Statement by:
Donnie R. Marshall
Acting Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before the:
Senate Drug Caucus on International Narcotics Control
Date:
March 21, 2000
Note: This document may not reflect changes made in actual delivery.
Chairman Grassley, Members of the Senate. I appreciate this opportunity to
appear before the Committee today to discuss the issue of Certification and
U.S. Counter narcotics efforts. I would like first to thank the Committee for
its continued support of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and
overall support of drug law enforcement.
As all of you are aware, DEA is first and foremost a law enforcement
agency. Although the certification process has proved to be an effective
diplomatic tool relative to the international antidrug effort, as a matter of
policy, DEA does not make recommendations relative to certification. Each
year, DEA provides the Attorney General with an objective assessment of the
drug trafficking situation for a country based upon evidence and factual
information. DEA's analysis of counter-narcotics efforts by another country
does not include an opinion on whether a country should or should not be
certified. We merely present the facts to U.S. policy makers and allow them
to make an informed decision on the certification of a respective country. As
such, my comments today will be limited to an objective assessment of the law
enforcement issues involved with drug trafficking.
As part of the submitted written testimony, I have also included the drug
trafficking assessment reports of several countries which were recently
evaluated and either decertified or granted a waiver due to vital U.S.
interests. These countries include Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Paraguay,
Nigeria, and Haiti. Due, however, to the magnitude of the threat drug
traffickers pose to the national security of both countries, along with the
strategic importance to the United States, I will direct much of today's
testimony on Mexico.
As many of you know, criminal organizations based in Mexico pose the
greatest challenge to U.S. law enforcement agencies charged with enforcing
narcotics laws. Due to the ever-increasing legitimate cross-border traffic
and commerce between the U.S. and Mexico, several international organized
crime groups have established elaborate smuggling infrastructures on both
sides of the U.S./Mexico border. Furthermore, it has long been established
that in addition to drug trafficking, these international criminal
organizations spawn violence, corruption, and intimidation that threaten the
safety and stability of our cities and towns across America.
The complex and sophisticated international drug trafficking groups
operating out of Mexico are oftentimes vicious, destructive entities, that
operate on a global scale. The largest drug trafficking organizations in
Mexico --- operating out of Guadalajara, Juarez, Mexicali, Tijuana, Sonora,
and the Gulf region --- under the auspices of Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes,
Armando Valencia-Cornelio, Miguel Caro-Quintero, Ramon and Benjamin
Arellano-Felix, and Osiel Cardenas-Guillen are in many ways, the modern
versions of the mob leaders and groups that U.S. law enforcement has fought
against since the beginning of last century. These international organized
crime leaders, however, are far more dangerous, far more influential, and
have a greater impact on our day-to-day lives than did their domestic
predecessors.
Those international traffickers and their organizations make operational
decisions from places like Sonora, Mexico, and other locations outside U.S.
borders, which detrimentally affect the quality of life of our citizens and
directly support drug-related crime in cities and towns across our country.
These groups have reached new levels of sophistication and have become a
threat not only to the United States and Europe, but also to their own
countries. Their power and influence are unprecedented. Unless innovative,
flexible, multi-faceted responses are crafted, these drug trafficking
organizations threaten to grow even more powerful in the years to come.
The Damage to the United States:
In order to understand the extent and nature of the damage caused by
international drug trafficking organizations, it is crucial to look at how
these organizations work, and how they infiltrate and position themselves in
U.S. communities in order to further their goals.
On any given day in the United States, business transactions are being
arranged between the major drug lords headquartered in Mexico and their
surrogates who have established roots within the United States, for the
shipment, storage, and distribution of tons of illicit drugs. In the past,
Mexico-based criminal organizations limited their activities to the
cultivation of marijuana and opium poppies for subsequent production of
marijuana and heroin. The organizations were also relied upon by Colombian
drug lords to transport loads of cocaine into the United States, and to pass
on this cocaine to other organizations who distributed the product throughout
the U.S. However, over the past several years, Mexico-based organized crime
syndicates have gained increasing control over many of the aspects of the
cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana trades, resulting in
increased threats to the well-being of American citizens as well as
government institutions and the citizens of their own country.
In the recent past, traffickers from Mexico had maintained dominance in
the western part of the United States, and in some Midwest cities. Today, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, along with other law enforcement agencies,
has developed evidence leading to indictments demonstrating that associates
of organized crime groups based in Mexico have established themselves on the
East Coast of the United States, thus becoming significant participants in
the nationwide drug trade.
Mexican Traffickers Rise to Prominence:
During 1995 and 1996, intense law enforcement pressure was focused on the
Cali leadership by the brave men and women of the Colombian National Police.
As a result, all of the top trafficking leaders from Cali were either jailed
or killed. During that time frame, U.S. law enforcement agencies were
effectively attacking Colombian cells operating within the United States.
