayor and read about this. The baby formulas were maligned and
mothers who were breast feeding had issues. Then we had issues
with the hip, the artificial hip. We were just getting it
together.
So, Madam Administrator, as we move into this new
administration, as we plus up on the numbers of TSOs because we
need them, as we prepare to provide them, and this is not your
issue, but provide them opportunity for workforce rights that
they have been asking for, I think it is important for you to
note, and I will yield back to the gentleman, as someone who
has been involved either on this subcommittee for a number of
years since 9/11, this is an issue that we must confront. We
confront it all of the time in our law enforcement, but this is
a new team. It looks like on this new team we should be able to
make as much progress as we possibly can.
I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. You said much
more eloquently and clearly what I was hoping to convey.
Whenever we increase training dollars, it seems to me that is a
perfect opportunity to expand the teaching of courtesy.
I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your astuteness
and eloquence, Congressman.
Let me conclude by giving us an update on the Secure Flight
Program implementation. It looks like there is very little in
the budget requested for this program, and we would like to
have the assurance from TSA that you are budgeting
appropriately for this program since it is supposed to be
completed in fiscal year 2010?
Ms. Rossides. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. We are making
excellent progress on Secure Flight. The system is built and we
are in the process now of working with the carriers to begin
the transference of their system of vetting over to TSA. There
is a schedule in place. We are working very hard with the
carriers to keep that schedule so that the U.S. carriers have
been cut over and their passenger records are being vetted
under the Secure Flight Program by March of 2010, and again the
international carriers by the end of 2010.
We have had great success with those carriers, albeit they
are small carriers, and our capability to vet them under the
Secure Flight Program. There is a very strong management team
in place, and as I stated earlier, we have met all of the
conditions under the Government Accountability Office for this
program to be a very strong program. We will keep the committee
apprised of the progress we are making as we are bringing the
major carriers into the system.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate if you would keep us
informed. It is very important. I also ask, we have language in
H.R. 2200 on these foreign repair stations. This has been a
continuing issue for this committee. We want to see TSA take
our interests seriously and begin to look at the structure that
you need to put in place and the requirements that you need to
put in place.
There is no doubt that every time a catastrophic incident
happens in the air, or one that happens on the ground, such as
Mumbai, which was our latest, and we had Spain and some other
areas, that was surface transportation, but the recent
Brazilian Air France air crash, those of us on this committee's
immediate response is not to be hysterical but it is to think
of anything so catastrophic, disappearing, no evidence, at
least in the most recent hours, begin to think of all kinds of
unfortunate incidents. Those foreign repair stations are one of
the stopgaps to that kind of unfortunate circumstance possibly
occurring, as it was with the question of interline bags that
we addressed, tragically probably too late in the case of Pan
Am 103, which was preceding 9/11.
So what is the hold-up or the issue with the foreign repair
stations?
Ms. Rossides. Madam, the rule is within review still within
the administration, and we are working very diligently to get
it out so that it will be something that we can work on. We are
staying in very close touch with the FAA on it, and it is a
matter of getting it through the review process currently
within the administration.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to leave these points on the
record. Mr. Reitinger has gone and this is not in his absence,
but if you can convey to him, I think I made a point about
being apprised and kept in sync with what you are doing on
outreach. I know that TSA, the whole agency is looking to
provide, to ensure that they have the right kind of staffing.
Some people would say, as I mention this on the record, that I
am speaking the obvious because there is possibly new attitudes
here in Washington, and I respect that and I am excited about
it, but I hope that we are keeping in mind diversity, and that
includes region, that includes ethnicity, racial. Sometimes
that overlaps. That includes both, if you will, gender, that is
diverse, so we will look in far ranges of opportunities.
I hope that we will look at the Nation's colleges. The
class of 2009 is now ready to work. There are small and large
universities. I am always hearing from my constituents, they
didn't come to ABC, 2,500-student campus, I know you can't do
that, but with e-mail and outreach, I frankly believe some
notice should be at all of the campuses across America, at
least those that may have programs, and that includes
historically black colleges, Hispanic-serving colleges, and any
other college, community colleges, Ph.D., MIT, all those that
have a range of diversity.
I think the other point of it is that goes to the idea of
contracting. H.R. 2200 gives some impetus or push to science
and technology that has not been very responsive. There are all
sorts of small inventors and others with creative ideas that
need to be before you and need to be on your list if they are
adequate. That needs to be diverse as well. Talent is diverse.
Maybe we will have an opportunity for us to get back and show
some data that indicates that you have seen the light as you
move forward to building your team and obviously getting all of
the personnel that the Secretary needs at DHS.
Ms. Rossides. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I would love to
come back and brief you on specifically the initiatives TSA has
put in place on diversity. We have some superb programs with
colleges and programs where we are offering our officers
associate degrees. We have extensive intern programs now that
are in place, and I would love to be able to brief you or the
committee and your staff on those programs.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will be delighted, and you will get
your chance.
Ms. Rossides. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ensure that I have no further
questions. I think I have asked the question on Secure Flight.
I thank the witnesses for appearing before us today and the
Members for their question. The Members of the subcommittee may
have additional questions for the witnesses, and we ask that
you respond to them expeditiously in writing.
Hearing no further business, let me thank you very much for
your presentation. The subcommittee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee for Phillip R. Reitinger,
Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. There has been a lot of discussion about the permanence
of NPPD. As we all know, it is a disparate collection of entities that,
in some cases, do not appear to have a unifying focus beyond being
security programs. With that said, does this budget set the stage for a
reorganization of NPPD before or after the delivery of the Quadrennial
Homeland Security review next winter?
Answer. The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is
a diverse organization with a vital cross-cutting and unifying mission
of risk reduction. The Directorate works to reduce risks to the Nation
through five mission areas: Protect the Nation's citizens and visitors
against dangerous people, protect the Nation's critical infrastructure,
protect and strengthen the Nation's cyber and communications
infrastructure, strengthen the Department's risk management platform,
and strengthen partnerships to foster collaboration and
interoperability.
NPPD has just passed the 2-year anniversary of the establishment of
the organization and much has been accomplished during this time to
solidify NPPD as a permanent organization within the Department. While
building an organization that is best aligned to meet critical mission
needs is always under review, there are currently no plans to eliminate
or reorganize NPPD before the delivery of the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review (QHSR). The findings of the QHSR will be incorporated
during the fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budget cycles. It is premature at
this time to speculate whether the QHSR findings will impact the
organizational make-up of NPPD.
The fiscal year 2010 President's budget request included the
proposed transfer of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to NPPD from
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The proposed transfer aligns
the FPS mission of Federal facilities infrastructure protection within
the NPPD mission of critical infrastructure protection. Further, NPPD
chairs the operations of the Interagency Security Committee, a group
that includes the physical security leads for all major Federal
agencies and whose key responsibility is the establishment of
Government-wide security policies for Federal facilities. These
missions are complementary and mutually supportive, and the alignment
improves and advances the mission effectiveness of both FPS and NPPD.
Question 2. As you can imagine, the subcommittee is concerned with
the level of personnel NPPD employs. The subcommittee was happy to
learn from your testimony that NPPD has brought on-board 300 new
employees over the last 12 months, and currently has approximately 800
Federal employees on board out of the 1,064 fiscal year 2009 positions.
We were pleased to learn from your budget request that you intend to
bring on additional personnel. Please describe NPPD's efforts to employ
additional personnel and how this will affect current contracts at the
Department.
Answer. There are additional personnel coming on-board each pay
period. The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has 859
employees on-board as of July 6, 2009. There are an additional 184
selections in the pipeline, which are currently in the tentative job
offer, security, or final job offer phases of the hiring process.
Additional efforts to increase NPPD's staffing include:
1. Within the past 100 days NPPD has switched their contract for
hiring support from Booz Allen Hamilton to the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM). In addition to a cost savings,
OPM's processes have streamlined several of the hiring steps
and have provided NPPD with a more comprehensive tracking
system, which allows a more accurate identification and
determination of where delays are occurring in the hiring
process as well as the ability to quickly address the
underlying cause(s) for those delays.
2. The Deputy Under Secretary has implemented internal procedures
that ensure appropriate coordination and hiring decisions are
made within defined timelines.
3. An improved process has also been implemented to review requests
by candidates for recruitment incentives.
4. There have been a number of steps undertaken by the Office of
Security to streamline the clearance process. In addition to
those steps, NPPD has received approval to assign a Federal
employee full-time to coordinate the preliminary checks to
abbreviate the amount of time required for a completed security
package to get from the candidate to the security adjudicators.
5. Since there have been frequent delays in the amount of time
selectees take to complete their security paperwork and have
their fingerprints taken, tentative job offer letters now
require candidates to complete their security paperwork and
fingerprinting within a week of receiving the pre-appointment
letter. If the required documents have not been submitted with
a week of the offer letter the individual is called to
determine if they need any assistance in completing this
requirement and provided with 1 additional week if there is a
reasonable justification for their delay. At that time they are
also informed that if the paperwork is not completed within the
second week, the job offer will be rescinded and DHS will need
to go to the next candidate under consideration. Additional
extensions are only approved for extenuating circumstances.
6. The Director of Resource Administration is also working with the
components and the Human Capital Office to ensure that standard
or existing position descriptions (PDs) are being utilized to
fill current vacancies. The length of time required to draft,
review, and acquire approval for PDs prior to announcing a
position has been identified as a significant point of delay in
the hiring process.
Based upon on board strength, the current list of candidates within
the pipeline and the additional process changes undertaken, NPPD expect
to be able to reach a required staffing level of more than 1,000 for
fiscal year 2009, with selections made against another 10% of existing
vacancies.
In regard to `` . . . how this will affect current contracts at the
department''; as FTE positions are filled with Federal employees it
will reduce NPPD's reliance on contractors. As NPPD hires additional
Federal personnel we are validating if contractor support positions
need to be replaced. Once this determination is made NPPD will
coordinate with the Office of Procurement Operations to request
appropriate contractual action (i.e. reevaluating exercising contract
of options periods and/or de-scope the contract requirements, etc.)
Question 3a. As you know, the subcommittee has been quite concerned
about the progress and authority of the Office of Risk Management and
Analysis. As directed, RMA has been providing quarterly updates to
staff. From these updates, it appears that RMA has quite an ambitious
agenda, ranging from a national risk assessment to the informing of
budget cycles to a heavy presence in the development of the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review.
How, then, is approximately $9 million enough for fiscal year 2010?
Answer. The Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) has two
strategic objectives: (1) Establish an integrated approach to risk
management within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and (2)
conduct systematic, rigorous risk analysis methodologies to execute
assessments in support of Department-wide decision-making. To work
towards these objectives, RMA has planned and budgeted for the drafting
of an Integrated Risk Management Framework and development of
supporting materials and processes; execution of the Risk Assessment
Process for Informed Decision-making (RAPID) tool; and leading a study,
under the auspices of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, to
develop a process and identify the level of required resources to
produce a Homeland Security National Risk Assessment (HSNRA) which will
serve as a tool to provide strategic guidance and inform high-level
Departmental resource allocation in a meaningful way. Following the
HSNRA study, RMA will review the scope of requirements and with
guidance from Department leadership reevaluate the resources needed to
accomplish their mission.
Question 3b. Staff was told last week that 19 of 26 FTEs are
filled. How quickly can it be at full capacity, given the vast hiring
bureaucracy at NPPD?
Answer. RMA has 13 Government personnel on board and 11 on-site
contractors. In addition, 7 applicants have accepted FTE offers. Five
of the 7 accepted offers are Presidential Management Fellows. The
remaining vacancies within RMA are not due primarily to the perceived
limitations of the hiring business process within DHS, but rather, the
difficulty of finding qualified applicants with the technical and
scientific expertise required for conducting risk analytics. RMA has
the National Academies and individuals from the private sector and
academia assisting with the recruitment efforts. RMA is also
considering filling at least one of the technical billets using an
Intergovernmental Personnel Assignment (IPA).
