Daily Times (Pakistan) March 28, 2004
OP-ED: Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally -Satish Kumar
In the new dispensation, Pakistan will be subjected to a situation where, as a subsidiary ally, America's enemies will have to be regarded as Pakistan's enemies, and Pakistan's assets and resources as America's assets and resources
The March 18 announcement by US Secretary of State Colin Powell that the administration will notify Congress to designate Pakistan as a "major non-NATO ally [MNNA]" of the United States is another disastrous step in the series of historic mistakes committed by the US in recent times. It is immaterial that Colin Powell did not share this information with his Indian interlocutors a day earlier in Delhi. If it was a breach of faith with a so-called "strategic partner" on an issue of strategic concern to it, the US should have reasons to feel guilty about it. A mature India can easily take it in its stride. What is important is to examine the decision's repercussions on the security and stability of Pakistan.
The least one can say at this stage is that granting the MNNA status to Pakistan will sharply accentuate the internal polarisation and contradictions in Pakistani politics. The most dominant feature of Pakistani politics today is the precarious balance between the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the chief opposition conglomerate of six Islamic parties, and the government led by Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali of PML-Q. At the apex of this, however, the real power lies with General Pervez Musharraf as president and army chief. Although the government and the MMA oppose each other in parliament, they share power in the country as a whole. The MMA rules the NWFP and is a coalition partner with the PML-Q in Balochistan.
From March to December 2003, the MMA immobilised the National Assembly because of differences with Musharraf on his proposed constitutional amendments subsumed under the Legal Framework Order (LFO). A compromise of sorts was arrived at last December on the basis of live and let live. Differences have cropped up again over the content of the National Security Council Bill which was introduced in the assembly last week. But these differences are a very faint reflection of the deep antagonism that exists between the government and the MMA on the whole question of Pakistan's relations with the United States.
There is no doubt that the MMA was brought into existence by the establishment through pre-poll rigging on the eve of the October 2002 elections to keep the mainstream parties, the PPP and PML, out of power. But the MMA, whose constituents like Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam of Fazlur Rehman and Sami-ul Haq had played the most important role in the rise and growth of the Taliban, were the strongest critics of Musharraf when he did a u-turn on his Afghanistan policy after 9/11, under pressure of the United States. In fact, it was the anti-American agenda of the MMA which contributed in a major way to their electoral win in NWFP and Balochistan. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the Secretary General of MMA, during his visit to India last July, pleaded for India-Pakistan reconciliation mainly on the ground that this was necessary to keep America out of the region.
Given this background, it was natural that the MMA should have been upset at the military operation launched in South Waziristan on March 7 by the Pakistan army, in coordination with the US and Afghan forces, to hunt the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. The operations were intensified on the eve of Powell's visit to Islamabad on March 18, and have yielded some result. But the news of the grant of MNNA status to Pakistan is bound to increase resentment among the MMA constituents, for the immediate quid pro quo expected of Pakistan is a more effective military action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Pakistan may be feeling gratified at receiving the MNNA status for it has great symbolic as will as material value. While symbolising closeness with America, it will also entitle Pakistan to get the best available defence material, training, assistance through defence export loan guarantee, and priority of delivery for defence articles. But, as in the past, this relationship is not going to be an unmixed blessing.
As of now, this status puts Pakistan at par with other MNNA countries, viz., Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, all of which are America's subsidiary allies. But the strategic autonomy of each of these allies vis-à-vis the US is determined by its relative military and economic strength, and its value to the US on the one hand and vulnerability on the other. At the present moment, Pakistan's military and economic capability is rather low. While its value to the United States is great, so also is its vulnerability because of Pakistan's record of supporting militant groups and the recent charges of nuclear proliferation.
Therefore, Pakistan runs the risk of paying a heavy cost for its newly conferred honour of MNNA. Ever since 9/11, the presence of US military and intelligence apparatus in Pakistan has tended to increase on same pretext or the other. Pakistan's strategic assets, including nuclear and missile installations, are already under close surveillance of the United States. What remains to be ensured, apart from the capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, is that Pakistan allows its territory and troops to be used for US strategic goals in the region.
The US is already being accused of an imperial overstretch. Approximately 360,000 US troops were stationed around the world as of February 2004, according to GlobalSecurity.org. About 2,15,000 were deployed in combat, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations, and an additional 1,45,000 in Germany, Japan, Italy and England are performing routine duties. Despite 1,53,000 troops in Iraq and 11,000 troops in Afghanistan, there is severe shortage of troops in both these theatres. Other Non-NATO allies like Japan and South Korea have not been able to resist the US pressure to send troops to Iraq, even if for non-combat duties, despite domestic opposition in both countries. The problem has become more acute after Spain's new leadership has threatened to pull out its troops and Poland has started debating a pullout.
The MNNA status is worse than being a NATO ally, where one is bound by strategic decisions taken by NATO Council rather than the US alone. It is also worse than being a member of the former CENTO and SEATO where the enemy was defined. In the new dispensation, Pakistan will be subjected to a situation where, as a subsidiary ally, America's enemies will have to be regarded as Pakistan's enemies, and Pakistan's assets and resources as America's assets and resources.
Satish Kumar is editor of India's National Security Annual Review and a former professor of diplomacy at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He wrote this piece for Daily Times
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