Homeland Security

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Hollings and members of the Committee, my name is Mike Mitre. I am a member of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), which since 1934 has been chosen by thousands of West Coast port and dock workers to represent us in all matters related to our employment. For the past two years, I have served as the union representative regarding port security and have had opportunities to work with the Coast Guard, TSA, Customs, and other stakeholders in an effort to effectively secure our ports from acts of terrorism. We commend these agencies for their hard work and commitment to the national security of the United States. In particular, the ILWU commends the Coast Guard for developing comprehensive port security regulations in a very short time frame. We appreciate the hard work and dedication of the Captain's of the Ports, coast guard personnel, TSA, and Customs personnel. I also want to commend other labor organizations that have worked on a common agenda to protect our ports including the International Longshoremen's Association, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO.

As co-chair of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union Legislative Committee, I have developed a number of policy statements with respect to the security of our ports on behalf of our members and communicated our position to members of Congress and key staff. We appreciate the commitment that Congress and this Committee in particular, has made to the goal of protecting both our ports and ILWU dockworkers from the threat of international terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. We are at a critical time in the history of this country. The threat of a terrorist attack against the marine transportation system is a new reality. On March 14, 2004, suicide bombers at the Ashdod Port in Israel killed 10 people and wounded another 16. It appears that all the victims were workers. It is certainly in the interest of American port workers to secure our ports. Every day we unload thousands of containers from ships calling from virtually every point on the globe, each filled with unknown items packed by unknown people throughout the world. Few of these containers or vessels are screened or inspected before being unloaded by longshoremen. Many of the containers do not go through any type of a security screening process before being loaded on a truck or railcar bound for the interior of the United States. Many of our families, friends, and coworkers live in different seaport communities such as San Pedro and Oakland, California, Portland, Oregon, Seattle, Washington, and Honolulu, Hawaii. While I would like nothing better than to be able to tell them that all the stakeholders within the marine transportation system are doing everything possible to keep them safe and secure from terrorism, this may not exactly be the case.

My testimony today will focus on specific measures that, if implemented, will provide more meaningful security for our port marine terminals and our communities. Marine terminal operators along the west coast continue to refuse, despite repeated encouragement and demands from the ILWU, to implement adequate port security measures to protect our port workers, communities and the nation as a whole from possible terrorist attacks. Even more shocking and inexplicable is the reality that some terminal operators have reduced or abandoned some of the most basic port security measures following the September 11th and the terrorist attack against our American people.

On March 15, 2004, the ILWU wrote to Coast Guard Admiral Hereth to urge the Coast Guard to take effective action to compel these employers, the marine terminal operators, to immediately implement and maintain adequate security measures in accordance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the applicable and related Coast Guard regulations issued on July 1, 2003 and October 22, 2003.

Since September 11, 2001, the ILWU has made repeated overtures to these same employers to develop and institute, without delay, practices and procedures designed to increase the level of security to at least that which existed on September 11th , 2001. The Union's requests for Employer action to increase port security is documented in various proposals and letters to the employers, samples of which are attached to this testimony marked Attachment 1.

Many of these companies have actually reduced security by, among other things, discontinuing the practice of inspecting the integrity of container seals upon entering marine terminal facilities. The second attachment to the testimony are copies of some of the letters documenting our Employers' discontinuation of the regular inspection of container seals and inspection of "empty" containers shortly before and after September 11, 2001. The Employers' insistence, over Union objection, to stop inspecting container seals at certain West Coast marine terminal facilities is especially disconcerting given that the Coast Guard regulations in 105.265(b)(4) specifically mandate that terminal operators and owners "check seals and other methods used to prevent tampering upon entering the facility and upon storage within the facility".

While we have urged our Employers to initiate adequate port security measures regardless of specific governmental mandates, the Union has especially pressed for the PMA Employers' immediate full compliance with Coast Guard Regulations 105.265, "Security Measures for Handling Cargo", which plainly constitute the core security provisions for marine terminal facilities; where the majority of ILWU port workers are employed.