Question 4. The President's budget request cuts $11 million from
IP's National Infrastructure Protection Program efforts. Please explain
the rationale behind these cuts, given that most companies are not
regulated for security purposes and many do not have the financial
resources in this economic climate.
Please also explain whether other departments and agencies--which
partner with DHS under the NIPP--will be providing resources to further
security efforts under the NIPP in fiscal year 2010.
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must prioritize
limited resources towards the highest priority programs. The reductions
to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) program efforts
were required to fund other critical DHS responsibilities.
Maintaining the greatest possible degree of engagement and
information-sharing with our private-sector critical infrastructure and
key resources (CIKR) partners and coordination with the Sector Specific
Agencies (SSAs) will continue to be a main focus of the Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP).
These funding reductions will result in DHS relying more heavily on
its sector-specific partners to use their own existing expertise and
sustain service capabilities. SSAs will need to assume a greater role
in managing, developing, and producing sector programs, reports, and
metrics. The private-sector is actively engaged in the public-private
partnership. They contribute their subject-matter experts (SMEs) and
bring corporate representatives to the table at their own cost and
time. Several of the partnership trade member associations have taken
on some of the sector support responsibilities including planning,
analysis, and writing support for tailoring products to their members'
interests. DHS will work diligently with remaining resources to ensure
that the value found in information sharing and coordination remains
high between DHS and our private-sector partners.
Although DHS will not be able to provide the same amount of in-
person interaction with the private-sector and State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and regional governments and organizations, the Department
is promoting on-line conference capabilities and delivering web-based
training on the Homeland Security Information Network for Critical
Sectors. DHS will continue to foster relationships with private-sector
entities while promoting mutual-aid agreements within and among CIKR
partners in the industry.
The SSAs outside of IP provide funding to develop and implement a
wide range of CIKR programs. The budget requests for each of these
sectors are at least partially captured in their Sector CIKR Protection
Annual reports. Due to the reduction, DHS will no longer provide on-
site contract SME support to departments and agencies with SSA
responsibilities, and they will need to assume a greater role for the
development, coordination, and final submission of the sector metrics,
Sector CIKR Protection Annual Reports, Sector-Specific Plans (annual
reviews and triennial rewrites), and other required information.
Question 5. As you know, the expiration of the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards is of great import to this committee. Is the
Department prepared to ask for an extension of the legislation? If so,
what resources are needed for fiscal year 2010 for CFATS? Your
testimony requests $103.4 million for fiscal year 2010, which includes
268 Federal staff, and this is to be allocated for high-risk chemical
facilities and to establish ammonium nitrate regulations. Under this
request, how much is going to the CFATS program?
Answer. The President's budget submission included a request to
extend authorization of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
(CFATS) for a period of 1 year to give us time to evaluate what is
needed for a permanent authorization. For fiscal year 2010, the
Department of Homeland Security has requested funding in the amount of
$103.4 million to continue its efforts under CFATS and to develop
ammonium nitrate regulations.
The Department's fiscal year 2010 request included 268 FTP and 246
FTE Federal staff. Of the requested $103.4 million in funding, the
Department has proposed to direct $33.5 million to salaries and
benefits, $55.5 million to CFATS and $14.4 million to ammonium nitrate
regulations.
Question 6. As you know, the committee championed the resilience-
based approach to critical infrastructure protection during the last
Congress. Your testimony and the budget request highlight five Regional
Resiliency Assessment projects at IP. Please describe these projects,
their resources, and their objectives.
Answer. Much of the Nation's critical infrastructure and key
resources (CIKR) are not part of a single, integrated system that can
be controlled and monitored from a single location. High-priority CIKR
are a complex ``system of systems''--a loosely woven network of
localized infrastructure, each with unique characteristics and
vulnerabilities. Recognizing this, the Office of Infrastructure
Protection (IP) has adopted a resilience-based approach to protecting
Nationally significant CIKR. This shift is reflected in the 2009
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), Partnering to Enhance
Protection and Resiliency, which focuses on protection and resiliency
as National priorities. Resilience of critical infrastructure focuses
on systems as a whole--particularly on investments that make a system
better able to absorb the impact of an event without losing the
capacity to function. The resilience of critical infrastructure also
includes the protection and physical survivability of key National
assets and structures. Because of the regionally clustered distribution
of CIKR, the protection of component assets is best planned,
coordinated, and executed locally. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) developed the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) to
analyze and build resilient assets, systems, and communities at the
regional level.
The RRAP is a cooperative Government-led assessment of designated
CIKR facilities and regional analysis of the surrounding
infrastructure. It provides Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial,
and private sector stakeholders with an awareness of the geographic
area's National and regional impact, vulnerabilities, dependencies,
interdependencies, resiliencies, and necessary protective measures. The
RRAP:
Examines vulnerabilities, threats, and potential
consequences from an all-hazards perspective using enhanced
assessment methodology;
Identifies CIKR dependencies, interdependencies, resiliency
characteristics, and gaps;
Evaluates the prevention and protection capabilities of
owners/operators, local law enforcement, and emergency response
organizations;
Supports required grant applications;
Provides baseline examination of risk and metrics to measure
mitigation; and
Coordinates and integrates other protection programs,
including assessments, training, economic analysis, IED
awareness, geospatial products, information sharing and
exercises.
The RRAP analyzes gaps using multiple assessments and surveys
including Site Assistance Visit (SAV)\1\ and Enhanced Critical
Infrastructure Protection (ECIP)\2\ assessments, Buffer Zone Plans
(BZPs),\3\ the Computer-Based Assessment Tool (CBAT),\4\ independent
subject matter expert analysis, Emergency Services Capabilities
Assessment (ESCA),\5\ System Recovery Analyses (SRA),\6\ Multi-
Jurisdiction Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning
(MJIEDSP),\7\ National Capabilities Analysis Database (NCAD)
assessments,\8\ and other tools designed to capture the region's
dependencies, interdependencies, and resiliency characteristics. The
results are used to enhance the overall security posture of the
facilities, the surrounding communities, and the geographic region
using short-term improvements and long-term investments in equipment,
planning, training, and resources to mitigate risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ SAVs are facility vulnerability assessments focused on
identifying security gaps and recommending protective measures. SAVs
are conducted by DHS/IP in coordination with other Federal, State, and
local government entities and CIKR owners and operators.
\2\ ECIP visits are conducted by DHS/IP in coordination with
facility owners and operators and other Federal, State, and local
partners to assess overall site security and recommend protective
measures at facilities, track implementation of new protective
measures, and build public-private relationships.
\3\ BZPs are strategic documents developed by local jurisdictions
with support from DHS that assist State and local law enforcement and
other first responders in developing site-specific preventive and
protective measures that make it more difficult to successfully target
and attack CIKR sites.
\4\ CBAT blends vulnerability assessment data, structural
schematics, and other relevant site data with 360-degree spherical
color video of facilities, surrounding areas, routes, and other areas
of interest to create an interactive visual guide of any location.
\5\ ESCA examines the region's emergency services capabilities in
the context of all-hazard events such as natural disasters or terrorist
attacks.
\6\ SRA examines the region's interdependencies in the context of a
tailored scenario, such as large-scale system failures or industrial
accidents.
\7\ MJIEDSP examines the region's IED security plans in the context
of integration of assets and capabilities from multiple jurisdictions
and emergency service sectors, providing DHS officials and regional
authorities and responders with an accurate picture of current
preparedness and response capabilities for IED security.
\8\ NCAD assessments of bomb squads, explosive-detection canine
units, SWAT teams, and public-safety dive teams use a task-based model
to examine IED security operations capabilities and readiness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each RRAP produces an Integrated Protective Measures Analysis
(IPMA) Report and a self-executing CBAT multi-media file for use as a
State and regional planning and response tool. The IPMA and CBAT
multimedia file documents the resiliency of critical nodes in the
region; dependencies and interdependencies among the assets and
possible cascading effects from loss, destruction, disruption, or
degradation of one or more of these systems; gaps and corresponding
options for consideration, to be used for continued planning to buy
down risk; and individual assessment reports and plans.
The IPMA can be used by the State to inform their Buffer Zone
Protection Program (BZPP) grant applications. RRAP-identified gaps and
options for consideration are mapped directly to the multi-jurisdiction
Vulnerability Reduction Purchasing Plan (VRPP) required as part of the
BZPP application. In this way the RRAP supports more effective resource
allocation decisions. For each RRAP BZPP grant funding is used address
RRAP-identified planning and equipment needs of the local law
enforcement agencies responsible for protecting the CIKR sites.
Five (5) RRAPs will be completed in fiscal year 2009. RRAP
locations were selected by DHS in coordination with the States based on
relative risk profile and feasibility of the assessment process.
Programmatically, each RRAP costs between $596,500 and $686,500 for DHS
to conduct. This cost does not include BZPP grant funding, which are
funds provided directly to local law enforcement.
Based on the budget request for fiscal year 2010, IP will conduct
six (6) RRAPs. The regions will be selected by DHS based on input from
the States through the Tier 1 and Tier 2 data call. The revised data
call allows States to nominate ``critical clusters'' that meet the Tier
1 and Tier 2 criteria. Critical clusters are groups of similar
infrastructure that can be disrupted through a single incident, whether
natural or manmade, and the disruption of which could cause Nationally
or regionally critical consequences meeting the Tier 1 and Tier 2
thresholds. IP is currently assessing high-risk clusters across the
U.S. as well as preparing guidance and a data call to States. Potential
locations for the fiscal year 2010 RRAP include: Detroit International
Transportation Hub, Colonial Pipeline (Atlanta Hub), Louisiana Highway
1 (LA1), Port of Long Beach, Las Vegas Strip, and Henry Hub Pipeline in
Louisiana.
(nppd) oec
Question 7. Within NPPD sits the Office of Emergency Communications
(OEC), which has, among many responsibilities, ownership of the
Integrated Wireless Network, or IWN. This is supposed to be an
interoperable communications network for all Federal law enforcement
officials--including DHS, DOJ, and Treasury. To date, however, OEC has
done nothing to advance the implementation of IWN. In your view, is
interoperability a priority for Federal law enforcement officials? If
so, what role do you believe OEC should play in that effort? How should
this office work with the Office of the CIO, as well as the CIOs of DHS
components, to advance interoperability within DHS?
Answer. The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) and Federal
law enforcement officials recognize the importance of interoperability
with other Federal, State, local, and Tribal agencies. However,
existing Federal tactical wireless infrastructure is outdated,
resulting in an inability to meet both intra- and inter-agency
communications needs. Federal tactical wireless capabilities must be
modernized and basic operability shortfalls addressed before
interoperability can be achieved. Historically, these modernization
efforts have been underfunded, which limits interoperability efforts.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) believes that the
original Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) concept of a single, Nation-
wide, consolidated network is no longer viable due to funding
limitations and the disparate requirements of Federal law enforcements
users. OEC and the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) are
working together to implement the underlying IWN concepts of
intergovernmental partnerships, joint requirements gathering, and
integrated short- and long-term planning to improve mission-critical
wireless capabilities and promote interoperability while reducing
costs. OEC's inherent interagency and intergovernmental roles and
responsibilities are appropriate to drive joint requirements
development, planning, and implementation efforts. However, this can
only be achieved with a true stakeholder-driven approach in concert
with Federal users and managers from partner agencies and components.
OEC, the DHS OCIO, and the DHS Component OCIOs are working together
through the Wireless Working Group to develop a consolidated
Departmental strategy for the modernization of DHS tactical wireless
infrastructure. This strategy will address immediate mission-critical
tactical voice requirements while driving toward an integrated
interoperable long-term solution. OEC supports the Department's
strategic planning efforts by identifying opportunities for resource
sharing with external agencies across all levels of government and by
helping to define and shape interoperability standards and external
relationships for long-term coordination. Through the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center, OEC is advocating the need for
Federal tactical wireless communications modernization and will elevate
the issue to senior officials throughout the Federal emergency
communications community. In addition, OEC is adding value to Federal
efforts by sharing its knowledge of State and local activities across
the Nation to help identify opportunities for resource sharing across
various levels of government.
