Terrorism: Threat Assessment in a Changing Global Environment
Statement of Raphael Perl, Specialist in International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, July 26, 2000.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee.
In my capacity as a specialist at the Congressional Research Service [CRS], I welcome the opportunity to appear here today to address the issue of Combating Terrorism: Assessing Threats, Risk Management, and Establishing Priorities.
Introduction
Terrorism threat assessment is integrally linked to dramatic changes taking place in the global economy and its technology infrastructure. These changes may directly influence and effect terrorist goals, tactics, organizations and weaponry. As the United States grows stronger, economically, politically, and militarily, our enemies may be tempted even more to attack our nation with asymmetric weaponry.
The evolving threat raises important issues regarding the structure, organization, preparedness and ability of governments to respond effectively to threats which have been characterized by some as more dangerous, diffuse, and difficult to prevent. Central to policy formulation and implementation are issues of centralization of leadership-centralization of the threat assessment process, centralization and coordination of policy planning, coordination and implementation, and accountability to Congress. Coordination of counterterrorism efforts also involves non-conventional and preemptive activities within existing policy constraints.
The way the government deals with issues, defines problems, and is structurally organized to deal with them, can have a strong impact on threat assessment, policy planning and implementation, and allocation of resources. Structures and mindsets that have been successful in one time period in history may be less successful in others. We must ask ourselves- does the way we look at the problem reflect the realities of today's world?
There is no universally accepted interagency definition of terrorism in law. Terrorism is defined in law differently in different contexts. To some degree governments have established an artificial compartmentalized way of looking at terrorism as a phenomenon distinct and separate in and of itself. There was much to be said for this in past years, but perhaps, in today's rapidly changing, more fluid and interconnected environment, our approaches should be reexamined. What some have characterized as a new and growing opportunistic relationship between terrorism and organized crime could well result in an increased role of law enforcement in terrorist threat assessment and a need for readjustment of concepts, responsibilities and capabilities, and methodologies. A central characteristic used to distinguish terrorism from common crime is the willingness of terrorists to go after often random innocent targets without limit for some greater cause.
It may well be that a trend is emerging where the magnitude of the threat and "pain" factor of the act, and not the motivation behind it, defines terrorism as a practical matter. The greater damage or trauma an act or threat can cause- the greater the level of shock, panic and fear it can instill- the more likely it may be viewed by the public and in the policy community as terrorism.
Many have argued the need to better prioritize, focus, and target resources for combatting terrorism. In this regard, the recently released report of the congressionally mandated National Commission on Terrorism recommends that: "The President and Congress should reform the system for reviewing and funding departmental counterterrorism programs to ensure that the activities and programs of various agencies are part of a comprehensive plan." The Commission recommends that: "The executive branch official responsible for coordinating counterterrorism efforts across the government should be given a stronger hand in the budget process." The Commission recommends as well that "Congress should develop mechanisms for a comprehensive review of the President's counterterrorism policy and budget."
My remarks are divided into five parts. First, I review developments taking place in the global environment which impact on terrorist activity and the government's response. Second, I will discuss emerging threats. Third, I will describe how the federal government is structured to respond to the threat of terrorism. Fourth, I will look at the "drug czar" policy coordinating model which some have suggested may have features transferable from the counterdrug arena to the counterterrorism arena. I will then discuss some challenges facing the counterterrorism community.
Globalization's Impact on Terrorist Operations and Government Responses.
In the United States addressing terrorist threats and government responses often involves tension between-or balancing of -civil liberties and effective detection of, and response to terrorist threats or acts.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, ancient hatreds and modern hostilities that were submerged or frozen during the cold war are asserting themselves. Volatile areas include the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. One force in particular, radical Islamist movements, is of rising concern as a source spawning terrorist groups. In an expanding information age, information about weapons and tactics becomes widely available to terrorists.
