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Homeland Security

STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG
ADJUTANT GENERAL
STATE OF WASHINGTON AND CHAIR,
HOMELAND SECURITY, ADJUTANTS
GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES (AGAUS)

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 13, 2003
 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.  For the record, my name is Major General Tim Lowenberg.  I am the Adjutant General of the State of Washington and Chair of Homeland Security for the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS).   

Thank you for the opportunity to address the role of the National Guard, in combination with other uniformed service components, in providing for homeland security and homeland defense.  In this time of expanding terrorist threats and limited fiscal resources, we must take maximum advantage of everything the National Guard and other components of the Department of Defense can contribute to our collective security. 

I am one of a majority of Adjutants General who have homeland security responsibilities significantly transcending conventional command and control of Army and Air National Guard forces.   I am "dual hatted" (to use the military vernacular) as our state's senior emergency management official.  The state Emergency Management Director, Mr. Glen Woodbury (who also serves as the current President of the National Emergency Management Association [NEMA]) works directly for me as head of the one of the three major divisions of the State Military Department.  I am advised and supported in this capacity by Mr. Woodbury and by a State Emergency Management Council (EMC) consisting of representatives of cities, counties, sheriffs, state and local police chiefs, fire chiefs, local emergency management directors, health officials, ecology officials, fire protection bureau officials, building trades officials, seismic safety experts, search and rescue volunteers, and private sector business leaders.  I meet with this group of state and local leaders at least once every 60 days, and more often as needed.

In 1999, at the behest of Governor Gary Locke, our state also formed a Committee on Terrorism (COT) which reports to me through the Emergency Management Council.  Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), with which you are all familiar, prompted our formation of the state Committee on Terrorism.  PDD 63, along with the early work of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the so-called "Hart-Rudman Commission") convinced us that our nation was entering a new and decidedly dangerous period;  one marked by increased vulnerability to domestic terrorist attacks.  Although it would be nearly two more years before the fatal attacks of September 11, 2001, we were well aware that our national interests had been under attack by Al-Qaida since at least 1991.  We therefore formed the Committee on Terrorism in the fall of 1999.  That investment in multi-jurisdiction collaboration and coalition building has paid off handsomely as we've dealt with the challenges of the post-9/11 world.  The Committee on Terrorism is our fusion point for marshalling the efforts of more than thirty (30) federal, state, and local government agencies and private sector organizations.  The full committee operates through more than a dozen standing subcommittees and work groups which report through the EMC to the Adjutant General and the Governor.         

I am also responsible for overseeing our state-wide Enhanced 911 program - everything from managing E-911 tax revenues to assuring essential system upgrades and support for local public safety answering points (PSAP's).  In this capacity, I'm assisted by a 27-member

Advisory Council of government and private sector leaders, including representatives from the private sector wire-line and wireless communications industry. 

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 Governor Locke also directed that the Adjutant General serve as the state Homeland Security Advisor.  In that capacity, I am our state's primary point of contact with the White House, the Department of Homeland Security and the National Governors Association on all matters pertaining to homeland security.  In that role, I also chair the weekly meetings and oversee the daily liaison of the state Domestic Security Executive Group, which includes the governor's chief of staff and senior policy advisors, several other key cabinet officials and our separately elected state Attorney General. 

I am submitting a diagram, for the record, depicting these multiple responsibilities.  I've taken the liberty of doing so for several reasons:  first, because these multiple roles are not unique to me or to our state - a majority of the nation's Adjutants General have similar dual civil-military roles and responsibilities;  second, these duties do not conform to the position description or range of homeland security responsibilities of any senior military leaders outside the National Guard - no other active duty or reserve component general officers deal so extensively and habitually with senior federal, state, local and private sector civilian emergency responders; and third, these duties underscore the unique capabilities of Adjutants General as forward deployed military commanders for purposes of executing federal and state emergency response plans.

