TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
COMMITTEE
AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE
ON
AIRPORT SECURITY
SEPTEMBER, 25, 2001
BY
PATRICIA A. FRIEND
INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT
ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AFL-CIO
1275 K STREET, NW, 5TH FLOOR
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
(202) 712-9799
My name is Patricia
A. Friend. I am proud to be a flight
attendant and the International President of the Association of Flight
Attendants, AFL-CIO. AFA represents 50,000 flight attendants at 26
carriers. Thank you for giving me the
opportunity to testify today at this important hearing on aviation
security.
I speak today as the
voice of the twenty-five flight attendants who lost their lives onboard the
hijacked aircraft on September 11. It
is now my responsibility as a flight attendant to speak for them - to tell you
today what they can no longer tell you, that they were on those airplanes that
day to just do their job, to protect the flying public. They are no longer here to tell you their
stories or to remind you of the crucial
role flight attendants have on the aircraft.
It is for them, and for all flight attendants, that I urge you to move
quickly on these improvements so necessary to ensure the safety and security of
our airline industry.
In the last two
weeks, we have read countless articles and heard countless stories about the
heroic deeds of fire fighters, police officers and passengers who risked their
lives and lost their lives on September 11th. Their actions were unquestionably
heroic. But we must not forget the
heroic flight attendants we lost that tragic day, some of whom, it is now being
reported, had their hands bound by the hijackers, their throats heartlessly
slit. Reports say that some of these
flight attendants, my colleagues, bravely made calls to provide critical
information toward identifying the evil people who perpetuated these vicious
acts. We must honor them and recognize
their sacrifices.
Flight attendants
are the front line safety personnel on aircraft. In the air, we are the fire fighters, the law enforcement agents,
the first aid responders, and the comforters to our passengers. On that Tuesday morning, all twenty-five of
the flight attendants onboard the United and American Airlines flights became
the last line of defense in protecting the cockpit. All twenty-five lost their lives in the performance of their
duties that fateful day.
Our heroes went to work that day with the
knowledge that they might be called upon to evacuate an aircraft in case of an
accident, as we are trained to do, or to assist with a medical emergency or
even restrain an abusive passenger. We
know, on that morning, that our heroes made sure their passengers were in their
seats with their seat belts fastened and their carry-on bags stowed. We know those flight attendants prepared the
cabin and conducted the pre-departure safety briefing as they always do. Yet, we can only imagine what horrors
happened next. We do know this was
nothing for which any of us have ever been trained.
While we may never know the exact chain of
events that occurred once the hijackers took over, we know with certainty that
these women and men did their best to protect their passengers and the security
of the cockpit. I am here today as the
only voice remaining to them, to implore you to make immediate, drastic and
permanent changes in airline security so our members= voices and commitment to
safety are heard and never lost. We
must move forward on important recommendations regarding fortifying the cockpit
door, increasing protections for pilots, federalizing the security screeners,
and increasing the role of federal marshals on the planes. But we must also take decisive action on
crucial safety recommendations to protect flight attendants and to help us do
our job. As flight attendants, we take
pride in our role as aviation safety professionals, and I appreciate the
opportunity to tell you, from the perspective of the front line safety and
security professionals on the aircraft, what needs to be done to make our skies
as safe as we know how.
Major deficiencies in our national aviation
security procedures allowed a determined group of terrorists to attack this
country and kill thousands of innocent civilians on September 11th. Tragically, most of these flaws have existed
for years. In fact, as I prepared for this hearing, I reviewed testimony given
by AFA to the President=s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism in
1989, almost 12 years ago. At that time, AFA recommended many of the same
changes that I am going to outline today.
It is my fervent wish that this horrible terrorist attack will finally
move Congress, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to act swiftly on these recommendations. It is my hope that my successors at AFA will
never have to testify on these same issues again, and that AFA=s flight
attendant members and our passengers will feel safe and secure as they prepare
to take their next flight.
In the immediate aftermath of the September
11th attacks, the FAA quickly issued multiple security directives to address
heightened security concerns. These directives, as an immediate response
to the tragedies were necessary and helpful, but much more must be done
to address other weaknesses in aircraft
cabin security in order to prevent another such a tragedy in the future. AFA
urges this Committee and the Congress to move forward on the following
recommendations to ensure that this industry is as safe as it can possibly be.
