Testimony of David Z. Plavin,

President, Airports Council International - North America

 

On Behalf Of

Airports Council International - North America

And

The American Association of Airport Executives

 

House Aviation Subcommittee Hearing

Implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act

With a Focus on the 60-Day Deadline for Screening and Checked Baggage

January 23, 2002

 

Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Lipinski, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to offer the views of Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA) and the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) today on a number of issues regarding implementation of the recently enacted Aviation and Transportation Security Act.  As you know, ACI-NA represents local, regional and state governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada.  AAAE is the world's largest professional organization representing the men and women who manage primary, commercial service, reliever, and general aviation airports.

 

On behalf of airports across the country, we appreciate the work of the subcommittee in passing airport security legislation late last year and, especially, for calling this important hearing on the very first day that Congress reconvenes for the year.  Implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act is a major challenge for the federal government, airports, and the aviation industry and one that will require constant oversight during this session of Congress. 

 

Before addressing the specific concerns of airports on a host of implementation-related issues, I would like to note the importance of ensuring that as we work on the outstanding security issues in the new law we not sacrifice the very valuable role the nation's aviation system plays in our economic vitality and in bringing people together.  The steps that the aviation community is taking on security are important to ensuring that passengers are safer and that they feel comfortable to fly. These will go a long way in supporting the economic vitality of the industry.

 

We are also pleased with the signals we have received from Secretary Mineta and others that efficiency and customer service will be key goals as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) moves forward to implement the law.  The 10-minute performance goal that Secretary Mineta set reassures the airport community that the federal government wants to provide a high-performing workforce at sufficient staffing levels to get the job done right.

 

Whether considering implementation of passenger or baggage screening or the other mandates of the legislation, it is imperative that the government use cooperative and collaborative approaches to make system improvements.  The recently enacted airport security law dramatically alters the role of airports, the airlines, and the federal government with regard to airport security.  And, while the federal government has assumed a greatly expanded role, it is clear that airports and other segments of the aviation industry must be involved in shaping the implementation of new programs and procedures to meet ongoing security challenges.   

 

Airports are uniquely positioned to help in that regard.  In addition to maintaining significant security responsibilities under the new law, airport operators have an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of their individual facilities - characteristics that vary significantly from airport to airport.  This fact means that national standards and a "one-size-fits-all strategy" are themselves insufficient to improve security. Airports are well equipped to take a leadership role because of their community ties, professional leadership, and their public interest orientation and accountability to the communities they serve.  One need look no further than the example airports across the country have set since the tragic events of September 11 to get a clear understanding of the positive and active role airports can and should play in addressing ongoing security challenges. 

 

ACI-NA, AAAE and a number of individual airports have repeatedly reached out to DOT and the TSA over the past several months to offer assistance and to partner in the process.  To this point, however, the focus of the TSA has been largely internal and on airline issues. While we understand the numerous challenges the Administration faces in pulling together a huge organization and meeting important deadlines, we firmly believe that the task would be made easier with airport involvement.  We hope the subcommittee will agree and encourage the federal government to work collaboratively with airports and the aviation industry.      

 

The 60-Day Baggage Screening Requirement

 

While I am happy to comment on the requirement that all checked baggage at airports be screened and offer my assessment of some of the lessons learned with the arrival of one of the most anticipated and publicized deadlines of the new law, I want to remind members of the subcommittee that airports have limited responsibility for screening passenger baggage.  As you know, airlines have traditionally held this responsibility.  With the passage of the new law, the responsibility shifts to the federal government effective mid-February. 

 

Having said that, it is clear that airports have an interest in ensuring the smooth transition to 100 percent baggage screening as the guardian of the traveling public in the communities they serve.  And, as members of the subcommittee know, airports are more often than not the party passengers seek out when there are problems.

 

Many airports anticipated potential problems with this transition and immediately set out to work with the federal government and the airlines serving their facilities to develop a plan to meet these new requirements.  If there is one lesson to be learned from the airport perspective with the arrival of this first important deadline, it is that we have a long way to go in achieving the collaborative and cooperative approach that I mentioned earlier.  Rather than being allowed to play an active role in finding ways to meet the deadline, the airport community was generally kept out of the process and left holding their collective breaths hoping that everything would work out. Unlike the Year 2000 challenges, meeting this requirement will require daily vigilance and continued consultation.

 

That fact has so frustrated some airports that they have indicated to us an interest in taking over the responsibility for all baggage and passenger screening themselves.  While not contemplated under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, we would hope that the Congress would consider giving airports this option - at least on a limited basis - should you look at making future modifications to the law.  Airports have existing law enforcement and security infrastructure already in place that can be immediately modified and expanded to undertake this task. 