The National Guard

Just as the role of the Adjutants General is unique, so too is the composition and constitutional status of the Army and Air National Guard forces we command.  When discussing the National Guard, it must be understood that the "Guard" is really two separate and distinct organizations. The terms of art used to describe these two organizations are the National Guard of the several States and the National Guard of the United States. The National Guards of the several states are state military organizations maintained by the sovereign states under the Militia Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  These National Guard forces can be used at the direction of the Governor at state expense and for state purposes (e.g., state active duty deployments in response to natural disasters such as flooding and wild fires) or at federal expense and for federal purposes (e.g., guarding our nation's airports).

Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes states to provide military support to the federal government "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions".  Under Title 32, United States Code (T32, USC) National Guard members have been used at federal expense and "in the service of the United States" to train the traditional, part-time force, for counter-drug support for federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, for providing Civil Support Team assistance to federal, state and local emergency responders, and, most notably, for augmenting airport security following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The third and final National Guard status is as the National Guard "of the United States";  this legally distinct status refers to the reserve components of the United States Army and Air Force under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, sections 3062 (c) (1) and 8062 (d).   Unlike state active duty and Title 32 duty, Governors and Adjutants General have no command or control over National Guard Forces that have been ordered to Title 10 federal duty; National Guardsmen/women become indistinguishable members of the federal armed forces upon being placed on Title 10 orders. 

The various Guard statuses and the expansive range of potential Title 32 duty are depicted in the diagram marked as Attachment 2. 

As a result of these distinct legal statuses, all National Guard members are commissioned or enlisted in each of two separate and legally distinct military organizations:  the National Guard of the individual state and the National Guard of the United States.  The Supreme

Court recognized these important status distinctions in Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990), a case in which the Court analogized that National Guard members have three hats in their closet:  a civilian hat, a state militia hat and a federal reserve of the Army or Air Force hat, only one of which can be worn at any given time.

It has been my experience that most active duty military leaders and many supposedly knowledgeable commentators don't understand these distinctions and therefore adopt the simplistic view that the National Guard is available only in state active duty status or as a Title 10, federally-controlled force.  This overlooks the broad range of Title 32 duty status options in which the National Guard can be used under state control but at federal expense and for federal purposes.  In truth, as I will explain momentarily, use of the National Guard in Title 32 status offers federal authorities an operationally and fiscally superior range of options for undertaking homeland defense and homeland security missions. 

For ease of reference, I will use the term "National Guard" throughout the balance of my testimony to mean the National Guard under state control in either State Active Duty or Title 32 status.  When referring to the National Guard of the United States (the Guard's Title 10 reserve component status), I will call attention to that special context.    

The National Guard Bureau

The Adjutant General is the commander of all Army and Air National Guard units in his state, regardless of his branch of service.  The Adjutant General therefore exercises joint command.  What then is the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB)?  It might surprise you to learn that he is not the commander of the National Guard "of the United States", the federal component of the National Guard; in fact, the National Guard of the United States does not have a national command structure.  Rather, the National Guard Bureau is a "channel of communications" between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the several states (10 USC 10501) and the Chief is the head of the Bureau, not a commander.  The responsibilities of the CNGB are articulated in 10 USC Sections 10501-10507, the National Guard Bureau Charter from the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and other DoD directives and regulations. Foremost among these is the Chief's role as senior spokesman between the Army and Air Force and the states on all matters pertaining to the National Guard. In addition, the CNGB is responsible for insuring that the National Guard of the several states is prepared to respond to Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and other state mission requirements while concurrently training and otherwise preparing for mobilization as the primary reserve of the Army and Air Force (i.e. as the National Guard of the United States1).

The National Guard of the Several States

The governors of the several states routinely employ the National Guard in a traditional Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) role and in concert with other state resources when responding to state and local emergencies.  They employ their National Guard forces in state active duty status and at state expense before requesting federal assistance through their state emergency management functions to DHS/FEMA. They can also obtain assets, including other National Guard forces, from other states using one of several emergency assistance compacts (for example, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact [EMAC] which now has 47 state members) or by direct, ad hoc agreement with other states. 

When state-to-state mutual assistance is provided in response to an emergency for which there has been a Presidential Disaster Declaration, the expenses of the supported state, including the costs of assistance from supporting states, are reimbursable under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et. seq.  This highlights an important new dimension in the war on terrorism. As part of our national homeland security planning, we need to recognize that National Guard military assistance for civil authorities and other National Guard functions (both intra and interstate assistance) can be funded through FEMA and need not be funded solely through the Department of Defense.

