Statement by:
William E. Ledwith
Chief of International Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before the:
House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Date:
February 15, 2000
Note: This document may not reflect changes made in actual delivery.
Chairman Mica and members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure for me to
appear here today to testify on the narcotics crisis in Colombia. We in DEA
believe that the international trafficking organizations based in Colombia
who smuggle their illegal drugs into our country pose a formidable challenge
to the national security of the United States. DEA is proud to play a key
role in the U.S. Government's long-range strategy to assist Colombia in the
counterdrug effort.
DEA is well aware that Colombia not only faces a drug trafficking crisis,
but also is torn by an economic crisis and a generations-long civil conflict.
There are, to be sure, regional and hemispheric concerns for stability rising
from the current situation in Colombia. There is a wide range of witnesses
here today who can, taken together, give you a broad picture. I am here to
comment on the law enforcement aspects of dealing with international drug
trafficking organizations operating in Colombia.
We have the highest confidence in the observations and conclusions we will
share with you today. When DEA operates in foreign posts, we work within the
legal systems of our host nations, of course in accord with U.S. law, and in
cooperation with our host nation police agency counterparts. During our
investigations, in partnership with our host nation counterparts, we gather
and collect a wide range of information, including drug intelligence, on the
trafficking organizations, which we target.
1. DEA TARGETS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
DEA's mission, in Colombia as in other foreign postings, is to target the
most powerful international drug syndicates that operate around the world,
supplying drugs to American communities, and employing thousands of
individuals to transport and distribute drugs. The most significant
international drug syndicates operating today are far more powerful and
violent than any organized criminal groups that we have experienced in
American law enforcement. Today's major international organized crime drug
syndicates are simply this new century's versions of traditional organized
crime mobsters U.S. law enforcement officials have fought since the beginning
of the Twentieth Century. Unlike traditional organized crime, however, these
new criminals operate on a global scale.
Members of international groups headquartered in Colombia and Mexico today
have at their disposal the most sophisticated communications technology as
well as faxes, internet, and other communications equipment. Additionally,
they have in their arsenal: aircraft, radar-equipped aircraft, weapons, and
an army of workers who oversee the drug business from its raw beginnings in
South American jungles to the urban areas and core city locations within the
United States. All of this modern technology and these vast resources enable
the leaders of international criminal groups to build organizations which --
together with their surrogates operating within the United States -- reach
into the heartland of America. The leaders in Colombia and Mexico, by
creating organizations that carry out the work of transporting drugs into the
United States and franchising others to distribute drugs, themselves try to
remain beyond the reach of American justice. The traffickers also have the
financial resources necessary to corrupt law enforcement, military, and
political officials in order to create a relatively safe haven for themselves
in the countries in which they make their headquarters.
As complex as these communications arrangements of organized crime groups
are, U.S. law enforcement agencies have been able to exploit their
communications by using court-approved telephone interceptions. With the top
leadership of these organizations in hiding beyond the immediate reach of
U.S. law enforcement, we have directed our resources at their organizational
structure, and their transportation and distribution elements in the United
States.
We have been able to identify, indict, and in many cases arrest,
international drug traffickers because the very feature of their operations
which makes them most formidable -- the ability to exercise effective command
and control over a far-flung criminal enterprise -- is the feature that law
enforcement can use against them, turning their strength into a weakness.
However, it must be noted that the spread of encryption technology threatens
to remove this essential investigative tool from our arsenal, and poses, in
our view, a threat to the national security of the United States because it
will hamper law enforcement efforts to protect our citizens from drug
trafficking organizations operating abroad.
The international drug syndicates headquartered in Colombia, and operating
through Mexico and the Caribbean, control both the sources and the flow of
drugs into the United States. The vast majority of the cocaine entering the
United States continues to come from the source countries of Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru. Virtually all of the heroin produced in Colombia is
destined for the U.S. market. In fact, Colombia has over the past five years
become the leading source of heroin in the United States. Recent statistical
data indicate that approximately 65% of the heroin seized and analyzed by
Federal authorities in the United States is of Colombian origin. For the past
two decades - up to recent years - crime groups from Colombia ruled the drug
trade with an iron fist, increasing their profit margin by controlling the
entire continuum of the cocaine market. Their control ranged from the coca
leaf and cocaine base production in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, to the
cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) production and processing centers in Colombia, to
the wholesale distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United
States.