Question 8. The stimulus bill signed earlier this year provided $60
million for Customs and Border Protection to procure and deploy
tactical wireless communications equipment. How is OEC working with CBP
to ensure that this money is spent on equipment that would fit within
the DHS vision of IWN and within the DHS vision for having an
interoperable communications system for all its law enforcement
officials?
Answer. In the case of the stimulus bill, the Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC), the Office of the Chief Information Officer
(OCIO), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Wireless Working
Group are working closely together to ensure development of a common
strategy for both Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement that improves interoperability and cost
efficiencies through the acquisition of standards-based technologies
(e.g., Project 25) while promoting the sharing of resources, to include
spectrum, infrastructure, engineering, and acquisition. Per DHS
Management Directive 4100.1, OCIO is responsible for the internal
coordination of wireless investments across the Department, which it
does through the DHS Wireless Working Group. OEC identifies
opportunities for DHS components to coordinate with other Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies external to DHS.
Question 9. IWN has been under the purview of OEC for several years
now. As you have become familiar with the work of NPPD during your time
at DHS, what, if anything, have you seen done to date by OEC on IWN? Do
you think that OEC has a role in overseeing a Department-wide effort to
build an interoperable communications system for Federal law
enforcement officers, given the lack of operational expertise in the
Office?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) believes that the
original Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) concept of a single, Nation-
wide, consolidated network is no longer viable because of funding
limitations and the disparate requirements of Federal law enforcements
users. OEC and the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO),
through the Wireless Working Group are working together to implement
the underlying IWN concepts of intergovernmental partnerships, joint
requirements gathering, and integrated short- and long-term planning,
thereby improving mission-critical wireless capabilities and promoting
interoperability while reducing costs.
OEC works through the DHS Wireless Working Group and the OEC-
chaired Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications for
operational expertise. OEC plays an important role in the Department-
wide effort to build an interoperable communications system for Federal
law enforcement officers. OEC's core roles and responsibilities are
appropriate to drive joint requirements development, planning, and
implementation efforts. However, this can only be achieved with a true
stakeholder-driven approach in concert with Federal users and managers
from partner agencies and components. OEC provides comprehensive
knowledge and understanding of requirements and activities across
departments and various levels of government to identify opportunities
for resource sharing and to help define and shape external
relationships for long-term coordination. Through the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center, OEC is advocating the need for
Federal tactical wireless communications modernization and will elevate
the issue with senior officials throughout the Federal emergency
communications community.
Question 10. In the DHS response to the GAO Report on Radio
Communication (report number 09-133, dated December 2008), the reason
giving for abandoning the joint IWN program was, ``Because DOJ and DHS
have different regional priorities--a common system will not work at a
national level . . . '' Given that, why has DHS not at least embraced
IWN within its own Department? Wouldn't the IWN program provide the
cost savings, efficiencies, and interoperability needed between DHS
agencies, such as CBP, ICE, Coast Guard, and others?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) believes that the
Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) concept of a single, Nation-wide,
consolidated network is no longer viable both for DHS and as part of an
interagency partnership because of cost and schedule constraints. The
Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) and the DHS Office of the
Chief Information Officer (OCIO) are working together through the DHS
Wireless Working Group (WWG) to implement the underlying IWN concepts
of intergovernmental partnerships, joint requirements gathering, and
integrated short- and long-term planning, thereby improving mission-
critical wireless capabilities and promoting interoperability while
reducing costs. Each of these organizations includes representation
from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), as well as the other
DHS components.
OEC, the DHS OCIO, and DHS components including CBP, ICE, and USCG
are integrating these concepts as they develop a consolidated
departmental strategy for the modernization of DHS tactical wireless
infrastructure through the DHS WWG. This collaborative effort will
result in a strategy that addresses immediate mission-critical tactical
voice requirements while driving toward an integrated interoperable
long-term solution. A key element of the DHS strategy is to ensure that
investments are coordinated with internal and external partners and
that opportunities to share resources are appropriately considered. In
addition, DHS components including CBP, ICE, and USCG are examining
common architectures and standards so as not to preclude future
interoperability or resource sharing if current operational priorities
dictate the need to modernize independently in some areas.
Question 11. The White House Web site states the Federal Government
will ``support efforts to provide greater technical assistance to local
and state first responders and dramatically increase funding for
reliable interoperable communications systems.'' Given the minimal
budget change in the President's fiscal year 2010 request for the
Office of Emergency Communications, how does NPPD intend to meet the
increasingly high demand for technical assistance across the country?
Answer. The National Protection Programs Directorate/Office of
Emergency Communications (NPPD/OEC) Interoperable Communications
Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) provides direct support through
the development and delivery of training, tools, and on-site services
to State, Tribal, territorial, regional, and local agencies for the
implementation of the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) and
the advancement of public safety emergency communications, operability,
and interoperability capabilities.
NPPD/OEC technical assistance is provided at no cost to States/
territories with the stipulation that the services support the
implementation of the State's Statewide Communication Interoperability
Plan and promote achievement of the NECP goals. Using the NPPD/OEC
Technical Assistance Catalog, the States may submit up to five requests
for services annually (an average State has more than 30 applicable
initiatives). Although participation by the States/Territories is
voluntary, during fiscal year 2009 all 56 States/Territories have
requested (or indicated that they will request) NPPD/OEC technical
assistance, with more than 90 percent submitting the maximum five
service requests. Nation-wide, 240 technical assistance requests have
been (or will be) submitted. In considering these requests, NPPD/OEC
uses a needs-based approach, incorporating the State's risk and
communications capability, to determine how best to allocate its
technical assistance resources.
The President's fiscal year 2010 budget request includes an
additional $3.8 million for OEC. If enacted, the increased funding will
provide some additional support to State and local interoperable
communications technical assistance. Specifically, assistance will be
provided to State and local governments to achieve response-level
emergency communications by the designated goal deadlines.
The fiscal year 2009 NPPD/OEC budget for State-requested technical
assistance was $5.2 million. OEC's strategy for meeting the current
demand is based on innovative restructuring and the re-scoping of
services. We try to minimize the travel cost by working remotely or
conducting multiple engagements during a single trip. During the
project-planning phase, OEC scopes the engagement in the most cost-
effective manner. Our project managers look for additional cost-cutting
measures by leveraging personnel with broad skill sets that allow them
to conduct multiple facets of a Technical Assistance delivery,
minimizing the need to send additional personnel. Lastly, we look to
other programs to transfer applicable requests, such as the Public
Safety Interoperable Communications Grant Program. Our diligent efforts
to maximize the productivity of each Technical Assistance dollar enable
us to fulfill more than half of the States' fiscal year 2009 requests.
Although it remains unclear how many ICTAP requests NPPD will
receive for fiscal year 2010, we are confident that strong program
management, responsible and creative engagement scoping, and the
leveraging other programs will maximize the available fiscal year 2010
funding to ensure that State, territorial, local, and Tribal
governments receive critical Technical Assistance services to address
key emergency communications gaps.
Question 12. Nearly 8 years have passed since the tragic attacks of
9/11 and 3 years since the devastating storms of Hurricane Katrina.
Congress responded and created the Office of Emergency Communications
at DHS to be the focal office responsible for emergency communications
in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. Despite
efforts made by Congress, I remain very concerned by the various
components at the Department with stronger influences over first
responder communications capabilities. For example, some argue that the
relationship between the OEC and FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications
(DEC) is a complementary relationship, while others view their missions
as overlapping, identical, or competing. Can you explain how you intend
to strengthen the OEC within this budget request and streamline
interoperable emergency communications issues at the Department and
within the Federal Government?
Answer. Secretary Napolitano has made unifying the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) as ``One DHS'' a top priority. Within the
Department, the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) is the focal
point for National planning and coordination for interoperable
emergency communications, and Departmental leadership will continue to
support OEC's efforts to strengthen and coordinate emergency
communications activities both within the Department and across other
Federal Government agencies.
The Department plans to facilitate intra- and inter-departmental
coordination on emergency communications and interoperability issues.
Inter-departmental coordination will occur within the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center framework. Intra-departmental
efforts will occur within the framework of a DHS-wide working group,
led by OEC and dedicated to coordinating emergency communications
issues across the Department. The intra-Departmental working group will
include components such as OEC, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the National Communications System, and the Command, Control
and Interoperability Division of the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Question 13a. As you know, PKEMRA created the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) to serve as the focal point
and information clearinghouse for Federal interagency emergency
communications efforts. However, in order for the ECPC to be
established, DHS, through the OEC, must complete a charter with the
signatures from all the appropriate Department heads across the Federal
Government. The ECPC charter was due to Congress last year, but it has
yet to materialize.
What assurances can you provide to the committee about the
Department's commitment to taking the issue of operability and
interoperability seriously both at DHS and throughout the Federal
Government?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its
Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), is fully committed to
establishing the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) as
the focal point for interagency efforts and as a clearinghouse for
intergovernmental information to support and promote communications
operability and interoperability. OEC created an ECPC working group in
September 2007 as the primary collaborative mechanism to establish the
ECPC and facilitate its activities. In its first action, the ECPC
working group solicited and coordinated Federal agency input to the
National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), which was published in
July 2008. The ECPC working group also drafted and internally approved
an ECPC Charter. The Charter was approved by the DHS Secretary on June
8, 2009, and distributed to member departments and agencies for
approval and designation of their official representatives.
With the approval of the ECPC Charter by the Secretary of Homeland
Security and continued planning within the OEC, the committee can be
assured that DHS is seriously addressing the issues of operability and
interoperability. OEC is actively supporting the following actions:
Close coordination with ECPC member agencies to gain
approval of the Charter and to identify representatives to
serve on the ECPC executive and steering committees. To date,
the Charter has been approved by six of the 12 ECPC member
agencies;
Content development and agenda planning for the inaugural
ECPC executive committee and steering committee meetings to be
convened upon final charter approval by member agencies;
Development and testing of ``beta'' version of a secure
emergency communications clearinghouse capability for rollout
in January 2010;
Continued execution of targeted focus group activity in the
area of emergency communications technical assistance and grant
guidance coordination. For example, the technical assistance
focus group has successfully cataloged Federal Technical
Assistance programs and begun identification and sharing of
best practices for effectively administering Technical
Assistance; and
Execution and completion of the initiatives and milestones
identified in the NECP.
DHS is optimistic that full approval of the ECPC Charter by member
agencies will be achieved by September 2009.
Question 13b. From your assessment, what are some of the major
hindrances to OEC fulfilling this requirement?
Answer. Approval of the Charter and designation of formal
representatives to the ECPC have been delayed because of the impact of
the Presidential transition and the resulting Departmental appointments
and confirmations of personnel needed to review and approve agreements.
We believe this to no longer be an issue.
Question 13c. What Congressional assistance is needed for the
Department to complete this requirement?
Answer. We believe that progress is being made more quickly now
with the ECPC Charter and the designation of representatives from the
Federal agencies. In addition, we will continue to develop the agenda
for the initial ECPC session.
(nppd) cyber
Question 14. How will the President's announcement of the creation
of a new ``cyber coordinator'' in the White House affect the
Department's cybersecurity mission?
Answer. As the Nation becomes ever more dependent upon cyber
networks, we must address cybersecurity strategically. Overcoming new
cybersecurity challenges is a difficult task requiring a coordinated
and focused approach to better secure the Nation's information
technology and communications infrastructures. President Obama's
Cyberspace Policy Review reaffirms that cybersecurity is among the most
significant issues facing the Nation's economy and national security,
and it solidifies the priority that the administration places on
improving cybersecurity.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) believes the creation of
a senior-level cyber position within the White House will help ensure
coordination and collaboration across Government agencies. No single
agency is responsible for cyberspace and the success of our cyber
mission relies on more than one department. As such, the many
Government players with complementary roles--including DHS, the
intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Justice, and other Federal agencies--require coordination and
leadership to ensure effective, and efficient execution of the overall
cyber mission.