With respect to the specific security measures mandated in Coast Guard regulation 105.265, "Security Measures for Handling Cargo", our information, daily work experience, and observations disclose that the PMA Employers have failed to implement the following security measures listed in that provision:

o 105.265(a)(5) - "Identify Cargo That is Accepted for Temporary Storage in a Restricted Area While Awaiting Loading for Pickup" - Most if not all port facility operators/owners have, after September 11, 2001, and also after the December 31, 2003 filing of security plans, continued the standard practice of mixing cargo and containers designated for loading on different ships and trucks scheduled for different time periods and also mixing them with other cargo and containers not yet designated for a particular loading or pickup. Moreover, few, if any, facilities have "restricted areas" for temporary storage of cargo.

o 105.265(a)(6) - "Restrict the Entry of Cargo to The Facility That Does Not Have a Confirmed Date for Loading as Appropriate" - No facility operator/owner, as far as we know, has instituted any restrictions on the entry of cargo that lacks a confirmed date for loading, let alone conduct any determination of "appropriateness" for receipt of such cargo since September 11, 2001, and since the December 31, 2003 filing of security plans. In fact, many facility operators/owners continue to use what they call "dummy bookings" to document the regular receipt of cargo that lacks a designation or confirmed date for loading onto ships. In addition, most, if not all, marine terminal facilities continue the standard practice of allowing cargo to first enter the facility and only after entry determine the existence of appropriate documentation and designation for loading. Many facility operators/owners also continue the practice of storing on site, without restriction for several days, cargo with inadequate documentation and unknown designation for loading.

o 105.265(a)(9) - "Create, Update, and Maintain a Continuous Inventory of All Dangerous Goods and Hazardous Substances From Receipt to Delivery Within the Facility Giving the Location of Those Dangerous Goods and Hazardous Substances." - This critical security measure has simply not been implemented at any facilities where ILWU members work since September 11, 2001 and continuing after the December 31, 2003 filing of security plans. In nearly all marine terminal facilities, hazardous material cargo is randomly integrated with other types of cargo, including even food products throughout the terminals. Also, as noted, it is standard practice for marine terminals to receive and store for a certain period of time containers of unknown contents pending receipt and verification of complete documentation.

o 105.265(b)(1) - "Unless Unsafe To Do So, Routinely Check Cargo, Cargo Transport Units and Cargo Storage Areas Within the Facility Prior to and During Cargo Handling Operations for Evidence of Tampering." - Few if any West Coast Marine Terminals have instituted any practices or procedures to "routinely check" cargo, containers and the storage areas for possible tampering within these facilities following September 11, 2001 and even since the December 31, 2003 filing of security plans. In those port facilities where some checking is performed, such as for example, at Terminal-6 in Portland, Oregon, the security guards merely drive through the facility in a perfunctory manner no differently than they did before September 11, 2001.

o 105.265(b)(2) - "Check That Cargo, Containers, or Other Cargo Transport Units Entering the Facility Match the Delivery Note or Equivalent Cargo Documentation." - While this practice was commonly followed in the West Coast ports ten or more years ago, the industry trend starting before September 11, 2001 and continuing to the present is the elimination of requiring that cargo and containers match the delivery documentation before entry into marine terminal facilities. Neither the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the issuance of the Coast Guard interim regulations of July 1, 2003, nor the filing of facility security plans as of December 31, 2003, have changed this regressive trend. o 105.265(b)(3) - "Screen Vehicles". - The screening of vehicles before entering marine terminal facilities is done in some West Coast ports, but not all.

