U.S. News & World Report April 07, 2003
Pressing The Fight
Despite stiff Iraqi resistance, U.S. and British troops are poised for the assault on Baghdad
By Mark Mazzetti; Kevin Whitelaw; Christopher Anderson; Julian E. Barnes; Bay Fang; Jeff Glasser; Elaine M. Grossman; Mark Mazzetti; Joellen Perry; Kit R. Roane; Richard J. Newman; Thomas Omestad; Kenneth T. Walsh
DATELINE: 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq; 101st Airborne Division in Iraq; Northern Iraq; U.S. Central Command in Qatar; Central Command's Combined Force Land Component Command in Kuwait; 1st Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters in Iraq; USS Constellation; Central Iraq; Washington
It was a risky call, perhaps riskier than everyone was comfortable with. In the midst of a blinding sandstorm in central Iraq, Lt. Gen. James Conway's battle staff debated whether to send armored columns of U.S. marines from Conway's 1st Marine Expeditionary Force on a daylong push north through sand-choked air toward a reinforced division of Iraq's Republican Guard. The Cobra attack helicopters were grounded, so the marines would have little air cover. If they encountered heavy fighting, they would be sitting ducks. Conway's staff decided, with his approval, that they could use their infrared technology to push ahead. The marines could have waited for the weather to clear, but that would have meant losing momentum--the death knell for a military plan based on relentless speed.
The advance was slow, but the marines punched through, and, this time, the gamble worked. Like the Army forces to their west, the marines could rest, resupply, and steel themselves for the massive tank battles that may prove the most decisive test of a campaign that suddenly seems more difficult than it looked during the early race across the empty desert. If the battle with the Republican Guard is swift and decisive, that would open the way to Baghdad and, perhaps, an early end to the war. If not, U.S. troops could be battling in the desert heat for weeks, even months, as they retool their strategy and wait for reinforcements.
The premium Pentagon war planners have placed on speed carries with it risk--a risk that has already been measured in blood. So urgent was the Pentagon's desire to reach Baghdad that it ordered commanders to spend little time securing the cities its troops moved through. Unsurprisingly, the outgunned Iraqis adopted the only tactics available to them--exploiting unprotected flanks and pinning down supply convoys with rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire. Many of the Iraqi forces have fought ferociously. "The guerrilla fighting will be intense until Saddam is gone," says one Marine commander, underlining the original rationale for a swift assault on Baghdad. "Nobody is going to rise up till they are sure Saddam is dead, because the last time they did, many were slaughtered."
These guerrilla attacks, led by Saddam's Fedayeen militia, succeeded in slowing the U.S. advance. "It's a force protection issue," notes one defense official. War planners have already had to alter campaign plans to address the heavier than expected resistance in the south. U.S. and British troops got caught up in fierce battles in southern towns like Basra and An Najaf that they had originally planned to avoid entering. A suicide car bomber Saturday in An Najaf killed four soldiers at an Army checkpoint in an attack that was immediately praised on Iraqi television. After 10 days of war, more than 40 Americans are dead, while the British report that more than 20 of their soldiers have been killed. As the intensity of resistance became clear, Pentagon officials ordered more troops to the region; more than 100,000 will arrive in the next few weeks.
A handful of successful ambushes, broadcast widely on Iraqi and Arab television, provided an enormous morale boost for Saddam's beleaguered regime. And it took little more than gruesome photos of U.S. POWs and chilling live footage of troops in urban gun battles to remind a nation about the horrors of armed conflict it has spent three decades trying to forget.
To be sure, the small-scale attacks are more of a nuisance than a strategic defeat. None of Iraq's regular Army divisions have stood their ground. The lead U.S. Army and Marine units covered some 250 miles in about five days on their way toward Baghdad. "When you take a step back, we've had an enormous accomplishment--now we're preparing the Republican Guard for the kill," says Richard Russell, a former CIA political-military analyst now at the National Defense University. "It gets lost in this minute-by-minute tactical preoccupation with these hit-and-run attacks."
