Homeland Security

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW BAGGAGE EXPLOSIVE DETECTION LAW

 

Statement of Ian Hutcheson

Head of Group Security

BAA plc

 

7 December 2001

 

Chairman Mica, Congressman Oberstar, Members of the Sub-Committee

 

My name is Ian Hutcheson and I am the Head of Group Security of BAA plc whose business address is at 130 Wilton Road, London, SWIV 1LQ, England.

 

I appear before you today to discuss the experience of BAA plc and other UK Airport Operators in the installation of in line screening systems to achieve 100% screening of hold baggage.

 

BAA plc is a public company quoted on the London Stock Exchange and owns and operates seven airports in the United Kingdom through wholly owned subsidiary companies.  These airports are Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted serving London, and Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen airports in Scotland. The seventh airport is Southampton. Outside the UK, we have management contracts or stakes in 12 airports - Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, Harrisburg and Boston Logan in the USA, six in Australia, including Melbourne and Perth, Naples in Italy and Mauritius.

 

My present responsibilities cover a number of areas of aviation security and includes ensuring that all our airports in the UK comply with the National Aviation Security Programme determined by the United Kingdom Government.

 

In this statement I will briefly explain BAA's experience in developing and implementing hold baggage screening systems in the UK, our approach in relation to passenger and staff screening, access control, and the factors affecting performance by staff.

 

HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING ( CHECKED BAGGAGE) - AN OVERVIEW OF THE BAA APPROACH

 

Background

 

The introduction of Hold Baggage Screening to BAA's seven airports was a long and complex process from the initial research and development work in the early 1990s, through to the final completion of the system in June 1998.  The BAA experience of concourse screening systems ie setting up x-ray equipment prior to check-in, was that these led to unacceptable levels of congestion within a terminal building, a potential additional terrorist target, significant delay to the processing of passengers and an overall poor level of customer service.  The decision was, therefore, taken to develop Hold Baggage Screening systems within the baggage system itself.   BAA set out the objectives for the project as follows:

 

·       The HBS systems must be fail safe in operation.

·       The system would use inline smart x-ray screening machines to detect components of explosive devices.

·       The solution must be cost effective and provide value for money.

·       The system must allow for the introduction of upgrades and screening technology.

·       The system should not degrade the existing baggage system capacity and performance.

·       The system should be fit for its purpose and right first time.

·       The implementation of the system should not adversely affect the existing operation.

·       The system should provide an acceptable level of maintainability and life cycle costs.

 

The Project

 

The project to implement Hold Baggage Screening began with research and development activities during 1990-1992.   BAA worked with a number of manufacturers during this period, and implemented trials both within the operation, and off site.  The first operational trial of an inline baggage screening system was developed and implemented at Glasgow Airport in 1993.  The final part of the project to be completed was the Terminal 3 originating system, which was  commissioned in June 1998.  The overall costs of this project to the BAA were just over $300m across the seven airports.

 

 

The costs of implementing hold baggage screening can be broken down as follows:

·       building works -                                                      20%

·       baggage handling equipment and controls -          37%

·       mechanical and electrical -                                      7%

·       screening equipment -                                           21%

·       other -                                                                     15%

 

These figures clearly show that the cost of screening equipment represents only a small part of developing an inline solution.

 

Project Timescales

 

It has to be remembered that BAA developed the approach to Hold Baggage Screening virtually from scratch.  Alterations were made to the brief as parts of the system were trialled in line, and indeed the overall concept altered as concerns were raised over the reliability of explosives trace detection equipment in a Hold Baggage Screening process.  The most important factor was that these systems were introduced into existing airports, and involved a wholescale realignment of the baggage systems in  many cases.

 

The following are some typical time scales for implementation:

·       Heathrow T3 -                    30 months

·       Heathrow T1 -                    18 months

·       Heathrow T2 -                    9 months

·       Heathrow T3 transfers -     9 months

·       Southampton -                   2 months

 

These timescales assume the development of a design brief,  that a baggage handling contractor is available, that equipment is available from manufacturers, and includes overcoming issues of baggage integration, confidence trials and commissioning.  Some of these projects were extremely complex, and BAA continued to run the terminal buildings while these projects were implemented.  In Terminal 3 this involved two and a half years of night working. 

