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TABLE OF CONTENTS(Click on Section)

PURPOSE

BACKGROUND

WITNESSES

The purpose of this hearing is to discuss issues associated with providing firearms and/or less-than-lethal weapons to flight crews for the purpose of defending aircraft against terrorist acts.

Since the tragedies of September 11, 2001, the issue of whether to provide weapons to flight crews has received considerable attention. While the concept has received strong public support, industry experts remain divided over the safety, security and effectiveness of such measures. With every weapon, there exists a risk of collateral injury, and the risk that the weapon can be used against the intended operator. Additionally, every type of weapon has unique properties that create unique challenges and opportunities. All weapons that will be considered for use on an aircraft will fall into two general categories: less-than-lethal and firearms.

Less-than-lethal weapons

Under section 126 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-71), the Secretary of Transportation, with the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, may authorize members of a flight crew to carry less-than-lethal weapons in the interest of avoiding air piracy.

Less-than-lethal weapons can be divided among six categories: electrical shock (i.e. stun guns), chemical (i.e. tear gas or pepper spray), impact projectiles (i.e. rubber bullets), physical restraints (i.e. nets), optical, and acoustic. They are designed to temporarily incapacitate, confuse, delay or restrain an adversary in a variety of situations. They must strike a delicate balance between safety and effectiveness. In general, less-than-lethal weapons have a lower risk of accidental injury or death to innocent bystanders than lethal weapons.

The effectiveness of less-than-lethal weapons in an aircraft environment has not been widely studied. Aircraft are unique in the sense that air is re-circulated in a small space, critical flight safety-related instruments can be easily damaged, and passengers, crew and aggressors are confined together for the duration of flight. The risk of collateral injury is significantly higher under these conditions.

Among currently available less-than-lethal weapons, TASERs are widely regarded as potentially offering the most effective form of protection for passengers and flight crews. A TASER is a hand-held device that fires two gas-propelled (CO2 or NO2) barbs connected to trailing wires. When the barbs penetrate the subject's skin or clothing, the TASER discharges a high voltage (50,000 volts), low current (26 watt) electrical charge. TASERs have a maximum range of 15-21 feet, with a minimum range of approximately 3 feet, and are available in only one or two-shot models.

As long as the barbs make good contact, a TASER can instantaneously incapacitate its intended subject. The effects can last for several seconds and can be reactivated repeatedly as long as the wires remain intact and the barbs stay connected to the subject. Once the current flow stops, the subject generally recovers in less than one minute.

TASERs have not been cleared for use on commercial aircraft. However, United Airlines has purchased several hundred M-26 TASER guns and intends to install them in lockboxes in the cockpits of all their planes. The airline already is training cabin crew and flight deck crew on their use.

Several issues require more attention before TASERs can be approved for use on an aircraft in flight:

• Effectiveness and countermeasures: According to FBI data, TASERs fail to incapacitate their intended subject in 15-30 percent of deployments. Counter-measures such as heavy clothing or makeshift shielding are readily available.
• Limited number of shots: TASERS are only commercially available in one or two- shot models. After a TASER has been fired, it cannot easily be reloaded. Some models can be used as direct contact weapons; however, such models would require some form of hand-to-hand combat to be effective.
• Multiple attackers: Since TASERs have a limited number of shots and a relatively short effectiveness period, they are not ideal weapons for use against multiple attackers.
• Lethal backup: In most situations where law enforcement officers use TASERS, lethal backup is readily available. Such backup will not be available on an aircraft in flight.
• Aircraft electrical systems: The effect of a high-voltage electrical discharge on aircraft electrical systems has not been widely studied. Significant research needs to be conducted.

Section 126 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-71) directs the National Institute of Justice to assess the effectiveness of less-than lethal weapons to defend aircraft against acts of air piracy. The study has not been released to the public.

Firearms

Under section 128 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-71), a pilot of a commercial air carrier may carry an approved firearm while operating an aircraft if he receives approval from the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security and his employer, and he has received proper training. The Transportation Security Administration has begun discussions on this issue with pilots groups, airlines and other interested parties; however, to date, no pilot has received approval to carry a firearm.

Despite widespread public support, arming commercial pilots remains highly controversial among industry experts and Federal authorities. Critics contend that allowing pilots to carry firearms would introduce new and potentially greater risks to safety and security. It would create a proliferation of weapons into sensitive, sterile and secure areas and provide opportunities for individuals with hostile intentions to gain control of a firearm that would not otherwise be available. There is concern over the high risk of lethal collateral damage from both accidental and intentional discharge, harming passengers, crew or critical aircraft parts. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and Homeland Security Advisor Governor Tom Ridge have both made public statements against allowing pilots to carry guns. The airlines and other employee groups, while publicly remaining neutral, have privately expressed concerns.

Proponents point out there is a standing order to NORAD to shoot down any aircraft that has been over taken by terrorists. As a last line of defense, firearms remain the most effective deterrence and most effective means to retain control of an aircraft against air piracy. Supporters believe that other means such as emergency aircraft maneuvers or less-than-lethal weapons create even greater safety risks or are not universally effective. They contend that the risks associated with arming pilots are controllable or insignificant when compared to the potential catastrophe that could result from a terrorist gaining control of an aircraft. They also point out that certain foreign airlines currently have allowed pilots to carry weapons for years without incident. A recent poll by a pilots group of its members indicates that 73 percent of airline pilots support arming properly trained pilots with guns.

In addition to basic concerns, several other issues must be resolved before approval to carry a firearm into a cockpit of an aircraft can be granted. They include:

• Pilot qualifications;
• Type of firearm and ammunition;
• Length, frequency and intensity of training;
• Weapons storage aboard the aircraft;
• Pilot and air carrier liability;
• Method of firearms carriage;
• International legal considerations; and
• Vulnerability of aircraft to catastrophic collateral damage.