*First, it is paramount that flight
attendants training programs be updated and improved, and that a process for
certification be enacted to formalize and reinforce our role as safety professionals.
Today, the FAA requires carriers to provide minimum training on hijacking
situations. This training is grossly outdated and falls far short of addressing
the new reality that flight attendants are facing on the aircraft. The current ACommon
Strategy@ hijacker training includes showing flight attendants an outdated
video focusing on hijacking situations of the 1970s. It labors under the old scenario of a dissident hijacker who
wants to go to Cuba and emphasizes a negotiated resolution. That scenario no longer exists. The reality of September 11 shows times have
changed, and terrorist tactics have changed.
In order to address the current, real-world dangers that our members may
face onboard the aircraft, the training procedures must be updated to include
appropriate and effective responses to terrorism as it exists today. The
training should be realistic and should include options and recommendations for
maintaining the integrity of the cockpit.
The successful completion of training will be meaningless unless it is
recognized by a formal certification process for flight attendants, in order to
reinforce our role as safety professionals. Mandatory certification is the only
way to ensure that all flight attendants receive better training in all types
of emergency situations. As with other workers in the airline industry, flight
attendant certification and licensing would provide for tighter and more
stringent requirements, making infiltration of the airline system more
difficult.
*Strict limits for carry-on baggage must be
enforced. Reducing carry-on baggage by imposing a single standard that clearly
and strictly limits carry-on baggage is imperative and must be done
immediately. This is not a new concept. Five years ago, the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) established the Domestic Security Baseline Working
Group to review the threat of foreign terrorism within the United States. The
group considered the warning and interdiction capabilities of intelligence and
law enforcement, and examined the vulnerabilities of the domestic civil
aviation system -- in particular checked baggage and check-point screening.
They identified seven areas of aviation operations as being vulnerable,
including carry-on bags. The Committee specifically recommended that the FAA Aprescribe
uniform standards to restrict the size, type and amount of carry-on property
and provide for strict enforcement.@
Some of the members of this group included the National Security
Council, CIA, Department of Defense, The National Air Carrier Association, The
Regional Airline Association, U.S. Secret Service, Air Line Pilots Association
and The Air Transport Association. The
group supported all the recommendations listed in the final report.
AFA has long supported the need for a
standard rule to limit carry-on baggage. While we have stressed the safety and
health arguments for limiting bags, we have also testified before this
Committee on the security reasons for a carry-on baggage rule. Some may still
argue that the amount of carry-on baggage is not a security issue. However, in light of the attack on September
11th, there can be no longer be any doubt. Since at least the time of the Pan Am 103 bombing, the security
risks of checked baggage have been recognized. I will address issues regarding checked baggage later in my
remarks. But it is carry-on baggage that can pose a security risk in the
cabin, hiding bombs and potential weapons. The amount and size of carry-on
baggage is a security issue. There is no industry-wide limit on the
amount or size of carry-on baggage a passenger can bring onboard commercial
aircraft today. Because of the lack of sufficient limits on carry-on bags,
security screeners must check thousands of bags per day. It is inconceivable that these over-taxed
screeners have not overlooked weapons in carry-on items. It is clear that screeners are currently
examining far too many bags, some of which are extremely large, in too short a
time frame. This makes proper scanning difficult, if not impossible. As a result, screeners miss suspicious or
potentially dangerous items that could be used in an attack.
If Congress is serious about preventing
terrorists from bringing weapons onboard an aircraft, then you must take action
to immediately limit the amount and size of carry-on baggage.
*Congress must also provide funding for adequate
bomb detection and K-9 detection units at all major airports for use in routine
airport and aircraft bomb searches. A number of AFA carriers are making their
flight attendants, rampers, or aircraft cleaners responsible for searching the
aircraft for suspicious devices in order to comply with the new security
directives. To maximize safety and
security, law enforcement personnel should be responsible for all such
searches. If other employees are given
this responsibility, they must be trained and certified to do so
properly. Flight attendants are not the appropriate personnel for such searches
because we are not properly trained for such a task. Providing us with a
check-list of where to search in the cabin is a far cry from adequate bomb
detection training. It is crucial that
employees who will conduct such searches are adequately trained on the proper
procedures for cabin inspections. AFA is calling for funding to increase the number of airport K-9 units.