The world is changing in other ways, too. The global economy is bringing trends towards deregulation, open borders, and enhanced movement of people, goods, and services. We are witnessing the spread of (1) democracy; (2) capitalism and free trade; and (3) global access to information and new technologies. This globalization facilitates the ability of individual terrorists, terrorist groups, and support networks to operate in a relatively unregulated environment. The development of the world economy and modern communications systems have made it possible for small groups and even private individuals to fund terrorism at a level possible previously only to states.
Today's terrorism does not constitute military power. Terrorism is assessed as posing only a small direct threat to our national survival, but its impact over time on U.S. foreign policy interests and U.S. national security may be far greater. Domestically, successful terrorist acts could erode the public's faith in the government's ability to provide a fundamental service: security and protection for its citizens.
In formulating threat assessments, experts look beyond the immediate impacts of such tragedies as the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa to how terrorism and the threat of terrorism affects our actions in the longer run. International terrorists seek to undermine what the renowned military strategist, Clausewitz, called our "center of gravity." In this case, our national will to stay committed in world affairs.
To some degree other societies, such as Israel, Ireland, Peru and Colombia, have learned to live with casualties from terrorism. But each society decides for itself. For example, we in the United States have also learned to live with violence and casualties in some contexts. In 1998 we had more than 41,000 deaths nationwide ascribed to traffic accidents and more than 17,000 murders. In other instances, even a small number of casualties can have major policy consequences. For example, when 18 U.S. Army rangers in Somalia were killed, we pulled out, creating what some critics see as a poor precedent and a damaging image for U.S. foreign policy.
An important question is: to what degree does terrorism undermine our will, or ability to be an active leader in international affairs? The fact is that in the post cold war era U.S. national interests in a region may not be crystal clear. Thus, public support for U.S. engagement may be weak. Our participation in international coalitions is particularly controversial and force protection is an integral component of mission success. A case in point is the U.S. peacekeeping presence in Lebanon during the 1980's which was withdrawn after terrorists blew up the U.S. marine barracks there.
Our policy makers now face a dilemma. Some national leaders make the case that the acceptable level of terrorism against the United States is zero. However, as a practical matter, we cannot be strong everywhere, and the determined terrorist will always have some opportunity to create a newsworthy incident.
The availability of weapons and weapons delivery systems has historically had a profound impact on the political, social and physical structure of societies. Today we see dramatic changes in potentially available highly destructive weapons systems.
Speed and coordination of operations are essential to both terrorists and counterterrorist organizations. Many of the advantages historically available to counterterrorist forces-even those with large resources- are potentially neutralized by instantaneous secure communications available to terrorists through the internet and other technology.
Although the response to terrorism will always have a strong and growing law enforcement component, many believe that terrorism is increasingly assuming a national security dimension. Some argue that never before in history has information and technology to harm so many been so readily available worldwide. They see as unprecedented the challenge to defend against deadly weapons systems and discover those responsible for their use. Never before has the threat been so diffuse and difficult to define, manage, and contain, they argue. Others see this concern as highly exaggerated. They argue against the practicality of committing substantial resources to defend against "speculative," "low probability" threats, even should the negative consequences of any such successful terrorist acts be high.
Terrorist Threat Is Changing as Is Our Perception of It
Insurgency and limited guerilla warfare were threats that characterized the cold war environment. Terrorism may become a major threat that characterizes the post cold war environment. Terrorism is a threat that many believe we are likely to see more-- and not less-- of. And as we move into the twenty-first century, the terrorist has better weapons against a more vulnerable world.
A number of assumptions, right or wrong, appear to underlie community thinking on threat assessment. Included are, first, that threat assessment must focus more immediately on non-state actors as this is where the real threat currently emanates. Second, that the near-term potential for use of weapons of mass destruction by such groups or individuals is low, but, if employed, chemical weapons would be a likely choice of agents; and third, that if biological agents are employed, they are likely to be employed against humans --not agricultural crops or livestock--and to be deadly agents (e.g., anthrax) and not agents designed to wear down a nation or to test delivery/dissemination systems (e.g., flu).
