Orlando Sentinel (Florida) August 27, 2003
Many Hurdles Remain Before Shuttles Can Return To Space
By Sean Mussenden, Sentinel Staff Writer
WASHINGTON -- NASA must overcome more than a dozen major obstacles -- from planning complicated in-flight repairs to the relatively simple task of obtaining damage-detecting photos during each flight -- before it can launch the next space shuttle.
Experts say the spacewalking plan designed to fix damage to the shuttle's fragile thermal-protection system could stretch the limits of NASA's capabilities and perhaps even push back the agency's tentative plan to return to space next spring. But it remained unclear Tuesday how long it will take to make all the changes recommended by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
The board Tuesday gave NASA 29 distinct mandates to improve the shuttle program, which NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe called part of a "blueprint" for the space agency's future. About half of the recommended fixes, the board said, are so crucial for safety that they must be carried out before the next shuttle lifts off.
The agency has said the shuttle will not get off the launchpad until at least March -- and probably later.
Board members and outside experts said that NASA's toughest job by far will be to figure out how spacewalking astronauts can inspect and fix damage to the thermal-protection tiles and the reinforced carbon-carbon, or RCC, that protects the wing edge from the hot gases of re-entry.
"I think we're all in agreement that the RCC repair will be the biggest challenge," board member Sheila Widnall said. "It will be an engineering exercise that will wring out the organization."
Decades ago, sometime after the first shuttle launch, NASA set aside plans to develop an in-orbit repair system. It revived those efforts shortly after the Columbia accident. One board member, Scott Hubbard, the only NASA employee on the board, said the level of progress has left him optimistic such a system will be in place before the next flight.
During its nearly seven-month investigation, the board had informed NASA of many of the recommendations, some of which the agency has complied with or is close to complying with.
One example: modifying an agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to get photos of the shuttle on every flight while it orbits Earth. Doing so will allow for consistent long-distance damage inspection.
Experts agree that NASA faces a stiff challenge if it hopes to complete the in-orbit tile-repair system -- and 15 other "return-to-flight" recommendations -- by March, although a late-spring or early-summer date for the next launch might prove much more realistic.
The board also identified a number of other recommendations it said were just as important to the future of the shuttle program but could wait until after the shuttle returns to flight.
Among the other immediate fixes recommended in the report:
Develop a shuttle-flight schedule that is realistic based on available resources.
Develop a more comprehensive crisis-training program for mission managers.
Test a device that prevents exploding bolts from slamming into the space shuttle.
The workhorse space shuttles are instrumental to building the international space station. Because of the Columbia disaster, construction has been put on hold, and the crew has been reduced from three to two.
Still, Al Feinberg, a NASA spokesman, said Monday that the agency has been working well with the Russians and their spacecraft to ensure the station remains supplied and has enough of a crew. As such, he said, the return-to-flight date will hinge on safety, not just on the needs of the station.
But space-program analyst John Pike said some of the recommendations were written with such "wiggle room" that NASA might be able to fly the shuttle again without actually making necessary fixes.
"I think that all of those recommendations have some management discretion," said Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a space-policy think tank. "If they were going to take these things seriously, they'd be grounded for several years."
Pike pointed to the board's recommendations dealing with foam and the shuttle's thermal-protection armor. The impact of a chunk of foam on the RCC proved so devastating to Columbia that the board described it as the primary cause of the accident.
Still, the board did not mandate that NASA strengthen the thermal-protection system or totally prevent the massive external tank from jettisoning foam before the next launch.
Instead, it only suggested that the agency "initiate" programs to work toward those goals.
"Our study, after months and months of this, leads us to believe that it's unreasonable to require, as a return-to-flight item, that they eliminate all debris shedding from the launch stack," said Harold Gehman, the board's chairman.
Gehman said requiring NASA to study the issue will lead to a better understanding of both the foam and the thermal-protection system.
© Copyright 2003, Sentinel Communications Co.
