STATEMENT
OF THE
INSTITUTE OF MAKERS
OF EXPLOSIVES
ON
H.R. 1710, Title lll, Section 305, and Title V
(Relating To Taggants In Explosives)
BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 13, 1995
Institute of Makers of Explosives
1120 19th Street, N.W., Suite 310
Washington, D.C. 20036-3605
(202) 429-9280 FAX (202) 293-2420
OUTLINE OF STATEMENT
I . Introduction
Il. Description of Institute of Makers of Explosives
Ill. Description of Commercial Explosives Industry and
Regulations
IV. IME's Position on HR 1710
A. Overview
B. Study v. Reasonable Regulation
V. Identification Taggants
A. Safety of Taggants
B. Environmental Concerns with Taggants
C. Feasibility of Taggants
D. Effectiveness of Taggants
E. Cost of Taggants
F. Tagging in Switzerland
Vl. Detection Markers
Vll. Permitting of Purchasers of Explosives
Vlll . Conclusion
I. INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTE OF MAKERS OF EXPLOSIVES
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I am
Christopher Ronay, the President of the Institute of Makers
of Explosives (I ME), and I am accompanied by members of I
ME's Board of Governors, Mr. David True, Vice President of
Austin Powder Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and Mr. Paul
Rydlund, Vice President of El Dora do Chemical Company of
St. Louis, Mo. We appreciate the opportunity to present
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 1710,
the Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995 and, in
particular, on the sections related to tagging explosives.
My statement will be brief and to the point. It is more
fully amplified in I ME's written statement which I
understand will be made a part of the record. Following my
short statement, Mr. True, Mr. Rydlund, and myself will be
happy to respond to your questions.
Prior to my joining the IME last fall, l was Chief of
the FBI Explosives Unit. l spent 18 years of my career with
that unit and during that time have been personally involved
with the bombing investigations under the Bureau's
jurisdiction, including the bombing of Pan Am 103, the World
Trade Center in New York, and the UNABOM investigation.
Prior to my FBI career I was a Captain in the United States
Army, commanding an Explosives Ordnance Disposal Detachment
As you can see, my professional career has been
dedicated to assuring the public safety and the safe use of
explosives. I joined IME because of the long tradition of
cooperation between law enforcement and the explosives
industry. From my own experience, l know that IME and this
industry are dedicated to preventing explosives from being
used by criminals and terrorists.
Il. DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTE OF MAKERS OF EXPLOSIVES
IME is the safety association of the commercial
explosives industry in the United States and Canada. IME was
founded in 1913 to provide technically accurate information
and recommendations concerning explosive materials and to
serve as a source of reliable data about their use.
The primary concern of IME is the safety and
protection of employees, users, the public and the
environment in the manufacture, transportation, storage,
handling, use and disposal of explosive materials used in
blasting and other essential operations.
The member companies of IME and their 60-odd
subsidiaries and affiliates produce about 90% of the 4.1
billion pounds of commercial explosives consumed annually in
the United States in connection with quarrying, mining,
construction, demolition, and oil and gas exploration.
IME has a long record of promoting safety in the
manufacture, transportation, storage, handling and use of
the explosive products manufactured by its members. It has
an equally long record of cooperating with federal, state
and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies. Our
industry's recommendations are today embedded in the
regulations of federal agencies such as the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), the Department of
Transportation (DOT), the Office of Surface Mining (OSM),
the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as
well as the regulations of over thirty states. We also are
proud, as an industry, that we have been called upon to
assist law enforcement agencies in their
efforts to investigate bombing incidents and that we have
been able to respond promptly and effectively.
As manufacturers of explosive materials, we have a
special responsibility to ensure that our products are safe
for their intended use. We are committed to doing everything
possible to prevent the criminal use of our products and to
assuring the safe handling by those who legitimately are in
contact with them. We are also committed to working with
government bodies in developing new technologies to
safeguard the public.