Governors and Adjutants General have a great deal of experience dealing with major disasters.  The State of Washington, for example, has averaged at least one Presidential Disaster Declaration each year for the past forty (40) years.  Many of these disasters have required activation of the National Guard.  For us, Military Support to Civil Authorities is not a theoretical mission possibility that might occur once during a 2 or 3 year military assignment;  it is the kind of bread and butter emergency response mission to which we devote a substantial portion of our careers.   

Most recently, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (CSTs) were deployed from supporting states to assist supported states in recovering potentially dangerous NASA Space Shuttle debris.  In furnishing this Title 32 assistance, the supporting states continued to exercise command and control over the deployed CSTs, with tactical supervision being extended to the supported state(s).  The supporting teams were also deployed under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, rather than through normal DoD channels.  This illustrates the flexibility of using existing state National Guard command channels to furnish Title 32 National Guard assistance to states struck by major disasters.

Adjutants General manage the readiness and operations of their state Army and Air National Guard forces pursuant to guidance from their Governor and from the CNGB acting on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Army and Air Force.  They do so through a state command element called the State Area Command (STARC).  The STARC is an Army National Guard unit augmented by appropriate Air Guard personnel to achieve a measure of "jointness".  The STARC, which can itself be mobilized under Title 10 USC, can be used to execute state active duty, Title 32 and/or Title 10 USC functions in carrying out MSCA missions and wartime readiness and mobilization missions.  The STARC provides mature, cost-efficient state command and control of National Guard forces regardless of the nature or purpose of their mission.

I used our STARC to mobilize, deploy and oversee the operations of soldiers and airmen in state active duty status when quelling the World Trade Organization Conference riots in Seattle in 1999.  I used the STARC to mobilize, deploy and oversee the operations of soldiers and airmen in Title 32 federal pay status when rushing to augment airport security following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  I am also using the STARC to mobilize and deploy soldiers for Title 10 active duty in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.   The STARC's MSCA responsibilities are described in detail in DoD Directive 3025.1 (MSCA), paragraphs 4f, 6c and 7e.

The operational and fiscal advantages of using the Guard in Title 32 status and in fully utilizing the existing STARC command structure are best illustrated by two post-9/11 missions.  Shortly after the attacks of 9/11, President Bush called upon governors to make National Guard forces available to guard the nation's airports.  His request came without forewarning during a presidential press conference.  Notwithstanding these unusual circumstances, within 24 hours of the President's request approximately 1,000 Guardsmen deployed to key airports. The FAA and NGB developed a five-day train up program. Over 6,000 Guardsmen were then trained and deployed to 440 airports.  During the peak holiday season in 2001, over 8,000 Guardsmen were deployed to our nation's airports. 

The airport security mission was a classic case of the National Guard being used "in the service of the United States" for a federal purpose and at federal expense.  Although the terms of the Title 32 deployment and rules of engagement were specified by the federal government (the supported jurisdiction), command and control of the uniformed forces remained with state military authorities (the supporting jurisdictions).  The states used their existing STARC and subordinate command headquarters to mobilize and manage the deployed forces.  No new command structures had to be created.  No extraordinary mobilization expenses were incurred.  Because the soldiers and airmen remained under state command and control, they trained at home station and soldier and employer hardships could be accommodated by rotating personnel in and out of the Title 32 mission.  Work schedules were carefully managed so that soldiers and airmen continued to drill with their units.  They thereby maintained individual and unit war-fighting proficiencies, assuring their continued readiness for OCONUS combat missions.  Most importantly, if the soldiers' primary unit had been needed for an OCONUS combat, combat support or combat service support mission, we could have rotated other soldiers into the airports and returned the affected soldiers to their units for OCONUS deployment.   