With the Cali leaders imprisoned in Colombia and the successful attacks by
law enforcement on their U.S. cells, traffickers from Mexico took on greater
prominence. A growing alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the
organizations from Mexico worked to benefit both sides. Traffickers from
Mexico had long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine
across the U.S.-Mexico border, using established distribution routes to
deliver drugs throughout the United States. The Mexico-based organizations'
emergence as major methamphetamine producers and traffickers also contributed
to making them a major force in international drug trafficking. The Mexican
traffickers, who were previously paid in cash by the Colombian traffickers
for their services, began to routinely receive up to one-half of a shipment
of cocaine as their payment. This led to Mexican traffickers having access to
multi-ton quantities of cocaine and allowed them to expand their markets and
influence in the United States, thereby making them formidable cocaine
traffickers in their own right.
With the disruption of the Cali syndicate, Mexican groups such as the
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization, the Arellano-Felix cartel, the
Amezcua-Contreras brothers, and the Caro-Quintero group, consolidated their
power and began to dominate drug trafficking along the U.S.-Mexican border
and in many U.S. cities. Recent events in Mexico and along the southwest
border emphasize the fact that trafficking groups from Mexico have developed
into a significant force in international organized crime.
Overview of Narcotics Smuggled along the U.S.-Mexican Border:
Recent estimates indicate that approximately 55% of the cocaine available
in the United States is transported across the U.S.-Mexico border. Typically,
large cocaine shipments are transported from Colombia, via commercial
shipping, fishing and "go-fast" boats and off-loaded in Mexico. The cocaine
is transported through Mexico, usually by trucks, where it is warehoused in
cities like Guadalajara, Tijuana or Juarez, that are operating bases for the
major criminal trafficking organizations. The extremely high volume of
vehicular traffic over the U.S./Mexico border allows cocaine loads to be
driven across the border and taken to major distribution centers within the
U.S., such as Los Angeles, New Jersey, Chicago, or Phoenix. Surrogates of the
major drug lords wait for instructions, often provided over sophisticated
communications devices--phones, faxes, pagers or computers--telling them
where to warehouse smaller loads, who to contact for transportation services,
and to whom to return the eventual profits. Individuals sent to the United
States from Mexico, often illegally, have been shown to have contracted with
U.S. trucking establishments to move loads across the country. Once the loads
arrive in an area that is close to the eventual terminal point, safehouses
are established for workers who watch over the cocaine supplies and arrange
for it to be distributed by wholesale dealers within the vicinity. These
distributors have traditionally been Colombian nationals or individuals from
the Dominican Republic, but recently, DEA has come upon evidence that Mexican
trafficking organizations are also directly involved in cocaine distribution
in New York City.
We have not only identified the drug lords themselves, but in most cases,
the key members of their command and control structure. The combined efforts
of the DEA, FBI, DOJ, the U.S. Customs Service, and members of state and
local police departments have resulted in the seizure of hundreds of tons of
drugs, hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds, and most
importantly, several significant indictments. In fact, some of the leaders of
these organizations - Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Felix, Luis and Jesus
Amezcua-Contreras, Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes - have become familiar names in
every major law enforcement department in the United States. Despite this
evidence, along with the notoriety, these traffickers have continued to evade
arrest and prosecution.
The primary reason they have been able to avoid arrest and continue their
criminal enterprise is their ability to intimidate witnesses and assassinate
and corrupt public officials. Clear examples of this point may be cited in
recent efforts to apprehend members of the Arellano Felix cartel and the
Cardenas Guillen cartel, based in Tijuana and Matamoros, Mexico,
respectively. In Tijuana over the past year, Mexican officials, have not been
able to apprehend key traffickers working for the Arellano Felix
organization. In November 1999, major Gulf cartel drug trafficker Osiel
Cardenas Guillen illegally detained and assaulted two U.S. drug enforcement
agents in Matamoros, Mexico, across the international border from
Brownsville, Texas.
Methamphetamine traffickers, oftentimes associated with major Mexican
organized crime groups, obtain the precursor chemicals necessary for
methamphetamine production from sources in other countries, such as China and
India, as well as from rogue chemical suppliers in the United States. In
fact, Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations have become the most
significant distributors in the U.S. of methamphetamine and its precursor
chemicals. Several bulk ephedrine seizures destined for Mexico have focused
attention on the magnitude of ephedrine acquisition by Mexican organized
crime groups. Methamphetamine super labs, capable of producing hundreds of
pounds of methamphetamine on a weekly basis, are established in Mexico or in
California, where the methamphetamine is provided to traffickers to
distribute across the United States.
Heroin from Mexico now represents 14% of the heroin seized in the United
States by federal authorities, and it is estimated that 43 metric tons of
opium gum was produced in 1999 in Mexico. A recent study conducted by the DEA
indicates that as much as 29% of the heroin being used in the U.S. is being
smuggled in by the Mexico-based organized crime syndicates. Mexican black tar
heroin is produced in Mexico, and transported over the border in cars and
trucks. Like cocaine and methamphetamine, it is trafficked by associates of
the organized criminal groups in Mexico, and provided to dealers and users in
the Southwest, Northwest, and Midwest areas of the United States. At one
time, it was commonplace for couriers to carry two pounds or so of heroin
into the United States; recently, quantities of heroin seized from
individuals have increased as is evidenced by larger seizures in a number of
towns in Texas. This heroin is extremely potent, and its use has resulted in
a significant number of deaths.