Ill. DESCRIPTION OF COMMERCIAL EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY AND
REGULATIONS CONTROLLING ITS ACTIVITIES
A brief description of the commercial explosives
industry is appropriate. Members of the commercial
explosives industry are involved in the manufacture,
distribution and use of a wide variety of explosives
products. The manufactured explosive materials are shipped
to agents and distributors who, in turn, sell these products
to the end users. Commerce in explosive materials is carried
out within an aggressive, long-standing regulatory scheme
enacted by Congress and administered by a number of state
and federal regulatory agencies.
The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)
requires all participants in the interstate commerce of
explosives to have a license or permit to manufacture, sell,
distribute, store, use or otherwise handle explosive
materials. Currently, about 10,000 individuals and firms
possess licenses or permits issued by BATF for these
purposes. Manufacturers of commercial explosives represent
approximately 10 percent of this total and distributors,
importers, and consumers engaged in the sale, distribution,
storage, and
use of explosive materials make up the remaining 90 percent.
These BATF requirements do not apply to intrastate purchases
of explosives.
BATF also has extensive regulations related to the
storage of explosives. The Department of Transportation
(DOT) regulates the transportation of all explosive
materials. The Occupational safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) regulates the safety and health of employees engaged
in the manufacturing and handling of explosives. The Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and Office of
Surface Mining govern the use of explosives in mining
activities and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
controls all environmental aspects of commercial explosives
and their use.
Commercial explosives are used by a diverse group of
industries with operations of varying sizes. Generally, the
4.1 billion pounds of commercial explosives produced in the
United States can be broadly divided into the following
industrial use categories:
ù About 65 percent of all the total annual tonnage of
commercial explosives is used in coal mining, both open pit
and underground. The coal mining users of commercial
explosives range from large publicly-owned corporations to
small independent operations. Explosive materials are used
primarily for blasting the coal overburden to allow access
to the coal seam. With the use of commercial explosives, the
coal industry produced approximately 1 billion tons of coal
in 1992
ù Approximately 15 percent of explosive materials are used
annually in quarrying and nonmetal mining.
ù Approximately 10 percent of explosive materials are used
annually in metal mining.
ù Approximately 7 percent of explosive materials are used
annually by the construction industry for buildings, roads,
and pipelines.
ù The remaining 3 percent of commercial explosives are used
in a variety of ways including oil and gas exploration,
agricultural uses (e.g. clearing land, removal of stumps,
and dislodging of boulders), and specialty functions such as
fusing metals together.
Commercial explosives include a wide variety of
explosive products that are put to many industrial,
agricultural and residential uses affecting a broad cross
section of individuals in this country. Several thousand
different products/formulations are offered to the users of
explosives. Because commercial explosives are used in
construction, mining, oil exploration, and agriculture,
regulatory programs potentially affect the safety of workers
in many different workplace settings. They also can affect
the costs of housing, fuel, energy, and a myriad of other
products and services that are dependent on the use of
commercial explosives.
IV. Overview of I ME's Position on HR 1710
Domestic and international terrorism, such as the
recent bombing of a federal building and day care center in
Oklahoma City, raise concerns of what can be done
legislatively to prevent these horrific events. IME has long
offered its expertise and assistance to law enforcement and
to Capitol Hill to move forward on rational and effective
legislative initiatives. That is our intent in testifying
today and offering our views on HR 1710.
A. Overview--With regard to HR 1710, I ME's position on
legislative initiatives under consideration is as follows.
1. IME supports a comprehensive licensing/permitting
requirement for purchasers of explosives, such as that
required in HR 488 sponsored by Congressman Quinn. HR 488,
currently not a part of HR 1710, would expand the current
requirements for permitting interstate purchases of
explosives to include intrastate purchases of explosives.
2. IME supports Title V of HR 1710 related to the Convention
on the marking of plastic explosives.
3. IME supports Section 305 of Title lll requiring a study
of tagging of explosive materials, rendering explosive
materials inert, and imposing controls for precursor
chemicals of explosives.