Colombian traffickers continue to import cocaine base from the jungles of
Bolivia and Peru, but in ever decreasing amounts. Coca leaf production has
increased dramatically within Colombia itself, however, the traffickers move
the cocaine to the large cocaine HCl conversion laboratories in southern
Colombia. The vast majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl destined for
the United States is produced in these laboratories. Many of these activities
take place in the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of Colombia.
Most of the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of
Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo. This cultivation occurs in areas where there
is limited, if any, government control or presence. Cocaine conversion
laboratories range from smaller "family" operations to much larger
facilities, employing dozens of workers. Once the cocaine HCl is
manufactured, it is either shipped via maritime vessels or aircraft to
traffickers in Mexico, or shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including
the Bahamas Island chain, to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami, and New
York.
Over half of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from
Colombia through Mexico and across U.S. border points of entry. Most of this
cocaine enters the United States in privately-owned vehicles and commercial
trucks. There is new evidence that indicates a few traffickers in Mexico have
gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to
circumvent Colombian middlemen.
Drug trafficking in the Caribbean is overwhelmingly influenced by
Colombian organized criminal groups. The Caribbean had long been a favorite
smuggling route used by the Cali and Medellin crime groups to smuggle cocaine
to the United States. During the late l970's and the l980's, drug lords from
Medellin and Cali, Colombia, established a labyrinth of smuggling routes
throughout the central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and
the Bahamian Island chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling
techniques to transfer their cocaine to U. S. markets. Smuggling scenarios
included airdrops of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off
the coast of Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000
kilograms, and the commercial shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the
port of Miami.
2. CURRENT COLOMBIAN DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS
Colombian drug trafficking groups are no longer the monolithic
organizations they were over most of the past two decades. After Miguel
Rodriguez Orejuela and his confederates in the Cali Cartel were brought to
justice by Colombian authorities in 1995, new groups from the North Valle del
Cauca began vying for control of the lucrative markets on the United States
East Coast, previously dominated by Rodriguez Orejuela. Experienced
traffickers who have been active for years -- but worked in the shadow of the
Cali drug lords -- have more recently proven adept at seizing opportunities
to increase their role in the drug trade. Many of these organizations began
to re-activate traditional trafficking routes in the Caribbean to move their
product to market.
DEA's focus on the Cali organization's command and control functions in
the U.S. enabled us to build formidable cases against the Cali leaders, which
allowed our Colombian counterparts to accomplish the almost unimaginable --
the arrest and incarceration of the entire infrastructure of the most
powerful crime group in history. Although the incarceration of Cali
traffickers may continue to direct a portion of their operation from prison
they are no longer able to maintain control over this once monolithic giant.
Now, the independent groups of traffickers from the Northern Valle del Cauca
have replaced the highly structured, centrally controlled business operations
of the Cali Cartel. These new groups tend to be smaller and less monolithic,
however, they continue to rely on fear and violence to expand and control
their trafficking empires.
DEA has identified the major organizations based on the northern coast of
Colombia that have deployed command and control cells in the Caribbean Basin
to funnel tons of cocaine to the United States each year. Colombian managers,
who have been dispatched to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, operate
these command and control centers and are responsible for overseeing drug
trafficking in the region. These groups are also directing networks of
transporters that oversee the importation, storage, exportation, and
wholesale distribution of cocaine destined for the continental United
States.
In addition to trafficking their own cocaine, organizations operating out
of Colombia supply almost all of the cocaine to the Mexican crime syndicates.
The Mexican organizations purchase cocaine, as well as accepting cocaine in
payment for services, from Colombian groups. This change in the manner in
which business is conducted is also driven by the new trafficking groups in
Colombia, who have chosen to return to the Caribbean to move their cocaine to
the United States.
Mexican organized crime syndicates now control the wholesale distribution
of cocaine in the western half and the Midwest of the United States.
Moreover, the Colombians have franchised to criminals from the Dominican
Republic a portion of the mid-level wholesale cocaine and heroin trade on the
East Coast of the U.S. The Colombian groups remain, however, in control of
the sources of supply. The Dominican trafficking groups, already firmly
entrenched as low-level cocaine and heroin wholesalers in the larger
northeastern cities, were uniquely placed to assume a far more significant
role in this multi-billion-dollar business.
