Athens Banner-Herald April 6, 2006
Holmes: Iran's 'wonder weapons' are limited, but they are still a threat
By Andrew Selsky
Color me unimpressed with the announcements issuing forth from Iran about its new wonder weapons. During its recent Great Prophet naval exercise, the Islamic Republic declared that it had successfully tested advanced surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, a new ballistic missile able to carry multiple warheads, and a rocket-propelled torpedo that runs at more than 200 miles per hour - about four times the speed of a conventional torpedo.
But this weaponry is more limited than Iranian spokesmen admit. Consider the Iranians' new torpedo, which seems to be a variant of the Shkval, deployed by the Russian Navy in the mid-1990s. While inarguably fast, the Shkval is unguided and its range is short - serious drawbacks in submarine warfare. John Pike, who runs the invaluable GlobalSecurity.org Web site, observes that arming Russian warships with such a weapon amounted to a "stunt" on Moscow's part.
More importantly, there is little sign Iranian warfighters have developed the tactical proficiency necessary to use their new weapons effectively. People, not hardware, wage war.
The ability to fire a weapon under exercise conditions is not the same as the ability to wield it in combat, where, as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted, fear, uncertainty, and confusion predominate. Clausewitz observed that only training and combat experience can supply the "lubricant" necessary to overcome the "friction" intrinsic to this high-stress environment. The Iranian navy and supporting forces are short on both.
All of that said, it would be a serious mistake for the Bush administration to overlook Iran's capacity to defend itself.
Tehran's political aim is plain: to deter U.S. military action against its nuclear complex or, failing that, to field a panoply of new weapons to execute the time-honored strategy of "sea denial." Unable to control the seas itself, a navy that resorts to sea denial builds up the capacity to inflict enough damage on a superior navy to induce that navy to keep clear of the contested waters for an extended period of time.
Much of the firepower the United States would need to reduce Iran's nuclear installations is sea-based, so sea denial makes perfect sense for the Islamic Republic.
Look at China, Tehran's commercial partner and one of its suppliers of weapons technology. The People's Liberation Army Navy has raised sea denial to an art form in recent years. One of the PLA Navy's core strategic concepts is the "assassin's mace." In theory, an inferior military power can develop "niche" capabilities that allow it to nullify certain advantages of a superior force without achieving overall superiority, or even parity.
If the PLA Navy outfitted itself with, say, high-tech sea mines, it could hold U.S. Navy reinforcements at bay during a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Or, if the U.S. force did risk venturing into the Taiwan area, the Chinese defenders could mete out enough punishment to create a public outcry in the United States. For example, if China sank an American aircraft carrier, Washington, unable to bear the political pain, might abandon the fight.
The Iranian military has the same sort of thing in mind, as its weapons imports attest. Notes MIT scholar Barry Posen, "The closer U.S. military forces get to enemy-held territory, the more competitive the enemy will be. This arises from a combination of political, physical and technological facts. These facts combine to create a contested zone - arenas of conventional combat where weak adversaries have a good chance of doing real damage to U.S. forces."
Several advantages accrue to powers set on defending contested zones. The defender usually has the home-court advantage. Its political motivation is greater, it has more manpower and assets in-theater, and it knows local circumstances better. Even third-rate military powers - think Somalia and the Taliban - have at times been able to leverage these factors, denying superior U.S. forces their goals.
Posen's assessment certainly applies to Iran. The Islamic Republic enjoys certain advantages by virtue of its geographic location and the combat environment of the Persian Gulf, where warm, shallow water and the large volume of air and sea traffic complicate U.S. efforts to detect and defeat submarines, missiles and armed speedboats. These factors should give Washington pause as it contemplates using force in the Iranian nuclear dispute.
While the Iranian defenders clearly aren't 10 feet tall, the U.S. military and its political masters shouldn't take the challenge they pose lightly.
Holmes is a senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security.
© Copyright 2006, Athens Banner-Herald
