Homeland Security

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. BLITZER

CHIEF

DOMESTIC TERRORISM/COUNTERTERRORISM PLANNING SECTION

NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

HEARING BEFORE THE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

NOVEMBER 4, 1997

Thank you Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to address the committee on the FBI's role in the Federal response to the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) against the United States and the preparedness initiatives we have undertaken in the interagency setting.

It is essential to understand that any criminal use of WMD against the United States, its population, interests, or critical infrastructure will be considered an act of terrorism. Because of mandates set out in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39 and existing and newly created statutory requirements, including the Antiterrorism and Intelligence Authorization Acts and the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, today it is more difficult for those who may be planning to commit such heinous crimes to carry them out. The proactive measures that our interagency efforts have instituted thus far are intended to prevent terrorist use of WMD.

Prior to the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombing investigations and the sarin gas attack in Tokyo by the Aum Shinrikyo, the FBI dedicated a very small staff to the area of WMD terrorism. Realizing the potential for future mass casualty types of attacks, the Congress provided sufficient funding for the addition of personnel to the FBI's Counterterrorism Program. Part of the resources and the funding resulted in the creation of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) at FBIHQ which spans both the International and Domestic Terrorism Sections. Eighteen USG agencies, including our primary colleagues noted above, are represented in the CTC. Additionally, we have created two WMD units: one to address operations, cases, and threats, which have tripled in 1997 over those in 1996, and one to implement the Countermeasures Program, which includes exercises, deployments, and the First Responder Initiative.

Established policy, including PDD-39, identifies the FBI's lead role in an operational response to any act of terrorism in the U.S. Included are those which may involve a WMD. The potential impact of such an event, coupled with the response necessary for its complete resolution, transcends any one agency's abilities to fully manage such a crisis. A WMD terrorist attack may be catastrophic, and will require a unified approach among all Federal resources and cooperation among Federal, state, and local governments for definitive success.

Within its responsibility to take proactive measures involving prevention, and the formulation and execution of a response to terrorist incidents, the FBI has worked closely with the five other agencies that make up the nucleus of the response against WMD. These agencies include the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Public Health Service (PHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The FBI also maintains extensive liaison with members of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and others on WMD and counter-proliferation matters.

Let me now briefly articulate the initiatives and projects we have undertaken since the March 1996 hearings:

Coordination and Planning

We have developed "Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a Domestic Terrorist Threat or Incident in Accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 39", also known as the "Domestic Guidelines". Upon approval of the Attorney General and the President, these guidelines will serve to enhance the capability of the U.S. Government (USG) to respond effectively to potential or actual significant terrorist threats directed against the United States or its territories. These guidelines are formulated to facilitate interagency coordination in support of the lead Federal agency's mission to combat terrorism in the United States. The guidelines reflect the direction set forth in PDD-39: the FBI will serve as on-scene manager of the incident; FEMA will act as lead Federal agency in executing a consequence management response; and other agencies will provide the On-Scene Commander (OSC) with appropriate support.

Further, in accordance with PDD-39 we have formulated the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) to expeditiously provide expert advice and guidance to the FBI OSC and to coordinate needed follow-on response assets. This specialized interagency team would be deployed upon the request of the FBI in response to a significant threat or act of terrorism. The exact composition of the DEST will be determined by the FBI, in consultation with supporting Federal agencies, on a case-by-case basis. In view of its urgent nature, the DEST is designed to consist only of relevant agencies needed to respond to the specific incident at hand. As such, when appropriate, the DEST will include modules for specific types of incidents to include WMD.

We have also engaged in a major planning effort to develop an interagency Concept Plan (CONPLAN) for an integrated U.S. Government response to a domestic WMD threat or situation. The CONPLAN is intended to integrate the plans and procedures of individual agencies and departments with responsibilities to respond to a WMD incident and to establish a conceptual framework for a truly integrated Federal crisis and consequence WMD response. The plan specifies which USG assets are deployed, the conditions for deployment, the priority of their movement, and how they are operationally engaged within the FBI's crisis management structure.

To date, the FBI has participated in over 30 exercises involving WMD to test and improve operational readiness plans and procedures. Most of the exercises serve to clarify individual agency roles and responsibilities and improve overall communication and coordination among Federal, state, and local resources.

