[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
100% AIR CARGO SCREENING:
CAN WE SECURE AMERICA'S SKIES?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-10
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Peter T. King, New York (Ex
James A. Himes, Connecticut Officio)
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Beland, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Joseph Vealencis, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 8
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 9
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 10
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Edward Kelly, General Manager, Air Cargo, Transportation
Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Panel II
Mr. Andre L. Johnson, Chief Executive Officer, FreightScan:
Oral Statement................................................. 42
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
Mr. Jack Boisen, Chairman, The International Air Cargo
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Mr. Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 49
Prepared Statement............................................. 51
Mr. James C. May, President and Chief Executive Officer, Air
Transport Association of America, Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 53
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
For the Record
Mr. John Costanzo, President, Express Delivery and Logistics
Association (XLA):
Letter, Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee............. 4
Mr. Michael Whatley, Air Cargo Security Alliance:
Letter, Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee............. 4
Mr. Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Letter, Submitted by Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee............. 67
100 PERCENT AIR CARGO SCREENING:
CAN WE SECURE AMERICA'S SKIES?
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Wednesday, March 18, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Lujan,
Cleaver, Massa, Thompson (ex-officio), and Dent.
Also present: Representative Markey.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The subcommittee will come to order, and I
thank you for your indulgence.
It is interesting that this happens to be a full calendar
day. A number of committees are meeting, which include
committees that I participate in; and it seems like it is
timely because we are listening to testimony of Mr. Liddy in
one committee and discussing legislation regarding no more
greed. You would wonder why this is a timely hearing because
all of them are operating with the, if you will, somewhat shock
of the Congress that laws that we have passed or that
statements that we have made have not been, if you will,
adhered to.
We now are in a hearing where instructions have been given
by this full committee and subcommittee on the issue of cargo
screening; and it has come to our attention that the full
impact, full action on our instructions have not been pursued.
It raises an issue of security to the crisis level of great
concern. So this hearing is about fixing it, about the
instructive oversight that we should have on these issues and
about fixing it; and this subcommittee intends to work
diligently to do so.
Also, we will look forward to our hearings in the future
being on a Tuesday, which will help all of us in terms of the
schedule. So I thank all of you for your indulgence.
I am delighted to acknowledge the presence of the Ranking
Member, Mr. Dent; the presence of the full committee Chairman,
Mr. Thompson; Members of the subcommittee, Mr. DeFazio, Mr.
Lujan, and Mr. Cleaver--we thank you for your presence--and our
guest, a former Member of the Homeland Security Committee and
this subcommittee, Mr. Markey.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``100 Percent Air Cargo Screening: Can We Secure America's
Skies?'' Our witnesses today will testify about TSA and
industry's progress and challenges to meet the 9/11 Act
requirement to screen 100 percent of all passenger plane cargo
by August, 2010.
Before I begin my opening statement, I would like to
welcome the gentleman from Massachusetts, a former Member of
the subcommittee and a champion of cargo security, Mr. Markey.
Without objection, it will be our privilege to authorize Mr.
Markey to sit on the dais, provide an opening statement and
question our witnesses during the hearing today.
Mr. Dent. Madam Chair, I have no objections. I just wanted
to ask the Chair's consideration should a Member of the
minority party wish to make an address to this committee or a
5-minute opening, I would hope that you would receive that
request favorably.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
Today, this subcommittee will continue its commitment to
robust oversight of one of the most important issues addressed
by Congress in the 9/11 Act, the screening of cargo on
commercial passenger aircraft. This is my second hearing on
this issue as Chairwoman of the subcommittee which has
jurisdiction over aviation security, and we will continue to
monitor TSA's progress in screening cargo during the 111th
Congress.
I look forward to engaging with my colleagues on the
subcommittee and learning from our witnesses about how TSA and
industry are working together to achieve the cargo screening
mandate. This mandate is a critical step toward securing
aviation. Might I add, as I started out, it is important when
Congress issues mandates to note that they are for the
betterment of the American people; and we will work diligently
to comply.
The subcommittee is determined to work with the new
administration and conduct thoughtful oversight to make sure we
can move forward and complete implementation of this essential
element of the 9/11 Act.
The logic is clear. If we screen passengers and their
checked baggage, we must screen the other cargo on-board the
same aircraft. It is my intent to view a number of airports and
to really see in action whether or not we are utilizing
officers or, in fact, at these major airports, what are we
doing to comply with the 100 percent screening.
Section 1602 of the 9/11 Act established two deadlines: the
first required screening of 50 percent of cargo on passenger
planes by February 3, 2009--already passed--the second requires
100 percent screening by August 3, 2010.
The February deadline has passed, as I indicated. Aside
from receiving an e-mail from TSA stating that it had begun to
enforce the 50 percent screening requirement on air carriers,
this subcommittee has not received any further, more detailed
confirmation that this requirement is being satisfied. Today,
we are more than a month past the deadline; and I was concerned
when I read GAO's testimony which states that TSA cannot verify
that screening is being done at the mandated 50 percent level.
Now, let me at least say to the two witnesses here, this is
not an attempt to excoriate either one of you. We hope you will
present us with very forthright testimony. It is an attempt to
express, again, the word of the day, ``outrage.'' It fits quite
squarely with actions of financial markets and what is
happening here in this security area. Which means that the word
``verify''--just as there could be no explanation of Saturday
night bonuses given out, there seems to be no explanation. You
cannot ``verify.'' That is the word for me.
This is not to say that TSA has not been working with
industry stakeholders to fulfill the Section 1602 requirements.
I know it has made progress in this endeavor, but the question
remains can TSA positively verify that 50 percent of cargo on
passenger planes are being screened and can this be formally
reported to Congress? That is our large question here today.
Still, the most important thing is to achieve 100 percent
screening by August, 2010, and we therefore need to be able to
verify the 50 percent so that we can move forward to fulfill
the 100 percent by August, 2010.
This afternoon, we will also examine whether TSA is on
track again to meet the 2010 deadline. The scope of this
hearing includes reviewing the programs and regulations that
have been put in place in its efforts to achieve 100 percent
screening by TSA on cargo screening on passenger aircraft,
exploring TSA compliance and verification standards for
ensuring that screening is taking place, and evaluating DHS
progress in certifying new and effective screening
technologies.
In addition, we want to know whether TSA has adequate
resources and personnel to accomplish this mission. We want to
know what kind of oversight and initiatives or new legislative
action needed are to be taken by this subcommittee to draw upon
the seriousness of our mission along with the full committee.
As we review TSA's efforts to meet the screening deadlines,
we also want to review the impact this is having on our
industry partners, including air carriers, freight forwarders,
and manufacturers who must make significant investments who
have the greatest stake in an effective and efficient
implementation process.
The importance of achieving 100 percent cargo screening
cannot be understated. As such, and based on what we will learn
here today, I will be asking GAO to conduct a follow-up
assessment for the subcommittee to keep us informed about how
the implementation process is progressing and alert us to any
new hurdles that may arrive. I hope that the Ranking Member,
Mr. Dent, will join me in making this request so we can proceed
in a bipartisan manner.
I would like to thank our witnesses for coming today and
presenting to us what I hope will be helpful in shedding light
on this critical endeavor. I know that much work has been done,
but there is still a lot more to be accomplished in order to
achieve 100 percent screening by next summer.
We are always reminded that we have not had a terrorist act
on our soil since 2001. One, it gives us comfort, but then it
gives those who believe that we focus too much on security and
the securing of our homeland or that we shouldn't worry about
it or why are you getting so excited, it gives them, I guess,
the extra fodder for their belief.
But I am always mindful of our good Boy Scouts, and that is
to make your camp better than you found it and to be prepared.
We are not prepared. If we cannot verify 50 percent, then we
are certainly not prepared; and any moment a small package of
any kind sent by anyone who endeavors to do this Nation harm
can again create the atmosphere for a terrorist act on our
soil.
It is well-known from hearings that we have had that we
have decentralized terrorism. They can be found anywhere. So I
am delighted that we have the opportunity to show that we mean
business. All of the witnesses today are experienced,
knowledgeable veterans of the aviation industry; and I look
forward to hearing from all of you and working with you to make
our skies secure.
I would like to enter into the record two statements, the
first is by the Express Delivery and Logistics Association and
the second is from the Air Cargo Security Alliance.
Is there any objection?
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement for the Record Submitted by John Costanzo, President, Express
Delivery and Logistics Association (XLA)
The Express Delivery and Logistics Association (XLA) understands
that the Air Cargo Security Alliance is a coalition that was started to
combat the 100% screening mandate. The alliance was established with
the singular intent of charging the Transportation Security
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security with screening
at the airports much in the way that they have taken over passenger
screening. In order to cover the resources required by TSA and DHS, the
alliance is proposing to add a $0.05 surcharge per pound on cargo to be
borne by customers of Indirect Air Carriers.
Following discussions with our Government Affairs Committee and the
security subcommittee as well as XLA members at large, the XLA Board of
Directors has taken a position not to support or join the ACSA
initiative. XLA will continue to endorse Certified Cargo Security
Program (CCSP) and TSA's current implementation plan that is well
underway. Our membership has embraced CCSP with many members certified
or in the process of being certified, some with considerable
investments in the project. Consequently we have recommended to our
members that, should they be approached, they not lend their name or
any other form of support to this effort.
______
Statement for the Record Submitted by Michael Whatley, Air Cargo
Security Alliance
March 18, 2009
introduction
The Air Cargo Security Alliance would like to thank Chairwoman
Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent and the other Members of the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection
for the opportunity to submit testimony for today's hearing.
Today's hearing topic--whether we can secure America's skies with a
100% air cargo screening mandate--is timely and critical to both our
national security and the air cargo industry. My testimony focuses on
TSA implementation of the 100% screening mandate and its impact on the
thousands of small and mid-size freight forwarders whose very existence
depends on reliable access to passenger aircraft for shipping cargo.
The Air Cargo Security Alliance (ACSA) is an alliance of over 225
indirect air carriers, direct shippers, airlines, airport authorities,
customs brokers, and affiliated businesses Nation-wide that represent
every part of the air cargo industry. Formed in 2008, ACSA is dedicated
to developing and implementing an air cargo screening program that will
meet our homeland security needs and allow all members of the air cargo
industry to continue providing world-class service to their customers.
ACSA's mission is ensure a level playing field for the entire air
cargo industry through the development of a multi-layered air cargo
screening program that relies on two very important components: First,
voluntary screening by members of the air cargo industry and, second, a
robust Federal screening program physically located at America's
airports. Any program that fails to include both of these elements will
create economic and logistical obstacles to effective screening and
fair competition.
background
The air cargo industry is made up of over 4,200 registered indirect
air carriers (IACs), which operate at over 10,000 separate facilities
and utilize over 450 airports Nation-wide, as well as dozens of
airlines which carry air cargo and millions of companies that rely on
IACs (also known as freight forwarders) to move their goods through the
air cargo supply chain. The volume of cargo that is shipped via
commercial airplanes is immense--more than 50,000 tons a day, with over
12 million pounds moving on commercial passenger planes daily.
Air cargo can range from very small packages to loads that weigh
several tons. On any typical day the cargo shipped on passenger planes
will include anything from perishable foods and flowers to machinery
and equipment. The cargo can be shipped in numerous forms including
individually wrapped packages, wooden crates, assembled pallets, and
large containers called unit-loading devices.
The companies that make up the air cargo industry are as diverse as
the freight that they move. Obviously, there are several very large
companies such as integrators, which own their own planes, trucks, and
warehouses (such as FedEx, UPS, and DHL). However, the vast majority of
the companies that make up the industry are small companies that do not
own or operate aircraft, own limited (or no) warehouse space and
contract with trucking companies for their trucking needs rather than
own fleets of trucks.
Typically, when a small or mid-size IAC gets an order to move cargo
from one city to another on a specific, time-sensitive schedule, the
company will make arrangements with a commercial air carrier to
transport the cargo and contract with a trucking company to deliver the
cargo from its origination point to the airport for loading on the
passenger plane. They will also contract with another company to pick
the freight up at the airport following the flight and deliver it to
its final destination. At no point during this transaction does the
cargo go to a warehouse or central clearing station owned or operated
by the IAC.
The consequences of the 100% air cargo screening mandate apply
equally to every participant in the air cargo industry; from the
shipper, trucker, and IAC to the airline and the ultimate consignee. It
is vitally important to the existence of all of these companies that
the mandate be implemented in a manner that takes into consideration
their unique needs and business model.
9/11 act and bush administration response
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for
securing the air cargo transportation system without unduly impeding
the flow of commerce.\1\ In order to carry out this mission, TSA is
responsible for establishing security requirements governing all
domestic-originating flights (whether on domestic or foreign passenger
air carriers) that transport cargo, overseeing the implementation of
air cargo security requirements by air carriers and freight forwarders,
and conducting research and development of air cargo security
technologies.\2\
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\1\ Transportation Security Administration, Air Cargo Strategic
Plan, November 2003.
\2\ GAO, Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource
and Other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo
Transported on Private Planes, Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, July 2008.
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In order to meet these security requirements, TSA developed a
multilayered, risk-based system that requires airlines to screen a
percentage of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, requires IACS to
screen (or provide to TSA for screening) all cargo that meets certain
high-risk criteria and includes TSA screening of all cargo at Category
II-IV airports.
Pursuant to the language enacted in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (``the 9/11 Act''),
TSA is also required to establish a system to screen 100 percent of air
cargo transported on domestically originated passenger aircraft.
Section 1602 of the 9/11 Act requires this system to provide a
level of security commensurate with the level of security for the
screening of passenger checked baggage, requires that 50% of all cargo
be screened by February 2009, and require 100% of all cargo be screened
by August 2010. The 9/11 Act also provides TSA with the authority to
develop additional methods to ensure that cargo does not pose a threat
to transportation security--including the development of a program to
certify the security methods used by shippers.
The 9/11 Act defines the term ``screening'' to mean ``a physical
examination or non-intrusive method of assessing whether cargo poses a
threat to transportation security.'' Examples of such methods include
X-ray systems, EDS, ETD, explosives detection canine teams, and a
physical search with manifest verification.
The costs of meeting the 100% screening mandate will be
significant--in a 2007 study, the Center for American Progress
estimated the total costs of screening 100% of the cargo tendered on
passenger planes will be at least $600 million annually.\3\
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\3\ PJ Crowley and Bruce Butterworth, Keeping Bombs Off Planes,
Center for American Progress, May 2007.
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In response to the enactment of the screening requirements set
forth in the 9/11 Act, the Bush administration announced that TSA would
not conduct any screening of air cargo, but would instead develop a
two-pronged approach that will rely on screening by air carriers and
the development of the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP).
The CCSP is designed to allow the screening of air cargo to take
place at various points throughout the air cargo supply chain.
Participants in the CCSP, including freight forwarders, direct
shippers, manufacturing facilities, and perishable shippers, will be
designated at Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSFs) upon meeting
security requirements established by TSA. In order to prove the
validity of the CCSP approach, TSA has initiated a pilot program, in
which TSA has purchased screening equipment for a limited number of
large IACs in 18 major cities.
In addition to the development of the CCSP, TSA implemented
regulations which require 100% of all cargo transported on narrow-
bodied planes (airplanes that have only one aisle) to be screened. Due
to the fact that the CCSP has not yet been fully implemented,
compliance with this rule, which became effective on October 1, 2008,
has fallen largely on the shoulders of air carriers.
Airline compliance with the Narrow-Body Rule, as well as industry
participation in the CCSP Pilot Program are expected to achieve the 50%
screening mandate set forth in the 9/11 Act.
impacts of the current tsa approach
The Air Cargo Security Alliance applauds TSA's commitment to a
multi-layered approach to air cargo security and the creation of the
CCSP program. However, ACSA believes that CCSP must be a complement
to--rather than a substitute for--a Federal air cargo screening program
at America's airports.
In order to participate in the CCSP, a freight forwarder will be
required to purchase screening equipment, acquire (or already own)
warehouse space to facilitate the screening, and hire and train
employees to conduct the cargo screening.
As discussed above, the small and mid-sized companies that make up
the vast majority of freight forwarding industry have very limited
warehouse space--and operate at many airports where they do not have
any warehouses at all. Unlike the integrators, who move all of their
cargo through their own warehouses located at the airports prior to
placing it on their planes, freight forwarders rely on a Nation-wide
network of trucking companies to route their cargo directly from the
original pick-up point to the airport for tender with the airline for
the vast majority of their shipments.
Given the business model that freight forwarders use, the costs of
securing warehouse space, acquiring screening equipment, hiring
employees to conduct the screening and training those employees in
order to participate in the CCSP can be simply overwhelming. The
purchase of the screening equipment alone will cost between $150,000
and $500,000 or more per facility.\4\ For a typical freight forwarder
or customs broker, this will add up to an investment of several million
dollars merely to continue servicing existing clients and accounts.
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\4\ Testimony of Cindy Allen, National Customs Broker and
Forwarders Association of America, before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, July 15, 2008.
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Although there are some companies which can afford these types of
investments, there is simply no way that the vast majority of the 4,200
IACs Nation-wide have the financial resources to participate in such a
program. In order to remain competitive with the multi-national freight
forwarders or integrators who can afford the investment in screening
equipment, small and medium-sized IACs are forced to make a tough
choice--they can either purchase the screening equipment (provided that
lenders are able to extend them credit), or they face a continuing loss
of business and are forced to downsize their operations. Considering
the current economic contraction, the burden of making such a
tremendous investment could not be placed on small business owners at a
worse time.
In addition to the direct costs, the air cargo industry will also
face reduced air cargo service because airlines have been forced to
invest millions in cargo screening equipment in order to continue
providing air cargo services. Given the volume of air cargo traffic,
airlines are likely to make these investments at major hub-airports.
However, airlines are simply not economically capable of making the
substantial investments required to continue servicing all non-hub
airports that are currently used by IACs.
In fact, over the last 6 months, air carriers have announced
reduced or eliminated air cargo service to several regional airports
including Colorado Springs, Anchorage, Palm Springs, and Buffalo. As
airlines are faced with the costs of purchasing screening equipment, it
is reasonable to assume that airlines will scale back air cargo
services to hub airports only. This pull-back in cargo service will
essentially force IACs and their customers to rely solely on hub-
airports--and will likely force many to lay off workers and close their
doors.
The impact that TSA's reliance on CCSP and airline screening to
meet the 100% screening mandate will have on the air cargo industry
will be devastating.
In addition to forcing airlines to restrict air cargo services to
hub-airports only, denying them much-needed cargo revenues, it will:
Force airlines them to spend millions of dollars in
screening equipment at a time when they are least able to make
such investments,
Significantly reduce (or completely eliminate) cargo volumes
at hundreds of regional airports Nation-wide,
Force IACS to choose between spending millions to
participate in the CCSP program or face restricted (and more
expensive) access to passenger fleets for air cargo service,
Significantly drive up shipping costs for businesses that
rely on the air cargo industry to move their goods on an
expedited basis, and
Cause job losses as both regional airports and small to mid-
size IACs lose air cargo volume.
a federal air cargo screening program--a better approach
The Air Cargo Security Alliance believes that there is a better way
to achieve the 100% screening mandate. In the 9/11 Act, Congress
instructed TSA to establish an air cargo screening program
``commensurate with'' the checked baggage screening program already run
by TSA.
In order to comply with the clear Congressional intent in the 9/11
Act, and in order to ensure that the thousands of small companies that
make up an integral part of the air cargo industry are not
significantly or unfairly disadvantaged, we recommend that TSA
establish a Federal air cargo screening program that will operate at
all American airports.
In order to be a fair and effective, a Federal screening program
would ideally:
Be funded by a $0.05 per pound security surcharge modeled on
the passenger screening program currently operated by TSA,
Provide screening at all American airports,
Allow the screened cargo to go onto any airline that
provides air cargo services,
Reimburse any airline that conducts screening for the costs
of such screening, and
Work in conjunction with the CCSP program.
Such a program would preserve hundreds of thousands of jobs in the
air cargo industry, enhance air cargo security, ensure that the entire
air cargo industry would retain the ability to service their customers
and maximize the flow of cargo at all American airports.
In addition to protecting hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs
in the air cargo industry, this Federal screening program would:
Create thousands of new jobs without raising taxes or adding
to the Federal deficit,
Allow non-CCSP participants to continue to drop cargo at the
airport,
Allow non-CCSP participants to ship cargo on any airline,
Allow companies to choose whether they want to participate
in CCSP or not, and
Effectively set a ceiling on screening charges.
Furthermore, where the individual IAC operating as a CCSF will
screen only a limited amount of cargo, the Federal screening program
would screen cargo received from multiple IACs, providing a much better
return on investment.
conclusion
The air cargo industry is as diverse as the shipping community it
services. The companies that make up this industry come in all sizes
and offer ``niche'' services as well as a full menu of offerings from
managed global transportation to warehousing, distribution, trade
compliance, and even financial services. The small to mid-size
forwarder with an entrepreneurial bent can provide equally competitive
service offerings as multi-national companies given a level playing
field.
However, TSA's current cargo screening regime will take away that
level playing field and force the small to mid-size IACS to face
insurmountable costs and logistical hurdles in order to remain in the
market-place. For many, a 100% screening mandate without a Federal
screening program operating at all American airports is a threat to
their very existence.
The Air Cargo Security Alliance calls upon Congress and the Obama
administration to fulfill the clear Congressional intent of the 9/11
Act and protect the air cargo industry by creating a Federal air cargo
screening program that will operate at all American airports. As a
Nation committed to both homeland security and economic growth, we must
allow IACs to continue to serve their clients and provide essential
services that create hundreds of thousands of jobs, ensure the timely
delivery of essential goods worldwide and bolster the American economy.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony to the
subcommittee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Today, we plan on discussing the Transportation Security
Administration's attempt to meet a congressionally mandated 100
percent air cargo screening requirement included in the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. This
law requires, ``Not later than 3 years after the date of
enactment the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a
system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft operated by an air carrier.''
At the outset, let me compliment the TSA on their hard
work. The men and women of the TSA labor tirelessly to ensure
the security of our traveling public; and, quite frankly, air
cargo security has not always received the time, attention, or
funding it deserves. So, further, the Congress has seen fit to
place upon you unrealistic mandates in order to score political
points.
While 100 percent screening never equals 100 percent
security, I did vote for the passage of the 9/11 Commission
Act; and, despite these unrealistic 100 percent mandates, I
will require the Department to meet the mandates of the law. I
am therefore disappointed with what I perceive as the
Department's intention to provide the appearance of meeting its
security mandate without actually meeting, at least in my mind,
the actual mandate. The TSA's use of fuzzy math to artificially
inflate its aviation screening statistics is intellectually
dishonest, and I look forward to hearing our first panel on
this matter.