 

The BAA Baggage Design Team believe that it would be possible to progress from inception to completed baggage design within four months.  Completion of build will vary dependant on the size of system and the complexity of the operation.  Recent projects were completed at Stansted and Gatwick respectively.

 

Stansted -     Extension to building, installation of baggage belts, screening equipment  and control rooms to process up to 2,500 bags per hour.  Completed within twelve months (including design).

 

Gatwick -      Installed within existing building, linked to new check-in facilities, capable of screening 1,250 bags per hour.  Completed within six months.

 

Systems Design

 

The approach in the UK and BAA airports to screening hold baggage in line has been to take a 5 level approach as follows:

 

Level 1 -     100% of  bags are screened through an automated smart x-ray machines.

 

Level 2 -     the image of all bags rejected at level 1 by the x-ray machine are presented to an operator for scrutiny.  Operationally  30% of the bags screened at Level 1 are referred to Level 2.

 

Level 3 -     All bags which the Level 2 operator cannot clear, all mis-tracked bags and all bags rejected by the operator for picture quality reasons, are examined at a separate machine by another operator.  The operator is required to inspect the image of every bag presented at Level 3 and positively clear the bag.  Operationally this represents 3% of the bags that were screened at Level 2.

 

Level 4 -     Reconciliation of bags that contain items that cannot positively be cleared by the Level 3 operator but are not thought to contain an explosive device.  Less than 1% of the Level 3 throughput are referred to Level 4.

 

Level 5 -     Threat assessment by an assessment team of any bag thought to contain an explosive device.  Level 5 threat assessment is undertaken under 10 times per annum. 

 

BAA deploy Perkin Elmer Vivid machines at Level 1 / 2.  Level 3 machines will be either Perkin Elmer Vivid or Invision CTX, dependent on the perceived threat to airline operators  e.g. Heathrow Terminal Three deploys Invision at Level 3, whilst Terminal 1 UK deploys Vivid machines.

 

The systems described above require staff to man each x-ray monitor at Level 2 and Level 3.  The latest Perkin Elmer equipment allows the x-ray equipment to be "matrixed" i.e. staff numbers can be reduced as screen images are sent to operators regardless of their position within the screening room.  This allows for flexibility to match baggage flows throughout the day.

 

An alternative approach has been developed at Manchester Airport using fully automated Level 1 and 2 with the only decision making being at Level 3. This system is based on Perkin Elmer Vivid's at Level 1 and Invision CTX in automatic mode at Level 2, with an image being referred to Level 3.

 

The system choice is influenced by the hourly baggage throughput rate of the airport and careful consideration has to be given to the level of redundancy required (failsafe systems) and the capacity for future growth.  Any system will have to take account of out of gauge baggage, which cannot be screened through certified technology due to size.

 

Equipment  Capability

 

When designing a system three key issues must be taken into account; detection, throughput and reliability.  The question of detection capability is a matter for the regulating authority, however throughput, reliability and relative costs will influence a design appropriate for an airport. 

 

The throughput capability of the machines currently available for explosive detection screening vary by machine type and are dependant on the operating mode of the machine.  BAA's experience indicates that the following throughputs are achievable:

 

Perkin Elmer Vivid in Level 1 /2 operating mode - 1440 per hour

Perkin Elmer Vivid in Level 3 operating mode - throughput varies according to bag type and operator scrutiny time, but can comfortably manage the bags referred from Level 2.

 

CTX 5500 - These machines are operated in "show all bags - hold inside machine" mode, typical throughput ranges from 170 - 190 bags per hour.

 

All manufacturers can supply details of performance and the figures above are based on the BAA operating experience.

