Statement by:
William E. Ledwith
Chief of International Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before the:
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources
Date:
February 29, 2000
Note: This document may not reflect changes made in actual delivery.
Chairman Mica, Congresswoman Mink and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee: I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee
today to discuss the issue of the U.S. and Mexican Counter-narcotics efforts.
I would like first to thank the Subcommittee for its continued support of the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and overall support of drug law
enforcement. My testimony today will provide you with an objective assessment
of the law enforcement issues surrounding the drug threat posed by
international drug trafficking organizations operating from Mexico. These
criminal organizations based in Mexico pose the greatest challenge to U.S.
law enforcement agencies charged with enforcing narcotics laws. Due to the
ever-increasing legitimate cross-border traffic and commerce between the U.S.
and Mexico, several international organized crime groups have established
elaborate smuggling infrastructures on both sides of the U.S./Mexico border.
Furthermore, it has long been established that in addition to drug
trafficking, these international criminal organizations spawn violence,
corruption, and intimidation that threaten the safety and stability of our
cities and towns across America.
The complex and sophisticated international drug trafficking groups
operating out of Mexico are oftentimes vicious, destructive entities, that
operate on a global scale. The four largest drug trafficking organizations in
Mexico --- operating out of Guadalajara, Juarez, Mexicali, Tijuana, Sonora,
and the Gulf region --- under the auspices of Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes,
Armando Valencia-Cornelio, Miguel Caro-Quintero, Ramon and Benjamin
Arellano-Felix, and Osiel Cardenas-Guillen are in many ways, the 1990's
versions of the mob leaders and groups that U.S. law enforcement has fought
against since the beginning of last century. These international organized
crime leaders, however, are far more dangerous, far more influential and have
a greater impact on our day-to-day lives than did their domestic
predecessors.
Those international traffickers and their organizations make operational
decisions from places like Sonora, Mexico and other locations outside U.S.
borders, which detrimentally affect the quality of life of our citizens and
directly support drug-related crime in cities and towns across our country.
These groups have reached new levels of sophistication and have become a
threat not only to the United States and Europe, but also to their own
countries. Their power and influence are unprecedented. Unless innovative,
flexible, multi-faceted responses are crafted, these drug trafficking
organizations threaten to grow even more powerful in the years to come.
The Damage to the United States:
In order to understand the extent and nature of the damage caused by
international drug trafficking organizations, it is crucial to look at how
these organizations work, and how they infiltrate and position themselves in
U.S. communities in order to further their goals.
On any given day in the United States, business transactions are being
arranged between the major drug lords headquartered in Mexico and their
surrogates who have established roots within the United States, for the
shipment, storage and distribution of tons of illicit drugs. In the past,
Mexico-based criminal organizations limited their activities to the
cultivation of marijuana and opium poppies for subsequent production of
marijuana and heroin. The organizations were also relied upon by Colombian
drug lords to transport loads of cocaine into the United States, and to pass
on this cocaine to other organizations who distributed the product throughout
the U.S. However, over the past several years, Mexico-based organized crime
syndicates have gained increasing control over many of the aspects of the
cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin and marijuana trades, resulting in increased
threats to the well-being of American citizens as well as government
institutions and the citizens of their own country.
In the recent past, traffickers from Mexico had maintained dominance in
the western part of the United States, and in some Midwest cities. Today, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, along with other law enforcement agencies,
developed evidence leading to indictments demonstrating that associates of
organized crime groups based in Mexico have established themselves on the
East Coast of the United States, thus becoming significant participants in
the nationwide drug trade.
Mexican Traffickers Rise to Prominence:
During 1995 and 1996, intense law enforcement pressure was focused on the
Cali leadership by the brave men and women of the Colombian National Police.
As a result, all of the top trafficking leaders from Cali were either jailed
or killed. During that time frame, U.S. law enforcement agencies were
effectively attacking Colombian cells operating within the United States.
With the Cali leaders imprisoned in Colombia and the successful attacks by
law enforcement on their U.S. cells, traffickers from Mexico took on greater
prominence. A growing alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the
organizations from Mexico worked to benefit both sides. Traffickers from
Mexico had long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine
across the U.S.-Mexico border, using established distribution routes to
deliver drugs throughout the United States. The Mexico-based organizations'
emergence as major methamphetamine producers and traffickers also contributed
to making them a major force in international drug trafficking. The Mexican
traffickers, who were previously paid in cash by the Colombian traffickers
for their services, began to routinely receive up to one-half of a shipment
of cocaine as their payment. This led to Mexican traffickers having access to
multi-ton quantities of cocaine and allowed them to expand their markets and
influence in the United States, thereby making them formidable cocaine
traffickers in their own right.