I am also disappointed that, with the 2010 deadline just a
year off, the TSA is unable to tell me what consequences an in-
bound aircraft might be subject to if it is determined to
possess a piece of freight that has not already been screened.
If it were an international flight bound for the United States,
would it be diverted to another country? Would a domestic
flight be required to land? What are the consequences of
failing to comply with the law?
Ultimately, I hope for an honest and open discussion about
what challenges the TSA expects to encounter in implementing
the air cargo screening requirements over the next 17 months.
The TSA has a relatively small number of certified cargo
screening facilities and relatively few transportation security
inspectors authorized to inspect and enroll these facilities.
Perhaps the biggest hurdle is that TSA has no clear way ahead
in managing foreign air carriers bound for the United States
with cargo. Much like the 100 percent screening requirement for
maritime containerized cargo, screening air cargo overseas
requires significant levels of international cooperation, which
dramatically complicates the TSA's efforts to meet its
congressional mandate. So I look forward to hearing from both
panels on these many challenges and the way ahead for the TSA
as it tries to meet this congressional mandate.
I think this is a very important discussion to have; and I
thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for having this hearing today.
At this time, I would yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Dent.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, for
convening this important hearing today.
I also welcome our panel of witnesses, both the first and
second, for bringing their important testimony to us.
This afternoon's hearing will evaluate progress made by TSA
in implementing the 9/11 Act's requirement to screen 100
percent of all cargo aboard passenger aircraft. Section 1602 of
the 9/11 Act also requires TSA to screen 50 percent of all
cargo aboard passenger aircraft by February, 2009.
I would like to take this opportunity to applaud the
efforts of my colleagues on this subcommittee and the full
committee and champion this important mandate in ensuring that
we take all necessary steps toward enhancing the Nation's
aviation security. After all, the 9/11 Commission Report
recommended that TSA intensify its efforts to identify, track,
and appropriately screen potentially dangerous cargo in
aviation. In an effort to fulfill this recommendation, Congress
has provided TSA with the necessary tools and a great deal of
flexibility.
Today, I would like to know if TSA can verify that it has
met the 50 percent deadline and whether it will be able to meet
the 100 percent deadline next year.
Mr. Kelly, I am particularly looking forward to your
testimony, not because this is your first time on the Hill, but
I want to hear what you have to say. I am interested in TSA's
perspective on the challenges it faces in meeting the 100
percent deadline.
As you know, I am also interested in hearing about DHS's
progress in exploring innovative technologies that can be
applied to fulfill the requirements of this law.
It is important to evaluate any existing research and
coordinating efforts between TSA and industry. We need to
ensure that the work in progress made by industry relevant to
screening can be leveraged by TSA to effectively screen and
detect explosives hidden in air cargo.
Today, we will also hear from stakeholders who have
concerns about TSA's plan to implement this mandate. This
hearing is not just about TSA checking the box. It is about
strengthening aviation security and protecting the traveling
public.
This hearing is also being hosted well in advance of the
August, 2010, deadline so that we can address the concerns of
Government and industry stakeholders early in the process and
remedy or avert potential obstacles to implementation.
Again, I thank the Chairwoman for hosting this important
hearing and thank the witnesses again for appearing before us
today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman of the full committee
for his insightful remarks.
I am noting that the Ranking Member of the full committee
is held up in another committee.
We will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Markey, for a statement of 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. I thank the gentlelady for extending this
courtesy to me. This is the first time in 7 years that I have
not been a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, and it is
a great honor and privilege that you have extended to me to
participate in today's hearing.
As you know, on 9/11, there were two planes hijacked up in
Boston that had 150 people on those two planes that were then
flown into the World Trade Center. Obviously, that is still at
the heart of my concern about these issues. Those two planes
still and all of those people and their families who I knew who
died that day still live on with me in terms of making sure
that we not see another recurrence of that.
In 2007, when Congress passed the landmark legislation to
implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, it
included the mandate to screen 100 percent of the air cargo
carried on passenger planes within 3 years and 50 percent of
cargo screened within 18 months. Now that last month's
statutory deadline to screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger
planes has passed, today's hearing, Madam Chairwoman, is
particularly timely and important.
A year ago, Chairman Thompson and I requested that the GAO
assess TSA's progress in implementing the cargo screening
mandate to ensure that the agency's approach is consistent with
congressional intent. I am pleased that today, Mr. Lord, you
will provide GAO's preliminary findings and recommendations in
this area.
GAO's testimony raises several important questions about
whether the system that the Bush administration developed to
fulfill the 100 percent screening mandate will meet the
requirements of the law.
Specifically, GAO's testimony notes that:
No. 1, TSA cannot verify that it has met the February, 2009
deadline, for screening 50 percent of cargo on passenger planes
as required by law.
No. 2, TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening
of in-bound air cargo, that is, cargo on passenger planes
entering the United States from overseas, by the mandated
deadline of August 2010. In-bound cargo is almost half of the
total volume of cargo on passenger planes, accounting for 44
percent of the total, or 3.3 billion pounds of cargo each year.
No. 3, the system developed by TSA relies heavily on
shippers, freight forwarders, and others in the supply chain to
screen cargo before it reaches the airport. However, as GAO has
noted, there is a real risk that if these private-sector firms
decide not to participate in TSA's system, it would make it
difficult, if not impossible, to meet the 100 percent mandate.
These are critically important shortcomings in the
implementation of this law that the Obama administration has
inherited but which it needs to move quickly to correct. TSA
has a duty to ensure that the 100 percent screening mandate is
met and that the level of security that is applied to air cargo
is commensurate with the level of security applied to
passengers' checked bags pursuant to the law.
Again, it is my great honor, Madam Chairwoman, and I thank
you, Mr. Dent, for the opportunity to testify. I have invested
7 years of my career in this provision; and it means a lot to
me that the two of you, along with Chairman Thompson and the
rest of the committee Members, have allowed me to participate.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We thank you for your testimony, Mr.
Markey. We thank you for your on-going interest on this very
vital issue.
Let me also acknowledge a Member of our committee, Mr.
Massa's, presence here today; and we thank him so very much.
We look forward to engagement of all of our Members.
Again, I welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Edward Kelly, General Manager for
Cargo at TSA. Mr. Kelly joined TSA in September 2006 and brings
with him a wealth of knowledge and over 30 years of experience
in the supply chain in the cargo industry. In his current
capacity as general manager, he manages a $70 million budget,
with a staff of 55 transportation security experts, program
managers, and contractors.
Our second witness, Stephen Lord, is a Director of GAO
Homeland Security in the Justice Issues Division and is
responsible for directing numerous GAO engagements on aviation
and surface transportation issues. Mr. Lord was a key member of
the 2007 Iraq Benchmarks Assessment Team that received a GAO
integrity award for exceptional analysis of the Iraq governance
progress for meeting 18 legislative, security, and economic
benchmarks, which I believe would make him quite appropriately
trained for the challenge we have before us.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
Mr. Kelly, we thank you for your service for this Nation.
We thank you for the 30 years that you bring to the Department
of Homeland Security in serving the Nation, and we look forward
to the concept of fixing our problems together.
You are recognized, Mr. Kelly, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD KELLY, GENERAL MANAGER, AIR CARGO,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Kelly. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Dent, Chairman Thompson, Mr. Markey, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to
discuss progress by the Transportation Security Administration
on the air cargo requirements of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The 9/11
Act gives TSA the responsibility to ensure that the airline
industry screens 100 percent of the cargo on passenger aircraft
by August, 2010, with an interim milestone of 50 percent by
February 2009.
First, I want to assure the subcommittee that all
indications are that the cargo industry has met the February
deadline. This week, TSA began receiving from the airlines
February's cargo screening data; and we will validate that the
50 percent screening milestone was, in fact, achieved. We will
share the results with you by mid-April.
Thank you for your patience.
To achieve this milestone, TSA and our industry partners
put in a great deal of effort to creatively rethink the
logistics of air cargo security. Together, we have dramatically
changed air cargo operation.
The key elements to TSA's approach is the Certified Cargo
Screening Program. This program screens cargo at the most
efficient and effective point in the supply chain. It provides
optimal security with minimal economic disruption. TSA
recognizes that air cargo is a vital part of our economy, and
this approach to security supports the financial health of the
airline industry.
Another step in achieving 100 percent screening is the
requirement for all airlines operating narrow-bodied passenger
aircraft from U.S. airports to screen 100 percent of the cargo
transported on this aircraft. I am pleased to report that TSA
achieved this milestone in October 2008, a full 22 months
before the deadline. One hundred percent of the cargo on 96
percent of the flights originating in the United States is now
screened. This point is worth emphasizing: 85 percent of the
passengers flying each day from U.S. airports are on planes
where all of the cargo has been fully screened. We have
improved security significantly.
A number of challenges remain as we move toward the goal of
100 percent screening. The characteristics of cargo are vastly
different than those of checked baggage. For example, 75
percent of air cargo is tendered on skids that cannot be
screened with existing TSA-approved equipment. TSA is working
with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop
technology adapted to the cargo screening environment. We are
testing technologies now previously used to screen cargo for
explosives such as metal detectors, vapor trace detectors,
radio wave devices, and hand-held detection equipment.
Another challenge is to develop screening requirements for
air cargo in-bound from foreign countries. To date, industry
has accomplished 50 percent system-wide screening for
international in-bound air cargo. However, TSA cannot implement
a security regimen in a foreign country without extensive
cooperative planning with and acceptance by our international
partners.
Given these challenges, TSA does not expect that a 100
percent screening will be available for in-bound cargo on
passenger aircraft by August 2010. Nonetheless, significant
efforts toward reaching the 100 percent mark are on-going.
Through bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements, a
proposed amendment to the International Civil Aviation
Organization standards and partnering with CBP to use its
automated tracking system, we are improving security on in-
bound cargo. With the cooperation of the entire air cargo
community, we are well on our way to achieving the 100 percent
air cargo screening mandate of the 9/11 Act for domestic cargo.
We appreciate the important oversight of Congress and
notably the support of this subcommittee. We will continue to
work closely with the Government Accountability Office
represented here today. We will continue to be transparent and
to keep you informed of our progress.
Finally, I would like to recognize the efforts of the
industry and the TSA employees who have worked tirelessly on
developing innovative solutions to a daunting task.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Kelly
March 18, 2009
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear
today to discuss the progress the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is making toward fulfilling the air cargo security
requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), Pub. L. 110-53. These requirements mandate the
screening of 50 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft by
February 2009 and 100 percent by August 2010.
I am happy to report that while much remains to be done to fulfill
this requirement, we are confident that the industry is currently
screening at least 50 percent of air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft on flights originating in the United States and we anticipate
that the 100 percent screening requirement will be met by August 2010
for domestic cargo through our Certified Cargo Screening Program
(CCSP). The requirement in the 9/11 Act to screen 100 percent of
inbound air cargo continues to present significant challenges. Although
it is unlikely that we can meet the ambitious timetable set by
Congress, we are working with our international partners to address the
many challenges and expect to continue to see significant improvements
in the level of security for in-bound air cargo on passenger aircraft
as we move forward.
collaborative development and transparency of process
As TSA has previously noted in testimony and reports, the only
means of meeting the 100 percent cargo screening requirement without a
significant negative impact on commerce is through creative and
dedicated collaboration throughout the air cargo community. Our
involvement of stakeholders has been broad and inclusive in the
planning stages and will continue as we implement the program. Since
September 2007, we have reached out to more than 2,500 stakeholders in
virtually all industry segments that are potentially affected by the
screening mandate, including both individual entities and associations
of air carriers, cargo forwarders, and shippers. Beyond meeting with
stakeholders, we have brought into TSA a number of individuals with
significant industry experience to provide key practical expertise to
our program development and execution.
We have also reached out to other countries in an effort to draw on
the lessons learned from air cargo security programs throughout the
world, and to our Federal partners, particularly United States Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), which also has responsibilities with
respect to the security of in-bound air cargo. As I will discuss below,
this work will serve us well as we address the special issues of
securing in-bound international cargo.
Throughout the development and implementation of TSA's air cargo
security program we have been, and remain, dedicated to providing
transparency. We appreciate the important oversight responsibilities of
Congress and its various committees--and notably this subcommittee. We
also continue to work closely with the Government Accountability Office
so that they can fulfill their role to independently inform Congress on
our air cargo security program. We will continue to brief you
periodically and to facilitate field visits to key air cargo industry
sectors to assure that you get both reports of our progress and an
opportunity to see first-hand how the program is designed and
implemented as it proceeds.
50 percent milestone reached
As noted above, I am confident that the industry is currently
screening 50 percent of air cargo transported by passenger aircraft.
Our confidence is based on numerous discussions with regulated parties
and industry associations, coupled with the historically solid record
of compliance with TSA security programs industry-wide. We are
currently receiving hard data from airlines for the month of February.
We are aggressively working to summarize this data and report back to
you in mid-April. We will keep the subcommittee informed of our
progress in that regard. We also understand that the 50 percent target
is not a static figure, and we anticipate a continual increase as we
move toward the August 2010 date for 100 percent screening.
A key component of achieving this milestone is the requirement,
developed in coordination with air carriers and other stakeholders,
that 100 percent of cargo transported on narrow-body (single-aisle)
aircraft be screened. This requirement went into effect in October
2008.
The passenger security impact of this screening is significant:
although these aircraft carry only 25 percent of domestic air cargo on
passenger aircraft, they account for the majority--approximately 95
percent--of domestic passenger flights. More importantly, these flights
carry more than 80 percent of all passengers on flights originating in
the United States. Thus, even at the statutory deadline for screening
50 percent of air cargo aboard passenger aircraft, we are effectively
protecting the vast majority of the flying public.
supply chain approach to securing air cargo
The dramatic shift in the air cargo security legal requirement--the
addition of a 100 percent physical screening requirement to our
otherwise layered, risk-based security regimen--has required a creative
re-thinking of the logistics of security. The practical problems with
physically screening all cargo on-site at airports throughout the
Nation are formidable. Simply put, there is neither adequate space at
airports to accommodate such an operation nor sufficient time at that
point in the journey of cargo to accomplish 100 percent screening
without crippling the flow of commerce. As we discussed in testimony
before this subcommittee on July 15, 2008, we have designed and are
implementing a total supply chain approach to air cargo security, the
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). Under this program, the
responsibility for screening is distributed throughout the supply chain
to improve security while minimizing the potential negative impact on
the integrity and movement of commerce.
This supply chain approach allows cargo screening at the most
efficient and effective point in the supply chain for optimal security
and minimal economic disruption. For example, screening might be
performed at a shipper's facility before packing or at the facility of
an indirect air carrier (IAC), or a freight forwarder, before
consolidation and transport to an airport. Furthermore, sensitive
commodities--such as foodstuffs and other perishable items and fragile
goods--can be screened by the shipper or manufacturer and not have to
be reopened at the airport, thus minimizing the potential for damage.
The CCSP is a voluntary program--facilities that seek approval as
certified cargo screening facilities (CCSF) will be required to meet a
variety of rigorous security standards and will be regulated by TSA.
For example, a CCSF would be required to submit to security threat
assessments of personnel, adhere to specified physical security
standards, and maintain a strict chain of custody for cargo they screen
and forward to the air carrier as a condition of its acceptance as
screened cargo by the air carrier. A key characteristic of the system
will be rigorous tracking of the chain of custody, including the use of
tamper-evident technology to assure that, once screened, cargo remains
secured in transit to the aircraft. Under the CCSP the air carrier will
continue to have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that cargo has
been screened prior to flight; if the air carrier cannot verify that
cargo has been screened, the carrier must screen it before allowing it
to be transported.
CCSP shippers will benefit from participation in several ways. By
screening their own shipments, shippers can significantly reduce the
possibility that their cargo may be physically opened, and they can
still tender full skids of cargo without having them taken apart to be
screened. Additionally, they can bypass the expected delays that could
occur if all screening is performed only by carriers. Similarly, IACs
benefit by these same measures, and may also continue to take advantage
of typical airline reduced rates for cargo tendered in bulk
configurations.
As discussed above, we have effectively addressed screening for
narrow-body aircraft with a 100 percent screening requirement. To
address the broader task, we have concentrated our efforts by piloting
the CCSP at the 18 U.S. airports that originate 96 percent of cargo
transported on wide-body passenger aircraft, or more than 65 percent of
cargo transported on all passenger aircraft. By focusing outreach in
the pilots on IACs and shippers using the airports with the highest
volume of cargo transported on wide-body passenger aircraft, we have
been able to maximize the impact of the pilots. To date we have
validated over 200 facilities in the pilot program and plan to
ultimately roll out the program Nation-wide.
challenges of cargo technology
As we address the security of the entire air cargo supply chain, we
are simultaneously turning our attention to the development of
appropriate technology for the screening of air cargo. One of the
challenges we face is the limitations of the currently available
technology--specifically, the effectiveness of existing technology for
detecting explosives in cargo, its operational feasibility, and its
general availability for deployment to the industry to meet the mandate
of the 9/11 Act. Until recently the focus of research and development
of explosives detection technology has been on the development of
screening technology for checked baggage, not cargo. This has been
dictated in no small measure by the fact that Congress imposed
comprehensive checked baggage screening requirements on an aggressive
time-table when it created TSA in 2001, while the comprehensive
screening requirement for air cargo is relatively new.
The characteristics of checked baggage are vastly different from
those of cargo--in size, weight, variety of content, and configuration.
Consequently the technology designed to screen one is not automatically
suitable to screen the other. Because checked baggage screening
technology (for example, Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), Explosives
Trace Detection (ETD), and X-Ray) is available, however, TSA is working
with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to explore ways
in which checked baggage screening technology can be adapted to the
cargo screening environment. To this end, TSA has created a list of
approved technologies to screen cargo based on checked baggage
screening technologies. To ascertain the effectiveness of baggage
technologies on screening cargo, we are conducting a voluntary pilot
program with certain IACs participating in the CCSP pilot. To
participate in this technology pilot, an IAC must agree to purchase
specified technologies to screen cargo and report to TSA on its
effectiveness. TSA is partially funding this research and the IACs are
responsible for the remainder of the costs.
On a parallel front, we are partnering with S&T to test
technologies that have not been previously used to screen cargo for
explosives. These include types of metal detectors, vapor trace
detectors, radio wave devices, and hand-held ETD equipment. American
Airlines has agreed to allow S&T to set up test sites at two of its
cargo facilities (New York and Miami) in order to test the
effectiveness of some of these technologies in a real environment.
TSA has also deployed its proprietary canine teams at the 18 high-
volume airports participating in the CCSP pilot. All of the 85 teams
funded through the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L.
110-28, will have graduated by the end of 2009. These teams dedicate
100 percent of their time to cargo screening functions. We foresee a
greater use of these valuable assets in the air cargo screening
environment as their experience base expands. In addition, we will
continue to evaluate the appropriate number of proprietary canine teams
devoted to air cargo screening.
Among other things, cost, effectiveness, and feasibility are all
being weighed to determine the right mix of resources to accomplish
this task, given the multitude of types and the configurations of
commodities tendered as air cargo.
in-bound air cargo
Meeting the screening requirements with respect to air cargo in-
bound from foreign countries presents unique challenges. As noted
earlier, collaboration with all involved stakeholders is critical to
implementation of a mandate as ambitious as 100 percent cargo
screening. Nowhere is collaboration more critical to success than in
the international arena. As is true domestically, the physical space at
foreign airports is often constrained; moreover, screening is regulated
and often conducted by a variety of State authorities, each with its
own requirements. Domestically, TSA is addressing this issue through
the CCSP. As a practical matter, however, TSA cannot implement a
security regimen such as CCSP in a foreign country absent extensive
cooperative planning with and acceptance by our international partners.
TSA has the legal authority to require that a given percentage of
in-bound cargo be screened before it reaches the United States. Given
the physical limitations of many airports, however, requiring U.S. and
foreign air carriers to screen 100 percent of in-bound cargo by a given
date would significantly impede the flow of commerce into the United
States. For example, a unilateral mandate of 100 percent screening
would cause significant delays at origin airports because, as is the
case in the United States, carriers are not equipped to perform this
level of screening. Where all-cargo flights exist as an alternative,
shippers would be forced to divert business away from passenger
airlines, which rely on cargo as a major generator of revenue and
profit. Such a reduction in volume would most likely be reflected in
higher passenger ticket prices. Additionally, taking a unilateral
approach would significantly undermine TSA's long-term efforts to
develop common platforms and standards for air cargo security with our
international partners, including work toward the development of
commensurate systems of security partners cooperatively to enhance the
security of civil aviation globally; our efforts in this regard are
discussed below.
Another major complexity of the international environment is the
sheer number of entities across a broad geographic span that handle and
ship cargo to the United States and the nearly infinite points of
origin for each cargo supply chain. In 2006, more than 2.4 million
unique shippers and manufacturers shipped cargo to the United States on
passenger aircraft. Moreover, TSA's assessment of the risks associated
with the international environment indicates that the risks vary by
location and demography. These risks begin well beyond our borders and
are compounded by the fact that security practices vary with the
foreign location.
Given these challenges, at this time TSA does not expect that 100
percent screening will be attainable for in-bound cargo on passenger
aircraft by August 2010. This is a complex, long-term process.
Nonetheless, significant efforts toward reaching the 100 percent mark
are on-going. First, TSA has revised its security programs to improve
the screening of cargo imported into the United States and we believe
we have accomplished system-wide screening at 50 percent for
international in-bound cargo. Countries such as the United Kingdom,
Ireland, France, and Israel have programs similar to our CCSP. Through
bilateral and quadrilateral arrangements, TSA is working with a number
of countries to introduce the supply chain approach to securing air
cargo into their programs and regulations. Our foreign partners
involved in these arrangements are Canada, Australia, and the 27 Member
States of the European Union.
In 2007, a total of 98 countries imported cargo to the United
States on passenger flights. These countries all implement the
Standards and Recommended Practices set by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Annex 17 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation and the associated air carriers are
required to carry out the measures set forth in our security programs.
TSA will be recommending an amendment to the Annex 17 standards on
securing air cargo that would introduce the supply chain screening
paradigm. A similar recommendation (called Secure Freight) is being
submitted by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). This
will undoubtedly be a long-term process, but if ICAO adopts this
approach in Annex 17, all 190 Contracting States would be encouraged
and obligated to implement a supply chain approach to screening.
CBP currently assesses the risk of the presence of illegal
contraband, including explosives, in in-bound international air cargo
as part of its supply-chain security programs and advance cargo
requirements, and TSA and CBP are actively working on better
integrating those processes to ensure air travel safety and security.
For example, an opportunity we are actively exploring is using CBP's
Automated Targeting System (ATS) to assess risk on in-bound freight.