 

Accounting & Authorising of Hold Baggage for Carriage by Air (also known as Triple 'A'

 

The requirement to reconcile hold baggage with the passenger actually flying was introduced by the UK Government following the tragedy at Lockerbie.  This is an airline responsibility, and BAA worked with the airline community to introduce automated systems by 1998.  When passengers check in their hold baggage details are automatically relayed to the departure gate, and a further reconciliation takes place at the final boarding process.  Any piece of baggage travelling 'unaccompanied' must be subjected to special screening procedures (Level 3).

 

Passenger Profiling

 

The regulatory regime differs between the UK and US with the US applying special measures to targeted passengers (selectees) and the UK applying consistent security measures to all passengers.  System design might allow for the best of both worlds, with 'selectee' baggage automatically being referred to Level 3, along with other bags referred to that Level by the normal operation of the system.  This would inevitably build in additional cost (dependent on baggage throughput), but such costs could be minimised at the design stage.  United Airlines have developed software which could achieve this objective if desired.

 

PASSENGER & CABIN BAGGAGE SCREENING - OVERVIEW OF THE BAA APPROACH

 

Background

 

Passenger and cabin baggage screening at BAA Airports is carried out within a framework of requirements defined by the DTLR (Department of Transport, Local Government & The Regions).

Passengers present their travel documents at a ticket presentation point before being screened through a centralised search area and entering a sterile departure lounge.  Typically, these screening points will process anything from 1,500 to 3,000 passengers per hour, dependent on this size of the airport or terminal building.  From the departure lounge passengers proceed to gate rooms and the procedural checks before boarding their aircraft.

 

The archway metal detectors and x-ray machines used for screening passengers meet standards defined by the DTLR, and are operated within tolerances also defined by the regulator.  The procedures laid down by the National Aviation Security Programme require that all passengers that alarm the archway metal detector, and a percentage of  passengers selected at random, must be searched by hand.  Passengers are not allowed to be rescreened through the archway metal detector.

 

Carry on baggage is screened through x-ray equipment, and any bag rejected by the operator, and a random ratio, must be searched by hand.  Prior to April 2000 at least 20% of cabin baggage was searched by hand.

 

Trials of New Screening Methodology

 

In  April 2000 BAA (in partnership with the DTLR) embarked on a new screening process involving the use of Threat Image Protection (TIP) supported by explosives Trace Detection Equipment (TDE).  This new screening system has become known as the New Screening Methodology.  BAA approached these trials in a participative way with their own staff, involving the staff in the development of working procedures and protocols, and establishing the most appropriate layout and equipment for the successful implementation of this methodology.

 

Following the successful trial, BAA introduced TIP and TDE throughout the seven airports in the UK.

 

Benefits

 

BAA would contend that there is hard evidence to support that the New Screening Methodology brought about improvements in operational efficiency, customer service and detection capability.  In particular, TIP has provided the following benefits:

·       it has definitely improved operator concentration.

·       it has provided a process by which operators become familiar with the type of threats that they must detect.

·       the identification of training requirements are simplified.

·       performance of individuals and the overall operation can be monitored and tracked.

 

The New Screening Methodology leads to a targeted search of bags which the operator has identified, rather than the searching of bags to meet a random ratio.  The use of TDE and revised bag search techniques has led to a much more thorough approach to bag searching.

 

BAA has now successfully rolled out the New Screening Methodology to all its seven airports.  This has involved close liaison and participation of the staff representatives of our work force, and the next steps will be to link TIP performance to certification of screeners.  The results and trends monitored through TIP have been validated by a rigorous covert testing programme. 

 

Other Issues

 

BAA will be embarking on trials of the Quantum Magnetics Portal (Archway Metal Detector) with an operational trial due to start this month.  At the same time, BAA are reviewing the working layouts and arrangements of screening areas to develop the most cost effective and security effective model.

 

ACCESS CONTROL - AN OVERVIEW OF THE BAA APPROACH

 

All staff who wish to enter airside areas at BAA airports are required to hold an ID card, which can be electronically validated at the point of entry.  While referencing checks are carried out on all staff before ID cards are issued, the approach in the United Kingdom (regulated through the DTLR) is that all staff should be subject to the same screening standards as passengers entering similar areas.  Staff will generally enter airside areas through specified staff access points, and controls consisting of an electronic validation point, an archway metal detector, and an x-ray machine are in place at these access points.  The standards of screening for staff are exactly the same as those for passengers.