To ensure Bureau-wide consistency with these initiatives and national level policies for counterterrorism operations, the FBI has developed new Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plans (WMDICP). These plans highlight the Bureau's policy for crisis management of WMD terrorist events, and contain reference information to assist FBI field office personnel in the development of site-specific Incident Contingency Plans. The plans detail the decisions required by Department of Justice (DOJ) and the sequence of actions required to appropriately guide, oversee, and support successful execution of the U.S. Government response to a WMD threat or incident. Unclassified versions of these plans will be shared with our Federal, state, and local emergency responder counterparts to ensure a unified approach to the on-scene management of the crisis. In addition, the Incident Contingency Plans also delineate the many FBI components with specific responsibilities during a WMD terrorist incident, including those resources located at FBI Headquarters and Quantico, Virginia:

Internal FBI Response Assets

The following FBI internal assets are available to assist the On-Scene Commander during a WMD incident:

• The Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures Unit (WMDCU) is responsible for managing the deployment of the DEST, previously described. The DEST is deployed at the request of the Director through the Attorney General. It is an enhanced specialized interagency team capable of responding to WMD incidents for purposes of providing advice and guidance to the OSC concerning Federal response capabilities for use in resolving a WMD incident. DEST also has limited operational capability. WMDCU is also responsible for WMD exercises, the First Responder Training Program, and countermeasures planning.
• The WMD Operations Unit (WMDOU) serves as the FBIHQ program manager for WMD threats and incidents, including coordination of the threat credibility assessment process. The WMDOU provides a point-of-contact for operational advice and assistance to the field and maintains extensive liaison with the other Federal agencies involved in WMD matters. This unit provides the primary staffing for the FBI Headquarter's Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) during exercises and actual occurrences.
• The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) provides rapid assistance to field elements involved in incidents of a crisis nature. CIRG provides a comprehensive crisis management capability, as well as tactical resources including the Hostage Rescue Team, hostage negotiation specialists, aviation support, and criminal investigative support, including the Profiling and Behavioral Analysis Unit (PBAU).
• The Laboratory Division contains several units with capabilities that would support the FBI's On-Scene Commander during a WMD terrorist incident. The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) is responsible for directing the proper evidence handling procedures in a contaminated environment and for providing expert technical assistance to FBI personnel conducting the investigation. The Evidence Response Team Unit coordinates and manages the FBI's Evidence Response Team (ERT) program, which is designed to train and equip field personnel to conduct crime scene searches and collect evidence. The Chemistry/Toxicology Unit provides technical advice and scientific analysis.
• Finally, the Information Resources Division (IRD) contains several teams available to support the On-Scene Commander, including the Crisis Response Team and the Rapid Start Team. The Crisis Response Team is responsible for providing command logistical support. The Rapid Start Team (RST) is designed to streamline and organize the information flow of major cases to readily track leads, prioritize information, and easily retrieve information for future prosecution.

Domestic Training Initiatives

The FBI also plays a major role in the development and delivery of the Domestic Preparedness Program in accordance with the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. Federal partners from DoD, FEMA, DOE, PHS, EPA, and the FBI are providing training and assistance to "First Responders", or the police officers, firefighters, and emergency management and medical personnel, as well other agencies with appropriate expertise and jurisdiction that will be the first on the scene of a domestic terrorist incident. The FBI's contribution to the training includes an assessment on the WMD domestic threat and a discussion on the integration of the Federal response with that of the local incident command structure. In addition, the FBI has partnered with FEMA in the development of the Senior Officials' Workshop designed to instruct community leaders and department heads on the details of Federal response procedures. Included in the goal of this effort is the promotion of regular dialogue for planning, training, and exercising among members of the community and regionally assigned personnel from the FBI and other Federal agencies. These contributions are important because FBI offices located in most metropolitan areas and in many small towns across the country will be among the first Federal responders to the scene of a WMD terrorist incident.

Also in accordance with the Domestic Preparedness Program, the interagency group has established a 24 hour hotline to enhance information response time in an emergency situation, such as a terrorist event involving WMD. The hotline's purpose is to field emergency calls from First Responders, and provide them with the expert advice they need as quickly as possible. The hotline, which is being developed in cooperation with the National Response Center, will alert the FBI and DoD simultaneously, thereby improving the overall capabilities of local and Federal responses.

Because chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorist threats or incidents are increasing, it is imperative that the FBI, as a law enforcement agency, coordinate the domestic response with other Federal agencies in a unified U.S. Government approach in support of state and local responders to neutralize or mitigate the WMD threat or incident. In order to provide critical training to FBI personnel, we have conducted three WMD counterterrorism and proliferation training courses this past Fiscal Year. The main objective of these courses is to provide recipients with an understanding of Federal agencies' roles and capabilities as well as Federal interaction with state and local agencies. The courses have included presentations and valuable information from FEMA, DOE, DoD, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), EPA, and PHS.