By contrast, when Border Patrol, Customs and INS needed augmentation to assure the security of our nation's land borders, federal authorities insisted that National Guard members be federalized in Title 10 status.  This required costly and cumbersome federal command structures to be created from scratch.  Instead of training at home station, all soldiers had to ship out to one of two federal mobilization stations.  Instead of operating under familiar state command structures, command was exercised by an active duty Army headquarters on the opposite coast.  Once on Title 10 orders, the soldiers could no longer train with their units.  Over the course of their six month border deployment, they were no longer available for OCONUS combat duty, individual soldier skills eroded and the combat readiness of their original units of assignment was irreversibly compromised.  Moreover, in contrast to the speedy deployment of National Guard forces to the nation's airports (3 to 6 days), imposition of these cumbersome and costly federal control procedures delayed deployment to the borders for more than six (6) months.  To add insult to injury, National Guard soldiers had to be deployed unarmed in order to comply with the Posse Comitatus Act restrictions on Title 10 forces, thereby minimizing their effectiveness as border security augmentees.   As a result, at the border crossing at Blaine, Washington armed Title 32 Washington National Guard soldiers assisted Border Patrol, Customs and INS agents with counter-drug operations as we have done for more than twelve (12 years) while unarmed, federalized National Guard soldiers from many of the same units had to be protected by Border Patrol, Customs and INS agents at the same border while they performed marginally effective counter-terrorism duties. 

The Adjutants General of the United States and the nation's governors are adamant that when National Guard forces are used domestically they should remain under state control, whether operating for a state purpose (at state expense and under state control) or for a federal purpose (at federal expense but under continued state control under Title 32, USC).  The nation's governors, by formal resolution adopted at their mid-winter conference on February 25, 2003, have called upon federal authorities to use the National Guard in Title 32 status instead of Title 10 for all domestic missions.   A copy of the Governors' resolutions on Army and Air National Guard Policy and Terrorism and Homeland Security Policy are attached to these remarks [Atchs 3 and 4].

Dual Missioning

The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century (February 15, 2001) argued for "orders-of-magnitude improvements in planning, coordination, and exercises.  The government must also be prepared to use effectively - albeit with all proper safeguards - the extensive resources of the Department of Defense.  This will necessitate new priorities for the U.S. armed forces and particularly, in our view, for the National Guard". 

With that assessment in mind, the Commission recommended to Congress that the National Guard "should:

    Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state, local and regional planning for responding to a WMD incident

    Train and help organize local first responders

    Maintain up-to-date inventories of military resources and equipment available in the area on short notice

    Plan for rapid inter-state support and reinforcement; and

    Develop an overseas capability for international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief."

The Adjutants General concur with the Commission's assessment and recommendations, having been assured by Commission representatives that the Commission did not intend for the Guard to be turned into a constabulary force or to assume homeland security missions in lieu of existing combat, combat support and combat service support missions.  The Commission recognized, as we do, that we are able to perform our domestic support roles so well precisely because of our OCONUS combat training and experience. 

The Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) urge the President to direct the Secretary of Defense, and request the Congress where necessary, to authorize, support, equip and fund the National Guard to assume significant homeland security responsibilities.  These responsibilities must be recognized as an important mission but not the sole or primary mission of the National Guard.  Although there may be a need for selected units and personnel to be specially missioned or resourced for these purposes (e.g., CSTs and recently proposed Homeland Security units - see S. 215), homeland security can most effectively and efficiently be accomplished as a dual mission that compliments, enhances and draws its essential strength from the National Guard's continued combat force structure, training and experience. 

In truth, we are already doing as much as possible to support the activities recommended by the Hart-Rudman Commission.  We are constrained from doing more, however, because the recommendations do not fall within the wartime missions for which we are currently funded.  

S. 215 (currently pending before the Senate Committee on Armed Forces) would substantially advance the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission by authorizing the National Guard to perform federally approved MSCA missions pursuant to a formal Governor's Plan for Homeland Security.  The proposed program is patterned after the counter-drug program model in which each state administers a program of full-time National Guard counter-drug support for civil agencies.  Within prescribed national guidelines enforced by the National Guard Bureau, the Governor's Homeland Security Plan would marshal National Guard resources to meet the unique homeland security needs of each state and territory. 

 The Adjutants General Association and the National Guard Association of the United States strongly support S.215 and urge its adoption by both houses of Congress.  We believe the road ahead should also include an integrated Counter Narcotics / Homeland Defense Counter Terrorism program, drawing upon the existing authorization of the counter drug program and the new homeland security authorization of S.215.  