Soldiers are not the only ones under fire. Top Bush administration officials took up defensive positions after being barraged with questions about their early, optimistic predictions. Just days before the war started, for instance, Vice President Dick Cheney said, "The read we get on the people of Iraq is that there's no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein, and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that." A week into the war, just as the generals began reworking their battle plans, administration officials tried recalibrating their message while Americans seemed to be steeling themselves for more bad news. For now, political support for the war is holding firm, and Bush remains confident of a successful outcome.
Behind the scenes, however, a new whispering campaign has begun, suggesting that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top aides may have been too willing to believe their own optimistic scenarios. What would have happened, some wondered, had Rumsfeld gotten his way? The original war plan Rumsfeld touted envisioned a much smaller force to take down a regime he expected to collapse in short order. Gen. Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, successfully pushed for a larger force. The final plan, says a senior U.S. official, was "a compromise--Franks didn't get everything he wanted, and Rumsfeld, thank God, didn't get everything he wanted." Some officials estimate that as many as 50,000 more troops are needed now simply to protect rear areas and supply convoys.
For their part, ground commanders were never as sanguine as Pentagon civilians and some neoconservative pundits that Saddam's regime would crumble at the first shot. In fact, CIA analysts had warned specifically that Iraq was likely to use guerrilla tactics such as fake surrenders and soldiers in civilian garb. Moreover, the commanders knew that moving thousands of troops over hundreds of miles has a built-in drag factor that would at times slow the campaign's momentum. Still, dozens of war games never predicted the enemy that is now arrayed against them.
For the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne Division, the stronger than expected resistance has forced commanders to throw out much of their original playbook. Instead of attacking deep to the north, the 101st has shown it will attack Republican Guard factions squaring off against the 3rd Infantry Division and will also probably take on the paramilitaries attacking U.S. supply lines. "You never know how the enemy is going to fight," says Lt. Col. Rodney McCants. "The smart thing to do is to take care of those groups before you extend communications and supply lines further."
Their first mission was mostly a success as Apache Longbow helicopters took on Republican Guard troops 50 miles south of Baghdad, killing several tanks and armored personnel carriers. But they also lost two helicopters to a dust storm brownout, although the crew escaped.
The air war has also proceeded a little more slowly than expected. In advance of the fights against the Republican Guard, airstrikes have been pounding frontline Iraqi units for days. As the columns of U.S. troops press north, the focus of airstrikes has shifted away from command-and-control hubs in Baghdad toward attacks on the Republican Guard divisions guarding the major arteries into the capital. "We take large formations and whittle them down to bite-size pieces," says Lt. Col. David Pere, senior watch officer for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.
Degrading. At first, the airstrikes had only limited effect, as Iraqi units hunkered down in "dispersal positions" to evade their attackers. Republican Guard units spread out their tanks and armored vehicles, hid them in revetments, and poured sand over their equipment to make it more difficult to detect from the air.
After six days of bombing, air commanders switched tactics. Instead of spreading airstrikes across all units, they decided to begin cutting down the Republican Guard's firepower one division at a time. B-52s also began pounding their positions with gravity bombs. For his part, Saddam opted for his own change of tactics, deploying his Republican Guard forces south and straight into the teeth of the U.S. advance. By week's end, coalition military officials said that its top priority target, the Medina Division north of Karbala, had finally been reduced to 60 percent of its combat strength. But other divisions had been degraded by only 20 percent to 25 percent, not yet the 50 percent level, the typical objective before launching a ground assault. More broadly, U.S. bombing has disrupted the Republican Guard's command and control, but the units are still able to communicate and stage counterattacks.
With the impending assault on Baghdad, airstrikes have also begun targeting the intricate network of air defenses--so-called missile engagement zones, or MEZs, throughout the capital city. These zones provide a blanket of protection for some of the Republican Guard units defending the outskirts of Baghdad, and war planners fear that U.S. jets may come under intense fire while providing close air support to troops engaging the Republican Guard. Senior planners say the ground attack can't begin until the MEZs are taken down.