With the disruption of the Cali syndicate, Mexican groups such as the
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization, the Arellano-Felix cartel, the
Amezcua-Contreras brothers, and the Caro-Quintero group, consolidated their
power and began to dominate drug trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border and
in many U.S. cities. Recent events in Mexico and along the southwest border
emphasize the fact that trafficking groups from Mexico have developed into a
significant force in international organized crime.
Overview of Narcotics Smuggled along the U.S./Mexican Border:
Recent estimates indicate that approximately 55% of the cocaine available
in the United States is transported across the U.S.-Mexico border. Typically,
large cocaine shipments are transported from Colombia, via commercial
shipping, fishing and "Go-fast" boats and off-loaded in Mexico. The cocaine
is transported through Mexico, usually by trucks, where it is warehoused in
cities like Guadalajara, Tijuana or Juarez, that are operating bases for the
major criminal trafficking organizations. The extremely high volume of
vehicular traffic over the U.S./Mexico border allows cocaine loads to be
driven across the border and taken to major distribution centers within the
U.S., such as Los Angeles, New Jersey, Chicago or Phoenix. Surrogates of the
major drug lords wait for instructions, often provided over encrypted
communications devices-- --phones, faxes, pagers or computers---telling them
where to warehouse smaller loads, who to contact for transportation services,
and who to return the eventual profits to. Individuals sent to the United
States from Mexico and often here illegally, have been shown to have
contracted with U.S. trucking establishments to move loads across the
country. Once the loads arrive in an area that is close to the eventual
terminal point, safehouses are established for workers who watch over the
cocaine supplies and arrange for it to be distributed by wholesale dealers
within the vicinity. These distributors have traditionally been Colombian
nationals or individuals from the Dominican Republic, but recently, DEA has
come upon evidence that Mexican trafficking organizations are also directly
involved in cocaine distribution in New York City.
We have not only identified the drug lords themselves, but in most cases,
the key members of their command and control structure. The combined efforts
of the DEA, FBI, DOJ, the U.S. Customs Service and members of state and local
police departments have resulted in the seizure of hundreds of tons of drugs,
hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds and most importantly,
several significant indictments. In fact, some of the leaders of these
organizations---Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Felix, Jesus Amezcua-Contreras,
Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes----have become familiar names in every major law
enforcement department in the United States. Despite this evidence, along
with the notoriety, these traffickers have continued to evade arrest and
prosecution.
The primary reason they have been able to avoid arrest and continue their
criminal enterprise is their ability to intimidate witnesses and assassinate
and corrupt public officials. Clear examples of this point may be cited in
recent efforts to apprehend members of the Arellano Felix cartel and the
Cardenas Guillen cartel, based in Tijuana and Matamoros, Mexico,
respectively. In Tijuana over the past year, Mexican officials, with support
from the DEA, have unsuccessfully attempted to apprehend key traffickers
working for the Arellano Felix organization. In November 1999, major Gulf
cartel drug trafficker Osiel Cardenas Guillen illegally detained and
assaulted two U.S. drug enforcement agents in Matamoros, Mexico, across the
international border from Brownsville, Texas.
Methamphetamine traffickers, oftentimes associated with major Mexican
organized crime groups, obtain the precursor chemicals necessary for
methamphetamine production from sources in other countries, such as China and
India, as well as from rogue chemical suppliers in the United States. In
fact, Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations have become the most
significant distributors in the U.S. of methamphetamine and its precursor
chemicals. Several bulk ephedrine seizures destined for Mexico have focused
attention on the magnitude of ephedrine acquisition by Mexican organized
crime groups. Super methamphetamine labs, capable of producing hundreds of
pounds of methamphetamine on a weekly basis, are established in Mexico or in
California, where the methamphetamine is provided to traffickers to
distribute across the United States.
These methamphetamine organizations based in Mexico also have well
established, polydrug distribution networks in place throughout our country.
The Mexican trafficking organizations have single-handedly created a new
booming demand for methamphetamine, moving it in mass quantities eastward
across the country-far beyond the traditional West and Southwest markets.