Marijuana from Mexico still dominates the illicit U.S. import market
although U.S. experts estimate Mexico's marijuana production at 3,700 metric
tons (compared with 4,600 in 1998 and 4,800 in 1997). In addition, during
1999, the GOM eradicated some 23,547 hectares of marijuana (down from 24,200
in 1998). Seizures of Mexican marijuana have increased from 102 metric tons
in 1991 to 836.3 metric tons in 1999. Marijuana organizations from Mexico are
very powerful and violent. In some places, traffickers from Mexico have
established marijuana cultivation operations within the United States. In a
recent case in Idaho, DEA , working with other Federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials, arrested a group of illegal aliens from Zacatecas,
Mexico. A total of 114,000 marijuana plants, weighing almost 20 tons, was
seized. This operation represented the largest marijuana seizure ever in the
state of Idaho.
It is important to note that although many of the transactions relating to
the drug trade take place on U.S. soil, the major organized crime bosses
direct each and every detail of their multi-billion dollar business while
situated in Mexico. They are responsible not only for the business decisions
being made, but also ultimately for the devastation that many American
communities have suffered as a result of the influx of cocaine,
methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana. These powerful and organized
syndicates can frustrate the ability of the Mexican anti-drug police. Their
ability to place obstacles such as corruption and unlimited resources in the
path of police can oftentimes impede investigations. In the past year, none
of the major Mexican trafficking organizations have been dismantled or
significantly disrupted by Mexican authorities.
Law Enforcement Response:
Reporting indicates that the Southwest border (SWB) remains a major point
of entry for approximately 70% of all illicit drugs smuggled into our country
by Mexican trafficking groups. In response to this continued threat along the
border, the DEA has established several initiatives that facilitate and
improve intelligence and information sharing, while identifying and removing
impediments to cooperation. These initiatives employ a multi-pronged
strategy, which utilizes and combines law enforcement operations,
intelligence operations, and provides for law enforcement assistance in order
to achieve success in combating criminal drug trafficking organizations along
the border. The objective of these initiatives is to disrupt and ultimately
dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle illicit drugs into the U.S. by
linking Federal, state and local investigations domestically and mobilizing
multilateral enforcement efforts abroad. Based upon past trends,
intelligence, and recent seizures along the border, the DEA has established
the following priorities for the SWB Field Divisions: (1) cocaine
investigations involving violent organizations; (2) methamphetamine
investigations, (3) heroin investigations, (4) marijuana investigations, (5)
money laundering investigations and (6) diverted/dangerous drug and chemical
investigations.
Enforcement Operations/Strategies:
In response to the emergence of these Mexican Drug Trafficking
Organization's (MDTO), it became apparent that a coordinated strategy for law
enforcement counterdrug activities needed to be implemented. In order to
combat drug production and trafficking networks operating along the
U.S./Mexican border, DEA, in concert with other Federal agencies, established
the Southwest Border Initiative - an integrated, coordinated law enforcement
effort designed to attack the command and control structure of organized
criminal operations associated with the Mexican Federation. This strategy
focuses on intelligence and enforcement efforts which target drug
distribution systems within the U.S. and directs resources toward the
disruption of those principal drug trafficking organizations operating across
the border.
As such, DEA, in cooperation with other Federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies is focusing increased intelligence, technical resources,
and investigative expertise on the major MDTO's responsible for smuggling
vast quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine across the
border.
Apart from this effort, DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
also provide assistance in the form of operational planning, intelligence,
and training to Government of Mexico (GOM) law enforcement authorities, to
strengthen their capacity to combat these organizations. The Southwest Border
strategy targets specific Mexican trafficking organizations operating across
the border and attacks their command and control infrastructures wherever
they operate.
Further, the Special Operations Division (SOD) is a joint national
coordinating and support entity comprised of agents, analysts, and
prosecutors from DOJ, Customs, FBI, DEA and IRS. Its mission is to coordinate
and support regional and national criminal investigations and prosecutions
against trafficking organizations that most threaten the U.S. SOD performs
seamlessly across both investigative agency and district jurisdictional
boundaries, providing field offices with necessary support, assistance,
intelligence analysis and "leads" for investigative action. Within SOD, no
distinction is made among the participating investigative agencies. Where
appropriate, state and local authorities are fully integrated into
coordinated operations. As presently configured, SOD consists of five
sections; each of which has both DEA, FBI, and USCS personnel assigned. One
section targets Colombian Trafficking Organizations, a second concentrates on
cocaine and heroin trafficking in Europe and Asia, a third targets money
laundering organizations, and the remaining two sections are the heart of the
Southwest Border Project and focus their efforts on the principal MDTO's.