A growing concern is that, in the wake of a growing number of future anonymous terrorist acts, authorities may be unable to quickly and definitively assign responsibility, thereby neutralizing any deterrent effect prosecution or military retaliation or economic sanctions may hold. Another concern is that terrorists, through cybertechnology, will at some point attempt to damage U.S. critical infrastructure. Many analysts worry that that the magnitude of catastrophic terrorism could reach a degree where a lead military role would be required necessitating the need for advance planning for contingencies where targets may be hard to anticipate.
Another area worthy of further exploration is what are the unintended consequences of our counterterrorism assumptions and policies. By hardening military targets and embassies overseas, will U.S. commercial sites or residential sites become more likely targets; by telling terrorists who thus far have been using bombs and bullets, that we expect catastrophic terrorism by exotic agents, are we encouraging such activity; and by telling states that we see the threat shifting to non-state sponsors-could we be encouraging clandestine state- sponsored activity?
For half a century, the U.S. perceived the threat of terrorism first and foremost as an overseas issue. Today, this appears to be changing especially with incidents such as the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York.
For a third of a century, we were able to link international terrorism to sponsorship of specific groups by foreign nations. Today, we see a new breed of terrorist: one who does not work for any established organization and who is not known to be an agent of any particular state sponsor.
In the past, terrorism was viewed as politically motivated. Today, religious, ethnic, and national motivations and beliefs, not subject to compromise or negotiation, form the basis of an increasing number of terrorist acts against U.S. personnel, property, and interests. In the future, we may also see more instances of economically motivated terrorism--so called "terrorism for profit".
Traditionally, terrorism has been seen as physical violence, causing death, destruction and fear by guns and bombs. In the future, additional, more-sophisticated forms of destruction such as computer virus system sabotage and extortion are possible.
Traditionally, the immediate aim of terrorist acts was often to gain publicity for the terrorist's cause. Terrorists were quick to claim public responsibility. Today, more terrorists seek to remain anonymous. Inflicting pain on the "enemy" seems often to be the terrorists' goal, rather than drawing publicity to a cause.
Also, traditionally, the terrorist relied on elementary weapons and explosives technology, causing relatively small-scale destruction. Today, some see access by terrorist groups to advanced explosives technology, and access to chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear technology that could raise casualty levels substantially as a real possibility.
Today, simply by implied threats, terrorists can cause the expenditure of hundreds of million dollars by governments. On the other hand, ignoring threats by groups that have engaged in terrorism is generally thought not to be an acceptable policy option.
Federal Counterterrorism Response Structures
The federal counterterrorism response structure has been well documented by the General Accounting Office [GAO] in its September 1997 study on Federal Agencies Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy and by CRS, among other places, in its internal electronic web page briefing book for Congress.
In brief: The chain of command on anti-terrorism planning runs from the President through the National Security Council (NSC), a representative of which chairs a senior interagency Terrorism Security Group (TSG). The State Department is designated the lead agency for countering terrorism overseas; the Justice Department's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for domestic terrorism; and the Federal Aviation Administration is the lead for hijackings when a plane's doors are closed. These roles were reaffirmed by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) No. 39 in June 1995. PDD 62 (Protection Against Unconventional Threats) and PDD 63 (Critical Infrastructure Protection) of May 22, 1998: (1) established within the NSC a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism who also provides "advice" regarding the counterterrorism budget; (2) established within the NSC two Senior Directors who report to the National Coordinator--one for infrastructure protection and one for counterterrorism; (3) established a new inter-agency working group primarily focused on domestic preparedness for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents; and (4) laid out the architecture for critical infrastructure protection. Intelligence information is coordinated by an Intelligence Committee, chaired by a representative of the CIA.
An informal NSC chaired teleconference on threat assessment takes place usually twice a week at the Assistant Secretary level. Representatives from the Department of State, the FBI, and the CIA are regular participants. Interagency data exchange on threat advisories is accomplished by a data base and classified communications system linking key analysts in the intelligence community.
Looking at some foreign organizational models, at least six countries studied-Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom-share common structural elements in their approach to terrorism.