ATS is a proven system for evaluating certain risks associated with in-
bound cargo based on information provided by airlines. We are proposing
an enhancement to the system to perform an evaluation of risk for
explosives in cargo shipments. If we find that this is an effective
tool, we will work with CBP to have the information supplied early
enough to assure that evaluations could be done prior to a flight's
departure.
compliance and enforcement
TSA has a robust compliance and enforcement regimen to support the
implementation of air cargo security requirements. Since 2008, TSA has
been authorized a total of 450 cargo inspectors dedicated exclusively
to the oversight of air cargo. Over 420 inspectors have been trained
and deployed to date. Our air cargo inspectors receive specific
instruction on the security requirements of the CCSP as well as cargo
screening technology and improvised explosive device (IED) recognition.
Our inspectors regularly assess all air carriers, freight
forwarders, and their authorized representatives; those entities that
have had previous compliance issues are inspected more frequently and
thoroughly. The TSA-led canine teams discussed earlier are an integral
part of our inspection program.
conclusion
With the cooperation of the entire air cargo community, we are well
on our way to achieving the 100 percent air cargo screening mandate of
the 9/11 Act. We are comfortable that the 50 percent screening
requirement has been met overall and, when fully developed, our CCSP
promises to provide the framework for timely achieving 100 percent
screening domestically. We will continue to work with our international
partners to find a path to overcoming the considerable challenges of
achieving the same mark with respect to in-bound international air
cargo.
As always, TSA appreciates this subcommittee's support of our
efforts as we move ahead with this important aviation security program.
We look forward to our continued work together in finding the optimal
path to full implementation of this important security mandate.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me recognize Mr. Lord to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lord, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Dent, Members of the subcommittee, Chairman Thompson. I am
pleased to be here today to discuss TSA's efforts to meet the
congressional mandate for screening air cargo. This is an
important issue as each year over 7 billion pounds of air cargo
is flown on U.S. passenger flights.
As you know, Congress has mandated the establishment of a
system to screen 50 percent of cargo by February, 2009, and 100
percent by August, 2010. Since TSA is addressing this mandate
through two separate systems, my testimony will discuss TSA's
efforts to meet the screening mandate for domestic and in-bound
cargo separately.
Today, I would like to discuss two issues: first, TSA's
progress in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to
domestic cargo; second, the challenges that TSA and industry
stakeholders may face in meeting the mandate, including
challenges related to in-bound cargo.
To its credit, TSA has taken several important steps to
meet the screening mandate.
First, TSA established a new screening requirement for air
carriers. For example, effective October, 2008, and several
months before the first mandated deadline, TSA required 100
percent screening of cargo carried on narrow-bodied passenger
aircraft, such as Boeing 737s. These narrow bodies carry about
26 percent of the cargo and most of the passengers on domestic
flights, as Mr. Kelly mentioned in his testimony.
Second, TSA revised or eliminated most of its screening
exemptions for domestic but not in-bound air cargo.
Third, TSA created a voluntary program known as the
Certified Cargo Streaming Program to allow screening to take
place by freight forwarders, shippers, and others before it was
consolidated and delivered to the airport.
Finally, among other steps, TSA established a technology
pilot to allow industry participants to test approved screening
technology.
In our recent discussions, TSA officials stated they are
confident that the 50 percent screening mandate, as it applies
to domestic air cargo, has been achieved based on feedback they
received from industry stakeholders. However, it is important
to note that TSA does currently not have an empirical basis for
verifying that these mandated screening levels have been met.
According to TSA, air carriers will provide the first set of
screening data this month, and by next month TSA will be in a
position to determine whether the mandated screening levels are
being met. Until it completes this important analysis, TSA
cannot verify that the mandated screening levels established by
Congress are, in fact, being achieved.
A related question concerns TSA's current screening
process. While the details of its screening requirements are
considered sensitive security information, the implications are
not. Thus, I am hoping that today's hearing will help us better
understand how TSA's efforts to meet the screening mandate may
result in variations in the percentage of cargo screened on
individual passenger flights.
I will now discuss the potential challenges that TSA faces
in meeting the screening mandate.
First, although voluntary industry participation in the
certified screening program is vital to its success, it is
unclear whether TSA will be able to attract the necessary
industry participation. This is an important issue as TSA
estimates that freight forwarders and shippers will conduct the
majority of screening by the August, 2010, deadline.
Second, TSA faces a number of challenges related to
technology. For example, TSA is evaluating the effectiveness of
several technologies at the same time that screening entities
are using these technologies to screen air cargo.
Third, TSA also faces challenges overseeing the Certified
Cargo Screening Program due to the size of the inspection
workforce and the thousands of newly regulated entities that
may join the program.
Finally, with respect to in-bound cargo, TSA does not
expect--I repeat--does not expect to achieve 100 percent
screening of in-bound air cargo by the mandated deadline of
August, 2010. This is due in part to existing in-bound
screening exemptions and to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing
air cargo standards with those of other foreign nations.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I look
forward to answering any questions that you or other Members of
the committee may have and thank you for giving me the
opportunity for to appear before your subcommittee today.
[The statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord
March 18, 2009
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-09-422T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
mandates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a
system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by February 2009 and 100 percent of such cargo by
August 2010. This testimony provides preliminary observations on the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) progress in meeting the
mandate to screen cargo on passenger aircraft and the challenges TSA
and industry stakeholders may face in screening such cargo. GAO's
testimony is based on products issued from October 2005 through August
2008, and its on-going review of air cargo security. GAO reviewed TSA's
air cargo security programs, interviewed program officials and industry
representatives, and visited two large U.S. airports.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and TSA in prior reports to
increase the security of air cargo, including completing vulnerability
assessments and re-examining existing screening exemptions. DHS
generally agreed with these recommendations and plans to address them.
GAO discussed the preliminary observations in this statement with TSA
officials. TSA agreed with GAO's findings.
aviation security.--preliminary observations on tsa's progress and
challenges in meeting the statutory mandate for screening air cargo on
passenger aircraft
What GAO Found
TSA has made progress in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as
it applies to domestic cargo. TSA has taken steps that will allow
screening responsibilities to be shared across the air cargo supply
chain--including TSA, air carriers, freight forwarders (which
consolidate cargo from shippers and take it to air carriers for
transport), and shippers--although air carriers have the ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that they transport cargo screened at the
requisite levels. TSA has taken several key steps to meet the mandate,
including establishing a new requirement for 100 percent screening of
cargo transported on narrow-body aircraft; revising or eliminating most
screening exemptions for domestic cargo; creating the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP) to allow screening to take place at various
points in the air cargo supply chain; and establishing a screening
technology pilot. Although TSA estimates that it achieved the mandated
50 percent screening level by February 2009 as it applies to domestic
cargo, the agency cannot yet verify that the requisite levels of cargo
are being screened. It is working to establish a system to do so by
April 2009. Also, TSA's screening approach could result in variable
percentages of screened cargo on passenger flights.
TSA and industry stakeholders may face a number of challenges in
meeting the screening mandate, including attracting participants to the
CCSP, and technology, oversight, and in-bound cargo challenges. TSA's
approach relies on the voluntary participation of shippers and freight
forwarders, but it is unclear whether the facilities needed to meet
TSA's screening estimates will join the CCSP. In addition, TSA has
taken some steps to develop and test technologies for screening air
cargo, but the agency has not yet completed assessments of these
technologies and cannot be assured that they are effective in the cargo
environment. TSA's limited inspection resources may also hamper its
ability to oversee the thousands of additional entities that it expects
to participate in the CCSP. Finally, TSA does not expect to meet the
mandated 100 percent screening deadline as it applies to in-bound air
cargo, in part due to existing in-bound screening exemptions and
challenges it faces in harmonizing security standards with other
nations.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the
opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss the security
of the air cargo transportation system. In 2007, about 7.6 billion
pounds of cargo was transported on U.S. passenger flights--56 percent
of which was transported domestically and 44 percent of which was
transported on flights to the United States (in-bound cargo).\1\ In
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was enacted in November 2001.\2\
ATSA created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
required it to provide for the screening of all passengers and
property, including cargo, U.S. mail, and carry-on and checked baggage
that is transported on passenger aircraft. Recognizing the need to
strengthen the security of air cargo, Congress passed, and the
President signed into law, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), which mandates the
establishment of a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on
passenger aircraft--including the domestic and in-bound flights of
foreign and U.S. passenger operations--by February 2009, and 100
percent of such cargo by August 2010.\3\
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\1\ For the purposes of this statement, domestic air cargo refers
to cargo transported by air within the United States and from the
United States to a foreign location by both U.S. and foreign-based air
carriers, and in-bound cargo refers to cargo transported by air from a
foreign location to the United States.
\2\ Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
\3\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (codified at
49 U.S.C. 44901(g)).
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The 9/11 Commission Act establishes minimum standards for screening
air cargo, and requires that such standards provide a level of security
commensurate with the level of security for the screening of checked
baggage. Although the mandate is applicable to both domestic and in-
bound air cargo, TSA stated that it will address the mandate for
domestic and in-bound cargo through two separate systems. For example,
while TSA interprets these standards to mean that all cargo, with
certain exceptions, must be screened by TSA-approved methods, the
exceptions vary greatly between domestic and in-bound cargo. This
testimony will therefore address efforts to meet the screening mandate
as it applies to domestic and in-bound cargo separately.
My testimony today includes preliminary observations on: (1) TSA's
progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft as it applies to domestic cargo, and
(2) the challenges TSA and industry stakeholders may face in screening
such cargo, including challenges TSA may face in meeting the mandate as
it applies to in-bound cargo. My comments are based on GAO reports and
testimonies issued from October 2005 through August 2008 addressing the
security of the air cargo transportation system.\4\ More detailed
information on our scope and methodology appears in our published
reports.
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\4\ GAO, Review of the Transportation Security Administration's Air
Cargo Screening Exemptions Report, (Washington, DC: August 15, 2008);
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face
Resource and Other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All
Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft, (Washington, DC: July 15,
2008); Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation and
Surface Transportation Security Programs, but More Work Remains,
(Washington, DC: May 13, 2008); Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to
Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be
Strengthened, (Washington, DC: April 30, 2007); and Aviation Security:
Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security,
(Washington, DC: October 17, 2005).
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This statement also includes information from our on-going review
of air cargo security requested by the Chairman of the House Committee
on Homeland Security, Bennie G. Thompson, and Congressman Edward J.
Markey. The results of this review will be issued later this year. To
determine the progress TSA has made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act
mandate, and to identify any on-going challenges, we reviewed TSA's air
cargo security programs, and interviewed TSA air cargo program
officials and representatives from various air cargo industry
associations. We also conducted site visits to two large U.S.
commercial airports that process domestic and in-bound air cargo to
observe screening operations and technologies, and interviewed local
TSA officials and representatives from air carriers, freight
forwarders, and shippers to obtain their views on TSA's system to
implement the screening mandate.\5\ Our site visits and interviews with
industry stakeholders were based on a judgmental sample and are not
generalizable to the entire air cargo industry.
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\5\ There are about 450 commercial airports in the United States.
TSA classifies airports into one of five categories (X, I, II, III, and
IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and
landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the
airport, and other special security considerations. In general,
category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and
category IV airports have the smallest.
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We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
summary
TSA has taken several key steps to meet the air cargo screening
mandate of the 9/11 Commission Act. These include the following:
Requiring that each air carrier ensure that 100 percent of
domestic cargo transported on its narrow-body passenger
aircraft is screened as of October 1, 2008, and that each air
carrier ensure that 50 percent of domestic cargo transported on
its entire passenger aircraft fleet is screened as of February
1, 2009.\6\ Effective February 2009, TSA also revised or
eliminated most of its screening exemptions for domestic, but
not in-bound, cargo;\7\
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\6\ Narrow-body aircraft, such as B-737s and A-320s, are defined by
fuselage diameter, and most narrow-body aircraft have only one aisle.
Narrow-body aircraft that fly in the United States do not carry any
consolidated pallets or unit loading devices (ULD) that allow packages
to be consolidated in one container. Wide-body aircraft are also
defined by fuselage diameter, and can carry consolidated pallets or
ULDs.
\7\ Details on TSA's screening exemptions are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this statement.
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Creating the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) to
allow screening to take place earlier in the shipping process
and at various points in the air cargo supply chain;
Conducting outreach to inform air cargo industry
stakeholders about the new industry requirements and the CCSP;
Establishing the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot to
allow freight forwarders and shippers to operationally test
approved screening technology; and:
Expanding its explosives detection canine program to include
85 canine teams dedicated to screening air cargo at 20 major
airports.
However, while TSA estimates that it achieved the February 2009 50
percent screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, the agency
cannot yet verify that requisite screening levels are being met. In
addition, although TSA believes its current screening approach enables
it to meet the statutory screening mandate as it applies to domestic
cargo, some of the ways in which TSA has defined the terms for
screening cargo could result in variable percentages of screened cargo
on passenger flights.
TSA faces several challenges in meeting the air cargo screening
mandate. For example, it is unclear whether the facilities needed to
meet TSA's screening estimates will join its new CCSP, in part because
the costs could be prohibitive. Moreover, TSA faces a number of
challenges related to technology--for instance, TSA has not yet
completed assessments of the technologies it plans to allow air
carriers and CCSP participants to use to meet the 100 percent cargo
screening mandate. TSA also faces challenges overseeing compliance with
the CCSP due to the size of its current transportation security
inspector (TSI) workforce. In addition, with respect to in-bound cargo,
TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of in-bound air
cargo by the mandated deadline of August 2010. This is due, in part, to
existing in-bound screening exemptions, and to challenges TSA faces in
harmonizing the agency's air cargo security standards with those of
other nations.\8\
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\8\ The term harmonization is used to describe countries' efforts
to coordinate their security practices to enhance security and increase
efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. Harmonization efforts can
include countries mutually recognizing and accepting each other's
existing practices--which could represent somewhat different approaches
to achieve the same outcome, as well as working to develop mutually
acceptable uniform standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO has made recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and TSA in prior reports to increase the security of air cargo,
including completing vulnerability assessments and re-examining
existing screening exemptions. DHS generally agreed with these
recommendations and plans to address them. We discussed the preliminary
observations that are contained in this statement related to our on-
going work with officials from TSA. TSA officials agreed with our
findings. TSA also provided us with technical comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
background
Air cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons, and in type
from perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic
equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, fresh produce,
and human remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including
large containers known as unit loading devices (ULD) that allow many
packages to be consolidated into one container that can be loaded onto
an aircraft, wooden crates, consolidated pallets, or individually
wrapped/boxed pieces, known as loose or bulk cargo. Participants in the
air cargo shipping process include shippers, such as individuals and
manufacturers; freight forwarders; air cargo handling agents, who
process and load cargo onto aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and air
carriers that load and transport cargo.\9\ A shipper may take or send
its packages to a freight forwarder who in turn consolidates cargo from
many shippers onto a master air waybill--a manifest of the consolidated
shipment--and delivers it to air carriers for transport. A shipper may
also send freight by directly packaging and delivering it to an air
carrier's ticket counter or sorting center, where the air carrier or a
cargo handling agent will sort and load cargo onto the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ For the purposes of this statement, the term freight forwarders
only includes those freight forwarders that are regulated by TSA, also
referred to as indirect air carriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to TSA, the mission of its air cargo security program is
to secure the air cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding
the flow of commerce. TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo
include, among other things, establishing security requirements
governing domestic and foreign passenger air carriers that transport
cargo and domestic freight forwarders. TSA is also responsible for
overseeing the implementation of air cargo security requirements by air
carriers and freight forwarders through compliance inspections, and, in
coordination with DHS's Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T
Directorate), for conducting research and development of air cargo
security technologies. Of the nearly $4.8 billion appropriated to TSA
for aviation security in fiscal year 2009, approximately $123 million
is directed for air cargo security activities. TSA was further directed
to use $18 million of this amount to expand technology pilots and for
auditing participants in the CCSP.
Air carriers and freight forwarders are responsible for
implementing TSA security requirements. To do this, they utilize TSA-
approved security programs that describe the security policies,
procedures, and systems they will implement and maintain to comply with
TSA security requirements. These requirements include measures related
to the acceptance, handling, and screening of cargo; training of
employees in security and cargo screening procedures; testing for
employee proficiency in cargo screening; and access to cargo areas and
aircraft. Air carriers and freight forwarders must also abide by
security requirements imposed by TSA through security directives and
amendments to security programs.
The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening for purposes of the air
cargo screening mandate as a physical examination or nonintrusive
methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation
security.\10\ The act specifies that screening methods include X-ray
systems, explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives trace detection
(ETD), explosives detection canine teams certified by TSA, physical
search together with manifest verification, and any additional methods
approved by the TSA Administrator.\11\ For example, TSA also recognizes
the use of decompression chambers as an approved screening method.\12\
However, solely performing a review of information about the contents
of cargo or verifying the identity of the cargo's shipper does not
constitute screening for purposes of satisfying the mandate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See 49 U.S.C. 44901(g)(5).
\11\ EDS uses computer-aided tomography X-rays to examine objects
inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of threat
explosives. ETD requires human operators to collect samples of items to
be screened with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any
traces of explosives material. Certified explosives detection canine
teams have been evaluated by TSA and shown to effectively detect
explosive devices. Physical search together with manifest verification
entails comparisons between air waybills and cargo contents to ensure
that the contents of the cargo shipment matches the cargo identified in
documents filed by the shipper.
\12\ Decompression chambers simulate atmospheric pressures
affecting aircraft by simulating flight conditions, which can cause
explosives that are attached to barometric fuses to detonate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
tsa has made progress in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to
domestic cargo; however, tsa cannot yet verify whether the mandated
level is being met
TSA Has Made Progress in Meeting the 50 Percent and 100 Percent
Mandated Screening Levels as They Apply to Domestic Cargo
TSA has taken several key steps to meet the 9/11 Commission Act air
cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo. TSA's approach
involves multiple air cargo industry stakeholders sharing screening
responsibilities across the air cargo supply chain. TSA, air carriers,
freight forwarders, shippers, and other entities each play an important
role in the screening of cargo, although TSA has determined that the
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that screening takes place at
mandated levels lies with the air carriers. According to TSA officials,
this decentralized approach is expected to minimize carrier delays,
cargo backlogs, and potential increases in cargo transit time, which
would likely result if screening were conducted primarily by air
carriers at the airport. Moreover, because much cargo is currently
delivered to air carriers in a consolidated form, the requirement to
screen individual pieces of cargo will necessitate screening earlier in
the air cargo supply chain--before cargo is consolidated. The specific
steps that TSA has taken to address the air cargo screening mandate are
discussed below.
TSA revised air carrier security programs. Effective October 1,
2008, several months prior to the first mandated deadline, TSA
established a new requirement for 100 percent screening of nonexempt
cargo transported on narrow-body passenger aircraft. Narrow-body
flights transport about 26 percent of all cargo on domestic passenger
flights.\13\ According to TSA officials, air carriers reported that
they are currently meeting this requirement. Effective February 1,
2009, TSA also required air carriers to ensure the screening of 50
percent of all nonexempt air cargo transported on all passenger
aircraft. Although screening may be conducted by various entities, each
air carrier must ensure that the screening requirements are fulfilled.
Furthermore, effective February 2009, TSA revised or eliminated most of
its screening exemptions for domestic cargo. As a result, most domestic
cargo is now subject to TSA screening requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ According to TSA officials, narrow-body aircraft make up most
domestic passenger flights, and transport most passengers traveling on
domestic passenger flights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA created the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). TSA also
created a program, known as the CCSP, to allow screening to take place
earlier in the shipping process and at various points in the air cargo
supply chain. In this program, air cargo industry stakeholders--such as
freight forwarders and shippers--voluntarily apply to become Certified
Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF).\14\ This program allows cargo to be
screened before it is consolidated and transported to the airport,
which helps address concerns about the time-intensive process of
breaking down consolidated cargo at airports for screening purposes.
TSA plans to inspect the CCSFs in order to ensure they are screening
cargo as required. TSA initiated the CCSP at 18 major airports that,
according to TSA officials, account for 65 percent of domestic cargo on
passenger aircraft. TSA expects to expand the CCSP Nation-wide at a
date yet to be determined. CCSFs in the program were required to begin
screening cargo as of February 1, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Other facilities that can become CCSFs are manufacturing
facilities, third-party logistics providers, warehouse/distribution
centers, and independent cargo screening facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While participation in the CCSP is voluntary, once an entity is
certified by TSA to participate it must adhere to TSA screening and
security requirements and be subject to annual inspections by TSIs. To
become certified and to maintain certification, TSA requires each CCSF
to demonstrate compliance with increased security standards to include
facility, personnel, procedural, perimeter, and information technology
security. As part of the program, and using TSA-approved screening
methods, freight forwarders must screen 50 percent of cargo being
delivered to wide-body passenger aircraft and 100 percent of cargo
being delivered to narrow-body passenger aircraft, while shippers must
screen 100 percent of all cargo being delivered to any passenger
aircraft. Each CCSF must deliver the screened cargo to air carriers
while maintaining a secure chain of custody to prevent tampering with
the cargo after it is screened.
TSA conducted outreach efforts to air cargo industry stakeholders.
In January 2008, TSA initiated its outreach phase of the CCSP in three
cities and subsequently expanded its outreach to freight forwarders and
other air cargo industry stakeholders in the 18 major airports. TSA
established a team of nine TSA field staff to conduct outreach, educate
potential CCSP applicants on the program requirements, and validate
CCSFs. According to TSA officials, in February 2009, the agency also
began using its cargo TSIs in the field to conduct outreach. In our
preliminary discussions with several freight forwarders and shippers,
industry stakeholders reported that TSA staff have been responsive and
helpful in answering questions about the program and providing
information on CCSP requirements.
TSA established the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot and is
conducting additional technology pilots. To operationally test ETD and
X-ray technology among CCSFs, TSA created the Air Cargo Screening
Technology Pilot in January 2008, and selected some of the largest
freight forwarders to use the technologies and report on their
experiences. TSA's objectives for the pilot are to determine CCSFs'
ability to screen high volumes of cargo, test chain of custody
procedures, and measure the effectiveness of screening technology on
various commodity classes. TSA will provide each CCSF participating in
the pilot with up to $375,000 for purchasing technology. As of February
26, 2009, 12 freight forwarders in 48 locations are participating in
the pilot.\15\ The screening they perform as part of the operational
testing also counts toward meeting the air cargo screening mandate.
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\15\ Initially, the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot was
limited to freight forwarders. However, in November 2008, TSA issued a
second announcement seeking additional freight forwarders and
independent cargo screening facilities to apply for the pilot. Entities
that are not part of the technology pilot must still report screening
volumes to TSA, but not the screening technology data. Moreover,
entities that do not participate in the pilot will not receive TSA
funding to purchase screening technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program. To assist air
carriers in screening consolidated pallets and unit loading devices,
TSA is taking steps to expand the use of TSA-certified explosives
detection canine teams. TSA has 37 canine teams dedicated to air cargo
screening--operating in 20 major airports--and is in the process of
adding 48 additional dedicated canine teams. TSA is working with the
air carriers to identify their peak cargo delivery times, during which
canines would be most helpful for screening.
