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Homeland Security

Congressional Research Service . Library of Congress . Washington, D.C. 20540

Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism in a

Changing Global Environment

December 13, 2000

Prepared by

Raphael F. Perl

Specialist in International Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service

in a Changing Global Environment

Statement of Raphael Perl, Specialist in International Affairs

Congressional Research Service

before the

House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime

December 13, 2000

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee.

 

I appear today in my capacity as a specialist at the Congressional Research Service [CRS]. I thank the Committee for the opportunity to appear here and address the issue of the threat posed by the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

Globalization presents the opportunity for "domestic" crime to transform itself into a national and international security issue.

Organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are nothing new. What most observers see as new is the expanding scale of current operations; the ability of such operations to threaten important national and international interests; and the increasing complexity of responding to transnational criminal activity.

The globalization of the international economy, the internationalization of markets, and the integration of organized criminal activity into this changing market structure have transformed largely domestic criminal issues to issues with broader implications.

Many nations increasingly live in a world affected by global trends of deregulation, open borders, and freer movement of people, money, goods and services. In today's global economy we have also often witnessed the spread of (1) democracy; (2) capitalism and free trade; and (3) global access to information and new technologies.

In this connected world, this global village, traditional time, distance, and spacial barriers are increasingly broken down by advanced technology. This globalization can facilitate the ability of drug traffickers, terrorist, and other criminal organizations to operate in relatively unregulated environments. Moreover, the development of the world economy and modern communications systems have made it possible for relatively small groups and even private individuals to amass wealth at a levels generally attainable by nation states.

Illegitimate business activity, criminal activity, and terrorist activity, like legitimate business activity, seek new opportunities for expansion, safehaven, and profit. Transnational crime goes where the money is, or where the money or the operations generating it are protected. And terrorists obviously seek soft targets and unregulated or politically friendly operating environments. In today's world, opportunities for profit, protection, and the commission of terrorist acts are often available in a global transnational environment.

The distinction between drug trafficking, terrorism, and other forms of criminal activity is becoming increasingly blurred.

Increasingly, we see a blurring--an overlapping symbiotic relationship--between terrorism, drugs, and organized crime. Terrorism and drug trafficking are both specialized forms of criminal activity.

Drugs and terrorism often cut across traditional bureaucratic and subject jurisdictions and structures. Today there are some 50 U.S. agencies with some degree of counterdrug responsibilities and at least 12 federal agencies with important counterterrorism responsibilities.

Drug trafficking, terrorism, and other organized criminal activity are generally clandestine activities that share operational similarities. Terrorists, like drug traffickers and other criminal groups, need weapons and engage in violence to achieve goals. Terrorists, like other criminal groups, are often involved in hiding and laundering sources of funds. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other criminal groups operate transnationally and often seek logistical and operational support from local communities.

Terrorists and drug traffickers often rely on the criminal community for support: they may need smuggled weapons, forged documents and safehouses to operate effectively. As a practical matter, this means that drug traffickers and terrorists can become increasingly vulnerable to effective law enforcement activity.

Terrorists increasingly rely on drug money for funding.

Terrorists and criminals alike need a steady cash flow to operate. In the case of terrorists, where state sources of funding may be diminishing, drug trafficking is an attractive funding option. Increasingly, terrorist organizations are looking to criminal activity and specifically the drug trade as a source of funding. The FARC in Colombia is but one of many cases in point. It is estimated that drug trafficking activity generates between $400 and $600 million of tax free dollars a year for FARC guerrilla coffers.

In the case of North Korea, some analysts have suggested that North Korean government-supported criminal activity, carefully targeted to meet specific needs, generated at least $85 million in 1997: $71 million from drugs and $15 million from counterfeiting. Estimates vary, but most observers believe that the total figure is at least $100 million. However, there are indications that the figures may be considerably higher: $500 million to $1 billion annually generated by criminal activities.

Differences exist, however, between drugs and terrorism. The drug trade has a strong demand component. In contrast, there is no addiction-based international demand for terrorism. Profit drives the drug trade. Terrorists do need money to operate, but for the terrorist, funding generally is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Political ideology, radical religious viewpoints, alienation, or revenge, and not a desire for financial profit, usually drive terrorist activity. A central characteristic often used to distinguish terrorism from profit-motivated common crime is the willingness of terrorists to go after often random innocent targets in the claimed pursuit of some greater cause.

Once engaged in drug trafficking activity, organizations and nations find it hard to stop.

One danger facing organizations and governments involved in drug trafficking and criminal activity is that the illicit activity can become institutionalized, and the income generated, addictive. It has been suggested that should organizations such as the FARC or the North Korean regime desire to end drug trafficking and other criminal activities, they might find it difficult to do so.

Drug trafficking organizations are increasingly seen as a threat to society because of their corrupting and politically destabilizing influence.

To many drug policy analysts, a danger of the drug trade beyond drug use itself is the corrupting power of the organizations engaged in the trade. Funded by drug trafficking, organizations can gain the resources, routes, and networks to engage in a whole series of other forms of criminal activity, including illicit arms trading, possible proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons, technology theft, smuggling of aliens, extortion, and even smuggling of stolen body parts. The policy response to such developments by a number of governments has been to disrupt drug organizations wherever possible, regardless of whether such activity results in a reduction of available drug supply in the involved country.