These include: (1) centralization of decisionmaking (i.e., one lead ministry) with coordinating mechanisms; (2) guidelines for clear designation of agency in charge during a terrorist incident; (3) strategies with a strong intelligence component; and (4) executive branch oversight mechanisms. Resource allocations are targeted generally at likely threats rather than potential vulnerabilities and the trend is for nations generally to rely on existing capabilities, mechanisms, and programs rather than to create new ones.
Unlike the concept of jointness of command built into the U.S. national military establishment, the civilian side of the U.S. government functions more as a hierarchy of committees. Each agency has a clearly defined separate piece of the action and at the end of the day a final product is put together that works well. Efficiency, however, may break down when interdisciplinary issues are involved and in today's global technological, information-age issues that were traditionally separated are increasingly intertwined.
In this regard, an important question arises: Is the executive branch properly structured to put together an integrated threat driven counterterrorism strategy? How best does one achieve desired levels of leadership, cooperation, coordination, and accountability? A major challenge facing those tasked with counterterrorism threat assessment and planning is not to lose the creativity, spontaneity, and boldness of individual agency threat assessments. Should domestic terrorism grow, the number of agency programs brought into the process to respond to the threat or its aftermath can be expected to grow as well, even further complicating efforts at strategy integration.
In the interagency process, critics argue that being a team player is a prized and encouraged value. Creative dissent is not. In the interagency process, they believe that negotiation, compromise, and a homogenized least common denominator rule. In the interagency process, the perspectives of a small agency with limited political clout may easily be overlooked. Many see the alternative as a more centralized approach. While potential shortfalls are also inherent in centralized power structures, internal structural obstacles to decisive action are generally not among them.
On the other hand, consensus is far from inherently a negative phenomenon. The interagency process for counterterrorism threat assessment and counterterrorism policy formulation has advantages. Whether accepted or not, all relevant data is reviewed and exchanged, working relationships among personnel are developed, appreciation and understanding of sister agency missions and viewpoints are enhanced, dissent to written products is allowed in the form of footnotes, mechanisms for higher level policy disputes resolution are in place, and in instances where the process is directed from the White House, prompt and strong decisionmaking is more readily implemented.
The "Drug Czar" Model
Some experts have looked to the "Drug Czar" model in seeking to reform government structures to fight terrorism. Counternarcotics efforts have forced local, state and federal agencies to build operable, cooperative, inter-agency relationships. The need to build and maximize similar relationships to deal with terrorism exists and some have suggested that the "drug czar" [White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)] model may have applicability to the counterterrorism arena. Legislation is currently before Congress on this issue [H.R. 4210].
Drugs and terrorism are both multifaceted and interdisciplinary issues. They cut across traditional bureaucratic and subject jurisdictions and structures. Both drugs and terrorism have strong national security and law enforcement components, they have military components, border control components, economic and trade components, medical components, and agricultural components. Today there are some 50 federal agencies with some degree of counterdrug responsibilities and at least 12 federal agencies with important counterterrorism responsibilities.
Drug trafficking and terrorism are illegal clandestine activities with strong national security and law enforcement threat components and operational similarities. Terrorists, like drug traffickers, need weapons and engage in violence to achieve goals. Terrorists, like drug traffickers, are often involved in hiding and laundering sources of funds. Both terrorists and drug traffickers operate transnationally and often get logistical and operational support from local ethnic satellite communities. Both groups often rely on the criminal community for support: they may need smuggled weapons, forged documents and safe houses to operate effectively. Finally, both groups need a steady cash flow to operate. In the case of terrorists, where state sources of funding are rapidly diminishing, drug trafficking is an attractive funding option. Increasingly, terrorist organizations are looking to criminal activity and specifically the drug trade as a source of funding. The FARC in Colombia are but one of many cases in point.
Differences exist, however, between drugs and terrorism. The drug trade has a strong demand component. In contrast, there is no addiction-based international demand for terrorism. Profit drives the drug trade. Terrorists do need money to operate, but for the terrorist, funding generally is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Political ideology, radical religious viewpoints, alienation, or revenge, and not a desire for financial profit, usually drive terrorist activity.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy, the so-called "drug czar's" office, is a coordinating office in the Executive Office of the President established by Congress in 1988 by P.L. 100-690. The office is charged with: (1) establishing policies, objectives, and priorities for the national drug control program; (2) promulgating a National Drug Control Strategy; (3) coordinating agency implementation of the strategy; and (4) developing [with the advice of the program managers of agencies] a consolidated national drug control budget proposal to implement the strategy which shall be transmitted to the President and Congress.