*AFA agrees with most Americans that we must
immediately federalize the airport security screening process. The jurisdiction
over security screeners must be handled by law enforcement experts at the
Department of Justice. It is crucial that the position of security screener be
treated as a law enforcement position. Today, screeners are poorly paid, poorly
trained, and as a result of the rapid turnover among the workforce are often
inexperienced at their jobs. A GAO
report from April 2000 shows that the turnover can range from an average of 100
percent a year at some airports to nearly 400 percent at other airports. Such
high attrition rates mean there are huge numbers of people who now are familiar
with how airport screening works. In order to achieve an efficient, effective
and competent airport security screening system, the system must be federalized
immediately with jurisdiction and responsibility for training turned over to
the Department of Justice.
*Definitive steps must be taken to secure the
aircraft cockpit, including new regulations to fortify the cockpit and limit
access. All current and future commercial aircraft must be retrofitted with
fortified cockpit doors. Training must be implemented so that pilots and flight
attendants are familiar with new procedures and the limited access procedures
that are to come.
*To ensure the safety of the crew and
passengers, it is essential that Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) are assigned to
domestic flights. We believe that plain-clothed federal marshals should be
mandated on domestic flights immediately.
These federal law enforcement officers, who are properly trained and
authorized federal agents, will enhance security aboard aircraft and help in
restoring confidence in air travel by a very concerned flying public.
*In order to guarantee safe flights, AFA
strongly believes we must address the issue of checked baggage. The FAA must
mandate that airlines increase the amount of checked baggage that is screened.
In addition, the airlines must expand positive baggage-passenger match to all
domestic flights. This will ensure that only the baggage belonging to
passengers who actually board aircraft is carried on that aircraft and that all
other Aunaccompanied@ bags are removed from the aircraft. Unless a bag is
positively matched to a passenger, it should be removed from the plane as a
potential security risk.
Baggage-passenger match was recommended in 1997 in the Final Report of
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. It is time we
finally move forward on this sensible security recommendation.
*In addition to a baggage-passenger match, it
is imperative that the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS)
be expanded for all domestic passengers as well as international
passengers. CAPPS needs to be linked to
other security and law enforcement agencies to ensure a comprehensive analysis
of all passengers.
*Finally, AFA supports FAA=s quick action
following last Tuesday=s attack to ban curbside and remote site check-in. This
is an important step to improve aircraft security; however, it is important
that all remote check-ins be banned. The ban should include disallowing
automated ticket check-in kiosks that permit a passenger to check-in, answer
security questions electronically and then receive a boarding pass. All this is
done without ever being positively identified by any airline or airport staff,
creating a potential weak link in the security system. AFA believes that it is
important that all passengers must check-in and show identification at staffed check-in
counters.
We at the Association of Flight Attendants
strongly believe that adoption of these crucial security procedures is critical
to building a truly secure and safe aviation environment. We must do everything
we can to protect flight attendants, and all airline employees and passengers
from future terrorist attacks. We must give them the training and the support
they need to perform their essential safety and security functions. Restoring
faith in air travel is paramount. We must be primarily concerned with the speed
and precision with which we accomplish these goals, and less concerned about
the costs involved. We must be totally focused on what needs to be done --
immediately -- to avoid another unthinkable tragedy.
It should be the legacy of the flight
attendants lost in this tragedy, and of all the innocent victims of the attack
on September 11th, that air travel is no longer a viable target for those
intent on destruction. Flight attendants
are on the front lines of airline security.
In the aircraft environment we must create, we will be the key security
defense between passengers and a terrorist hijacker. Every time we go to work on a commercial aircraft, we will know,
and our loved ones will know, that on
that day we may be called upon to put our lives on the line. Please listen to our voices. Provide us with these additional measures we know we need to make
our workplace safer and more secure. If
there is ever another terrorist incident -- and I pray that it never happens --
flight attendants will respond courageously.
It=s our job and our duty.
Please act now and do your part to save lives in the future.
I thank you again for the opportunity to
testify today and will answer any questions you may have.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