The Dominican traffickers operating in the U.S., and not the Colombians,
are now the ones subject to arrest, while the top level Colombians control
the organization with sophisticated telecommunications. This change in
operations reduces profits somewhat for the syndicate leaders. It succeeds,
however, also in reducing their exposure to U.S. law enforcement. When
arrested, the Dominicans will have little damaging information that can be
used against their Colombian masters. Reducing their exposure, together with
sophisticated communications, puts the Colombian bosses closer to their goal
of operating from a political, legal, and electronic sanctuary. Colombian
drug traffickers' efforts to reduce their exposure is clearly linked to the
1997 change in Colombian constitutional law which, once again, exposes the
Colombians to extradition to the United States for drug crimes.
Colombia has always been the world's number one producer of finished
cocaine HCl. Colombia now also has the dubious honor of also being the
world's largest producer of cocaine base. These changing dynamics highlight
the fact that Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations continue to
dominate the international cocaine trade. Over the past several years,
Colombian coca cultivation and cocaine production have been increasing.
Net cultivation in 1998 was 101,800 hectares, yielding an estimated
437,500 MT of leaf - equal to 435 MT of cocaine base. New data obtained from
DEA's Operation BREAKTHROUGH has since been used by the CIA Crime and
Narcotics Center (CNC) to recalculate how much cocaine may have been produced
in 1998 from Colombia's domestic coca crop. Much of the difference is because
DEA has recently provided new data based on re-calculation of alkaloid
content, crop yield, and lab efficiency in Colombia.
For the above reasons, the CNC now estimates Colombia's potential cocaine
production in 1998 at 435 metric tons, compared to the previous announced
1998 estimate of 165 metric tons. As recently announced, using the updated
cocaine production formula based on the new Operation Breakthrough results,
the CNC now estimates Colombia's potential 1999 cocaine production from
Colombia's domestic coca crop to be 520 metric tons, based on cultivation of
122,900 hectares of coca.
In historical perspective, in 1989 Colombia had 42,400 hectares net
cultivation in coca, after eradicating 640 hectares, and produced 33,900 MT
of leaf. Although there was no official estimate for that year, a comparable
amount of leaf would yield slightly over 65 MT of HCl. It may appear from
these statistics that Colombian production of HCl has increased from 65 MT to
over 435 MT in 10 years. We must bear in mind, however, that the 1989
estimate and the 1998 or 1999 numbers are based on different calculations,
methodology, and levels of confidence . We have, so far, worked the new
formula backward in time only as far as 1995. The 10 year increase might not,
therefore, be quite as dramatic as appears. Net Coca cultivation was about
50,000 hectares in 1995, and has doubled since then - at the same time as net
cultivation decreased in Bolivia and Peru. Interdiction programs like Peru's
operation AIRBRIDGE, which denied Peruvian airspace to traffickers flying
cocaine base into Colombia, forced traffickers to utilize alternative routes
and methods - such as using better communications security during their
flights, flying from closer to the Peruvian border and through Brazilian
airspace, and using riverine routes. The Colombian traffickers also sought to
become more self-sufficient by increasing cocaine base production within
Colombia itself, to offset the decline in base brought in from Peru.
3. COLOMBIAN CRIME GROUPS IN THE U.S.
Colombian cocaine trafficking groups in the U.S. -- consisting of
mid-level traffickers answering to the bosses in Colombia -- continue to be
organized around compartmented "cells" that operate within a given geographic
area. Some cells specialize in a particular facet of the drug trade, such as
cocaine transport, storage, wholesale distribution, or money laundering. Each
cell, which may be comprised of 10 or more employees, operates with little or
no knowledge about the membership in, or drug operations of, other cells.
The head of each cell reports to higher manager who is responsible for the
overall management of several cells. The regional director, in turn, reports
directly to one of the drug lords of a particular organization or their
designee based in Colombia. A rigid top-down command and control structure is
characteristic of these groups. Trusted lieutenants of the organization in
the U.S. have discretion in the day-to-day operations, but ultimate authority
rests with the leadership in Colombia.