These two sections target, among other things, the command and control
networks of the identified MDTO's, and their supporting organizations
operating along the Southwest border. As such, the interagency regional
objectives are as follows; (1) Intelligence collection and analysis, (2)
Investigations, (3) Interdiction and Enforcement and (4) Prosecution and
Incarceration. The following operation delineates the need and significance
for such a multi-agency project:
Operation Impunity:
In September 1999, the DEA announced the conclusion of a two-year
international investigation that culminated in the arrest of over 106
individuals linked to the Amado Carrillo Fuentes (ACF) drug trafficking
organization, headquartered in Cancun, Mexico. This investigation, known as
"Operation Impunity," was a multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency investigation
which directly linked drug trafficking activity in the United States to the
highest level of the Mexican cocaine trade.
This investigation began in January 1998 and was conducted jointly by the
DEA, FBI, USCS, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, DOJ/Criminal Division, and a host of
state and local law enforcement agencies. The investigation encompassed 53
DEA, FBI, and USCS case investigations which spans 14 Federal judicial
districts. Since 1998, this investigation has resulted in 36 seizures,
netting 12,434 kilograms of cocaine, a half a kilo of heroin, 4,806 pounds of
marijuana, more than $19 million in U.S. currency, and the arrest of 106
individuals.
The above statistics only tell part of the story. Operation Impunity
demonstrated an unparalleled coordinated and cooperative effort among the law
enforcement community. Overall, this investigation allowed the law
enforcement community to ascertain this organization's method of operation
from the narcotic distribution in Colombia to the transportation through
Mexico to the ultimate distribution networks throughout the U.S. Such success
clearly demonstrates the need for the continuation of long term, multi-agency
investigations.
Cooperative Efforts with the Government of Mexico/Status of Vetted Units:
Subsequent to the arrest of General Gutierrez Rebollo in 1997 and the
establishment of mechanisms within the Mexican law enforcement
infrastructure, such as the Bilateral Task Forces (BTFs) and the Vetted Unit
program, DEA became cautiously optimistic relative to the prospects of the
GOM's commitment to bilateral investigations. The DEA has supported these
programs financially and with other resources in hope that our efforts would
result in a successful attack against the drug lords who are creating so much
havoc throughout communities in the United States. However, continuing
reports of corruption and the rapidly growing power and influence of the
major organized criminal groups in Mexico cause us great concern about the
long-term prospects for success. Perhaps the arrest of Operation Impunity
target Jaime Aguilar Gastelum and Operation Millennium target Guillermo
Moreno-Rios, by Mexican authorities, is indicative of the GOM's future
commitment to such joint ventures.
However, in the last year the Vetted Units Program in Mexico has not
achieved the potential as originally envisioned by both governments. In order
to address this issue, the DEA and the Government of Mexico's equivalent to
the DEA, the Fiscalia Especializada Para la Atencion de Delitos Contra la
Salud (FEADS), have agreed to carefully review the Program and establish ways
to improve its efficiency and effectiveness against mutually agreed
investigative targets. The DEA also provides support and assistance to the
FEADS to conduct investigative endeavors throughout Mexico. These
investigations are being conducted with the primary investigative component
of the FEADS vetted units - the Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's).
Unfortunately, the investigative achievements by the BTF and the Sensitive
Investigations Unit (SIU) as related to cases against the major drug
trafficking organizations are minimal. The inability of these units to fully
employ the new investigative techniques and authorities provided in the
Organized Crime Law to investigate these major organizations has been equally
disappointing. Further complicating investigative efforts, the Mexico
City-based SIU was compromised in February 1999 by a Mexican news
exposé describing the operations of that unit, to include its
location, activities, and investigative targets. Because of this setback, the
SIU has been largely shut down. In addition, throughout 1999 police personnel
from the Mexico City SIU were separated into smaller groups and often
deployed to various regions throughout Mexico in order to work other
investigations, such as the search for Mexico fugitive and former Governor of
the State of Quintana Roo Mario Villanueva-Madrid.
On a positive note, vetted unit personnel of the Organized Crime Unit
(OCU), of which the SIU is a part, have been investigating a drug smuggling
network of the Carrillo-Fuentes organization in Cancun, headed by Alcides
Ramon-Magana. During the course of this investigation, DEA has shared three
principal witnesses with the OCU who have provided information regarding this
organization . The information gleaned from these witnesses has contributed
to the seizure of real estate in Quintana Roo and the arrest of several
defendants in this case, including mid-level drug trafficker and
money-launderer Carlos Colin-Padilla. In addition, the GOM issued arrest
warrants for a total of 44 individuals associated with Ramon-Magana including
an arrest warrant issued on April 5, 1999, against former Governor Villanueva
Madrid on 28 counts of drug related offenses.
