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TABLE OF CONTENTS(Click on Section)

PURPOSE

BACKGROUND

WITNESSES

The purpose of this hearing is to review whether the FAA is deploying and fully utilizing the best available weapon and explosive detection technology.

Although the September 11th terrorist attack has focused attention on screeners, there has been a long-standing concern about the equipment they use. The concern is that the equipment is not state-of-the-art and is often not fully utilized.

Shortly after the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988, FAA issued a rule requiring airlines to purchase advanced technology to detect bombs in checked baggage. The best technology at the time was Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) machines. FAA purchased three TNA machines for testing from the only company that made them.

After testing the TNA machines at several airports, FAA realized the machine could only detect levels of explosives that were twice the amount that it believed destroyed Pan Am 103. The TNA machines were also expensive, very large, and extremely heavy making their deployment impractical. One of the recommendations of a 1990 Presidential Commission was that the FAA should not make further investments in TNA machines but instead aggressively research other detection systems.

In December 1994, the FAA awarded its first explosive detection certification to the CTX 5000. InVision, a company based in Foster City, California, makes this machine. Its workings are similar to that of a CAT Scan, as used in the health care industry. More recently, the FAA certified a similar machine made by L3 Communications. L3 has facilities in New York and Clearwater, Florida.

The explosion of TWA 800 in 1996 was at first thought to have been caused by a bomb. Many people were aware that there were explosive detection systems being used in the rest of the world that, while not certified by the FAA, might still be useful in detecting bombs before they made it aboard an aircraft. As a result, section 305 of the 1996 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act and the Gore Commission recommended the use of non-certified commercially available explosive detection equipment. The FAA responded by purchasing and deploying trace detection devices. These usually involve wiping a cloth or blowing air on a person or baggage to detect the presence of explosive residue.

According to the FAA, it has spent $441 million for the purchase of explosive detection systems. This includes both the trace detection and bulk detection (the CTX and the L3) products. One hundred forty-two bulk detection systems have been installed at 47 airports for 20 airlines. There are 22 systems still in a warehouse but the FAA claims that they will be installed in the next 2 months.

UNDERUTILIZATION OF EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEMS

Underutilization of Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), such as the CTX machine, has been a concern since their deployment began in 1997. In a 1998 report on Deployment of Explosives Detection Equipment, the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that for the first quarter of that year, 10 of the 11 CTX machines that they reviewed were screening fewer than 200 bags per day.

This rate is well below both the certified rate of 225 bags per hour per machine, and the effective mean capacity of 125 bags per hour per machine obtained in FAA field demonstrations. Using the effective mean capacity of 125 bags per hour, and conservatively assuming six hours use per day, the OIG estimated that each machine is capable of screening 750 bags per day.

In March 2000, the OIG testified before the Aviation Subcommittee that a comparison of quarterly performance statistics compiled on a per machine basis in 1998 and 1999 showed no significant increase in CTX average usage rates. The OIG compared the average number of bags screened daily by each CTX machine in 1998 to the number screened in 1999, as reported by the FAA, and found an average increase of only 20 bags per day per machine, from 223 in 1998, to 243 in 1999.

These low utilization rates reflect the lack of a requirement to screen more than the number of bags checked by "selectees." Selectees include (1) passengers selected by Computer-Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS); (2) passengers who cannot produce an approved form of identification; and (3) passengers unable to correctly answer the security questions required by the Air Carrier Standard Security Program. According to the OIG, prior to full implementation of CAPPS, the FAA expected a greater number of selectees than were actually identified by the system once it was in place. The OIG testified in March 2000 that, unless the number of CAPPS selectees is increased, or the air carriers agree to screen more than the minimum required number of bags, CTX machines will continue to be underused, which in turn could negatively affect the proficiency of screeners.

Section 6 of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-528, 114 Stat. 2521, November 22, 2000) required the airlines to increase their utilization of explosive detection equipment. The Act required that in addition to the baggage of passengers who were selected by the CAPPS profile, explosive detection equipment should also be used to examine passenger baggage that is randomly chosen. According to OIG staff, however, the latest data show that utilization rates remained low as recently as July 2001.

UNDERUTILIZATION OF EDS AFFECTS PROFICIENCY OF SCREENERS

According to a 1999 report by the National Research Council, "Underutilization poses a potential problem for the maintenance of operator skills, particularly the skills required for resolving false alarms, because underpracticed skills often deteriorate. At some [CTX] locations, the throughput rate has been so low that operators could even lose their skills for operating the equipment."