Upper echelon and management levels of these cells are normally comprised
of family members or long-time close associates who can be trusted by the
Colombian drug lords -- because their family members remain in Colombia as
hostages to the cell members' good behavior -- to handle their day-to-day
drug operations in the United States. The trusted personal nature of these
organizations makes it that much harder to penetrate the organizations with
confidential sources. That difficulty with penetration makes intercepting
criminal telephone calls all the more vital. They report back to Colombia via
cell phone, fax and other communications methods. Colombian drug traffickers
continually employ a variety of counter-surveillance techniques and tactics,
such as fake drug transactions, using telephones they suspect are monitored,
limited-time use of cloned cell phones (frequently a week or less), limited
use of pagers (from 2 to 4 weeks), and use of calling cards. The top level
managers of these Colombian organizations increasingly use sophisticated
communications, posing a severe challenge to law enforcement's ability to
conduct effective investigations.
4. INSURGENTS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE
There continues to be deep concern in DEA, as in the rest of the
Administration and in the Congress, about the connection between the FARC and
other groups in Colombia and the drug trade. The Colombian government is now
engaged in responding to this challenge. DEA will continue to closely monitor
the situation.
An alliance of convenience between guerillas and traffickers is nothing
new. Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary
alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups.
In each case, this has been done to secure protection for the drug interests.
At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies
to provide security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in
fact, become little more than bands of well-armed thugs selling their
services to drug traffickers.
The presence of the insurgents in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southern
rainforest--the country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing
regions--hinders the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counterdrug
operations. The frequent ground fire sustained by Colombian National Police
eradication aircraft operating in insurgent occupied areas shows the extent
to which some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of
their "local constituents" (i.e., coca farmers and drug traffickers).
Likewise, insurgent attacks continue to pose a threat to CNP personnel,
supported by the DEA conducting operations, against clandestine labs.
Some insurgent units raise funds through extortion or by protecting
laboratory operations. In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange
for weapons, the insurgents protect cocaine laboratories in southern
Colombia. Some FARC and ELN units are independently involved in limited
cocaine laboratory operations.
The most recent DEA reporting indicates that some FARC units in southern
Colombia are indeed directly involved in drug trafficking activities, such as
controlling local cocaine base markets. Some insurgent units apparently have
assisted drug trafficking groups in transporting and storing cocaine and
marijuana within Colombia. In particular, some insurgent units protect
clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia. There remains, however, no
information that any FARC or ELN units have established international
transportation, wholesale distribution, or drug money laundering networks in
the United States or Europe. Northern and central Colombia continues to be
the primary base of operations for paramilitary groups. Recent reporting,
however, indicates that paramilitary groups have become more active in
southern Colombia.
Most of these paramilitary groups do not appear to be directly involved in
any significant coca, opium poppy, or marijuana cultivation. Paramilitary
leader Carlos Castano has recently admitted, however, that his group receives
payments -- similar to the taxes levied by the FARC -- from coca growers in
southern Colombia to protect them from guerrillas, according to press
reporting.
Several paramilitary groups also raise funds through extortion, or by
protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos
Castano organization, and possibly other paramilitary groups, appear to be
directly involved in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary
groups appears to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia.
5. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The Colombian National Police is a major law enforcement organization with
a long and honored tradition of integrity. Under the direct command of
General Rosso Jose Serrano, the CNP has become recognized for its dedication,
patriotism, and commitment to integrity. The CNP has introduced fundamental
changes in the force in order to make it a thoroughly modern and efficient
institution within the context of Colombia and the international
community.
General Serrano has been an effective advocate on behalf of the thousands
of loyal and dedicated Colombian National Police officers within the ranks.
He has encouraged their motivation, even in the face of the tragic losses of
over 900 fellow police officers in the last three years alone. The fact that
the CNP, and other members of Colombia's law enforcement community, were able
and willing to pursue operations against the drug underworld is a testament
to their professionalism and dedication.
All of the top Cali drug lords either have been captured by the CNP, have
died, were killed, or have surrendered to Colombian authorities. These
unprecedented drug law enforcement successes were the culmination of years of
investigative efforts by the CNP, with active support from DEA.
Unfortunately, Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela and his associates, who comprised
the most powerful international organized crime group in history initially
received shamefully short sentences for their crimes. In January 1997,
Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela was sentenced to 10 years in prison on drug
trafficking charges. As a result of Colombia's lenient sentencing laws,
however, Gilberto may serve only five years. Miguel, originally sentenced to
nine years, was later sentenced to 21 years on Colombian charges based on
evidence supplied by the United States Government in the Tampa, Florida,
evidence-sharing case. Miguel is expected to serve less than 13 years in
prison. The Colombian judicial system must be strengthened so that the
traffickers, once convicted, are sentenced to terms commensurate with their
crimes.
