The Detroit News July 12, 2004
Safety issues plague 5-ton truck
Design, training flaws prove to be fatal
By Lisa Zagaroli
Spc. Ryan Brent Stark was a confident soldier, often telling his wife, Cami, that he'd have the mettle to survive any military challenge.
But when the Utah National Guardsman got behind the wheel of a 5-ton truck during the remaining moments of his life on May 23, 2003, a long history of safety problems was stacked against him.
The M925A1 was part of a family of vehicles that had years earlier been identified as having a higher accident and death rate than comparable military and commercial trucks.
Stark climbed into the truck that day with civilian contractor Duane R. Gross, a driving instructor from Copperas Cove, Texas. They were testing the antilock brakes the Army had decided several years earlier would make the trucks safer, but had just been added to the Utah-based vehicle.
The rollover crash that killed them when the new brakes failed is one illustration of how a combination of predictable problems that range from leadership failures and inexperience to vehicle design and a lack of safety features contribute to the Army's climbing mishap rate.
In the last decade, there have been 8,200 accidents in Army vehicles, killing nearly 250 soldiers and injuring another 2,600. The Army is trying to cut in half the number of all accidents by 2005.
Stark's accident raises questions about basic protections such as seat belts with upper body protection and other safety features that might help in a culture where high-risk driving conditions are foreseeable hazards. And even when the Army does identify tangible ways to keep soldiers out of harm's way, they may remain at risk during the slow phase-in of some safety measures.
"Our guys have been asking for something like this for a long time ? three-point harnesses, a roll cage, a lot of different things," said Maj. Jim Brown, executive officer of the 1st Battalion 145th Field Artillery unit where Stark served. "They've always wondered why the Army hasn't upgraded it."
Army battalions like Stark's were eager to get the new brakes.
"We've been asking for this for a long time, for probably a couple of years, because the truck had speed limitations," Maj. Brown said. "We drive a lot of miles, so basically at that slow speed it was also a hazard on the highways."
5-ton truck problems
Stark was going 5 miles per hour faster than the 50 mph posted speed limit on a straight Utah highway called Main Ammo Road near the Tooele Army Depot when he pressed down on the new brakes. That was 15 mph faster than the Army decided was safe for that vehicle with the original brakes, according to a safety message the Army had issued eight years earlier.
Problems with the Army's 5-ton trucks first got public attention in Washington after two Army Reserve soldiers were killed during a training exercise in April 1997. The cargo truck's rollover prompted Congress to call for a General Accounting Office investigation into the M939 series of vehicles' accident history. The truck group includes cargo trucks like the M925 driven by Stark.
The Pentagon acknowledged that about 60 people had died and another 300 had been injured in the vehicle by 1998, most of them since 1992.
But the Army had known about the problem since 1992, after a spike in accidents around the time of the first Iraqi war, the GAO report said.
TACOM, the Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, headquartered in Warren, Mich., had issued what's known as a "safety of use message" in August 1992. It warned that, particularly when empty or carrying a light load or on wet pavement, the vehicles' brakes could cause the rear wheels to lock up, the engine to stall and the power steering to fail.
Three years later, the Army limited the M939s to maximum speeds of 40 mph on most roads, and 35 mph on cross-country roads. When they were retrofitted with the new safety features, they could be driven at 55 mph.
An investigation into Stark's crash by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, said the road testing shouldn't have been done on a highway with a soft dirt shoulder.
"Prior to road testing future vehicles, select an area void of soft shoulders and/or other potentially hazardous surroundings," OSHA area director Herb Gibson wrote to Gross' employer, Premier Professional Systems Inc., the Huntsville, Ala., contractor that has installed more than 5,000 brake kits to the trucks since 1999. "This in turn will lessen the possibility of upsetting a vehicle should loss of control occur."
System failures
In the fatal crash, both Stark and Gross were wearing the 1987 model vehicle's only safety restraint: a lap belt. The truck skidded and then rotated, going off the road and sliding sideways down an embankment, according to a safety analysis by Maj. Donald Graham, chief of the U.S. Army Safety Center's combat service support branch. The truck rolled 1 1/4 times.
Though virtually every seating system in civilian passenger vehicles now has a shoulder belt because of proven effectiveness in preventing head and upper torso injury in some crashes, the federal government doesn't require them in the 5-ton trucks, and neither does the Army.
Though the Army has shoulder belts in other trucks, it couldn't install them in the M939 because when the soft-top truck was introduced in 1983, its body was merely a larger version of a much older truck. Unlike civilian vehicles, which are remodeled every few years, military vehicles often use the same platform for decades.
"There was not an anchor point to put the shoulder belts, so they never fielded it with that," said George Jarvis, safety director at TACOM.
Stark's autopsy listed numerous injuries that contributed to his death, including trauma to his head and broken ribs that severed an artery to his heart, Cami Stark said.
"There was quite a few factors in the death," she said, but wondered, "Maybe the damage to his heart wouldn't have happened."
It's impossible to say whether a shoulder belt would have made a difference in the crash. Gross was wearing his retractable two-point belt, but too loosely, the accident report said. He was partially ejected and crushed under the door, said Brown, who arrived at the crash site shortly after the accident.
There were other safety precautions to cut down on injury severity in the vehicles that were approved by the Army, but they weren't implemented in time to help Stark.
The trucks had a fatal crash rate seven times higher than those for similar commercial vehicles, according to a 10-year analysis of the M939 series conducted in 1999 by the GAO, Congress' investigative arm.
The truck group accounted for about 34 percent of all fatal Army ground accidents, though the trucks only made up about 9 percent of the Army motor vehicle fleet, a second GAO analysis of 11 1/2 years of Army crashes found.
