A STRATEGY FOR AVIATION SECURITY

TESTIMONY FOR THE HOUSE AVIATION SUBCOMMITTE OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE

by

Larry C. Johnson

Managing Director

The Business Exposure Reduction Group, LLC

Suite 800

2300 M Street, NW

Washington, DC  20037-1434
TESTIMONY OF LARRY C. JOHNSON BEFORE THE HOUSE AVIATION SUBCOMMITTE OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE

21 SEPTEMBER 2001

I thank the Chairman and members for the opportunity to appear today before this committee to discuss steps that should be taken to ensure our nation's aviation security system can deter current and future threats.  We are here today because of the horrific chain of events that started with the hijacking of four commercial airliners and ended with three suicide attacks and the crash of one plane as its heroic passengers and crew battled to regain control of the plane. 

As we look at the hijackings on September 11^th  many leaped to the initial conclusion that the system broke down.  Some assumed that hijackings occur because someone failed to do something, with immediate attention focused on the security companies that manned the security screening checkpoints at Logan and Dulles airports.  Yet subsequent reports indicate that the screeners did their job properly and only permitted items to go on the aircraft that were sanctioned by existing security standards.  If anything September 11^th was a failure of the regulatory system.

The events last Tuesday have more to do with knowledgeable terrorists taking advantage of gaps in the security system rather than a systemic breakdown.  The four hijackings on September 11 are consistent with a pattern observed worldwide since 1987-people who claim to have a knife or an explosive have hijacked most planes.  This shift coincided with the introduction of walk through metal detectors in airports around the world.  Scrutiny at a security-screening checkpoint cannot prevent such events.  All a person has to do is announce that they are hijacking a plane and, with something as innocuous as a fountain pen or a cylindrical tube, threaten the flight attendants, the pilots, and the passengers.

Last week's horrific events exposed the fallacy that security on board a plane depends in large measure on an assumption about human behavior-hijackers are not suicidal and are open to negotiations.  The flight crews last week acted in accordance with their training.   They did their jobs bravely.  Pilots and flight attendants are trained to handle hijackers in much the same way that a bank teller is taught to deal with a bank robber--cooperate, give them what they want, buy time, and, if you are lucky the police will come.  Furthermore we have assumed that hijackers will not fly or navigate a plane and that the pilot will remain in control of the craft.  We now know that these assumptions are invalid and that fuel filled planes can be transformed into human controlled cruise missiles. 

What can be done to prevent this from occurring again?  The first step requires a fundamental shift in how flight crews are taught to respond to hijack attempts.  Rather than cooperate and grant hijackers access to the cockpit, pilots must be taught to remain behind a locked door.  At a minimum, the door should withstand breaching attempts for at least five minutes.  I know of at least one company, which builds blast proof cargo containers, that has a prototype bulletproof/blastproof cockpit door available.  A hardened door gives pilots time to bring the aircraft down to an altitude that will minimize the risk of a catastrophic decompression in the event the skin of the aircraft is pierced.  They also can contact appropriate authorities and alert them to the incident.  Some have even suggested decompressing the aircraft voluntarily in order to incapacitate the hijacker or starting severe flight maneuvers that would make it difficult for a hijacker to remain standing.  Finally, pilots should have a last resort option of being able to open a lock box, remove a revolver and defend the plane from being taken over if a hijacker succeeds in getting thru the door.  We must ensure that the cockpit is as safe as Fort Knox.  

This step sounds extreme but offers the greatest chance of preventing a repeat of the events of last week.  Implementation will require that all pilots (and possibly flight crews) receive firearms instruction, demonstrate their proficiency once a year with the weapon, and visit a firing range once every three months.  This approach also requires that we may have to accept some casualties among flight attendant and passengers in order to save the plane and its occupants.

Fixing the aviation security system is really no mystery.  The problems and weaknesses have been highlighted in previous reports issued uner both Republican and Democrat administrations-the 1990 Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism and the 1997 Report on Aviation Safety and Security issued under the direction of Vice President Gore Commission.  We know what needs to be done.  Blame for lack of progress on this front can be assigned to many, but it is neither appropriate nor productive to look backwards and focus on finding scapegoats.  The time has come to look forward and take positive action.