The CNP continues to pursue significant drug investigations in cooperation
with the DEA. The CNP is also aggressively pursuing significant counterdrug
operations against cocaine processing laboratories, transportation networks,
and trafficker command and control elements. We expect these operations will
result in prosecutions in both Colombia and the United States.
On October 13, 1999, the CNP, the Colombian Prosecutor General's Office,
DEA, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and Department of Justice Criminal Division
carried out Operation MILLENIUM, a long-term, complex investigation targeting
the inner workings of several of the largest international drug trafficking
organizations operating in Colombia and Mexico, and smuggling their product
into the United States. This operation resulted in the indictment and arrest
of one of the former leaders of the Medellin drug cartel, Fabio Ochoa-Vasquez
along with 30 other defendants. Operation MILLENNIUM effectively targeted
major cocaine suppliers who had been responsible for shipping vast quantities
of cocaine from Colombia through Mexico into the United States. Operation
MILLENNIUM targeted drug kingpin Alejandro Bernal-Madrigal, who, by his own
admission, had been smuggling 30 tons, or 500 million dosage units, of
cocaine into the United States every month. U.S. law enforcement authorities
seized more than 13,000 kilograms of cocaine during the last two weeks of
August alone.
The U.S. Government has requested extradition of all 31. The criminal acts
for which they were arrested all took place after December 17, 1997, the
effective date of Colombian legislation allowing for renewed extradition of
Colombian nationals. It has long been the case that the greatest fear of
these major traffickers is that they could face extradition to the U.S.,
efficient trials, and conviction to terms commensurate with the enormity of
their crimes.
Once the extraditions of the MILLENIUM targets are completed, the
operation will be the most successful and significant drug enforcement event
since the elimination of the Medellin cartel. Operation MILLENIUM would
simply not have been possible without the dedicated cooperation of the CNP
and the Colombian Prosecutor General's Office.
6. OVERVIEW OF PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS:
Due to the precarious and ever-changing dynamics of the cocaine trade in
South America, the DEA Bogota Country Office (BCO), in conjunction with the
United States Embassy in Colombia, developed strategies to identify,
investigate and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. The DEA South
American Regional Plan (SARP) and the United States Mission Performance Plan
(MPP) are the primary strategies developed by the BCO and U.S. Embassy in
Colombia to direct and guide DEA and U.S. counter-drug efforts in Colombia.
In essence, the SARP and the MPP prioritize targeting the significant drug
trafficking organizations operating throughout Colombia. The SARP and MPP are
the foundation of the BCO Work Plan. Essentially, the BCO Work Plan is based
on the premise that the organizations controlling the manufacture and
transportation of cocaine HCl are the most vulnerable elements of the drug
trafficking organizations. As such, the BCO directs available resources at
these factions in an effort to identify and ultimately immobilize them.
Based upon the BCO Work Plan, the BCO will enhance resources in the area
known as the Colombian Source Zone. This is an area southeast of the Andes
mountains characterized by few roads, no rail transportation, very little
commercial air traffic, many clandestine airstrips and an extensive river
system linking this area to Peru, Brazil and Venezuela. The BCO and United
States Country Team believe that by augmenting resources in the Colombian
Source Zone, the amount of cocaine HCl available for transportation to the
United States will be significantly reduced.
As in the past, the BCO will continue to direct assets and resources at
the command and control structures of major drug trafficking organizations
operating throughout Colombia. These organizations operate primarily
northwest of the Andes Mountains and throughout major Colombian cities. These
organizations also control transportation of cocaine HCl from the Colombian
Transit Zone (that area adjacent to both Colombian coasts) to the United
States, as well as other countries, for eventual distribution.
As alluded to earlier, the BCO has noted a significant increase in
seizures of Colombian heroin, both in Colombia and the United States. The BCO
will strengthen its resources dedicated to targeting the organizations
controlling the manufacture and transportation of heroin from Colombia to the
United States.
All BCO programs, in one form or another, will focus on the identification
and immobilization of major drug trafficking organizations operating
throughout Colombia. To further augment these objectives, programs such as
the Andean Initiative, Sensitive Investigations Unit, and Intelligence
Collection will be the primary support for the BCO's enforcement efforts.