The governments of Mexico and the United States will continue to work
cooperatively on investigations. Just this month, based upon information
provided by the DEA to the GOM, two such operations were conducted, resulting
in the seizure of a cocaine laboratory and a methamphetamine laboratory in
Mexico. Ultimately, DEA believes that the vetting process is our best chance
at ensuring integrity with our counterparts. As mentioned in previous
testimony today with respect to the ongoing bilateral Vetted Units Program
survey, DEA will remain actively engaged with our GOM counterparts relative
to this process. DEA will also encourage the GOM to fully staff and support
the BTFs and the SIUs with FEADS personnel that have already been vetted and
to supply the resources that these operations require.
Corruption Issues:
Although the Mexican government is attempting to address the issue of
corruption, it continues to be a serious problem in Mexican law enforcement
institutions. The Federal Preventive Police (FPP) was created in early 1999
in response to the existing corruption in the police ranks, but recently
reported that several FPP agents were under investigation for corrupt
activities. In December 1999 the Government of Mexico/PGR reported that
between April 1997 through 1999 more than 1,400 of the 3,500 federal police
officers had been fired for corruption and that 357 of the officers had been
prosecuted. Additionally, the National Public Safety System established a
national police registry to prevent corrupt police officials from being
rehired by another law enforcement entity. However, the PGR has not fully
implemented these programs to deal with corruption. For example, in 1999, the
former Director of Investigations for the PGR's SIU and OCU, Cuauhtemoc
Herrera Suastegui, was reassigned to a high-level position within the PGR
despite failing polygraph examination in 1998. Although several FEADS vetted
"floater" units have had several successes during 1999, the Vetted Unit
Program failed to adhere to internal security principles involving the
polygraph process, which may lead to potential compromises and corruption.
The Mexican military also has experienced narco-related corruption within its
ranks.
As of July 1999, an amendment to the Judicial Organic law mandated that
PGR officers, prosecutors, police agents, experts, and pilots assigned to
narcotics eradication duties are required to undergo an evaluation process,
to include background checks and polygraphs.
Judicial efforts to stop corruption are also underway. On January 11,
2000, a Mexican Federal judge issued an arrest warrant for the magistrate who
wrongly freed Adan Amezcua-Contreras, a major methamphetamine trafficker.
Perhaps the most alarming incident involving Mexican officials occurred on
November 9, 1999, when a DEA Special Agent, along with a FBI Special Agent
debriefed a Confidential Source in Matamoros, Mexico. During the course of
this debriefing the Special Agents and Confidential Source were surrounded
and physically threatened by Mexican trafficker Osiel Cardenas-Guillen and
approximately 15 associates. Each of these associates, one brandishing a
gold-plated automatic assault weapon, were either municipal or state police
officers. Furthermore, despite monitoring the entire incident over the DEA
Special Agent's cellular telephone, which had been used to call for
assistance, the Tamaulipas State Judicial Police Commander took no action.
Due in large part to their resourcefulness and ability to diffuse this
dangerous situation, were the agents and the confidential source able to
survive unscathed. Among other issues, this incident highlights the
vulnerability of DEA and FBI Special Agents working in Mexico.
Status of Extraditions:
The principal leaders of major drug trafficking organizations fear the
threat of extradition to the United States more than any other law
enforcement or judicial tool. Extradition of significant traffickers ensures
that those responsible for the command and control of illicit activities,
including drug smuggling and money laundering, will be held totally
accountable for their actions and serve a prison sentence commensurate with
their crimes.
No major drug traffickers were extradited to the United States in 1999.
The Mexican Government did extradite 10 fugitives on narcotics related or
money laundering offenses in 1999 -- eight U.S. citizens and two Mexican
citizens. One Mexican citizen, a drug trafficker, was sought on drug charges
after escaping from a U. S. prison while serving a sentence on drug related
crimes. The other Mexican citizen, who killed a United States Border Patrol
agent, was sought on murder and marijuana smuggling charges.
In September 1998, the Government of Mexico arrested U.S. Citizen and DEA
fugitive Randall Jeffrey Spradling in Guadalajara which, given Spradling's
strong ties to both Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers, was an important
event. He is fighting extradition to the United States.
In the past twelve months, some Mexican Courts have denied extradition of
significant drug traffickers, such as Jaime Ladino-Avila, to the U.S. due to
a variety of reasons, such as a very dated legal precedent holding life
imprisonment unconstitutional in Mexico. At the end of 1999, there were
approximately 40 persons in Mexican custody and subject to extradition
proceedings based on U.S. provisional arrest warrants and extradition
requests.
Conclusion: The Road Ahead:
The United States' long experience with confronting and dismantling
organized criminal activity has necessitated the development of an
aggressive, cohesive, and coordinated strategy to identify, target, arrest,
and incapacitate the leadership of these organizations. DEA's role in
addressing the drug problem is to continue to attack the leadership of these
international criminal organizations. With a strategy consisting of mounting
attacks on the organizational command and control of major Mexican
trafficking syndicates that operate along the U.S./Mexico border, the DEA is
able to attack the ability of these organizations to conduct business and
impede their efforts to import drugs into the U.S.