 

Explosive Detection Systems Installation - A Bigger Challenge                 

 

A more daunting challenge on the horizon for the federal government is the requirement that Explosive Detection Systems be in place at all 429 commercial service airports by December 31, 2002.  Given the time available and efforts so far, we see little possibility that the deadline will be achieved. 

 

With the upcoming release of the President's FY 2003 budget in early February, we will soon have at least one indicator of the federal government's commitment to meeting this ambitious deadline.  In order to comply with the December 2002 deadline for all EDS screening, billions of additional dollars must be appropriated by the Congress to pay for the necessary equipment.  The first step in that process should be the Administration requesting those funds, either in early February or at the latest in yet another FY 2002 supplemental appropriations request this spring.

But, that is not the only challenge.  In addition to serious questions as to whether or not the estimated 1,500 to 2,000 machines necessary to meet the requirement will be off assembly lines by the end of the year, even bigger challenges exist in making the necessary infrastructure changes at airports to accommodate these huge machines. 

 

Even if all of the machines were magically made available today, it would be difficult to meet the requirement given the massive amounts of planning and airport infrastructure work required to strengthen floors and expand terminal areas, for example.  The task is even further complicated by the fact that there can be no cookie-cutter approach to installation.  Each airport facility is unique, requiring individual attention and planning. Looking at the aviation system as a whole from a risk-management perspective, it also makes sense to place the machines in airports where they can do the most good.  At this point, it is unclear whether or not such a process exists.

 

In addition, questions remain as to who will fund these massive changes.  Will airports be forced to put other critical capital projects on hold in order to meet this requirement?  Will the federal government be responsible for these changes since they are being made in the interest of national security?  Will the Administration's budget request include funds not only for the machines, but also for costly terminal changes?  There are also questions about the technology itself and whether at this point it makes sense to reconstruct the entire baggage screening process at airports in the same way. Make no mistake, this is an investment of billions of dollars.

 

Having said that, we will continue to do everything we can to help meet the December 31 date.  To fulfill our part, however, requires guidance from the Department of Transportation to meet this fast-approaching requirement. Many airports are in the middle of capital improvement programs that may need to be altered in order to comply with the need for additional EDS equipment.  Getting accurate guidance quickly from the TSA on the requirements, acceptable alternative approaches, and assurances that needed funding is in place is critical.

 

At Seattle-Tacoma Airport, for example, construction is under way for a new concourse with 14 gates.  The baggage system design originally included one CTX machine.  To comply with the new law, SEATAC will likely have to install at least 10 EDS machines.  If SEATAC stops construction now to wait for guidance, the cost of delay could easily reach $80 million.  However, if the airport moves forward with construction and is later informed that changes will have to be made to meet TSA requirements for EDS deployment the costs could rise even higher and the opening of the new concourse could be seriously delayed.  This problem is separate from the problems the airport faces with adding 15 to 20 machines for the remainder of the airport baggage system and integrating that equipment into the existing baggage conveyor system.  Unfortunately, many other airports face similar challenges.     

 

Other airports may seek different strategies to integrate the machines into their operations. Large origin and destination airports may require more than 100 machines, which may be impossible to physically place in the airport terminal. Will airports have the ability to use these in parking garages and other off-site locations in order to better integrate them? If so, will guidance be offered that provides realistic and secure procedures for moving bags?

 

Beyond the space required for EDS machines, TSA will likely require additional space for screening and other functions.  Traditionally, the FAA and the airlines have paid airports rent for the use of airport facilities for these tasks.  Given the significant burden that would be placed on the airports if they were required to provide such space without reimbursement, especially at smaller facilities that rely heavily on rent income, it is our expectation that the TSA will pay airports for the use of any space they require.    

 

The myriad of issues I raise here are only a fraction of the challenges that the federal government will likely face in meeting the year-end EDS requirement.  In light of the difficulties, it is our hope that the TSA will begin working immediately with airports to address these issues and to develop contingency plans.

 

Other Implementation Issues:

 

Reimbursement for Security-Related Expenses:  Beyond upcoming deadlines, the serious issue of reimbursing airports for the costs associated with meeting FAA mandated security requirements in the wake of the September 11 attacks needs to be further addressed.  As we have repeatedly stated, airports will spend at least $1 billion over the next year meeting mandates for a significantly increased law enforcement presence at airports, enhanced access control measures, and other key changes.  The problem is exacerbated by significant reductions in airport revenues - estimated at $2 billion to $3 billion industry-wide - due to decreased traffic levels and reduced concessions, parking and other passenger-related revenue. 