Air commanders were at first hesitant to hit some air-defense targets, fearing that their location in residential areas might put Iraqi civilians in danger. Pilots aboard the USS Constellation speak of the difficulty of hitting targets in tight urban spaces, where friend and foe mix intimately. Often, the armaments strapped to their fuselages are not appropriate for the delicacy of the operation--"like swatting a fly with a sledgehammer," says Capt. Guy Ravey, an F-18 Hornet pilot aboard the Constellation.
As in the first Gulf War, defense officials have proudly displayed video images of successful strikes by precision weapons. But much of what the world sees is the civilian damage that can be caused by an errant bomb or an Iraqi misfire of its air defenses--and it is often impossible to know immediately which is to blame. Case in point: Iraqi officials quickly condemned two strikes in Baghdad on consecutive days that hit civilian areas, including one massive blast at a marketplace that killed as many as 58 people. U.S. officials suggest that Baghdad's own errant missiles were at fault but said they were investigating.
Whatever the cause, the incidents are another reminder of the difficulty of conducting an antiseptic campaign against a regime that is using the dense urban environment as its prime defense. Most military officials continue to insist that avoiding civilian casualties must remain the top priority. But some planners warn that it will have to get worse before it gets better. "At some point, you need to make hard decisions," says one military official. "The criticality of ending this outweighs worries about collateral damage."
Throughout the south, U.S. troops confronted this dilemma after their supply lines became threatened by Iraqi paramilitary outfits who began engaging U.S. forces using tactics termed "blue-collar warfare" by one commander. "The only way we can tell who these guys are is they're usually clean shaven, don't smell, and wear new black boots," says Cpl. Qualesi Hernandez, 26, of Puerto Rico, "and that they won't look at you in the eye." In An Nasiriyah, some U.S. marines turned street corners only to stare directly into the barrel of Iraqi tanks half-buried in the earth.
Marines holding two critical bridges at An Nasiriyah endured relentless gun battles as waves of Saddam loyalists emerged from buildings and hospitals, often pushing young children out in advance of their attack. The militiamen would then spray bullets wildly in every direction. "Five feet to the left was no safer than 5 feet to the right," says Cpl. Bret Woolhether, a marine who took shrapnel in the arm in An Nasiriyah. At a makeshift hospital in the desert known as Camp Viper, veterans of the first Gulf War say the fighting was never this bad the first time around. "Nasiriyah was supposed to be a six-hour fight," says Gunnery Sgt. Tracy Hale, who was also injured. "It's already been five days. Five days of nonstop, 24-hour fighting. It was something you don't ever want to go through."
Saddam's most loyal forces weren't supposed to have been so established in the southern territory; yet as U.S. and British troops moved through desert towns, they reported thousands of Fedayeen, Baath Party, and Al Quds militia massing to thwart their advance. "They'll shoot at our marines, then jump into vehicles with women and children," says Lt. Col. John Miranda at Marine Combat Headquarters. "They're challenging us to take a shot at them." Top officials now believe that even Republican Guard officers have joined the southern fight, organizing the paramilitary forces and then melting back into the landscape once the fighting became intense. U.S. forces are targeting leadership locations--and leaders themselves--in hopes of cracking the regime. Says one Marine commander: "And as long as there is Saddam, the irregulars will keep on fighting."
For the Americans, it means treating every Iraqi civilian as a potential threat. "There's a blurring effect" between the friendly and hostile Iraqis, says one intelligence officer.
Collapse? With time, however, U.S. troops have grown to understand their enemy and adapt to the landscape of a guerrilla battle. Captured Iraqis have begun providing valuable intelligence about the movements of the paramilitary units, intelligence that is now being translated into offensive operations. On March 27, an Iraqi soldier captured by U.S. forces told of a gathering of Iraqi forces at a racetrack in Ad Diwaniyah. The Army sent up a Hunter drone to verify the information, and minutes later Air Force A-10s and Army artillery were raining fire on roughly 500 Iraqi fighters assembled at the racetrack.