In addition, we reported in October 2005 and April 2007 that TSA,
working with DHS's S&T Directorate, was developing and pilot testing a
number of technologies to screen and secure air cargo with minimal
effect on the flow of commerce.\16\ These pilot programs seek to
enhance the security of cargo by improving the effectiveness of
screening for explosives through increased detection rates and reduced
false alarm rates. A description of several of these pilot programs and
their status is included in table 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ GAO-06-76; GAO-07-660.
TABLE 1.--TSA AND DHS DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS TO TEST TECHNOLOGIES TO SCREEN AND SECURE AIR CARGO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot Program Description Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air cargo explosives detection Tests the use of Consistent with
pilot program. explosives the conference
detection systems, report
explosives trace accompanying the
detectors, Department of
standard X-ray Homeland Security
machines, canine Appropriations
teams, Act, 2006, DHS's
technologies that S&T Directorate
can locate a is required to
stowaway through report on the
detection of a initial results
heartbeat or of the pilots
increased carbon every 6 months
dioxide levels in after initiation
cargo, and manual of the first
screening of air pilot.* DHS last
cargo. submitted a
report dated July
2008. According
to DHS officials,
the final report
is currently
undergoing DHS
executive review
and DHS plans to
provide this
report to
Congress in March
2009.
Explosives detection systems Tests the use of TSA planned to
(EDS). computer-aided complete this
tomography to pilot program in
compare the May 2008. In
densities of February 2009,
objects to locate TSA officials
explosives in air stated that the
cargo and to pilot was
determine the long- completed in
term feasibility December 2008,
of using EDS and the final
equipment as a report should be
total screening available in July
process for bulk 2009.
air cargo.
Air cargo security seals....... Explores the In February 2009,
viability of TSA officials
potential security stated that the
countermeasures, agency is waiting
such as tamper- for vendors to
evident security produce
seals, for use technology that
during transport it can test and
of screened cargo. evaluate. TSA
then plans to
issue operational
requirements to
industry. In
March 2009, TSA
officials stated
that the agency
has not set time
frames for this
process.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA.
* H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 53 (2005) (accompanying Pub. L. No.
109-90, 119 Stat. 2064 (2005)).
TSA Cannot Yet Verify that Screening Is Being Conducted Domestically at
the Mandated Level, and TSA's Current Approach Could Result in
Variable Percentages of Screened Cargo
TSA estimates that it achieved the mandate for screening 50 percent
of domestic cargo transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009,
based on feedback from air cargo industry stakeholders responsible for
conducting screening. However, TSA cannot yet verify that screening is
being conducted at the mandated level. The agency is working to
establish a system to collect data from screening entities to verify
that requisite screening levels for domestic cargo are being met.
Effective February 2009, TSA adjusted air carrier reporting
requirements and added CCSF reporting requirements to include monthly
screening reports on the number of shipments screened at 50 and 100
percent.\17\ According to TSA officials, air carriers will provide to
TSA the first set of screening data by mid-March 2009. By April 2009,
TSA officials expect to have processed and analyzed available screening
data, which would allow the agency to determine whether the screening
mandate has been met. Thus, while TSA asserts that it has met the
mandated February 2009, 50 percent screening deadline, until the agency
analyzes required screening data, TSA cannot verify that the mandated
screening levels are being achieved.
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\17\ Details on TSA's reporting requirements are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, although TSA believes its current screening approach
enables it to meet the statutory screening mandate as it applies to
domestic cargo, this approach could result in variable percentages of
screened cargo on passenger flights.\18\ This variability is most
likely for domestic air carriers that have a mixed-size fleet of
aircraft because a portion of their 50 percent screening requirement
may be accomplished through the more stringent screening requirements
for narrow-body aircraft, thus allowing them more flexibility in the
amount of cargo to screen on wide-body aircraft. According to TSA,
although this variability is possible, it is not a significant concern
because of the small amount of cargo transported on narrow-body flights
by air carriers with mixed-size fleets. However, the approach could
result in variable percentages of screened cargo on passenger flights
regardless of the composition of the fleet. As explained earlier, TSA
is in the process of developing a data reporting system that may help
to assess whether some passenger flights are transporting variable
percentages of screened cargo. This issue regarding TSA's current air
cargo security approach will be further explored during our on-going
review.
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\18\ Details on TSA's screening approach are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this statement.
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Lastly, TSA officials reported that cargo that has already been
transported on one passenger flight may be subsequently transferred to
another passenger flight without undergoing additional screening.
According to TSA officials, the agency has determined that this is an
approved screening method because an actual flight mimics one of TSA's
approved screening methods.\19\ For example, cargo exempt from TSA
screening requirements that is transported on an in-bound flight an be
transferred to a domestic aircraft without additional screening,
because it is considered to have been screened in accordance with TSA
screening requirements. According to TSA, this scenario occurs
infrequently, but the agency has not been able to provide us with data
that allows us to assess how frequently this occurs. TSA reported that
it is exploring ways to enhance the security of cargo transferred to
another flight, including using canine teams to screen such cargo. This
issue regarding TSA's current air cargo security approach will be
further explored during our on-going review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Details on TSA's approved screening methods are Sensitive
Security Information and are not discussed in this statement.
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tsa faces participation, technology, oversight, and in-bound cargo
challenges in meeting the screening mandate
It Is Unclear Whether TSA Will Be Able to Attract the Voluntary
Participants Needed to Meet the 100 Percent Screening Mandate
Although industry participation in the CCSP is vital to TSA's
approach to spread screening responsibilities across the supply chain,
it is unclear whether the number and types of facilities needed to meet
TSA's screening estimates will join the CCSP. Although TSA is relying
on the voluntary participation of freight forwarders and shippers to
meet the screening goals of the CCSP, officials did not have precise
estimates of the number of participants that would be required to join
the program to achieve 100 percent screening by August 2010. As of
February 26, 2009, TSA had certified 172 freight forwarder CCSFs, 14
shipper CCSFs, and 17 independent cargo screening facilities
(ICSF).\20\
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\20\ An independent cargo screening facility is a facility that
will accept cargo from freight forwarders and shippers, and screen it
for a fee, according to CCSP guidelines.
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TSA estimates that freight forwarders and shippers will complete
the majority of air cargo screening at the August 2010 deadline, with
shippers experiencing the largest anticipated increase when this
mandate goes into effect. According to estimates reported by TSA in
November 2008, as shown in figure 1, the screening conducted by freight
forwarders was expected to increase from 14 percent to 25 percent of
air cargo transported on passenger aircraft from February 2009 to
August 2010, while the screening conducted by shippers was expected to
increase from 2 percent to 35 percent. For this reason, increasing
shipper participation in the CCSP is necessary to meet the 100 percent
screening mandate.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As highlighted in figure 1, TSA estimated that, as of February
2009, screening of cargo delivered for transport on narrow-body
aircraft would account for half of the mandated 50 percent screening
level and 25 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
TSA expected screening conducted on cargo delivered for transport on
narrow-body passenger aircraft to remain stable at 25 percent when the
mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft goes into effect.\21\ TSA anticipated that its own screening
responsibilities would grow by the time the 100 percent mandate goes
into effect. Specifically, TSA anticipated that its canine teams and
transportation security officers would screen 6 percent of cargo in
August 2010, up from 4 percent in February 2009. It is important to
note that these estimates--which TSA officials said are subject to
change--are dependent on the voluntary participation of freight
forwarders, shippers, and other screening entities in the CCSP. If
these entities do not volunteer to participate in the CCSP at the
levels TSA anticipates, air carriers or TSA may be required to screen
more cargo than was projected.
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\21\ TSA expects air carriers operating wide-body aircraft to
screen approximately 5 percent of cargo as of February 2009, and 9
percent when the 100 percent mandate goes into effect in August 2010.
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Participation in the CCSP may appeal to a number of freight
forwarders and shippers, but industry participants we interviewed
expressed concern about potential program costs. In preliminary
discussions with freight forwarders, shippers, and industry
associations, stakeholders told us that they would prefer to join the
CCSP and screen their own cargo in order to limit the number of
entities that handle and open their cargo. This is particularly true
for certain types of delicate cargo, including fresh produce. Screening
cargo in the CCSP also allows freight forwarders and shippers to
continue to consolidate their shipments before delivering them to air
carriers, which results in reduced shipping rates and less potential
loss and damage. However, TSA and industry officials with whom we spoke
agreed that the majority of small freight forwarders--which make up
approximately 80 percent of the freight forwarder industry--would
likely find prohibitive the costs of joining the CCSP, including
acquiring expensive technology, hiring additional personnel, conducting
additional training, and making facility improvements.\22\ TSA has not
yet finalized cost estimates for industry participation in air cargo
screening, but is in the process of developing these estimates and is
planning to report them later this year. As of February 26, 2009, 12
freight forwarders in 48 locations have joined TSA's Air Cargo
Screening Technology pilot and are thus eligible to receive
reimbursement for the technology they have purchased. However pilot
participants, to date, have been limited primarily to large freight
forwarders. TSA indicated that it targeted high-volume facilities for
the pilot in order to have the greatest effect in helping industry
achieve screening requirements.
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\22\ A freight forwarder's size is determined by its annual sales.
For example, a freight forwarder with $5 million or less in annual
sales is considered to be small.
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In response to stakeholder concerns about potential program costs,
TSA is allowing independent cargo screening facilities to join the CCSP
and screen cargo on behalf of freight forwarders or shippers. However,
it is unclear how many of these facilities will join. Moreover,
according to industry stakeholders, this arrangement could result in
freight forwarders being required to deliver loose freight to screening
facilities for screening. This could reduce the benefit to freight
forwarders of consolidating freight before delivering it to air
carriers, a central part of the freight forwarder business model.
TSA Has Taken Some Steps to Develop and Test Technologies for Screening
Air Cargo, but Has Not Yet Completed Assessments to Ensure
Their Effectiveness
TSA has taken some steps to develop and test technologies for
screening and securing air cargo, but has not yet completed assessments
of the technologies it plans to allow air carriers and program
participants to use in meeting the August 2010 screening mandate.\23\
To date, TSA has approved specific models of three screening
technologies for use by air carriers and CCSFs until August 3, 2010--
ETD, EDS, and X-ray.\24\ TSA chose these technologies based on its
subject matter expertise and the performance of these technologies in
the checkpoint and checked baggage environments. According to TSA
officials, the agency has conducted preliminary assessments, but has
not completed laboratory or operational testing of these technologies
in the air cargo environment.
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\23\ Technologies that successfully pass lab assessments and
independent testing and evaluation become eligible to undergo
additional operational testing and evaluation in an operational
environment. Technologies that successfully pass independent and
operational evaluation will be added to a list of qualified products.
\24\ Decompression chambers are also approved for use by air
carriers.
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After the technology pilot programs and other testing are complete,
TSA will determine which technologies will be qualified for screening
cargo and whether these technologies will be approved for use after
August 3, 2010. However, TSA is proceeding with operational testing and
evaluations to determine which of these technologies is effective at
the same time that screening entities are using these technologies to
meet air cargo screening requirements. For example, according to TSA,
ETD technology, which most air carriers and CCSFs plan to use, has not
yet begun the qualification process. However, it is currently being
used to screen air cargo as part of the Air Cargo Screening Technology
Pilot and by air carriers and other CCSFs. Although TSA's acquisition
guidance recommends testing the operational effectiveness and
suitability of technologies prior to deploying them, and TSA agrees
that simultaneous testing and deployment of technology is not ideal,
TSA officials reported that this was necessary to meet the screening
deadlines mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act. While we recognize TSA's
time constraints, the agency cannot be assured that the technologies it
is currently using to screen cargo are effective in the cargo
environment, because they are still being tested and evaluated. We will
continue to assess TSA's technology issues as part of our on-going
review of TSA's efforts to meet the mandate to screen 100 percent of
cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
Although TSA is in the process of assessing screening technologies,
according to TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of
efficiently and effectively screening all types of air cargo for the
full range of potential terrorist threats. Moreover, according to
industry stakeholders, technology to screen cargo that has already been
consolidated and loaded onto a pallet or ULD may be critical to meet
the 100 percent screening mandate. Although TSA has not approved any
technologies that are capable of screening consolidated pallets or ULDs
containing various commodities, according to TSA, it is currently
beginning to assess such technology. TSA officials reported that they
do not expect to qualify such technology prior to the August 2010
deadline.
Air cargo industry stakeholders we interviewed also expressed some
concerns regarding the cost of purchasing and maintaining screening
equipment for CCSP participants. Cost is a particular concern for the
CCSP participants that do not participate in the Air Cargo Screening
Technology Pilot and will receive no funding for technology or other
related costs; this includes the majority of CCSFs. Because the
technology qualification process could result in modifications to TSA's
approved technologies, industry stakeholders expressed concerns about
purchasing technology that is not guaranteed to be acceptable for use
after August 3, 2010. We will continue to assess this issue as part of
our on-going review of TSA's efforts to meet the mandate to screen 100
percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
In addition to the importance of screening technology, TSA
officials noted that an area of concern in the transportation of air
cargo is the chain of custody between the various entities that handle
and screen cargo shipments prior to its loading onto an aircraft.
Officials stated that the agency has taken steps to analyze the chain
of custody under the CCSP, and has issued cargo procedures to all
entities involved in the CCSP to ensure that the chain of custody of
the cargo is secure. This includes guidance on when and how to secure
cargo with tamper-evident technology. TSA officials noted that they
plan to test and evaluate such technology and issue recommendations to
the industry, but have not set any time frames for doing so. Until TSA
completes this testing, however, the agency lacks assurances that
existing tamper-evident technology is of sufficient quality to deter
tampering and that the air cargo supply chain is effectively secured.
We will continue to assess this issue as part of our on-going review of
TSA's efforts to meet the mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft.
Limited Staffing Resources May Hamper TSA's Ability to Effectively
Oversee the Thousands of Additional Entities Involved in
Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate
Although the actual number of cargo TSIs increased each fiscal year
from 2005 to 2009, TSA still faces challenges overseeing compliance
with the CCSP due to the size of its current TSI workforce. To ensure
that existing air cargo security requirements are being implemented as
required, TSIs perform compliance inspections of regulated entities,
such as air carriers and freight forwarders. Under the CCSP, TSIs will
also perform compliance inspections of new regulated entities, such as
shippers and manufacturers, who voluntarily become CCSFs. These
compliance inspections range from an annual review of the
implementation of all air cargo security requirements to a more
frequent review of at least one security requirement. According to TSA,
the number of cargo TSIs grew from 160 in fiscal year 2005 to about 500
in fiscal year 2009. However, cargo TSI numbers remained below levels
authorized by TSA in each fiscal year from 2005 through 2009, which, in
part, led to the agency not meeting cargo inspection goals in fiscal
year 2007. As highlighted in our February 2009 report, TSA officials
stated that the agency is still actively recruiting to fill vacant
positions but could not provide documentation explaining why vacant
positions remained unfilled.\25\ Additionally, TSA officials have
stated that there may not be enough TSIs to conduct compliance
inspections of all the potential entities under the CCSP, which TSA
officials told us could number in the thousands, once the program is
fully implemented by August 2010. TSA officials also indicated plans to
request additional cargo TSIs in the future, although the exact number
has yet to be formulated. According to TSA officials, TSA does not have
a human capital or other workforce plan for the TSI program, but the
agency has plans to conduct a staffing study in fiscal year 2009 to
identify the optimal workforce size to address its current and future
program needs. Until TSA completes its staffing study, TSA may not be
able to determine whether it has the necessary staffing resources to
ensure that entities involved in the CCSP are meeting TSA requirements
to screen and secure air cargo. We will continue to assess this issue
as part of our on-going review of TSA's efforts to meet the mandate to
screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ GAO, Aviation Security: Status of Transportation Security
Inspector Workforce, GAO-09-123R (Washington DC: February 6, 2009).
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TSA Has Taken Some Steps to Meet the Screening Mandate as It Applies to
In-bound Cargo but Does Not Expect to Achieve 100 Percent
Screening of In-bound Cargo by the August 2010 Deadline
To meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to
in-bound cargo, TSA revised its requirements for foreign and U.S.-based
air carrier security programs and began harmonization of security
standards with other nations. The security program revisions generally
require carriers to screen 50 percent of nonexempt in-bound cargo. TSA
officials estimate that this requirement has been met, though the
agency is not collecting screening data from air carriers to verify
that the mandated screening levels are being achieved. TSA has taken
several steps toward harmonization with other nations. For example, TSA
is working with foreign governments to improve the level of screening
of air cargo, including working bilaterally with the European
Commission (EC) and Canada, and quadrilaterally with the EC, Canada,
and Australia. As part of these efforts, TSA plans to recommend to the
United Nations' International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that
the next revision of Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil
Aviation (due for release in 2009) include an approach that would allow
screening to take place at various points in the air cargo supply
chain.\26\ TSA also plans to work with the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), which is promoting an approach to screening cargo
to its member airlines.\27\ Finally, TSA continues to work with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to leverage an existing CBP system
to identify and target high-risk air cargo.
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\26\ ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with the
primary objective to provide for the safe, orderly, and efficient
development of international civil aviation.
\27\ IATA is an industry association that represents about 230 air
carriers constituting 93 percent of international scheduled air
traffic.
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However, TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of
in-bound air cargo by the August 2010 screening deadline. This is due,
in part, to TSA's in-bound screening exemptions, and to challenges TSA
faces in harmonizing its air cargo security standards with those of
other nations. TSA requirements continue to allow screening exemptions
for certain types of in-bound air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft.\28\ TSA could not provide an estimate of what percentage of
in-bound cargo is exempt from screening. In April 2007, we reported
that TSA's screening exemptions on in-bound cargo could pose a risk to
the air cargo supply chain and recommended that TSA assess whether
these exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability and, if necessary,
address these vulnerabilities.\29\ TSA agreed with our recommendation,
but has not yet reviewed, revised, or eliminated any screening
exemptions for cargo transported on in-bound passenger flights, and
could not provide a time frame for doing so. Furthermore, similar to
changes for domestic cargo requirements discussed earlier, TSA's
revisions to in-bound requirements could result in variable percentages
of screened cargo on passenger flights to the United States. We will
continue to assess this issue as part of our on-going review of TSA's
efforts to meet the mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo transported
on passenger aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Details on TSA's screening exemptions are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this statement.
\29\ GAO-07-660.
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Achieving harmonization with foreign governments may be
challenging, because these efforts are voluntary and some foreign
countries do not share the United States' view regarding air cargo
security threats and risks. Although TSA acknowledges it has broad
authority to set standards for aviation security, including the
authority to require that a given percentage of in-bound cargo be
screened before it departs for the United States, TSA officials caution
that if TSA were to impose a strict cargo screening standard on all in-
bound cargo, many nations likely would be unable to meet such standards
in the near term. This raises the prospect of substantially reducing
the flow of cargo on passenger aircraft or possibly eliminating it
altogether. According to TSA, the effect of imposing such screening
standards in the near future would be, at minimum, increased costs for
international passenger travel and for imported goods, and possible
reduction in passenger traffic and foreign imports. According to TSA
officials, this could also undermine TSA's on-going cooperative efforts
to develop commensurate security systems with international partners.
TSA agreed that assessing the risk associated with the in-bound air
cargo transportation system will facilitate its efforts to harmonize
security standards with other nations. Accordingly, TSA has identified
the primary threats associated with in-bound air cargo, but has not yet
assessed which areas of in-bound air cargo are most vulnerable to
attack and which in-bound air cargo assets are deemed most critical to
protect. Although TSA agreed with our previous recommendation to assess
in-bound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets, it has not yet
established a methodology or time frame for how and when these
assessments will be completed. We continue to believe that the
completion of these assessments is important to the security of in-
bound air cargo.
Finally, the amount of resources TSA devotes to in-bound compliance
is disproportionate to the resources for domestic compliance. In April
2007, we reported that TSA inspects air carriers at foreign airports to
assess whether they are complying with air cargo security requirements,
but does not inspect all air carriers transporting cargo into the
United States.\30\ Furthermore, in fiscal year 2008, in-bound cargo
inspections were performed by a cadre of 9 International TSIs with
limited resources, compared to the 475 TSIs that performed domestic
cargo inspections. By mid-fiscal year 2008, international compliance
inspections accounted for a small percentage of all compliance
inspections performed by TSA, although in-bound cargo made up more than
40 percent of all cargo on passenger aircraft in 2007. Regarding in-
bound cargo, we reported in May 2008 that TSA lacks an inspection plan
with performance goals and measures for its international inspection
efforts, and recommended that TSA develop such a plan.\31\ TSA
officials stated in February 2009 that they are in the process of
completing a plan to provide guidance for inspectors conducting
compliance inspections at foreign airports, and intend to implement the
plan during fiscal year 2009. Finally TSA officials stated that the
number of international TSIs needs to be increased.
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\30\ GAO-07-660.
\31\ GAO-08-487T.
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Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to
answering any questions that you or other Members of the subcommittee
may have at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank both gentlemen for their
testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
When I make that statement, I think there is probably an
appropriate sigh that might come after that before I even enter
into the questions, because we are all here to try to make
Government work, and I mentioned the word ``verify,'' Mr. Lord,
quite frequently in my testimony. So I really think I am going
to go directly to you.
The verifying question gives me pause, the formula for
verifying gives me added pause, and I would like to have you
restate your concerns about verification, whether or not it is
the approach, the formula that is being used, the cooperation
of our aviation industry. So I have given you three points
there.
Then I want to go to a point that was raised in a letter
that we received from TSA that talks about commensurate--were
you able to determine what kind--what level of screening does
it equate to? Passenger luggage? Or are we at a lesser level
than that? Did your research or your investigation take you to
that level? If it did not, then I think I am going to add
another aspect to our inquiry when we seek to ask you for more
review.
Mr. Lord.
Mr. Lord. I would be glad to respond to that.
In the first phase of our assignment, we focused on what
data the agency had in place to verify compliance with the
legislative mandate. We spent a lot of time trying to
understand the system; and, to its credit, TSA is putting in
place a system that they expect will help answer that question
next month.
The broader issue of whether the entire process provides a
level of security commensurate with checked baggage, that is
something we are looking at. We are consulting closely with
TSA, our counsel's office, their counsel's office. I understand
that is the overall----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we don't have an answer at this time.
Is the data that you looked at, is that a degree of software
that you find adequate for this review?
Mr. Lord. Excuse me?
Ms. Jackson Lee. The data that you looked at, does that
include software that you think is adequate for this review?