 

Access for airline crews is on the same basis.

 

Vehicles that enter airside areas are also validated using a pass system, and checks to screen the vehicles are made at dedicated control posts.  These checks involve in depth searches of specified areas of each vehicle on a random basis.

 

The key difference between the UK approach and that of many other countries is that staff are screened to the same standard as passengers when entering airside areas.  In many countries total reliance is placed on the holding of a valid ID, and, therefore, of the referencing and vetting procedures that are required before such an ID is issued.  Such as approach is fraught with difficulties given the typical working population of a large airport.

 

HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION SECURITY - BAA'S EXPERIENCE

 

The role of human factors in the aviation security operation involves many different aspects - all critical to the success of the operation.  Acquisition of the most up-to-date and efficient technology can be of limited use if some of the factors listed below are encountered.  The "human factor" can be the weakest link in the process, leading to a lapse in security.  

 

In addition to ongoing development in-house, BAA  co-operates with QinetiQ (formally a government research agency, recently privatised) in the Human Factors Programme, facilitated for the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR).  The outputs of this research is utilised to improve and develop processes on an ongoing basis. 

 

The Training Team

 

Heathrow Airport has a team of trainers who provide a "Centre of Excellence" for the BAA group - training standards and programmes are developed for all aspects of aviation security.  This method ensures that BAA meets the requirements of the Regulator, (the DTLR) and also provides a clear set of standards for monitoring and the audit process.

 

All trainers are recruited to an agreed set of competencies, both technical and behavioural, and an agreed induction programme, to enable a professional and consistent approach to learning and development.  In addition to the full time trainers,  a team of current security officers and supervisors are utilised as the "local trainers" - providing an "on-the-job" training resource to support the practical skills training carried out in the operation.

 

Selection of staff   

 

Selecting the right staff for the security duties is an essential "front end" to the process of effective training.  An effective process for recruitment, carried out by trained personnel, provides an appropriate resource for the trainers in the induction programme.  Selection testing is a necessary tool to assist the recruiter in assessing the competency of prospective candidates. The mix between interpersonal skills and skills relevant to the job is an important element.

 

BAA's recruitment process involves several stages: completion of an observation exercise, a spatial recognition test, completion of a written exercise (a question regarding customer service), a competency based interview and use of the OPQ profile as an indicator of personality traits.  Competencies used for the interview are contained in the security officers role profile:  customer focus, teamworking with others, communication skills, adaptability, drive and decisiveness. This role profile is used as a baseline for recruitment, training and performance management. The OPQ profile is a psychometric test which is used to provide information on the candidate against a "set profile" of  behaviour - key factors are self control, participative, flexible, detail conscious and resilient.  These elements provide information on the  potential behaviour of applicants with customers in the "front line". 

 

In addition, aspects such as physical fitness, and testing for colour blindness are routine checks, prior to employment.  A robust process for referencing is in operation: to carry out both the DTLR requirement of Counter Terrorist Checks and the full five year employment reference. Issues such as poor literacy skills, dyslexia, limited language skills may also require specific testing at the recruitment stage.        

 

Induction training

 

Induction programmes are approved by the DTLR, however the BAA programmes exceed the minimum standard required.  The training consists of both classroom based and operational based training with assessment carried out throughout the training process.  Candidates spend 1 day with Human Resources, 5 days in the classroom and a minimum of 8 days on the operational programme. The assessment process consists of a written questionnaire, a practical demonstration of a physical body search, a baggage search and completion of an x-ray image recognition test. This process is consistent across all BAA airports with an agreed pass mark for all elements.  All aspects of the assessment must be passed successfully prior to commencing employment.

 

After the initial classroom sessions, inductees work in the security operation, under the close guidance of the training team, who provide regular coaching and support throughout the programme.  All parts of the training are recorded and documented for inspection by the Regulator as required.