Civil Support Teams 

The Secretary of Defense has certified 31 of the 32 currently authorized and funded Civil Support Teams as being fully mission ready.  The remaining team should be certified no later than 31 March 2003.  The 107th Congress authorized a total of 55 teams but did not provide funding for the additional teams.  The Hart-Rudman report for the Council on Foreign Relations urges Congress authorize and fund 66 teams.  The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), the Council of State Governments (CSG), the National Governors Association (NGA) and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) join the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) in urging Congress to authorize and fund at least one (1) CST in every state and territory.   To do any less is to treat every man, woman and child in 23 of our states and territories as acceptable casualty risks.

As the Adjutant General of the first CST to be certified to Congress as fully mission ready, I am intimately familiar with the operational capabilities and limitations of these teams.  Their capabilities are truly unique - there is nothing else like them.  They provide a critical margin of safety for emergency responders and citizens at large.  They also provide a critical base of information for officials charged with protecting the public's safety.  Our teams provide invaluable training and exercise support to civilian emergency responders, routinely integrating such responders into our training scenarios.  We have even deployed civilian responders as part of our CST to such national special security events as the 2002 Winter Olympics.  The limitations of the teams are largely confined to time and distance factors over which we have little control.  Although our entire team can deploy on a single C-17 and we regularly practice such deployments, there is no dedicated tactical airlift for any of the CSTs.  The only sure method of employment is to drive to the disaster scene.  Our teams are on a 2-hour 24/7 response line, but the harsh reality is that weather and traffic conditions  make it  impossible to provide timely support to remote areas in several states or to the states and regions that don't have their own CST.  On more than one occasion, we have had to decline requests for deployment of our team to sensitive out-of-state events because we couldn't get military airlift. 

The CST program needs two things:  first, every state and territory needs at least one Civil Support Team and, second, we need a plan for the military airlift of the teams.  This latter need is especially critical in the event of asymmetric terrorist attacks.   

A New Concept

CNGB was recently recognized as the channel of communications between the Commander, NORTHCOM and the National Guard of the several states. As a member of the General Officer Work Group at NORTHCOM, I join my fellow Adjutants General in applauding this development.  For nearly sixty years, combatant commanders and Service Secretaries have communicated with the several states through the National Guard Bureau.  It is the Bureau that coordinates and facilitates multi-state responses to complex domestic and foreign emergencies.  The Bureau is a one-stop-shop for the Department of Defense in dealing with the several states, territories and the District of Columbia.  CNGB should play the same role not only with Commander, NORTHCOM but with all other civilian and military officials involved in executing our national homeland security strategy.   The CNGB should, for example, have a similar formal relationship with the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the new MSCA action agent (The Joint Staff). The CNGB should serve as the channel of communications between them and the states for National Guard matters. As part of this relationship, the NGB would sustain a 24/7 situational awareness of

National Guard state active duty and Title 32 operations and provide a daily current operational picture to all concerned organizations.

NGB can easily provide this service by utilizing existing and upgraded information capabilities  such as "GUARDNET, Reserve Components Automation System (RCAS), electronically linked Information technology classrooms, the GCCS/SIPRNET, and federally provided tactical systems.

The Concept at the Operational Level

A guiding principle of this concept is that federal missions executed by the states should be federally funded and subject to federal oversight. The CNGB assists OSD and the Services in  performing this oversight function across the entire spectrum of National Guard missions.  Utilizing Title 32 as an operational status, as well as a training status, is a transformational force application of the National Guard and is within the scope of 32 U.S.C. Section 502(f). Some OSD officials have argued that Title 32 can only be used for training and not for operational missions.  As a lawyer and law school professor, as well as a military commander, I respectfully take exception to their narrow interpretation of Congressional intent.  32 USC 502 (f) authorizes the Service Secretaries, with or without consent of the member, to order soldiers and airmen "to perform training or other duty.".  (emphasis added).  The first tenet of statutory construction is that statutes are to be interpreted in a way that gives meaning to all words and phrases.  The stilted definition embraced by those who are hostile to Title 32 operations renders the phrase "or other duties" meaningless. To be intellectually honest, they would also have to argue that the President's use of the National Guard for airport security was patently illegal;  the most they will say, however, is that the President's actions were "legally problematic".  The fact is that Title 32 has been used repeatedly in recent years for purposes as diverse as counter drug support, Civil Support Team assistance and securing our nation's airports. 