With U.S. troops now eyeing Baghdad, there are growing fears that the apparent success of Iraq's guerrilla tactics could spur the regime to put up an even tougher, nastier fight there. Many top military leaders had hoped that the decisive rout of the Republican Guard they anticipated would crush the regime's spirit and that Saddam's feared security forces would melt away. "The apparent success of the guerrillas will probably make it harder to get that kind of psychological collapse in Baghdad," says Kenneth Pollack, an Iraq analyst at the CIA during the first Gulf War.
Many U.S. commanders are keeping a wary eye on the fierce firefights between Saddam's militias and British forces in Basra, battles that might foreshadow the fight for Baghdad. After initially camping out on the outskirts of the city, growing civil unrest and fears of a humanitarian crisis forced British troops to declare the city a military target. After several days of dicey raids, British forces watched one day as Iraqi paramilitaries in Basra fired mortars and machine guns on several thousand Iraqis who were trying to flee the city. The British troops returned fire and tried to evacuate the civilians. "The local regime in the city is still using fear as its principal instrument to keep the population in line," said one British commander, Maj. Lindsay MacDuff.
Protecting key roads like Route 80 from Kuwait City has often meant not just passive patrolling of the southern territory but offensive "snatch and grab" missions to cleanse cities like Az Zubayr of top Saddam loyalists. "If we don't seize that town, it will become uncontrollable, like the Wild West," says Maj. Steve McQueenie, a British operations officer. "This is our bread and butter."
Security blanket. It is a role the British have played before, in places like Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Bosnia. U.S. troops have less experience with these kinds of missions, while commanders are still haunted by bitter memories of deadly urban ambushes in Somalia. Such combat would mean that the gloves have to come off. One Marine commander is already telling his men that if it comes to that, "a fair fight is clubbing baby seals. If the Iraqi forces are in a building, we drop the building. We will not go room to room."
Such tactics, however, could backfire in a country that Washington has pledged to rebuild. Already, the Iraqis have not been as welcoming as expected. Much of this is continued fear of Saddam. But there is also a powerful mix of resentment at America for 12 years of sanctions and wounded pride at being invaded by Westerners. "You can deliver human assistance and clean water, but that's still not going to make them love you," says one senior State Department official. "You'd better have some real good plans to get things fixed and out quick." Many are also worried about more immediate problems in the aftermath. "When Saddam's regime falls, we will not have enough troops here to throw the kind of security blanket we want across Iraq to assure the population there won't be any retribution and that there won't be chaos," says Pollack. More U.S. troops are now on the way, but it will be at least a month before they start arriving in Iraq in large numbers.
Still, U.S. forces have to get to Baghdad first. And with that distance closing, the threat of chemical weapons looms larger. Based on intelligence assessments, U.S. commanders built in "trigger points" to the war plan, places along the way they believed Saddam might order a chemical attack. Two such points--U.S. forces crossing into Iraq and troops crossing the Euphrates--failed to prompt a gas attack. Now, with an invasion force with bulky chemical suits set to engage Republican Guard units, the generals fear the trigger may be pulled. According to coalition intelligence sources at Camp Doha, Kuwait, late last week, Iraq's use of chemical weapons as troops advance on Baghdad is now "assessed as likely."
The View from Baghdad
This satellite image of the Iraqi capital was taken last Thursday after the severe sandstorms from the week subsided. Details of the image show damage caused by U.S. bombing attacks. In addition, oil fires set to defend the city are visible.
[Picture is not available]
[Labels]
Oil fires
Area around Ministry of Planning
Council Of Ministers
Area within presidential palace compound
Tigris River
Credit: DigitalGlobe
BATTLING IRAQI ARMOR
When U.S. forces confront Iraqi armored divisions, they will bring a wide variety of tactics and hardware to the battlefield. One classic tactic is to punch through enemy lines, and then turn and attack from the rear. But even before the battle, the Army may rely on air power to destroy as many Iraqi tanks and fighting vehicles as possible.