B. Study v. Reasonable Regulation
President Clinton and Congress have proposed that the
government conduct a comprehensive study of placing taggants
in explosives. President Clinton has also proposed that BATF
regulatorily require that taggants be placed in explosives.
IME believes a study is necessary before any conclusion can
be drawn as to whether BATF should begin regulatory
proceedings to require placing taggants in explosives. There
are good reasons, which are detailed in this statement, for
our position.
The only major and comprehensive study on taggants was
completed by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in
1980. OTA, in its report entitled "Taggants in Explosives"
noted the limitations of the project, primarily "the
preliminary nature of the taggant research." The report
noted "Additional information is required on all aspects of
the analysis--technical efficacy, safety, cost and utility."
Over the last fifteen years new information and new
technologies have been developed. It is important to
evaluate all of this information as well as to address
concerns that are, to the best of our knowledge, unresolved.
More specifically, with regard to the study of placing
taggants in explosives, IME believes it is essential that
the study address the following concerns prior to
legislatively mandating a regulatory requirement for placing
taggants in explosives:
Safety--There are safety concerns with placing taggants in
explosive materials during the manufacturing process and
with the legitimate use of the tagged explosives during
mining operations. For example, it was recently concluded
that the taggants destabilized TNT during a melt/pour
operation for making cast boosters.
Environment--No one has evaluated the environmental effects
of introducing over two million pounds of the plastic/metal
chips (taggants) into the environment every year, or the
effects of disposal of greatly increased amounts of
hazardous waste resulting from leftover batches of tagged
explosives.
Feasibility--Use of explosives containing taggants during mining
operations will result in the contamination of the raw materials, such
as silica, sand and salt and, in some cases, render it useless for
production of end products. For example UNIMIN Corp. has written its
Congressional delegation regarding the "devastating impact" on the
American manufacturing of semi-conductors by placing taggants in
explosives.
Law Enforcement Effectiveness--Very few criminal bombings,
one to three percent, are made of commercial high
explosives. Homemade explosives were the choice of criminals
bombing the world trade center, the federal building in
Oklahoma City, and those planning to bomb the Lincoln Tunnel
in New York City. In 1993, only 36 bombings of 2,364,
involved commercial high explosives. A number of those 36
bombings were solved and traced to the manufacturer through
evidence left at the scene. Obviously, tags would have been
relevant in only a handful of cases. In these cases, the
tags would have to be found by investigators, which, in a
devastating bombing such as in Oklahoma City, is most
unlikely. If a taggant is found, the investigator is led to
the manufacturer and to a listing of the purchasers of that
batch. Criminals are not likely to legally purchase the
commercial explosive. It is more likely to have been stolen
from a storage magazine. One does not need a taggant to
obtain a list of commercial explosive thefts, as those are
required to be reported to the BATF. Furthermore, if
taggants were required in explosives many crime scenes would
contain multiple taggants (those from new building materials
and construction sites) thus the taggant from the criminal
bomb would not be distinguishable from those taggants
resulting from legitimate use of explosives such as in the
making of concrete, mortar and brick.
Cost--Our nations financial resources are limited. Congress
has struggled with the federal budget and recognized the
impacts of increased cost of regulation on business, jobs
and competitiveness, both abroad and at home. The placement
of taggants in explosives, the record keeping, the cleaning
of pipes and gears between each batch of explosives, the
cost of disposing of excess hazardous waste at the end of
each batch would be very expensive and would raise the cost
of mining operations and other commercial operations.
Furthermore, cost estimates are needed regarding the impact
on small business, which may be forced to shut down, and on
trade, domestic and international. The mining industry would
be severely impacted.
IME can assure the committee of its full participation
in any study and that, provided the Report is sound,
thorough and objective, we will work with the Congress and
the agency to address its conclusions.
The remainder of our testimony will expand further on
these issues as well as I ME's position on legislative
issues.