The Congress, the Executive Branch, and the airline industry need to agree to do four things:

1.      Create and enforce one, clear, consistent security standard and practice.

2.      Put the Federal Government in charge of airport security.

3.      Replace security measures based on assumptions about human behavior with technology.

4.      Conduct continuous tests of the security system to ensure it is functioning as it should. 

HAVE ONE CLEAR SECURITY STANDARD

It appears that the hijackers exploited the difference between international and domestic security practices.  The current system operates under three different standards.  There are one set of fairly strict security procedures in place for international travel, a more lenient set in place for travel from high volume airports, and an even less stringent standard for travel from smaller airports.  The fact that the hijackers went after domestic flights, indicates they were aware that US sky marshals prior to September 11^th would only be found on an international flight.  The use of a different standard for domestic travel as compared to international travel created a security loophole.

In adopting a single, tough standard for aviation security it is important to recognize that there are international and diplomatic implications for these actions.  Security for airline passengers currently is handled in two arenas-one international and one national. Internationally security standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Annex 17, offers a least common denominator approach to security. While accepted internationally, these standards fall short of providing a tough set of measures that protect air carriers that have been targeted by terrorists. For countries like the United States, however, Annex 17 has been a starting point for security rather than the final destination.

The real action on security occurs at the national level. By law and by tradition, a nation has the right to set and enforce aviation security practices for their flag carriers, regardless of where they operate, and for foreign carriers that depart from its airports. In actual operation, however, these rights are not exercised equally. The United States, in particular, enjoys a substantial advantage in setting the standards and practices used for aviation security. Its influence is partly due to its market influence-a large number of passengers fly on U.S. flagged carriers and a large number of foreign carriers want to fly to the United States.

Two U.S. laws-the Foreign Airport Security Act of 1986 and more recently the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990-provide the legal foundation guiding how the U.S. carry out the aviation security mission, particularly overseas. Both laws recognize the principle that a country-in this case the United States-has the sovereign right to control who can land planes in its territory. The United States can set standards for any carrier that wants to land in the United States, although foreign carriers in the past have not been required to use the same security programs followed by U.S. flagged carriers. The legal framework also requires the U.S. Government to assess security at any foreign airport where U.S. carriers operate. In addition, the FAA monitors the overseas performance of security procedures such as adding personnel to screen passengers prior to allowing them on board a plane or requiring passengers to be screened with metal detectors before boarding a plane.

If the world consisted of only one nation the task of aviation security would be simple and straightforward. In the multinational world, however, aviation security involves more confusion than clarity. A U.S. carrier operating in the Germany, for instance, must carry out extraordinary procedures mandated by the FAA. Yet both Germany's federal government and the Hessian State Government control the U.S. air carriers operations at Frankfurt's international airport.

While the FAA can dictate the procedures U.S. flagged carriers U.S. must follow and penalize them with fines for lapses in security, its ability to monitor those procedures falls under the jurisdiction and laws of Germany. In addition, foreign flagged carriers flying to the United States claim that under Annex 17 the United States cannot compel them to impose tighter security procedures. The FAA can only require foreign carriers to implement higher standards if they are departing from a U.S. airport.

For many years the demands of operating in an international environment have generated friction between the FAA and U.S. air carriers. Prior to the bombing of Pan Am 103 U.S. air carriers complained regularly that they were being held accountable by the U.S. Government for implementing security procedures, but were on their own in securing the permission of the host government.

In the aftermath of Pan Am 103 the U.S. Government expanded its role in helping U.S. based air carriers resolve disputes with foreign authorities over implementing security procedures. For instance, U.S. air carriers operating in Great Britain and Germany in the spring of 1992 were co-located at check-in counters with Iran Air. Because of Iran's dubious status as a state sponsor of terrorism the carriers expressed fears that the Iranian airline officials, by virtue of their proximity, would gain knowledge about U.S. mandated security procedures. The U.S. State Department, agreeing that the carriers had a legitimate concern, interceded with British and German officials to provide a solution.

PUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN CHARGE OF AIRPORT SECURITY

We can no longer ignore the fact that aviation security is a national security issue.  Unfortunately, our present system treats aviation security as a shared responsibility of airline companies and local government authorities, with the Federal Government hovering in the background as a regulator and occasional overseer.  I do not believe that airlines or local authorities or the FAA deliberately have acted in bad faith or sacrificed security.  However, the existing security system has been shaped by political and economic considerations as well as security principles. 

Consider, for example, the issue of security screening.  The GAO as well as several news organizations has documented repeated instances over the last several years of inadequate and unprofessional screening at airport security checkpoints.  The problems include checkpoints staffed with people who are generally underpaid and ill-trained, a high turnover in personnel, employment of non-US citizens in security positions and no requirement to hold any kind of security clearance.