DHS will continue to have a preeminent role in ensuring the
cybersecurity of the Federal domain and collaborating with the private
sector to improve the security of private sector networks, and it will
have a significant role in accomplishing near-term actions outlined in
the report, including updating the National strategy, strengthening
private sector and international partnerships, increasing public
awareness and preparing a National response plan. The operational goals
of the comprehensive National strategy will include better
coordination, response, recovery, and mitigation across stakeholder
communities.
Furthermore, DHS works closely with its Federal partners, and the
leadership and staff of the National Security Staff in the development
and continued tracking, coordination, and execution of the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. The Department also
maintains close working relationships with the 18 Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) sectors, and their Federal
sector-specific agencies, under the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan Partnership Framework.
Question 15. How does the Department intend to work with other
relevant agencies to secure the electric grid from cyber attack?
Answer. In May 2004, DHS created the Control Systems Security
Program (CSSP) within the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) to
lead a cohesive effort focused on reducing the cyber risks to the
control systems within critical infrastructure. A control system is a
general term that encompasses several types of systems, including
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, process control, and other
automated systems that are most often found in the industrial sectors
and critical infrastructure. These systems are used to operate physical
processes in industries such as electricity, oil and gas, water, and
critical manufacturing. Control system security in the electric power
grid is particularly important because of the significant
interdependencies inherent with the use of electricity in all other
critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, operations of Federal,
State, and local government rely on the electric grid. Therefore,
assessing risk and effectively securing industrial control systems is
vital to maintaining the Nation's strategic interests, public safety,
and economic prosperity.
The CSSP currently partners with several Federal, State, and local
agencies to provide analysis capabilities for technologies affecting
control systems that impact the electric grid. Among these
organizations are the Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense,
Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Department of the Navy,
Department of the Treasury, Department of Transportation, Environmental
Protection Agency, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission as well as representatives from law enforcement
and the intelligence community. These relationships provide reciprocal
coordination on efforts as emerging technologies, and the cyber issues
affecting critical infrastructure, are evaluated. Most importantly, the
CSSP's Advanced Vulnerability Discovery facility, funded by DHS and
housed at the Idaho National Laboratory, offers a world-class test
environment where technical experts continuously evaluate nearly every
major control system used in the critical infrastructure.
In 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) that identified the CSSP as responsible for coordinating
activities to reduce the likelihood of success and severity of impact
of a control systems cyber attack against CIKR sectors through risk
mitigation activities. DHS recognizes that control systems exist across
sectors and must be secured from cyber attacks, the effects of which
could result in significant consequences. To address this, the CSSP has
built a culture of reliability, security, and resiliency by partnering
with government agencies, industry, and international entities to
reduce the cyber risk to all 18 CIKR sectors. The CSSP leverages the
risk management framework and partnership model described in the NIPP,
which provides a mechanism for coordination among CIKR stakeholders,
Government, and industry associations.
To assist public and private sector partners in identifying and
mitigating the risks to their control systems, the CSSP provides
leadership and subject matter experts through partnerships with key
stakeholders. It develops recommended vulnerability mitigation
strategies, practices, informational products, and assessment tools and
delivers focused training. Recognizing that stakeholders must be
involved in the process of identifying vulnerabilities and developing
strategies to improve their security posture, the CSSP developed the
first widely available control system cybersecurity self-assessment
tool, which employs a systematic and repeatable approach for owners and
operators to assess the security of their industrial control systems
network. It also offers recommendations based on industry standards
that are customized to the operating characteristics of each control
systems facility.
While valuable products and tools such as these allow asset owners
to understand the cyber risk to their control systems, it is also
imperative that all stakeholders have a full understanding of the
underlying fundamentals of control systems security. Consequently, the
CSSP developed an advanced training center at the Department of
Energy's Idaho National Laboratory that includes functional models of
critical infrastructure equipment. This center provides hands-on
training in a realistic, scenario-based environment. Since the
program's inception, more than 14,000 professionals have received
training through both classroom and web-based instruction.
To execute its mission and lead a cohesive effort between
Government and industry, the CSSP created two overarching initiatives:
The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT)
and the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group (ICSJWG). The
ICS-CERT, in coordination with the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT), is an operational entity that responds to and
analyzes control systems-related incidents, conducts analysis on
vulnerabilities and malicious software, or malware, and disseminates
cybersecurity guidance to all sectors through informational products
and alerts. The ICS-CERT provides more efficient coordination of
control system-related security incidents and information-sharing with
Federal, State, and local agencies and organizations, the intelligence
community, private-sector constituents including vendors, owner-
operators, and international and private-sector CERTS.
The ICSJWG follows a structured approach supported by the NIPP
Partnership Framework and the Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council to continue the successful efforts of the Process
Control System Forum to accelerate the design, development, and
deployment of more secure industrial control systems. This group held
its inaugural meeting on March 25, 2009 and is comprised of industry
representatives from both Sector and Government Coordinating Councils
under the NIPP Partnership Framework. The ICSJWG will provide a vehicle
for communicating and partnering across all CIKR sectors among Federal,
State, and local agencies, and private asset owner-operators of
industrial control systems. CSSP engages through the ICSJWG with
several Federal agencies on the issues of cybersecurity and industrial
control, which include matters impacting legacy electric grid
technologies and the enabling technologies used to deploy the ``SMART
GRID'' systems. Departments and agencies participating in the ICSJWG
include the Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy,
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice,
Department of State, Department of the Interior, Department of the
Navy, Department of the Treasury, Department of Transportation,
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Aviation Administration,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Food and Drug Administration,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Science
Foundation, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as
representatives from law enforcement (FBI, Secret Service) and the
intelligence community.
DHS identifies vulnerabilities and works with the vendors, owners,
and operators of control systems to develop mitigation strategies
tailored to their use and application in each of the critical sectors.
There can be a gap between identification of a vulnerability and
development of a vendor patch or full solution. To address this, the
CSSP has developed a Vulnerability Management Process operated by the
ICS-CERT, in conjunction with trusted partners, to identify interim
mitigation and consequence management approaches. CSSP also engages
with other Federal partners in this process--such as the Departments of
Defense and Justice and the intelligence community--to address equities
and mitigate risks as vulnerability identification, risk assessment,
mitigation development, and promulgation of these mitigation efforts
are advanced.
(nppd) fps
Question 16a. The fiscal year 2010 budget request proposes the
transfer of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) from Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to the National Protection and Programs
Directorate, with level funding for FPS. FPS was previously transferred
from the Government Services Administration (GSA) into DHS on March 1,
2003; a move that brought with it a number of management and
contracting issues, as well as budgetary shortfalls. Even prior to the
transfer, GAO noted in a 2004 report that GSA could not collect
sufficient funds through fees to pay for FPS security services and had
to provide FPS with supplemental funding from the GSA Federal building
fund in order to cover the FPS deficits. Once under DHS, the Office of
the Inspector General repeatedly identified poor contract oversight as
another major issue for FPS, and a major cause of FPS' budget problems.
In hearings held by this committee and reports to congressional
appropriators, FPS identified methods of cutting costs that revolved
around increasing fees, reductions in its staffing, and reductions in
the hours those Federal employees work, but not in a reduction of
contract guards.
Given that FPS has been plagued by problems with financial
management throughout its time in the Department of Homeland Security,
how does NPPD plan to address these issues?
Question 16b. Does NPPD project FPS to run a budget deficit in its
first fiscal year under NPPD?
Question 16c. Does NPPD plan to continue cost-cutting measures for
FPS? If so does NPPD plan to use the ICE model for cutting costs, or
will it create its own plan to address the financial problems at FPS?
Question 16d. Does NPPD have a plan for improving the contract
guard procurement process?
Answer. The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is
working with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) to ensure FPS' critical operation and
management functions continue without interruption during the
transition. NPPD already uses ICE as its service provider for the
accounting and financial system services. ICE will continue to provide
these services to NPPD, and subsequently to FPS, if Congress approves
its transition. NPPD is also evaluating FPS' processes and internal
controls in the areas of budget and financial management. NPPD has
already identified several improvements that will be implemented
beginning in fiscal year 2010. Based on current cost and revenue
projections, NPPD does not expect FPS to run a budget deficit next
year.
NPPD is evaluating the operating costs of FPS to identify areas
where there is insufficient funding. NPPD is also studying where
funding might be better utilized for improved operations. NPPD is also
evaluating the FPS staffing and workforce composition to ensure that
FPS has the appropriate level and mix of Federal staff and contractors.
NPPD is not considering cutting FPS operational staff. NPPD has
identified FPS billing and collections as an area that can be staffed
more effectively to provide better customer service. Additionally, NPPD
is reviewing the historical amounts of outstanding FPS collections to
determine if the collections process can be improved.
ICE and FPS are currently developing and implementing improvements
in the areas of acquisition and contract oversight staffing, training,
and policy development. ICE and FPS are also working on a number of
standardization initiatives to address challenges in contract guard
oversight and management. The proposed transfer of FPS to NPPD, if
approved by Congress, will not delay or otherwise alter the steps
currently being taken by ICE/FPS.
In addition, DHS is conducting a major coordinated review regarding
the way forward with FPS in light of the recent GAO report. The DHS
review will be provided to Congress in the next several weeks.
(nppd) ip/rma
Question 17. How are you expediting the security and suitability
review process at NPPD? I hear that wait times for a clearance to be
transferred can take as many as 6 months. Can Congress help expedite
this process?
Answer. The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
faces many challenges in the security and suitability clearance
processes. While we have made progress in on-boarding Federal
employees, we still face a large backlog of people we need to bring on-
board. However, we are working to increase the number of people
assigned to the staffing process to expedite hiring. That said, work
also remains to be done in reconciling the suitability process specific
to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the overall security
clearance process. While this one instance of what NPPD is doing
internally to accelerate the process, we are receiving assistance from
DHS in improving the process.
The Under Secretary for Management is also committed to working
with NPPD to resolve these issues, and we continue to work together to
coordinate our efforts. For example, we implemented a system wherein
NPPD is responsible for the initial steps in the clearance process,
including inviting the candidate to access the on-line system to enter
required information and loading candidate information into the
Integrated Security Management Systems (ISMS), the Office of Security's
tracking database. This has shortened the timeline form the issuance of
a tentative job offer to the entry of personal data into ISMS, which
initiates the background investigation. Additionally, the Office of
Security no longer requires original signatures before initiating a
background investigation. This will shorten the time associated with
mailing original signatures and improve timeliness of decisions.
Collectively, these changes should significantly impact the wait times
for a clearance.
Question 18. In your testimony, you say that IP has ``[p]rovided
physical security and risk data to 5,000 registered Homeland Security
Information Network-Critical Sector (HSIN-CS) users responsible for
critical infrastructure . . . .'' Our hearing on the Mumbai attacks in
March revealed that DHS' response--in terms of outreach to the private
sector--was hobbled and confused. Can you demonstrate the satisfaction
of these users with HSIN-CS?
Answer. The Mumbai attacked occurred over the Thanksgiving holiday
weekend on November 26-29, 2008. During the Mumbai attacks, DHS
provided the private sector incident-related documentation and reports
via the Homeland Security Information Network--Critical Sectors (HSIN-
CS). HSIN-CS housed 26 documents related to the Mumbai attacks,
including sector-specific vulnerability reports for the Transportation
and Commercial Facilities sectors. Content also included post-incident
analysis, protective measure reports, and future threat analysis. DHS
posted the Office of Intelligence & Analysis' warning product, ``(U//
FOUO) Islamic Militant Group Attacks Multiple Locations in Mumbai,
India'' on HSIN. Once a clear picture of the attacks emerged after the
initial chaos, products such as the Technical Resource for Incident
Prevention's (TRIPwire) ``Analysis of Mumbai Combined Arms Operation
and Recommended Protective Measures'' were posted.
As indicated in the graph below, during the week of the incident
period (notably a holiday timeframe) stakeholders accessed HSIN-CS
content 280% more (195 sessions/day) and remained on-line 86% longer
(6.5 minutes) than is typical during a holiday. The length of a session
reflects the user's interest in accessing relevant content.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The second graph below (HSIN-CS Daily Session Volume and Length:
Nov 19-Dec 9 2008 Workdays) provides further context of HSIN-CS usage
during the Mumbai attacks as compared to the weeks immediately before
and after the incident.