V. IDENTIFICATION TAGGANTS
Section 305 of HR 1710 would require the
Attorney-General, in consultation with other interested
parties with expertise, including the private sector, to
conduct a study on (1) placing identification and detection
taggants in explosive materials; (2) whether materials
commonly used to manufacture explosives can be rendered
inert; and (3) whether controls can be placed on certain
precursor chemicals used to manufacture
explosive materials. The Attorney-General would be required
to report the results of this study to Congress within 6
months after the effective date of the legislation.
IME's comments are directed only towards the proposed
study of identification taggants. Identification taggants
are microscopic chips of metal and nine layers of
different colors of plastic. Each batch of chips is assigned
a code based on the color scheme . The theory is that each
batch of chips can be easily placed in a batch of
explosives; that law enforcement will, timely, find a
taggant at a bomb scene (if a commercially manufactured
explosive is used); that the color code will identify the
manufacturer and the recorded purchasers; and that the
information will lead to the criminal. There are many
problems with this theory.
IME believes that a study is needed to examine the
following: the unresolved safety issues raised by placing
identification in explosive materials; the impact on the
environment; the technical feasibility of adding taggants
during manufacture; the effectiveness of taggants as a law
enforcement device and whether taggants would enable law
enforcement agencies to apprehend bombing suspects more
quickly and efficiently than they do at present; whether
tagging explosives is feasible for intended lawful mining
use; and whether the high cost of this proposal is justified
by the minimal benefits to law enforcement. IME believes
that these issues are unresolved, at best, and that the
study should be designed to require that these issues be
thoroughly evaluated. I ME's concerns about each of these
issues is explained in more detail below.
A. Safety of Taggants
The manufacture of explosives is a very sensitive
process that must be done with 100% safety or the result can
be an explosion that kills and injures workers and
demolishes the facility. Any change in the explosives
formula, and particularly the addition of any new substance,
can destabilize the mixture, setting off reactions that
create a severe safety hazard. The Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) requires that any change in the
formula for a "permissible" (an explosive used underground)
must be retested and reap proved before it is used in actual
blasting. Furthermore, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration prohibits workers from carrying any loose
items into a manufacturing facility because of the fear of
foreign items getting into the explosives mixture.
July 25, 1979, there was an explosion in GOEX's cast
booster plant in Camden, Arkansas, which GOEX believes was
caused by the taggants. GOEX subsequently filed suit in
Federal Court against The Aerospace Corporation and the 3M
Company, which, at that time, was the owner of the taggant.
Prior to the trial, the parties reached a settlement
agreement with GOEX resolving the dispute (Aerospace paid an
undisclosed sum to GOEX), with each party neither admitting
or denying the adverse parties' allegations.
In 1993-94 the Austin Powder Company, Cleveland, Ohio,
conducted a compatibility study by incorporating taggants
into cast boosters. It was concluded that the taggants
destabilized the TNT resulting in an unsafe manufacturing
condition. Recently the New Mexico Institute of Mining and
Technology confirmed this result (see attachment A).
In 1980, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
assessed the question of whether the addition of taggants to
explosives might create a safety hazard. OTA
concluded a full-scale qualification program is necessary
before taggants can be added to all explosive materials and
that:
* The addition of 3M (now manufactured by Micro trace,
Inc.) identification taggants to .... and one variety of
booster material produces a chemical reaction at elevated
temperatures and high taggant concentrations
* There is little evidence regarding the safety of
detection taggants, or of the
combination of identification taggants, as testing has
only recently been initiated and no results have yet
been reported.
OTA also concluded "Additional information is required
on all aspects of the analysis--technical efficacy, safety,
cost, and utility."
MSHA has recently raised concerns with placing
taggants in permissible, explosives placed deep into the
earth and then discharged. The concern is that the
plastic/metal chip would not be entirely burned up during
the blast and that these chips would be expelled,
potentially igniting coal dust/gasses, and causing a second
explosion endangering the work site.
Furthermore, long-term production compatibility and
the affects on stability and shelf life testing has not been
performed. Such testing is essential to any thorough
evaluation of the potential hazards of adding an
identification taggant to explosives.
