Homeland Security

 Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Aviation

September 25, 2001

Jerry B. Epstein

Former President of the Board of Airport Commissioners for the City of Los Angeles

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, for giving me this opportunity to provide you with my views regarding airport security.

By way of introduction, I am a real estate developer from Los Angeles, California, who has tried to give something back to the country and community I love by serving on various local and state commissions for the past thirty years.  From 1985 to 1990, I served on the Board of Airport Commissioners for the City of Los Angeles, which runs four airports, including Los Angeles International Airport, better known as LAX.  From 1991 to 1997, I was a member of the California Transportation Commission, which oversees Caltrans and allocates all federal and state funds for highway and rail projects.  And, since 1997, I have sat on the California High-Speed Rail Authority, which is seeking to plan for high-speed rail between the Bay Area and Southern California.  For nearly three decades, therefore, my public activities have focused on the vital importance of the safe and convenient movement of people and goods.

It was during my years as a member of the Board of Airport Commissioners over a decade ago that I first tried to make decision-makers at the local and federal levels aware of the inadequacy of airport security at LAX and, indeed, throughout the United States.  Federal Aviation Administration reports since the mid-1990s have reported that undercover agents have been able to smuggle guns, hand grenades, and even bombs through screening machines and airline security guards.  For years the FAA has simply imposed modest, and generally secret, fines on the airlines-and then concealed the results from the public, ostensibly to prevent giving away  information to potential terrorists.  In January, 1999, I wrote an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times which concluded that

"We live in a dangerous age when acts of terrorism could threaten our sense of comfort and security in public places.  Airports are highly visible and, therefore, vulnerable.  We should not have to wait for a major tragedy to occur before appropriate measures are taken to protect both people and property."

There is an old adage that the traffic light doesn't go up on the corner until someone is killed.  Sadly, we are here today because, despite the warnings of many, our federal and local governments and airlines chose to ignore  the potential tragedy which has been waiting to happen for years.  And, now, we are faced with a grave crisis, with thousands dead, billions of dollars of damage, and an anxious and fearful people.

The government and the airlines have not wanted to bother passengers with, nor to pay for,  too much time-consuming security.    Today, I think we all agree we can no longer afford to risk passengers' safety. 

The thrust of my remarks here this morning is to impress upon you my heartfelt belief  that our security needs will only be resolved through the implementation of a national solution-the establishment of a trained special force whose members are identified, trained, and managed by one accountable agency.

Based upon my conversations with airport security experts and my own experience, I would humbly request that this distinguished committee and others consider the following approaches:

Every airport in the United States should be assessed and evaluated by security  professionals  and military experts to identify the security issues, including any specific potential threats, at each facility.  Professionals should develop a plan for each facility which states the kind of technological and human resources necessary required to make the airport safe.

Security tactics and strategy must be in place before take-off.  We need to focus our efforts to enhance airport security on four main areas of concern:  first, the perimeter of our airports; second, on our commercial aircraft; third, the Airfield Operations Area and tarmac; and, finally, at terminal passenger screening areas.

Most areas of our airports and their surroundings are continuously open to incursion by terrorists.  For example, grassy areas at the end of runways are seldom even patrolled by law enforcement.  We need more secure perimeter fencing to prevent untrammeled access to runways and to planes.  This fencing technology exists, and is presently used around many military installations, and should be, and can be, easily installed  around our airports.

The solutions for stepped-up security on our commercial planes are not complicated:  install stronger cockpit doors and require the presence of an undercover armed trained law enforcement officer on board.

Our tarmacs and runways are simply not adequately protected either.  Thousands of "security" badges are unaccounted for.  Disgruntled former or present employees, let alone scheming terrorists, can endanger planes without walking through a terminal checkpoint.  We need to be more thorough in background checks for airport personnel, as well as in the management of security arrangements at airports.  Random identification checks of the 600,000 people nationwide who hold badges at our airports isn't good enough.  All airline crews and ground workers ought to be required to pass through security checkpoints and detection equipment as well.  The number of operational access points to restricted terminal and ramp areas must be more effectively controlled and planes should be routinely inspected prior to boarding by FAA-certified K-9 explosive detection teams. 