The division of responsibility at local airports for other security operations, such as controlling access to the AOA and the activities of third party vendors on site create additional loopholes that can and have been exploited by criminals and terrorists.  By putting the Federal Government in charge of all security operations at an airport we will at least create a structure that can be held accountable.  The current situation, as detailed in the various Executive Branch and GAO reports over the last 11 years, makes it very clear that when everyone shares some responsibility then no one is ultimately accountable or in charge.  We need to break the linkage that currently exists between the commercial imperatives driving the airlines and the responsibility for managing and designing aviation security.  Governments, not businesses, must be responsible for designing, implementing and monitoring security at airports and on airlines.

RELYING ON TECHNOLOGY

We can no longer afford to rely on assumptions about human behavior as critical security measures.  Besides the hijacking procedures discussed earlier, we also rely on the belief that a passenger will not put a bomb in their checked luggage and get on board a plane.  This assumption is the basis for the security procedure known as positive passenger bag match.  Last week's events provide a clarion call that we can no longer trust terrorists to protect their own lives much less their hostages while in control of a plane or while on board a plane. 

Rather than rely on assumptions we must use existing technology and expand research and development into developing engineered systems.  To prevent a bomb from getting on board a plane we must ensure that every bag is subjected to inspection by an explosive detection system.  Bomb sniffing dogs offer some benefit but are not suited for the drudgery of looking through thousands of bags for a deadly needle in the haystack.   

Technology in tandem with human operators must play a critical role in protection commercial aviation.  When new technology is introduced it changes how criminals or terrorists operate.  Consider what happened following the worldwide the introduction of walk thru metal detectors; the number of hijackings with firearms fell dramatically. 

The 1997 Gore Commission report recommended the following steps:

3.1 The federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and provide funding for capital improvements.

3.4 The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and work with industry to develop new initiatives in this area.

3.5 The FAA should establish a security system that will provide a high level of protection for all aviation information systems.

3.7 The FAA should work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all passengers are positively identified and complete security procedures before they board aircraft.

3.14 Deploy existing technology.

3.15 Establish a joint government-industry research and development program.

3.18 Complement technology with automated passenger profiling.

These recommendations have not yet been fully implemented.  Most airports in the country do not have explosive detection systems deployed.  We have the ability to put an encoded picture of passengers on tickets and verify that people boarding the plane are the ones who are supposed to be on board.

TEST AND TWEAK THE SECURITY SYSTEM

The real challenge comes when the memory of the horrific events of September 11^th begin to fade.  It is human nature to become complacent.  The reality of terrorism is that it tends to be very infrequent.  Heightened security measures in the past have been resisted by the airline industry on the grounds that the threat is exaggerated.  We need to change the debate.  We must recognize that it is almost impossible to predict when a person or a group will launch a terrible attack.  And, if the system is designed properly, there will be few attacks.  If we go for a prolonged period with no attacks we may be tempted to believe that security is to onerous.  The only thing I am certain of is that we will face future surprises.  But that should not lead to the conclusion that we must sit by idly awaiting a grim fate.  To the contrary, we know from experience that countermeasures are effective in deterring and preventing attacks.

Our challenge is to remain alert when nothing is going on and no threat appears imminent.  We also must remember that technology alone cannot solve the problem.  It requires an integrated systems approach that incorporates machines and people.  If we accept this reality it is paramount to monitor and test the system to ensure it is capable of protecting commercial aviation. 

NEXT STEPS TO A SECURE FUTURE

In 1995 Doug Laird, the former security director of Northwest Airlines, and I wrote the following for Security Management Magazine:

We are entering a new era of aviation security that will change how airlines and airports do business and how you travel. While the adjustments may not be easy, particularly in the beginning, we believe the results will make traveling by air more safe in the long run. The choice before the United States Government is whether or not it wants to strengthen its ability to prevent terrorist acts against civil aviation.

Because U.S. aviation is a high profile target of terrorist threats, and since commercial aviation plays an important role in supporting national defense, the federal government should treat aviation security as part of a national defense strategy. U.S. flagged carriers are targeted by terrorists because they have the U.S. flag on their tails. They are surrogate targets. And U.S. commercial air carriers play a key role in U.S. military operations, assisting in the transport of troops or material during national crises. It is, therefore, reasonable for the federal government to view protecting commercial aviation as a national security issue.

These words were true then and remain valid for today.  Let me close by reiterating that we know what to do.  The challenge is to find the will and to devote the resources necessary to accomplish these objectives.