The Office is unique in the federal bureaucracy in its merging of international and domestic responsibilities in bringing together the law enforcement, intelligence, foreign policy/national security policy, and domestic health communities-all of which are components of the counterterrorism community as well. Although the office is a policy office without an operational mandate, it does provide policy direction to operations. This is accomplished through the budget process in the form of planning guidance and recommendations on how to prepare for existing and emerging threats. By exercising its budget process review role, ONDCP performs budgetary integration of the operational aspect of interdiction activities of such agencies as the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Departments of Defense and State.
The Director of the Office, though not a formal statutory voting member of the NSC, as the President's key drug policy adviser, is the principal adviser to the NSC on national drug control policy [E.O. 12280]. The Director also chairs an interagency working group (IWG) on international counternarcotics policy charged with ensuring development and coordination of such policy. Other agencies are required by law to provide ONDCP, upon the request of the Director, with such information as may be required for drug control and the Director of Central Intelligence is specifically required by law to render full assistance and support to ONDCP.
The Director's budget certification power-although often unpopular with individual agencies-wields considerable clout in terms of policy input and integration. In preparing the National Strategy, ONDCP staff, in consultation with agency personnel who are often detailed to ONDCP, define the mission and the threat in terms of needs, goals and objectives. Targets and measures of effectiveness [MOE's] are established. ONDCP annually provides agencies with policy initiatives which reflect the goals and objectives of the strategy which are presumably threat driven and which ONDCP would like to see reflected in agency budgetary priorities. Agencies respond with individual budget packages which the Director may certify as adequate to accomplish the strategy's goals and objectives. If certified, the budget goes to the President. If decertified, the agency resubmits to ONDCP. The process for resolution of disagreements usually involves OMB, the White House Chief of Staff, and the Director. If not resolved, a meeting with the President, the Agency Head, an OMB representative, and the Director is scheduled. Reportedly, the last five meetings of this nature have been resolved in favor of ONDCP's position.
Supporters of strong drug czar concept find favor in the current structure in that it permits the Director to serves as both a national and international Administration spokesperson on drug policy issues. From the congressional viewpoint, an attractive component of the drug czar model is accountability to Congress. Unlike the current counter terrorism policy/leadership structure under NSC direction, the Drug Czar is confirmed by Congress and testifies regularly before congressional committees. Moreover, when Congress reauthorized ONDCP in 1988, it enacted specific targets that the drug strategy was required to meet. Congress could consider setting targets for counterrorism policy if it deemed this an effective approach. For those who favor a centralized coordination/control drug policy model, the Drug Czar's budget certification authority, an authority not shared by NSC staff, is seen as a favorable asset. A Director with a strong personality and strong backing from a President has been said to command the respect of a "500 pound gorilla" in the interagency community.
Others, however, suggest that the effectiveness of the drug czar's office in integrating the diverse and multifaceted federal counterdrug community has been mixed at best. Also, in a "czar" type structure, perhaps more so than in other bureaucratic structures, changes in leadership could significantly impair or enhance the effectiveness of a national leadership effort. Nevertheless, this area is one that might be further explored as Congress considers alternative approaches to dealing with terrorism.
Challenges for the Counterterrorism Policy Community
A substantial challenge lies ahead for the counterterrorism policy community. In past years, when terrorism was largely the product of direct state sponsorship, policymakers were able to diminish prospects for the United States becoming a target by exercising a credible deterrent on potential state sponsors. Today, however, many terrorist organizations and individuals appear to act independently from former and present state sponsors, thereby diluting our ability to deter them. On the other hand, without support structure implied by state support, this threat may be much less formidable.