Finally, there is much which can be done to improve airport security within terminals.  The FAA has been derelict in not compelling airlines to better train security personnel and airport authorities to buy more and better detection equipment.  Annual turnover among airport security staff is as high as 400% a year!  Despite the years of complaints, the FAA has failed to issue new requirements for the qualifications of, and training for, checkpoint screening personnel.  The first order of business ought to be the purchase and installation of state-of-the-art scanners.    Improved detection technology is readily available.

The more difficult public policy question is what to do about pre-boarding passenger screening.  To me, the logical answer is to federalize airport security.  While only a very few individuals come with criminal intent, most people who come to an airport are often anxious and harried.  Inexperienced and poorly trained minimum-wage workers cannot handle security; even most law enforcement personnel are not appropriately trained to handle the special circumstances of airport work.   As other countries do, so should the United States develop a special force trained to carry out airport security at our major airports.

For too long, the FAA has protected the private airlines, airport operators, and private security companies; our federal government's responsibility, first and foremost, should be  to protect the American people.

I leave it to you all to decide if it should be a branch of the United States Marshals Service or the National Guard, or some other new or existing military or law enforcement entity, but my point is that our security needs will only be resolved through the implementation of a national solution-the establishment of a trained special force whose members are identified, trained, and managed by one accountable agency.   Training and performance standards can be put in place, and monitored.  All airlines and all passengers should enjoy the same level of security.  And, intelligence information ought to be more easily shared between federal agencies than between the plethora of federal and local government agencies, as well as private firms, involved in the current disjointed airport security process.  

I am told that a federal takeover of airport passenger screening would require approximately 28,000 people and cost $1.8 billion a year.  When we look at the terrible human toll and almost incalculable financial cost of the September 11 terrorist attack, I think that number, however large, can be put into perspective.  The funds wisely invested in security can equal the security achieved.  It's an insurance policy of sorts the American people would be happy to pay for.  

I would argue the traveling public has already been paying special taxes and other charges for years which ought to be utilized for the improvements cited in my testimony. As a practical matter, it is simply unrealistic to expect financially-strapped airlines to pay the bill for enhanced security. Why is the federal government hoarding the billions in the Aviation Trust Fund if not to build perimeter fencing and other necessary infrastructure improvements at our nation's airports?  Why shouldn't the FAA and other appropriate agencies approve of the collection of Passenger Facility Charges at local airports to identify and implement other security measures?  Isn't this why these taxes and charges are called "user fees"?  

The American public is ready to be educated on how to use our airports safely.    We will understand that, if we want to be safe, we must accept new rules and to practice new habits once we step into the airline terminal.  Many of the emergency measures put into place at major airports in the last few weeks-allowing only ticketed passengers into gate areas, keeping passenger cars away from terminals, barring curbside check-in, for example-are probably not real or cost-effective deterrents, and may actually cause substantial unwarranted inconvenience for passengers.    The public will be willing to pay for a national solution which can be demonstrated  to be thorough, effective, and consistently implemented.

While I recognize we are all in a crisis mode at the present time, I also urge you to begin to pay more attention to the long-term implications for transportation generally, and for air travel more specifically, that may well be prompted by increased airport security.   Traveling by air is simply going to take more time.  Our nation's economic vitality is dependent upon the efficient movement of people and goods.  Thus, while it is not the subject of this hearing, I want to take this opportunity to urge you to consider what the rest of the world already knows, and what we in America are only just beginning to grasp:  that high-speed rail can be the most effective mode of transportation for trips of 400 miles or less.  Look at the increase in Amtrack passenger service in the Northeast since September 11.  A substantial  national investment in high-speed rail between nearby metropolitan markets would reduce the number of short flights and airline passengers, which in turn would alleviate traffic congestion on the ground and in the air, as well as ameliorate some of the security problems in, around, and above our nation's airports.  High-speed rail will not only move people and goods more quickly, it also makes environmental and economic sense.  

The American public is looking to the federal government, to you, for common sense, as well as for your collective vision and leadership.  For too long, the government has ignored, or even hid, the seriousness of the inadequacy of security procedures at our nation's airports.  Now, because of our current tragic crisis, there is an opportunity to upgrade and tighten security, and it shouldn't take, indeed it can't take, years to implement.  National security, the public's desire for safety, and the economy's current dire straits, all require the federal government's immediate, but thoughtful, attention.

Thank you for your time and consideration.