 

The situation has resulted in a downgrading of some airport bonds and placed airports in a precarious position just as new security requirements come into place.  Having airports on strong financial footing is important to meet security challenges and to continue with capital expansion plans as traffic returns.  An estimate compiled late last year by ACI-NA showed that airports had between $16 billion and $20 billion of capital projects on hold awaiting more security guidance and information about future traffic levels. We hope the subcommittee will work to find additional funding for airports.      

 

As you know, the airport security bill provided a $1.5 billion general fund authorization to assist airports in meeting these mandates and to compensate airport vendors.  To date, however, only $175 million in additional AIP funds has been appropriated for reimbursement of airport expenses.  While important and helpful, those funds fall far short of meeting the overwhelming needs that exist at airports across the country in complying with the important security directives issued after the attack. 

 

We also appreciate the flexibility given to airports in the current fiscal year to use Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funds and Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) revenues to pay for security-related operational expenses.  While this flexibility is important in the short-term to help airports meet immediate needs and keep them in operation, we remain very concerned about the effect on funding for long-term capital expansion.  Diverting key capital funds from AIP and PFCs in this manner is not an approach that serves the nation in the long-term. 

 

Security Resources:  On a related funding issue, we would like to urge Congress and the TSA to pay close attention to the amount of revenues raised via the new security fee and from air carrier payments to fund the operations of the TSA and other security functions.  Any shortfall in funding from these two sources would have to be appropriated under the new law.  We are very concerned about the effect this could have on AIP and other FAA accounts.  We simply cannot afford to find ourselves in a situation where airport expansion, air traffic control modernization and other important programs become squeezed because of a shortfall in funding from security fees and airline payments.  Again, we look forward to the Administration's budget request with the hope that there will be sufficient funds to meet all of the new requirements as well as for important capital programs.  

 

Federal Screener Workforce:  Another key implementation item that airports are closely following and have concerns with is the transition to the federal screening workforce.  Given the overwhelming number of workers needed and the higher standards and proficiency requirements, we question whether or not enough qualified personnel will be available by the mid-November deadline for a fully federalized workforce.  We look forward to learning about and participating in development of possible contingency plans.   

 

Airport Pilot Program and Opt-Out Provisions:  The law establishes a pilot program for five airports to eventually opt out of the federal screening workforce requirements in favor of private screening companies that would be held to the same high standards as the federal government.  We believe that these provisions are extremely important in building accountability from the federal workforce.  Again, we urge the subcommittee to also consider allowing some number of airports to take over passenger and baggage screening responsibilities themselves if they so choose. Such a step would complement the myriad of security responsibilities airports have and provide yet another model to analyze as we move forward. 

 

Federal Law Enforcement:  In addition to requiring screeners and screener supervisors at all passenger screening checkpoints, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires at least one law enforcement official (LEO) to be present and even more than one LEO at the 100 largest airports.  The law also requires additional federal law enforcement resources to help secure airport perimeter areas. 

 

While airports have been informed that federal law enforcement officials will likely play a major role at both passenger screening checkpoints and perimeter areas, a number of questions remain as to the specifics of implementation.  Airports are eagerly awaiting much needed guidance as to how many federal law enforcement officials we should expect, what their specific role will be, and how they will interact and coordinate with local law enforcement officials already in place at airports.  What will the role of a federal law enforcement official be at a passenger-screening checkpoint, for example, if he finds drugs on a passenger, a non-federal crime?  We also have questions as to how the National Guard will be used in the transition since the law allows for their continued use in the short-term.

 

Federal Security Directors:  One of the most important issues that many airports have pertains to the role of Federal Security Directors, which will soon be in place at every commercial service airport to coordinate passenger and baggage screening and to oversee all other aspects of airport security on behalf of the TSA.  As has been described by Secretary Mineta publicly on several occasions, these officials will have a great deal of authority at airports across the country.  We are encouraged that these individuals will have the power to make important decisions.  However, it is critical that these officials in particular work closely with airport operators and airlines to ensure airport security and continued system efficiency.  Without doubt, coordination and collaboration at this level will be key.

 

Access Control:  In addition to continued vigilance from airport operators and a greater law enforcement presence at access control points, technology offers great promise in better policing access to key points throughout an airport.  We are pleased that Congress created a pilot program for at least 20 airports to test and evaluate new and emerging technologies for providing access control and other security protections for closed or secure areas of the airport.  We also applaud provisions in the new law that provide technical and financial assistance to small- and medium-hub airports to improve access control at smaller facilities.  We look forward to working with the TSA to implement these important provisions.      