Mr. Lord. They have designed a system. They have initial
reports streaming in and out. It is up to them to, No. 1, judge
whether the data is reliable, scrub the data, and then analyze
it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Where does the data come from? Is this
submission by airline companies?
Mr. Lord. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What about the question about verifying?
Where are we in that? That was a question that you raised in
your testimony or in your report.
Mr. Lord. That is our job. We help this committee conduct
oversight, and we typically focus on the data. We are trained
to study the data, trends in data. Our position is we haven't
seen the data.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You were also saying you question whether
TSA can verify what is going on, that they are doing 50
percent.
Mr. Lord. That is true. We typically look at the system,
the agencies that put into place, to judge performance. That is
the basic point of our testimony. They are in the process of
putting into place a system. So even though they are confident
they have met the threshold, there is no analytical basis to
determine that at this point.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We thank you.
Mr. Kelly, why don't you tell me about your assessment as
to whether TSA will be able to meet the 100 percent screening
mandate--which, in essence, I am sort of putting the cart
before the horse, but where are you now specifically with
respect to the 50 percent deadline that was on--that just
passed in February?
Mr. Kelly. Madam Chairwoman, in order to ascertain whether
the airlines have achieved the requirement of 50 percent
screening, what we have done is we have done polls of the
airlines, we have talked to each of the airline security--the
people at the security part of the airlines to discuss with
them what their airlines are doing and are they achieving the
goal. No. 2, we have our inspectors--our cargo inspectors out
at the airline facility spot checking each of the individual
airlines to make sure that they are complying with the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is this manual? Airlines are giving you
written pieces of paper or somebody is standing there standing
in front of your inspector and giving them information?
Mr. Kelly. It is both. The airlines feed to us the data
which we have asked them to furnish to us, which is the
screening data, which we will take and we are putting it into a
system to accumulate it by airport, by airline; and we are also
sending our inspectors out to observe what is being done at
each of the facilities that they are inspecting.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Kelly, I know that you have just come
on in the last 2 or 3 years. You have an Office of Science and
Technology. There have been a lot of small businesses that have
offered new technology that would have led up to being prepared
for this challenge. Has anyone put on your desk new
technologies that small businesses, such as one that we will
have as a witness, but, in any event, that has come to your
attention that could help utilize or help airlines utilize to
help so this process can move forward?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, we have been coordinating with the Science
and Technology Director to look at what I would consider non-
standard screening technologies. It is not X-ray. It doesn't
have to be X-ray or EDS. What we are looking at are things such
as metal detectors to screen cargo, produce.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are any of those in place now?
Mr. Kelly. No, there are none in place. We have them at the
science and technology facilities.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would appreciate that if you could
gather that and provide this committee with a list of what you
are looking at and the progress of their being able to be
utilized.
Mr. Kelly. Absolutely, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me finish in my question here. I am
still trying to hear, of the 50 percent deadline verification
that was due this past February, where exactly is TSA in that
ability to verify?
Mr. Kelly. We are in the process today or this week of
receiving the data from the airlines, and we are putting it
into a system, and we will analyze the output of that system
and then report it to you by mid-April of this year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is your airline selective, or are all of
the airlines flying in the Nation's skies today?
Mr. Kelly. It is every airline in every airport by month.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will probably have another inquiry to
get that list in some format, and I am going to try to
formulate the question.
Let me now recognize the distinguish Ranking Member, Mr.
Dent of Pennsylvania, for his 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Kelly, in your written statement you indicate
that the industry is, ``currently screening at least 50 percent
of air cargo transport on passenger aircraft on flights
originating in the United States.'' When compared to the actual
language of the 9/11 Act, your statement includes some
qualification that I wish to explore further here today.
Why does your statement include qualifications such as
``originating in the United States''? Does the TSA not include
in its calculations air cargo transported by international
flights?
Mr. Kelly. We do, and we state that we have met the 50
percent requirement for both in-bound international freight and
in freight originating in flights out-bound from the U.S.
airports.
Mr. Dent. Based on TSA's statistics, 50,000 tons of air
cargo are transported daily. Of these, 7,500 tons are carried
on passenger aircraft. How much is carried on in-bound foreign
air carriers?
Mr. Kelly. Those numbers you are referencing are out-bound
U.S. originated cargo. The total cargo moving on passenger
airplanes is about 7 billion bounds a year. Four billion of
that is out-bound from the United States; 3 billion is in-bound
to the United States.
Mr. Dent. So 3 billion in-bound?
Mr. Kelly. Yes.
Mr. Dent. When TSA provides the Congress its statistics for
the amount of cargo screened, do you include this exempted
cargo, or do you take that off the top and not include it in
your calculations?
Mr. Kelly. We include all cargo, including cargo that is
subject to alternate means.
Mr. Dent. So the TSA is required to provide an inspection
regime commensurate with that covering passenger baggage. How
does TSA propose to ensure that foreign air carriers bound for
the United States provide this commensurate level of security
for in-bound cargo?
Mr. Kelly. TSA is working with our foreign partners to
harmonize our programs so that their level of screening is
equal to ours. Until they get to that, what they have to follow
is our model security program, which we verified through our
international inspection force.
Mr. Dent. I would like to get to the issue of harmonization
here in a second. I will turn to Mr. Lord on that subject.
I am concerned that no matter what the Herculean efforts
that TSA may apply, the statutory requirements for TSA's
mandate to truly screen 100 percent of air cargo will not and
cannot be achieved for many years because of the need for
significant international discussions or harmonization. Would
you agree that TSA will not meet its statutory requirement for
the screening of 100 percent of all air cargo?
Mr. Kelly. I would have to agree.
Mr. Dent. I would have to ask Mr. Lord.
Mr. Lord. Yes. TSA has already informed us as part of our
on-going engagement they don't plan to meet the 100 percent
deadline.
Mr. Dent. Do you agree that TSA's most significant hurdle
to meeting the congressional mandate for 100 percent of all air
cargo will be the necessary cooperation with foreign
governments?
Mr. Kelly. We identified two issues, addressing the
exemption issues and harmonization standards with other
nations. They are both very important issues that need to be
addressed before we will be able to achieve the 100 percent.
Mr. Dent. So the TSA has been throwing around percentages,
but these have included a series of qualifiers. They use words
like ``domestic'' or ``out-bound.'' Do these qualifiers mask
the actual percentages being reached by the industry?
Mr. Kelly. Could you repeat the question again, sir?
Mr. Dent. I was talking about these qualifiers, that the
TSA has been throwing around percentages, and they have these
various series of qualifiers that use words like ``domestic''
or ``out-bound''. Do these qualifiers mask the actual
percentage being reached by the industry?
Mr. Kelly. I don't think those two qualifiers do. Out-
bound, they basically segregate the data: domestic, which
includes flights originating in the United States flying out of
the country, then in-bound. But they have--it is a separate set
of issues for both. But those are commonly understood terms, as
I understand it.
I think the issue is, though, to what extent the in-bound
cargo traffic is exempt from screening. You have to understand
the significance of these exemptions to really understand
whether they are going to be able to achieve the 100 percent on
the in-bound.
Mr. Dent. How much cargo is being exempted, and how much is
being screened by means other than what is listed in the 9/11
Act?
Mr. Lord. That is a great question. We asked TSA what--for
example, regarding the in-bound, what percent of the cargo was
currently exempted from screening; and they reported to us they
weren't--they didn't have the data at their disposal to answer
that. Even if they did, I would caution that is considered
sensitive security information, the exact percentages. We
wouldn't be able to discuss that in an open forum anyway, the
significance of the exemptions.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Kelly, did you want to address that last
question on how much is being exempted and how much is being
screened?
Mr. Kelly. Like Mr. Lord said, that is sensitive
information. We would be happy to talk about it off-line.
Mr. Dent. I would love to have that opportunity, Madam
Chairwoman. I realize my time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We will engage with TSA in a briefing
along with other security organizations with this issue.
It is now my privilege to recognize the full committee
Chairman, Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Kelly, you mentioned that with the Narrow Body
Amendment TSA is screening cargo on flights carrying 85 percent
of the public. Can you tell me what lessons learned, if any,
the Department has obtained from that?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I think what it has done is, No. 1, we
have learned a lesson that we could make a small step in the
process and make a huge step in securing the traveling public.
I think that is one of the key lessons that we have learned.
The other lesson is that, while this may be low-hanging
fruit, it is probably not--it doesn't foretell the level of
complexity and difficulty that is going to be encountered by
the air cargo industry in getting from the 50 percent to the
100 percent.
Mr. Thompson. Since you raised the 50 percent, please tell
the committee why did TSA miss the February deadline?
Mr. Kelly. Well, Mr. Thompson, I would argue that we didn't
miss the deadline. We have missed the ability to report on it.
But we consider, and all indications are, is that the airline
did, in fact--the airlines have, in fact, accomplished the 50
percent screening.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Lord, do you agree with what Mr. Kelly
just said?
Mr. Lord. I have a lot of respect for Mr. Kelly and what he
said was--it may turn out to be accurate. But, at this time,
since I am from GAO and we are trained to look at the data, my
simple retort is, ``show me the data.''
Mr. Thompson. Did you see anything?
Mr. Lord. We know they are in the process of gathering it
and analyzing it, but as of yet have they met the threshold or
not? We simply don't know.
Mr. Thompson. So I take it, Mr. Kelly, that you disagree
with Mr. Lord?
Mr. Kelly. I would never disagree with Mr. Lord.
No. Really, as I said, we feel that the industry has
accomplished the milestone; and we will be able to verify that
to the committee by mid-April.
Mr. Thompson. So in the absence of submitting the
information in a timely manner, you will stipulate that you
missed the congressional-mandated February deadline?
Mr. Kelly. So stipulated.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
From the standpoint of technology, what has been your
experience within TSA for how long it takes new ideas to get
through the system and implement it?
Mr. Kelly. I don't know if I have been around long enough
to really answer that question accurately, but I find that most
of the research that has been done for screening has been
centered around the efforts of screening baggage and passengers
at the checkpoints. There has been very little time and money
devoted to screening of cargo.
Now, in the last 6 months, we have had a lot of discussions
with the science and technology group and our own technology
force internally to TSA, and they recognize where the
shortfalls are, and they are making a concerted effort to try
to find technologies that will fill the gaps that we have in
the cargo screening theater.
Mr. Thompson. Are you involved in that process at all?
Mr. Kelly. Absolutely.
Mr. Thompson. Even though you haven't been around a long
time and you know that this mandate for screening is upon you,
can you give the committee a guesstimate of how long it takes
for new technology to get through TSA's system of review?
Mr. Kelly. Honestly, I can't. I don't have that
information.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Can you then tell me, is it an issue
that you don't have the money to do it or you don't have the
staff or both of--why you can't provide that?
Mr. Kelly. I think, as I said, TSA was more focused on
baggage screening than they were on cargo screening; and that
has now shifted with the introduction of the 9/11 Act. That
emphasis has shifted, and they are now looking at the issues
related to screening of air cargo. I think what we have tried
to encourage with the Science and Technology Directorate is to
look outside the box and look for innovative ways of screening
cargo. I think they are right now doing that; and, hopefully,
we will find technologies that are good.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I beg the indulgence of the committee,
Madam Chairwoman.
Can you provide the committee with whatever those new ideas
or new technologies are that you presently have under review?
Mr. Kelly. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman. I think we have
asked the same questions, so I hope that we will be able to put
that in writing so that you can understand it appropriately.
I think we have enough time to yield again. So let me
indicate the Chair will now recognize other Members for
questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance
with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize Members
who were present at the start of the hearing based on the
starting of the subcommittee, alternating between the majority
and minority. Those coming in later will be recognized as they
arrive.
We will now recognize Mr. Lujan for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
My questions fall exactly in line with where Chairman
Thompson left off and talking specifically about the technology
and some of the advantages that we could be using to assist you
in meeting these goals.
In your testimony, Mr. Lord, it clearly states, as you
point out, that TSA faces a number of challenges related to
technology. You highlighted the effectiveness while TSA
contractors are utilizing technologies before standards have
been met, in utilizing technology and creating these standards
with technological advances with other nations as we move
forward.
My question specifically, I guess, Mr. Kelly, is what can
be done to be able to utilize the technology that we are using
here in the United States to be able to create these standards
and formalize these standards with other nations?
Mr. Kelly. Well, one thing we are doing in working with the
science and technology group is we have set up I guess what I
would call live labs at airline facilities--one in New York and
one in Miami--where we are actually placing the technologies
that we hope will work with screening cargo in these facilities
so that we can test it on a live environment, rather than do it
in a lab.
We find that if you are working in a lab, people wearing
white coats and white gloves, there is no dirt around, and
whereas if you can put it in a cargo facility, it is going to
be what is actually going to happen with the equipment, and we
get a better result on the effectiveness of that equipment.
Mr. Lujan. Okay. Mr. Lord, again, your testimony points out
that the 9/11 Act defines screening for the purposes of the air
cargo screening mandate as a physical examination or
nonintrusive methods for assessing whether cargo poses a threat
to transportation security with examples of various
technologies.
I would go back, Mr. Kelly, to maybe embrace some of the
work that is being done with some of the labs and in the lab
environment.
Los Alamos National Labs, which is a national laboratory in
my district, is developing a variety of technologies that could
make air cargo screening more effective and more affordable.
The national labs are developing technologies that will improve
the safety and affordability of air cargo screening and air
travel in general.
For example, the Magvid scanner is capable of identifying
liquids and gels within sealed cargo or baggage using
technology similar to the magnetic resonance imaging systems.
They are also developing the advanced active interrogation
systems and advanced spectroscopic portal monitors, which are
capable of detecting nuclear and radiological materials and can
be adapted for cargo screening.
My specific question is, how are--and this would be to both
of you--how, specifically, is TSA or other organizations
incorporating the new innovative technologies being developed
by national laboratories across the country in its protection
of air passengers?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I can't speak for the S&T Directorate, but
I know that they are very heavily involved with the various
laboratories throughout the United States in what they are
developing at those laboratories.
Mr. Lujan. Madam Chairwoman, what I would like to do, if at
all possible, is submit to the committee, and maybe we can
submit it to TSA as a recommendation, various technologies that
are being explored by national laboratories around the country
that maybe can assist us in meeting these goals.
I know we are short on time, Madam Chairwoman, so, with
that, I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We would be happy to receive that from the
gentleman. I am not sure if he has a list now that he would
like to submit into the record?
Mr. Lujan. Later.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So the gentleman will submit it later.
Let me yield to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Cleaver.
Mr. Cleaver, we are trying to get you in and allow these
gentlemen to depart. You are yielded at this time. Thank you,
Mr. Cleaver.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Kelly, my concern is that we, I mean, we have so many
challenges, it seems, still before us. We are told that there
are not enough inspectors. Is that accurate?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I think presently we have enough
inspectors to do at the level of screening that we are at
today. But, as the system grows, as the Certified Cargo
Screening system grows, we will probably have to re-evaluate
the needs of our inspectors, and staff accordingly.
Mr. Cleaver. Now, if we don't have the sophisticated
screening equipment that would allow us to actually screen
crates with cargo over 10 feet long, then it means--this is a
question--it means that we would have to do it manually, that
we would have to actually open up crates and screen the
material; is that accurate?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, it is. But also, if the facility that
crated the goods was a Certified Cargo Screening facility, then
they would screen it before they closed up the crate, and it
would be considered screened at that point.
Mr. Cleaver. Okay. But how do we--I mean, it seems like we
are going to have a traffic jam, you know, as we move toward
fulfilling the congressional mandate that--I mean, you are
saying you have enough people at this moment to do the work,
but we are talking just another year. You know, I am frustrated
now in my questioning because I know we have to go vote, and I
am not able to get into the depths of this whole issue.
Mr. Kelly. Well, if you want, we could meet with you and
talk to you.
Mr. Cleaver. Yeah, I am very much interested in the
problems, or apparent problems, of lack of inspectors, and
particularly in light of the fact that you have a short
timeline.
Mr. Kelly. Well, the TSA inspectors don't screen cargo.
What they do is they are inspectors to make sure that the
airlines or the screening facilities comply with the
regulation. So they are not physically screening the cargo.
Mr. Cleaver. Then who is?
Mr. Kelly. The airlines will do it, the freight forwarders
will do it, the shippers will do it, manufacturers.
Mr. Cleaver. We are just estimating that we are at 50
percent?
Mr. Kelly. No.
Mr. Cleaver. We know?
Mr. Kelly. Well, we will verify that and advise you mid-
April as to the status of where we are.
Mr. Cleaver. But it won't be an estimate?
Mr. Kelly. It won't be an estimate, no.
Mr. Cleaver. Okay.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. DeFazio. Can I ask one really quick question? You can
leave and I will take over as temporary Chair if you are
worried about the time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman.
Two of us have clarifying questions, and we are trying to
dismiss them.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. I just want to express a concern. I
would love to follow up with Mr. Kelly. That is all.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. DeFazio. I would love to follow up with you. It is a
particular parochial concern; all politics are local. It has to
do with cherries and the, sort of, improbabilities and
possibilities of how we are going to screen the 2 months' worth
of intense cherry exports we have by air freight every year, a
very valuable commodity. I just need to follow up with you and
see if there is some way we can deal with this, because right
now we don't think it is going to work.
Mr. Kelly. All right. Fine.
Mr. DeFazio. I will have my staff follow up.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. We have had a lot of discussions----
Mr. DeFazio. Yeah, and we will point to what we think are
still some problems. Your one person--your one person--out
there in the whole Northwest is doing a great job, but he
probably needs to be cloned, duplicated, replicated.
Mr. Kelly. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. DeFazio, let's get his name, he or
she, that is doing a great job. We want to make sure we do
clone him.
I have a clarifying question, and then we will dash--thank
you very much, Mr. DeFazio--we will dash and be able to dismiss
this particular panel. So I yield myself just a brief moment.
Mr. Kelly, let me understand, have you conceded or admitted
that you missed the deadline of February 9, No. 1? No. 2, you
are not verifying 50 percent? Have you conceded to both of
those points?
Mr. Kelly. No----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You missed the deadline of February 9 to
meet 50 percent, and you also say you are not able to verify 50
percent cargo inspection. Is that what you are saying to us
today?
Mr. Kelly. We are in the process of verifying the 50
percent cargo----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But right now, today, you cannot verify
that.
Mr. Kelly. Right now we cannot verify it, no.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Lord, what did you say? You are
agreeing that they can't verify it. Do you expect they will
ever be able to verify it?
Mr. Lord. I indicated they are in the process of verifying;
they can't do it today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Pardon me?
Mr. Lord. I indicated they are in the process of verifying,
but, as of today, they can't tell you whether they have met it
or not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Last point, Mr. Kelly, on airlines, are you saying airlines
are cooperating, giving you information, or you are getting
information from them?
Mr. Kelly. They are cooperating, and they are feeding the
information to us.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. I would like to get, again--I think
I asked the question--a list of the airlines, and we will
pursue that at a later time.
I yield to the gentleman, Mr. Dent of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Very quickly, Mr. Kelly, do you consider exempted cargo
when conducting your statistical analysis?
Mr. Kelly. We include all cargo in the base of what we
are--to how we get to the 50 percent, we include all cargo.
Mr. Dent. Including exempted cargo?
Mr. Kelly. Yes.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Then, without going into detail, do you
right now know the amount of cargo you exempted in 2008 from
screening, yes or no?
Mr. Kelly. No.
Mr. Dent. So I guess the question then is, how is that
possible?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I mean, I don't know, and I don't know if
I can find out. But I could look to see.
Mr. Dent. Okay. I would appreciate your following up. We
have to go run to vote, so thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Dent.
There being no further questions for our first panel, I
thank the witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee
today. Again, they are great public servants. We appreciate
that.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for you, and we ask that you respond to them
expeditiously in writing.
We now will ask that you graciously accept the fact that
this committee is in recess. When we return, we will start with
our second panel.
The committee now stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. This hearing will now be reconvened, and
let me thank all of you for your patience.
I thought I would acknowledge the Ranking Member for both
his diligence and his support for the product in his district.
He has wanted to emphasize the bipartisanship of this
particular subcommittee, and you will see it as we go forward.
These are Peeps marshmallow chicks that he has graced the
Chairwoman with. It will suggest to you that if we do not see
you before the holidays are approaching, we wish you
wonderfully blessed holidays. If someone starts failing
physically, we will be willing to share one of the marshmallow
chicks with you.
Thank you, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Madam Chairwoman, you are most welcome. I would
be happy to make sure that we provide it to the Chairman of the
full committee some Easter Peeps, as well, for when he needs a
little sugar.
Ms. Jackson Lee. He is on the Agriculture Committee, and I
think he might take great interest in this.
Mr. Dent. The name of the company is Just Born, Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania. There you go.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Oh, my goodness. Thank you for your
kindness, Mr. Dent.
I welcome our second panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Andre Johnson, who is responsible
for strategic direction as well as financial and overall
management of FreightScan. FreightScan, a California-based
company, is a leader in the development and deployment of
customer-driven technology. As well, it is a company that has
evidenced its interest in the area that we are discussing.
These solutions for the freight and logistics industry are the
basis of the customer-driven technology solutions that this
company is engaged in. Mr. Johnson has practical knowledge and
experience in all sizes of business, from entrepreneurial to
Fortune 100 companies.
Welcome, Mr. Johnson.
Our second witness is Mr. Jack Boisen, who recently retired
as the head of Continental Airlines Cargo. After an auspicious
14-year career leading global operations, sales, marketing,
customer service, and postal affairs, he continues his role as
the chairman of the International Air Cargo Association. Mr.
Boisen has spent more than 40 years in the airline industry,
handling positions of increasing stature and responsibility. He
served Houston-based Continental as vice president of the cargo
division since 1994. I will not be biased toward Mr. Boisen
because of his former affiliation with my hometown airline.
But thank you and welcome, Mr. Boisen.
Our third witness is Mr. Brandon Fried. Mr. Fried was
appointed to serve as the executive director of the
Airforwarders Association in November 2005. Mr. Fried has more
than 25 years of experience in the air freight industry. He
started his career as a sales representative in Los Angeles and
then moved to Washington, DC, where he founded, owned, and
operated the Washington office of Adcom Worldwide, a global
freight forwarder specializing in time-definite air cargo
transportation.
We welcome you, as well, Mr. Fried, to the panel.
Our fourth witness is Mr. James May, president and CEO of
the Air Transport Association of America, the Nation's oldest
and largest air trade association. He joined ATA in February
2003 and has lead the association through an especially
challenging time in its history. Prior to joining ATA, Mr. May
served as an executive vice president of the National
Association of Broadcasters, vice president for public affairs
for the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New York, and directed
Government relations for PepsiCo, and served as vice president
for public affairs for the Grocery Manufacturers of America.
We welcome you, Mr. May.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Johnson.