In 1980, the OTA stated: The lack of dab on long-term
effects in terms of safety, stability and performance,
especially in products such as gels and slurries,
is particularly important. As a result of this uncertainty,
not even preliminary indications of safety are possible at
this time, much less the demonstrations necessary before a
tagging proposal could be safely implemented. (OTA, Tagging
in Explosives, p.6)
Even the company now manufacturing the taggant, Micro
trace, Inc., will not attest to the safety of placing
taggants in explosives. In fact, they would insist on the
following disclaimer:
"MICRO TRACE shall not be liable for any injury, loss
or damage, direct or consequential, arising out of the
use or the inability to use the product. Before using,
user shall determine the suitability of the product
for his intended use, and user assumes all risk and
liability whatsoever in connection therewith."
As this disclaimer implicitly recognizes,
manufacturing and using explosives are extremely dangerous
activities. These activities require 100 percent safety 100
percent of the time.
B. Environmental Impact
Whenever a new material is added to a product, the
environmental impacts of that addition should be analyzed.
One direct impact of adding taggants will be an increase in
the volume of explosive waste, with a commensurate increase
in the safety, cost, and technology concerns associated with
waste disposal. This increase will occur as a result of
being unable to reuse waste product that, except for the
need to preserve the integrity
of the taggant code, could otherwise be reused e.g. product obtained
when cleaning out machinery between taggant batches, damaged packages
etc.
Additionally, taggants are made from a combination of
plastic and metal, neither of which is biodegradable. If
added to explosives, the widespread use of these products
will spread these taggants throughout the environment. Over
time, taggant particles will inevitably accumulate in areas
where explosives, are used e.g. mine sites, construction
sites, and quarries..
We have no information with which to evaluate the
effects of introducing these materials into the environment.
We do not know whether metal will leach out, affect plant
life, or end up in the food
C. Feasibility of Taggants
The impact on adding taggants to explosives would have
a tremendous effect on related industries. One example is
explained in a letter sent to Senators Helms, Fair cloth,
Dodd and Lie Berman from UNIMIN Corp. Which has a quartz
operation in North Carolina. UNIMIN states that placing
taggants in commercial explosives would devastate their
business. (The letter is Attachment B.)
UNIMIN uses high purity silica to produce
semiconductors. If the explosives used in blasting for
silica-containing ore contained taggants, the raw material
would be contaminated with the taggants. UNIMIN uses the
most advanced technology in the industry to remove nearly
all forms of contaminants from the silica products. The
slightest impurity can result in defective silicon chips.
The contamination of silica with taggants
would make the product unsuitable for use in the production
of semiconductors and provide foreign competitors with an
enormous opportunity to make inroads into Unimin's market
share. The company strongly opposes the requirement for
taggants in explosives.
I have attached similar letters related to sand used
in glass manufacturing (see Attachment C) and to salt (see
Attachment D). It is likely many industries are in a similar
situation.
D. Effectiveness For Law Enforcement Purposes
In theory, taggants provide a utility to law
enforcement. This is just not the case.
In the first place, commercially manufactured
explosives, such as dynamites, water gels, slurries, ANFO
and blasting agents, are used in only 1 %-3% of the bombing
incidents that occur each year in the United States. The
remaining 97% to 99% consist of homemade mixtures and
commercial powders. In the overwhelming number of incidents,
therefore, taggants would not have been involved. The tragic
criminal bombings at Oklahoma City and the World Trade
Center, involved homemade explosives which would not have
contained taggants.
For example, in 1993, the last year for which figures
are publicly available, the BATF reported that approximately
2,364 bombing incidents, including the World Trade Center
bombing, were perpetrated in the United States. Of these
incidents, approximately, 714 (30%) were caused by devices
using flammable liquids; 626 (26%) by devices using black
and smokeless powders; 565 (24%) by devices using broadly
defined chemicals; 303 (13%) by devices using fireworks
powders; 32 (2%) by match heads; and 31 (1%) by
devices using dynamites and water gels or high explosives. The
remaining incidents, approximately 4%, were caused by military,
blasting agents and other unidentified explosives.