As not all private entities in the Commercial Facilities Sector are
registered users of HSIN-CS, DHS communicates using a variety of
methods. The Commercial Facility SSA directly contacted private sector
partners in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, in
particular the Lodging Subsector. The Commercial Facility SSA urged
private sector partners to review their protective posture and
electronically re-distributed awareness tools such as the ``Active
Shooter'' materials (booklet, poster, wallet cards).
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
(nppd) us-visit
Question 19. The committee understands that DHS has begun piloting
two different biometric collection methods at airports for the US-VISIT
program, one involving TSA at the checkpoint and the other using CBP
officers at the gate. We are aware that the program has roughly $30
million in carry-over monies to use for the pilots, but we are
concerned it may need additional funds. If the pilots indicate that the
CBP or TSA collection methods are optimal, will you have the funding
necessary to implement biometric exit in fiscal year 2009 or fiscal
year 2010?
Answer. Approximately $28 million remains available from prior-year
appropriations for testing technological solutions with pilot scenarios
for the Biometric Exit project. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) originally intended the collection of biometrics--with the costs
involved--to be borne by the commercial carriers. DHS published this
intent in a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal
Register on April 24, 2009.
Congress included a provision in the Consolidated Security,
Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, that
restricted DHS from obligating US-VISIT funds for a final comprehensive
air exit solution until additional tests were completed. US-VISIT
conducted pilot tests with the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) at the security checkpoint in the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport and with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
at the boarding gate in the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.
After a review within DHS, the results of the CBP and TSA pilot tests
will be reported to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and
reviewed by the Government Accountability Office. Both pilots began on
May 28, 2009, and concluded on July 2, 2009--a period of 35 days.
Based on the results of the pilots and comments to the NPRM, DHS
plans to publish a final rule, tentatively scheduled for March 2010,
which will direct the implementation of new biometric procedures for
non-U.S. citizens departing the United States via airports and
seaports.
If DHS goes forward with a final rule implementing the solution as
stated in the NPRM--that commercial air carriers and vessel carriers
will collect and transmit biometrics--no further funding would be
required to implement Air/Sea Biometric Exit. If the evaluation and
analysis of the air exit pilots recommend selection of a Government-
operated option, such as CBP at the boarding gate or TSA at the
security checkpoint, US-VISIT anticipates that additional funding will
be required to implement such a recommended option. In that case, US-
VISIT needs to develop a new cost estimate to determine the amount of
additional funds required.
Question 20a. Last year's DHS appropriations bill required the
Department to complete two biometric exit pilots at airports: (1) Where
the airlines collect and transmit biometric exit data and (2) where CBP
collects such information at departure gates. It is our understanding
that the Department has yet to partner with any airline but that it has
moved forward with the CBP pilot as well as an additional pilot
performed by TSA personnel.
What can you tell the committee about the exit pilots currently
being performed by US-VISIT?
Answer. US-VISIT conducted a pilot with Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP) collecting biometrics at boarding gates at the Detroit
Metropolitan Wayne County Airport in Detroit, Michigan, and another
pilot with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collecting
biometrics at a security checkpoint at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia. Both pilots began on May 28,
2009, and concluded on July 2, 2009--a period of 35 days.
CBP operated at the departure gate at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
County Airport. This pilot evaluated the operational impact of
collecting biometric information from, and verifying the identity of,
passengers at the departure gate before leaving the United States for a
foreign destination. CBP collected biographic and biometric information
from in-scope travelers near the departure gate. The biometric
information collected consisted of electronic fingerprints: Either a
right-hand, four-finger scan or two single-finger scans. The biographic
information was collected from travel document information--such as
name, date of birth, document issuance type, country, and document
number--all of which are contained in the document's machine-readable
zone of a machine-readable travel document.
CBP used two different biometric collection devices during the Air
Exit pilots: The 3M RT mobile passport and ID reader; and the portable
Cross Match Guardian R Jump Kit. CBP used both collection devices to
determine which device type would better serve the needs of its
collection staff. CBP followed its established reporting requirements
regarding the air carriers and processes to minimize interference with
the air carrier boarding process.
TSA operated at the security checkpoint at Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International Airport. This pilot evaluated the operational
impact of collecting biometric information from, and verifying the
identity of, passengers at TSA security checkpoints before leaving the
United States. Those foreign passengers with an international
destination were directed to an area within the checkpoint where the
biographic and biometric information were collected. The biometric
information collected consisted of two electronic single-finger scans.
The biographic information was collected from travel document
information--such as name, date of birth, document issuance type,
country, and document number--all of which are contained in the
document's machine-readable zone of a machine-readable travel document.
TSA chose to use the 3M RT mobile passport and ID reader device for
biometric collections.
A total of 34,485 transactions were collected from May 28 to July
1, 2009.\9\ CBP collected 10,903, and TSA collected 23,582. Passengers
were compliant and familiar with the process because of their
experience with biometric collection and verification at ports of entry
upon their entry to the United States. The results of this test are
currently under evaluation at DHS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The biometrics were collected from passengers through July 1;
none were collected on July 2, 2009. The processing of the collected
biometrics through US-VISIT systems continued through July 2, and the
decommissioning of the devices was completed that day. Thus the air
exit pilots began on May 28, 2009, and were completed on July 2, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 20b. What progress has DHS made in addressing the air
carriers' concerns?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials reached
out to the airline industry on numerous occasions to address its
concerns and to identify potential partners for biometric air exit
pilot efforts. Despite on-going US-VISIT discussions with the Air
Transport Association and its member carriers, no airline volunteered
to participate in the biometric exit pilot required by the fiscal year
2009 DHS Appropriations Act. The airline industry made clear in many
forums its concerns about DHS requiring the collection of biometrics by
carriers.
Question 20c. If DHS is unable to complete the air carrier pilot,
what will be the Department's next steps?
Answer. Based on the results of the exit pilot tests and the
comments received from the notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS will
determine which methodology for collecting biometrics best addresses
the dual needs of security and facilitation. Once a solution is
identified, DHS will publish a final rule and deploy the solution at
the air and sea ports.
Question 21. Secretary Napolitano's Southwest Border Initiative
calls for the installation of license plate readers on outbound lanes
throughout the southwest border. These readers will be instrumental in
controlling the exit of smugglers attempting to move drugs, weapons,
and cash out of the country and into the hands of the cartels. What
role, if any, will US-VISIT play in gathering and analyzing the exit
information that is collected from the license plate readers?
Answer. US-VISIT does not play any role in gathering or analyzing
the exit information that is collected from the license plate readers.
The US-VISIT Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) is a
person-centric system.
ADIS does not receive license plate reader information from U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). However, ADIS is currently in a
planning stage for creation of an interface this year with TECS, a CBP
database to receive Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative/Vehicle
Primary information.
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee for Gale D. Rossides,
Acting Administrator, Transportation Security Administration
Question 1. The fiscal year 2010 request for air cargo security
programs is less than the enacted fiscal year 2009 amount. Can you
please explain this reduction in light of the upcoming August 2010 100%
cargo screening deadline for cargo on passenger aircraft?
Can you describe how the budget is changing with respect to the
number of inspectors, as well as the resources being allocated to
certify shippers' screening facilities?
Answer. The fiscal year 2010 budget submission was built on the
fiscal year 2009 enacted appropriation, which included a one-time
increase of $18 million to expand air cargo screening technology
pilots. The $18 million increase was not mandated to recur in the
fiscal year 2010 budget. As a result, the fiscal year 2010 request of
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was lower than its
fiscal year 2009 enacted budget. The funds requested for fiscal year
2010 are adequate for TSA's current initiatives. Currently, TSA's
workforce of 450 Transportation Security Inspectors for Air Cargo (TSI-
C) cover air cargo operations at 121 main hub airports and their spoke
operations. These inspectors provide inspection oversight, respond to
air cargo related incidents, provide outreach and industry support, and
conduct investigations into violations of security programs and
regulations for 1,500 domestic and international carriers operating in
the United States, and over 10,000 indirect air carriers. Considering
the current number of regulated entities, TSA has adequate resources
for fiscal year 2010.
TSA expects to issue an interim final rule this fall to meet the
2010 statutory deadline. The rule is expected to increase the number of
regulated entities by approximately 8,000 as TSA certifies additional
cargo screening facilities. It is important to note that it will take
time to certify these facilities. After certification of all new
regulated entities and upon full implementation of the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP) in 2011, the current number of TSI-C will be
re-evaluated to determine if additional TSI-C are needed to continue
their current air cargo oversight mission as well as oversee the new
CCSP program.
Question 2. In light of significant delays in issuing regulations
and processing grant awards and applications, combined with the
imbalance of expertise in surface transportation modes compared with
aviation, why were there no funding or FTE increases requested for
``Surface Transportation Security Operations and Staffing''?
Answer. The fiscal year 2010 budget request for the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) for surface transportation security
includes an increase of $64,985,000 and 192 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE)
over the fiscal year 2009 enacted levels for surface transportation
security. The request includes a funding increase of 25 percent for
``Surface Transportation Security Operations and Staffing'', and would
substantially expand TSA's field expertise in surface transportation
security and capability to conduct joint security augmentation
operations in the surface modes. Of the proposed increase, $50 million
will be used to support an additional 15 Visible Intermodal Prevention
and Response (VIPR) teams (comprised of 169 FTEs) to enhance the
security of the Nation's surface transportation modes. The teams will
be dedicated to conducting VIPR operations. In addition, the fiscal
year 2010 budget request annualizes increases in the fiscal year 2009
surface transportation security appropriation made to further implement
the 9/11 Act requirements. This includes the increase of 50 additional
surface transportation security inspectors, and additional funding for
exercises with surface transportation providers.
The responsibility for processing grant awards and applications
relating to the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) lies with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Grant Programs Directorate (GPD).
GPD received funding in FEMA's fiscal year 2009 budget to hire
additional FTEs. GPD is in the recruitment and selection process and
plans to triple the size of staff managing this program by the end of
the current fiscal year.
Question 3a. Last year, Assistant Secretary Hawley discussed
Checkpoint Evolution as TSA's new way of modernizing checkpoints across
airports. This initiative was started at the end of the previous
administration. Outside of BWI, it does not appear that many of the
elements have been implemented at other airports. What is the status of
Checkpoint Evolution?
Has it been implemented across all airports?
Question 3b. What elements of Checkpoint Evolution provide TSA with
metrics by which to measure enhanced security at airports?
Answer. Checkpoint Evolution was the term used to brand the
approach to aviation security that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is implementing at airports across the country.
While TSA included many discreet elements at Baltimore/Washington
International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI) to accomplish as part of
a security strategy, TSA is continuing many elements to evolve and
enhance our security performance by developing our officers and
leaders, fielding new technology, and adjusting the approach to
deploying these assets to evolving threats.
The installation at BWI included a range of security elements, many
of which have been developed for Nation-wide deployment. The following
reports on the implementation of those elements throughout the TSA
screening workforce:
Enhancements for Employees:
Over a 6-month period ending in April 2009, two training courses,
developed to improve security and increase engagement with
passengers, were given to the more than 50,000 front-line TSA
employees. The response to the training classes called ENGAGE!
and COACH! was overwhelmingly positive as officers leveraged
their experience and used newly developed skills to calm down
unruly travelers at checkpoints and better detect those with
hostile intent.
TSA has also improved the career development and employment of our
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) by increasing the
Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) program, fully implementing
training programs, and incorporating passenger engagement as
part of our mandate to verify travel documents, which we
assumed from the airlines. When officers demonstrate attentive,
interactive, and appropriate command presence, a passenger's
common, natural anxieties associated with the screening
experience are calmed. Passengers who have hostile intent see
engaged interactions as a threat to their goals, making their
behaviors stand out and easier to detect by officers trained to
spot anomalies. Engaged TSOs present a far more formidable
opponent to those with harmful intent than technology and
process can offer alone. TSA is also using our field
intelligence officers, shift briefings, and other communication
approaches to enable TSOs to perform their jobs efficiently and
effectively.