 

Refresher training

 

Refresher training is required to be carried out on an annual basis.  Currently a training needs analysis exercise is carried out to ensure that areas requiring development ie trends from covert test results, feedback from customers and security managers, is taken into account.  Trainers have moved away from a "blanket" course offer to a more focused programme based on individual needs.  Supervisory training is derived through the same process, with individual action plans linked to the more formal training courses. These programmes are under continuous development.

 

First line management 

 

Selection of supervisors for the first line management role is important, as is the clear definition of the role.  A good supervisor will provide sound leadership for the team of staff and manage the security operation effectively.  The role profile for these key individuals is focused on management competencies and the induction programme covers both technical and behavioural skills.  All supervisors attend a 4 day induction programme, followed by an operational training programme of 80 hours covering all the technical tasks and the monitoring process for which they are responsible on an ongoing basis. 

 

Quality Assurance  

 

Monitoring of aviation security standards is an ongoing activity, involving several different processes. Part of the front line supervisors role is to continually monitor standards and provide constructive feedback, however, there are other processes which complement this ongoing activity.

 

1.   Familiarisation programme - this is an ongoing "education" programme which is carried out by the "local training team" at the airports to show weapons, firearms, and IED's to security officers in the "live" operation.  In controlled conditions, items are placed in x-ray machines to demonstrate to staff and "familiarise" items which would not normally be seen on a regular basis.

 

2.   Covert testing programme - all BAA airports operate an internal covert testing programme, working to standard guidelines for operating the tests ie standard test pieces, agreed "placement areas" for test items.  Feedback on tests - whether positive or negative result - is provided for staff and supervisors in the area tested. Failure due to what is considered to be negligence, is dealt with as a disciplinary matter.  This testing is in addition to the tests carried out by the Regulator. 

 

3.   Threat Image Projection (TIP).  TIP has been successfully introduced into all passenger screening areas in BAA over the past year. The data compiled from TIP has provided trend analysis for areas ie by terminal, by airport across the group.  Further refinements to the process and the equipment are ongoing, with the next stages being to provide individual data and feedback.  The current trend information has enabled trainers to focus on specifics within the image recognition process.

 

4.   Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).  CCTV has been employed in BAA airports over the past few years as an additional tool for standards monitoring.  Video footage and "live" video is monitored by trained operators and supervisors to review the operation and provide feedback on performance.  Protocols regarding the operation, management and use of video have been produced which lead to professional use of the equipment, in line with legislation such as the Data Protection Act.

 

Learning and development  overview

 

BAA has recently introduced a corporate university concept, developing a programme of learning and development which is consistent across the BAA group.  The security training operation has developed this model over the past five years and continues to build and expand on these concepts. 

 

In addition to a set of behavioural competencies, a suite of technical competencies has also been designed, which assists with training needs analysis and the development of training plans for security staff.

 

Different methods of training delivery are continuously being trialed ie such as the use of computer based training, more delivery in the workplace. BAA uses computer based training for x-ray image recognition sessions, however, there are limitations to this methodology dependant on the sessions it is used for and the "PC literacy". The demonstration of body search in the live operation in refresher training, rather than in a classroom reduces duplication, and provides a direct opportunity for feedback and coaching.

 

The BAA performance management process provides a robust system of feedback through performance appraisal and regular reviews.  Individuals produce personal development plans, which are regularly monitored by line mangers - these plans must meet business needs as well as individual aspirations for development.    

             

Looking forward

 

Research carried out by QinetiQ over the past two years has provided information on shift working patterns ie design of rostas, teamwork and the role of supervision, and many other topics.  BAA has worked with the researchers and used the information to continuously develop training.  Currently, BAA are working with the DTLR to introduce certification for x-ray screeners in the UK, which will further enhance standards and the management of the operation.  The development of technology ie improvement of x-ray machines and an understanding of the best enhancements for operators to use, the presentation of "best image first" will all assist in the process.

 

Each of the key elements is important - selection, induction, refresher training and continuous monitoring - all supported by effective supervision.  The human factor can create a weak link in any of these areas.   

 

Conclusion

 

Mr Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.