In the 1 %-3% of bombings that did involve commercial
high explosives, there are many forensic clues that help
identify the manufacturer. The industry works closely with
the BATF and the FBI to assist in identifying the product
used, the manufacturer, and if possible, the likely
purchasers of the explosives. For example, the companies
provide law enforcement with samples of their products for
forensic work and assist with the analysis as needed. The
industry maintains detailed records of products sold and
provides that information to law enforcement when requested.
Furthermore, the BATF requires the reporting of all thefts
of commercial explosives. Any taggant, if found, would be
unlikely to provide additional or, timely, information that
would lead to the criminal. The tag only identifies the
purchaser of a specific batch of product.
Another problem which draws the utility of taggants
into question, is the likely difficulty of actually finding
any taggants after a blast of any magnitude. Investigators,
using fluorescent lights and magnets in the dark will have
to scour through tons of debris containing countless
particles of metal and fluorescent materials looking for a
chip the approximate size of a grain of sand. Additionally,
if taggants are mandated in explosives, the resulting raw
materials used in building and road construction will
contain tags. Thus, a new building will contain many
different tags confusing the investigation of the future
bombings.
It has been asserted by some proponents of tagging
that an identification tagging program would permit tracing
a particular explosive, just as a firearm can be traced by a
serial number, or a truck by the serial number on its axle.
This assertion is not correct, of course.
A batch, or lot, of explosives can consist of hundreds
or even thousands of explosive items. For example, a 20,000
pound batch of dynamite packed in 1-1/4" x 8" cartridges or
sticks, a popular size, would be packaged in approximately
40,000 cartridges which would in turn be packed in 400
fifty-pound cases. The same taggant would be in each of the
40,000 cartridges. Therefore, if the identification taggant
survived the detonation atmosphere, its recovery would not
identify a particular cartridge. The recovery would simply
identify all the legal purchasers of the dynamite comprising
the entire 20,000 pound batch which could be distributed
over large geographic areas.
There are many ways to circumvent a tagging program,
and a bomber with only minimal grasp of the issue would be
able to do so. Terrorists arid professional criminals, the
primary targets of a tagging program, are precisely the
groups most capable of defeating its intent by:
ù Stealing the explosives,
ù Purchasing explosives using false identification;
ù Making explosives from many untagged, unregulated
and commonly available materials such as ammonium
nitrate fertilizer;
* Removing the taggants, which with the 3M taggant can
be accomplished with relative ease in some explosives
using an ultraviolet light and a simple magnet.
The industry shares in the universal concern that
bombing suspects should be apprehended promptly. It is
notable, however, that in the two most recent terrorist
bombing incidents, i.e. the World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City, suspects were apprehended promptly, without help from
taggants. Taggants would not have reduced the time it took
to make an arrest, or produced any significant improvements
in an already laudable law enforcement performance.
E. Cost Effectiveness
The costs to society of placing taggants in explosives
depend on many things, none of which have been adequately
estimated:
ù The cost of buying a batch of taggants (from a company
monopolizing the market);
ù safety testing all explosive formulations to which
taggants are added;
ù changes in the manufacturing process (e.g. converting the
existing process to accommodate batch manufacturing;
performing OSHA process safety management analyses on
changed manufacturing processes and products; additional
clean-up operations necessitated by contamination concerns;
reduced productivity due to lost time; the hiring of
additional employees);
ù the size of the batch in which taggants are to be placed,
and the taggant concentration;
ù lost production due to the inability to rework damaged or
off-spec explosives or explosives reclaimed during
maintenance;
ù record keeping by manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors
and retailers;
ù the environmental costs associated with the inability to
rework explosives which thus become hazardous waste;
ù costs to secondary industries, such as silica miners who
will be required to remove taggants from their mined product
to ensure that their product will be suitable for its
intended use e.g. semiconductor chip manufacture;
ù law enforcement and government costs connected with the
administration of the program; market distortions due to
product losses, shifts to products without taggants, and the
pressures placed on smaller businesses by the generally
higher costs they would have to pay for taggants;
ù product liability costs associated with the introduction
of foreign matter into explosives,*the percentage of
taggants required in a pound of explosives;
ù costs of shutting down a manufacturing plant for cleaning
before starting a new batch;
The 1980 Office of Technology Assessment report on
"Taggants in Explosives", which is fifteen years out of
date, evaluated some of these elements but acknowledged that
the OTA data was very limited. In addition, the OTA Report
did not estimate many of
the cost elements listed above such as cost of shutting down
the plant between batches to clean out pipes and gears, or
the costs associated with disposing of the leftover
explosives waste following each new batch of explosives.