Heroin from Mexico now represents 14% of the heroin seized in the United
States by federal authorities, and it is estimated that 43 metric tons of
opium gum was produced in 1999 in Mexico. A recent study conducted by the DEA
indicates that as much as 29% of the heroin being used in the U.S. is being
smuggled in by the Mexico-based organized crime syndicates. Mexican black tar
heroin is produced in Mexico, and transported over the border in cars and
trucks. Like cocaine and methamphetamine, it is trafficked by associates of
the organized criminal groups in Mexico, and provided to dealers and users in
the Southwest, Northwest, and Midwest areas of the United States. At one
time, it was commonplace for couriers to carry two pounds or so of heroin
into the United States; recently, quantities of heroin seized from
individuals has increased as is evidenced by larger seizures in a number of
towns in Texas. This heroin is extremely potent, and its use has resulted in
a significant number of deaths.
Marijuana from Mexico still dominates the illicit U.S. import market
although U.S. experts estimate Mexico's marijuana production at 3,700 metric
tons (compared with 4,600 in 1998 and 4,800 in 1997). In addition, during
1999, the GOM eradicated some 23,547 hectares of marijuana (down from 24,200
in 1998). Seizures of Mexican marijuana have increased from 102 metric tons
in 1991 to 836.3 metric tons in 1999. Marijuana organizations from Mexico are
very powerful and violent. In some places, traffickers from Mexico have
established growing operations within the United States. In a recent case in
Idaho, DEA , working with other federal, state and local law enforcement
officials, arrested a group of illegal aliens from Zacatecas, Mexico. A total
of 114,000 marijuana plants, weighing almost 20 tons, were seized. This
operation represented the largest marijuana seizure ever in the state of
Idaho.
It is important to note that although many of the transactions relating to
the drug trade take place on U.S. soil, the major organized crime bosses
direct each and every detail of their multi-billion dollar business while
situated in Mexico. They are responsible not only for the business decisions
being made, but ultimately for the devastation that too many American
communities have suffered as a result of the influx of cocaine,
methamphetamine, heroin and marijuana. These powerful and organized
syndicates can frustrate the ability of the Mexican anti-drug police. Their
ability to place obstacles such as corruption and unlimited resources in the
path of police can oftentimes impede investigations. In the past year, none
of the major Mexican trafficking organizations have been dismantled or
significantly disrupted by Mexican authorities.
Law Enforcement Response:
Reporting indicates that the Southwest border (SWB) remains a major point
of entry for approximately 70% of all illicit drugs smuggled into our country
by Mexican trafficking groups. In response to this continued threat along the
border, the DEA has established several initiatives that facilitate and
improve intelligence and information sharing, while identifying and removing
impediments to cooperation. These initiatives employ a multi-pronged
strategy, which utilizes and combines law enforcement operations,
intelligence operations, and provides for law enforcement assistance in order
to achieve success in combating criminal drug trafficking organizations along
the border. The objective of these initiatives are to disrupt and ultimately
dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle illicit drugs into the U.S. by
linking Federal, state and local investigations domestically and mobilizing
multilateral enforcement efforts abroad. Based upon past trends,
intelligence, and recent seizures along the border, the DEA has established
the following priorities for the SWB Field Divisions: (1) cocaine
investigations involving violent organizations; (2) methamphetamine
investigations, (3) heroin investigations, (4) marijuana investigations, (5)
money laundering investigations and (6) diverted/dangerous drug and chemical
investigations.
Enforcement Operations/Strategies:
In response to the emergence of these Mexican Drug Trafficking
Organization's (MDTO), it became apparent that a coordinated strategy for law
enforcement counterdrug activities needed to be implemented. In order to
combat drug production and trafficking networks operating along the
U.S./Mexican border, DEA, in concert with other Federal agencies established
the Southwest Border Initiative - an integrated, coordinated law enforcement
effort designed to attack the command and control structure of organized
criminal operations associated with the Mexican Federation. This strategy
focuses on intelligence and enforcement efforts which target drug
distribution systems within the U.S. and directs resources toward the
disruption of those principal drug trafficking organizations operating across
the border.
As such, DEA, in cooperation with other Federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies is focusing increased intelligence, technical resources
and investigative expertise on the major MDTO's responsible for smuggling
vast quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine across the
border.
Apart from this effort, DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
also provide operational planning, intelligence and training to Government of
Mexico (GOM) law enforcement authorities, to strengthen their capacity to
combat these organizations. The Southwest Border strategy targets specific
Mexican trafficking organizations operating across the border and attacks
their command and control infrastructures wherever they operate.