After the collapse of the Soviet empire and as some nations attempt to redefine themselves geographically with borders to accommodate indigenous ethic groups, what is often a loss of centralized control provides fertile ground for breakdowns in law and order. A growth of criminal organizations, particularly those engaged in the illicit production and smuggling of narcotics, can easily follow, especially if financed from without. Such organizations can threaten the stability of fragile governments and subvert emerging democratic institutions. Moreover, opportunities for active expansion of their smuggling activities into the national security-sensitive areas such as weapons proliferation may be available. A related problem arises as members of ruling elites use state-protected channels to facilitate drug-trafficking activities. The possible emergence of such "narcocracies," proliferating criminal organizations engaged in the drug trade could be an increasing problem in the coming decade.

Insurgency and limited guerrilla warfare were threats that characterized the cold war environment. Drug trafficking, terrorism, and crime appear to be growing threats in the post cold war environment. And as we move into the twenty-first century, the transnational criminal or terrorist may become a more important actor.

Governments often compartmentalize their organizational structures and response to criminal activity when drug trafficking and terrorism are involved.

To some degree governments have established an compartmentalized way of looking at drugs, terrorism, and crime as phenomena distinct and separate in and of themselves. In today's environment, these approaches may need to be reexamined. What some have characterized as a new and growing opportunistic relationship between drugs, terrorism, and organized crime could well result in an increased role of law enforcement and counterdrug personnel in counterterrorism, and an expanded role for counterdrug and terrorism personnel in anti-crime policy planning and implementation. Changes of this kind could prompt a reassessment of concepts, responsibilities, capabilities, and methodologies. For example, the incorporation of the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) into the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) could reflect this kind of operational shift.

Loss of tax revenue from organized criminal activity is a major global problem.

Perhaps even more important to many economies is the issue of tax evasion by groups engaged in large scale criminal activity. Throughout the world, governments are experiencing fiscal deficits. The demand for their services rises; meanwhile, their tax base is often dramatically eroding.

Challenges. A major challenge facing policy makers is how to develop a less congenial and more costly operating environment for drug traffickers, terrorists, and other organized criminal groups. Such a response is complicated by the fact that although linkages among these groups and their activities are increasing, we are generally not dealing with monolithic groups. Instead, we are dealing with different organizations, structures, activities, operating modes, and agendas.

Analysts argue that the aggregate potential threat posed by such groups should not be underestimated. In countries like Russia, the rampant spread of such activity can result in increased popular support for old authoritarian methods, at the expense of weak democratic institutions.

Policy Options. Numerous approaches for responding to this challenge have been proposed.

1. Enhancing policy emphasis and public awareness concerning the major criminal/drug trafficking/ or terrorist organizations and the threats they pose. In effect, continued implementation of a prioritized "crime kingpin strategy": identifying involved organizations, and their strengths and vulnerabilities.

2. Instituting a requirement for an annual report to Congress, possibly integrating international crime, drug trafficking, and terrorist activity into one strategic document.

3. Creating new mechanisms, or enhancing utilization of existing mechanisms, to facilitate law-enforcement cooperation. This includes increased cooperation between domestic police agencies as well as regional and international law enforcement alliances. Criminal activity knows no borders, but the law enforcement community frequently runs up against many types of jurisdictional boundaries. Increasingly, criminals are forming multilateral alliances and to be competitive, nations may have to do the same. Agendas on the nation state level could include: harmonization of laws, information exchange, customs cooperation, law enforcement cooperation, multilateral training programs, and exchange of personnel, passage and implementation of conventions such as the OAS arms control convention, and conventions to see that exports such as precursor chemicals or weapons go to the correct recipient.

4. Promoting endeavors to encourage international legal harmonization and interoperability of legal systems.

5. Promoting, in a way that respects civil liberties, international law-enforcement tools. Proponents have argued for:

.Training programs to identify and flag non-random criminal activity;

.Hiring of linguists;

.Reward-sharing programs;

.Witness protection programs;

.Waiver of bank-secrecy arrangements;

.Promoting criminal-conspiracy legislation abroad; and

.Promoting asset seizure and forfeiture laws abroad

6. Enhancing linkages between crime-related law enforcement intelligence and crime-related national security intelligence on the strategic and operational levels.

7. Mobilizing the private sector. Much organized crime preys on the private sector, which in turn takes extraordinary measures to protect itself from loss. One proposal calls for more public/private partnership initiatives to combat organized crime.

8. Further restrictions on money laundering and tax havens. This could include barring them from access to international banking clearinghouses.

9. Promoting research to examine the feasibility of international or specialized national criminal courts to handle issues such as money-laundering.

10. Promoting transparency and openness in government and banking. Proponents assert that criminal activity hates openness, for openness could mean exposure. A free and secure press is also seen as playing an important role here. Proponents argue that the murder of journalists is common in countries where organized crime and corruption flourish. Strong money-laundering legislation is seen as central to such transparency.

11. Promoting corruption safeguards worldwide. Instruments can include investigatory commissions, campaign finance reforms, financial disclosure requirements for public officials, special offices in the ministry of justice to deal with corruption, anti-bribery laws, and witness protection programs. Proponents argue it is not enough to have safeguards on the book. To be effective, they believe that such deterrents must be enforced with convictions and jail time.

In the coming decade, organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are likely to receive increased attention in the law enforcement, foreign policy, and national defense communities. The challenges associated with realistically assessing threats, allocating resources, and insuring an effective congressional role in combating organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking are complex. Addressing these problems, according to many observers, will require bringing together the diverse elements of the anti-crime, drug and terrorism communities to share information, experiences, ideas, and suggestions about how to deal more effectively with law enforcement, national security, and public policy concerns.



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