Furthermore, the OTA Report is out of date on the costs of
tags; the differences in costs for large business versus
small business; and the manufacturing processes used today.
Data from the companies themselves show an average of
eight changes per day of running a different product through
the same machine. How often would the government have the
companies change tags for different batches? The costs could
be astronomical. Confidential data show that small companies
forced to buy tags in small quantities at the higher prices
would most likely go out of business. Companies engaged in
international commerce would be forced to manufacture
overseas or beyond our borders to avoid the costs of
taggants.
A commonly used 1993 cost estimate for buying the
identification taggant for explosives was $0.09, which
equates to roughly $400 million. This figure does not
include any other of the cost factors cited above. Even so,
this figure is significant when one considers the 1993 costs
of various explosives:
ù Cost of bulk ammonium nitrate-fuel oil (ANFO) blasting
agent at use site --- about $.10 per pound.
ù Cost of bagged ANFO blasting agent at use site --- about
12› per pound.
ù Cost of bulk blend blasting agents at use site --- 20› to
25› per pound.
Cost of packaged blend blasting agents at plant --- 20› to
27› per pound.
ù Cost of Class A (UN Division 1.1) dynamites, emulsions,
water gels and slurries at
plant -- less than 90› per pound
The direct and indirect costs of an identification tagging
program would vary enormously depending on the scope of the program
implemented.
During the original pilot program referred to in the
OTA study, BATF proposed a taggant concentration of 0.05%
taggants, by weight, per pound of explosives and a batch
size of 9920,000 pounds . IME received information from
sources, including BATF personnel, that BATF wanted to
increase the taggant concentration to facilitate taggant
recovery at bombing scenes and lower the batch size to
10,000 pounds to facilitate tracing legitimate users.
IME has not asked its members to conduct current cost
analyses because specific details of a tagging program
involving both an identification taggant and a detection
taggant have not been outlined. Nevertheless, the cost of
taggants must be focused considered, particularly in light
of the minimal benefit to law enforcement.
A thorough study is needed before these kinds of
devastating impacts are imposed on legitimate businesses in
this country or we will once again be exporting jobs and
market share overseas..
F. Tagging in Switzerland
Proponents of tagging explosives have cited the Swiss
experience as proof that tagging works. This is mixing
apples and oranges. IME believes the Swiss experience should
be a part of the study on tagging but we do not believe that
it can be cited as proof
that a U.S. program is feasible since their program is
vastly different than any under consideration in the United
States..
The Swiss do not use the Micro trace taggant in all of
their products. In fact, there are only three manufacturers
of explosives in Switzerland and they use the Micro trace
taggant in only a handful of explosives. Furthermore, they
put a very low concentration of taggants in each batch of
explosives and change tags only twice a year. Additionally,
they do not clean out their manufacturing equipment between
batches. Thus, some of each batch is contaminated with tags
from the previous batch.
The Swiss program simply permits law enforcement to
identify one of the Swiss manufacturers and a family or
group of explosive products produced by that manufacturer.
European competitors of the Swiss believe the program was
implemented not as a law enforcement tool but as a non
tariff barrier to protect Swiss manufacturers from outside
competition, a belief that seems consistent with the Swiss
decision not to require taggants in all products
manufactured or imported.
