Prepared
Witness Testimony The Committee on Energy and Commerce W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman Port Security: A Review of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's Targeting and Inspection Program for Sea Cargo Mr. J. Richard Berman
Mr. Chairman, Members of Congress: I am pleased to appear before the
Subcommittee to discuss the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of
Inspector General's (OIG) efforts to review the DHS's bureau of Customs and
Border Protection's (CBP) Targeting and Inspection Program. From April 2001 to March 1, 2003, the Department of Treasury Office of
Inspector General (Treasury OIG), and since that date, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) OIG, have been conducting reviews related to the
targeting, inspection and security of ocean going cargo entering the United
States. The Treasury OIG initiated a series of seaport reviews that focused on
these issues at the major seaports of Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York/Newark,
Charleston, South Carolina, Philadelphia, and Port Everglades, Florida. These
ports processed about 4.5 million containers, or about two thirds of the vessel
containers arriving in the U.S. during FY 2002. The Treasury OIG reports on
these ports, along with a sixth nationally focused summary report, were
completed shortly after the conversion of the Treasury OIG staff to the
Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003 (see attachment for report
listing). The DHS OIG is now responsible for following up on CBP compliance with
the recommendations in those reports. CBP, formerly Treasury's Bureau of Customs, performs dual missions: one of
regulating commercial activities and one of law enforcement. Prior to September
11, 2001, Customs' law enforcement mission concentrated on preventing the
smuggling of drugs into the country. Following September 11, Customs' mission
expanded to include inspections for implements of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. CBP does not rely on any single technology or inspection process but deploys
multiple technologies to support a layered inspection process. Customs relies
heavily on the advanced information they receive electronically through the
Automated Manifest System (AMS) to select cargo or containers for inspection.
This selection is made using the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to identify
high-risk shipments based on anomalies and "red flags" within AMS
data. The targeting process is performed by the Manifest Review Unit (MRU).
Inspectors assigned to the MRU are responsible for analyzing risk factors by
conducting pre-arrival manifest/document reviews and reviewing indicators of
suspicious shipments. CBP officials state that they screen 100 percent of
manifests received. They also conduct intelligence work-ups using various
research tools and enforcement databases. After a container is targeted, it can be inspected in a number of ways. If
available, large-scale x-ray and gamma ray machines, such as the Vehicle and
Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) are used to assist the inspectors in conducting
non-intrusive inspections. When circumstances warrant, containers are sent to
container examination stations where more intrusive examinations such as opening
and verifying cargo can be performed. Treasury OIG's assessment of Customs' targeting concluded that inaccurate
manifest data were used to target high-risk vessel containers; some MRU's
improperly implemented the targeting process; MRU targeting personnel lacked
formal training and performed collateral duties reducing targeting activities;
MRU effectiveness was reduced due to limited access to intelligence information;
procedures for in-bond shipments did not address how to process ATS targeted
shipments at in transit ports; and Customs did not have targeting efficiency
measures for vessel containers to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of ATS
to target potential violators. Regarding inspections of targeted high-risk shipments, several staffing,
procedural and processing issues existed that could impair Customs' ability to
detect and deter contraband and weapons of mass destruction. These issues
included: lack of sufficient inspection personnel to conduct examinations;
inspections not always performed in accordance with established guidelines;
results of examinations not always recorded accurately; examination statistics
not reported consistently; and underutilization of non-intrusive inspection
equipment. DHS OIG is currently engaged in conducting a series of projects to assess
CBP's cargo inspections and the reporting of statistics associated with those
inspections. In April 2003 we initiated work at the Port of Houston and have
produced a draft report. CBP has not had an opportunity to officially comment on
this draft; however, we have briefed Port of Houston, Field Office, and
Headquarters personnel regarding our findings. We have also finished fieldwork
at the ports of El Paso, and will visit the ports of Seattle and Blaine,
Washington in the near future. We will issue separate reports on these ports as
well as a summary report to CBP detailing all issues requiring Headquarters
attention. Generally, we found that overall guidelines on what constituted an
examination and what procedures and steps should be taken in different types of
examinations were unclear and subject to different interpretation; the
inspection procedures associated with each type of inspection were not applied
consistently; examination results were not always recorded properly; and the
reporting systems did not accurately reflect the examinations performed. While CBP has not had the opportunity to formally comment on the draft
report, the Port of Houston generally agreed with the findings, and, in fact,
stated it is using the OIG audit process to improve the operation of the Port's
cargo examinations. Following the audit, the port undertook several changes and
modifications. We will continue to provide oversight over CBP's targeting and inspection of
high-risk vessel containers and associated port security issues. Specifically,
during FY-04 we will review CBP's Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program
and CBP's Container Security Initiative. Also, we plan to conduct a series of
projects to evaluate the physical security over high-risk vessel containers to
ensure that these containers are not subject to compromise and theft. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks at this time. It is my understanding
that you plan to continue this hearing in closed session. Since much of my
prepared testimony contains sensitive information, I would like to expand on
this statement, and answer any questions you or the members may have, during the
closed session. The
Committee on Energy and Commerce |
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