Adjutants General, through their STARC headquarters, provide the Command, Control and Communications (C3) for National Guard units serving in Title 32 and State Active Duty (SAD) status. Presently, the states are transitioning from separate and distinct Army National Guard and Air National Guard state headquarters to a joint headquarters command structure (the Joint State Headquarters, JSHQ). Most states will have transitioned to the JSHQ by December 2003.

JSHQ could also be mobilized under Title IO (in whole or in part) and, in that status, exercise C3 of units from any component serving in Title 10 status. The JSHQ will coordinate,

through its director of military support (DOMS), with the state emergency management office and the NGB.  By working with State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs) [SEPLOs are reserve component Title 10 officers - normally colonels or Navy captains] and the use of joint task-organized forces, the JSHQs will create a capability for immediate joint state-level response.

The Concept at the Tactical Level

The question that must be answered is, "If the National Guard is deployed operationally under Title 32 while federal (Title 10) military forces are operating in the same geographic area for generally the same purpose, can there be unity of effort without unity of command?" The answer, in the judgment of the nation's Adjutants General, is an unqualified "Yes". The Federal Response Plan itself presumes willing collaboration and unity of effort toward a common objective from local, state and federal civil and military agencies.  Unity of effort and coordination of command, rather than unity of command, has worked well in responding to emergencies and disasters of every imaginable scope and magnitude.  

The recent local, state and federal Shuttle COLUMBIA response and recovery effort provides a real world illustration.  Local sheriffs and fire departments provided the immediate response forces. A patch-quilt of federal military and non-military elements responded. The Texas and Louisiana National Guard happened to be in a Title 32 training status that weekend. The National Guard of those two states deployed to provide security forces within hours of notification of the disaster.  They were deployed by order of their Adjutants General. Immediately, NORAD, through 1st Air Force, as CONR, diverted two (2) Texas Air National Guard F15s, in Title 32 status, to provide aerial recon capabilities. These Title 32 aircrews supported the Title 10 headquarters without regard for "command" technicalities or clarification of court martial authority. An Alabama Air National Guard KC-135 tanker was placed in Title 10 status to provide aerial refueling capabilities. The Texas and Louisiana Civil Support Teams were deployed by their Governors to provide immediate response to a hazardous material incident of the magnitude of a "weapon of mass destruction" scenario.

The National Guard units in Texas transitioned seamlessly from Title 32 status to State Active Duty (SAD) status on Monday, 3 February 2003. Those forces (approximately 500 personnel) were then commanded or controlled by an Army National Guard lieutenant colonel; the forces consisted of Texas Army National Guard in state active duty status as well as Oklahoma, Arkansas and New Mexico Army and Air National Guardsmen in Title 32 status (the WMD-CSTs). The task force commander provided daily situational awareness reports to the National Guard Bureau, and those reports were routinely passed on to DOMS and Northern Command. The National Guard forces were "working for" the following state and federal civilian agencies: EPA, NASA, Texas Emergency Preparedness Department and FEMA, each of which also had their own tactical assets committed (first responders/emergency responders, technical subject matter experts, and the like). The federal military elements performed their role as tasked by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) provided by 5th US Army. This response clearly illustrates a federal/state/local civil/military emergency response in which unity of effort was coordinated primarily by the Texas State Emergency Management Agency without either a deliberately-developed ad hoc operations plan or unity of "command" in the military Title 10 sense.  The result was a timely, efficient and wholly effective outcome.