As we make strides to improve the professionalism of our officers,
one aspect of that effort has been the conversion to new
uniforms on September 11, 2008. These uniforms were developed
to enhance the professional appearance of the screening
workforce and to recognize their vital role in securing the
Nation's commercial aviation system.
TSA continues, through passenger feedback and surveys, to evaluate
impact and public perceptions of security measures and officer
performance. These internally and independently executed
measures will provide additional information on security impact
to which Evolution enhancements are a contributor.
Enhancements to Process:
One element of the Evolution training was to empower the TSOs to
use their experience and intelligence-driven intuition to
mitigate the threat by utilizing additional screening
techniques described in the standard operating procedure (SOP)
or by involving other members of their security network. This
empowerment of critical thinking by the front-line officer is a
key element of the dynamic security at the heart of Evolution.
Enhancements to Technology:
Additional technology solutions, such as imaging technology and
Advanced Technology X-Ray were part of the BWI installation and
continue to be rolled out at airports Nation-wide. Technology
to help identify fraudulent documents was also deployed at the
Travel Document Checker position. TSA has piloted and is now
prepared for Nation-wide deployment of ``wireless whisper''
radio communications equipment to airport checkpoints. This
technology will improve officer communication capabilities and
reduce the background noise levels, allowing for enhanced
threat detection and improved security. TSA also continues to
pilot new technologies that enhance security and improve
passenger movement through checkpoints, including mobile
boarding pass scanners.
Security Metrics:
Completion and measured reinforcement of ENGAGE! training and
principles should be viewed as a predictive measure for
employee engagement and security effectiveness. Training
completion rates and reinforcement efforts are actionable items
that address known symptoms of security performance and
effectiveness. Though they are lagging indicators, survey
ratings, standardized performance assessments, ASAP results,
Red Team results, TIP scores, absentee rates, attrition rates,
numbers and types passenger complaints, numbers and types of
Ombudsman contacts, numbers and types of disciplinary actions,
numbers of behavior-initiated detections or security incidents,
etc., can all be influenced by the delivery and application of
ENGAGE! training and the consistent reinforcement of its
principles. The principles taught in the Evolution training
address the root causes of issues in all the lagging indicators
listed above. Compliant delivery of Evolution training and
principle reinforcement is a high-impact driver of performance
in all aspects currently evaluated with lagging indicators.
TSA continually adapts to stay ahead of the threat. Other specific
initiatives include:
Capturing best practices by aggregating successful ideas for
training sustainment and distributing them to other airports
Nation-wide;
Utilizing employee surveys, to determine the degree to which
Evolution training principles have been adopted by the
workforce; and
Tracking of technology deployment, which will lead to
enhanced detection and improved security.
Question 4. Please provide detail on the Secure Flight program
implementation. There is very little in the budget request on this
program, and the subcommittee would like assurance that TSA is
budgeting appropriately for this program, as it should be completely
implemented in fiscal year 2010.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is pleased
to report that Secure Flight implementation is currently underway and
the fiscal year 2010 budget request contains sufficient funds to
continue its implementation. Initial deployment began in late January
2009 with four aircraft operators. TSA continues to follow a structured
implementation plan that systematically adds additional aircraft
operators and flights as the program stands up in order to limit risk.
Domestic implementation is scheduled to be completed by the end of the
first quarter of calendar year 2010. International implementations will
begin in late calendar year 2009 and are scheduled to be completed by
the end of calendar year 2010. The fiscal year 2010 Secure Flight
budget request supports the schedule of implementation activities
during that period. Those activities include coordinated implementation
with aircraft operators by government and contractor staff, operation
and maintenance of the Secure Flight system/Secure Flight Service
Center, and support for the Secure Flight IT systems development. They
also include funding to support the high standards of privacy,
security, Independent Validation and Verification, and other program
management services required by the program. Aircraft operators covered
by the Secure Flight final rule are required to modify their systems
and procedures to send and receive Secure Flight passenger data within
scheduled time frames that are keyed to the Secure Flight
implementation schedule. There is no mandate to completely implement
Secure Flight in fiscal year 2010. The TSA PLAN is to complete
implementation by calendar year 2010 which the Secure Flight fiscal
year 2010 budget supports.
Question 5a. According to GAO, the DHS Inspector General, and
multiple stakeholders, the role, purpose, and activities of the VIPR
program with respect to surface modes are ambiguous and often poorly
communicated to relevant transit agencies. With the exception of
surface inspectors, each of the components named in your written
testimony has little to no role or expertise in securing surface modes.
In fact, the program is housed and managed by an aviation security
component, comprised almost totally by aviation security personnel, and
lacks any defined objectives or meaningful performance measures
specific to surface modes. Accordingly:
Please explain in detail how TSA determined that allocating
virtually the entire increase in funding and FTEs for surface
transportation security to the VIPR program is the best way to maximize
these security resources, given the severe backlog of transit security
grant awards and overdue regulations, as well as an understaffed
surface inspection program.
Question 5b. Please explain how such an allocation of resources is
consistent with a risk-based strategy for securing surface
transportation systems and facilities.
Question 5c. Please explain the delay in submitting to the
Committee on Appropriations the report on performance standards and
resource allocation for the VIPR program, as required in the report
accompanying the fiscal year 2009 Appropriations Act, and provide
information on the status of that report.
Answer. The requested additional funding will specifically address
the inherent vulnerabilities of our Nation's surface transportation
systems and better position the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to more readily and proactively perform its surface security
mission as outlined in the 9/11 Act. With the requested funding, TSA
plans to add an additional 15 Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams to be based in strategic locations throughout the
country. Each of the dedicated teams will support a distinct region,
which include airports and other transportation venues. This will allow
the teams to be cognizant of their respective regional needs for
enhanced security and law enforcement operations within the entire
transportation domain, while allowing them to be scalable and flexible
to respond and surge based on on-going threat streams. The full
complement of dedicated VIPR Teams (25) will focus their efforts in the
surface modes of transportation, consistent with the Secretary's vision
for transportation security.
Working with the TSA's Office of Intelligence, the VIPR Program
develops intelligence-driven deployment plans based on credible threat
intelligence. Through the use of risk management principles, VIPR teams
are deployed to implement flexible and nimble security operations at
high-risk transportation assets. Utilizing the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Risk Analysis Model, VIPR teams are deployed to surface
and aviation modes to implement security operations at high-risk
transportation sites. To date, the primary focus of these efforts has
included the Focus 40 Airports (Category X and Category I), the
identified 60 High Threat Urban Areas and the 20 High Threat Maritime
Cruise Ship Ports.
VIPR teams provide a tool with unique capabilities to the
transportation system. Deterrent effect is best achieved through
development and implementation of a joint plan for unpredictable
deployment of varying force packages at differing times and locations.
VIPR teams also augment security during periods of heightened threat as
well as during special events, such as political conventions, major
sporting events, and other occurrences of national or regional
significance that raise security concerns. Use of VIPR teams in this
manner builds a trained and tailored security augmentation capability
for deployment in periods of heightened threat or in response to
security incidents.
VIPR teams are deployed through deliberate planning using a risk-
based approach to work with Federal, State, and local security and law
enforcement officials for the purpose of augmenting resources in
response to an intelligence-driven threat or to provide a deterrent
presence. The program optimizes the ability to leverage a variety of
resources quickly to supplement local aviation, passenger rail, cruise
line and mass transit agency security capabilities.
VIPR allows TSA to respond quickly to unplanned or incident-driven
events and execute its response and recovery capabilities. Most VIPR
team activities are scheduled in advance to cover high-risk
infrastructure, address intelligence-driven threats or support special
event operations. These core elements dictate VIPR deployments across
transportation sectors.
Although TSA recognizes that additional work is needed to complete
hiring of its Transportation Security Inspector workforce, TSA's Office
of Security Operations has been moving aggressively to perform the
necessary recruitment. As planned, all inspector positions will be
filled in fiscal year 2010 and these positions will be working as an
integral component of VIPR deployment operations. TSA is also working
with the Department and key stakeholders to address regulatory and
grant management issues to provide additional security and efficiencies
to the surface transportation domain.
Although earlier reports generated by Government Accountability
Office and DHS Office of Inspector General have detailed issues
regarding planning and execution of VIPR operations in collaboration
with transportation stakeholder/partners, TSA has made great inroads
with transportation stakeholder/partners all across the Nation and
provides the bridge to all key components for VIPR operations. There
have been over 1,600 VIPR operations conducted in the surface modes
since inception. TSA now enjoys a robust relationship with its
stakeholders/partners, State, local and international due to the proven
capabilities that it brings to the enhancement of security and law
enforcement capabilities at all transportation modes.
Transportation stakeholder/partners have reacted positively to the
VIPR concept and often request TSA to augment their forces. TSA
provides proactive public affairs information in locations were VIPR
operations occur.
The fiscal year 2009 report to Congress regarding VIPR deployment
and performance measures was recently submitted to the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees on June 25, 2009.
Question 6. Earlier this year, GAO released a classified technology
report highlighting some of the certification and deployment challenges
faced by TSA regarding checkpoint technology. The report indicated
that, since 2003, over $700 million has been invested in the
development, procurement, and deployment of checkpoint technologies.
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that adequate investments are
made in technologies and that proper and timely certification,
procurement, and deployment of checkpoint screening technologies are
carried out by TSA?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
developed a comprehensive Passenger Screening Program (PSP) that
encompasses a collection of threat detection devices and projects in
various states of exploration, development, and deployment based on
commercial availability and program requirements. The program has a
mixed lifecycle of technology to include legacy systems, systems in the
process of deployment, and future systems that are undergoing testing
and evaluation. The program focuses on deploying screening equipment
with improved detection capabilities in addition to the lifecycle
maintenance and replacement of existing (legacy) locations and
equipment.
PSP continues to use a sound methodology to procure new emerging
technologies. As a requirement of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Acquisitions Directive (AD) 102, projects are required to
generate Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCEs) based on known and estimated
costs that are presented at prescribed instances, known as Acquisition
Decision Events (ADEs), to the proper reviewing authority along with
documentation displaying the benefits of the technology. On an annual
basis, the PSP participates in both TSA and DHS Acquisition Review
Boards to review specific project costs and benefits.
The Program works with the respective stakeholders to develop a
tailored plan for each project that identifies primary objectives,
risks, as well as schedule and execution strategies for the procurement
and deployment of technology. To that end, the PSP must be flexible and
able to adapt quickly to changes in terrorist tactics. The PSP strives
towards optimizing technological investments based on thorough analysis
and risk management principles, as well as the collaborative testing
and evaluation of new technologies.
The PSP has implemented a formal testing process as documented in
our Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), which establishes a
framework of the testing processes followed for all PSP technology
investments to ensure products meet specifications, are safe and are
operationally effective. TSA is in the process of improving the already
robust Testing and Evaluation (T&E) paradigm to ensure that operational
effectiveness and suitability of candidate security technology systems
are evaluated prior to deployment. Employing the concept of independent
and integrated testing and evaluation in support of acquisition
decision events and other program reviews, this process leverages data
from multiple developmental and operational testing sources, accredited
vendor data, modeling and simulation, and other special analyses (as
required), in accordance with testing and evaluation and systems
engineering principles and best practices, to streamline testing and
evaluation requirements while still providing a credible and
comprehensive evaluation product.
The deployment team has been increased and structured into a
regional paradigm with specialized knowledge of each respective region
and the attendant airport requirements for permitting and other
deployment logistics. Deployment Planning and Execution is organized
across three regional areas (East, Central, and West). The deployment
process makes use of the integrated product team (IPT) approach to
develop strategies, monitor overall performance and achieve deployment
program goals.
Question 7a. On June 2, 2009, committee staff received an
announcement from TSA indicating that TSA is ``currently denying air
service by Delta to Nairobi and Monrovia until security standards are
met or security threat assessments change.'' What steps did TSA take to
reach this decision?