There appears to be an increasing tendency to limit the presence of U.S. personnel overseas at a time when constraining the threat of terrorism may require a significant increase in overseas presence of law enforcement and intelligence assets.
Some have suggested that policy planners need to incorporate factors relating to the impact of terrorist incidents or campaigns, not only into the domestic policy equation, but also into the foreign and defense policy equation. Some view mechanisms such as the Defense Department's [DoD's] "bottom-up" review as providing possible vehicles for organizing, funding, and training for antiterrorism and counter-terrorism related missions. They believe that potential contributions from such institutions as our nation's nuclear weapons laboratories to terrorism threat analysis might be more fully explored.
A continuing need is seen to sustain a credible deterrent against potential state sponsors, but also important, appears to be the need to develop and sustain an increasingly proactive deterrent against terrorist groups and individuals operating independently. Developing deterrents against independent groups may diminish the probability of use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and the potential for their use as a retaliatory measure by U.S. policymakers.
Other challenges facing the counterterrorism policy community include:
how to strengthen intelligence & law enforcement relationships in a manner consistent with their respective missions.
how to better share information and ways of combating terrorist groups in a timely fashion with other nations.
and how to insure that the possibility of terrorist actions by groups and individuals is taken into account when we formulate our foreign, defense, and domestic policy planning.
To meet the evolving threats, experts recommend programs to develop:
inexpensive, simple, effective, chemical, biological and explosives weapons detectors.
an antiterrorism curriculum for law enforcement, security, and emergency response community personnel that can be taught on a national basis.
more effective computer security systems.
Critical to threat assessment is the need for abundant, timely and useable intelligence, about potential terrorist sponsors, perpetrators, activities and targets, as well as intelligence to help develop our own targets to deter or punish state sponsors. In this regard, the development of long term human source intelligence [HUMINT] is often cited as a vital component in building our ability to preempt attacks.
Critical to threat assessment is the need to get smarter, not just in protecting against the threat from outsiders, but smarter about the threat posed by people with legitimate access. This includes acts of carelessness by insiders. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. We need to continue our efforts to enhance our vigilance to minimize any potential threats posed by third country nationals- for example, threats posed by outsiders working at U.S. embassies and military installations overseas.
Critical to threat assessment is a better understanding of the countries and cultures where foreign terrorists are bred and operate. This includes understanding the root causes of unrest that give rise to terrorism. It is important to understand such factors when we plan how to combat terrorist groups on an operational level. And it is important to understand such factors when planning to prevent or respond to specific terrorist attacks.
Threat assessment is an ongoing evolving process. As the threat changes, it may change slowly, but it may also change unexpectedly, radically, rapidly, and dramatically. To meet changing or unanticipated threats, strategies and missions may need to change, and allocation of resources may need to shift as well. Such circumstances require a certain fluidity of policy. Forward-looking planning, flexibility and periodic review thus become important policy components. A community mindset which encourages challenging of policy coupled with practical exercises designed to test policy and policy assumptions may contribute to policy relevance. Some experts have suggested that designation of "no year" money in an agency's budget account and establishment of an interagency counterterrorism reserve contingency fund may be options which warrant consideration. Other experts are concerned over lack of accountability such a process may contain and the fact that money might be spent for purposes other than intended.
One of the most important challenges facing the counterterrorism policy community is to ensure that our anti-terrorism efforts are fully coordinated. When push comes to shove, agencies still do an awful lot of "ad hocing". The Oklahoma City bombing and other more recent events have demonstrated that terrorism is not limited to those areas where we are prepared for it.
As we move into the first decade of the new millennium, terrorism may receive increased attention in the foreign policy, national defense, and law enforcement communities. As we assess and formulate our international and national commitments, policymakers are likely to consider possible impacts of terrorism on those commitments and on public and political support vital to those commitments. The challenges facing us in assessing threats, allocating resources, and insuring an effective congressional role in counterterrorism policy are complex. But inherent in challenges are opportunities to bring together the diverse elements of the counterterrorism community to share information, experiences, ideas, and creative suggestions about how to effectively deal with this growing national security, law enforcement, and public policy concern.
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