These programs will be further enhanced through the Information
Analysis/Operations Center (IA/OC). All programs targeting major drug
trafficking organizations will be in conjunction with the United States
Embassy counterdrug strategy and the MPP.
Furthermore, the Sensitive Investigation Units, Heroin Task Force,
Operation Selva Verde, and other units such as the Commando Especial del
Ejercito will be tasked to initiate significant investigations targeting the
command and control structure of the major drug trafficking organizations.
These units will target organizations operating in the Colombian Source Zone
and other areas of Colombia. The units will be encouraged to work
simultaneously with DEA domestic offices to investigate major drug
trafficking organizations. In addition, the BCO will continue to enhance and
promote host nation and regional counterdrug cooperation throughout the
area.
To effectively attain each of the goals set forth in the 2000 SARP, it is
the BCO's conviction that joint investigations between Colombian and U.S.
authorities will garner the most significant and damaging results against
international drug trafficking organizations. As revealed in Operation
MILLENNIUM, such endeavors require extensive coordination among a myriad of
agencies, both in Colombia and the United States, respectively. Given this,
the BCO is continuing to break new ground in this area and believes several
significant investigations will result from this continued cooperation.
7. CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build
cases against the leaders of the new criminal groups from Colombia. These
criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing
from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than
their predecessors. A number of initiatives hold particular promise for
success:
- The U.S. Embassy's Information Analysis/Operations Center (IA/OC) will be increasingly utilized to coordinate and analyze tactical information regarding the activities of drug trafficking groups active in the Colombian territories south and east of the Andes Mountains. The IAOC is comprised of personnel from the DEA Bogota Country Office and the U.S. Military's Tactical Analysis Team. Support and staffing also are provided by the Defense Attaché Office and the State Department. Furthermore, the IA/OC will remain instrumental in the continuance of DEA's support for the host nation communications intercept program, which provides intelligence about the organizations controlling the manufacture and movement of cocaine. This organization should be the focal point for counterdrug intelligence and law enforcement cooperation in Colombia.
- The special program of vetted units, funded by the U.S. Congress under the Vetted Unit Initiative, will make it possible to convert existing partially vetted units of the CNP into fully vetted teams. These teams of investigators will work closely with DEA and will conduct high level drug investigations.
- We intend to carry out even more of the cutting-edge, sophisticated investigations like MILLENIUM, as part of a joint Criminal Division/DEA bilateral case initiative with our Colombian counterparts. Such operations benefit from the closest possible cooperation between the DEA and CNP. These investigations will continue to lead to the dismantling of major portions of the most significant drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia today. Operation MILLENNIUM successfully targeted traffickers who had previously operated without fear of capture or prosecution in the United States, believing that only their low-level operatives were at risk. These operations effectively demonstrated that even the highest level traffickers based in foreign countries could not conduct drug operations inside the United States with impunity. Operation MILLENNIUM was made possible by direct support from the governments of Colombia and Mexico, in addition to collaborative efforts between the DEA and foreign law enforcement agencies. These operations underscore the importance of cooperation among international drug law enforcement agencies.
- DEA will continue to work closely with specially trained and vetted Colombian task force units to develop joint cases, such as Operation MILLENNIUM. Plan Colombia provides for specific support for these types of initiatives, including training and support for a counter narcotics task force and an anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture task force. We look forward to supporting these training programs and then working with our Colombian counterparts in the day-to-day investigative work, which leads to successful cases.
- DEA supports Plan Colombia. DEA will continue to work closely with specially trained and "vetted" Colombian law enforcement units, other Colombian law enforcement agencies and Colombian prosecutors to initiate joint investigations such as Operation MILLENNIUM.
- Colombia faces dramatic challenges to the rule of law, many of which are directly related to drug trafficking. Plan Colombia addresses many of these elements. The support to multilateral investigations, counter drug units and money laundering sections of the Justice Initiative portion of Plan Colombia can support DEA, Colombian National Police, DAS, and Colombian Prosecutors efforts to fight drug trafficking in Colombia.
The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting
the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. In particular, we
will continue to work with our partners in Colombia -- and throughout the
world -- to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug
smuggling. The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice
the drug lords who control their vast empires of crime which bring misery to
the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and
convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate
with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to
face justice in U.S. courts.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
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