Welcome, Mr. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF ANDRE L. JOHNSON, CEO, FREIGHTSCAN
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. My name is Andre
Johnson, the CEO of FreightScan. We are a company that provides
innovative technology solutions for transportation companies.
FreightScan is a trustee member of the International Air Cargo
Association, member of the Air Forwarders Association also.
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and Members of
the distinguished subcommittee, let me extend my sincere
appreciation and gratitude for your inviting me to provide this
testimony this afternoon.
Chairman Thompson, thank you for coming also.
I am here to speak on behalf of the small entrepreneurial
companies that are at the forefront of developing new
technology to solve problems for both the private and public
sector. Can we secure American skies? I believe we can. The
story of FreightScan illustrates how small companies can play a
significant role, meeting the air cargo screening requirements
mandated by Congress in the
9/11 Act.
FreightScan was formed several years ago with a mission to
offer business solutions for the freight industry, with an
initial focus on air cargo. The first problem we set out to
solve was how to automatically capture dimensions and images of
cargo without disrupting workflow. Solving this problem will
enable air carriers to accurately charge for large, light-
weight shipments, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in
profits. FreightScan developed and deployed a solution, and in
late 2007 we introduced the FS100.
As our team traveled around the world promoting the FS100,
we kept hearing the same question: If this technology can
capture dimensions and images, can we use it to screen cargo?
FreightScan has always taken great pride in being customer-
focused, and we committed to developing a screening solution
that would not slow the flow of commerce. The result is
CargoVizion, a system which will detect potential threat
objects in cargo during the standard acceptance process of
shipments.
Our next step was to get CargoVizion validated and tested
for inclusion on the Qualified Product List, or QPL. Our
initial entree to the QPL process was frustrating. The roadmap
to presenting our technology was not clear, and we couldn't get
specifications for what threats we had to detect or various
other critical pieces of information we needed to complete our
development.
We fully support and understand the need to protect
sensitive information; however, a defined QPL process, without
classified data, would have accelerated our ability to get
details about our technology to TSA for evaluation. We could
not afford any more delays, so we eventually validated the
technology internally and presented the information to the TSA
in the hopes it was a format that they could accept.
That said, let me be clear: This is in no way a criticism
or indictment of the TSA and its related agencies. Our initial
point of contact at TSA made it clear the agency was besieged
by companies large and small claiming to have solutions. We
always believed that the TSA wanted to find a screening
solution as much as we wanted to deliver one.
The proof of the TSA's commitment to finding and validating
potential solutions for 100 percent screening could be proven
where we are today. Just a few short weeks after we convinced
the TSA that we have a potentially viable solution, the pace
has picked up significantly. Since then, we have had number of
positive, constructive calls and e-mails with the TSA and the
TSL lab in Atlantic City, and we are finalizing a cooperative
research and development agreement to test and validate our
technology.
There are many positive outcomes for FreightScan's journey.
We were able to obtain private funding and develop our
screening solution in record time without burdening the U.S.
Government for resources or funding. We have demonstrated the
solution in industry events, and there are several companies
waiting to implement CargoVizion immediately after being added
to the QPL. We have hired 20 additional employees in the last
12 months, in spite of the current economic downturn, all of
whom enjoy a safe working environment, full health insurance
for them and their families, and many other benefits.
Securing American skies is a difficult task, and,
therefore, the ability to validate related technology is also
very difficult. My hope is that FreightScan's story will
inspire other small companies and also encourage the hard-
working men and women at TSA to make the QPL process
transparent for both large and small companies. This will
encourage others to attempt the demanding but important duty of
securing America. I understand that TSA is working on this, and
we applaud them for their efforts.
In conclusion, let me thank industry leaders like Jack
Boisen and Brandon Fried and also the TSA leadership for their
encouragement and communication. FreightScan is one example of
a company that had the determination to navigate the very
challenging process. The reward is a working partnership with
the TSA that will certainly contribute to everyone's goal of
securing American skies.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you
today. It would be my honor to return before this distinguished
subcommittee before the August recess, and it is my hope I will
be able to report that our solution is in use, as I believe
CargoVizion can make a significant contribution to meeting the
August 2010 deadline for screening 100 percent of cargo.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andre L. Johnson
March 18, 2009
Good afternoon. My name is Andre Johnson. I am the Chief Executive
Officer of FreightScan, a company that provides innovative technology
solutions for transportation companies. FreightScan is a trustee member
of The International Air Cargo Association, as well as a member of the
Air Forwarders Association.
To Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and the Members of
this distinguished subcommittee, let me extend my sincere appreciation
and gratitude to you for inviting me to provide testimony this
afternoon.
I am here today to speak on behalf of the small, entrepreneurial
companies that are at the forefront of developing new technology to
solve problems for both the private and public sector. Can we secure
American Skies? I believe we can, and the story of FreightScan
illustrates how small companies can play a significant role meeting the
air cargo screening requirements mandated by Congress in the 9/11 Act.
FreightScan was formed several years ago with a mission to offer
business solutions for the freight industry with an initial focus on
air cargo. The first problem we set out to solve was how to
automatically capture dimensions and images of cargo without disrupting
workflow. Solving this problem would enable air carriers to accurately
charge for large lightweight shipments, generating hundreds of millions
of dollars in profits. FreightScan developed a solution, and in late
2007 we introduced the FS100, an automated dimensioning system that
captures dimensions of cargo in four seconds.
As our team traveled the United States and around the world
promoting the FS100, we kept hearing the same question: If this
technology can capture dimensions and images, can we use it to screen
cargo?
FreightScan has always taken great pride in being a small, agile
company that is customer-focused and we committed to developing a
solution that would screen cargo without slowing the flow of commerce.
The result is CargoVizion, a system which will automatically detect
potential threat objects in cargo during the standard acceptance
process of shipments. Our next step was to get CargoVizion validated
and tested for inclusion on the Qualified Product List, or QPL, and we
set out to introduce our company and technology to the authorizing
Federal agencies.
Our initial entree to the QPL process was frustrating. The roadmap
to presenting our technology to the TSA was not clear, and we couldn't
get specifications for what threats we had to detect, or various other
critical pieces of information we needed to complete our development.
We fully support and understand the need to protect sensitive
information. However, a defined QPL process, without classified data,
would have accelerated our ability to get details about our technology
to TSA for evaluation and our efforts to bring CargoVizion to the cargo
industry. We eventually decided that we could not afford any more
delays, and so we validated the technology internally and presented
that information to the TSA in the hopes it was in a format they could
accept.
That said, let me be clear, this is in no way a criticism nor
indictment of TSA and its related agencies. Our initial point of
contact at TSA made it clear the agency was besieged by companies large
and small claiming to have solutions, and they were doing what they
could to respond. We recognized the enormity of the task and at no time
did we take the obstacles to progress personally. To the contrary, we
always believed that the TSA wanted to find a screening solution as
much as we wanted to deliver one. The proof of TSA's commitment to
finding solutions for 100% air cargo screening can be seen in where we
are today.
Just a few short weeks ago, after we convinced the TSA that we have
a potentially viable solution, the pace picked up significantly. Since
then, we have had a number of very constructive calls with the TSA and
the TSL, and we are finalizing a Cooperative Research and Development
Agreement to test and validate the equipment. TSA and TSL
representatives have been responsive and helpful, and I believe we are
very close now to being in a position to offer the freight industry a
new method for screening cargo transported on passenger planes in an
efficient and practical manner.
There are many positive outcomes from FreightScan's journey. In our
pursuit to gain the attention of TSA, we were able to obtain private
funding and develop an innovative screening solution in record time
without burdening the U.S. Government for resources or funding. We have
demonstrated the solution at industry events, resulting in a list of
airlines and freight forwarders who waiting to implement CargoVizion
immediately after being added to the QPL. We have hired 20 additional
employees in the last 12 months in spite of the current economic
downturn, all of whom enjoy a safe working environment, health
insurance for their families, and many other benefits such as sharing
in the pride of knowing that they are participating in making our great
country stronger and safer for all.
Securing American skies is a difficult task; and therefore the
ability to validate related technology is also difficult. My hope is
that FreightScan's story will inspire other small companies to work
through the process, and also encourage the hard-working men and women
at TSA to make the QPL process transparent for both large and small
innovative companies. This will encourage others to attempt the
demanding but important duty of securing America. I understand that the
TSA is working on this, and we applaud them for their efforts.
In conclusion, let me thank industry leaders like Jack Boisen and
Brandon Fried, and also the TSA leadership for their encouragement and
communication. FreightScan is one example of a company that had the
determination to navigate a very challenging process. The reward is a
working partnership with the TSA that will most certainly contribute to
everyone's goal of securing American skies.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. It
would be my honor to return before this distinguished subcommittee
before the August recess. It is my hope that I will be able to report
that our solution is in use, as I believe CargoVizion can make a
significant contribution to meeting the August 2010 deadline for
screening 100% of cargo.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for your
testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Boisen to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JACK BOISEN, CHAIRMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Boisen. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent,
Chairman Thompson, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, it is my pleasure to testify today on behalf of
the The International Air Cargo Association, or TIACA, for
which I serve as chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to
present our views in one of the most important issues facing
the air cargo sector: the screening mandates established by so-
called 9/11 Act.
First, allow me to introduce TIACA. We represent all major
segments of the air cargo supply chain, including airlines,
forwarders, airports, ground handlers, all cargo carriers, road
carriers, customs brokers, third-party logistics companies,
integrators, shippers, and aircraft manufacturers. Because of
the diversity of our membership, TIACA members are affected by
all of TSA's security protocols. Our members are committed to
ensuring the safety and security of air cargo while maintaining
the viability of the air cargo supply system.
In assessing current and future air cargo screening and the
question of whether we can secure America's skies, it is
important to understand that it is not possible to design a
one-size-fits-all approach to air cargo security. Operating
realities are different for each segment of the industry, and
security policies need to take these distinctions into account.
TIACA commends TSA for its sensitivity to this fact.
TSA has determined that, because of the realities of the
air cargo supply chain, the best way to implement the 9/11 air
cargo screening mandates is to spread the screening
responsibilities throughout the supply chain via the Certified
Cargo Screening Program, or CCSP. TIACA agrees with this
approach. We do not believe that screening can be the sole
responsibility of the airlines, nor do we support the efforts
of some entities to Federalize all air cargo screening.
We believe Federalization of airline-only screening would
unduly crowd this function onto airport grounds, potentially
creating significant bottlenecks to impose a one-size-fits-all
approach to air cargo screening. While this might work in
certain locales, it would likely produce commercial gridlock at
many U.S. airports. The flexibility allowed under CCSP is a
better fit with the diverse needs of the air cargo supply
chain.
While TIACA supports the general concept of CCSP, we have
several concerns about implementation of the air cargo
screening mandates. I would like to highlight a few of them in
my testimony today.
First, TIACA is concerned about the cost likely to be
incurred by its members due to the new screening obligations.
Those companies that become certified screeners will need to
acquire costly equipment. There will be other costs incurred,
as well, including facility security improvements, training, et
cetera. We hope the U.S. Congress can consider providing some
relief to these companies, perhaps through tax incentives.
Second, we are quite concerned that much of the equipment
currently certified for use is most appropriate for the
passenger screening environment and not to the air cargo
environment, where palletized or other consolidated shipments
are the norm. We believe TSA should expedite this review of
technologies geared toward the air cargo environment.
Third, we are unclear on how TSA will be verifying
compliance with the February 2009 and August 2010 screening
standards and how potential stoppages due to noncompliance will
be handled.
Fourth, there is confusion within the air cargo sector
about how the air cargo screening standards will be applied to
flights originating from foreign airports. At this point, we do
not know the extent to which foreign security protocols may
have to change to meet the August 2010 100 percent screening
standard or what the impact might be on airlines, forwarders,
shippers, and others.
Fifth, TIACA is also concerned that there is occasionally a
breakdown between TSA headquarters' interpretation of policy
and the actions that are taken by inspectors in the field.
Sixth, TIACA believe the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, known as ASAC, and its vital Air Cargo Working Group
should be resuscitated as quickly as possible. We believe both
would serve as vital conduits for industry-Government
discussion of the implementation issues as we move toward the
100 percent air cargo screening.
Seventh, TIACA believes it is essential that the Department
of Homeland Security better leverage the security programs of
TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP, with a view
toward increasing efficiency and eliminating redundancies.
In summary, many challenges remain as we move toward August
2010 and the 100 percent air cargo screening mandate. TIACA
commends the subcommittee for its strong leadership on this
issue and hopes to continue working with you and with the TSA
to address these challenges and ensure viable implementation of
the new air cargo screening standards and the security of
America's skies.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
[The statement of Mr. Boisen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jack Boisen
March 18, 2009
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to testify today on
behalf of The International Air Cargo Association, or TIACA, which I
serve as chairman. I am also a veteran of more than 40 years in the air
cargo industry, having served most recently as Vice President of
Continental Airlines' Cargo Division for 14 years.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on one of the
most important issues facing the air cargo sector, the screening
mandates established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007. The law requires that 50% of all air cargo on
passenger aircraft be screened as of February 2009 and that all such
cargo be screened as of August 2010. Obviously, we are currently
operating in an environment where the 50% standard is applicable and
are less than 17 months away from the comprehensive requirement.
First, allow me to introduce TIACA. We represent all major segments
of the air cargo supply chain, including airlines, forwarders,
airports, ground handlers, all-cargo carriers, road carriers, customs
brokers, third-party logistics companies, integrators, shippers,
aircraft manufacturers, and educational institutions. Because of the
diversity of our membership, TIACA members are affected by all of TSA's
security protocols. As a result, we actively engage with TSA on a wide
range of air cargo security issues, and implementation of the 9/11
Act's air cargo screening mandates is one of our top priorities. Our
members are committed to ensuring the safety and security of air cargo
while maintaining the viability of the air cargo supply chain.
In assessing current and future air cargo screening, and the
question of whether we can secure America's skies, it is important to
understand that, because of the many different entities in the air
cargo supply chain, it is impossible to design a one-size-fits-all
approach to air cargo security. Operating realities are different for
passenger airlines, all-cargo airlines, express operators, air freight
forwarders (or indirect air carriers), ground transportation providers,
and shippers. Different airports have distinct footprints, and tend to
handle different types of cargo. Security policies need to take these
distinctions into account if they are to offer workable approaches.
TIACA commends TSA for its sensitivity to the diverse range of
operators in the air cargo supply chain, and for its recognition of the
need to maintain flexible policies because of that diversity.
TSA has determined that, because of the realities of the air cargo
supply chain, the best way to implement the 9/11 Act's 50% and 100% air
cargo screening mandates is to spread screening responsibilities
throughout the supply chain via the Certified Cargo Screening Program,
or CCSP. Fundamentally, TIACA agrees with this approach. We do not
believe that screening can be the sole responsibility of the airlines,
nor do we support the efforts of some entities to federalize all air
cargo screening, making it a TSA function and locating it solely on
airport grounds. We believe federalization or airline-only screening
would unduly crowd this function onto airport grounds, potentially
creating significant bottlenecks, and would impose a one-size-fits-all
approach to air cargo screening. While this approach might work in
certain locales, it would likely produce commercial gridlock at many
U.S. airports. The flexibility allowed under CCSP is a better fit with
the diverse needs of the air cargo supply chain.
While TIACA supports the general concept of CCSP, we have several
concerns about implementation of the air cargo screening mandates. I'd
like to highlight a few of the issues that are particularly important
for TIACA members in my testimony today.
First, TIACA is concerned about the costs likely to be incurred by
its members due to the new screening obligations. Those companies that
become certified screeners will need to acquire costly equipment for
each of their certified facilities. Passenger airlines may face
additional equipment acquisition costs as well. This is significant,
particularly given the current economic downturn which has reduced air
cargo volumes by roughly 25%, threatening the viability of many
companies. We hope the U.S. Congress can consider providing some relief
to companies that incur the substantial cost of screening equipment
acquisition. For example, establishing tax incentives or credits for
such companies could provide significant financial relief.
Second, we are quite concerned that much of the equipment currently
certified for use is most appropriate for the passenger screening
environment and is ill-suited to the air cargo environment where
palletized or other consolidated shipments are the norm. We believe TSA
should expedite its review of technologies geared towards the air cargo
environment. Given the looming August 2010 deadline, it is essential
that new technological options be made available very soon. Without new
equipment capable of screening consolidated shipments, we may face
considerable disruption to air cargo commercial flows in a 100%
screening environment. In this regard, TIACA strongly supports
increased funding for and use of canine screening teams for air cargo
and believes expanded use of canines could help ensure smoother
implementation of the comprehensive screening mandate.
Third, we are unclear about how TSA will be verifying compliance
with the February 2009 and August 2010 screening standards. TIACA
members have advised that they are in compliance with the reporting
requirements TSA has placed on them with respect to the February 2009
screening standard, and report they are meeting the 50% standard.
However, we are unclear about how TSA is processing and validating that
information, individually and across the entire supply chain. We are
also unsure whether there might be future disruptions to trade based on
TSA determinations of cases where the 50% standard may not be met, and
how that information will be communicated to others in the supply
chain. Furthermore, once the 100% standard is in place, the potential
for unforeseen stoppages in trade may increase. We do not know what
sort of notification there will be in such instances, nor how difficult
it may be for shippers, forwarders, or airlines to adjust their
schedules to ensure service.
Fourth, there is confusion within the air cargo sector about how
the air cargo screening standards will be applied to flights
originating from foreign airports. Up until recently, TSA had
maintained that the 9/11 Act's screening mandates applied only to
flights originating from U.S. airports. Under this interpretation, non-
U.S. airlines would be required to meet the 9/11 Act's screening
standards for flights they operated out of U.S. airports, just as would
U.S. airlines. However, neither U.S. nor foreign airlines would be
required to meet the screening thresholds for flights originating from
foreign airports. Instead, those flights would be subject to the
security protocols in the country of departure.
Roughly 6 months ago, TSA modified its interpretation and concluded
the 9/11 Act mandates also apply to foreign-origin flights. At this
point, we do not know the extent to which foreign security protocols
may have to change to meet the August 2010 100% screening standard, how
TSA will factor in-bound cargo into its calculations of whether the
threshold is met, or what the impact might be on screening methods,
technologies, certified cargo programs, etc.--let alone what all this
will mean for airlines, forwarders, shippers, and others.
In this uncertain environment, it is critical that TSA and its
counterpart agencies in other countries work closely with industry
groups to ensure timely communication to those in the air cargo supply
chain so that widespread commercial disruption is avoided. We simply
cannot afford commercial bottlenecks due to confusion over security
regimes, on top of the damage already caused by the global economic
crisis. TIACA stands ready to do its part by addressing member concerns
and questions to TSA, liaising with security authorities, and conveying
key information to its members. We urge all parties to cooperate in an
effort to ensure that security standards are met and commercial chaos
is avoided.
Fifth, TIACA is also concerned that there is occasionally a
breakdown between TSA headquarters' interpretation of policy and the
actions that are taken by inspectors in the field. We will continue to
raise issues of inconsistency with TSA and urge the agency to ensure
coordination between headquarters and the field through better
education and communication.
Sixth, TIACA believes the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
(ASAC) should be reinvigorated as quickly as possible. In the past,
this body served as a vital conduit for industry-government
collaboration on issues critical to air cargo, but it has been shut
down for well over a year due to issues related to its re-chartering.
The former ASAC created an Air Cargo Working Group, which fostered a
highly productive dialogue between TSA and all elements of the air
cargo industry. Without the ASAC umbrella, there is no formal mechanism
for reactivating that dialogue and resuming the valuable work of that
group. Unfortunately, that means that now, during the critical months
leading up to the August 2010 deadline, this vital means of
communication is silenced.
We understand that new ASAC members have been selected, but the re-
chartered ASAC has yet to meet. We believe it is particularly important
to reactivate the dialogue of the Air Cargo Working Group so it can
address implementation issues related to the 100% screening mandate,
and we encourage this subcommittee to do what it can to ensure that the
ASAC and this critical working group are resuscitated.
Seventh, TIACA believes it is essential that the Department of
Homeland Security better leverage the security programs of TSA and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, or CBP. Both agencies operate extensive
national security programs, and both are part of the same department--
yet industry partners are generally unable to leverage participation in
one agency's programs with those of the other agency. DHS should more
aggressively explore synergies between TSA and CBP cargo screening
programs, including use of automation, risk-based assessment,
personnel, and Government-industry partnerships such as the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (or C-TPAT) and the CCSP, with a
view towards increasing efficiency and eliminating redundancies.
Finally, on a related matter, TIACA is closely monitoring CBP's
implementation of the so-called 10+2, or Importer Security Filing,
regulation. While this initiative currently applies solely to maritime
shipments, CBP has indicated at various times that it might consider
rolling it out to other modes. TIACA believes that, if such a rollout
were to occur, CBP must take into account the unique aspects of each
mode of transportation and differentiate the requirements based on the
realities of each mode. In particular, if CBP were to consider an
importer security filing for air, it would need to articulate why such
an approach is warranted in light of the fact that 100% screening, by
TSA, would already be applicable as of August 2010. This is in stark
contrast to the maritime environment, where CBP has specifically
advocated 10+2 as a preferable alternative to 100% scanning of maritime
shipments.
In summary, many challenges remain as we move towards August 2010
and the 100% air cargo screening mandate. TIACA commends this
subcommittee for its strong leadership on this issue, and hopes to
continue working with you and with TSA to address these challenges and
ensure viable implementation of the new air cargo screening standards
and the security of America's skies.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your testimony,
Mr. Boisen.
I now recognize Mr. Fried to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRANDON FRIED, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIRFORWARDERS
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Fried. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent,
Chairman Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before the House Committee on
Homeland Security to discuss the challenges in meeting the
first screening deadline, as well as the challenges we
anticipate the next 50 percent.
As you are aware, the air freight industry has been working
hard to meet the 100 percent passenger air cargo screening
mandate. The Airforwarders Association is committed to
facilitating compliance and remains confident that the 100
percent benchmark will be met. We urge Congress and the TSA to
maintain the CCSP against calls for Federalization, provide
funding mechanisms for participants to reduce the barrier to
participation, and resist any further moves away from a risk-
based approach to cargo security.
More than a quarter of the facilities currently certified
to screen cargo are Airforwarders Association members. It seems
that, for the vast majority of the industry, reaching the 50
percent benchmark has not been particularly problematic. While
the economic environment has had the effect of lowering cargo
volume, remarkable progress made by TSA, forwarders, air
carriers, and shippers deserves most of the credit. The ease of
attaining the first portion of the screening mandate should be
both a sign of encouragement and caution. Let me outline the
remaining challenges with the remainder of my time.