The effectiveness of national and bilateral efforts against drug organizations will depend largely on demonstrable progress in disrupting and dismantling these transnational narco-trafficking organizations. This includes apprehending, prosecuting and convicting major drug traffickers, as well as exercising extradition laws against those defendants facing federal drug trafficking charges in the United States, and exposing and prosecuting individuals and businesses involved in providing critical support networks such as front companies, security, transportation and the like.
Therefore, it is imperative for law enforcement to continue to facilitate
the flow of information and intelligence while identifying and removing
impediments to cooperation. In this vein, it is vital for the DEA, along with
other USG agencies, to continue to support the GOM in the field of
counternarcotics operations. In turn, DEA encourages and expects the GOM to
provide adequate investigative manpower, ongoing integrity testing, financial
resources, equipment and reciprocal drug intelligence in support of bilateral
drug law enforcement, which should significantly improve both governments'
ability to counter and eliminate transnational drug trafficking
organizations.
However, the true sign of success regarding anti-drug efforts in Mexico is
best recognized with tangible results from concerted law enforcement efforts,
i.e. the arrest and successful prosecution of significant leaders of these
major drug cartels in Mexico and; where applicable, their extradition to the
United States to face federal drug trafficking charges. We are not yet
there.
Part II:
As an addendum to the drug trafficking assessment on Mexico, included are
abbreviated drug situation reports on six countries. These countries were
selected due to the Administration's recent announcement either decertifying
(Afghanistan and Burma) or certifying due to vital U.S. interests ( Haiti,
Paraguay, Cambodia, and Nigeria). These reports include criteria and
guidelines that may be evaluated during the certification process.
Paraguay:
Paraguay's primary role in the cocaine trade is as a transit country.
Traffickers send shipments of Bolivian cocaine HCl and base through Paraguay
into Brazil and Argentina for further shipment to the United States and
Europe. Recent information also indicates that there is some trafficking of
cocaine essential chemicals from Paraguay into Bolivia.
Paraguayan cocaine traffickers serve primarily as facilitators for major
Bolivian and Brazilian cocaine organizations. Paraguayan transportation
groups have, on occasion, provided aircraft and pilots to transportation
groups operating between Peru, Brazil, and Colombia. A common exchange method
for Paraguayan traffickers is to trade luxury cars stolen in Asuncion and
Argentina for Bolivian cocaine. This makes the capital for large cocaine
purchases relatively easy to obtain and allows Bolivian traffickers to
launder their profits directly into tangible assets.
Counter-drug efforts in Paraguay are consolidated under the direction of
the Secretariat Nacional Antidrogas (SENAD), a Federal agency with national
authority to propose legislation, conduct anti-drug education programs,
control the diversion of chemicals and drugs, and to conduct drug
investigations and operations, including eradication efforts. In February
2000 Retired Army Colonel Hugo Ibarra was appointed as the director of SENAD.
In spite of continuing political turmoil within the government, Ibarra has
displayed some willingness to conduct investigations into drug trafficking
and has cooperated with the DEA in mainly low level investigations.
The Anti-Narcotics Directorate of the Paraguayan National Police (DINAR)
is a full-time investigative unit consisting of approximately 100 police
special agent personnel. DINAR is controlled organizationally and financially
by SENAD. The DEA Asuncion Country Office (ACO) utilizes both organizations
to conduct investigations and operations. The formation of a DEA-sponsored
investigation/intelligence unit within the DINAR has enhanced the ability of
the ACO to conduct more sensitive investigations and to properly train and
equip this smaller and more secure unit.
A criminal code promulgated in 1997 went into effect in November of 1998.
The new code provided sentencing guidelines for money laundering offenses.
Asset seizures are also provided for under Paraguayan law, but the law is
very new and has only been minimally used. In 1998, the Government of
Paraguay signed an extradition treaty with the United States, which includes
a provision for the extradition of nationals. The government also drafted
legislation that explicitly authorizes undercover operations and controlled
deliveries. Due to the political instability in Paraguay the proposed
legislation remains pending.
Burma:
In 1999, Burma was named as the world's number two producer of opium
behind Afghanistan. The 1999 CNC Opium Yield Survey, conducted jointly with
US and Burmese officials estimated the 1999 potential opium yield to be 1,090
metric tons. This reflects a 38% decrease from 1998 survey estimates of 1,750
metric tons. In February 2000, the CNC, Embassy and Host Nation officials
conducted the 2000 Opium Yield Survey with the DEA as an accompanied
observer.
Burma continues to be a major producer of both heroin and methamphetamine.
Burma accounts for approximately 80 percent of the total production of
Southeast Asian opium. In 1999, the Government of Burma (GOB) seized 273
kilograms of heroin, down from 490 kilograms in 1998. The decrease in
seizures is partly due to opium crop reduction, directly attributed to severe
drought conditions. Also attributed is the response by the GOB against
narcotic traffickers, in response to intelligence information provided by
DEA. The increased enforcement activity on behalf of the GOB has resulted in
the traffickers' utilization of smaller and highly mobile opium
refineries.