In addition, 44 percent of fatal rollovers involved that series of vehicles.
TACOM, following the safety warnings it issued in 1995, had conducted two studies of its own. It found that the vehicles were being used on-road as much as 80-90 percent of the time, though the tires were designed for about 80 percent off-road use.
It determined that the overall truck design was sound, but the truck's safety performance could be enhanced, according to the GAO report.
TACOM told the GAO it planned to add antilock brake kits and make other changes in brake response, and upgrade to radial tires, at a cost of $3,800 per truck, or $120 million, by 2005.
TACOM also recommended replacing the M939 cabs "when they wore out with ones outfitted with a rollover crush protection system," the GAO said.
"Both TACOM and Army Safety Center personnel stated that installation of the reinforced cab rollover crush protection system, while not an industry standard or required by law, would better protect M939 occupants in the event of a rollover," the GAO report said.
Adding cab rollover protection would cost another $3,600 per truck, or $114 million. "Because the truck cabs will be replaced as they wear out, a precise schedule for completing this modification cannot be estimated at this time," the report said.
As of June 2004, two-thirds of the vehicles had new brakes and tires, Jarvis said. The Army has developed a rigid cab to replace the soft top, but none has gotten that rollover protection.
"It will provide a whole lot more structure than they have right now," he said.
The modification took years to get under way after the problem was discovered because it was so costly that it required congressional approval, said Nick Straffon, who retired as TACOM's safety director a few months ago.
"When we identify a problem, if it's relatively cheap, it's taken care of immediately because we have a little bit of money to do that and you just defer something else until the following year," he said. "But when you have a big recall, you have to go to Congress and that takes two to seven years to get the money."
Preventable accidents
To help pay for college, Stark, 27, a welder, followed in his father's footsteps by joining the National Guard. He was called up to active duty in July 2002 to monitor a chemical depository at Deseret Chemical Depot as part of a homeland security plan called Operation Noble Eagle II.
His duties were mainly fire protection, and the vehicle he used most of the time was a Humvee.
Stark was gone from his Orem, Utah, home six days out of every nine, though he was allowed a two-week furlough in November 2002 when his second son, Crew, joined first-born Cameron. His wife, Cami, said she shared the same concerns as many military spouses.
"He was out near all those chemicals ? I was worried about terrorism," said Cami, now a 24-year-old widowed mom. "It was really an important job for him to be out there."
Stark had a laid-back attitude and "always did what he was asked ? gladly," his widow said.
But according to an accident analysis by the Army, Stark never should have been asked to drive the 5-ton truck used to tow artillery pieces, because he was unlicensed and inexperienced.
"As a result, he didn't know how to handle the emergency situation created when the ABS (antilock breaking system) failed and the vehicle reverted to the old braking system," Graham said in his accident report published in the Army safety publication called Countermeasure.
"(D)river's training programs must ensure soldiers are trained and licensed before sending them to receive advanced training on a vehicle," Graham wrote in the August article. "Unit leaders must thoroughly know their soldiers' capabilities to avoid sending them to training for which they are not qualified."
Brown, whose duty it was to inform Stark's family of the death, wishes a lot of things had been done differently.
"In hindsight, if we'd have had more experienced soldiers driving the truck, if the soldier had a Kevlar helmet on like we require, obviously if the truck had a three-point harness, it would have minimized (the injury) or hopefully wouldn't have been a fatality, on both occupants for that matter," he said.
The battalion has spent some time thinking about priorities since the crash, he said.
"State-of-art weapons system and computers vs. a $75 shoulder belt?" Brown asked. "There is definitely some irony there and it's sad, it really is.
"I am troubled by it, but I think I understand the big picture, too. It's funding and certain priorities, and unfortunately, I don't get to make those decisions. All we can do is request and stand by to receive whatever comes our way."
Cami Stark said she doesn't blame the military. She just wishes the brakes had worked and hopes that installing new brakes will prevent future accidents.
"He always knew if anything happened, he would be fine," she said. "He thought if anything happened, he would make sure that if there were a way to survive that he would. In the accident, there was not a chance for him to survive."
Military Menace: Deadly Vehicles
M939 History
1983: M939 is introduced primarily for tactical, off-road use. The 5-ton cargo truck is based on an older model, but has new features such as automatic transmission, improved power steering and air brakes.
1992: Army begins reviewing its crash statistics after a spike in accidents during the first Iraq war; the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command issues a "safety of use message," warning that brakes could cause rear wheels to lock up, engine stalling and power steering failure, resulting in uncontrolled skidding and rollovers.
1993: Army stops acquiring new M939s; about 32,000 trucks are in the Army fleet.
1993-97: Army evaluates safety of vehicle's tires and brakes.
1995: Army issues a precaution limiting the M939s to maximum speeds of 40 mph on most roads.
1997: Two reserve soldiers are fatally injured during a training exercise in a rollover, prompting Congress to call for a General Accounting Office investigation.
1997: Safety studies are completed; as a result, Army decides vehicles can stay on the road but will install different tires and braking systems to prevent rollovers, and to replace the nonrigid cabs with a rollover crush protection system when the existing ones wear out.
1998: Pentagon acknowledges that about 60 people have died and more than 300 have been injured in the vehicles, most of them since 1992.
1999: GAO investigation finds M939s crash more than similar civilian and military vehicles.
2000: Army begins installing antilock brakes and radial tires on some of the trucks; TACOM issues a modified edict that said the vehicles could be driven 55 mph when they were retrofitted.
2004: Army has replaced brakes and tires on two-thirds of the M939s. It has developed a cab with rollover protection, but hasn't installed any.
Source: General Accounting Office; Globalsecurity.org; U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command
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