Did you engage Delta throughout your decisionmaking process?
Question 7b. When was Delta informed of your decision to deny air
service to Nairobi and Monrovia?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration Representative
(TSAR) for Africa and a team of TSA inspectors completed a
comprehensive security assessment of Roberts International Airport
(ROB) in Monrovia, Liberia and Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
(NBO) in Nairobi, Kenya. TSA also conducted a Man Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS) Assistance Visit of NBO and worked with the U.S.
intelligence community to develop a full understanding of the terrorist
threat to civil aviation in Africa.
Upon completion of these initial airport assessments of NBO and
ROB, the TSA Office of Global Strategies (OGS) led a TSA Integrated
Product Team (IPT) that included representatives from TSA's Offices of
Intelligence (OI), Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/
FAMS), Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM), and Chief
Counsel (OCC), to ensure that a thorough evaluation of security
conditions was performed, training and assistance provided, and
additional security measures implemented, as appropriate.
TSA is continuing to work with the Liberian Civil Aviation
Authority to assist it in achieving compliance with international
security standards, and with the Kenyan Civil Aviation Authority to
address identified security vulnerabilities and implement mitigating
measures. TSA will reassess the situation at ROB and NBO as appropriate
measures are implemented.
TSA actively engaged Delta Air Lines representatives throughout the
decision-making process. TSA OGS senior leadership met with Delta Air
Lines corporate senior security officers on several occasions at TSA
Headquarters, including on December 11, 2008, January 6, 2009, April 2,
2009, and April 30, 2009.
TSA's decision to deny Delta's proposed air service to NBO and ROB
was communicated to Delta Air Lines on June 1, 2009, based on TSA's
determination that security was not yet adequate to allow these
airports to be served. On April 2, TSA briefed Delta Air Lines on the
observations made by the security inspectors at ROB, and on April 30, a
similar briefing was provided to Delta regarding the observations made
by the security inspectors at NBO. During each of these meetings, TSA
advised Delta Corporate Security officers that while a final decision
would be made by TSA's Acting Assistant Secretary, in consultation with
Secretary Napolitano, the TSA IPT was recommending that Delta not
initiate service to ROB or NBO due to identified security deficiencies
and/or assessed security concerns.
Question 8. DHS, and specifically TSA, has had significant
challenges in its acquisition process, notably in the Secure Flight
Implementation, Business Operation (IBO) program, and the Information
Technology Infrastructure Program (ITIP). What steps have you taken to
ensure that TSA is progressing and improving its acquisition process to
ensure that procurements are done efficiently and competitively, and
that there is integrity in the process?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
confronted many acquisition challenges since its founding only 7 years
ago. However, TSA takes competition and the integrity of its
procurements very seriously. The Secure Flight Implementation and the
Business Operation (IBO) and Information Technology Infrastructure
Program (ITIP) are competitively awarded procurements. They represent a
significant advancement and evolution in acquisition strategy. For
example, the ITIP effort evolved into a performance-based service
acquisition, in which the scope of the predecessor contract was
separated into multiple fixed-priced acquisitions instead of a time and
materials contract. While difficult and challenging, this strategy
provides for better performance measurement, and the ability to
incorporate best industry practices.
TSA has made significant strides to establish processes and
procedures to ensure consistent, efficient, and effective acquisitions.
TSA exceeded the competition goal established by the Department of
Homeland Security Chief Procurement Officer by awarding 71 percent of
all contract dollars on a competitive basis. In fiscal year 2008, TSA
awarded 1,100 contracts and only 12 protests were submitted to the
Government Accountability Office. Also, TSA awarded over 20 percent of
all contract dollars to small businesses. All of Tier 1 and 2 (TSA's
largest programs) have certified Program Managers and Contracting
Officer's Technical Representatives. TSA has pursued several
initiatives to improve the acquisition process including: (1)
Implemented several initiatives to ensure the TSA acquisition workforce
has the appropriate skills; (2) completed an exhaustive lean six sigma
effort to identify, document, and improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of acquisition processes; (3) instituted a phased review
program, in which procurements are reviewed prior to solicitation and
award and after execution; and implemented an aggressive small business
program which has produced marked improvement in awarding contracts to
small business.
(tsa) aviation
Question 9a. Earlier in the Congress, the House unanimously passed
H.R. 559, FAST Redress Act of 2009. The legislation required the
Department of Homeland Security to develop a ``comprehensive cleared
list'' which will enhance the overall efficiency and effectiveness of
the DHS Traveler Redress Program. The President's budget has requested
$1.3 million and 1 FTE for the management of the program.
How will the additional funding and staffing allocation improve the
overall effectiveness of the program?
Question 9b. Additionally, the President's budget discusses the
``centralization of the DHS TRIP processing system''; could you please
expand on what this ``centralization'' entails and how it will work
with Secure Flight in the future?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Travel Redress
Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) serves as the centralized U.S. Government
customer service office for traveler-related redress concerns. While
the program office has made substantial progress in establishing a
robust redress process, it can enhance performance further through
centrally automating key process functions--such as inquiry intake,
routing, vetting, tracking, reporting, and response. The objective is
to gain operational efficiencies and to reduce the overall time
required to process traveler requests. The fiscal year 2010 budget will
accomplish this objective through investing in DHS TRIP technology and
staffing capabilities.
DHS plans to direct over half of the requested funding toward
Information Technology (IT) improvements for DHS TRIP through an
enhanced case management system. This case management system will
leverage lessons learned since the launch of DHS TRIP in February 2007
to centralize and improve inquiry intake, routing, tracking, reporting,
and response functions. DHS plans to direct the remaining funding and
its staffing allocation to develop and implement additional
enhancements (i.e., call center support and an improved vetting
process) that will strengthen customer service. These investments will
also allow DHS to expand redress support to non-travel related
watchlist vetting programs in the Department, supporting DHS's
objective of reusing redress results across vetting programs.
These IT improvements will allow programs such as Secure Flight to
use the results of the redress process more effectively to reduce
occurrences of misidentifications during vetting. DHS TRIP currently
provides a listing of cleared individuals to the airlines and to Secure
Flight to assist in the watch list matching process. This cleared list
contains individuals for whom the redress process has determined are
not on the watch list but may be prone to misidentification due to the
similarity of their names and biographic information to records in the
watch list. Once the new DHS TRIP IT system is implemented, Secure
Flight (as well as other DHS vetting programs) will benefit by
receiving automated inquiry updates of cleared individuals on a more
frequent basis and in a more efficient format. As a result, DHS can
better prevent future inconveniences to misidentified travelers.
Question 10a. Throughout meetings between committee staff and TSOs,
a number of concerns have been raised on TSA's ability to provide
adequate training for all TSOs who may need recurrent training on
certain technologies at checkpoints. Additionally, TSOs indicated that
very few of them were cross-trained to serve in more than one position
at an airport checkpoint.
How is TSA able to verify that appropriate recurrent training is
made available to TSOs who need it at any given time?
Question 10b. Additionally, does TSA cross-train TSOs to be able to
serve multiple positions at checkpoint? If so, what percentage of TSOs
is trained to serve multiple locations at a checkpoint?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
established an annual National Training Plan. Specific recurrent
security training courses are loaded into the learning plans of all
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) on the On-Line Learning Center
(OLC). TSOs are required to complete this training to ensure they
maintain proficiency of skills learned during basic training.
Additionally, the recurrent courses are designed to keep the workforce
up-to-date with procedural changes; build upon existing skills and
abilities, new technologies introduced into the screening operations;
equipment used by the TSOs in the performance of their duties; and, new
threat items. Recurrent training is available via web-based training on
the OLC, through instructor-led classes, and hands-on training at the
checkpoint. Additional training can be assigned to TSOs by the field
training staff to target TSOs' individual training needs (e.g. X-Ray
Image Interpretation).
All TSOs must participate in an Annual Proficiency Review to ensure
that they meet the qualifications and performance standards required to
perform their duties as set forth under the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA). TSOs are certified annually based on their overall
annual performance as defined by the Performance Accountability and
Standards System (PASS). One of the components of PASS is that TSOs
must complete all assigned training. Training is recorded and tracked
through the OLC.
TSOs are trained to perform checkpoint screening functions, checked
baggage functions or both. TSA does not have multiple positions at the
checkpoint, but multiple functions. TSOs rotate and perform the various
functions. Upon successful completion of Basic Screener Training and
On-the-Job Training, as well as achievement of passing scores on all
tests associated with this training, 100 percent of the TSOs certified
to perform checkpoint screening functions can perform each of those
functions, therefore, no cross-training is required.
The TSO workforce is comprised of 16,980 TSOs who can perform all
checkpoint screening functions; 5,626 TSOs who can perform checked
baggage screening functions, and 23,753 TSOs who can perform both
checkpoint and checked baggage functions.
Question 11. Last year, Assistant Secretary Hawley discussed
Checkpoint Evolution as TSA's new way of modernizing checkpoints across
airports. This initiative was started at the end of the previous
administration. Outside of BWI, it does not appear that many of the
elements have been implemented at other airports. What is the status of
Checkpoint Evolution, has it been implemented across all airports? What
components in Checkpoint Evolution provide TSA with metrics in which to
measure enhanced security at airports?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. So much of the aviation security budget is geared
towards passenger checkpoint and baggage screening. Please provide us
with an explanation as to how the agency will balance the need to
quickly roll out new technologies against the realistic budgetary
constraints that force TSA to prioritize how new checkpoint and baggage
screening equipment is allocated at airports.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Passenger Screening Program (PSP) has been aggressively engaged in the
national deployment of new technologies at the screening checkpoint.
The defined strategy of deploying to high-risk, high-volume airports is
used to prioritize and determine when each airport will receive the new
technology. PSP has gained and implemented a host of best practices
from the recent deployments of Advanced Technologies (ATs) and
passenger imaging technologies. The preparations for the accelerated
deployments have been predicated upon these best practices. The
deployment team has been increased and structured into a regional
approach with specialized knowledge of their region and the various
airport requirements for permitting and other deployment logistics.
There has been dedicated space identified at the Technology System
Integration Facility for the swift and massive undertaking to provide
daily monitoring and teaming of the upcoming deployments. Site designs
are already in the process of being drawn up in anticipation of the
accelerated deployments thereby shortening the time required to plan
and install. Finally, there is a streamlining of the contract vehicle
for deployments with the single systems integrator contract currently
under competition.
Question 13. In fiscal year 2010, for Explosives Detection Systems
(EDS) purchase and installation there is $250 million in mandatory
spending from the 9/11 Act, $856 million for discretionary spending in
the fiscal year 2010 budget request, and also $700 million in Recovery
Act funding. Can you please give the committee a perspective on how
this money will be allocated and prioritized in deploying these systems
at airports Nation-wide?
Answer. The additional funding from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act and fiscal year 2010 budget request will enable the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to accelerate its
implementation of the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). As
stated in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) expenditure
plan, the additional $700 million will shorten the timeline of full
optimal system deployment by up to 2 years. The initial ARRA spend plan
included 16 EDS aiport projects to receive the first infusion of ARRA
funds. Per congressional direction, quarterly updates addressing ARRA
spend plan changes and fiscal year 2009 appropriation changes will also
be submitted to Congress.
Funding considerations for the EBSP include: Program Operations and
Management (O&M), previously committed multi-year agreements for
facility modifications, purchase and install of explosives detection
systems equipment, new terminals, compliance, fulfilling existing
agreements, equipment for new projects, new funding for facility
modifications, and technology/engineering initiatives. In developing
the spend plan, TSA first considers the funding needed to keep the
organization operating--the Program O&M costs. Next, TSA identifies the
funding required for previously committed multi-year agreements. Then
funding is identified for the purchase and installation of this
equipment to fulfill existing agreements, equip new terminals, address
compliance issues, and include new projects not requiring facility
modifications. TSA tries to accommodate all of these projects since
they are required for 100 percent compliance of the requirement to
screen all checked baggage for explosives, fulfilling previous
agreements, equipment-only requests, and new terminal operations. With
any remaining funds, TSA will prioritize facility modification requests
and balance those with technology and engineering initiatives for
system improvements and cost management opportunities.