In 1999, the GOB seized in approximately 28.8 million tablets
(approximately 2,880 kilograms) of methamphetamine. During 1998, the GOB
seized 16 million tablets (approximately 1,600 kilograms). Additionally, in
1999, the GOB sseized 6.43 metric tons of ephedrine. The GOB continues to
pursue additional ephedrine smuggling investigations.
Methamphetamine produced in Burma is shipped almost exclusively to
Thailand. The largest and most recent reported seizure in Thailand was 4.3
million tablets (approx. 430 kilograms) on March 14, 2000. There have been
six reported seizures of Burmese produced methamphetamine, ranging from 200
to 7,800 tablets among the Hmong and Mien communities residing in
California.
The United States Government policy towards Burma continues to link
political change toward democracy and human rights issues with the narcotics
problem. Currently minimal assistance is provided to Burma by the U.S.
largely through assistance to law enforcement operations and to intelligence
sharing by DEA with host government counterparts. Training, utilizing INL
funds, has been prohibited since 1989.
The DEA Rangoon Country Office (RCO) has developed a working relationship
with their Host Nation Counterparts (Directorate of Defense Services
Intelligence /DDSI and State Peace and Development Council/SPDC).
Intelligence indicates that corruption is rampant in Burma. This situation
has led to petty graft and corruption. However, the government has taken
positive steps to solve this problem by aggressively prosecuting and
punishing violators determined to be involved in corrupt practices.
Cambodia:
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) enjoys a good relationship with
the Cambodian National Police and the National Police Anti-Drug Unit. The
Anti-Drug Unit is unable to carry out any type of sophisticated investigation
due to the lack of financial resources, extreme shortage of trained personnel
and lack of adequate investigative equipment.
Cambodia is not a major producer of narcotics although large amounts of
marijuana are cultivated with multi-ton quantities being exported to Europe.
Marijuana production and trafficking is not considered to be a major threat
to the United States. In 1997, enforcement efforts resulted in the disruption
and dismantling of a group of Americans identified to be sending multi ton
quantities of marijuana from Cambodia to the West Coast of the U.S. The
investigation resulted in the arrest of several of its members and the
seizure of approximately six tons of marijuana in Cambodia in June of that
year. U.S. and Cambodian defendants were subsequently indicted in the U.S.
Despite the fact that Cambodia has no extradition treaty with the U.S., the
Cambodian government deported the above defendants to the U.S. to stand
trial. Through a cooperative effort, the Government of Cambodia (GOC) allowed
DEA agents to interview the defendant's prior to their deportation to the
U.S. In addition to the above, the GOC allowed two of their officers to
travel to the U.S. and testify in a U.S. Federal Court.
There is little hard intelligence or information available on heroin
trafficking involving Cambodia. There have been no significant heroin
seizures in the U.S. either transiting through or initiated from
Cambodia.
Corruption has been identified as an endemic problem in Cambodia, and has
adversely affected drug law enforcement. Poorly paid and ill-trained police
and judicial officials have been all-too-easy to look the other way in
narcotics and other criminal cases.
Cambodia established a "National Authority for Combating Drugs" and a
"Special Drug Enforcement Unit" in the Ministry of the Interior. The
appointed heads of these units currently do not have any law enforcement
units directly under their control, but do have the ability to call on
resources from other enforcement agencies. The National Police remain DEA's
primary contact.
This year, the DEA's Office of International Training is scheduled to put
on the Basic Investigators Training Seminar. The seminar will include
approximately 60 National Police Officers.
Nigeria:
The Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLA) has provided some
cooperation to DEA in those areas where it can. The most basic of drug law
enforcement equipment is unavailable to the NDLEA. The NDLEA continues to be
underfunded, undertrained, and underpaid by the Government of Nigeria (GON),
calling into question the GON's own will to attack and prosecute major drug
traffickers operating in Nigeria.
NDLEA officials continued to arrest low level couriers and growers. Major
traffickers and organizations were largely unaffected. This is due to the
lack of training and modern equipment needed to identify, locate, monitor,
and investigate the activities of the major drug traffickers operating in
Nigeria.
Officials of the GON are quick to point to their yearly seizure
statistics, which are slightly misleading. For example, in 1998 the NDLEA
reports that they seized "over 10 tons of narcotics", which, taken at face
value, appears to be an impressive statistic. When urged to provide a
breakdown of the drug types seized, it is discovered that nine of those
metric tons were cannabis, 503 kilograms were unspecified psychotropic drugs,
17 kilograms were cocaine and only three kilograms, seized for the entire
year, were heroin.
The bulk of the cannabis seizures are a result of an active plant
eradication program. The cannabis products are destined for local consumption
and exportation to neighboring African countries, and some to various
destinations in Europe. While it is a source of pride for the GON, the
cannabis seizures have little impact on the United States.
The NDLEA attempts to prosecute narcotics and money laundering violators,
but are stymied by a dysfunctional judicial system and occasionally by
government corruption.