To date, 156 FBI Special Agents have completed this training. Two additional courses are planned for early FY98. The first course will mirror the previous three courses of FY97, and will be offered to new agents in the field of WMD. Subsequent courses will be advanced courses designed to convey a better understanding of the working parts of WMD technologies, delivery systems, and detection equipment.

In addition, interagency WMD workshops were co-sponsored by DOE and the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA). The basic objective of these workshops is to provide participants with an overview of the technical and threat aspects of WMD. The workshops also provide participants with a basic understanding of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies, delivery systems, and detection equipment, and consequence management responsibilities and capabilities.

In light of the Bureau's commitment to our field WMD personnel, the WMD workshop provides an excellent orientation for FBI personnel dedicated to WMD matters. DOE and DSWA have been extremely cooperative in providing additional slots for attendance of our personnel at these workshops. Since the first workshop was conducted in May 1996, more than 30 FBI Special Agents have received training.

The FBI's Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section (DT/CTPS) is currently working in conjunction with the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) to assure that both FBI and DOE field elements and local law enforcement are aware of their responsibilities and roles involving terrorist incidents at DOE sites.

International Training Initiatives

Recognizing the serious threats to U.S. national security posed by the proliferation of WMD, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 provided up to $10 million in reprogrammed Department of Defense (DOD) funds for the development and implementation of a joint counterproliferation initiative intended to train foreign law enforcement personnel to detect, prevent, and investigate incidents involving the illegal trafficking in WMD, and to improve U.S. efforts to deter the possible proliferation and acquisition of WMD in eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). So far, we have provided basic counterproliferation training for officials from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; officials from other countries of the Former Soviet Union are scheduled to receive this training in 1998 and the out-years. This program is intended to assist these nations in the establishment of a professional cadre of law enforcement personnel who are trained to prevent, deter, and investigate any aspect of crimes related to the proliferation and diversion of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems, as well as illicit trade in related materials. The DoD-FBI counterproliferation program also calls for the provision of a certain amount of detection equipment, as appropriate, and examination of the legal systems of these countries to suggest improvements to their ability to prosecute those involved in illegal proliferation activities.

Counter-Proliferation Program

The Bureau views the proliferation of WMD as a serious threat to national security. WMD proliferation is defined as the spread of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery. Examples include international transactions involving actual weapons, weapon delivery systems, plutonium, highly enriched uranium, diagnostic scientific equipment needed to conduct tests of weapon designs, and technology needed to produce weapons. WMD proliferation often centers on western countries, including the U.S., as a source of the raw technology and dual-use items needed for a foreign nation's WMD development program.

The mission of the FBI's proliferation program is the prevention of the malevolent use or proliferation of WMD through investigations, international cooperation, and proactive domestic programs. Our investigations attempt to prevent the acquisition or use of WMD devices by terrorists or others, uncover the breadth of proliferation activity, determine the modus operandi of proliferators, and curb the activities of terrorists and proliferators within the U.S. through aggressive law enforcement action.

WMD Cases and Trends

Reviewing the number of cases opened under the Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section's (DT/CTPS) WMD program since its inception highlights the program's continued growth. The WMD-related cases over the past two years include violations of the Atomic Energy Act, the Prohibition Against Possession of Nuclear Materials, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. Some examples of the violations included sabotage of nuclear facilities; illegal possession of radioactive by-product material; threats to sell or use nuclear material; threats to import nuclear material; use, possession, transfer, production, and transport of WMD; attempt to use, possess, obtain, manufacture, or transport WMD; and WMD threats, both credible and non-credible. This year, the number of chemical or biological cases under investigation tripled over those opened during calendar year 1996. The number of nuclear or radiological cases have remained proportionately equal for both years.

Conclusion

Our primary goal in the WMD program is to prevent a WMD incident from occurring. Secondly, we must ensure we have the capabilities to respond swiftly and decisively should an attack occur.

Through our investigations and active cooperative exchanges with the intelligence community, we remain alert for criminal or terrorist intentions to acquire or employ a WMD. Our capabilities to respond to threats of use of WMD are improving through active coordination with our colleagues in the Federal, state, and local level agencies. We are developing, planning, and providing WMD-related training for our personnel and the local response community. We are analyzing interagency exercises conducted to date, devoted to both crisis and consequence management of WMD threats, and intend to develop and participate in new exercises.