Last year, I had the privilege of addressing this
subcommittee and outlined the concerns forwarders have about
meeting the 100 percent mandate. Unfortunately, some of the
more serious issues have yet to be resolved. The following
three elements need to be resolved in order for CCSP to be a
viable security program: No. 1, the appropriation and
availability of additional Federal funding or incentives for
eligible participants; No. 2, the encouragement of all entities
involved in the supply chain as full participants in the act of
screening; and, No. 3, the availability of efficient and cost-
effective solutions to screening for all TSA-certified Indirect
Air Carriers and other qualified participants.
In the absence of certified technology, the focus will be
on examining pallets and containers. Each pallet or unit load
device contains nearly 200 pieces of varying size, shape, and
commodities. The space and time involved in breaking up cargo
poses an increased level of risk of theft or tampering, as idle
cargo is a security concern.
The Air Forwarders Association has been working with
carriers, shippers, and forwarders to ensure that there are
many options available to forwarders of all sizes. As such, we
believe that market competition and innovation, rather than the
TSA screening operation at each airport facility, is the best
way to provide efficient and effective options for all in the
supply chain.
Encouraging TSA's screening to the maximum extent possible
removes the supply chain's experience and problem-solving
skills for a system with delays, higher costs, and less
accountability. We urge TSA to continue to work with their
Science and Technology Office, as well as vendors, to identify,
test, and approve equipment that can effectively and
efficiently screen palletized cargo. In the absence of that, we
urge Congress to allocate additional funds for the canine
program.
Even as advancements are made with technology, the
significant amount of capital required to purchase technology
is a barrier for participation. Forwarders participating in
CCSP must purchase technology for which the cost may range from
$50,000 to $500,000 per facility, a price tag that cannot be
met by many forwarders, particularly smaller forwarding
businesses. As a result, they may face market disadvantages and
longer lines at the air carrier if alternate options are not
available. This lost revenue in the current economic
environment could force forwarders out of business.
For those in the pilot program, this need was addressed by
a TSA-funded grant. We ask Congress and TSA to provide funding
to ensure that thousands of jobs in the air freight industry
are not lost and the American economy does not face more harm
due to delay and market shrinkage.
Finally, as we face the future, it is critical to look back
on the mission of the Department of Homeland Security and TSA,
which is not only to secure the Nation's borders but also to
maintain an efficient flow of commerce. I agree that aviation
security is critically important, but we must not abandon all
consideration of international trade, economic security, and
our supply chain, particularly in these troubled times.
For that reason, the Airforwarders Association has been
working with the Safe Commerce Coalition to assess the most
effective way to secure cargo for the future. Noted experts,
including the Government Accounting Office, have stated that
abandoning a risk-based security program may actually make the
Nation less safe. Forwarders know it is an unwise use of finite
resources to treat each piece of cargo as if it has the same
threat level. The industry has already demonstrated its
willingness to comply with the law and will continue. However,
without a vigilant eye on the actual impact of our actions, I
fear we may have achieved a mandate without achieving its
goals.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and address
this important topic, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brandon Fried
March 18, 2009
introduction
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security
and Infrastructure Protection to discuss the challenges the forwarding
industry has addressed in meeting the first screening deadline, as well
as the challenges we anticipate with the next 50 percent. I ask that my
full statement be entered into the record.
As you are aware, the air freight industry has been working hard
with the administration to meet the 100 percent passenger air cargo
screening mandate. It is our firm belief that the full implementation
of the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) is the most efficient
and only realistic method of attaining the mandate. The Airforwarders
Association is committed to facilitating compliance across the
forwarding industry, and remains optimistic that the 100 percent
mandate as defined by TSA will be met. We urge Congress and the TSA to
maintain the CCSP, provide funding mechanisms for participants to
reduce the barrier to participation and resist any further moves away
from a risk-based approach to cargo security.
background
My name is Brandon Fried and I am the executive director of the
Airforwarders Association. It is a pleasure to address this
distinguished panel today on the important issue of air cargo security.
I was appointed to serve as the Executive Director of the
Airforwarders Association in November 2005 and have over 25 years of
experience as a forwarder myself. In my position as Executive Director,
I represent the Association on all security matters and currently serve
on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) working group in
counsel to the Transportation Security Administration.
The Airforwarders Association is an alliance of Indirect Air
Carriers, Cargo Airlines, and affiliated businesses located throughout
the United States that play a vital role in ensuring the continuous
movement of global commerce. There are over 4,000 registered indirect
air carriers who are responsible for the planning, oversight, and
transporting of companies' goods and products--anything from flowers
and seafood to pallets of humanitarian supplies. The parameters of this
service include steps such as pick-up of goods, customs clearance,
transportation, warehousing, regulatory compliance and delivery; we
work from one end of the supply chain to the other.
discussion
Products such as automobile assembly line parts, high-tech
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and vital consumer goods are transported
in the cargo holds of passenger planes on virtually every flight.
During the cold winter, our families enjoy fresh vegetables flown from
the warm west coast and South America on passenger flights. As we
speak, thousands of pounds of seafood are in flight to be served
tonight in restaurants in places like Albuquerque, Minneapolis, Omaha,
and St. Louis. In some cases our members help save lives by assisting
medical companies and hospitals ship urgently needed heart valves,
blood samples, and human organs across the country to waiting doctors
and patients.
It is the urgent need or ``just in time'' nature of cargo, coupled
with the variance in the products shipped and the sensitivity to
excessive handling or delay, that makes the task of screening so
challenging. It is also the reason that the supply chain, from shippers
of pharmaceuticals that cannot have their packages opened by a screener
due to product integrity issues, to the forwarder whose business
depends on meeting a deadline and even the air carriers all support
CCSP and screening throughout the supply chain.
However, we believe that the following three elements need to be
put in place in order for CCSP to be a viable security program: The
appropriation and availability of additional Federal funding or
incentives (e.g. tax relief on privately purchased screening equipment)
for eligible participants; the encouragement of all entities involved
in the supply chain as full participants in the act of screening; and
the availability of efficient and cost-effective solutions to screening
for all TSA-certified Indirect Air Carriers (IACs) and other qualified
participants.
Support for CCSP
Complex supply-chain dynamics and the broad range of facility and
cargo screening capabilities at our airports prevent a ``one-size-fits-
all'' solution to the complex cargo screening dilemma. This complexity
has motivated us to work cooperatively to ensure that many solutions
are available to the commercial concerns that participate in the supply
chain to meet air cargo screening mandates. Screening a high percentage
of air cargo upstream is a critical part of the solution, especially
where U.S. manufacturing and supply chain logistics involve secure bulk
packaging that must be maintained for the integrity of the product.
Another part of the solution is some airport screening by airlines
and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The Airforwarders
Association supports a system of cargo screening that offers forwarders
multiple options as to where and how to screen cargo, but those options
must work. We remain concerned that a system other than CCSP that would
screen the bulk of air cargo at a single facility at the airport does
not work and will most assuredly lead to significant delays,
bottlenecks, and increased costs and ultimately will jeopardize the
economic stability of the air transportation sector without providing
greater assurance of cargo safety.
Although it is a voluntary program, CCSP is a key part of the risk-
based multi-layered approach to air cargo security that strengthens
security throughout the global supply chain and balances the need for
increased security while also meeting the needs of the shipping public.
We believe the strength of CCSP is that it provides for multiple
options throughout the supply chain, including the use of centralized
third-party screening centers, third-party logistics providers, shipper
or exporters, and freight-forwarder screening facilities, which will
lead to robust competition and, ultimately, the reduction of screening
costs. Additionally, all members of the supply chain have a vested
business interest in a strong chain of custody to maintain the
integrity of cargo. As a result, relying on the shippers, forwarders
and airlines that have a strong record of safety and security to handle
the delicate screening operations for the wide spectrum of cargo will
increase cargo security in an effective manner.
Lessons Learned From the First 50 Percent
More than a quarter of the facilities currently certified to screen
cargo are Airforwarders Association members. Based on an informal poll,
it seems that for the vast majority of the industry, reaching the 50
percent benchmark has not been particularly problematic. Of the
problems experienced, most were relatively minor misunderstandings
about paperwork and tendering screened shipments to air carriers. These
did not have a substantial impact on cut-off times to deliver cargo, or
result in delays in shipment. While the economic environment has had
the effect of lowering cargo volume and therefore probably helped ease
the burden, remarkable progress made by TSA, forwarders, air carriers,
and shippers deserves most of the credit.
TSA began certifying participants in December and has been working
diligently to expand the number of certified participant facilities.
Dialogue has improved, as has information sharing, and TSA, despite the
transition to a new administration, has remained steady in its guidance
to industry. I believe participants in the pilot have learned that they
do have a trusted partner in TSA, and the learning curve will continue
to improve as we move closer to the 100 percent deadline.
Additionally, forwarders have found that their other partners in
the supply chain--shippers and air carriers--are actively responding to
the screening mandate as well. As more shippers come into the program,
the burden on forwarders to be the primary screener will decrease.
Additionally, air carriers have rapidly deployed technology and trained
employees to screen freight and are doing so in an efficient and
effective manner.
The ease of attaining the first portion of the screening mandate
should be both a sign of encouragement and caution. It proves that our
industry and its airline partners can collectively rise to any
challenge and implement effective solutions. It also means that the
road ahead may be rough and lessons learned today will be well used as
tomorrow unfolds.
Concerns About the Next 50 Percent
Last year, I had the privilege of addressing this subcommittee and
outlined the concerns forwarders have about meeting the 100 percent
mandate. Unfortunately, some of the more serious issues have yet to be
resolved. Specifically, those are the lack of approved pallet screening
technology, on-going financial barriers to participation, and the
future of air cargo security policy in general.
In the absence of certified technology, the focus will be on
examining pallets and containers, each needing to be unpacked to meet
the piece-level screening requirement. This poses serious logistical
and security concerns. Each pallet or unit load device (ULD) contains
nearly 200 pieces of varying size, shape, and commodity. Breaking up
the shipment of that size will require facility space large enough to
accommodate multiple unpacked pallets, a resource not all airports
have. Additionally, breaking up cargo poses an increased level of risk
of theft or tampering, as idle cargo is a security concern.
We urge TSA to continue to work with their Science and Technology
office, as well as vendors, to identify, test, and approve equipment
that can effectively and efficiently screen palletized cargo. In the
absence of that, we urge Congress to allocate additional funds for the
canine program, as it is an effective stop-gap solution.
Even as advancements are made with technology, the significant
amount of capital required to purchase technology and adapt business
practices is a barrier to participation. Forwarders participating in
CCSP must purchase technology for which the cost may range from $50,000
to $500,000 per facility--a price tag that cannot be met by many
forwarders, particularly smaller forwarding businesses. As a result,
they will face delays at the airport for cargo screening, causing them
to miss flights and lose revenue. This lost revenue, in the current
economic environment with high fuel surcharges and razor-thin profit
margins, could force forwarders out of business. This consolidation of
the market, with the resulting impact on competition, is bad for
forwarders, manufacturers, and the American consumer.
For those who were selected, based on size or commodity, to
participate in the pilot program, this need was recognized and
addressed by a TSA-funded grant for the purchase of technology. The
Airforwarders Association calls on Congress and TSA to provide funding
to ensure the hundreds of thousands of jobs in the air freight industry
are not lost and the American economy does not face serious harm due to
delays in goods and products being delivered. The Airforwarders
Association supports grants to fund CCSP as well as additional funding
or reallocation of TSA's budget to provide funding for equipment and
personnel devoted to cargo screening. We also support expanded funding
for canine detection units for use for large consolidations and
possibly also in other facets.
Finally, as we face the future of air cargo screening, it is
critical to look back on the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security and TSA, which is not only to secure the Nation's borders but
also to maintain an efficient flow of commerce. As a frequent flier, I
understand and agree that aviation security is critically important but
we must not abandon all consideration of international trade, economic
security and our supply chain, particularly in these troubled economic
times. For that reason, the Airforwarders Association has been working
with the Safe Commerce Coalition to assess the most effective way to
secure cargo for the future.
Noted experts, including the GAO, have stated that abandoning a
risk-based security program in favor of screening may actually make the
Nation less safe. Forwarders know that TSA has limited resources, both
financially and in terms of personnel, and it is an unwise use of those
finite dollars and employees to treat each piece of cargo as if it has
the same threat level. The industry has already demonstrated its
willingness to comply with the law, and will continue to do so.
However, without a vigilant eye on the actual impact of our actions, I
fear we may have achieved a mandate without achieving its goals.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to address this
important topic and look forward to your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Fried, for your testimony.
Now I recognize Mr. May to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.
Mr. May. Madam Chairwoman, it is a pleasure to be here. I
will truly summarize my statement for you.
No. 1, we are pleased to announce that we have met the
initial target of 50 percent across our membership.
No. 2, by definition, some of our carriers are narrow-body
carriers exclusively, so they are already at 100 percent of the
cargo they are carrying. We recognize that getting to that 100
percent target for all cargo, for all passenger aircraft is
going to be a real challenge.
The challenge is that we are going to wide bodies. As has
been stated here already, going to wide bodies means that we
are going to have palletized loads. Why is that a problem? No.
1, we don't have current technology; can't handle big portal.
We may have some--Mr. Johnson's technology may prove out to be
the exception to the rule.
No. 2, we have a lot of shippers, in particular those who
have high-value products, that are not interested in having us
tear those palletized loads down. There could be as many as 200
individual pieces. It takes an average of 75 minutes to tear
down and repack, and that doesn't include the screening time.
So what do we do? We rely on dogs. I would suggest to Mr.
DeFazio, as I will tomorrow, that his cherry problem will
probably be solved by dogs, because they are the least
intrusive, least expensive, most efficient explosives-detecting
technology available to us today.
We will work very hard to make the full 100 percent target.
We have every reason to think it can be done. But we know that
there are three or four things that need to happen. No. 1, we
have to have the continuing cooperation between our friends in
the freight forwarder community, the TSA, and ourselves.
No. 2, we have to rely on upstream checking, which is part
of this CCSP program that you have heard a lot about today
already. It is critical for all of us that that work
effectively. No. 3, because it is a very expensive proposition,
the committee and the Congress needs to look at ways to help
offset those expensive costs for our friends that are doing
that screening upstream for us.
Finally, you really need to think hard about providing the
funding to further expand canine technology. As I said a minute
ago--I have told Chairman Thompson this a number of times--it
is simply the single best solution to be used from a cost
perspective, a coverage perspective, speed, and all the other
principal elements.
I am delighted to be here to answer your questions. Thank
you for your time.
[The statement of Mr. May follows:]
Prepared Statement of James C. May
March 18, 2009
We appreciate the opportunity to inform you of the airline
industry's progress in achieving 100 percent screening of cargo
transported on passenger-carrying aircraft by August 2010. The Air
Transport Association members are committed to do their part in meeting
that key requirement of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act.
I am pleased to report that the airline industry has fulfilled the
interim requirement that 50 percent of such cargo be screened by
February 2009. This impressive achievement reflects hard work; this was
not an easy task. That experience has taught us an important lesson:
Achieving the 100 percent level will be difficult and will require the
continued close collaboration of the airlines, the Transportation
Security Administration, freight forwarders and shippers.
The biggest challenge in meeting the August 2010 deadline is the
lack of TSA-certified screening technology to inspect large air cargo
pallets. Most pieces of cargo transported on wide-body aircraft are
consolidated into large shipments and 75 percent of cargo is
transported on wide-body aircraft. That fact gives you an idea of the
magnitude of the challenge that we face.
Shippers and freight forwarders typically create these pallet-size
shipments before they are tendered to an airline. The dilemma is that
screening is required at the piece level but existing technology cannot
screen large consolidated shipments. The nature of our business and
available screening equipment are, at least for the time being, badly
mismatched.
Breaking down consolidated shipments at an airport cargo facility
is not practical. Shipment size, time constraints, and facility
limitations are the main difficulties. A pallet can have as many as 200
pieces on it. Dismantling it and screening each piece is labor-
intensive and time-consuming. To place this in some perspective, it can
take 75 minutes for two employees to break down and reassemble a
pallet. In addition, airport cargo facilities were never designed to be
high-volume disassembly and reassembly locations. They are not big
enough to perform that role, especially at peak times.
We therefore need to be very careful that airport cargo facilities
do not become choke points. Screening each piece from a consolidated
shipment at those facilities would undercut what air cargo service is
supposed to be all about: speedy movement of freight. Complicating this
situation is the fact that shippers of high-value items, such as
electronics and pharmaceuticals, for their own security reasons do not
want their consolidated shipments to be broken down.
Canine screening is the only easily-applied screening method that
does not require pallets to be disassembled. Because of that, for the
foreseeable future they will be the most effective and least costly
screening method for all types and configurations of cargo.
Unfortunately, there are not enough canines deployed at airports to
screen such shipments on every wide-body passenger flight. This means
that alternative screening measures that are both effective and
efficient need to be implemented.
The Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) is such a measure.
This program enables a high percentage of air cargo screening to be
performed ``upstream'' in the supply chain. Upstream security
measures--avoiding the airport cargo facility--are essential in the
current environment. Under CCSP, screening occurs at the shippers' or
freight forwarders' premises, where the cargo can be screened at the
piece level as TSA requires. These are known as Certified Cargo
Screening Facilities. This procedure is a very practical but expensive
solution. Freight forwarders and other supply-chain participants must
purchase equipment and train employees to carry out the program. This
has imposed an additional financial burden on the forwarder industry.
Nevertheless, if applied widely, it is a workable solution.
The Department of Homeland Security is to be complimented for its
high-tempo implementation of the CCSP. Its performance has been
admirable. Going forward, it cannot falter in maintaining that tempo.
The CCSP is an indispensable tool in meeting the August 2010 deadline.
If enough shippers and forwarders are not certified, attaining that
deadline will be at risk.
While we very much appreciate the Department's efforts, it needs to
act immediately in three areas to assure timely achievement of the 100
percent screening mandate:
1. Enlarge rapidly the number of Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities at large shippers, manufacturers, freight forwarders
and other TSA-certified Indirect Air Carriers.
2. Expand as swiftly as possible the use of TSA-certified
explosive-detection canines to screen large air cargo
consolidations, and direct additional funding to the TSA
proprietary canine cargo screening program.
3. Provide for additional Federal funding or incentives (e.g., tax
relief for privately purchased screening equipment) for all
TSA-certified indirect air carriers and other qualified CCSP
participants. This will enable small and medium-size companies
to participate in the CCSP and enable large companies to
continue to invest in screening equipment.
We are committed to achieving the 100 percent screening mandate.
The three initiatives described above will enable that statutory
mandate to be realized on time and in a way that will minimize adverse
effects on the shipping public. We ask that you support us in this
endeavor.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you very much for your
testimony.
I will, at this time, yield myself 5 minutes. As I do so, I
would like to remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel. I will begin.
Mr. Johnson, why don't you tell us how long ago or how long
a period of time did you begin this process of trying to reach
DHS and thinking that you had a contribution to make with
respect to air cargo security?
Mr. Johnson. We originally contacted TSA about May 2006.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, technically, we can say 3 years.
Mr. Johnson. Yeah.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you give us an abbreviated
recitation of what that encounter was like and how you have
been processed or engaging since that time?
Mr. Johnson. Well, in the beginning, it was a matter of
just trying to explain what are we trying to solve. As
engineers and as small companies, we have to decide what is the
problem to solve and the best way to solve it first. We had
heard from what the industry had and what they wanted to know,
and we were curious as to what the TSA side of it was.
We just couldn't get the answers in the beginning, all the
way until 2007, when we officially met with the TSA here in
Washington about what can be done. We wrote a proposal, an
unsolicited proposal at the time, asking for--release the
technology, what do we have to find? That took about 5 months.
We heard a resounding ``not interested'' at that time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me stop you. So you, sort of, followed
regular order, you got your materials in or your research or
your proposal in, and you were doing this in the backdrop of
understanding that we had these deadlines? Were you aware, as a
business person, that we had a 2009 and 2010 deadline?
Mr. Johnson. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you saw the sense of urgency.
Mr. Johnson. We saw it as a sense of urgency. With a
mandate like that, we just want a chance to complete. We never
said we were the best solution or the only solution, but we
felt that there might----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are a small business, but you might
also be counted as a minority business?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think, without a self-serving
comment, that if the technology that you offered, or maybe
there were some competitors of yours, but if they had been
processed, would we have been further along with the issues
that we are addressing today about 50 percent and then 100
percent by 2010?
Mr. Johnson. I think we would be further along.
Secondarily, I think if process is defined, it makes it easy to
fund, from the capital markets perspective. It is much easier
to go to the private investors in the private sector looking
for funding when you know the solution you are trying to solve.
Because if you can prove it to investors, you can usually raise
the capital that is needed to prove it to the Government.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think the key, however, is that this
technology could have been--and that is up to the selection
process of TSA--but it could have been part of the solution,
not part of the problem.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, absolutely. I am biased about that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand.
Mr. Boisen, you mentioned that you had difficulty in
understanding what kind of technology would be required of your
constituents, the companies that you represent. What was your
encounter with TSA? Do you have a private-sector response as to
why TSA has not been able to verify 50 percent?
Mr. Boisen. Well, I believe part of it is in the timing
issue, having been on the other side of it as a carrier. The
carriers all report on a day-to-day basis within their own
system during the month of February and collect data. Some
carriers have that data automated, and some receive a written
document, whether it is an e-mail or such, from every single
location. Then it takes a few days to accumulate those numbers.
Those are sent, I believe, to TSA. They are in the process of
trying to, I guess, organize those numbers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But your membership, have they developed
the kind of equipment that they would like to use? Have they
submitted it in? Do they know what TSA expect of them? What is
your issue? What is keeping your constituents from complying or
helping to comply?
Mr. Boisen. Well, many of ours are in compliance with the
50 percent, I believe. We are all in compliance.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. If you are, would you provide us
with that list, those who are in compliance of up to 50
percent?
Mr. Boisen. I believe I can acquire that from our
membership.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So do you have equipment? Has it been
certified? Are people using their own equipment that they have
been using in the past?
Mr. Boisen. I think it is a variety. A number of our
members, our airlines, are also members of ATA. Having been on
that side of it, we have acquired equipment some time ago,
generally trace-detection equipment. I know one carrier that I
am very close to had met the 50 percent months and months and
months ago. If it is there, it is very, very feasible if you
focus and commit yourself to do it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what would help you get better than
where you are today?
Mr. Boisen. As it has been mentioned before, it is that
cargo that is very difficult to measure and to monitor in
today's environment, the containers.
Now, TSA, in the past, has tried to find some technology
and, frankly, spent a lot of money on fast-pulse neutron
devices, that type of thing, that sits in Houston today
gathering dust, without ever going through that step of
developing something for the industry without any input back
from the industry. You know, they spent, I understand, some $6
million on a device that has never worked, and this output
would have been six containers an hour, which is totally almost
useless.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is this designed by the industry, or this
was given to you by TSA?