o 105.265(b)(4) - "Check Seals and Other Methods Used to Prevent Tampering Upon Entering the Facility and Upon Storage Within the Facility." - As noted, most marine terminals on the West Coast have not instituted any procedures for the checking of seals and other methods to prevent tampering either upon a container entering a facility or upon its storage within the facility. Indeed, some marine terminal operators have actually discontinued this practice in years before and in months after September 11, 2001. That most marine terminal operators do not routinely check and verify the integrity of seals on most containers is reflected by the one limited exception where such checks are more commonly done with respect to cargo and containers subject to USDA regulations. Moreover, most marine terminal operators fail to have adequate procedures for monitoring pilferage and other tampering of containers and cargo as reflected in the common practice of the terminal operators and the carriers splitting the cost of any such losses based on their failure to know the time and location where such tampering occurred.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of checking the outside seal of containers upon entry into the facility by rail or truck and especially, upon entry by sea. A broken seal would immediately alert the port facility that the container may have been with tampered and needs to be carefully inspected. A systematic check of container seals also provides authorities with a record as to the parties responsible for placing the seal on any container that may be the means of a terrorist act.

The Coast Guard regulations do not contain references regarding the need to develop a program to inspect and seal "empty" containers. There should be little disagreement over the need for an inspection or verification protocol concerning these containers. The fact that marine terminal operators routinely conducted "empty" inspections in the past as a regular part of their security program to verify the absence of harmful contents and to detect and deter possible terrorist attacks only adds to the viability of this procedure. The ILWU urges the Coast Guard to strongly consider creating a mandate regarding the inspection of empty containers. If there was ever to be an attack from anyone using an "empty" container to transport and stage explosives or chemical or biological agents, this would be the ideal manner in which to accomplish it. The level and manner of intelligence gathering and the sophistication of technique used by various terrorist organizations should leave nothing to chance.

It is the Union's view that the Coast Guard regulations in general, and the MTSA in particular, as well as basic common sense and good faith concern for the security of the ports and the country necessarily require that all maritime companies initiate comprehensive and adequate port security measures without delay, notwithstanding the technical final compliance date of July 1, 2004 as set out in 105.115(b) of the Coast Guard regulations. Terminal operators that fail to implement necessary security measures in the interim preceding the July 1, 2004 deadline is contrary to the stated intent and objective of the MTSA and the Coast Guard regulations.

Indeed, Section 70103(c)(7) of the MTSA mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who has delegated such responsibility to the Coast Guard, "shall require each owner or operator of a vessel or facility located within or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to implement any necessary interim security measures, including cargo security programs, to deter to the maximum extent practicable a transportation security incident until the security plan for that vessel or facility operator is approved." Under these clear statutory and regulatory mandates, there is no legitimate reason or excuse for any vessel or facility operator/owner not to implement the provisions of the Regulations and of their security plans after submission to the Coast Guard on December 31, 2003, and pending review and approval by the Coast Guard by July 1, 2004. Any good faith approach to port security would demand no less. To be sure, would-be terrorists will not wait for the passing of a technical future deadline to attack our ports; nor should port Employers wait to adequately protect our port facilities from such potential attacks.

Common sense would indicate that waiting until July 1, 2004, in which to institute necessary port security measures actually could heighten the risk of potential terrorism during this waiting period. I understand that our employers are concerned about the cost of port security measures. The ILWU is mindful of their concerns and we understand that it may be cost prohibitive and impractical to subject every container to a thorough and complete inspection. However, every container that enters our ports can and should be subjected to a security check. When there is a conflict between efficiency in the maritime transportation system versus additional security measures that will enhance the security of the system and our port communities, we believe that security should prevail.

The ILWU has worked closely with TSA in developing the TWIC ID, envisioned as a nation wide transportation worker ID security program. The prototype phase now underway in the ports has already actively involved many ILWU members, an indication of the realization by the most average worker just how serious security has become. It is also an indication of the degree of commitment the ILWU has exhibited. Only through a dedicated and unified effort by all stakeholders will true port security be achieved.

Finally, we ask the Congress and the Administration to fully fund port security. It is critical that when the facility security plans are finalized that money is available for optimum security rather minimal security. We applaud the members of this committee, and particularly Senator Hollings, for efforts to secure the necessary funding. If a terrorist attack occurred in a major port, the lives of our workers, families, and community would be lost. The national economy would be badly shaken. It is incumbent on the Congress to provide the necessary funding to meet longshore labor and other port workers security objectives.

On behalf of the members of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to answer your questions.