300 N. Washington St.
Suite B-100
Alexandria, VA 22314
info@globalsecurity.org

GlobalSecurity.org In the News




Associated Press May 03, 2003

The two U.S.-led wars with Iraq were different conflicts

By Richard Pyle

Criticized after the 1991 Gulf War for failing to finish what they started, allied commanders replied that the sole mission was to drive Iraqi invaders from Kuwait, and any attempt to occupy Baghdad or depose Saddam Hussein could have led to a quagmire-in-the-desert.

Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote later that it was not in U.S. interests - or that of Middle East stability - to create a leaderless Iraq, so weakened that only a U.S. takeover could keep it from being "fragmented" into separate Sunni, Shia and Kurd political entities."

"It is naive to think that if Saddam had fallen, he would necessarily have been replaced by a Jeffersonian in some sort of desert democracy where people read the Federalist Papers along with the Quran," Powell said in his 1995 autobiography, "My American Journey."

Eight years later, another U.S.-led military coalition has deposed Saddam, and American troops effectively occupy Baghdad. As Powell, now Secretary of State, and American generals struggle to lay groundwork for that very form of government, the quagmire question still looms in the background.

Pentagon code names for the two conflicts reflect key differences between them. Desert Storm in 1991 was literally that - six weeks of violence, followed by swift withdrawal. The heavy fighting of Operation Iraqi Freedom lasted only half that long, but bespeaks an open-end commitment of time to secure what may be deemed victory.

Statistics, still being compiled, also reveal significant differences, especially in two categories - "troops and bombs," according to John Pike, founder of the Virginia-based military think-tank GlobalSecurity.org.

The invading forces seized Iraq with about 130,000 troops, roughly a third of those involved in the Gulf War of 1991. Then, about half of 34 coalition members contributed at least token forces; in this year's war the only visible uniforms were American, British and Australian, although Washington said the coalition numbered 30 countries.

In Desert Storm, allied forces hammered the Iraqis with air strikes for 40 days, then wrapped it up with a 100-hour ground war. In 2003, the strategy was ground and air attack in simultaneous symphony.

This time, the United States dropped only about a tenth of the bomb tonnage of 12 years ago. But virtually all was "precision-guided" - the same amount of high-tech munitions used the first time around.

Given the improved accuracy and availability of such weapons, there was no need for less reliable "dumb bombs" that constituted the other 90 percent of the air-delivered ordnance in 1991, Pike said.

Military casualties on the allied side were roughly comparable in raw numbers - 148 U.S. killed in Desert Storm and 139 to date in Iraq - but much higher per capita in Iraq, due to the smaller overall force.

"Friendly fire" casualties, 35 U.S. and 24 British, were a serious problem in Desert Storm. They were far fewer in Iraq, despite the Pentagon's cancellation, for budgetary reasons, of a battlefield "fratricide prevention" system that was being developed in recent years.

The most glaring incidents of "blue on blue" in Iraq were the mistaken shootdowns of a British Tornado fighter, killing two airmen, and an U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornet by American Patriot anti-aircraft batteries. Both incidents are still under investigation by U.S. officials. Three other British soldiers and one U.S. Marine were the only other reported "friendly fire" casualties.

"The presence of fewer troops meant less opportunity for forces to be crossing each other's lines or friendly and enemy tanks mixing," Pike said. "The flip side of that is the utterly bewildering shootdown of the two planes by Patriot missiles."

Originally designed as an anti-aircraft missile, the Patriot was pressed into service against Iraqi Scud missiles in 1991, with spotty results. Reprogrammed since for greater targeting efficiency, Patriots knocked down several missiles during the recent war.

"In 25 years, the only two aircraft ever shot down by Patriots were friendly. That's weird," Pike said.

No "official" figures exist for Iraqi casualties - military or civilian - in either war. Estimates, apparently based mainly on anecdotal and news media reports, ranged widely in Desert Storm from 60,000 to 160,000 Iraqi soldiers killed and as many as 300,000 wounded.

U.S. Central Command has not estimated Iraqi battle deaths in the recent war. "There are multiple reasons for them not doing that, the most obvious one being that the military used the body count in Vietnam and have been allergic to it every since," Pike said.

Most of those killed were probably members of the five Republican Guard divisions deployed to defend Baghdad, but pummeled by allied aircraft whenever they tried to move in the open.

The cluster bombs used in these attacks "leave body parts, not corpses," Pike said.

The only way to get an accurate figure would be to compare the prewar rosters or paperwork with those who deserted or otherwise survived the attacks. he added.

The most politically sensitive issue in both wars, civilian casualties, is also one for which figures may be least reliable.

Estimated Iraqi civilian deaths in the latest war range between 2,100 and 2,600, according to a private web site that claims to keep track. Pike said there was no way to be sure, but "that number does not sound obviously wrong."

Reported civilian deaths during Desert Storm were "at least at that, if not much higher," he said. One figure cited by the Iraqi government then was 30,000 dead, but only hundreds were claimed to have been killed in the two highest profile incidents of errant U.S. bombs in Baghdad.

Both wars were heavily one-sided in the allied coalition's favor. Iraq's Soviet-built armor, reduced nearly by half during Desert Storm and vastly outclassed by newer allied tanks, were sitting ducks for U.S. air and ground forces. Its once potent air force of aging French and Soviet combat planes mounted no serious challenge to allied forces in 1991, and this time did not dare to fly.


Copyright © 2003, Associated Press