Further, the Special Operations Division (SOD)is a joint national
coordinating and support entity comprised of agents, analysts, and
prosecutors from DOJ, Customs, FBI, DEA and IRS. Its mission is to coordinate
and support regional and national criminal investigations and prosecutions
against trafficking organizations that most threaten the U.S. SOD performs
seamlessly across both investigative agency and district jurisdictional
boundaries, providing field offices with necessary support, assistance,
intelligence analysis and "leads" for investigative action. Within SOD, no
distinction is made among the participating investigative agencies. Where
appropriate, state and local authorities are fully integrated into
coordinated operations. As presently configured, SOD consists of five
sections; each of which has both DEA and FBI personnel assigned. One section
targets Colombian Trafficking Organizations, a second concentrates on cocaine
and heroin trafficking in Europe and Asia, a third targets money laundering
organizations and the remaining two sections are the heart of the Southwest
Border Project and focus their efforts on the principal MDTO's. These two
sections target, among other things, the command and control networks of the
identified MDTO's, and their supporting organizations operating along the
Southwest border. As such, the interagency regional objectives are as
follows; (1) Intelligence collection and analysis, (2) Investigations, (3)
Interdiction and Enforcement and (4) Prosecution and Incarceration. The
following operation delineates the need and significance for such a
multi-agency project:
Operation Impunity:
In September 1999, the DEA announced the conclusion of a two-year
international investigation that culminated in the arrest of over 106
individuals linked to the Amado Carrillo Fuentes (ACF) drug trafficking
organization, headquartered in Cancun, Mexico. This investigation, known as
"Operation Impunity", was a multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency investigation
which directly linked drug trafficking activity in the United States to the
highest level of the Mexican cocaine trade.
This investigation began in January 1998 and was conducted jointly by the
DEA, FBI, USCS, U.S. Attorney's Office, DOJ/Criminal Division and a host of
state and local law enforcement agencies. The investigation encompassed 53
DEA, FBI and USCS case investigations which spans 14 Federal judicial
districts. Since 1998, this investigation has resulted in 36 seizures,
netting 12,434 kilograms of cocaine, a half a kilo of heroin, 4,806 pounds of
marijuana, more than $19 million in U.S. currency, and the arrest of 106
individuals.
The above statistics only tell part of the story. Operation Impunity
demonstrated an unparalleled coordinated and cooperative effort among the law
enforcement community. Overall, this investigation allowed the law
enforcement community to ascertain this organization's method of operation
from the narcotic distribution in Colombia to the transportation through
Mexico to the ultimate distribution networks throughout the U.S. Such success
clearly demonstrates the need for the continuation of long term, multi-agency
investigations.
Cooperative Efforts with the Government of Mexico/Status of Vetted Units:
Subsequent to the arrest of General Gutierrez Rebollo in 1997 and the
establishment of mechanisms within the Mexican law enforcement
infrastructure, such as the Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's) and the Vetted Unit
program, DEA became cautiously optimistic relative to the prospects of the
GOM's commitment to bilateral investigations. The DEA has supported these
programs financially and with other resources in hope that our efforts would
result in a successful attack against the drug lords who are creating so much
havoc throughout communities in the United States. However, continuing
reports of corruption and the rapidly growing power and influence of the
major organized criminal groups in Mexico cause us great concern about the
long-term prospects for success. Perhaps, the arrest of Operation Impunity
target Jaime Aguilar Gastelum and Operation Millennium target Guillermo
Moreno-Rios, by Mexican authorities, is indicative of the GOM's future
commitment to such joint ventures.
However, in the last year the Vetted Units Program in Mexico has not
achieved the potential as originally envisioned by both governments. In order
to presently address this issue, the DEA and the Government of Mexico's
equivalent to the DEA, the Fiscalia Especializada Para la Atencion de Delitos
Contra la Salud (FEADS), have agreed to carefully review the Program and
establish ways to improve its efficiency and effectiveness against mutually
agreed investigative targets. The DEA and FEADS also continue to conduct
joint investigative endeavors throughout Mexico. The joint investigations are
being conducted with the primary investigative component of the FEADS vetted
units --the Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's). However, the DEA has not worked
with the remaining vetted units due to diminished efforts of the Government
of Mexico/PGR to better organize them into a well-engaged work force.