 

"Smart Card" Technology:  In addition to helping maintain better access control, technology offers great promise in better targeting passengers for closer scrutiny.  One piece of technology that airports have already begun to proactively tackle with our airline partners is the use of "Smart Credentials" to identify passengers.  We cannot run an efficient public transportation system if we try to treat all 700 million passengers a year like potential terrorists. We need a voluntary system that allows frequent travelers to provide enough information on themselves, so government and industry can agree they belong in a "low-risk" pool.

 

In return, a so-called "smart card" with biometrics can confirm identity and provide access to an expedited screening process. The system can then concentrate its resources for rigorous screening on passengers who do not qualify to be listed as "low-risk," or passengers we do not know anything about, including those individuals simply uncomfortable with providing information on themselves.  Such a voluntary database of passengers can reside either in or out of government control, but the federal government must be involved in validating the criteria for information used in this process.  Smart credentials are key to identifying those who may be potential threats to aviation security.  It is important to point out that we know the technology works, the key is having federal agencies share information with each other so the system can quantify risk in real-time.

 

300-Foot Rule:  As you will recall from your work on the security bill, one of the big problems for airports across the country in the wake of the September 11 attack were rules that prohibited parking within 300 feet of an airport terminal.  This blanket requirement caused a number of problems with passenger inconvenience and lost airport revenue, among others.  While no one questions the wisdom of protecting airport facilities and other public buildings from potential threats, there are clearly alternative safeguards that can be put in place to achieve the goal. 

 

Recognizing that fact, Congress as part of the airport security bill included language that allows for the removal of the 300-foot restriction if an airport operator after consultation with appropriate state and local law enforcement authorities determines that safeguards are in place to sufficiently protect public safety and certifies those findings in writing with the TSA.  The Under Secretary of Transportation has the authority to keep the rule in place if a determination is made that the local safeguards are inadequate.

 

Unfortunately, implementation of this provision has not gone as smoothly as we would have hoped, and in many instances airport applications are being routinely rejected by the FAA (acting for the TSA) without regard for the intent of Congress.  In simple terms, the FAA has raised the bar so high in terms of what an airport must show in its blast and local threat analysis that it has become virtually impossible to have the restriction relaxed.  In most cases, the answer is no before the documentation is ever submitted. 

 

A recent survey of the ACI-NA membership on this issue showed that a majority of all requests had been denied.  In most cases, the FAA has made it virtually impossible to prove that adequate safeguards are in place.  Perhaps more maddening to many airport operators is the fact that the parking restrictions remain in place while traffic is allowed to circle just a few feet from terminal buildings.

 

For airport operators, the issue boils down to local control.  Local authorities maintain responsibility for protecting public places such as shopping malls, sports stadiums and certain utility operations, for example.  Yet, they are being told in this instance that they are incapable of determining on their own whether or not they have adequate safeguards in place to protect the community they serve at the airport.  We urge the subcommittee to push the FAA and TSA to interpret the law as was intended by Congress.

 

Expediting Security-Related Airport Projects:  While virtually everyone agrees with the wisdom of quickly working to install access control equipment, fencing and other items aimed at enhancing security, there will inevitably be instances in which important security projects are delayed because of cumbersome environmental regulations.  As airport operators have learned all too well over the past decade in trying to proceed with important capacity-related projects, environmental rules often run contrary to the need for timely completion.  For that reason, we hope the TSA will work administratively to expedite environmental work for security-related projects.  We also ask the subcommittee to consider legislative changes along these lines if you have the opportunity to revisit the security law this year.  Flexibility will be key to bringing important projects on-line as quickly as possible. 

 

General Aviation/Cargo Security:  While the airport security bill did touch on important issues relating to general aviation and cargo security, it is clear that the TSA will soon be taking an active role in these areas.  Again, it is our hope that the Administration will draw upon the expertise of airports and general aviation and cargo interests to improve security at general aviation and cargo facilities.  On the general aviation side, AAAE has established a General Aviation Security Task Force comprised of airport operators, private pilots, general aviation and business aviation interests among others to develop a comprehensive approach to general aviation security.  We look forward to submitting that report to the TSA.     

 

Conclusion: 

 

In contemplating the difficult task of implementing the Aviation and Transportation Security law, it is clear that many more questions exist than answers.  As we move forward toward the goal of making the nation's air transportation system more safe, secure and efficient, it is clear that we must work together to tackle ongoing security challenges.  Decisions must be made collaboratively, quickly, and correctly.

 

Airports have been on the forefront of offering their assistance to the TSA and others, and we stand ready to serve as a partner to the federal government as the process moves forward.  We appreciate the continued oversight of the subcommittee in addressing many of the concerns we have raised here, and we look forward to working together on behalf of the travelling public.