Question 14. The overall number of Transportation Security Officer
FTEs remains about the same in the fiscal year 2010 budget request as
in previous years with just under 46,000 personnel. At the same time,
more of these FTEs are performing specialized functions such as
Behavioral Detection and Travel Document Checking. Please explain how
you determine what the right amount of passenger and baggage screeners
is for the current volume of passenger traffic, and how shifting more
personnel into other specialized security roles impacts traditional
passenger and baggage screening.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) utilizes a
discrete event simulation commonly known as the Staffing Allocation
Model to determine base staffing requirements for baggage and passenger
screening activities. The inputs for this model includes multiple
variables such as an airport's physical configuration, flight
schedules, passenger volumes, and type and number of screening
equipment on hand. This level of detail ensures staffing allocations
are molded to the demand and are sufficient to cover all operations.
Furthermore, field engineers and workforce utilization experts conduct
routine analyses to verify that the model inputs remain accurate
throughout each year. Shifting personnel into specialized security
roles has no adverse effect on the traditional passenger and baggage
screening, and improves our overall security posture. TSA has become
more efficient in its utilization of resources and technology. The
shifting of resources was not done at the expense of passenger and
baggage screening, but rather as a result of increased efficiencies
identified through the use of advanced technologies along with improved
resource utilization.
Question 15. The fiscal year 2010 budget contains a modest increase
over last year's enacted amount for Transportation Security Officer
training programs. Please highlight where TSA intends to focus with
respect to allocating training resources. Can you say that TSOs have
access to appropriate facilities at work to participate in training?
Have you heard any complaints from the TSO workforce about training
issues, and if so, have there been any corrections or improvements made
in this area?
Answer. With the rapid pace of change and implementation of new
concepts, demographic challenges, and enabling technologies, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) constantly seeks to
improve ways to help the security workforce be successful on the job
with the right knowledge and skills. Therefore, acquiring and using
emerging technologies and innovative ways to deliver training is
critical to the success of the mission.
We recognize that training space constraints continue to be a
challenge, and we continue to provide off-site space to address space
restrictions at many airports. Although Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs) may not have immediate access to training at the
checkpoints, appropriate facilities are available at every airport for
TSOs to complete training.
Question 16. There is a modest increase in the fiscal year 2010
budget request for Aviation Regulation that includes the inspection
programs for international programs, repair stations, and the canine
training program. Given the upcoming cargo-screening mandate, can you
say that the regulatory programs are adequately resourced?
Answer. The fiscal year 2010 budget request by the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) provides adequate regulatory oversight
resources to screen 100 percent of passenger cargo originating at U.S.
airports.
Question 17. The budget very briefly states in the Tort Claims
section that TSA screens over 50 million bags per month and reimburses
passengers that have experienced baggage loss or damage due to TSA
negligence. Please describe how this process is working in terms of
outstanding and adjudicated claims.
Answer. In fiscal year 2008, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) received and adjudicated approximately 17,600
claims, 19 percent of which resulted in payments to the claimant. In
fiscal year 2009, through June, TSA has received just over 10,000
claims. Fiscal year 2009 payment percentages remain consistent with
fiscal year 2008. TSA is processing claims within the 6-month deadline
established by the Federal Tort Claims Act, with the exception of
certain special cases, such as claims that are in litigation. As of the
end of June 2009, TSA had 2,666 claims under adjudication (i.e.,
outstanding). Of these claims, over 80 percent have been received since
May 1, 2009.
(tsa) surface transportation
Question 18. Please explain the reasoning behind the allocation of
surface transportation security resources toward the VIPR program,
including whether any Federal entities (such as GAO or the DHS
Inspector General) or non-Federal stakeholders were consulted about
surface transportation security priorities, and whether any new
surface-focused components are envisioned for VIPR teams devoted to
surface activities.
Answer. The requested additional funding will specifically address
the inherent vulnerabilities of our Nation's surface transportation
systems and better position the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to more readily and proactively perform its surface security
mission as outlined in the 9/11 Act.
Through Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR), TSA
teams State and local agencies with additional Federal Air Marshals
(FAMs), Transportations Security Inspectors--Surface, Behavior
Detection Officers, and Bomb Appraisal Officers. Each element brings
expertise to the surface modes of transportation in a collaborative
effort to deter, disrupt, and defeat possible terrorist or criminal
actions towards the Nation's transportation system. Utilization of
these assets has been proven effective through the collaborative
deployment of over 1,600 VIPR operations in the surface modes using
existing resources not specifically dedicated to VIPR operations.
Dedication of these assets will create an even greater deterrence and
public awareness to the surface transportation domain, especially given
the enhanced level of coordination and communication that now exists
between TSA and its VIPR partner agencies.
For example, all of TSA's operational components collaborate on
plans to deploy VIPR resources in the surface transportation domain and
TSA's Office of Transportation Sector Network Management meets
regularly with its stakeholder/partners, collaborating on best
practices to secure the transportation domain. TSA's transportation
stakeholder/partners provide necessary and regular feedback and input
into the plans TSA proposes for future VIPR operational deployments and
this relationship has strengthened considerably since the Government
Accountability Office and the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General audits. Moving forward, TSA expects these working
relationships to continue to improve at a national level, particularly
if additional resources are made available to support the VIPR program
as requested in the President's budget.
Question 19. Please explain why only 18 additional canine teams are
supported by the budget request for surface transportation, and why
some of those teams are targeted for the ferry sector rather than rail
and transit activities.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's)
funding of an additional 18 canine teams for surface transportation
security represents an appropriate allocation of resources within the
TSA budget. These teams will be under the control of local law
enforcement responsible for surface transportation security in their
respective jurisdictions. This is in addition to 82 canine teams in the
National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) that are
already dedicated to surface transportation security. The NEDCTP will
continue to monitor its budget during fiscal year 2010 to determine if
additional surface canine teams can and should be funded.
With respect to ferry teams, NEDCTP worked with other offices
within TSA to identify surface transportation security requirements,
which included ferry systems. The NEDCTP based its decisions for team
locations on system-wide surface transportation security needs,
deployment requirements, and overall concept of operations. Ferry
systems were chosen based on passenger ridership and U.S. Coast Guard
risk management data.
Question 20. Please clarify what is happening to the First Observer
program. This program is supported by the Trucking Security Grant
Program, which is targeted for termination; yet, the budget
justification for TSA's request with regard to surface transportation
security states that the Highway Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ISAC) will be continued through fiscal year 2010. The ISAC is
part of the First Observer Program, which, as noted, is supported by
the trucking grants. How is this program going to continue if the
source of its funding is being eliminated?
Answer. The First Observer program was funded for $15.5 million by
the fiscal year 2008 Trucking Security Program (TSP) grant, which has a
36-month period of performance. The HMS Company was awarded the fiscal
year 2008 TSP grant for the First Observer program, and it developed
its budget, which includes funding for the Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) for 41 months from the date of award. The grant
award date was July 15, 2008 and the period of performance is August 1,
2008 through December 31, 2011. Therefore, the Information Sharing and
Analysis Center will continue to operate through December, 2011, funded
by the fiscal year 2008 TSP grant.
Question 21. Does the ``inter-modal security training and exercise
program'' referenced in your written testimony and the budget
justification include the outstanding training regulations for transit,
rail, and bus workers required under the 9/11 Act? Where is it housed
within TSA? And for the purposes of this program, does ``inter-modal''
include aviation? Please explain how this budget request reflects the
importance of supporting TSA's regulatory functions to address the long
delays in issuing these critical security regulations.
Answer. Three sections of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) require the establishment of a
program for conducting security exercises for public transportation
agencies, railroad carriers, and over-the-road buses. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed the
Intermodal Security and Training Exercise Program (I-STEP) under the
auspices of the TSA Office of Transportation Sector Network management
(TSNM) to provide these exercises. The intermodal programs under the I-
STEP do not include aviation.
The I-STEP Program does not address the development of regulations
calling for security training for frontline employees in certain modes,
as required by the 9/11 Act. TSA is actively developing regulations to
fulfill these requirements. Once these regulations are issued as final
rules, I-STEP will reinforce the training standards during exercises.
The funds needed for continued regulatory development are included in
the fiscal year 2010 budget request.
Question 22. In your written testimony you reference the
International Working Group on Land Transport Security and state that
TSA is engaged with that organization to promote best practices,
capacity building, and information sharing. Please describe all of
TSA's activities with respect to the International Working Group, and
elaborate on how this budget reflects the significance of those
activities.
Answer. The United States proposed the creation of an international
land transport security working group at the Japanese Ministerial
Conference on International Transport Security in January 2006. The
purpose was to create a forum within which the international
transportation security community could improve land transport security
by sharing best practices, enhancing cooperation between government
authorities and industry, and sharing technology information. Three
years after its inception, members now include: Australia, Canada,
China, the European Commission, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Philippines, Republic of
Korea (South), Russia, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), hosted the 4th
and 5th International Working Group on Land Transport Security (IWGLTS)
sessions on behalf of the United States. During the 4th session in
November 2008, the following priorities for IWGLTS were agreed upon by
the participating States: (1) Information sharing as an overarching
theme and the No. 1 priority; (2) creating a compendium of smart
practices; further developing the secure web board for IWGLTS efforts;
(3) conducting inter-sessional work; and (4) reaching out to other
organizations (e.g., International Union of Railways--UIC) to maximize
efforts; and conducting a survey of members' current and planned
technologies in land transport security.
Identifying specific deliverables within the previously agreed-upon
priorities (Mitigation Activities, Risk Assessment, Technology, Public
Awareness and Stakeholder Partnerships), prioritizing and deciding
which deliverables will be pursued before the 6th Session, and
identifying leads/co-leads for each deliverable for work to begin
during inter-session periods were accomplished at the 5th session in
May 2009. IWGLTS members not only identified, prioritized, and
committed to several deliverables, but also began establishing
timelines and planning inter-session efforts for the following
activities: (1) Conduct a survey of members' mitigation security
measures for land transportation modes--U.S. lead; (2) conduct a survey
of members' current/future land transport security technologies--
Australia lead; (3) develop a risk assessment matrix of land transport
modes--France lead; and (4) develop presentations and discussion on
Public Awareness campaigns (India, Indonesia, and United States will
present at the next IWGLTS meeting)--U.S. to coordinate during inter-
session periods.
small business
Question 23. As of June 22, 2008, TSA was no longer exempt from
complying with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. How has this change
impacted minority-owned, woman-owned, and veteran-owned businesses?
Answer. Although mandated to comply with the Federal Acquisition
Regulation since only June 2008, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has been a strong advocate for small business
since its inception and has developed a strong and robust small
business program. Prior to 2007, TSA developed internal management
directives and processes based upon acquisition best practices to
ensure small business participation. In 2007, TSA was required to
comply with the Small Business Act. In fiscal year 2008, TSA awarded
over 20 percent of contract dollars to small businesses, an increase of
5.3 percent from fiscal year 2003. In addition, TSA awarded 6.7 percent
of contract dollars to small disadvantaged business, exceeding the goal
of 5 percent. TSA also awarded 2.6 percent of contract dollars to small
businesses owned by disabled veterans.
Question 24. In order to receive grant funding from TSA, do State
and local governments that plan to utilize funds in a competitive
manner have to comply with any Federal rules/regulations on minority
business or disadvantaged business utilization?
Answer. The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) Grant Guidance
and Application Kit that is published for each grant cycle includes
language on Disadvantaged Business Requirements. Both the fiscal year
2009 TSGP Guidance (page 49) and the fiscal year 2009 American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act TSGP Guidance (page 53) state ``Applicants are
advised that, to the extent that recipients of a grant use contractors
or subcontractors, such recipients shall use small, minority, women-
owned or disadvantaged business concerns and contractors or
subcontractors to the extent practicable.''
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