However, the investigative achievements by the BTF and the SIU as related
to cases against the major drug trafficking organizations are minimal. The
inability of these units to fully employ the provisions of the Organized
Crime Law to properly investigate these major organizations has been equally
disappointing. Further complicating investigative efforts, the Mexico
City-based SIU was compromised in February 1999 by a Mexican news
exposé describing the operations of that unit, to include its
location, activities and investigative targets. Because of this setback, the
SIU has been largely shut down, and throughout 1999 to present, the GOM has
failed to revive the unit and is still in the process of searching for a new
site to relocate the SIU. In addition, throughout 1999 police personnel from
the Mexico City SIU were separated into smaller groups and often deployed to
various regions throughout Mexico in order to work other investigations, such
as the search for Mexico fugitive and former Governor of the State of
Quintana Roo Mario Villanueva-Madrid.
In addition, vetted unit personnel of the Organized Crime Unit (OCU), of
which the SIU is a part, have been investigating a drug smuggling network of
the Carrillo-Fuentes organization in Cancun, headed by Alcides Ramon-Magana.
During the course of this investigation, DEA has shared three principal
witnesses with the OCU who have provided information regarding this
organization . The information gleaned from these witnesses has contributed
to the seizure of real estate in Quintana Roo and the arrest of several
defendants in this case, including mid-level drug trafficker and
money-launderer Carlos Colin-Padilla. In addition, the GOM issued arrest
warrants for a total of 44 individuals associated with Ramon-Magana including
an arrest warrant issued on April 5, 1999, against former Governor Villanueva
Madrid on 28 counts of drug related offenses.
The governments of Mexico and the United States will continue to conduct
cooperative and bilateral investigations. Just this month, based upon
information provided by the DEA to the GOM, two such operations were
conducted, resulting in the seizure of a cocaine laboratory and a
methamphetamine laboratory in Mexico. Ultimately, DEA believes that the
vetting process is our best chance at ensuring integrity with our
counterparts. As mentioned in previous testimony today with respect to the
ongoing bilateral Vetted Units Program survey, DEA will remain actively
engaged with our GOM counterparts relative to this process. DEA will also
encourage the GOM to fully staff and support the BTF's and the SIU's with
FEADS personnel that have already been vetted and to supply the resources
that these operations require.
Corruption Issues:
Although the Mexican government is attempting to address the issue of
corruption, it continues to be a serious problem in Mexican law enforcement
institutions. The Federal Preventive Police (FPP) was created in early 1999
in response to the existing corruption in the police ranks, but recently
reported that several FPP agents were under investigation for corrupt
activities. In December 1999 the Government of Mexico/PGR reported that
between April 1997 through 1999 more than 1,400 of the 3,500 federal police
officers had been fired for corruption and that 357 of the officers had been
prosecuted. Additionally, the National Public Safety System established a
national police registry to prevent corrupt police officials from being
rehired by another law enforcement entity. However, the PGR has not fully
implemented these programs to deal with corruption. For example, in 1999, the
former Director of Investigations for the PGR's SIU and OCU, Cuauhtemoc
Herrera Suastegui, was reassigned to a high-level position within the PGR
despite failing a USG-administered polygraph examination in 1998.
Additionally, there are indications that he provided assistance to the
Carrillo-Fuentes drug trafficking organization. Although several FEADS vetted
"floater" units have had several successes during 1999, the Vetted Unit
Program failed to adhere to internal security principles involving the
polygraph process, which may lead to potential compromises and corruption.
The Mexican military also has experienced narco-related corruption within its
ranks.
As of July 1999, an amendment to the Judicial Organic law mandated that
PGR officers, prosecutors, police agents, experts, and pilots assigned to
narcotics eradication duties are required to undergo an evaluation process,
to include background checks and polygraphs.
Judicial efforts to stop corruption are underway. On January 11, 2000, a
Mexican Federal judge issued an arrest warrant for the magistrate who wrongly
freed Adan Amezcua-Contreras, a major methamphetamine trafficker. On February
3, 2000, the Mexican Federal Supreme Court ruled that the suspended Morelos
Governor, Jorge Carrillo-Olea, could be brought to trial for protecting drug
trafficking and kidnapping activities. Olea, a retired general and former
Director of Mexico's civilian intelligence agency (CISN) and former anti-drug
Commissioner for the Attorney General's Office (PGR), was ordered by the
Federal Supreme Court to be placed under house arrest by the PGR. The PGR,
however, has yet to take him into custody. This is the first time the Federal
Supreme Court ruled to refer a Governor or Executive Branch official to
trial.