The designation of Quick Reaction Forces/Rapid Reaction Forces (QRF/RRF) presents yet another opportunity to use this transformational approach in meeting the federal portion of the Homeland Defense mission. Use of Title 32 National Guard forces would provide DoD and the Combatant Commanders the flexibility of meeting their tactical and operational requirements without formally mobilizing National Guard forces. The states can organize, train, and employ appropriately sized forces based on DoD/Combatant Commander-approved criteria and can most effectively and efficiently do so in Title 32 status. These forces, if required, can even be placed in Title 10 status for limited periods to achieve unity of command under NORTHCOM or PACOM. This concept of operations is based on the time-tested First Air Force model in which National Guard forces seamlessly transition from Title 32 to Title 10 status and then back to Title 32 status, as necessary to achieve mission objectives. 

Conversion of the current National Guard Counter Drug effort provides another transformational opportunity. Approximately 3,000 National Guardsmen serving in Title 32 ADSW status are engaged in counter drug activities. Many of these activities are fully supportive of and closely aligned with needed Homeland Defense missions. Integrating Counter Drug personnel and assets with a Governor's National Guard Homeland Security Plan (S. 215) would substantially enhance our nation's homeland security strategy.  

Other opportunities exist for using this same transformational approach in such areas as National Guard medical assistance in CBRNE incidents, surveying critical infrastructure, and distributing the National Stockpile.  NGB has developed a joint requirements identification and validation process and has input from 40 of the 54 states and territories. As these requirements are further refined, more opportunities will be identified to meet DoD  and DHS operational requirements.  

The Way Ahead

AGAUS has been advised that the Acting Chief, National Guard Bureau (ACNGB) has met with the reserve component chiefs, under NORTHCOM auspices, and there is support for the National Guard providing the initial Homeland Defense and Civil Support capability for OSD. In the event Title 10 assistance from other reserve or active components is required, they could be prepared to provide necessary follow-on forces. A revision of the EPLO program to provide more deliberate use of local Reserve units through expanded planning, exercises, and pre-approved immediate response should also be part of this homeland security enhancement strategy. 

Notwithstanding the support of these other service components, the National Guard of the several states and the NGB remain the best link for DoD and NORTHCOM for military support to state and local civil authorities.  In furtherance of this role, creation of a JSHQ, in a form supportable by the Adjutants General, should be a high priority for DoD and NGB.  

Several legislative, policy and cultural challenges need to be effected to make these transformational strategies a reality. The first and most fundamental cultural change is to correct the misperception by some OSD and Service staff members that the only way to meet a national requirement with National Guard forces is to "federalize" or mobilize the Guard in Title 10 status.   As the nation's governors and Adjutants General have emphasized, however, our homeland security and homeland defense strategies are most dramatically advanced by taking maximum advantage of the domestic use of the National Guard in Title 32 status. 

The most urgently needed legislative and policy changes are:  

    Establish the Chief, National Guard Bureau as the channel of communications between the National Guard of the several states and the new MSCA/Civil Support executive agent for DoD (the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense) and the new action agent for DoD (the Joint Staff DOMS).

    Amend DoD Directives 3025.1 and 3025.15 to reflect these new relationships and operational concepts.

    Amend 10 USC Sections 10501-10503 to reflect these new relationships.

    Acknowledge that 32 USC Section 502(f) provides for use of the National Guard of the several States "in the service of the United States" and provide the necessary regulatory guidance or, if necessary, amend the United States Code with more explicit provisions authorizing the operational use of the National Guard in Title 32 status.

    Include in NORTHCOM / PACOM Integrated Priority Lists validated National Guard requirements for Homeland Security.

    Provide policy and resource support to merge separate state-level Army and Air National Guard headquarters into a Joint State Headquarters (JSHQ) in each state.

    Provide policy and resource support for upgrades to National Guard administrative and operational communications/IT capabilities, both classified and unclassified.

    Coordinate transformation of the National Guard Counter Drug program into an integrated Counter Narcotics / Homeland Security / Homeland Defense counter terrorism program.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to convey the thoughts and concerns of the nation's Adjutants General and of our Governors.  We are soldiers and airmen who are devoted to freedom's cause and to our nation's security.  The first step in this long journey is to capitalize on the transformational capabilities and established forward presence of the National Guard.  Working with other elements of the Department of Defense and civilian emergency responders, we can, we must, and we will protect our homeland and win the global war on terrorism. 

House Armed Services Committee
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515



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