A 1999 OIG audit on security of checked baggage demonstrated that CTX screening personnel were not competent at operating the equipment. The OIG found that when CTX 5500's warned of a threat, the equipment operator did not look for or identify the threat object in a significant number of cases. In March 2000, the OIG testified that, during more recent testing by FAA, operators continued to fail a significant number of tests. According to the OIG, the failures primarily occurred because operators cleared the test bag without a search, even though the machine had alarmed.

On September 21, 2001, Department of Transportation Inspector General Kenneth Mead testified before the Aviation Subcommittee that the majority of CTX machines are still underused, and screeners' performance still needs improvement. Mr. Mead testified that, although the FAA has taken action to increase utilization of bulk explosives detection machines, the utilization goal chosen by the FAA was still too low.

THREAT IMAGE PROJECTION

One prerequisite to improving screener performance is the ability to reliably measure an individual screener's performance. The FAA, in cooperation with industry, has developed a technology, known as Threat Image Projection (TIP), to do that. TIP is a method for inserting the images of threat items into the stream of images seen by screeners. The TIP systems use two different methods for projection. One method, used with screening checkpoint x-ray machines, superimposes the image of a threat item onto the x-ray image of the actual passenger baggage being screened. The other method, used with CTX machines, projects a prefabricated image of an entire threat bag onto the monitor.

With TIP, screeners can see threats every few minutes, providing both quick feedback on performance, as well as motivation to stay alert. The response of the screeners is recorded for the purposes of performance measurement and training, providing the reliable and consistent measure of performance that is crucial to any effort to certify screening companies.

The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 directed FAA to certify screening companies and improve screener performance. FAA was prepared to issue its final rule on the Certification of Screening Companies during the week of September 10, 2001. However, following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, publication of the final rule was delayed to allow reevaluation of the certification requirements. The final rule is expected to require that TIP be used to measure the performance of individual screeners and screening companies. However, according to the OIG, the FAA still needs to establish standards for measuring screener performance based on a combination of TIP testing and actual field testing by the FAA.

In 1999, the FAA purchased 30 TIP Ready X-Ray (TRX) systems for evaluation in the field. The FAA began to purchase TRX systems in large numbers for deployment at Category X and Category 1 airports (i.e., the airports with the highest security risk) in the summer of 2000. Currently, there are 703 TRX systems installed at U.S. airports. More than half of these 703 units, including those at 15 of the 20 Category X airports, have the TIP feature activated. Within the next month or so, the FAA expects to finish activating the TIP feature on all units at Category X airports, which will bring the number of TIP-activated units to 475.

According to the FAA, the time lag between purchase of the TRX systems and activation of the TIP feature was caused by the time FAA took to develop standardized TIP training. The FAA began providing standardized training at Category X airports in April 2001. Prior to development of the standardized training course, each vendor supplied its own training course, which resulted in non-uniform training of uneven quality.

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, some have urged the immediate utilization of TIP on every TRX unit already deployed, and the acceleration of the deployment schedule for additional TRX systems to provide a consistent and high level of security at all airports.

OTHER TECHNOLOGIES

Because of budget constraints and a narrow definition of the threat, the U.S. has relied on transmission-only x-ray systems for screening carry-on baggage. Some have argued that a combination of technologies working in unison could significantly improve the ability of screeners to detect weapons and explosives. One such technology is Z Backscatter technology, developed by American Science and Engineering, Inc. (AS&E).

AS&E stated in testimony before the Subcommittee on September 25, 2001, that Backscatter is especially effective in the detection of explosives, composite weapons, plastics and drugs, while metallic objects such as conventional knives and firearms are often better visualized with transmission x-rays. AS&E argues that, without foreknowledge of the threat, it is most prudent to inspect baggage with systems that combine transmission with Backscatter x-ray images.

According to AS&E, its technology is used by the Capitol Police, the Department of State (for protection of embassies overseas), and more than 30 other federal agencies. The U.S. Air Force uses Z Backscatter systems to scan luggage and parcels on flights to and from our overseas military bases. U.S. Customs Service uses AS&E's equipment to examine baggage, mail, cargo and passengers arriving from international flights at U.S. airports. International governments with a high threat of terrorism use AS&E technology for the protection of airports, high-threat government facilities, and heads of state.

Dual view x-ray systems are another currently available technology that could improve detection of weapons and explosives at screening checkpoints. It has been said that persons familiar with the exact construction of a particular x-ray system can pack a bag to make a threat item difficult to recognize. Dual view systems providing two different views of each item could reduce this risk. These systems have not been deployed more widely due to their increased acquisition cost and reduced throughput rate resulting from the need for screeners to evaluate two images rather than one.