Although there have been asset seizures in the past, a weakness in the law
does not allow for asset forfeiture without a prior conviction of the owner
of the asset. Since convictions are rare, no drug related forfeitures have
been reported.
Afghanistan:
The political situation in Afghanistan has adversely affected DEA's
strategy and enforcement efforts. Due to security reasons, the Department of
State has prohibited travel to Afghanistan for all of this year. Until
Special Agents can travel to Afghanistan, accurate reporting will be sporadic
and unconfirmed. Currently, there are no ongoing counter narcotics programs
or any cooperation in investigations underway between the U.S. and
Afghanistan. Illegal drug production in Afghanistan, however, remains a major
problem which must be addressed.
Drug traffickers in Afghanistan are both the world's largest producers of
illicit opium and major producers of cannabis products. In the absence of a
stable and universally recognized central government and the tolerance of
poppy cultivation and conversion laboratories by the Taliban, cultivation of
opium poppies is likely to increase in Afghanistan.
According to the U.S. Government, 51,500 hectares of opium poppy were
cultivated in 1999, versus 41,720 hectares in 1998, a 23% increase. From this
an estimated 1,670 metric tons of opium were produced, versus 1,350 last
year, a 24% increase. The increase results from favorable economic and
environmental conditions, in particular high opium prices during the planting
season combined with ideal weather conditions during harvest.
During 1999, representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, to include
DEA, have met several times with the Taliban High Commissioner for Narcotics
Control. In a recent meeting, the Taliban High Commissioner for Narcotics
stated that the Taliban government had taken measures to eliminate narcotics.
He claimed that the government had recently seized 2,000 kilograms of opium
and heroin and had destroyed 34 laboratories. Other significant hauls have
taken place at various airports and border areas under Taliban control. A
recent Taliban edict strongly admonished farmers to reduce poppy cultivation
by one-third in the year 2000. A common complaint by the Taliban government
is that the international community does not give the Taliban due credit for
these successes. The Taliban High Commissioner for Narcotics also denied
reports that the Taliban tax opium production.
Afghanistan remains essentially a country divided into regions controlled
by tribal leaders, all of whose support is necessary to effectively rule the
country. Afghanistan is not a center for money laundering and financial
institutions barely exist. Due to the total destruction of the Afghan
economy, narcotic traffickers often use proceeds to purchase goods abroad and
smuggle these items into Afghanistan.
Afghanistan continues to be a major recipient of multi-ton quantities of
acetic anhydride, which is an essential chemical in the production of heroin.
Shipments of acetic anhydride arrive regularly for such purported usage as
leather tanning and machine cleaning. As there are no known legitimate
businesses in Afghanistan utilizing acetic anhydride, these consignments are
highly suspect. Chemicals used in heroin processing laboratories in
Afghanistan usually are imported from India, Germany, and the former Soviet
Union. Some progress has been made in the tracking of shipments from western
countries. Several manufacturers have recently been cooperating and advising
DEA of suspect deliveries destined for Southwest Asia.
Haiti:
Haiti continues to be a transshipment and storage site for multi-hundred
kilogram quantities of cocaine from South and Central America. The country's
long coastline, mountainous interior, numerous uncontrolled airstrips, and
its 193-mile border with the Dominican Republic, as well as its location in
the Caribbean, make it an excellent transit site for drug shipments from
Colombia destined for the United States.
Colombian traffickers are the major players in the drug transportation
business in Haiti. As a result, Colombian organizations have become
entrenched in Haiti, and have cultivated long-standing relationships with
Haitian and Dominican traffickers in order to facilitate their
activities.
Colombian traffickers, operating through Haitian contacts, transport
multihundred-kilogram quantities of cocaine through the southern coast of
Haiti. Colombian traffickers are divided into two groups; those who have
lived in Haiti for some time and control drug operations and those who
routinely travel to Haiti aboard commercial aircraft and vessels.
The three primary methods for smuggling drugs into Haiti are noncommercial
air methods, noncommercial maritime activities (primarily go-fast operations
transiting from Colombia to Haiti's Southern Claw) and containerized cargo on
freighters or commercial/passenger aircraft. As drugs enter Haiti, they are
stored locally until they can be shipped to the United States or Europe.
Drugs are smuggled out of Haiti via coastal freighters or containerized
shipping. The primary shipping routes are:
- Directly to the Miami River/South Florida area from one of several Haitian ports such as Port-au-Prince, Miragoane, St. Marc, Gonaives, Cap Haitien, or Port de Paix. The drugs are typically secreted in hidden compartments within coastal freighters.
- Transferred overland from Haiti to the Dominican Republic and then smuggled across the Mona Passage into Puerto Rico via small vessels. Once in Puerto Rico, the illicit drugs are then hidden in containerized cargo and shipped to the United States or Europe.
- Transferred overland from Haiti to the Dominican Republic and then smuggled into the United States or Europe via containerized cargo. Jimani, Pederales, Malpaso, Dajabon, and Pepilo Salcedo are the border points that are most frequently crossed.
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