HIGH FLIERS (U.S.)
Forward air controllers, either on the ground or in A-10s or F-16s, will locate and identify targets, cueing exact coordinates to bombers at higher altitudes. High-flying B-1Bs can drop laser-guided bombs or GPS-guided munitions on targets. F-15s or F/A-18s may drop up to 2,000-pound bombs, laser guided to their targets by ground controllers. Observation helicopters, spotters, and video from unmanned aerial vehicles give U.S. commanders a full view of enemy forces.
M1-A1 (U.S.)
The Abrams Main Battle Tank has a quiet engine and a road speed of 45 mph. Its thermal-imaging sights and a laser range finder allow its gunner to detect enemy tanks and score hits at more than 2 miles, day and night. A battlefield intelligence system allows the tank commander to see, on a small screen, the location of friendly and enemy forces.
JOINT STARS (U.S.)
Joint STARS (Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) is the force's eye in the sky. Based in a modified Boeing 707, it sees behind enemy lines with a range of more than 150 miles. Its two modes of radar operation provide target information to ground and air forces in all weather conditions, giving commanders a real-time picture of the entire battlefield.
A-10 Thunderbolt (U.S.)
Flying slow and low, it kills tanks with its Gatling gun and missiles.
FIELDS OF FIRE (Iraqi)
Defensive weapons fire comes from different angles, covering the approaches to the battlefield.
Sandbagged gun position (Iraqi)
Iraqi tanks behind berms
Iraqi artillery
Wire fence (Iraqi)
Antitank trench (Iraqi)
Mines (Iraqi)
HOWITZERS (U.S.)
By employing counterfire radar, howitzers can detect incoming enemy artillery and fire shells accurately back at the source.
BRADLEY AND TOWs (U.S.)
Even the lightly armed Bradley fighting vehicle can take on an enemy tank if the Bradley is armed, as many are, with TOW antitank missiles.
MLRS (U.S.)
The Multiple Launch Rocket System can fire 12 rockets in less than a minute, at more than 19 miles. The rounds may carry antitank charges, antiarmor mines, or antipersonnel munitions.
CAMOUFLAGE TACTICS (Iraqi)
Practicing desert guerrilla warfare, Iraqi tanks and guns will do more than camouflage themselves behind revetments. They may hide in civilian areas, in sheds, among trees and under tarps until the last second when they emerge and fire.
MANEUVER WARFARE (U.S.)
U.S. forces are taught to move fast and exploit advantages. Tanks may punch through lines and roll up the enemy from behind.
APACHE HELICOPTERS (U.S.)
Artillery destroys enemy air defenses to provide a safe passage for the powerful, but sometimes vulnerable, attack choppers. One of the Army's most effective antitank weapons, the Apache can spot enemy tanks in the day or at night. It is armed with rockets, a 30mm chain gun, and laser-guided missiles. A narrow profile makes it hard to hit.
[Labels]
Howitzers (U.S.)
Bradleys (U.S.)
M1-A1 Abrams (U.S.)
Mine-clearing tanks (U.S.)
Mines (Iraqi)
MLRS (U.S.)
Humvees (U.S.)
Scout (U.S.)
Antitank trench (Iraqi)
Apaches (U.S.)
Iraqi artillery
Wire fence (Iraqi)
Iraqi tanks behind berms (Iraqi)
Jdam Guided Bomb (U.S.)
Sources: Col. Richard Dunn (Ret.); GlobalSecurity.org.; Jane's Modern Tanks; staff reporting
Graphic by Stephen Rountree--USN&WR
THE LONG MARCH TO BAGHDAD
U.S. Army and Marine forces heading for the Iraqi capital are maneuvering for battle against Iraq's elite Republican Guard divisions, six of which guard Baghdad or its approaches. Some Iraqi units are dug into defensive positions, but others are on the move. As American ground units paused to consolidate forces and resupply, the Iraqis were being pounded from the air.
