Computerworld December 18, 2003
After Saddam capture, real measure of Army IT awaits
By Dan Verton
WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division -- the first so-called digital division -- may have played a key role in the capture of Saddam Hussein last weekend, but military officials and analysts credited low-tech preparations and human intelligence for the operation's success. They said the ongoing Iraqi insurgency will be the real test of the Army's IT investment strategy.
Hussein's capture came after repeated raids in and around the former dictator's hometown of Tikrit produced a wealth of information from captured Saddam loyalists, and it shouldn't be seen as justification for any of the IT systems deployed by the Army, said military analysts.
Instead, those systems are more likely to play a big role in the ongoing effort to stamp out Iraqi insurgents, who have killed more U.S. soldiers since the end of major combat than the Iraqi army did in battle last spring.
"It would be foolish to justify spending on the Army's IT investment in digital divisions simply because of the 4th Infantry Division's role in the capture of Saddam," said James [Patrick] Garrett, a military analyst at Globalsecurity.org, a defense and intelligence consulting firm in Alexandra, Va. "While the technology undoubtedly assisted in the command and control efforts of the operation, U.S. forces probably could have captured Saddam even if the equipment hadn't been available."
In fact, Col. James B. Hickey, commander of the 4th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade, who headed the operation, said in a televised interview yesterday on Fox News Channel that his unit was intimately familiar with the area where Hussein was found. Soldiers from the 1st Brigade reported having previously raided the farmhouse where Hussein was hiding in a hole dug in the ground, and the unit had started planning last weekend's targeted raid some 24 hours earlier.
"I strongly believe that [Hussein's] capture was a combination of some very good and timely [human intelligence] on the ground and some persistence," said Bill Crowell, a former director of the National Security Agency, referring to human intelligence. Digitization efforts are really designed to help troops visualize where they and their fellow soldiers are on the ground and to coordinate operations, said Crowell. By contrast, he said, "this operation was against a specific target by a limited number of armored vehicles."
The Army started its multibillion-dollar digitization effort in the late 1990s, with the 4th Infantry Division being selected as the proof-of-concept unit that would test and be the first to field a slew of new computerized command and control systems for its vehicles. The 4th Infantry Division didn't see major combat in Iraq because it was deployed to Turkey, which didn't allow the U.S. to launch operations from its soil. As a result, analysts said that the current insurgency being waged against U.S. troops by Saddam loyalists and outside forces will continue to be the real test of the Army's IT investments.
Central to the 4th Infantry Division's capabilities is a $20 billion program known as the Army Battle Command System, a network of applications that provides real-time intelligence and weather data to computer terminals mounted in Army vehicles. The terminals are part of what's known as the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below system -- a 10-in., color touch-screen display supported by radio and satellite communications. It shows troops graphic depictions of the locations of friendly forces on the ground and allows them to communicate with one another and senior commanders. It also displays the location of known enemy units.
John Hillen, general manager for defense and intelligence at Fairfax, Va.-based American Management Systems Inc. and a former special operations soldier who served in Operation Desert Storm, said that while it's true the 4th Infantry Division's new IT systems haven't been "battle-tested in the classic sense," current operations allow the Army to assess systems during a phase in the war that has proved to be more perilous than the initial main battle.
"They're still doing patrols. They're still doing maneuvers and various other tasks that will enable them to test their systems in a combat environment," said Hillen. "Will the test be similar to high-intensity warfare, such as the tests they conducted at the National Training Center [at Fort Irwin, Calif.]? No, because in this case they're not lining up against another brigade or armored unit."
Although the Army's 3rd Infantry Division was equipped with some of the newer technologies bought by the Army, the 4th Infantry Division arrived in Iraq with a more integrated and comprehensive system "that has not been put through the strains of major ground warfare, the type of conflict it was designed for," said Garrett. "So there will likely be some kinks and gremlins in the system that have yet to be discovered."
© Copyright 2003, Computerworld Inc.