The Swiss manufacturing experience similarly has no
relevance in this country. In 1994, they produced about 6.6
million pounds of explosives compared to a U.S. consumption
of about 4 billion pounds.
In the U.S., unlike Switzerland, there are forty to
fifty manufacturers with multiple product lines, and
discussion has focused on requiring all 4 billion pounds of
explosives to be tagged in 10,000-20,000 pound batches.
Thus, each time a batch of the requisite size is
manufactured, the process would be stopped so that the
machinery could be cleaned to make way for the next batch.
Given the law enforcement purpose of the taggants, it
may be assumed that the manufacturers will be required to
prevent the cross contamination of batches with the codes of
another batch. Switzerland does not appear to have
confronted the technical problems likely to be involved in
converting continuous stream manufacturing to a batch
process, or in converting an existing batch process to the
particular batch pound limits.
The Swiss program is more modest in scope and the
industry is so different that it provides few if any
insights into the manufacturing difficulties likely to be
encountered in the U.S.
The Swiss program has also been lauded by taggant
proponents for its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.
Taggants are alleged to have helped solve 566 bombing
incidents. This information is grossly misleading as these
figures include all criminal incidents involving explosives
over a ten year period, including explosive thefts, non
commercial explosives and undetonated bombs. Swiss Federal
Institute figures verify 236 explosive attacks from 1984
through 1993. Of these, 60 involved marked material of which
28 were solved. It is not known to IME whether any taggant
actually has been found at a bomb site and aided law
enforcement in apprehending a criminal. One of the Swiss
manufacturers told me he was not aware that Swiss law
enforcement had ever found a taggant at a detonated bomb
site.
V. DETECTION TAGGANTS
Title V of H.R.1710 implements the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives by requiring all plastic explosives
manufactured in, or imported into, the United States to
contain a so called "detection" taggant. A detection taggant
is a chemical additive which odorizes the plastic and sheet
explosives so they can be detected by sensitive machines at
airports and other security points.
IME supports this provision. In fact, IME worked with
government officials to assist in identifying a feasible and
safe additive for use in U.S. plastic explosives.
IME also supports the study required in section 305 of
HR 1710 related to detection taggants.
Vl. Permitting
HR 1710 does not contain a provision requiring
intrastate purchasers of explosives obtain a permit from the
BATF before being authorized to purchase high explosives.
IME would urge the Committee to incorporate such a provision
as is currently in HR 488, a bill sponsored by Congressman
Quinn (R-NY).
Current law requires interstate purchasers of high
explosives to obtain a permit from the BATF before
purchasing high explosives. The Quinn bill would expand the
current law in two ways:
1) intrastate purchasers of high explosives would be
required to obtain a BATF
permit in order to purchase high explosives; and
2) permit tees would be required to submit a fingerprint
and a photo ID with each application.
IME believes such a law would aid in keeping
commercial explosives out of the hands of criminals.
D. CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, IME and its member companies
have worked cooperatively with law enforcement agencies and
regulatory bodies to develop extensive regulations governing
the manufacture, transportation, storage and use of
commercial explosives in a safe manner. We have worked with
law enforcement investigators to assist in identifying the
type of bomb and to trace a commercially manufactured bomb
back to a manufacturer and to purchasers. We have worked
with law enforcement to develop feasible detection taggants
for plastic explosives.
Based on this experience, we recommend:
ù adoption of Title V of HR 1710 which implements the
Convention on the Marking of Explosives, an
international agreement.
* Adoption of Section 305 of Title lll of HR 1710
requiring a thorough and
comprehensive study of tagging explosives, rendering
certain explosives inert, and controls ofn precursor chemical.
* Amendment of HR 1710 to incorporate the provisions
of HR 488, requiring permits for intrastate purchasers
of high explosives.
IME appreciate this opportunity to present our views
and would be happy to respond to any questions.
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