Republican Guard armored divisions form a ring around Baghdad, with one division, the Special Republican Guard, stationed in the city. Well equipped and loyal to Saddam Hussein, they are expected to fight hard to protect the capital.
3rd Infantry and marines have driven at a lightning pace to the outskirts of Baghdad, but they must still deploy forces to the rear to protect their long supply lines. Some believe they should wait for reinforcements; others favor a quick and bold attack.
[Labels]
Euphrates River
Tigris River
Special Republican Guard (Iraqi)
Hammurabi (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
Baghdad
101st Airborne (U.S. - exact location unavailable)
Al Nida (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
Adnan (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
Medina (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
Karbala (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
Baghdad Division (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
Al Kut (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
An Najaf (Iraqi Republican Guard Division)
1st Marine Expeditionary Force (U.S.)
U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division
101st Airborne (U.S.)
Sources: Reporting by Department of Defense; staff reports
Rob Cady--USN&WR
Inset Map of Iraq
[Map is not available]
[LABELS]
Iraq
Turkey
Syria
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Mosul
Arbil
Kirkuk
Tikrit
Samarra
Baghdad
Karbala
An Najaf
Al Kut
An Nasiriyah
Basra
Umm Qasr
Northern front: Paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade took control of Harir airfield, opening the way for U.S. forces to form a northern front.
Basra: Besieged by British forces, Iraqi units control the city but pose little threat to the goal of taking Baghdad.
Tallil airfield: Taken by U.S. forces, along with an airfield at nearby Jalibah, it forms a logistics base for moving supplies forward.
(Shaded area) Areas not controlled by Saddam Hussein
USNEWS.COM
The conflict with Iraq: Exclusive frontline reports from U.S. News
With U.S. ground forces
At U.S. Central Command in Qatar
In northern Iraq
Aboard the USS Constellation
www.usnews.com/iraq
GRAPHIC: Picture, HOLDING THEIR GROUND. A U.S marine barks orders to his troops as a convoy comes under attack during a sandstorm. (OLEG POPOV--REUTERS); Pictures: WAR'S TOLL. As a convoy rolls past, Marine 1st Lt. Harry Thompson of Downingtown, Pa., covers the body of a fellow marine after a fight near the town of An Nasiriyah. Above, special forces vehicles on a night mission. (HAYNE PALMOUR--NORTH COUNTY TIMES / GAMMA; CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON--VII FOR USN&WR); Pictures: BAGHDAD. Iraqi authorities search along a riverbank for a possibly downed U.S. pilot. At right, a woman learns that her brother is among the civilian casualties from an explosion said to be caused by an American bomb. (SUNGSU CHO--GAMMA; BRUNO STEVENS--COSMOS / AURORA); Picture, The View From Baghdad (DigitalGlobe); Drawing, Battling Iraqi Armor (Col. Richard Dunn, retired, GlobalSecurity.org, Jane's Modern Tanks; Stephen Rountree--USN&WR); Map, Long March To Baghdad, with inset map of Iraq (Reporting by Department of Defense; staff reports; Rob Cady-USN&WR); Pictures: FACE TO FACE. U.S. Marine Corps units rolling north. At right, a British soldier tries to maintain order as Iraqis swarm around a truck delivering badly needed food and water to the border town of Safwan. (OLEG POPOV--REUTERS; DAVID BUTOW--CORBIS SABA FOR USN&WR); Picture, DEATH. A clash between Iraqis and the Army's 3rd Infantry Division left a battlefield littered with bodies. CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON--VII FOR USN≀ Picture, RELIEF. A prisoner is offered a smoke by an American serviceman. Many Iraqis said they were forced to fight. (CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON--VII FOR USN&WR); Picture, THE WAITING GAME. Tank soldiers from the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division take a break, and even catch some sleep, as they wait out a sandstorm in central Iraq. (CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON--VII FOR USN&WR)
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