Perhaps the most alarming incident involving Mexican officials occurred on
November 9, 1999, when a DEA Special Agent, along with a FBI Special Agent
debriefed a Confidential Source in Matamoros, Mexico. During the course of
this debriefing the Special Agents and Confidential Source were surrounded
and physically threatened by documented Mexican trafficker Osiel
Cardenas-Guillen and approximately 15 associates. Each of these associates,
one brandishing a gold-plated automatic assault weapon, were either municipal
or state police officers. Furthermore, despite monitoring the entire incident
over the DEA Special Agent's cellular telephone, whom had called to request
assistance, the Tamaulipas State Judicial Police Commander took no action.
Due only to their resourcefulness and ability to diffuse this potentially
fatal encounter, were the agents and the confidential source able to survive
unscathed. Among other issues, this incident highlights the vulnerability of
DEA and FBI Special Agents working in Mexico.
Status of Extraditions:
The principal leaders of major drug trafficking organizations fear the
threat of extradition to the United States more than any other law
enforcement or judicial tool. Extradition of significant traffickers ensures
that those responsible for the command and control of illicit activities,
including drug smuggling and money laundering, will be held totally
accountable for their actions and serve a prison sentence commensurate with
their crimes.
No major drug traffickers were extradited to the United States in 1999.
The Mexican Government did extradite 10 fugitives on narcotics related or
money laundering offenses in 1999 -- eight U.S. citizens and two Mexican
citizens. One Mexican citizen, a drug trafficker, was sought on drug charges
after escaping from a U. S. prison while serving a sentence on drug related
crimes. The other Mexican citizen, who killed a United States Border patrol
agent, was sought on murder and marijuana smuggling charges.
In September 1998, the Government of Mexico arrested U.S. Citizen and DEA
fugitive Randall Jeffrey Spradling in Guadalajara which, given Spradling's
strong ties to both Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers, was an important
event. He is fighting extradition to the United States.
In the past twelve months, some Mexican Courts have denied extradition of
significant drug traffickers, such as Jaime Ladino-Avila, to the U.S. due to
a variety of reasons, such as outstanding Supreme Court decisions holding
life imprisonment unconstitutional in Mexico. At the end of 1999, there were
40 persons in Mexican custody and subject to extradition proceedings based on
U.S. provisional arrest warrants and extradition requests. However, DEA has
not observed any positive developments with respect to the extradition of
significant drug traffickers in the last year.
Conclusion: The Road Ahead:
The United States' long experience with confronting and dismantling
organized criminal activity has necessitated the development of an
aggressive, cohesive and coordinated strategy to identify, target, arrest and
incapacitate the leadership of these organizations . DEA=s role in addressing
the drug problem is to continue to attack the leadership of these
international criminal organizations. With a strategy consisting of mounting
attacks on the organizational command and control of major Mexican
trafficking syndicates that operate along the U.S./Mexico border, the DEA is
able to attack the ability of these organizations to conduct business and
impede their efforts to import drugs into the U.S.
The effectiveness of national and bilateral efforts against drug
organizations will depend largely on demonstrable progress in disrupting and
dismantling these transnational narco-trafficking organizations. This
includes apprehending, prosecuting and convicting major drug traffickers, as
well as exercising extradition laws against those defendants facing federal
drug trafficking charges in the United States, and exposing and prosecuting
individuals and businesses involved in providing critical support networks
such as front companies, security , transportation and the like.
Therefore, it is imperative for law enforcement to continue to facilitate
the flow of information and intelligence while identifying and removing
impediments to cooperation. In this vein, it is vital for the DEA, along with
other USG agencies, to continue to support the GOM in the field of
counternarcotics operations. In turn, DEA encourages and expects the GOM to
provide adequate investigative manpower, ongoing integrity testing, financial
resources, equipment and reciprocal drug intelligence in support of bilateral
drug law enforcement, which should significantly improve both governments'
ability to counter and eliminate transnational drug trafficking
organizations.
However, the true sign of success regarding anti-drug efforts in Mexico is best recognized with tangible results from concerted law enforcement efforts, i.e. the arrest and successful prosecution of significant leaders of these major drug cartels in Mexico and; where applicable, their extraditions to the United States to face federal drug trafficking charges. We are not yet there.
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