Mr. Boisen. No. This was TSA.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So it has never worked.
Mr. Boisen. It has never worked.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So these are some of the obstacles:
Getting the right technology?
Mr. Boisen. Getting the right technology.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Getting it certified by TSA?
Mr. Boisen. Yes. And working with the industry to say,
``What do you want?'' and working together.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you will know what to purchase or move
in what direction.
Mr. Boisen. In partnership, we believe. We have volunteered
for a number of pilot projects, whether it is on technology or
whether it is on software, over the years. We are the first to
say, ``Try us. We will try. We will work with anybody.''
But, frankly, I think, as Mr. Johnson has indicated, the
focus was not on cargo, from the technology standpoint. It just
wasn't there. Fortunately, we had the dogs, which, as Mr. May
indicated--I have been a dog advocate for years. They are
wonderful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you don't have enough.
Mr. Boisen. But we don't have enough, and they have a tough
union. You know, you can only work them 30 minutes, you have to
scratch them behind the ears and feed them, you know. There
aren't enough of them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have seen that happen. Thank you, Mr.
Boisen.
Let me just quickly, Mr. May, this is just a quick
question. I thank you for testifying. I noticed that your,
again, your membership is not here, but you are here
representing them.
What is the greatest difficulty for airlines to be part of
the compliance of 100 percent, 50 percent now in February 2009,
and then 2010? Compliance with cargo inspections.
Mr. May. We are in compliance for the 50 percent. We were
by the deadline in February. I think the whole issue there is
making sure that TSA has the forms from us that they can
aggregate and then report back to you and others to prove that
point. But I have no doubt in my mind that we are at 50 percent
right now.
Some of our carriers----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you would be willing to give us a list
of the airlines that represent that they are at 50 percent.
Mr. May. Sure, sure. We are happy--it is the ATA
membership. I am happy to give it to you. By definition, some
of our carriers are at 100 percent because they are exclusive
wide-body carriers. Southwest Airlines is a good example, from
your home State.
So the real challenge going forward, as I said in my oral,
No. 1, we now have to tackle wide bodies. Wide bodies take
palletized loads. Palletized loads are difficult to trace
because of their size, so you have to break them down, unless
that screening is done upstream. That is where our friends from
the freight forwarder community come in. They have to be
certified, they have to have the technology.
So the real challenge, it is a 25/75 formula right now,
just to put it in perspective, 25 percent of cargo goes on
narrow bodies, 75 percent goes on wide bodies. So the hurdle,
you know, has just jumped up a few feet, and that becomes the
real challenge.
We don't have enough dogs. We don't have any wide-portal
technology. We need to get more people certified upstream. That
is expensive, and there needs to be some accommodation for
those folks buying that technology upstream. So those are the
challenges.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you have laid out the top of the
mountain for us. We thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Dent is recognized for his questioning.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Following up, I guess, with Mr. May, as you know, we have
this 100 percent goal here. Do you think we can meet that 100
percent goal given the issues you just outlined with the wide-
bodied planes and other issues, you know, too, in terms of how
we are going to get foreign governments to collaborate with us
as it relates to the in-bound and out-going foreign cargo?
I mean, I understand how we can get this up to 85 percent,
but how do you get to 100 percent? Do you think we can actually
get to 100 percent realistically?
Mr. May. I don't think you can get to 100 percent as many
would define it, which is 100 percent of every piece of cargo
carried on every commercial passenger aircraft, because some of
that cargo is coming in from overseas, and it may not be
screened to the same levels of technology that you demand here.
I can tell you that we are going to make every effort for
all domestic and out-bound to comply with the law when it is
time for it to be 100 percent. We are going to work our tails
off to make sure that happens.
Assuming that we have a good partnership with TSA, assuming
that they get the funding for additional canine teams, assuming
that Mr. Johnson and his competitors continue to work on wide-
portal screening technology that can be efficient, effective,
quick--it can't be six pallets an hour, as Jack points out; we
have to have something that really moves--and if we have a good
upstream program, I think making 100 percent for domestic and
out-bound is very doable.
If you want to be pure and have an absolute 100 percent of
everything, then I think it is going to be a challenge because
of the problems working out internationally.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I would like to follow up with Mr. Fried, if I could. I
would be happy to hear you address that same issue. But, also,
I wanted to make a comment, too, that your comments regarding
the future of air cargo screening were of real interest to me.
TSA, as you know, must balance its security missions with the
need to ensure the efficient flow of commerce.
How do you think TSA could better manage its resources to
ensure it addresses the highest risks to air cargo while not
impeding the safe flow of low-risk cargo?
Mr. Fried. Well, I think it is important not to abandon
this targeted risk-based approach. I mean, I know we are
screening every single piece of cargo, but I think that the
agency needs to be mindful of making sure that risks, specific
risks, are addressed in the screening of cargo itself. I think
that, if we continue to use that approach going forward, the
agency will be effective.
I also think this is, as Mr. May has said, this is a
question of resources, and TSA needs as many resources as
possible to continue to expand the CCSP program. So it is a
question of finances.
Mr. Dent. I guess my next question to you, Mr. Fried, is
this: How are freight-forwarding employees vetted and
investigated to ensure that they are trustworthy employees?
Mr. Fried. Currently, the TSA has a security threat
assessment program that is instituted on anyone in the air
cargo and, I believe, airline industry, as well.
Mr. Dent. Are your facilities currently regulated with
respect to facility security minimum standards? Would those in
the CCSP be regulated by TSA?
Mr. Fried. Yes and yes. The TSA is a constant visitor to
all of our facilities. Of course, all Certified Cargo Screening
Program participants are, in fact, vetted, validated, and then
subsequently audited by TSA.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Then to Mr. Johnson, your frustrations with TSA's Qualified
Product List are heard loud and clear. Navigating any
bureaucracy, as you know, is difficult, but there are few more
difficult, perhaps, than at the Department of Homeland
Security. So it must have been particularly challenging for you
as a smaller business.
When you first sought to enter the Qualified Product List
program with TSA, how did you know where to look?
Mr. Johnson. Actually, I had met Mr. Kelly at an industry
conference and asked him the best way to start, and he referred
me to someone on his staff. That is how we started.
Mr. Dent. That is interesting. Is there any Web site or any
form or any handout explaining the process in an easy-to-
understand formats? Or is this just all word of mouth, like
through Mr. Kelly?
Mr. Johnson. There probably is a Web site or a place, but I
saw the guy at the top 10 feet away from me, so I went there.
Mr. Dent. That works. What was it that finally enabled you
to break through the ceiling? I guess it was just that, going
through Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Johnson. I think what really changed things is we had
been talking to the science group at the TSA, and the way we
explained our technology didn't make sense to them. The
challenge we had as a small business is the information they
were asking us and the things they wanted us to deploy to them
were the core of our technology. If I told them that, now it is
a matter of public record and it could interfere with my patent
ability. So we had this Catch-22 of, if we tell you how it
works, you will get excited about it, but what is to say it is
not now a matter of public record or somebody else doesn't get
the same technology?
So we took a chance very recently and just said, ``This is
how it works. This is why it works.'' We got everybody to start
nodding their heads, saying, ``Okay, this actually looks like
it could work.''
What we didn't know is that someone had told a very similar
story. I think that has been the challenge, is TSA has heard it
a hundred times from a hundred people saying, ``We can do it,''
and it never really comes out. You know, build the passive
neutron system or do something else.
Going back to the point, we tried to come up with a
business solution first: What is the process, as it sits today?
How do we add the screening process to it without interfering
with the workflow? Since all we focus on is cargo, we spend all
of our time in warehouses, we heard it from the ground up, so
it made us a lot easier for us. We just needed the TSA to
validate the technology.
Mr. Dent. By the way, congratulations on your additional
hires. I know that has to be pretty tough in these times. But
just a real quick question: How many employees does your
company currently have?
Mr. Johnson. Thirty-three.
Mr. Dent. Thirty-three. Okay, thank you.
I will yield back my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
Right now I am pleased to yield 5 minutes for questioning
to the full committee Chairman, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi.
Thank you, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
I appreciate the honesty of the witnesses.
I want to briefly paint a picture before I offer my
question to the panel. One of the challenges we have is to try
to protect the good people of America. Congress has tried to
say, given the vulnerability that exists in this space we are
talking about today, that we have to do something about it.
Now, whether or not the 100 percent target we have set is
valid, we have to have some idea of what is coming to our
shores, we have to have some idea of what is traveling on
passenger planes.
We believe and hope that nothing bad will happen. But the
problem is, if we don't do our duties and something bad
happens, shame on us. So, to that end, we are trying to get us
to a point where we can, with a reasonable assurance, give the
traveling public and others confidence that our systems work.
Now, the systems might be dogs, it might be men, it might
be technology, but aggregate that and we have a system that is
100 percent.
So, if the challenge for industry is, ``Well, if you give
100 percent, we can't get cargo to our markets fast enough, and
that delay costs money,'' sure. But if we create a process that
provides all the assurances and gets goods to market in that
period of time, then I think we all succeed.
So, to that end, Congress tried to set these time tables.
Granted, if we have to push them back, so be it. But our goal
still has to be the 100 percent. To the extent that we can
accomplish that within a period of time, we have to do it.
So I guess my issue for you, Mr. Johnson, is, your solution
that you have offered is a different approach to what we are
talking about getting us there. What makes yours different from
X-ray?
Mr. Johnson. From a pure technology perspective, we don't
use any radiation, so it is a safe working environment. We
actually use a microwave, so we don't require any shielding,
and it doesn't require--it is not heavy, it can be deployed
very easily.
Secondarily, I think the biggest difference is we try to do
it in the standard flow of commerce in the process. So our
technology is deployed at the scale or on the floor where the
cargo is already naturally being stopped to be weighed or
measured, and that is where we try to do the screening.
So, from a technology perspective, we are safer, in my
opinion. Then secondarily, we are automatically inserted in the
process, so it is not an extra step, it is not another place
you have to go, or another part.
We make it so that you don't have to check an image and
say, ``Is this image something suspicious?'' It is a simple red
light/green light approach. You put the cargo on the scale, it
takes the weight, our system takes the measurements, it takes
the digital picture, and it screens the cargo in seconds, all
in one step.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Boisen, you heard the panel of witnesses
before, especially our TSA representative. Given that testimony
and what your experience is being with TSA, do you have an idea
of whether they are moving on the front of a proven technology
at a pace where it does not impede commerce? Or the 100 percent
mandate, coupled with the ebb and flow of technology, might be
a problem, based on your observation?
Mr. Boisen. Well, my current observations are limited to
Mr. Johnson, and I have known his technology for some time.
But, without a doubt, there seems to be--the pace is picking
up. There seems to be greater attention to it.
I am concerned that--you know, some 5 years ago, I was
involved with another conference, involved with a lot of smart
people, Sandia Labs and Livermore Labs, et cetera, talking
about technology and that it was just 5 years away. That was 5
years ago. A lot of it--we have not heard anything promising
coming out of those sources again.
So I think it is one thing to say, we need technology. It
is another to actually find it. How do you get it out of the
lab? How do you make it functional into a pretty harsh
environment?
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Fried, do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Fried. Yeah. You know, TSA tells us that the technology
for screening pallets and containers with multiple commodities
is a few years away. While we hear some tales of promising
machines over in Europe, they say that the false alarm rates,
the false positive rates, as they are referred to, are too high
to be accepted by TSA.
So, you know, we do our best to encourage the agency to
look at as many different technologies out there as possible,
including, of course, Mr. Johnson's. You know, our opinion is
that they just can't roll it out fast enough. But, you know, of
course, it has to meet TSA's standards.
Mr. Thompson. Yeah.
I guess, Madam Chairwoman, I could not get a time frame
from TSA on any of what we are talking about. I think, from a
business perspective, if I wanted to do business in this space,
I would like to have some idea of how long we are talking about
to either say yea or nay, but I don't really want to just be
drawn out over a period of time, because time is money, and if
I am doing research and development, that is a challenge.
Mr. May, I agree with you. Dogs, canines, clearly, at this
point, is the immediate issue for us to have, to do this. But
if we know that the notion of having dogs in enough quantity to
get things done is almost impossible, then I think we have to
look to technology. If we can assure, you know, your membership
that should this technology come forth it would not impede
commerce, do you see your membership being supportive of that
effort?
Mr. May. Mr. Chairman, if I understand your question
correctly, I will give you an answer.
We are all in favor of new technology. We just want it to
be--we want it to work. That is to say, it has to meet the
TSA's standards. It has to have low false positives and so
forth. It has to do what it is purported to do. It, No. 2, has
to be quick and efficient. No. 3, there has to be a discussion
about cost-benefit, who is paying for this equipment, who is
going to run it, where is it going to be, and that sort of
thing.
But nobody is opposed to new technology. The problem is--
you and I have had the conversation about how long it takes to
train dog teams. Unfortunately, it seems to me like technology
has taken a whole lot longer than that.
Mr. Thompson. Well, you are absolutely correct. I don't
think we got the answer from the Department today that we are
looking for, because we are trying to encourage them to move
along and get it done. It just appears that, until recently,
the effort and energy to make that happen was not taking place.
So, again, we are going to have to get that. As a Member of
Congress, somebody who chairs this committee, I would not want
something to happen that can be put at the door of an imperfect
screening system as to the reason it occurred. If that
happens--and we all agree that if you think the AIG furor over
bonuses is something, you can imagine what the public furor
over something happening with this would be.
So we are all prepared to work together to try to come up
with a solution. I just wanted to let you know that the time
table is an issue, and we will have to continue to pursue it.
Mr. May. We fully concur with you, Mr. Chairman. I would
just reiterate that the CCSP program is going to become a major
component of our success in reaching 100 percent, especially
with wide-bodied palletized loads. So we need to make sure that
they have the resources to get going to it.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I asked that resource question of the
first panel. I wanted to make sure that if the Department needs
additional money, we can give it to them. Whatever it is to get
us to where we need to be, we are prepared to make it happen.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cleaver [presiding]. Thank you.
The Chair will return shortly. I will yield myself 5
minutes.
This morning we were called to votes, and so I was not able
to get in depth with those who were on the first panel.
But, Mr. Johnson, one of the issues I raised this morning
was the GAO report, which said that screening cannot be done to
crates 10 feet and larger. I am interested in and concerned
about what we do to that. What do you foresee in terms of
technology, emerging technologies, that would allow that to
happen?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think for us, in particular, we see a
lot more cargo on a pallet, a 48-by-40-inch wooden pallet, than
we do necessarily in the, what we would call a cookie sheet,
the 10-foot-by-10-foot. That cargo goes on a lot of all-cargo
carriers who are technically part of this regulation. I think
if we could screen at the palletized level, along with the
CCSP, we could definitely solve the 100 percent screening.
Mr. Cleaver. Why can't we?
Mr. Johnson. Right now? The technology that it would take
to--the power you need to get through that dense of cargo is
not safe for humans. It is just very difficult to stand by it.
The technology we are trying to deploy--and there are other
people out there trying to deploy solutions that require low
power that have great penetration to tell you if that pallet is
safe or not at a piece level.
You have 20 pieces on the pallet; each one of those pieces
are safe and, therefore, can be put on the plane. That is the
solution we are out trying to solve, without stopping the flow
of commerce and during the natural process of accepting the
cargo.
Mr. Cleaver. Okay. You know, if I have a business in my
district, Gates Bar-B-Q, they want to ship slabs of short ends
or, you know, some beef sandwiches, frozen beef sandwiches,
they are a small business, is the cost prohibitive for small
businesses?
Mr. Fried. To participate in the Certified Cargo Screening
Program?
Mr. Cleaver. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Fried. No. In that case, absolutely not. Most of the
businesses would not have to buy technology, because they are
doing their own packing of their boxes. Their people would have
to be certified. They would be security-threat-assessed by the
TSA. They would have to provide a sterile area for preparation
for packing. But I would tell you, generally speaking, no.
Mr. Cleaver. So they could do that in their own little
plant?
Mr. Fried. Absolutely.
Mr. Cleaver. The cost would be minimal.
Mr. Fried. Minimal cost. They have to just make sure that
their perimeter--they have controlled access to their
environment. But, generally speaking, I would say no.
Mr. Cleaver. So if we said that right now, in the middle of
this reinvestment and recovery--I am the only one saying it; we
fail to get everybody to say that. Everybody wants to say
``stimulus,'' but it is the Recovery and Reinvestment Act. One
of the big concerns we have, of course, in this bill that we
approved is, how do we help small businesses?
So, one of the issues that small businesses are concerned
about is, you know, in order for them to expand, they are going
to have to expand their markets, and that means, you know,
transatlantic business deals. My concern was--and I think you
have answered the question--that they are not going to be put
through any expense that they could not bear.
Mr. Fried. Right. The actual shippers, the people giving us
the boxes, that is correct.
Mr. Cleaver. One final question. Maybe this is not the--I
mean, the panel, I let them escape, because the bell saved them
this morning, because I wanted to know how we are doing
business with small and minority businesses.
I am pleased, Mr. Johnson, to see you here, but, I mean,
that was a question I wanted to raise with them. But, I mean,
your presence, I guess, would suggest that there is at least
some level of openness and sensitivity. You didn't have any
unusual challenges, other than the challenges that people
normally have as a business person?
Mr. Johnson. I would agree that it is more defined by the
bureaucracy of the process. I didn't think that I was treated
any different or slighted because we were a small business. The
challenge was just getting in front of them and telling our
story. Since then, it has gone really fast.
I would say the TSA has helped us find a solution. They
want to solve the problem just as bad as we want to give one to
the industry. I don't think they care if it is small, large, or
medium, as long as it makes sense for the industry and it can
hit the 100 percent screening mark.
Mr. Cleaver. Sounds like the coach from Alabama, Bear
Bryant, said he didn't want black players until Southern Cal
had a running back named Bam Morris, ran about 3 million yards
on him. Then he said, you know, I don't have any problems with
having those--I don't want to use the word he used--but having
those on my team. So I guess, you know, if you have something
to offer people, they want to get it.
One of the other questions that I wanted to ask--
incidentally, the Chairwoman will be back shortly--do you think
that, Nation-wide, region to region, TSA is focusing in the
right places and the right points in the supply chain to meet
the 100 percent screening mandate, congressional mandate?
Mr. Fried. I would say yes. I mean, the Certified Cargo
Screening Program is a smart solution. Spread the security task
into the supply chain is--it is a smart way to make sure that
we reach this mandate in the absence of certified technology.
Get the shippers involved. Make sure that TSA is well-
funded so that it has adequate personnel on hand to actually
carry out the vetting and the audit function over the shippers,
and I think that we will achieve this mandate without
hesitation.
Mr. Cleaver. Do all of you think that we are going to meet
the congressional mandate? If you would just go down from Mr.
Johnson all the way down to Mr. May.
Mr. Johnson. I would qualify it the same way Mr. May did. I
would say domestic and out-going, absolutely. But I have spent
enough time internationally, and the harmonization challenge
you have is that most in many countries believe that their
security standard is superior to the TSA's. So when the TSA is
trying to enforce upon them a standard that they believe they
are superior to, it is very difficult to call it harmonization.
Mr. Cleaver. But have we looked at any international--any
other international systems? I mean, for example, El Al is at
least spoken of as the superior system on the planet. Have we
had any contact with or involvement with El Al?
Mr. Fried. Yes, I spent a week over in Tel Aviv back in
May. I can tell you that, from what my experience was with the
Israelis, is that cargo is a conundrum to them, as well. One of
the solutions they have is to hold cargo for 2 days prior to
shipment.
Mr. Boisen's airline had service in and out of Tel Aviv, so
he could probably tell his personal experiences, but----
Mr. Cleaver. I have had personal experiences. You can't
take a beef sandwich on El Al.
Mr. Kelly. Right. As a passenger, if you plan on committing
a malicious act, obviously that is not the place to do it. But,
you know, cargo has its challenges.
Mr. Cleaver. Yes.
Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee [presiding]. We call this a cooperative
spirit. I thank Mr. Cleaver from Missouri. He has come to be a
valued Member of this committee, and I look forward to us
working to solve these problems.
Let me thank the members of this panel. I think you have
enlightened us as to the private sector's involvement but also
the concerns that you have expressed.
I do want to add to the record, to reinforce its addition
to the record, an October 30, 2008, letter from the
Transportation Security Administration to Chairman Thompson and
the committee that defines transportation, as to what the
transportation system means, what ``commensurate'' means, which
I think is going to be important to future legislation.
I ask unanimous consent to submit it into the record.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield myself just a minute just to ask
Mr. Johnson, what is your latest encounter--and I ask this
generically for small businesses--but what is your encounter
with TSA?
Mr. Johnson. Actually, we spoke this morning with the TSL
about setting a date to start the screening process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say this broadly. I have
asked, I think, Mr. Kelly to provide us with a list, maybe
extensive, of small businesses similarly situated and the
status of the technology that they may be offering.
Let me say on behalf of the committee, we hope that that
meeting that you are having, as well as others who are in line
to answer the question of Mr. Boisen and Mr. Fried and Mr. May
on technology, moves quickly. I am also going to write a letter
to TSA to ask for them to give us their process of moving
technology and assessing that technology.
I do think there is a gaping hole of consciousness between
the urgency that Congress puts into legislation like the 9/11
legislation, giving specific dates of 2009 and 2010, and there
is a disconnect between the kind of technology that needs to be
in place for the job to get done.
Mr. Boisen, on behalf of your constituents, we are going to
ask for some understanding of the process of certification and
providing information to your constituents to be able to now
have you assess which technology you can use and the
determination of whether or not the equipment that some of your
clients, customers, constituents are using is adequate.
Also, I had to rush away because I gave testimony to the
Budget Committee. I will be revising my statement to include
issues regarding transit and air cargo and asking for funding
that will answer some of the concerns about staffing and some
of the concerns about funding as it relates to the full
screening of cargo by 2010 and certainly to maintain the 50
percent that we have at this point.
I think I asked Mr. Boisen to give me a list of his
constituents, in terms of their compliance or representing that
they are at 50 or 100 percent, and I would like you to
designate who is at 100.
Mr. May, likewise, I would like you to do so, as well.
I would like to ask my staff, staff director, Mr. Beland,
that we have a briefing with airlines. We understand their
hesitancy to be at a hearing, but we hope that we will have
full attendance at a briefing so that we can be informed and be
working effectively on this issue. We may call upon those of
you who are here again.
With that, I believe I have come to a conclusion. I think I
will just simply say, no, we have not met the test, and the
test is to secure America. Frankly, I hope that this hearing
will set a wake-up call for us to do so.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond to
them expeditiously in writing.
In addition, I think this hearing has generated what I
believe is necessity for further legislation on this matter to
clarify, but also instructions to the industry and to TSA. We
look forward to introducing that legislation.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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